Financial Services Bill

Lord Sassoon Excerpts

Tuesday 10th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, this side of the House has already acknowledged the role of competition in serving the consumer. Indeed, we could do with rather more of it in the retail banking sector. A rather more creative vision of competition could address some of our concerns in that regard. For example, Age UK has suggested shared branches which offer a perfectly competitive environment, ease of comparison, and switching from one customer to another within the same location. We are wholly in favour of a competitive environment for the benefit of consumers.

That being so, I obviously support most of the amendments in this group. However, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Flight, why the first amendment is needed, given that it seems to put competition as a brake on the FCA. I worry what the driver is behind this. I hope it is not to protect bankers’ bonuses, given there are still some in the City who seem to believe that high wages and bonuses are a vital aspect of what makes the UK competitive in this sector. I would instead call on the coalition programme, which says the Government will bring forward detailed proposals for robust action to tackle unacceptable bonuses in the financial services sector. Amen to that, although I am rather sad that—I think it is today—the Chancellor of the Exchequer is in Brussels voting against such an amendment.

Or is the amendment drafted because there is a feeling that regulation is too burdensome? I hope it is not for that reason, but the Prime Minister has form in this regard. In 2008, he said he thought that the problem of the past decade was too much regulation. The current Chancellor also said, in 2006, that financial regulation was,

“burdensome, complex and makes cross-border market penetration more difficult … and it threatens the global competitiveness of the City of London”.

I hope that the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer are now grown up enough to accept that it was too little rather than too much regulation from which we suffered.

I hope it is not—maybe we can get some assurance on this—the idea that international competitiveness should trump consumer protection. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, was much more concerned about the wholesale market. I think she will also understand the concern of consumers that this might trump the consumer protection aspects. Although we very much want this to be an internationally competitive industry, we do not want it at any price. We do not want a race to the bottom for moving wherever regulation is cheapest or less obvious.

In respect of Amendment 104A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I know that Martin Wheatley, the CEO designate of the FCA, is very unkeen to have this duty. He does not think that in its intervention it is the function of a regulator to have to have regard to that as well as to consumer protection, and is concerned that it would create a set of conflicts. He said that,

“to have a specific UK competitiveness competition point can only lead to compromises in regulation”.

Perhaps the Minister can indicate whether the Government have the same concerns. Perhaps the “no regard” comment of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is a better way of describing this, rather than making it trump some of the other aspects. I imagine the Minister will say something similar, because I know the Government, in responding to the Treasury Select Committee on this issue, while recognising the importance of a competitive sector, do not feel that these words would add much to the Bill.

Amendment 129 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, is rather easier. It requires the PRA to consider the desirability of promoting the UK’s competitive position within financial services. We have no argument with that. London First I know is particularly supportive of this, stressing also the stability of regulation in financial services, which means no more change after this.

Amendment 110 in the name of my noble friend Lord McFall refines the FCA’s objective so that the integrity of the UK’s financial system includes the confidence that it generates within the UK, as well as in foreign financial markets. This would encompass consumer confidence, which would clearly be vital in rebuilding trust in savings and investment, so we are happy to support this amendment.

Finally, Amendment 139A in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and my noble friends Lord McFall and Lady Cohen of Pimlico provides that the objectives of both the PRA and the FCA should include consideration of the capacity of the sector to contribute to the UK’s economic growth, also supported by the CBI. As the coalition programme said:

“We want the banking system to serve business, not the other way round. We will bring forward detailed proposals to … create a more competitive banking industry”.

I am pleased to say that this is one element of the coalition programme that, again, we are very happy to endorse. Given that, sadly, growth continues to flatline under this Government, if ever there was a time to ensure that these new and powerful institutions focused on job creation, this surely is it, and we happily support that.

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

My Lords, this group of amendments seeks to ensure that the FCA and the PRA consider the impact that their actions could have on the competitiveness of the UK financial services sector or on the growth of the wider economy. We clearly all recognise the importance of a thriving financial services sector to the wider UK economy. Equally, we all agree that the financial services sector needs an appropriate level of regulation, and I recognise that this is a difficult balance to achieve. I hope we would all agree that in the run-up to the financial crisis this balance was wrong.

In resolving the balance, I listened very carefully to the concerns raised at Second Reading and I have also carefully considered the representations from the industry, including from the London Stock Exchange. I am going to explain why I feel that these amendments go too far, but I want to make it clear to the Committee that we are looking at alternative options to address noble Lords’ concerns that excessive regulatory action may unduly impact on the ability of the financial services sector to contribute towards the prosperity of the wider economy, and we will conclude on this ahead of Report. I see one puzzled face. I always try to be helpful to the Committee, and we brought forward some major concessions on each of the first two days. This is a very difficult area. I cannot accommodate all the concerns but I say up front that we want to see what we can do on this ahead of Report.

As these are important amendments, I shall try to do justice to them by talking through each of them relatively briefly. First, Amendment 104A, in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, would require the FCA to have regard to the same competitiveness principle as the FSA is currently required to do. The FSA’s report into the failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland made it clear that this competitiveness principle severely impacted on its ability appropriately to regulate the financial services sector. I have said this before but I hope that the Committee will understand why we cannot similarly constrain the FCA, and for this principal reason I am unable to accept this amendment.

Amendment 101A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Flight, would go further by requiring the FCA to carry out its general functions in a way that did not harm the competitive position of the UK financial services markets. As identified by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, this would operate as a brake on the FCA’s actions—along similar lines to the economic growth brake on the FPC, which we have already discussed. It would prevent the FCA from taking any action if that action could be seen as damaging to the UK’s competitiveness. I have already raised the negative impact of the FSA’s competitiveness “have regard”, so it would be impossible to accept an amendment that went even further in preventing the FCA from taking regulatory action to protect consumers, enhance competition and ensure integrity.

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[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I think the noble Lord, Lord Turner, and other noble Lords have made the point about how often this particular definition of risk and reward did not align with the interests of consumers, or, indeed, often with employing organisations. There is nothing wrong with rewarding risk, but when that is not aligned to other people’s interests, that is to the detriment.

[Lord Sassoon]

I completely agree, which is why we only very recently brought forward proposals including mandatory shareholder votes on board pay. There is, and will continue to be, a big agenda here on which this Government have been working very actively but which the European Parliament proposal would, I suggest, work against. That is why we are fighting hard in Europe, as we do on all matters, to get a result that is more desirable for the health of our industry.

I will just say a few words about Amendment 139A, which is another very important one. It would require both the PRA and FCA to consider the impact on the financial sector’s ability to contribute to the UK economy in the medium or long term, having regard to the principle of proportionality. The PRA and FCA must consider whether their actions are proportionate. That will act as a check on the FCA acting in a way that is excessively burdensome, which would prevent a subsequent negative impact on economic growth if there was not a greater benefit from taking the action. Similarly, if the PRA is being proportionate, it would be difficult to envisage a situation where the firms that it supervises could be required to be too safe or too sound.

I have listened to the valid points made by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lady Kramer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cohen of Pimlico, and I understand their concerns. It is essential that the UK financial services sector is not excessively constrained in its ability to contribute to economic growth. As I said at the beginning, in advance of Report, I will consider whether a more explicit consideration of the wider economic impact of the actions of the regulators should be included in the Bill. I should stress that in making changes there must be nothing that would seriously encroach on the regulators’ ability to take the action that may be necessary in furtherance of their objectives. Particularly in the light of that assurance I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Flight]

For the sake of clarity I thought the point that I was making regarding the FCA was that domestic competition is what matters for the consumer. The international institutional aspects which the FCA regulates are quite substantial.

The area that has been the real problem in the PRA and which has brought disgrace on the UK has been the banking sector, which has been largely the result of a cartel. That cartel was the result of regulation. Following Barings, it was made clear that the lender of last resort facilities were available only for banks judged otherwise too big to fail. Lots of lesser banks, such as Hambros, found that they were uncompetitive, so they closed and went away. We were left with a cartel, and when you have a cartel bad things always happen. In terms of the PRA’s ability to regulate and oversee the banking system satisfactorily, it is blindingly obvious that the UK needs a great deal more competition. It is not the sole cure of everything but it is very necessary.

The Government have taken the point and there is no point in putting the amendment to a vote. I hope that they will take note particularly of the need for greater competition in the banking industry as part of the vehicle by which the PRA can regulate better. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I share many of the concerns raised in this debate. Access to financial services and access to lending for individuals and businesses are vital to our society. The question we have to ask is: who should be charged with tackling access issues? The FCA will be a conduct of business regulator with a clear objective concerned with creating the right conditions in which well functioning markets can meet the needs of consumers. Ultimately, the menu of products and services they offer to whom and at what price is a decision for firms themselves. The FCA is there to regulate the market, not to ensure that the market delivers a particular set of services or products.

Where the market fails to provide the services that consumers need, there may well be a case for intervention in the market to promote consumers’ access to financial services. The noble Baroness mentioned that issue in connection with the previous Government’s drive on basic bank accounts. That is rightly the province of government and action needs to be taken. However, I do believe that it is not a matter of regulation. It is a matter of social policy and it is therefore the responsibility of the Government. It is not the job of the FCA to prescribe that there should be universal provision and who should be required to deliver it. That is for the Government.

I will not detain the Committee with the great detail that I could go into of the actions we are taking to promote and extend access to financial services: to boost lending, particularly to small businesses; to nurture and encourage the mutual sector; and to help increase consumers’ capabilities and work with industry to make access to simple products possible. We have touched on some of these issues in considerable detail in the past. There are some areas which my noble friend Lord Sharkey specifically raised, such as bank charges. I draw his attention to the agreement we announced with the banks last November, under which the major personal customer account providers came forward with a new agreement to send text alerts when balances fall below a certain level, and to provide buffer zones and so on. The action there has been significant.

The provision of data is another area which has needed and continues to need attention. It has had some attention. Information is already regularly published concerning lending and the provision of loans and other services in deprived communities. For example, the banks that are members of the British lending task force have publicly committed to continue to publish subregional lending data on an annual basis through the BBA. I could point to a significant number of initiatives. These are things that the Government will continue to work on but they are outside the ambit of the Bill.

[Baroness Kramer]

Is the Minister aware of the mechanism that has been successful in the United States and how much that is tied to action by the regulator under the Community Reinvestment Act? It is the regulator that has driven that process forward, because only when conditions are met does it give permission for the banks to act in ways for which they need the regulator’s permission. Is he abandoning a tool that we know has been successful?

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[Lord Sassoon]

No, we are not abandoning a tool; partly because in this country, of course, we do not have the tool. However, I think it would be perfectly feasible for the Government, essentially as a matter of social policy, to decide on any number of actions that might require the regulators to play a part in implementing them. I do not believe that anything in the Bill would rule that out. That is quite different.

The American example shows that the right way to go is through a focused decision by the Government or a specific piece of legislation that tackles this issue, which may then impose responsibilities on the regulator. That is quite a different matter from giving the FCA a very general power to take on itself a responsibility that is rightly the responsibility of the Government.

It will not surprise the Committee if I say, in respect of Amendments 102, 118AA and 121, which seek to give the FCA this new deprived communities objective, that for the reasons I have given I do not think they are appropriate and I cannot support them.

Amendment 104AA also seeks to ensure that the FCA has regard to the issue of consumers’ ability to access affordable and appropriate products that meet their needs. It does that by seeking to add access to the list of matters to which the FCA must have regard in discharging its general functions. The “have regard” provisions that are currently listed there include only financial crime and the regulatory principles. That is why I cannot support the amendment. I cannot agree that the FCA should be required to have regard to something that it is not responsible for. This is the important distinction between financial crime, for which the FCA is responsible and which is listed in proposed new Section 1B, and access, which is not.

Amendments 108A and 108B seek to ensure that the FCA considers access when advancing its consumer protection objective by adding,

“the ease with which consumers can access regulated financial services that meet their needs”,

to the list of matters to which it must have regard in assessing what constitutes,

“an appropriate degree of protection for consumers”.

I have already set out why I cannot support these amendments, which seek to give the FCA a formal role in promoting access, but I will remind the Committee of the kind of considerations that the FCA will take into account when advancing its consumer protection objective to help consumers. The FCA must have regard to consumers’ differing experience and expertise and to their needs for timely, accurate and fit-for-purpose information. The FCA must therefore consider whether vulnerable or marginalised consumers engaging with financial services may need additional information, protection or support. The FCA’s consumer protection operational objective provides the mandate for the regulator to design a regulatory regime that delivers this.

Amendment 117A seeks to make sure that the FCA takes into account consumers’ ability to access financial services in advancing its effective competition objective. Again, I cannot accept this as I am absolutely clear that it is neither necessary nor appropriate for such a have regard provision to be added to the competition objective.

I turn to Amendment 118A. I have explained why I do not think it right to give the FCA an access mandate. Where there may be a case for action beyond the FCA’s objectives, this is a matter for government, but that does not mean that the Treasury should be able to direct the regulator on how it should interpret and indeed advance its objectives, as Amendment 118A seeks to provide. This would fundamentally go against the Government’s intention that the FCA should be an independent regulator and would, I suggest, blur the boundaries between regulatory and social policies. I also do not think it would be appropriate to have a power in statute, as proposed here, to allow the Treasury to give the FCA greater powers to act in an area that is rightly a matter for the Government to deliver, or indeed to give the Treasury the power to impose requirements directly on industry. We would be blurring the lines of responsibility. As I have explained, there is a lot we can do and are doing to advance some of these important social policy issues. If it came to legislation that impinged on the regulator’s prerogative, it is right that any powers in this area should be considered as part of that legislation and Parliament should consider the consequences for the regulator at that time.

Finally, Amendment 112A seeks to add “and products” to the regulated financial services for which the FCA will promote effective competition. I will briefly try to reassure the Committee that this amendment is not necessary. We agree that products are important. In fact, the focus on the design and governance of products will be one of the key ways in which the FCA will be different from the FSA. The Bill contains enhanced powers for the FCA to regulate products and I look forward to discussing in due course the new product intervention power, which is provided for in Clause 22. However, the outcome which this amendment seeks to deliver is already reflected in the Bill. A product in the context of financial services is ultimately an agreement under which one person agrees to provide a service of some kind to another person, so products are captured in the definition of “regulated financial services” as used in the Bill.

In summary, we are sympathetic to the aims of my noble friend’s amendment and to a wide range of the concerns that have come up in this debate. We are taking action on a significant number of fronts in this area. However, these are not matters for the financial regulator in the way that they have been drafted and I ask my noble friend to consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Sharkey]

I thank all those who have spoken in support of the amendments in my name or in support of their general intent. At the beginning of his response the Minister said that the FCA is a conduct of business regulator. I say to him that it is precisely the inadequate conduct of the banking businesses that we want the FCA to regulate. I note that in the Bill the FCA is already required to take account of the needs of different consumers. All the amendments do is make this more explicit and more directed. I am disappointed by what seems to me to be a very narrow perspective in the Minister’s response. I do not agree that responsibility for helping funding into deprived areas is not a matter for this Bill. I will withdraw my amendment but I will return to the matter on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, one of the reasons why the likes of Wonga charges high rates of interest is that its formula for doing business is mechanical. What is required in order to be able to offer proper rates of interest on small amounts of money to people who are not well off is trust, knowledge and community. That is what this sector sets out to provide. Armed with that, it is capable of giving a much better deal to borrowers without imperilling those who are lending money. It is a thoroughly worthwhile sector of the financial industry.

We need to ask the FCA not to promote it but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, says in her late revision, to enable it. The Government and regulation stand in the way. They give the big banks privileges which are not extended to small lenders. Some of them probably cannot be. I do not know that there is any way in which the £85,000 guarantee can be got down to these sorts of institutions. But they impose immense tax differentials so that you can end up not being able to offset losses if you have made them in community lending. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, says, you can end up not knowing as a financial adviser whether you are allowed to mention these sorts of investments. We need a financial regulatory structure that gets out of the way, levels the playing field and gives these businesses a fair opportunity.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, let me begin by saying that, as with the previous group, I wholeheartedly support the sentiment underpinning these amendments. The Government want markets which serve the wider economy, underpin growth and contribute to a more prosperous society as a whole. We want more proactive and judgment-based regulation, and we want the FCA to be tough and decisive in identifying and acting on bad practice in the financial services sector.

The Government have been very clear that they want social ventures to create positive change in our society and that to achieve this we need to make it easier for them to access the capital and advice they need. There is a growing social investment market which seeks to combine financial return with social impact. Investors are often willing to accept higher risk and a lower financial return because of the social value that their investment can make. However, as has also been noticed, the market is embryonic and needs support. The Government are committed to providing that support. In a moment, I will describe how we seek to do that. Before I do so, I will turn to some of the specific amendments to which noble Lords have spoken.

There are a number of reasons why I cannot support Amendments 104, 104ZA, 120, 137, and 139. First, where their intention is to promote social investment, that is simply not an appropriate role for the regulator. Although I agree with my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury that the Government need to act in support of the social investment sector, we will not create a healthy UK financial services market, including for social financial services, by giving the FCA the job of taking forward what should be and is part of the Government’s wider social policy agenda. Let me be clear: the FCA’s job should be to administer a regulatory regime, policing it so that consumers are appropriately protected, regardless of what they invest in, that there is effective competition, and that markets are clean and operate with integrity.

Secondly, where the intention behind the amendments is to—

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend, but he did make a provocative remark just now, I suspect without realising it. He said that I was asking in these amendments for the FCA to “take forward” the social investment market. That is not the case. These amendments are couched extremely carefully, and not in any proactive way. To take Amendment 104, they merely ask the FCA,

“so far as is compatible with acting”,

in accordance with “its operational objectives”, to take,

“account of the distinctive features of social investment”,

and not to inhibit the development of it. On no basis can that be characterised as asking the FCA to “take forward”. It is merely asking the FCA to note the particularities of this sector and not to impede it.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, we will have to disagree on the construction of some of the words here. Taking some of the amendments in the group, I appreciate that some of them are couched in the way in which my noble friend has just elaborated. However, for example, Amendment 103 inserts into new Section 1B(4) the words “and society” at the end of a very critical recital of what the FCA must do. It says it must,

“discharge its general functions in a way which promotes effective competition in the interests of consumers and society”.

I accept that it is all driven with an override,

“so far as is compatible with acting”,

in a way that advances the consumer protection objective, but it would add something which is tantamount to asking the FCA to be proactive in driving forward the social objective.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I am sorry. The hour is late, but that simply cannot be the construction. As I explained in my remarks, I could not support the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, because it said “promote”. The four that I have signed up to, and the only four, are the ones which are entirely neutral, and all they are is enabling. With the greatest respect to my noble friend, who has dealt with us with courtesy and kept smiling despite the most enormous amount of provocation, the fact of the matter is that a lot of what he is saying is about investor protection in conventional investments. We are not talking about conventional investments here; we are talking about social investments, where the parameters are entirely different. The Treasury will persist in seeing it as a profit-making type of investment, as opposed to a profit and a social return. It simply cannot get it into its head that this is a different type of investment. It keeps writing for my noble friend speaking notes that do not recognise that difference.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, one of the problems is that I am speaking here to a group of amendments. If we had longer or they were all degrouped, we could tease out one from another in more detail. I appreciate that some are more directive than others. However, perhaps I may move on to my second area of difficulty here. It probably will not help but I have a number of difficulties with this group of amendments.

Where the intention behind the amendments is to ensure proportionate regulation of this budding social investment sector, I reassure the Committee that the FCA will indeed take a proportionate and risk-based approach. Both regulators must take a proportionate approach to the regulation of small or socially orientated firms, particularly in comparison with large and complex banks.

My noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury referred to new Section 137R, which enables different rules to be made in relation to different authorised persons. I could also draw the Committee’s attention to new Section 1C(2)(a), which requires the FCA to have regard to the differing degrees of risk involved in different transactions. Another is new Section 3B(1)(b), which requires the FCA to have regard to the principle of proportionality. Therefore, I believe that there are appropriate layers of protection there without this series of amendments highlighting the social investment sector in the way that they seek to do.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords—

[Lord Sassoon]

Perhaps I may finish this part of the argument and then of course I will let my noble friend come in again. I believe that this proportionate approach that I have described will be vital in supporting effective competition, as well as helping the social sector, and the requirement to make regulation proportionately has to be an important tool in delivering that. However, equally, consumers have to be reassured that if they deposit money with, or buy financial products from, socially oriented financial institutions, they will be subject to the same level of protection and security as would be the case with any other institution. My noble friend may come back and say that that is not what the words actually say. He compared the activity of the big banks with the very well meaning institutions—which I accept they are—in this budding sector. Nevertheless, we have to be very clear and careful in making sure that those who deposit money are subject to the protection that they would expect, regardless of whom they transact with. I believe that in this area the Bill as currently drafted will deliver a proportionate balance for both regulated firms and consumers. I will continue to listen to the full range of arguments on this important issue and we will continue with important strands of work.

My noble friend Lady Kramer referred to the ability of financial advisers to advise on social investments as an asset class. I agree that this is a concern. That is why it is one of several regulatory issues that are currently being considered by the Cabinet Office review. Therefore, there are other avenues through which these issues are being actively considered, as they should be.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way. I am sorry to detain the Committee at this time of night but this is an important group. My noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts made one extremely telling intervention. I recognise what a difficult task my noble friend the Minister has in piloting this incredibly complicated measure through this place. He called in aid—reasonably, because I myself referred to it—new Section 137R, which is headed “General supplementary powers”. I quoted from the first part of that new section in what I said. My point, which I do not think my noble friend has taken account of, was, and remains, that unless there are some indicators in the first part of the Bill as to the considerations that are legitimate for the regulator to take into account, being naturally conservative, it will not take them into account. It will not differentiate. The wording in Amendment 103 therefore adds “and society” to the part of the new section that instructs FCA as to what it must do. That section says:

“The FCA must, so far as is compatible with acting in a way which advances the consumer protection objective or the integrity objective, discharge its general functions in a way which promotes effective competition in the interests of consumers”.

The Minister objects to the addition of the words “and society”. Surely we have learnt over the past three years that the objectives of consumer protection, integrity and competition depend on a financial sector that, in promoting competition, does not just take into account the interests of its customers but also of society at large. Society is what social investment is about. It slightly gives the Government’s game away for the Minister to argue as he did. I repeat that this important section that he referred to, which gives the FCA and the PRA the power to make rules, seems to cut off the prospect that he afterwards says is there; namely, the power to differentiate between different types of financial organisation, including the social financial organisations.

I am sure this is a discussion we perhaps had better have outside the Committee. It is late at night. I am only registering—I think I have some support in this—disappointment that the Government are not construing their own provisions in a way that seems consistent with how my noble friend started when he said they were wholly behind the development of the social finance sector.

[Lord Sassoon]

I will keep saying it and no doubt we will have to disagree on this. On the narrow point of new Section 137R, that is a power to make different provisions. However, the other relevant provisions that sit with it are duties. There is a duty to act proportionately and a duty to have regard to different degrees of risk. When it sets rules, the FCA will have to explain and justify those matters in the consultation processes it goes though. It cannot simply escape from this.

I will again directly address the points made my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury on Amendment 103. The same thing applies to Amendment 111. There are certain things that we can expect of the FCA and there are other things that would place entirely unrealistic expectations on it. When the FCA is assessing whether there is effective competition in a market, we can expect it to consider the needs of consumers and act on its assessment. However, the needs of society as a whole are another matter entirely. It is not, and cannot be, the responsibility of the FCA to consider, even in a passive way—which I agree is different here from the way that it is formulated in some of the other amendments—what the best outcome for society is at any given point. It simply does not have the mandate to do that. It would not have the expertise or the powers fully to act on its findings. This is not in any way to say that these are not important matters. It is simply that I contend, as with the previous group of amendments, that these are judgments not for the FCA but the Government. The Government will not shirk these judgments.

I have referred to a number of the initiatives that are going on and there are others that I could mention, such as the Treasury’s current review of financial barriers to social enterprise. Recommendations from that review will sit along with the community interest tax relief revisions that were announced at the Budget. There are multiple strands of work at the Treasury and the Cabinet Office that are aimed, among other things, at making it easier for investors to invest in community development finance institutions. Those must go on. They are not the proper province of the FCA.

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[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

The FSA currently has responsibility for one particular sector of the social enterprise movement—the industrial and provident societies. I suggest that the Minister asks his officials in the morning to ring the FSA and ask how many people are working in the industrial and provident society section. The answer is half.

[Lord Sassoon]

I am not quite sure what happens to the other half of this unfortunate person.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

They only work part time.

[Lord Sassoon]

I understand. I will check on that but I hear what my noble friend says. The FSA is under pressure in a lot of areas. I stress again that I do not mean to say that there are no barriers. I have explained the ways in which we are looking at them but this is a Bill about the regulatory structure. There are other avenues through which the structure of the industry is being looked at, not least through the Bill that will enact the Vickers reform. In the most fundamental ways we are prepared to take on the structure of the industry. It is just that we want to keep this Bill and this architecture to what it is intended to be, which is about financial regulation and not about wider social issues, however important they are, even though there is great interlinkage with what we are talking about in the Bill.

I should do justice to Amendment 109, which is the last one that I have not directly touched on. It is another amendment over which I have some concerns. It seeks to ensure that the FCA considers social responsibility in advancing its market integrity objective. Social responsibility sits rather oddly alongside the other matters listed in new Section 1D that elaborate on what is meant by integrity. All the matters in the non-exhaustive definition of integrity in that section have a clear expectation of action associated with them. The FCA will act to prevent or root out and punish activities such as insider dealing or other market misconduct and abuse as well as money laundering, terrorist finance and corruption; it will test the reliability and robustness of computers and wider systems and controls to see whether it can guarantee the operational soundness, stability and resilience of the system, its orderly operation and the transparency of the price-formation process. These are all concrete actions, critical to ensuring that the financial system is effective in meeting the needs of people who use it and is, I suggest, rather different from social responsibility which very much stands out from that list.

Before I let my noble friend come in again, I want to repeat that determining what social responsibility is and how it should be delivered is a matter for the Government.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am grateful to my noble friend for giving way and hope this will be my last intervention. In new Section 1D, the integrity of the UK financial system—which is of course crucial, because it is one of the FCA’s operational objectives—is said to include soundness, stability and resilience. In Amendment 109, I have suggested adding “and social responsibility”. The Minister asks what on earth social responsibility has to do with the FCA which is all about banking things such as stability and soundness and so on. My point is that we are dealing here with a financial sector that marches to a completely different drum. It is about social responsibility: that is its purpose. For that not to be an element in the section of the Bill which, in effect, defines integrity, first, does not face that reality, and, secondly, demeans it. Thirdly, I hark back to the matters which the two regulators have the duty to have regard to when making rules and so on. Lastly, I put it to the Minister that if we had social responsibility in this list, it would mean that in future the regulator could and indeed should look at, for example, mis-selling. Mis-selling is not a crime, it does not impact on the soundness, stability or resilience of the bank, but it is none the less a practice which I am sure he will agree has been powerfully damaging to all concerned. That phrase in this part of this section would, I believe, put the regulator on its mettle to look beyond the conventional issues and take account of the social impact of some of the practices of the banks.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I cannot agree with that construction of what is intended here. Mis-selling very clearly comes under new Section 1C, the consumer protection objective. We have, perhaps, teased out of this discussion that if we are talking about social responsibility in the sense that my noble friend intends and in the way he has described it, it is more linked to the consumer protection objective, rather than the integrity of the UK financial system. The difficulty may partly be in the different uses of “integrity”. We are not talking in new Section 1D about integrity in the direct sense of the behaviour of the individuals in the system. We are talking about the wholeness and stability and soundness of the financial system, which is why these particular factors are listed in Section 1D(2). They are linked to concrete actions that would be expected of the FCA, examples of which I have just given. We may be partly mixing up apples and pears here because I do not think that social responsibility fits into this clause of the Bill.

If my noble friend came back and tried to attach it to proposed new Section 1C, I would still argue that social responsibility is a matter for government. Social responsibility in the sense that he is talking about will go to the heart of what the Joint Committee will look at in response to the LIBOR scandal. The responsibility of the participants in the sector will be tackled in different ways.

I have tried to reassure the Committee—I can see that I may have given only partial reassurance—that the Government firmly believe that the financial industry should serve society. There is a big unfinished agenda and the Government will not shy away from driving it forward. The right way to do so is through different avenues but not through expecting the FCA to be responsible for these particular areas. I ask my noble friend to consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, while my noble friend is doing that, perhaps he will say something about the effect that Amendment 103 would have in a practical sense. If faced with the words “and society” at the end of the subsection, how would the FCA’s decisions be different? Under what kind of practical circumstances would it make a difference?

Financial Services Bill

Lord Sassoon Excerpts

Tuesday 10th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes]

I may be able to help the noble Lord, Lord Peston, with his last question. In two groups’ time, we will be discussing precisely the nature of the procedure that will accompany these new tools. The noble Lord might like to wait until then.

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

I am always grateful to my noble friend or anyone else who wants to take the heat on challenging questions. We will come back to the nature of orders.

On the question of what the experiment is here, the experiment that has failed is that of creating the FSA, and we now need to go back to putting the Bank of England at the heart of matters, which is what this is all about. I rather preferred the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, referring to a “project”, which he did at the end of his speech, rather than an “experiment”. It is indeed a major project.

To dispose of the not entirely relevant question about the Joint Committee on banking ethics and standards, the procedural Motion to set up that committee will be before us very shortly. There is not much more that I can usefully add. I do not think it is directly relevant to these amendments, but I am sure that that Motion will come forward very soon.

[Lord Peston]

It is directly relevant because the Minister has argued constantly that these are times of crisis and that we need to act quickly. He keeps arguing that and blaming the previous Government for the crisis rather than his own Government’s continued mistakes. It is therefore very relevant for us to know when this committee is going to be set up and who will be on it.

[Lord Sassoon]

I am sure that we will not have to wait for very long. I shall address what is more directly the subject of these amendments and the question about possible conflicts between the FPC and the MPC. While it is conceivable that the two committees might seemingly appear to be taking conflicting action, I do not actually believe that that is likely to be the case as each committee’s actions will be designed to address very different aspects of the economy and the financial system. That said, there are mechanisms in place to ensure that conflict does not arise. The committees will share information and briefing in order to aid co-ordination, and the Bill makes provision for joint meetings of the two policy committees if at any time that is required. The Bank has also said that it agrees with the Treasury Committee’s recommendation on this question and that the governor should consult the chairman of court if a conflict arises. It is unlikely, but the Bill makes provision through joint meetings and the consultation with the chairman of court.

I turn to the specifics of Amendments 54 and 55. These amendments seek to require the Treasury to consult the public before making any order which makes macroprudential tools available to the FPC. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that effective consultation on macroprudential tools is essential, but this amendment is not the best way to achieve it. The practice of public consultation on important matters of policy and legislation is now well established and is engrained in good government practice. My honourable friend the Financial Secretary said in another place:

“As a matter of course and as part of the usual statutory instrument process, I expect that the Treasury will consult on macro-prudential tools”.—[Official Report, Commons, 28/2/12; col.46.]

The Government have already committed to a consultation on their proposals for the FPC’s initial toolkit and will produce a draft statutory instrument as a part of that consultation. The Bill as currently drafted does not prevent the Treasury from consulting the public. The Government have already shown their willingness to consult on macroprudential tools and demonstrated their commitment to transparency by asking the interim FPC to make public recommendations regarding its tools.

I do not quibble with the term “public”. From what the noble Lord said, I suspect that he might have been expecting me to come back and say that this is not for the public, but for consultation with the industry. I accept the context in which he uses the word “public”. That is not my objection. It is good practice to do it. We are doing it. The FPC has been asked to make public its recommendations regarding tools. However, it may not always be appropriate to consult the public, which is why this requirement should not be in the legislation. Not all macroprudential orders will make large changes to the FPC’s direction powers. It is possible that some orders will contain only minor and technical changes and in this instance a three-month public consultation would be unnecessary. The previous Government rightly recognised the risks of undertaking full public consultation in cases where it is not necessary. Their own code of consultation listed seven criteria, one of which stated:

“Keeping the burden of consultation to a minimum is essential if consultations are to be effective and if consultees’ buy-in to the process is to be obtained”.

The Government have stated that they will, in compliance with the principles of good government, consult the public when material changes to the FPC’s direction powers are proposed and in non-urgent cases. I hope that that provides reassurance which the Committee seeks.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, while we are on this point and before the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, moves on to other elements, I am grateful for his clarification on this issue of consultation. I heard that we expect the Treasury to consult and there is nothing to prevent it consulting. I was seeking that the Treasury be required to consult.

Turning to the point which the noble Lord has just raised about the consultation criteria, which is enormously helpful, would it not be appropriate to write the criteria in to the conditionality with respect to when the Treasury should consult? Then we will not have simply an expectation or a desire and we will not be saying that there is nothing to prevent consultation. We will be saying that the Treasury should consult in all circumstances other than those specified under the consultation criteria. Would that not be helpful?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, of course that could be done, but I make the point again that it is now engrained in the principles of good government that there should normally be three months’ public consultation. There is a code of consultation that the previous Government put out. It sets it all out very clearly, including the point about burdens and so on that I read out. In its full richness, it cannot easily be drafted in legislation. Indeed, if we were going to do it in this Bill, I imagine there could be hundreds of other Bills in which it could be spelled out. I suggest that the Committee should not only take comfort from the standard governmental practice but from the fact that we have already indicated what we are going to do with the FPC toolkit. I believe we have covered it all and do not need to burden this Bill with a lot of detail any more than other Bills are burdened with it.

Amendment 57 seeks to provide that the reasons for making an order without consulting the FPC or the public be subject to scrutiny by the Treasury Select Committee. While I agree that accountability to Parliament will be important and the provisions within the Bill reflect that, I believe, as I have said on other occasions, that it is for parliamentary committees themselves to decide what they will scrutinise. I would expect the Treasury Committee to take a great interest in any circumstances where the Treasury felt it necessary to create a new macroprudential tool on an urgent and therefore possibly not-consulted basis.

I suggest to the Committee that it would be inappropriate for the Government to use primary legislation to force the Treasury Select Committee to scrutinise something. It must be a decision for the committee itself. The committee has already taken great interest in the interim FPC and I hope that this will continue. For those reasons I believe that Amendment 57 is neither appropriate nor necessary.

We then get to Amendment 58—I was going to say “the dangerous amendment”. It seeks to deal with what the noble Lord says is a potentially dangerous situation. He was entirely clear in his reasoning. The amendment seeks to remove the FPC’s ability to confer discretion on the PRA and the FCA as part of a direction.

[Lord Eatwell]

It removes the Treasury’s ability.

[Lord Sassoon]

The noble Lord says that it is the Treasury’s ability to confer discretion. Whoever’s ability to confer discretion it is—I am just turning back to the drafting of the amendment, which really means looking at the clause as well. I will do that as I speak. I believe it is the FPC’s ability to confer discretion, but whether it is the FPC or the Treasury, the purpose of the provision is to allow the direction-making entity to take advantage of the expertise of the PRA and the FCA. Indeed, the noble Lord is completely right. I have now checked the text and it is the Treasury. However, the point is the same. We need to take advantage of the expertise of the PRA and the FCA which hold the expert knowledge relating to the supervision of individual firms. This provision allows the Treasury to take advantage of that expertise in its directions. For example, if the direction required the PRA to require firms with large exposures to hold additional capital, it would be for the PRA to decide which firms had large exposures. That would be something for the supervisor—the regulator—to do. Therefore, I believe that the amendment would unnecessarily hamper the ability of the direction to have proper effect.

[Lord Eatwell]

Shall we deal with it as I go along? It would be easier for the Committee if we deal with Amendment 58.

There is a mistake here. The text of the Bill says that the Treasury may make an order which,

“may confer a discretion on … the FCA or the PRA”.

In other words, the Treasury has direct macroprudential tool access to the FCA or PRA, not via the FPC. Proposed new Section 9G(5) describes the correct procedure, in that a discretion that could be given to the PRA or the FCA comes via the FPC. In other words, it comes via the macroprudential authority—the institution that is responsible for macroprudential measures. The example given by the noble Lord is particularly pertinent in this case. If there were a requirement to increase the capital that is relative, let us say, to large exposures or to other risk-weighted measures, then that must be a decision of the FPC. I do not see how the Treasury could give that macroprudential role in any shape or form directly to the FCA or the PRA.

If the provision’s wording was that an order may confer a discretion on the Financial Policy Committee, which may then be transferred to the FCA or the PRA at the will of the Financial Policy Committee, the point that the noble Lord has just made about expertise would be entirely well taken. However, if we are to maintain the integrity of this experiment, or indeed project, then we must maintain the FPC as the focus for macroprudential regulatory management. That is why I referred to this element as dangerous, in the sense that it undermines that clear structure within the Bill.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, according to these provisions, when the Treasury specifies what macroprudential measures the FPC may exercise, the Treasury may, in relation to those macroprudential measures, confer functions on the regulator. It is intended that this is likely to be used for minor matters such as definitions. For example, the Treasury could provide that the FPC may impose additional capital requirements on exposures to residential property, and that the PRA, as the microregulator, would define the meaning of “residential property”.

There is, therefore, a web of interlocking provisions here, which I fear I did not do justice to in my first attempt to cut through this. Would it help the noble Lord if I take this one away, write to him and copy it to the other Members of the Committee who are here, to try to explain how these provisions will work together? I do not believe that there is any gap here, because it is ancillary to the basic directions that will come via the macroprudentials of the FPC. But there may be some ancillary matters, particularly definitional ones, where the expertise of the PRA or the FCA would be operative and for which we need therefore to keep this element and not to close this off in the way that Amendment 58 seeks to do. I will write to try to set that out more clearly. I am grateful to the noble Lord for that.

Amendment 61 would require the FPC to publish a policy statement within 10 days of a direction being made in relation to a measure made before the FPC had been able to issue a statement of policy under new Section 9L to be inserted into the Bank of England Act 1998 under Clause 3. Again, the Government agree that transparency and openness will be vital to ensure sufficient accountability for the FPC and the use of its tools. However, I believe that this amendment is not appropriate.

The Bill already provides that a policy statement is produced and maintained for each of the Bank’s macroprudential tools. This would also apply to those measures granted using the emergency procedure. However, if a situation were urgent, it would be counterproductive to require the FPC to wait until it has drafted and published a statement of policy before it could use that tool.

We would expect the FPC to produce a statement of policy for the tool as soon as reasonably practical afterwards, assuming that the tool remains in the FPC’s toolkit. I suggest that the requirement in Amendment 61 would be excessively restrictive.

[Lord Peston]

I am very puzzled by the Minister’s answer. That may be because I do not understand what a macroprudential measure is. Macro normally means economy-wide: it does not mean dealing with a specific bank in trouble or anything like that. I would take it to mean that the whole financial intermediation process was in danger of going wrong. I am finding it very hard to believe that, as a matter of urgency if the FPC was acting to deal with that, it would not immediately draft a statement. The idea that it will take time to say, “We have got a crisis on our hands and we are acting” is preposterous. It rather takes us back to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Flight, which carried the same kind of message. Surely, the point for the Minister to emphasise is that he wishes to make it clear that all of us take it for granted that the relevant decision-making body should do exactly what my noble friend says.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, the requirement is there for the statement to be made. Indeed, it would be the full expectation that a statement would be made. We believe that the Bill does not need any extra amendment in relation to statements that relate to macroprudential measures where they are exercised as a matter of urgency. The statement has to be made in any case.

[Lord Eatwell]

Perhaps I may help the noble Lord. I think that there was a slight misunderstanding in what he said in his initial answer on this amendment. He said that if there were an urgent situation, it would be inappropriate to wait for a statement to be made. That is not what this amendment says. It in no way prevents urgent measures being taken immediately. It simply says that if that is the case—as the noble Lord said, as soon as possible, and as I say, within 10 days—a statement should be produced. Surely, it is appropriate to give confidence and comfort to the markets that they can have some degree of expectation that a measure taken in urgency would be subject to a statement within a timeframe which is known to the markets and therefore provides them with appropriate comfort.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I do not believe that any additional requirement needs to be put in. The FPC already has transparency requirements at the heart of what it does. I completely agree that in certain cases, if it was an urgent matter, 10 days would not be the answer. It would make a statement based on the merits of the case either immediately, or on some other timescale. The Treasury would need to lay secondary legislation on an urgent basis to create the new tools required. Regardless of this provision, the laying of this secondary legislation would involve a public statement about the need for the tool and how it would be used. There is another backstop. If the new tool was required to be created, Parliament would immediately have a statement in front of it to back up the secondary legislation.

For a variety of reasons, Amendment 61 is redundant. On the basis of some partial explanations, and my commitment to write to him—particularly to explain in more detail how I believe the matters around Amendment 58 will operate—I ask if the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Eatwell]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. Having a committee process where we go backwards and forwards on each particular amendment is helpful and removes the need for me to make a long summing-up speech. I will simply focus on Amendment 58, which has been the main matter of substance within this group which has exercised us, especially after the noble Lord clarified the issues of the consultations so well. Amendment 58 is still a serious problem, and I look forward to the noble Lord writing to me about it. Once I have his views in writing, perhaps we can consult further to find an appropriate way of sustaining the position of the FPC in the way that I have described. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell]

And now, my Lords, for something completely different. One of the objects relating to the governance of the Bank of England which we discussed in the first two days in Committee, and which is now coming up again, is to increase the collegiality of decision-making within the Bank, particularly with respect to this project. It seems that the deputy governor for financial stability is going to have an important role in the development of the FPC, the development of its activities and, indeed, its overall credibility and acceptance. It therefore seems entirely appropriate in these circumstances that the deputy governor for financial stability should be given a special status within the legislation, both in respect to consultation with the Treasury when an emergency order is introduced, and with respect to the discussions with the Chancellor of the Exchequer after the publication of the Financial Stability Report.

Amendment 56 seeks to place the deputy governor for financial stability within the framework of consultation when there is an emergency order. Overall responsibility rests with the governor. However, surely the deputy governor, who has the prime responsibility, should be consulted when there is likely to be an emergency order. Moreover, when the Treasury and the Bank have their formal discussions, which are required by the Bill, following the publication of the Financial Stability Report, it is surely appropriate that the person responsible for that report—the deputy governor for financial stability is the acting element in this respect—should be part of those conversations, as we require in Amendment 79.

If the Government accepted these amendments, we would feel much more comfortable about the overall governance structure of the Bank. It would acquire a more collegial framework, which we strongly feel is very appropriate to the development of these new measures. I beg to move.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, these amendments reprise an argument that was raised by the shadow Chancellor during the Bill’s Second Reading in another place.

As the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said, Amendment 56 would require the Treasury to inform not only the governor but the deputy governor for financial stability when it considers that there is insufficient time for the FPC to be consulted on the introduction of a new macroprudential tool.

Amendment 79 would place in the Bill a requirement for the deputy governor for financial stability to attend the biannual meetings between the Chancellor and the governor following the publication of the FPC’s annual stability report.

Clearly the Bank plays a crucial role not only in relation to the management of the UK’s economy but specifically, under the Bill, in relation to macroprudential and microprudential regulation. In fulfilling these very important responsibilities, we expect the Bank to act as the serious and respected organisation that it is. This means that the senior executives of the Bank will work as a team to determine the best course of action to achieve the Bank’s objectives and comply with the legal obligations placed upon it. The governor is the leader of that team and, working closely with his senior executives, will ultimately take the key decisions within the Bank.

It is clear that the success of the new regulatory structure, which, rightly, we are spending so much time debating, relies heavily on the relationship between the Treasury and the Bank of England, and I believe that the Bill provides the necessary clarity of responsibilities. However, it also depends on the personal relationships at play here, particularly between the most senior leaders of the two bodies—the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Governor of the Bank of England. One of the major problems leading up to the financial crisis was that the tripartite committee did not meet at principals level during the previous decade.

Therefore, there are clearly things that need to be legislated for, and this is not what the noble Lord is in any way seeking to argue against, but it is important background to this discussion. The Chancellor and the governor must meet regularly to discuss financial stability. That is why the Bill and the regulatory structure that it establishes place at the heart of the matter the institutional relationship between the Treasury and the Bank, and the personal relationship between the Chancellor and the governor.

I do not see any reason to attempt to insert into that relationship a further statutory channel of communication. First, I just do not believe that it is needed. The Treasury ministerial team regularly meets the current deputy governor for financial stability and the chief executive of the FSA. There is also a constant dialogue between the deputy governor and senior Treasury officials via meetings, phone calls and e-mails. The same was true under the previous Government, as I know, since I was part of it for three years, and it was very effective at working level. That has not changed and it will not change under the new structure. In practice, the deputy governor may well attend the biannual meetings between the two principals. If the Treasury notified the governor that a new macroprudential instrument needed to be introduced on an urgent basis, the deputy governor would be well aware of that.

I will just point out one slight correction that is relevant to this, which is that the FPC is responsible for the financial stability report to the deputy governor. That is relevant to the discussion of this amendment because it shows that we should not excessively personalise the relationships or draw attention to particular individuals if that risks, as it may do in this instance, causing confusion about who is responsible for what. I agree that the relationship with the two leaders of the bodies, the Treasury and the Bank of England, should be hard-wired in, as we have done. In practice, the deputy governor is, and will be, very much involved in all the relevant discussions. Amendments 79 and 56 are not necessary and go too far.

There is a strong argument here that such a provision could be positively unhelpful by opening the door to the possibility that the Bank may be divided and encouraged to speak with more than one voice. There is a risk of recreating elements of dysfunctionality that were in the system as it used to exist. I do not want to overplay this, since the main argument is the earlier one. However, I do see a slight but secondary danger that this provision could be built on in the wrong circumstances. On the basis of the earlier explanations, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, will withdraw this amendment.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, the noble Lord’s comments have been very valuable. The Government have continuously argued that the tripartite system set out by the previous Government did not work because of its structure. He has now admitted that it did not work because the principals did not work it and did not meet. That is a very different issue. The fact that the principals did not meet, and that we now find the need for them to meet in primary legislation, illustrates that it was not the structure that was wrong but the people working in it that went wrong.

I agree with the noble Lord that the Bank should work as a team. I am very much in favour of that. However, we have to distinguish between the captain of the team and those who take the penalty kicks. We may want Martin Johnson to be the captain but we want Jonny Wilkinson to take the kicks. In those circumstances, the particular specialist role of the deputy governor for financial stability seems to be an important element in effective communication between the Treasury and the Bank. Moreover, the noble Lord expressed, in a careful way, that this might expose differences in the Bank’s position and suggested that this might create dysfunctionality. There are differences in this Committee, but this Committee is not dysfunctional. It is making progress. The differences between us are highlighting, as it is their role to highlight, some problems in the Bill that can make it a better Bill, which is our entire objective. I do not accept that differences within a reasonably run organisation necessarily lead to dysfunctionality. That seems to be Sir Humphrey rampant, determined that there is a singular position.

The whole issue of governance of the Bank is still somewhat in the air. This is one element that we wished to put in the Bill and felt would be enormously helpful. Now the noble Lord has recognised that the tripartite system did not fail because of its structure, but because of the personalities who failed to work it, I hope that he will consider the value of these amendments when we return to them on Report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Myners]

My Lords, I have considerable sympathy with the amendment. I declare my interest as a former member of the court from 2004 to 2008. I fully support the creation of the Financial Policy Committee—I think that it will become the most important committee in the Bank—but I am deeply anxious about the governance of the Bank and the lack of appropriate oversight from the court, the oversight committee as envisaged or, indeed, Parliament.

The Minister is in many ways the architect of this restructuring of regulation, as part of a project which he led for the Opposition, having ceased to work in the Treasury. I understand his thinking in evolving the proposals, but events have moved on. In the light of what we now know about the Bank of England, we must ask whether it is still right to put so much authority in the hands of the Bank without appropriate accountability.

When I was a member of the court, I sat in on a meeting of the Financial Stability Committee. That would have been in 2006 or 2007. At that meeting, one of the governors proposed that as a mechanism to cope with the crisis, the Bank should buy half a dozen or a dozen bicycles in order that members of the Bank could move swiftly and anonymously around the City. That tells us a huge amount about where the Bank sits in terms of its understanding of the complexity of financial markets. Some of the things that we have seen over the past few weeks have simply raised more questions about the wisdom of putting so much power in the hands of the Bank.

We are also about to have a piece of legislation to implement the recommendations of the Independent Commission on Banking. Having been intimately involved in the Government’s response to the banking crisis from 2008 onwards, I would point out that the losses incurred in the British banking system—at HBOS, Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland—largely occurred within the ring-fence. The losses of $5 billion which we have seen recently reported in London from JP Morgan took place within the ring-fence as envisaged by the Vickers report. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, looks somewhat sceptical about that. Those losses occurred within the treasury operations, or the investment office, of JP Morgan, and as such lay within the ring-fence rather than outside it. In being sympathetic to this amendment, and hoping that at the very least the Minister will go away and reflect on that, I think that the Minister will have to rethink some of the fundamental building blocks of this legislation—in particular the great powers and responsibilities that we are placing in the hands of the Bank of England—before we reach its next stage. These are powers and responsibilities that the Bank of England has historically not had and, in my judgment, is still not equipped to exercise.

If we are to do this then, at the very minimum, we must ensure that the Bank and its various agencies, including the Financial Policy Committee, are properly accountable to a court which is clear about its functions and clear about who it reports to. As a former member of the court I know that it was never clear who we reported to. It must also be clear about its parliamentary accountability.

[Lord Sassoon]

It is always entertaining to have one of the Second Reading speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Myners. I am not sure what it had to do with this particular amendment—which is to do with super-affirmative procedures in respect of orders made by the Treasury—but, anyway, we did talk extensively about governance of the Bank of England over the last couple of sessions, and there will no doubt be other opportunities to talk about them. Here we are talking about an amendment that seeks to require macroprudential orders to be subject to the so-called super-affirmative procedure. Although I was not going to question the competence of Parliament to get into the detail of the macroprudential tools, my noble friend Lady Kramer did make a powerful point about the level of scrutiny that is appropriate to tools that are—yes—very important but also highly technical.

I say that in the context of believing that proper parliamentary scrutiny of these tools will be important to the overall accountability. That is why the Bill, as has been noted, requires the macroprudential orders to be subject to the affirmative procedure. As the Committee would expect, the Government maintain that that strikes the right balance between accountability and timeliness. Orders cannot be made unless a draft is laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.

I will of course draw attention to what the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee had to say, although my noble friend Lady Noakes dismisses its remarks as “interesting but not conclusive”. As a statement of fact, it is clear that its remarks are not conclusive. However, I take issue with her when she dismisses its remarks as “interesting”, because I think that we should take the consideration of the DPRRC very seriously on matters such as this. For the help of the Committee I shall quote the relevant paragraph, because I think that it shows that the DPRRC has thought about this matter in detail. It states:

“The importance of the power is recognised by the application of the draft affirmative procedure or, in urgent cases, the 28-day ‘made affirmative’ procedure … The Joint Committee on the Draft Bill and the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee have recommended an enhanced affirmative procedure for the non-urgent orders, based on that in the Public Bodies Act 2011. But the affirmative procedure provided for in the Bill should be a sufficient safeguard against inappropriate use of these powers.”

I really do not think that we should dismiss what the committee has said.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Peston]

My Lords, one of our difficulties in discussing this matter is that no one has mentioned a specific macroprudential measure. We are discussing them totally in the abstract, so perhaps I might mention a couple and say why the positive approach might well be relevant. If we look back to the corrupt practices of the past on the part of financial intermediaries, I suppose the worst of them was the mixing up of a package of toxic and non-toxic assets and then marketing them as if they were non-toxic. I would assume that for the relevant body here, if it was confronted with this, it would be relevant to introduce a macroprudential measure to say that that is simply not going to happen. It would describe the measure and intervene. The Minister shakes his head. Is he saying that that is not an example of a macroprudential measure?

[Lord Sassoon]

I would say that examples of macroprudential measures are things such as leveraged ratios. If we are talking about the mis-selling of products, that is generally not going to be a question of macroprudential tools but a conduct matter that the FCA would deal with. They would not be the sorts of things covered in the macro toolkit of the Financial Policy Committee, as the noble Lord describes it.

[Lord Peston]

Speaking as an economist, that sounds complete nonsense to me. I point out to the Minister that the measure I have just described was at the centre of the collapse of both the British and American financial systems in the post-2007 era. This is precisely what these financial intermediaries were up to and precisely what led to the enormous damage that all the economies have suffered. How the Minister can possibly say that that is not a relevant tool is completely beyond me. I could give him some more examples, but let us leave it at that one.

The only question then is whether the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is right that if it were introduced as an order we could not debate it in a way to be able to say that the Government’s method of dealing with this problem could be bettered. That is the only point at issue here. I would not like us to do this all the time. I would simply like us—and I mean the other place at least as much as us—to have the power to be able to say, “We can see that you’ve identified the problem and that you’ve got a solution, which you’re introducing by this order, but we think you could do it better this way”. That is all I am arguing and I cannot see what is unreasonable about it.

[Baroness Noakes]

Perhaps I might intervene on whether there is the power to amend or not. Debating under super-affirmative procedure is not like considering a Bill. There are no amendments tabled and voted on but there is the ability of either House to pass a resolution saying what it thinks. Much as the noble Lord, Lord Peston, articulated, either House would be able to consider whether it thought that the tools were up to the job. More importantly, as I tried to explain in my opening remarks, Parliament could consider the potential impact of using those tools and say to the Government whether it thought the tools appropriate in the context of the wider impact, not simply the narrow impact, on the regulation of financial institutions. The super-affirmative procedure does not allow a specific amendment process but it allows Parliament to say, “Government, we think you have got this wrong”. It is in contradistinction to any of the other procedures where we have the nuclear option: we either accept the order or we do not accept it. It is a more deliberative and amenable process, in particular for considering these very new tools which are being talked about. I hope that helps the Committee.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, this has been a helpful additional go-round of the tracks because it illustrates, I suggest, that with the procedures already in the Bill and the commitment that my right honourable friend the Chancellor has made to debate the toolkit on the Floor in another place—the same could apply here, clearly, subject to the usual channels agreeing it—we have in substance exactly what my noble friend wants to achieve. We have that without locking ourselves into the difficulty that goes with the 124 days, plus Recess time, which we can get locked into in cases that may be either minor ones where none of this is warranted or, more particularly, ones that started off not being urgent but then became more so. Having had this useful go-round and with the reassurance I have given of what the Chancellor has committed to, I ask my noble friend if she will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Noakes]

My Lords, the Minister has not appreciated the difference between the affirmative procedure and the super-affirmative procedure. Simply having a debate can have only one outcome, of approving or not approving the order, and that is the fundamental flaw. It is the thing that we all learn in opposition and that all Governments forget. Whether or not additional time is allowed or whether a different procedure is adopted in the other place may well improve the quality of debate but it cannot change its outcome. In your Lordships’ House, it is always open to us to have a debate on a draft order on the Floor of the House by the simple mechanism of any noble Lord tabling some kind of Motion disagreeing with it. That will automatically bring it into the Chamber. That is not the problem; the issue is the outcome.

The super-affirmative procedure is a more deliberative procedure; it allows views to be expressed without going so far as to say, “We are not having it”—the outcome of which is usually described as very harmful. That is why the House has a general practice of not voting orders down, because it is such a dangerous thing to do. That is why this super-affirmative procedure gives each House of Parliament more opportunity to debate all the issues contained within the order. It may be that we need a greater range of ways of handling this; however, all the methods of handling an order other than the super-affirmative can allow only acceptance or rejection of the whole. That is a difficult thing for the House to do—to put itself in the position of disagreeing with the whole.

The other issue is delay, although I do not see an issue here. The issue is about whether we take the right amount of time to get the thing right. The Government have available in the Bill, unaffected by my amendment, the ability to put something through on an urgent basis. Nobody would dream of circumscribing that power, because it may well be necessary. Even in the middle of the process to get a new measure through, if it was suddenly decided that it was so important that it had to come in urgently, the Government could default to that procedure. As I said earlier, the timing issue is therefore a red herring. The issue is about whether government can give the proper amount of time and consideration to these important new measures.

I will consider carefully what my noble friend has said, but my first instincts are that he has not said enough to convince me that the super-affirmative procedure is not the appropriate procedure for these new measures. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

69B: Clause 3, page 10, line 18, at end insert—
“Review9QB Duty to review directions and recommendations
(1) The Financial Policy Committee must—
(a) before the end of each review period, review each direction given by it under section 9G, other than a direction revoked before the end of the review period, and(b) prepare a summary of its conclusions.(2) A review period is—
(a) in relation to the first review, the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which the direction was given, and(b) in relation to subsequent reviews, the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which the previous review was completed.(3) The Financial Policy Committee must maintain arrangements for the review at regular intervals of any recommendations that it has made under any of sections 9N to 9Q and are of continuing relevance.”

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Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

74A: Clause 3, page 12, line 9, leave out “Committee’s objectives” and insert “objectives set out in section 9C(1)(a) and (b)”

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Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

76A: Clause 3, page 12, line 9, at end insert—
“(4A) If during the reporting period the Committee has made any decision in relation to which section 9QA requires the preparation of an explanation, the financial stability report must include the required explanation.”

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Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

91: Schedule 1, page 170, line 11, leave out “Bank” and insert “Oversight Committee”

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[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support my noble friend Lady Hayter’s amendment. She has drawn attention to a crucial issue for the United Kingdom. The fact is that we benefit greatly from the existence of the European single financial market. I believe that one of the reasons why so many overseas banks base themselves in London is that we are part of a single regulated market. There are grave dangers for us in going down the road of separating ourselves from that single market.

It is important that we keep very closely in touch with European developments at all times. It is a very fast-moving scene. As we understand the results of the last European Council, banking supervision within the eurozone will be put under the European Central Bank by the end of this year. I noted with interest the Governor’s comment, as reported in the Financial Times at any rate, that this would make it easier for the Bank of England to deal with regulatory issues because there would be, as it were, a single telephone number to ring in the European Central Bank. It is also the case that the UK has a critically important influence in the European Systemic Risk Board. It is vital that we play a crucial role in that board, of which the Governor of the Bank of England is the deputy chair.

[Lord Sassoon]

I think that he is the first deputy chair.

[Lord Liddle]

Britain’s position is given a special status given that we are the financial centre of the European single market. The governors of the central banks who make up that body are alive to London’s concerns at all times. It is very important that we play a major role there. It is therefore crucial that we keep these issues under review. I do not think that the way in which the Government have handled the proposals for a banking union is in the UK national interest. It is a bit rich to say, “It is none of our business because this is to do with the eurozone”, but then to complain that the creation of this thing might mean that there was an inbuilt majority against Britain on all financial regulatory decision-making. It is rather contradictory.

The position we have to adopt is that although we are not in the eurozone and will not be in the eurozone, we have to sustain the single financial market. That involves us having the closest possible relationship with the relevant European bodies and keeping abreast, in terms of our own arrangements, with developments there. For those reasons, I strongly support my noble friend’s amendment.

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[Lord Neill of Bladen]

My Lords, I have one comment to make on the text of the amendment. Just to have a report for one year seems such a limited objective. If it is worth doing at all, I do not understand why there is no language allowing for continuity. It was said that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, was providing for that. However, the actual language is:

“Within a year of commencement… the Bank of England shall publish a review”,

et cetera. It is to be a one-off. The idea is a good one. Have a regular review, and you can see whether things change. Whether it is going to be embarrassing for the governor, representing the Bank, to say what his relations are with all the other regulatory bodies outside the UK, I do not know. A case could be made for an independent body to produce this. However, the governor and the Bank probably have the information that is needed.

I add as a footnote that we need to keep in mind the terrible damage that has been done by the LIBOR scandal. There was an article in the Independent last week deploring the damage that it will do to the good name of the financial industry in this country. They are the sort of factors that are rather important.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, we have had an interesting run-around this issue. There have been quite a few divergent voices about the way of handling the challenge that is the subject of this amendment.

First, I certainly did not read this amendment as relating to the mapping of the UK structure as it will be against the European structure, because the start of this amendment talks about,

“a review of the effectiveness of coordination… and their relations with, the European Supervisory Authorities”.

This seems to go very much with the responsibilities under the co-ordination memorandum. I have a bit of trouble in my mind matching this up with the substantive concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, which I understand.

I start with the question as to whether the UK architecture does or should adequately map against the new European supervisory authorities. I do not believe it is necessary for the responsibilities of domestic regulators to exactly map on to the corresponding ESA for engagement with them to be effective and well co-ordinated. The regulatory systems of other EU member states do not match up with the activities-based structure of the ESAs. Of course, as has been discussed already, the European architecture is itself likely to be moving around, so that we are probably not going to be aiming at a fixed target. Although it has been stated that the City has had some concerns about the mapping, the broad consensus in the evidence given to the Joint Committee was that having a different regulatory structure to that of the ESAs, will not present any issues for the UK authorities in representing the UK’s interests. The Government have accepted the recommendation of the Joint Committee, and the Bill requires that the international organisations’ MOU establishes an international co-ordination committee, so we have fully responded to the concerns of the Joint Committee in this area.

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Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

97: Schedule 2, page 174, line 3, at end insert—
“(8A) After paragraph 12 insert—
“Publication of record of meetings12A (1) The Bank must publish a record of each meeting of the court—
(a) before the end of the period of 6 weeks beginning with the day of the meeting, or(b) if no meeting of the court is subsequently held during that period, before the end of the period of 2 weeks beginning with the day of the next meeting.(2) The record must specify any decisions taken at the meeting (including decisions to take no action) and must set out, in relation to each decision, a summary of the court’s deliberations.
(3) Sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) do not require the publication of information whose publication within the time required by sub-paragraph (1) would in the opinion of the court be against the public interest.
(4) Publication under this section is to be in such manner as the Bank thinks fit.””

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[Baroness Kramer]

My Lords, I think that I can be very brief in moving this amendment. Its purpose is to close a gap between the Government’s clearly stated intent and the language in the Bill. I am sympathetic to those who have drafted the language, because the complexities of the Bank of England Act 1998, as amended by the Banking Act 2009, make it quite hard to follow through a single train of thought, and I suspect that that is what has caused a trip-up in the language in this instance.

On the first day in Committee on this Bill on 26 June, the Minister was absolutely clear that the oversight committee—whose existence and procedures he put forward and the Committee accepted—should be made up of non-executive members of the Court of the Bank of England, and that its chair should also be a non-executive member. However, the language in the Bill does not allow that train of thought to follow through. It would permit the Chancellor to appoint the governor or deputy governor to the role of chair of the court and hence see that individual put into the position of chair of the oversight committee. I shall not bore the Committee at this point by trying to track through that but I assure noble Lords that that is the consequence of the current language. I simply say to the Government that I hope that someone can go away and fix this more elegantly than I have been able to do and, on that basis, I shall not be pressing the amendment.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I do not know whether anyone else wants to come in on this but it may be helpful if I speak now. This amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Kramer returns us, as she says, to the territory of not only Bank of England governance but nomenclature, which we discussed at some length two weeks ago. As my noble friend says, one of the changes made in the Banking Act 2009 was intended to amend the Bank of England Act to require the court to be chaired by a director, which, as we established two weeks ago, means a non-executive member—again, as my noble friend pointed out. However, she has gone further because it is only my noble friend, with her razor-sharp eye, who has noticed that the relevant provision inserted into the Bank of England Act 1998, while allowing the court to be chaired by a director, does not require that it be so. That is clearly not correct.

Therefore, although I cannot accept the amendment as drafted because it does not cover all the necessary ground to give full effect to this change, I assure my noble friend and the Committee that we will go away and draft the necessary changes. I thank my noble friend for bringing this to the Committee’s attention.

More generally, I am aware from the discussion that we had two weeks ago that there are some irregularities in the terminology in the Bank of England Act which I certainly had difficulties with and I think that other Members of the Committee did too. A prime example of this is that the so-called Court of Directors includes the executive members of the court who are not, and cannot be, directors. This is plainly absurd. To say that this is all justified because the Bank has been in existence for 300 years so we just have to live with it is not the right approach. As I think I wrote following the first day in Committee, I will consider further whether any other changes might be made to the 1998 Act to clarify these terms, making them more consistent with current usage. We cannot proof the legislation against further changes over 300 years but we can at least try to update a few things.

With thanks to my noble friend, I ask her to withdraw her amendment, as she has already indicated she will do.

[Baroness Kramer]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

99: Schedule 2, page 174, line 4, leave out “No provision of this paragraph” and insert “Nothing in sub-paragraphs (2) to (6)”

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

101ZA: Schedule 2, page 175, line 13, after “Bank’s” insert “functions under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, of its other”

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, this is a large group of minor and technical government amendments that I hope we can dispatch very quickly. The amendments address a number of technical issues such as updating the Bill to accommodate changes in European law made since the Bill was introduced, amending some rogue references to the FSA in FiSMA, making consequential amendments to enactments that have been passed since the Bill was introduced and making other technical improvements. I am happy to discuss them, or write in more detail, if any Member of the Committee would like to discuss them. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I will just say that I am very happy to accept the assurances from the Minister that, first, these are technical amendments and, secondly, that he would be very brief in what he said today. I have tried to see whether I could speak for longer than he did. I have not been through every amendment but did look at a sample. Each one I sampled was, indeed, technical and minor.

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Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

101ZB: Clause 5, page 15, line 25, leave out “or”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I have an amendment in this group of a slightly different variety but I have enormous sympathy with what the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has said about the strategic objective. When I first read the Bill, my note in the margin said “vacuous”. This notion that “relevant markets … function well” really is gamma minus stuff. It is pathetic and does not mean anything at all. One immediately asks for a definition of “function well”. We find that the objectives for competition, integrity and consumer protection are all defined, but there is no definition of what “function well” might mean.

Moreover, not only is this expression vacuous but it has no separate life. Whenever the FCA’s objectives are referred to in the Bill, it is the other objectives—the consumer objective, the integrity objective, the competition objective and the operational objectives—that are referred to. This strategic objective only has coherent life in other references in the Bill in so far as it lives through these more concrete proposals. If it is to be left as it is, it adds nothing other than spurious solidity and real complexity to the structure of objectives for the FCA. I have tried to give it some life. In our Amendment 101D in this group, my noble friend Lady Hayter and I have added the phrase,

“in the best interests of society as a whole”,

to the term “functions well”. That phrase captures the concept of the social optimum as defined in classical welfare economics. One does not want the technicalities of welfare economics within the definition of the Bill, but serving the best interests of society as a whole is the sort of expression that is used by Professor Amartya Sen in his discussions of evaluations of philosophical propositions relative to the social good. By adding,

“in the best interests of society as a whole”,

I would hope to provide this previously vacuous statement with some structure that could be referred to as a mission statement. Although I take on board the objections of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, to mission statements, I must say that I tend to agree with them. A mission statement could provide some framework within which the other operational objectives could be seen. For example, on the competition objective, one would look at the objective of stimulating competition in terms of the best interests of society as a whole. There may be circumstances in which the stimulation of competition is not in the best interests of society as a whole perhaps because it causes some distortion to the operation of the market, but, more generally, we would expect the encouragement of competition to act in the best interests of society as a whole.

We have a simple binary choice. Either we must give this vacuous statement some substance or we should remove it from the Bill, as proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. What we should not do is leave this statement, which can do no good other than cause a bit of innocent amusement about how silly some clauses in the Bill might be.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I was not quick in getting to my feet because I am not sure whether Amendment 101D was moved, taken separately, or where we are.

[Lord Eatwell]

I have just spoken to the amendment, which is in the group.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sassoon]

I wanted to be clear whether that amendment had been spoken to and on whether we should have something with substance in the provision or take it out all together.

It will not surprise the Committee if I say at the outset that, unlike my previous responses when I have been very accommodating or have tidied things up, I cannot support this group of amendments to delete the FCA’s strategic objective. The Government recognise the importance of getting the objectives of the FCA right. As my noble friend Lady Noakes said, there has now been a considerable period in which we have made substantial changes on the objective question since the first proposal, so we are, and have been, listening. It is perhaps worth going over where the suggestions for improvement have come from.

The Government took note of calls from the Independent Commission on Banking and others on the objective proposed in the draft Bill that,

“protecting and enhancing confidence in the UK’s financial system”,

needed to be changed. The Bill now provides that the FCA’s strategic objective, as has been noted, is,

“ensuring that the relevant markets function well”.

That change has been broadly welcomed, by the Independent Commission on Banking, and by consumer and industry stakeholders alike. Even the Treasury Committee considers that the revised drafting is,

“a significant improvement on the proposal in the draft Bill”,

as in its report of 31 May this year.

Let me attempt to reprise the argument, without delving into classical welfare economics and areas that are a bit beyond me. The Treasury Committee may assert that a mission statement has no place in primary legislation but the Government believe that it is right to enshrine something as important as the FCA’s overall purpose in primary legislation, whether or not we call it a mission statement. It is the FCA’s overall purpose.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell]

Will the noble Lord indulge me? What does function well mean? “Function well” for whom? Does it mean functioning well for a consumer? Does it mean functioning well for a trader? Does it mean functioning well in terms of working smoothly without any hiccups but not allocating resources terribly well? Does it mean allocating resources efficiently? All those things come under the term “function well” but contradict one another. What does it mean, and for whom?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, in giving those four examples the noble Lord knows very well that the first and fourth of his examples very much fit the bill, and the second and third very much do not. This is all about markets that work essentially to assist the end user of those markets. It has nothing within it to do with working well for a trader or something superficial that all looks smooth on the surface but does not provide the end result of liquidity, price discovery or choice for consumers. The noble Lord knows very well that it would be impossible within the compass of such a piece of legislation to try to define the well working of a market, but the Bill spells out the main ways in which the FCA will seek to promote the well functioning of markets—those operational objectives that I touched on.

Those operational objectives give clues and pointers to the FCA. It will be for the FCA’s board to consider if and when it needs to consider these questions of well functioning markets. I believe that it will be well equipped with its expertise to consider market by market what well functioning means. I see absolutely no problem with this. However, there needs to be something that brings together the FCA’s very diverse and individual functions, roles and responsibilities.

That relates to one of the questions asked by my noble friend Lady Noakes, who asked why the FPC and the PRA do not have strategic objectives. It is precisely because they have much more narrowly focused objectives that they do not need the overall strategic objectives that the FCA needs because of the breadth of its responsibilities. I agree with my noble friend and others that we have not provided this strategic objective for the FCA on some whim. We have not put it in for the FPC and the PRA because it is not necessary. It is precisely because of the diversity and the potentially conflicting nature of the objectives of the other bodies that we believe it is right to have it in the case of the FCA.

By the same logic, the strategic objective will act as a check and balance. If, say, the FCA seeks to advance its consumer protection objective by placing detailed requirements on firms, we want it always to ask itself whether what it is doing contributes to the ultimate end goal of ensuring that markets function well. What functioning well means will be determined with some commonality across all markets, but some of it will be market-specific, particularly depending on whether it is a consumer or a wholesale market. This is no afterthought. It reflects the Government’s desire to enshrine regulation which seeks to ensure that markets can do their job.

My noble friend also asked a question about how the FCA could act in a way that was not compatible with its objectives. There are examples which we need to take into account, one of which might be a short-selling ban which is, arguably, in the interests of end-consumers but is a measure which is not normally thought to be compatible with a well functioning market.

[Baroness Noakes]

I thank my noble friend for that example, in which a short-selling ban could be introduced because it was compatible with one of the operational objectives yet was incompatible with the strategic objective. What, then, is the point of having the strategic objective sitting in this Bill?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I have explained why a strategic objective is necessary in order to tie together the very disparate responsibilities of the FCA. Nevertheless, in answer to my noble friend’s question about the “in as far as reasonably possible” carve-out, I give her an example of why there will be circumstances where those words are necessary. It is entirely compatible with the need for the general, overarching statement to admit and allow for the possibility that there will occasionally be instances of conflict with that overarching objective. We have done that in the Bill and this does not in any way invalidate it.

I turn briefly to Amendment 101D in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. This seeks to extend the FCA’s strategic objective to ensure that markets function in the best interests of society as a whole. Consistent with what I have already said about the well functioning of markets, I support the sentiment underpinning the amendment. We want markets which serve the wider economy, underpin growth and contribute to a more prosperous society as a whole. We are not talking about markets that are working exclusively for those who are operating in them. This sentiment is very much part of what drives this whole programme of financial services reform.

Having said that, I am conscious about the amendment for two reasons. First, it is not the FCA’s job to decide what is ultimately in the best interests of society. The FCA is being set up as a focused, tough and proactive conduct-of-business regulator. If its new style of conduct regulation contributes to ensuring that the financial sector serves the wider economy, that is good and what we want to see. However, I suggest that deciding what benefits society as a whole cannot be the role of a financial services regulator.

Secondly, and linked to that, is an important question of expectations. The FCA will have some important powers but it is questionable whether we could argue that it has all the powers to deliver a market that benefits all of society all of the time.

There are difficult judgments to be made here, not least because there will always be trade-offs between policy choices. It is my strong belief that these societal choices are, ultimately, for the governor and not the regulator. I cannot, therefore, support Amendment 101D. I may be proved wrong in just a moment, but I sense that I have not completely won over my noble friend—no, I will not be proved wrong. However, she is always very reasonable about these things and she recognises the very considerable way that the Government have moved on the FCA’s strategic objective. I ask her to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Eatwell]

Before the Minister sits down, did I hear him correctly when he said that the choice of the benefit to society as a whole was not a matter for the regulator but a matter for the governor? Or did he say Government? I did not quite hear him properly.

[Lord Sassoon]

I said the Government. I hope he would agree that it was for the Government, not the governor. Good.

[Baroness Noakes]

My Lords, I am glad that my noble friend has cleared that up because I heard him say “governor” too. Perhaps there was a small slip, but Hansard will doubtless make sure that what he intended to say is recorded as having been said.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, for his support for my amendments and I agree with him that the current drafting is not much more than a vacuous statement. The Minister said that this is going to be an overarching goal, that it is going to be a check and balance but the first example he gave me, of short-selling, means that it can be ignored. This seems to be some form of window dressing. It is trying to appear that the Government agree with as many people as possible. It probably has no meaning whatever and it is therefore possibly something that we do not need to get overexcited about. It certainly does not add to clarity in the Bill. I shall think further on what my noble friend has said before we return to this on Report. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Sassoon Excerpts

Tuesday 10th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

My Lords, I will see if I can help a bit here. Amendment 47A seeks to prohibit the modification or exclusion of procedural requirements—that is, the requirement to consult—except for reasons of urgency. The reasons for the exclusion or the modification would also need to be included in the order. I should briefly explain why the Treasury has the ability to switch off or modify procedural requirements—the requirement to consult—which apply to action taken by the PRA and FCA on a tool-by-tool basis.

As the Government made clear in their February 2011 consultation document, in the case of some macroprudential tools, directions from the FPC will be very specific, requiring no discretion at all on the part of the regulator to implement them. Noble Lords asked for examples. In these cases—for instance, where the FPC is simply changing the level of a particular lever—consultation or cost-benefit analysis undertaken by the regulator would have little value and would introduce unnecessary delay into the process.

The Government believe that in these cases the FPC’s policy statement for the tool and its explanation of how the action is compatible with its objectives will provide much more valuable information about the action and its impact than any consultation by the regulators. However, I reassure the Committee that the Government do not expect to modify or exclude procedural requirements for most tools.

The Government will in due course publish a consultation document with proposals for the composition of the FPC’s initial toolkit, which will set out whether procedural requirements will be amended for any tools. In that case, there will be complete transparency regarding whether there has been any proposal by the Government to cut out the normal full consultation processes, and, if so, the reason will be clear. On the other hand, taking the question of urgent cases, if a delay in implementing an FPC direction could pose a risk to financial stability, both the PRA and the FCA already have, under their existing powers, the ability to waive consultation requirements in order to take action urgently.

Therefore, I hope I can assure my noble friend that on the one hand it will not be, in his words, at all common for consultation not to take place and it will be transparently set out; on the other hand, the power in new Section 9H(2) will not be needed in cases of urgency because that is already covered. On the basis of that explanation, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I think I am happy that the fundamental point is covered, and what the Minister has just stated effectively puts that on the record. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Eurozone

Lord Sassoon Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

My Lords, the June European Council discussed a report by the four presidents on strengthening economic and monetary union. They will conduct further work and report back to the European Council in December with an interim report in October. There is likely to be discussion on aspects of these issues in a number of different fora before and after the December report.

[Lord Dykes]

I thank the Minister for that Answer. I congratulate Her Majesty’s Government on their strong official support for the eurozone summit agreement success, in stark contrast to the negative carping of some Tory MPs and MEPs and of a few voices in the Christian Social Union in Bavaria.

[Lord Sassoon]

I am grateful to my noble friend for confirming the success of the recent European Council, a Council which confirmed among other things that the single market had to be considered in the context of fiscal union, which brought important parts of the new EU patent court to London, and which considered a raft of other growth-related matters.

[Lord Bilimoria]

My Lords, will the Minister confirm that the Government keep pushing the eurozone countries to go in for more fiscal and monetary union and yet do not seem to accept that that cannot take place unless there is a sovereign union in the way that there is in the United States of America or a country such as India? Why do the Government not accept that, and why do they keep encouraging the eurozone countries to pursue more and more fiscal and monetary integration?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I am pleased to say that no encouragement is now needed from the UK. The paper by the four presidents—the presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup—set out what they believed to be appropriate in relation to fiscal and monetary union. That work will continue and the UK is participating in the discussions in and around those reports. We are being fully supportive of those efforts.

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

My Lords, would it not be wise to ask the people of Germany and the other eurozone donor nations whether they agree to be burdened with the debts of Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and others, which even the Germans and the other countries cannot afford for long?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I thought I might have been asked a question about a UK referendum, instead of which I get a question about whether the German people will be consulted. I think I will leave that to German politicians to answer.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that a crucial ingredient in a successful fiscal and monetary union is transfer payments between the more prosperous to the less prosperous, as occurs within the US and even within the UK?

[Lord Sassoon]

Indeed, that is part of the remorseless logic of what an economic and fiscal union normally brings with it.

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

My Lords, does the LIBOR scandal and other financial scandals strengthen or weaken Her Majesty’s Government’s plans for exceptional treatment in Brussels? Do we not have a common interest in a properly regulated single market? Would not Her Majesty’s Government, particularly the Prime Minister, be better involved in discussing these matters rather than sulking on the sidelines?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, the UK is very much involved in the discussions in Brussels. That is why, as I have already said, we secured important parts of the EU patent court coming to London. That is why we recently secured a new British head for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We are at the table and that is where we intend to stay.

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

My Lords, with the leave of the House and as there are some minutes on the clock, instead of going along with this madcap, dangerous scheme of European financial integration, why do the Government not encourage the eurozone countries to abandon the incurable euro and go back to their own currencies, each with their own interest rate and exchange rate? Would that not be less painful and expensive than to go on trying to save the wretched thing?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, as we have discussed many times, 40% of our exports go to the eurozone. It is our most important trading bloc. The priority has to be to strengthen the eurozone countries. That is what they want to do and that is what we want to see them do and we must help them to achieve that.

[Lord Harrison]

The United Kingdom often blames the eurozone for the problems with the economy as it is being run by Her Majesty’s Government here. Why do we not do more to help? Does the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, agree with Mr David Lidington, who stated in replying to the Select Committee’s interrogation last week that he welcomed more Europe if it meant the implementation of the full ambit of the single European market?

[Lord Sassoon]

On the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Harrison, about the cause of the weaker growth in this country, the Office for Budget Responsibility and other commentators have identified the eurozone as a major source of threat to our growth and of weakness. Significant parts of the eurozone are plainly now in recession. I agree with my right honourable friend David Lidington about the need for more Europe in many areas including, particularly, more completion of the single market. That is why it is important that the four-presidency proposal referred to in the Council conclusions at the end of June will include,

“concrete proposals on preserving the … integrity of the Single Market”.

That is critical, as are the many growth initiatives included in those conclusions.

[Lord Lawson of Blaby]

My Lords, we all wish to see a successful European economy, but is my noble friend not aware that the so-called success of the European Council a fortnight ago has already disappeared, the financial markets have put the interest rate on Spanish sovereign debt back to where it was before, nothing was achieved, nothing can be achieved in this way and the sooner that it is realised that this project, however well intentioned, is a terrible mistake, the better?

[Lord Sassoon]

I certainly agree with my noble friend that we delude ourselves if we think that words coming out of one meeting of European leaders are going to solve all the problems. Part of the problem seems to have been a belief that the crisis can somehow be dealt with by fine words. I believe that in the underlying work— whether on the two pack, the six pack, or the intergovernmental treaty—there is the beginning of a construct of great significance to underpin the eurozone.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, would the Minister be prepared to share with us his prepared text on whether there should be an in/out referendum on our membership of the EU? If the Government are holding out the prospect of a referendum in relation to Europe, can he tell me why the Government refuse to have a referendum on the future of your Lordships’ House?

[Lord Sassoon]

I realise that I walked straight into this one. Now is not the time for an in/out referendum on Europe. Once Europe has settled all the matters that we have talked about, we can look at our relationship with Europe in the round. As for referenda on other matters, the legislation is starting in another place today and, no doubt, it will get here in due course.

[Lord Teverson]

Given that the eurozone is very likely to survive in a position very similar to its position at the minute and that it will probably move forward to a banking union and closer economic and fiscal union, what strategic preparations are the Government making in the longer term to make sure that Britain is not marginalised once we get through the existing crisis, however long it takes?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I think the most important thing is that we continue to be, as we are, constructively at the heart of all the discussions on these matters. As I have already said, there have been some significant achievements, as evidenced in the conclusions of the June Council, and that is the basis on which we have to continue our discussions. I would not think about it in the contingency planning terms that my noble friend portrays. We are there at the heart of the discussions and are continuing to focus our partners on growth and the completion of the single market.

Ulster Bank

Lord Sassoon Excerpts

Thursday 5th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord McAvoy]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to ensure benefits and allowances are being paid to recipients with Ulster Bank accounts.

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

My Lords, my honourable friend the Financial Secretary has spoken to Stephen Hester, chief executive of the Royal Bank of Scotland, about the technical difficulties affecting both NatWest and Ulster Bank to ensure that RBS is doing everything it can to resolve these issues as quickly as possible. Social security is a devolved matter in Northern Ireland but the Social Security Agency in Northern Ireland is advising benefit customers to go directly to their local branch where funds should be available to them.

[Lord McAvoy]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his Answer but the fact remains that 100,000 customers of Ulster Bank are suffering chaos in their accounts affecting direct debits, benefits and pensions. This also has an effect on small businesses and suppliers. Vernon Coaker called for the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to intervene but Owen Paterson says it is not his problem and he refuses to help. He holds the important position of Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Does the Minister accept that this is a disgraceful situation where 100,000 customers and small businesses in Northern Ireland are facing financial disaster but receive no help from a do-nothing Secretary of State for Northern Ireland who is not fit for the job?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I do not accept that for one minute. This is a very serious issue affecting, as the noble Lord says, 100,000 individuals in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has been actively on the case. He has discussed the Ulster Bank issue with my right honourable friends the Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Business. The Minister of State for Northern Ireland has spoken to the Northern Ireland Minister of Finance and Personnel and to Sir Philip Hampton, chair of RBS, who has made commitments about the fair and proper treatment of Ulster Bank’s customers with full compensation for financial loss. Ulster Bank itself is putting out daily updates and extending branch opening hours and has a freephone number. These are very serious issues. Once the dust has settled, the FSA will be requiring a full explanation from RBS and NatWest to make sure that any necessary steps are taken so that this does not happen again.

[Lord Rogan]

My Lords, this morning a spokesman for Ulster Bank stated that this technical failure will not now be fixed until 16 July. This further delay, now to be some three weeks, will compound the already serious cash-flow problems businesses are encountering. Some companies are inevitably going to suffer losses. Does the Minister agree that this raises the question of compensation for consequential losses caused by the IT breakdown?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I agree that the difficulties clearly are continuing. I looked at the Ulster Bank website. I see that it is giving daily updates of the situation and it has been completely clear that it is unlikely that it is going to be fully resolved until around 16 July. I repeat that RBS has made a commitment that no business or individual will be left permanently out of pocket as a result of this. The interpretation of that will no doubt raise the issues which the noble Lord raises.

[Lord Alderdice]

My Lords, the situation for people in Northern Ireland is extremely serious, as my noble friend has said. The noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, has raised the question of those who get benefits, but this nationalised bank run by the Government is also failing to address the needs of those whose salaries and wages are paid in, including from the Government. A number of private sector employers are helping out their employees who find themselves in immediate financial embarrassment during this holiday season. Is there any possibility that the Government, whose own employees are failing to have their salaries and wages paid in, can help in any way in the short term?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, my noble friend makes a very good point. I do not know what arrangements are being made because, again, it is going to be principally affecting employees of the devolved Administration. But I will take that issue back. I am sure it is being thought about by my colleagues in Government but I will remind them of it.

[Baroness Kingsmill]

My Lords, does not the chaos and total mess in the RBS-owned banks at the moment, which is affecting so many retail customers, just emphasise a lack of investment in back-office systems and computers in these retail banks, disadvantaging a large number of customers, at a time when we have been focusing far too much attention on what has been going on in the casino banks?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I do not know the cause of this significant failure. The noble Baroness may be right but, as I said, the FSA expects RBS to provide it with a complete account of the issues. I welcome the fact that the chief executive of RBS, Stephen Hester, has made a commitment to a full and detailed investigation overseen by independent experts and publication of those findings. In due course, we will know what the explanation is.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, is my noble friend satisfied with the role of the FSA? Surely it is not enough for the FSA to say, “We want a report”. The FSA is supposed to satisfy itself that people with banking licences have back-up systems to prevent what has happened, which is causing not only distress to families but real damage to commerce in our country. Surely the FSA should be far more active and should be giving an explanation to the Minister for why it has allowed this to happen.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, we delude ourselves if we think that there will ever be a no-failure regime in financial regulation. Regrettably, issues will arise. We want the FSA to do what it is doing: not getting in the way but doing whatever it can to ensure that RBS solves the immediate problems. Then it will get the full explanation and, on the back of that, the lessons for all concerned, including, I am sure, the FSA, will be learnt.

[Lord Browne of Belmont]

My Lords, as normal banking facilities will not be available at branches of the Ulster Bank until 16 July at the earliest, and given that there are public holidays in Northern Ireland on 12 and 13 July, will the Government take steps to ensure that Ulster Bank branches remain open on those dates to enable customers to receive advice and to access banking services? I declare that I am a client of the Ulster Bank—one, I hope, of good standing.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I am aware that 42 Ulster Bank branches have extended their opening hours until 7 pm. I am aware, because I have checked, that the availability of the freephone number, which is available until 10 o’clock at night, has been widely publicised. I am not aware of what the bank intends to do on those bank holidays, but it will have heard the question.

Universities: VAT on Alterations to Listed Buildings

Lord Sassoon Excerpts

Thursday 5th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Deech]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what evaluation they have made of the impact on universities of the removal of the zero rate of VAT for alterations to protected buildings.

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

My Lords, removing the zero rate of VAT from alterations to listed buildings, including those belonging to universities, removes a perverse incentive to change rather than repair them and ensures that all alteration works receive the same tax treatment. The change makes the VAT rules simpler for businesses to understand and reduces the scope for error and non-compliance. In the Government’s assessment of the impact of the measure included in the consultation response published on 28 June, no separate assessment was made of the impact on particular categories of listed building.

[Baroness Deech]

Does the Minister fully appreciate that the proposed removal of zero-rated VAT for much needed university alterations to listed buildings will have a severe impact on those universities? Not just Oxbridge, but nearly every university old and new has listed buildings and the sector as a whole will have to find an additional £150 million over the next five years. It is like an extra tax which will reduce the amount that universities have for bursaries. Will the Minister accept that the situation could be rescued without a U-turn if the Government were to limit zero-rating to buildings owned and occupied by charities?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I fully accept that universities will be affected, but that is not a reason not to go ahead with this measure. It is for sound and principled reasons, which I have summarised. There has been an extensive consultation process, including my honourable friend the Exchequer Secretary meeting representatives from a number of Oxbridge colleges, including the noble Baroness’s successor as principal of St Anne’s College, Oxford. There have been various numbers, including numbers coming from Oxford, which seem to vary considerably, meeting by meeting. I do not therefore recognise the £150 million figure, but I accept that there is a cost. As a result of the consultation, there have been significant changes to extend the transitional period and some of the details of the transition, but the change will go ahead.

[Baroness Brinton]

My Lords, does the Minister believe that the additional cost to universities resulting from the removal of the zero rate should be met from their teaching and research resources, or by an additional Higher Education Funding Council grant, or should it be passed on to the occupants of student housing?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, it will be for the universities and colleges affected to decide what they do. We have made generous transitional arrangements which give the affected institutions time to plan. Of course, the total of higher education institutions’ funding will rise during the next two to three years, so there is time for those institutions to make the necessary decisions.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, if the Government are to continue with the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme, why do they not introduce a listed places of learning grant scheme? Better still, why do they not abandon their defeatist attitude towards the European Union and reopen vigorous negotiations with the European Commission to secure a unified zero rate of VAT for both alterations and repairs to heritage buildings?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, on the noble Lord’s first question, he makes the point that I would make: that the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme is a continuation of an existing scheme and not a new scheme that has been introduced. As regards his question on Europe, we need to abide by the VAT rules that Europe sets. Those rules very seriously constrain us, and the noble Lord makes the important point that we have to work within those constraints.

[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, does my noble friend the Minister accept that the Listed Places of Worship Grant Scheme, while it is welcome, does not address the issue satisfactorily? All buildings in the ownership of cathedrals, for instance, are not eligible for it; it is just the place of worship itself. All the heritage organisations, headed by the Heritage Alliance, have submitted evidence to his department which shows that all those who truly know and care about the future of our built heritage in this country believe that the Government have got it wrong. Can we please have a rethink on this?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, there has been a consultation; there have been extensive discussions; and the response to the consultation was published on 28 June. Concessions have been made that will significantly help university listed buildings; for example, certain transitional repairs will be allowed to carry on for four summers. I shall not be drawn again into a discussion of listed places of worship, save to say that some of the same considerations apply. For example, anomalies in the arrangements affecting universities include the fact that those listed buildings which are used for business purposes such as teaching are already subject to VAT as are alterations to all non-listed university buildings, so there are very considerable anomalies here which we are clearing up.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the president of Queens’ College, Cambridge, which contains some of the most beautiful grade 1 listed buildings in the country. The Minister did not accept the figure of £150 million put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, so I can perhaps help him by giving him a precise figure for the impact on my institution. My senior bursar tells me that the impact of this change on my institution will be up to 5% of the teaching, research and student support budget. Was that the Government’s intention?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, the intention was to reduce a number of VAT anomalies, of which this was one, and to introduce generous transitional provisions relating to those measures.

Royal Bank of Scotland: LIBOR

Lord Sassoon Excerpts

Wednesday 4th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Empey]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether and when they were made aware by the Royal Bank of Scotland that the bank had dismissed employees for inappropriate behaviour in relation to setting LIBOR rates.

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

My Lords, the Government are aware that several banks are being investigated by the Financial Services Authority in relation to the setting of the LIBOR rate. While the investigation is going on, it would be inappropriate to comment on any specifics relating to the Royal Bank of Scotland. My right honourable friends the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the Government’s response to the LIBOR issue on Monday.

[Lord Empey]

I thank the Minister for his response. Before I ask my principal supplementary question, I ask: will the Minister comment on the disastrous handling by RBS Group of the customers of Ulster Bank, who are still suffering over two weeks after the crisis began?

With regard to my main Question, will the Minister tell us what instructions he has given to UK Financial Investments Ltd, which looks after taxpayers’ interests with regard to shares held by the Government in various banks? Can he assure the House that the reporting mechanisms back to the Treasury as principal shareholder, particularly in RBS, will be such as to enable the Government to pick up evidence of any malpractice or inappropriate behaviour at an early stage?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, on the RBS/NatWest/Ulster Bank IT failure, RBS has assured customers that nobody will be left out of pocket as a result of the problems. There is a Question down for tomorrow—number 4—from the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, that touches on Ulster Bank, so I am sure we will return to that tomorrow.

On the instructions to RBS and the monitoring of them, the Government manage their shareholdings in RBS at arm’s length through UK Financial Investments and the governance arrangements are set out in the framework document and the investment mandate between UKFI and the Treasury. It is all there transparently on the website. I believe that those arrangements continue to be appropriate for the arm’s-length management. As it happens, UKFI published its annual report only this week. It sets out a very full account of the issues that it has been engaged in with RBS and with Lloyds Bank. I believe that all the appropriate channels are there and that there is a high degree of transparency. I can reassure the noble Lord on that.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords—

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, will the Minister advise the House how many banks from how many countries provide regular LIBOR information in order to produce the average LIBOR rate?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I was looking at the setting of one of the rates the other day, and there is a panel of 18 banks. I think that is typical of the number of currencies and the different time horizons, so it is of the order of 18 or so banks on each one. Of course, they are typically the complete spread of global banks. It is by no means an activity of UK banks, notwithstanding the name of the rate.

[Lord Morris of Aberavon]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Morris of Aberavon]

Will the Minister confirm that the legal provisions for the offences of conspiracy to defraud and false accounting are sufficiently wide to cover most, if not all, of the wrongdoing in this field?

[Lord Sassoon]

The noble and learned Lord clearly points to a couple of very important offences in this area, but in the various inquiries that my right honourable friends have announced we also want to see whether there are any gaps. There is one obvious and glaring gap, which a Front-Bench spokesman from the Opposition conceded a couple of days ago, in that FiSMA is defective in the sense of not allowing direct prosecution for LIBOR fixing under the regime, and that needs to be put right.

[Lord McColl of Dulwich]

In view of the poor behaviour of the banks, could we consider changing the name “bank holiday” back to its original name, “Lubbock Day”? The workers used to call them St Lubbock Day, after the distinguished MP, the grandfather of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury.

[Lord Sassoon]

It is a fascinating suggestion. Thank you for that.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, the Minister will be aware that at Prime Minister’s Questions today my right honourable friend Ed Miliband emphasised the need for great speed in sorting out the issues around the LIBOR scandal, and the need for more considered speed with respect to wider issues. Surely the greatest speed would be achieved by a judicial inquiry which could now sit for five days per week. How many days per week will a parliamentary inquiry sit?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, it is not a question of trading how many days one inquiry or another will sit. I could read out the long list of judicial inquiries that have taken two, three, four, five or 10 years and more. We believe that a parliamentary inquiry can do its work effectively by Christmas. These matters will be debated in another place tomorrow.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords—

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, going back to the Question asked by my noble friend Lord Empey, can the Minister tell the House, without going into specifics, what was the first point in time at which the Government gained any information about the possibility of the rigging of LIBOR?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I am tempted to go back into history beyond the last two years but the answer is that I cannot. It would be inappropriate to discuss that while investigations are still going on.

Economic Policies

Lord Sassoon Excerpts

Wednesday 4th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Low of Dalston]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is their latest assessment of the success of their economic policies.

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

My Lords, returning the UK to sustainable, balanced economic growth is the Government’s overriding priority. Although considerable external risks remain, the Government’s actions to reduce the deficit and rebuild the economy have secured stability and positioned the UK as a relatively safe haven, with interest rates near record lows benefiting families, businesses and the taxpayer.

[Lord Low of Dalston]

I am glad that we are no longer expected to thank Ministers for their replies. I am becoming increasingly concerned about the gap between what Ministers say about the economy and what is actually the case. In the debate on the Queen’s Speech, the Minister told the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, that sustainable recovery was underway. When I asked him on 29 May how he squared that with the fact that we were in double-dip recession, he palmed me off with references to the success of the private sector in generating jobs and exports. No sooner were the words out of his mouth than manufacturing output plummeted. It is up a bit in June, but yesterday we learnt that activity in the construction sector had fallen at the fastest rate for two and a half years. We are probably heading towards a third-quarter recession.

[Lord Low of Dalston]

What has the Minister to say about all of that; and can we believe a word of what he says when he has said it?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I will try to make the answer shorter than the question.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Sassoon]

The noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, raises some important points. Let me try to summarise. On the one hand, the public sector deficit has already been reduced from 11% to 8% of GDP. Public sector employment is down more than 400,000 from the unsustainable levels that it had reached. That is very real progress and we are on track on that dimension.

On the other side, we should not underplay the real success of the private sector in the most difficult and challenging conditions. Some 800,000 new jobs have been created since the election—166,000 new private sector jobs in the past quarter. Unemployment is down by 51,000 in the latest quarter. The private sector is doing a fantastic job to get this country out of the mess that we were left with. That is what it is all about.

[Lord Barnett]

My Lords, last week, the noble Lord misled the House in a reply to a question from my noble friend Lord Peston. He said that the IMF supported the Government's “fiscal course”. May I quote directly from what the IMF said? It said that although it endorsed the deficit cutting plans of the Government, if growth failed to pick up it would help to consider delaying cuts in expenditure and also,

“focus on temporary tax cuts and greater”,

infrastructure expenditure. The noble Lord likes the IMF. Will he take its advice?

[Lord Sassoon]

I did not bring my IMF quote book today to trade on this one, because the Question is about the Government's assessment of the success of their economic policies, not what the IMF is saying about them. I am sure that we will come back to that on another occasion.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords, although reducing the deficit, and even more so the debt, is important, is not relying exclusively on reducing the deficit a bit like playing golf with only one club? Do we not have to have more emphasis on supply-side measures that will encourage the private sector to create the jobs and wealth that the country desperately needs?

[Lord Sassoon]

My noble friend is completely right, and it would be a one-club game if we were not doing all sorts of things on the supply side, such as reducing corporation tax from 28% to 22%, the national loan guarantee scheme of £20 billion, cutting red tape for the first time in living history, enterprise zones, the Regional Growth Fund, the largest number of apprenticeships ever funded by any Government and completely overhauling the planning system, to name a few supply-side reforms.

[Lord Grocott]

Is it in any way conceivable that some of the responsibility—just a smidgeon—for the fact that we are in a double-dip recession lies with the Government?

[Lord Sassoon]

We are working extremely hard on the reforms that I have talked about to make sure that we have sustainable public finances and a more balanced economy.

[Lord Sharkey]

My Lords, the latest report from the Federation of Small Businesses shows, in the second quarter of this year, an increase to 73% in the number of small businesses finding access to credit difficult and an increase to 41% in refusals of credit applications. Given the Government’s efforts to provide funding for the banks to lend to businesses, can the Minister explain why this is so?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, even though the latest business surveys show that private sector employment is significantly up and that manufacturing and service sector sales continue to grow, it is certainly the case that that is happening in the face of very tough financing conditions. That is why, among other things, the national loan guarantee scheme and the announcements from the Chancellor and the governor about the new funding for lending scheme, details of which will be put out in the coming weeks, were very important.

[Lord Peston]

My Lords, bearing in mind the extreme antipathy of the Europhobes on his own Benches and their desire to leave the European Union, why therefore are they so happy to have our economy run by the credit rating agencies?

[Lord Sassoon]

I am not sure that was a question that was addressed to me. However, I do not think that characterises the position of any noble friends of mine.

[Lord Dobbs]

My Lords, will my noble friend cast his mind back to the memoirs of the last Labour Chancellor—and how good those words sometimes sound—in which he described the situation at the end of his tenure of office as being “brutal and volcanic”? It is not clear to me whether he was talking simply about the economic situation that he passed on or his relationship with the Prime Minister, but when my noble friend looks at the sea of outrage opposite, does he not think that, even for them, it comes a bit rich?

[Lord Sassoon]

I entirely agree with my noble friend.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, as but one little wavelet on the sea of outrage, may I ask the noble Lord whether, when he referred to the Government achieving stability for the British economy, he was referring to their achievement of reducing the growth rate from 2% to zero?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I was referring to 800,000 new private sector jobs since the election. I am talking about interest rates at levels we have not seen for 300 years, and more of the same.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Sassoon Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord McFall of Alcluith]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 43. The four main Financial Policy Committee functions have been outlined in the Bill, but I would like the Minister to consider providing clear regulatory statements for both the FCA and the PRA, given that clarity is essential: there is an outside audience here, so transparency and clarity are very important. For both those bodies, that would be a helpful submission from the FPC.

[The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Sassoon)]

My Lords, we are into another bran-tub—not a pot-pourri this time, but a bran-tub, I note; I am not sure what the distinction is. This is a varied group of amendments about the functions of the FPC.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and all other noble Lords taking part in Committee that if there are definitional difficulties—we have got into one or two tangles about definitions, construction of difficult clauses and the interrelationship between clauses and subsections —I am very happy for the noble Lord or any other noble Lord to have meetings including the Bill team to try to thrash out some of those difficult issues outside the Committee if that would be helpful. Some of these things might more easily be done away from the constraints and formality of the debate. I lay that offer on the table to all noble Lords who are interested.

I will come back to Amendment 42, but let me start with Amendment 43, which would require the FPC to prepare and publish regulatory statements for the PRA and FCA. One of the most glaring flaws of the tripartite system of regulation was a lack of clarity about who was responsible for what. As we know, the Bill will create regulatory bodies with clear and separate responsibilities. Although the FPC will have the power to direct the FCA and the PRA, that will apply only in the case of actions required to address systemic risk. The Bill makes it clear that the FPC cannot make recommendations or directions that relate to specified persons—that is, individual firms. Decisions on the policy approach of the PRA and the FCA will be made by their respective boards, not the FPC. As such, the amendment would risk blurring those clear responsibilities of the regulators.

Amendment 47, which would provide the FPC with the power to direct the PRA to require the disclosure of leverage ratios, is simply unnecessary. The Government agree that the disclosure of leverage ratios would be beneficial. That is why we supported the Basel III proposals to require its calculation from 1 January 2013 and its disclosure from 1 January 2015. The Government have pushed for full implementation of Basel III.

The interim FPC recommended in November last year that the FSA encourage UK banks to disclose their leveraged ratios from 1 January 2013, and an update on the progress of that recommendation was included in the financial stability report published last week. I will not, but I could quote extensively from that report. It is clear from reading that FSR that the FPC is already using recommendations to address disclosure issues effectively, so I suggest that Amendment 47 is unnecessary.

[Lord Eatwell]

I do not want to delay the Committee, but will the noble Lord elaborate a little on “addressing effectively”?

[Lord Sassoon]

Perhaps the best thing is to quote what was written by the FPC in its most recent financial stability report, which was published last week. It states:

“Following FSA discussions with chief financial officers earlier this year, the major UK banks and building societies are expected to disclose leverage ratios, calculated according to the fully implemented Basel III definitions, in their end-2012 annual reports. Thereafter, UK banks and building societies will report on both a half-year and end-year basis”.

That is an example of the FPC in interim form, already using recommendations to address disclosure issues to pointed effect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell]

I should have been clearer at the time about what I had in mind. Would it, for example, include a speech made by, say, the Governor of the Bank of England, if that speech had not actually been printed somewhere or issued on a website, but the governor had made a statement about some matter relevant to the FPC?

[Lord Sassoon]

First, it would be difficult to define the governor as a regulator or other body. If the governor had made a speech that had not been published, it would certainly not be a document. Even if it is a published speech, it is unlikely to be a document in the sense of what I am suggesting—rules, codes, guidance or formal statements. The situation which the noble Lord postulates would not be one that would fall within what we are talking about here; there is no question of that.

Amendment 64 is identical to one that was debated in Committee in another place. They debated a number of amendments, although they did not spend as long as we are going to spend, quite rightly, on all this. However, this was one that debated in another place. I should start by repeating what my honourable friend the Financial Secretary made clear there, which is that the FPC’s responsibility to monitor the perimeter of regulation is not only for the outer perimeter covered by Amendment 64. It also has responsibility for the inner perimeter, between those firms regulated prudentially by the PRA and those that fall outside the PRA’s regulation; that is one of the FPC’s most vital roles. To do this effectively, the FPC must monitor whether activities outside the perimeter of regulation or outside the PRA’s scope are being undertaken in such a way that could cause systemic risk or sufficient risk to other firms or consumers that they need to be made subject either to regulation or to a different style of regulation. When the FPC believes that the perimeter of regulation needs to be changed to bring such activities within regulation or within PRA regulation, it can make recommendations to the Treasury under new Section 90. The Treasury can then use its powers to modify the perimeter of regulation accordingly.

I do not agree that the way to ensure that the FPC undertakes the role effectively is to place it under an inflexible and bureaucratic requirement to produce an annual report on the matter. In particular, it seems unrealistic to expect the FPC to produce recommendations within 30 days of coming into formal existence. We need to allow it to use its own judgment and discretion to decide what activities might pose a risk and how and when it should investigate them.

Amendment 65 would amend the FPC’s power to make recommendations to the Treasury to extend the scope of the PRA’s ability to obtain information from unauthorised persons. Given its expertise in systemic financial stability, new Section 90 gives the FPC a power to make recommendations to the Treasury if it believes that the ability of the PRA to obtain information from those outside the perimeter of regulation is needed for financial stability reasons.

[Lord Eatwell]

If I may interrupt the Minister, for the information of all noble Lords, he is referring not to new Section 90 but to new Section 9O. He lost me for some moments.

[Lord Sassoon]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. I should have been referring to new Section 9O in the previous amendment as well. What can I say, other than that the hour is late? I was thinking, “Why is there a typo in my speaking notes?”. I probably have a flood of notes coming from the Box on the matter, but the noble Lord got there first—in fact, I see I have only one.

As I was saying, new Section 9O gives the FPC a power to make recommendations to the Treasury if it believes that the ability of the PRA to obtain information from those outside the perimeter of regulation is needed for financial stability reasons. Removing the words “it considers that” from subsection (4) of new Section 9O —O for orange—would defeat the purpose of the recommendation power, which is to allow the FPC to make its own expert judgment about the need for the PRA to be able to obtain information that is relevant to financial stability from the wider class of person and make recommendations to the Treasury accordingly.

It is important to note that the decision to extend the PRA’s power still lies solely with the Treasury and is subject to approval by both Houses. It will be for the Treasury to look at the recommendation from the FPC alongside other information from the PRA and others and make a call on whether the power needs to be extended.

I shall now address Amendments 53, 87 and 88, all of which deal in some way with transparency and publication requirements around the FPC’s direction-making powers. Amendments 53 and 88 would require the Treasury to inform the chair of the Treasury Select Committee if the directions by the FPC were not laid before Parliament or published. The Government do not believe that it is necessary to make a restrictive legislative provision to provide that Parliament is informed in all cases when the publication of information or documents is deferred for public interest reasons. There is a well established principle that where public money is used to resolve threats to financial stability, the chairs of the relevant parliamentary committees are informed, in confidence if necessary. There are formal and informal mechanisms for this to happen, although I would point out that they are non-legislative mechanisms. I do not believe that the case has been made that it would be necessary, reasonable or proportionate to extend this principle to sensitive material that does not involve the use of public funds. The Bill already provides for the FPC to keep any decision to defer publication of information or documents relating to FPC decisions under review and to publish that material as soon as the threat to the public interest has passed—something we discussed in the previous Committee session. The Bill also requires that a copy of any direction included in the record of an FPC meeting must be laid before Parliament. Given these extensive requirements for the publication of FPC decisions, I do not believe that Amendments 53 and 58 are necessary or appropriate.

Turning briefly to Amendment 87, the provision which the noble Lord, Lord McFall, is attempting to amend already has the effect he desires. New Section 9W(3) reads:

“A direction under Section 9V must be in writing and may be revoked by a notice in writing”.

What the second part of this means is that a direction may be revoked as long as the Bank sends a notice in writing to revoke it. The Bank does not have any discretion to revoke a direction without sending a notice in writing. The Bank cannot revoke a direction orally. I hope that provides reassurance on why Amendment 87 is unnecessary.

I return briefly to Amendment 42, where we began, and an important question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, about why, in his interpretation, the FPC can endanger the FCA’s objective of making sure that markets function well. I hope I have got his key question right, because it is an important one. I will try to explain why I believe that it is a misunderstanding and how it actually works. The strategic objective is an overarching umbrella objective to provide a common goal for the regulator and, in that sense, it acts as a mission statement. It is an objective which has been amended in line with the recommendation of the Independent Commission on Banking; it was endorsed by the Joint Committee and now reads “ensuring that markets function well”. Legally, actions taken by the FCA in discharging its general functions need only be compatible with the strategic objective but must advance one or more of its operational objectives. As such, it is the operational objectives which provide the crucial mandate for the FCA to act in these areas. The Treasury Committee states that the case has not been made for the strategic objective. The Government believe that the strategic objective will act as a high level mission statement that brings together the diverse aspects of the FCA’s work and, as such, it will serve a useful purpose in focusing the new, regulatory culture of the FSA. It will also operate as a check and balance on the operational objectives and help to ensure that the FCA does not pursue any single operational objective in a manner that undermines the overall functioning of the market.

It might also be worth adding that effective mission statements commonly clarify an organisation’s purpose. They usually set out the aims of an organisation and its key target for shareholders. They do not go into detail of an organisation’s goals or targets and the approach taken in achieving them. The FCA’s strategic objective clearly meets these criteria. It gives an overall purpose or aim to the FSA, which is to ensure that markets function well, and it clarifies that this only refers to the relevant markets as defined in new Section 1F in Clause 5.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell]

I wonder if I have got it right. The noble Lord’s argument about the position being somehow at a different level does not work. What works in the definition of the FCA’s general duties is the following: the Bill states that the FCA must discharge its functions to,

“act in a way which … is compatible with its strategic objective, and … advances one or more of its operational objectives”.

Consequently, the only way in which the FCA can pursue its strategic objective is via one of the operational objectives. Consequently, if you do not prejudice the operational objectives, you do not prejudice the strategic objective. It therefore has nothing to do with higher levels, but simply relates to the word “and” at a relevant point that I had missed—for which I apologise—in the general duties of the FCA. Is that correct?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I believe that the drafting is fine. I reiterate that in discharging its general functions, the FCA must act in a way that is compatible with its strategic objective but which advances one or more of its operational objectives. The drafting is, I believe, appropriate, but I will of course have another look to see whether the “and” is appropriate. The noble Lord’s colleague in another place was, I am sure, given a clearer explanation by my colleague the Financial Secretary on exactly this point. Of course I will look again, but my belief is that the drafting works. If, on reflection, it does not, I will, in the customary way, write to all noble Lords who have taken part in this discussion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I first address the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I am now very puzzled by the status of recommendations, given that a recommendation is not necessarily something which needs to be followed. Given that there seems to be no indication, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, pointed out, about the reactions to recommendations, it is difficult to assess the status of this concept within the structure of the Bill. My Amendment 69 simply deals with the offending new Section 9Q and deletes it. It states:

“The Financial Policy Committee may make recommendations to”,

the world. I am sure the world would be very grateful, but we should not expend public money on making recommendations to the world, and especially not on confirming them in writing. It would be interesting to know who these “persons other than those” are defined to be when we are talking about the context of macroprudential regulation; we are not talking about relationships, say, with individual firms or whatever. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has picked up on some important and valuable obscurities in the Bill and it would be helpful if the Minister could elucidate them.

A sort of bran-tub of my amendments has again been grouped together. I am sorry about that but I am not responsible for the groupings. I could ungroup them but that would be tedious for everyone, so let us deal with them. Amendment 48 is included in the group, which again has been tabled in the context of directions. It refers to the point made with respect to the nature of directions. The Bill states in proposed new Section 9G(4) that:

“The direction may relate to all regulated persons or to regulated persons of a specified description, but may not relate to a specified regulated person”.

I understand entirely what the drafting is supposed to do, but given the level of conglomeration and concentration in the financial services industry, I do not think that this will work as it is quite possible to refer to,

“regulated persons of a specified description”,

but for there to be only one firm of that description. It is quite possible for that to happen. If this may not “relate to” in the sense that it may not have a relationship to, that would rule out, say, a reference to,

“regulated persons of a specified description”,

if it just so happened that the set of persons of that description contained but one element—just one firm of that type. We can see that there are various niche firms and highly specialised companies in the City. I can think of very highly specialised money brokers of which only one performs a particular role in the money markets. Perhaps my amendment would have been more helpful if it had changed the word “relate” to “refer”, so that the direction could not refer to an individual specified regulated person. That would be inappropriate and would go beyond what the FPC is designed to do. However, I am nervous that the activities of the FPC may be unreasonably limited by the possibility that there might be just one specific regulated person within a given class of persons to which the FPC wishes to issue a direction.

I turn to Amendment 50, which again refers to new Section 9G. Subsection (6) refers to the fact that a direction,

“may not require its provisions to be implemented by specified means”—

I am not quite sure what that means—but then it goes on to say,

“or within a specified period”.

This is very dangerous in the sense that it may be enormously important that a direction should be operational within a specified period. It may be important for the financial stability of Britain that actions take place within a month or six weeks, or whatever the period might be. Being unable to require that provisions be implemented within a specified period seriously weakens the ability of the FPC to pursue effectively the stability objective. I am also a bit worried about the term “specified means”, but again, I am not sure what it means. Perhaps the Minister could help me on that when he replies. I really think that the business of a specified period should be looked at very carefully indeed for fear of weakening the powers of the FPC.

Amendment 63 has been withdrawn, so I turn now to Amendment 66. It refers to the making of recommendations under new Section 9P(2), and states specifically that:

“The recommendations may relate to all regulated persons or to regulated persons of a specified description, but may not relate to the exercise of the functions of the FCA or the PRA in relation to a specified regulated person”.

Again, this is the problem. It is quite possible that a generic description could apply to just one regulated person. Therefore, this is the same point that I made with respect to Amendment 48. The word “relate”—that is, “have a relationship to”—could result in the FPC not being able to make recommendations because the specified activity was performed by only one particular institution.

Finally, Amendment 69 is where I follow on from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and comments that have been made by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, about new Section 9Q being very odd. It states that:

“The Financial Policy Committee may make recommendations to persons other than those”,

namely, the rest of the world. With those comments, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s comments on the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the various amendments in my bran-tub in this case.

[Lord Sassoon]

Yet another bran-tub—I am looking forward to another pot-pourri, which will come in due course, no doubt.

On this group of amendments around the levers and powers of the FPC, I will start with Amendments 42A and 62A in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, and I will follow with Amendment 69 from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. These amendments seek to remove the FPC’s powers to make recommendations. As my noble friend has said, she does not seek to remove those powers but to probe how they will operate and why they are necessary in some particulars, although Amendment 69 is intended to remove the wider recommendation power.

I say at the outset that recommendations will be the primary means by which the FPC will seek to address systemic risks, and I do not think that any noble Lords who have spoken are challenging that. It is a question of how they will operate and whether some of the power is redundant, but I hope that we would agree that recommendations will be at the heart of the FPC’s ability to do its job. My noble friend talked a bit about how it used to work; once upon a time there was, of course, regulation by the governor’s eyebrows, and a carefully calculated arching could elicit all sorts of reactions from the City.

I suggest that recommendations to industry from the FPC will fulfil a broadly similar—if more wordy—role to that of the governor’s eyebrows, by allowing the committee to highlight risks or unsustainable behaviour. However, recommendations, unlike the governor’s eyebrows, will have and need to have legal backing. The Bill allows the FPC to make recommendations to the PRA and FCA. In a moment I will come back to where the reciprocal requirement on those two bodies to follow through on the explanations is—to the Bank, to the Treasury and to other persons.

On the PRA and FCA, the question was: where is the duty? I am slightly puzzled by this, because it seems very clear, in new Section 9P(3), that the FCA and the PRA have a clear duty to comply or explain. They must either,

“act in accordance with the recommendations”,

or explain why not, and that is a firm legal duty.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

Just to be clear, the FPC is going to make recommendations within the Bank, so that the governor of the Bank, wearing his hat as chairman of the FPC, writes to himself as governor—is that what will happen? Have I got this right? I presume that the two deputy governors will also join in and send it in one door and walk next door to receive it—is that right?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, that is broadly right. [Laughter.] We should remember that the FPC will be made up of a different group of people, including independent members, who will be making recommendations. Taking the example I gave of the supervision of payment systems, the FPC, with its independent members and statutory responsibilities, could be making recommendations to the Bank regarding its supervision of payment systems. It would therefore be a mischaracterisation—it really does not matter who signs a letter to whom, it would be the FPC making a recommendation to the Bank. To reduce it to a suggestion that the governor will be writing to himself would be a mischaracterisation of an important power that should have a degree of formality around it, in the same way that the FPC will be required to exercise its powers of making recommendations for other regulatory bodies.

[Baroness Noakes]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the explanation that he is trying to provide, but I feel a little as if we are in Alice in Wonderland. Can the Minister give me an example in the real world where people within organisations behave in the way in which we seem to be expecting the Bank of England to behave?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I am not sure whether one can distinguish the world in which we are talking about financial regulation from the real world. This is the real world. It is a world in which these are very important powers that go to the heart of ensuring the financial stability of the UK. This is not a frivolous point. It may appear on the surface to be Alice in Wonderland territory but, if the FPC is to exercise the really significant powers in the system that it is being given or the responsibility for financial stability, it must first have the levers. One of the important constituencies that it will be addressing—and it would be totally remiss of the Government and this Bill to leave it out—would be directions from the FPC to another important regulatory body, of which the Bank is one.

An awful lot of things could be left unsaid which one would assume would somehow happen. This is not one where it would be safe in any way to do so because, if we did not have this power to make recommendations, there could be a significant risk that the FPC would not have the powers—the levers—over critical areas of the supervision and the regulation of the financial infrastructure that underpins so much of our financial system. One only has to look at recent events to see how computer glitches and apparently relatively simple IT problems can have very significant consequences. I suggest that the FPC would have a huge hole in this armoury if it was not able to make recommendations also directed at those who supervise the infrastructure.

[Lord McFall of Alcluith]

On this point, can I remind fellow Peers that I have invited the Governor of the Bank of England along tomorrow morning, so I suggest that they ask him the very important question: “Will he enjoy writing letters to himself in the future?”.

[Viscount Trenchard]

The Minister just said that the FPC is to be a separate committee with strong statutory powers. I find it very hard to reconcile this with its being a committee of the Court of the Bank of England. This is different from the MPC, which is not a committee of the court but is a committee of the Bank. It would be more logical and comprehensible if at least it were acknowledged—as it clearly is—that the FPC is not a committee of the court but a strong semi-separate body. However, the Bill says that it is a committee of the court, in which case it cannot have any powers beyond the powers of the court.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, the clear advice on the drafting of the Bill—notwithstanding other constructions that my noble friends are putting on this—is that the FPC should have the clear power to make these recommendations. I remember now that I, almost on a daily basis, am writing letters of perhaps a similar kind when I write to my boss the Chancellor—when, for example, he is wearing his hat as the chair of a Cabinet committee—for clearance or to seek permission for some policy matter. I certainly write letters within the Treasury on a regular basis to deal with formal matters, which is broadly similar territory to what we are talking about.

I have talked about the importance of clarity and transparency. It is perhaps worth underlining that one of the things that this power does is to ensure—because FPC recommendations will be published in the meeting record of the FPC—that the public are informed that, if a recommendation has been made by the FPC to the Bank, it is recorded and is open to public scrutiny.

I think that it was my noble friend’s construction that the FPC cannot have powers beyond those of the court. I correct him on that: if the Bill confers such powers on the Financial Policy Committee, it does indeed have powers that the court does not have.

[Viscount Trenchard]

In that case, does my noble friend the Minister not think that it would be right to recognise the FPC as a committee of the Bank and as separate from the court, having its own powers as given in the Bill? The position would then be logical. At the moment, it is stated that it is a committee of the court. If I were a member of the court, I would not find it easy to understand any structure where a committee of the court—that is, the board—had powers which were independent of and separate from those of the court itself.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, that is the situation; my noble friend might find it difficult now. If he or anybody else was appointed—as they have been—to the interim FPC or the formal FPC if and when it becomes established, they will of course receive extensive briefing on all these matters. This is not the right place to discuss how the FPC fits into the architecture of the Bank—that is dealt with in other provisions. Although my noble friend may not like it, the FPC, however it is constituted—I do not think that his construction would alter the point—simply must have these important powers, which are unequivocally the powers of the FPC and not those of the Bank. That is the case however the FPC fits into the architecture. I am glad that we have probed this matter but, without this provision being in the Bill, the FPC would be unable to make recommendations and would not therefore be transparent and open to parliamentary or public challenge.

These are important matters, but I think that I should turn, if the Committee will permit me, to Amendment 69, relating to the FPC’s ability to make recommendations to people other than those whom we have discussed so far. Amendment 69 would remove one of the FPC’s most versatile and useful levers for addressing systemic risks. Perhaps the best way of explaining this is by addressing the challenge given to me by my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts to provide examples of what we are thinking about and why the power is necessary.

For example, the FPC may wish to make a recommendation to the Financial Reporting Council regarding corporate governance standards, or to the European Banking Authority about a risk to the UK financial system stemming from European banks—that very much links in with our recognising earlier that systemic risks may come from overseas and should not be ruled out. Equally, here is a power taking on board the challenge from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, about international linkages. Here is a power that gives an important ability to the FPC to make recommendations to an international authority.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I want to refer to that discussion on Amendment 50. First, the amendment would not give the FPC the power to specify a precise time. It could specify a period: by the end of the month, within six weeks, within two months, or whatever it might be. The notion of a precise time is an inaccurate reading of the amended subsection. Secondly, while it is clearly right that the PRA and the FCA may have specialist knowledge at the micro level of the regulatory system, we are giving these powers to the FPC because it has specialised knowledge with respect to macro- prudential measures. If the FPC feels that it is urgent, for macroprudential reasons, that measures be taken within a specified period and it has the specialised knowledge, it seems to me that denying it the ability to require something to be done within a given time seriously weakens its effectiveness.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, we could discuss at some length what the meaning of a “specified period” might be. Clearly it could, if interpreted as the noble Lord says, be by a certain month end. Equally, it could mean tomorrow, on the day after tomorrow or at the beginning of next month. I did not want to detain the Committee for too long at this late hour but a recommendation or direction dictating that an action be implemented within a certain timescale could have a serious negative implication for the safety and soundness of individual firms or for consumers. The FPC will not necessarily be aware of those negative implications on individual firms or consumers but the regulators themselves will be.

There are scenarios that could be highly undesirable if they led to consumer detriment because the FPC had been specific about the timing of implementation. On the other hand, the arrangements that I have explained at some length, which mean that the FPC could issue the direction on a “comply or explain” basis, would put the individual supervisor or regulator in a position where it had to come back and justify very clearly why it had taken a particular course of action. I believe we have struck the right balance here, which avoids the difficulties to which I have referred.

Turning to Amendments 48 and 66, I will go straight to the critical issue that I was asked about on a couple of occasions in different ways. There may be other points that need to be made, but I will be clear on the questions about whether the FPC can be specific about one firm. The FPC can describe a type or class of firms even if that, in practice, only captures one firm. This is allowed so long as the FPC targets the risk and not the firm. The FPC is not allowed to say: “Do X to Barclays or prevent RBS doing Y”. However, in the circumstances that the noble Lord postulated, where a firm was the only one in a particular area or type of business, the FPC would not be prohibited or prevented from describing a class of one in those circumstances.

[Lord Eatwell]

I do not see how that can be right. Taking the first of the two amendments, the new Section 9G(4) would read:

“The direction … may not relate to a specified regulated person”.

If the direction is a generic direction and there is only one person who satisfies that generic description, it does relate to—that is, it has a relationship to. I think it is just the wrong verb. If you said “refer to”, you would be entirely right. “Relate to” is wrong. Perhaps later, over a glass of wine, we can turn to the Oxford English Dictionary, but I believe the word “relate” does not mean what the noble Lord has suggested it means. The word “refer” would mean that, but “relate” means “to have a relationship to”, and in the case that I have just described, it would certainly have a relationship to a specified regulated person.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, my clear understanding of the drafting here—and like these other drafting points that we have dealt with, if I have got it wrong I will of course write—is that a specified regulated person is the key thing, which in the examples I gave would be Barclays or the RBS. We should not be concentrating on the verb “relate” but what we need to be looking at in new Section 9G(4) is the construction on “specified regulated person” and that would be naming an individual firm.

If the FPC were to make a direction related to regulated persons of a specified direction which happened only to be a class of one firm, then I am clear that that is what is intended here. If I have got it wrong, which I do not believe I have, I will clarify the situation. I wish I had the complete Oxford English Dictionary. It would be quite difficult to bring it in to discuss it over a glass of wine, but I have the Concise Oxford English Dictionary at my fingertips and it might help the noble Lord to say that the concise edition defines “relate” interalia as meaning “having reference to”. I do not know whether that helps him, but perhaps we can move on.

We were on Amendments 48 and 66, and I think that that particular point was the major one here concerning the Committee. I would just say more generally that we are absolutely committed to maintaining clarity of responsibilities and distinguishing micro or firm-specific roles from the macro role. We do not want any lack of clarity here, but on the situation which the noble Lord postulates, I hope that I have satisfied him that indeed the drafting is correct. After that long and interesting discussion, I would ask my noble friend to consider withdrawing her amendment.

[Baroness Noakes]

My Lords, given the hour I shall not prolong any further what has been an interesting debate. I would like to thank my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, for taking part in 50-odd minutes of discussion. My noble friend says that these recommendations to which my amendments were addressed are a lever, and that they need legal backing. I frankly do not see that. I am going to read with great care what my noble friend has said, in particular about making recommendations within the Bank, to the rest of the world and indeed to the Treasury, none of which seems to have any legal effect and is just simply a way of writing down something that might happen. I will not prolong the agony any further this evening and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Sassoon Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd July 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

33: Clause 3, page 3, line 32, after “the” insert “Financial Policy”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stewartby]

My Lords, I well remember the debates that we had all those years ago on the Monetary Policy Committee, and how many objectives could be added to the central one. This is a bit of a nostalgic occasion, because we are going through different subject matter but the same basic problems. I start from the point that the more of these extras you have, the more confusing they are likely to become for those who have to identify them and classify them under a heading—for example, “You’ve got a bit of employment here, and perhaps supply of finance. How is that getting on in our calculations?”. Those who attempt to allocate specific ingredients under these headings will fairly quickly find themselves with a lot of practical problems.

That leads me to say that I am probably a bit more cynical than sceptical than most noble Lords here today. There is a tendency to be overexpansive in economic policy-making, because Governments tend to be optimistic, and are therefore more likely to err on the side of overcooking than undercooking. Their focus also tends to be short-term rather than long-term. It is very difficult to feed in long-term assessments of this when it takes a good while for the implications of individual policies to be evident. I am, therefore, at the cautious end of this argument, and we ought to be very careful about not loading the process with too many objectives.

We should definitely say that nothing should conflict with growth or whatever we want, but it is different when one puts it in a negative rather than a positive way. You can add any number of “promoting”, “contributing”, “having regards to” and so forth, but the fact that there are all these different explanations illustrate that it is not a precise science. To treat it as though it were would be a recipe for difficulty and internal conflict. I may, therefore, be in a minority of one about this, but most of what has been said this afternoon comes from a starting point that itself is questionable.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, the Government have always been clear that the Financial Policy Committee, as the body responsible for ensuring the stability and safety of the financial sector as a whole, must have financial stability as its primary focus. That is our starting point. However, we have been equally clear that the FPC must balance the pursuit of its primary objective for financial stability with the wider impact of its actions.

In our February 2011 consultation document the Government spoke of the need to,

“build the balance between financial stability and sustainable economic growth”,

into the FPC’s objectives. In addition, my right honourable friend the Chancellor made clear, when giving evidence to the Treasury Select Committee almost exactly a year ago, that we do not seek “the stability of the graveyard”. Our first shot at achieving this symmetry within the FPC’s framework was the creation of an economic growth “brake” for the FPC. The provision set out in subsection (4) of new Section 9C prevents the FPC from taking action that would significantly adversely affect the ability of the financial sector to contribute to medium- or long-term economic growth in all cases, regardless of the strength of the financial stability rationale. That is a very strong backstop provision.

However, the Government have listened to calls, both in another place and in our Second Reading debate in this House, for the FPC to be given a positive duty to support economic growth. In response to those calls, government Amendment 35A amends the Bill to give the FPC a secondary objective to support,

“the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including its objectives for growth and employment”.

As many noble Lords are aware, this wording is identical to that used in the MPC’s secondary objective.

The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has used similar wording in his Amendment 34, but in the form of “having regard” rather than a secondary objective. I believe that in this case a secondary objective is more appropriate—more purposive, in the words of my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots—than “having regard”. We mean to be purposive here. The Government’s intention is to require the FPC to seek proactively to support economic growth. For this, you need an objective, not simply “having regard”.

Some noble Lords have questioned how such an objective bites in the context of the MPC. I am very glad that the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, is at last starting to get answers to his questions from the noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell, who is much more expert in these things than I am, and long may he continue to keep the noble Lord, Lord Barnett, supplied with explanations. In my inadequate way, I shall attempt to give one or two examples; first, of how the new secondary objective will impact on the FPC’s decision-making. I do not want to get sidetracked too much on the MPC but I will make one or two remarks to suggest that similar wording has impacted on the MPC as well. It is most important to think about the FPC, because that is what we are talking about here.

Let us imagine that the FPC takes action, such as imposing additional capital requirements, during the upturn of the cycle, when systemic risks are building up and financial stability concerns are heightened. If the situation changes—for example, the expansion subsides and the financial stability risks reduce—the secondary objective for economic growth will incentivise the FPC to remove those additional capital requirements in order to free up money for lending to the real economy. This effect will work in tandem with the new requirement for the Bank to review previous actions, which we will discuss in due course.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, will the noble Lord recognise that what he has just described as being the result of his amendment is precisely what the Government are not doing in the present circumstances? The economy is not reviving and the Government have not reconsidered their policy of imposing additional capital requirements on banks.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, first, I was talking about different economic conditions, and, secondly, I would have thought that the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, would endorse why it would be extremely helpful to have such a secondary objective on the FPC.

Moving on, a second example of how such a secondary objective will operate is where the FPC is choosing between various different courses of action to address a systemic risk. Assuming that the actions under consideration are equally effective in addressing the risk to stability, the secondary objective will require the FPC to select the action that is more compatible with the Government’s economic objectives.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that it is the role of the FPC to lean against the wind.

[Lord Peston]

Before the noble Lord goes on with his agreement, which I am looking forward to, I still have not heard any argument from him about “subject to that”. What he has to say requires the word “and”, not “subject to that”. There is no way that “subject to that” makes any sense. To give him an example, could he imagine the head of the FPC being interviewed on the “Today” programme? The first question is, “What are you doing?”. “I’m contributing to the stability objective.” “Oh, and, incidentally, do you support the Government’s economic policies?” “Oh, no.” Can you imagine him saying, “Oh, no”? I cannot imagine any circumstances in which he would say, “Oh, no”. I cannot even imagine any circumstances—unless he wants to be regarded as insane—in which he would say, “I am unable to answer that question”. His only possible answer to the question “Do you support the Government’s economic policies?” is “Yes”, which is why the word “and” ought to be there and not “subject to that”.

That is why I regard the view that the Treasury took on the MPC as fudging the thing. I am afraid the ex-Treasury people have to recognise that that is what the MPC does. Could you imagine the Governor of the Bank of England saying, “I don’t support the Government’s economic policies”? We are not discussing the MPC. We are discussing the FPC—I always forget its name. Why does the Minister not use the simpler language, rather than “subject to that”, which is totally spurious?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, as I was coming on to say, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, which is very much to the point of the noble Lord, Lord Peston. The FPC has to, and should, be able to lean against the wind—in appropriate circumstances—which is why the FPC’s primary objective is and should remain financial stability. It is right that it is “subject to that” primary objective that the FPC should seek to support the Government’s economic policy. The wording picks that up in the way that an “and” would not. We will have to disagree on that. I have given examples of where I believe that the FPC will interpret the language we have used appropriately.

Although I do not want to go too far into MPC territory, it is relevant to look at the MPC because there are examples one can draw out from its analysis to suggest that language is used in the MPC context in a very similar way to the way I would expect it to be used in the FPC context. I draw the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Peston, to what deputy governor Charlie Bean said in February 2012: that if the MPC,

“had chosen to run a substantially tighter monetary policy, then that would only have served to depress activity and raise unemployment even further … it would also make the task of fiscal consolidation and de-leveraging even more challenging. And by providing a gloomier climate for business, it would also inhibit investment and slow the necessary re-balancing of our economy towards manufacturing and internationally tradable services”.

Although this is not the time to go into it further, it is possible to argue—and the evidence is very much there—that the MPC is affected by the wording in the same way in which the suggested wording of the Government’s amendments will bite on the FPC. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell, for further illuminating some of these issues.

The three situations in which the noble Baroness, Lady Valentine, quite rightly postulated that the new secondary objective needs to work were good times, crisis and uncertainty. I can only say that I completely agree with her and that the wording that the Government propose strikes the right balance and will take account of all those scenarios. Of course, we are not relying solely on the secondary objective for growth, but I am sure that she understands that.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

35A: Clause 3, page 3, line 35, leave out from first “to” to end of line 36 and insert—
“(a) contributing to the achievement by the Bank of the Financial Stability Objective, and(b) subject to that, supporting the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including its objectives for growth and employment.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blair of Boughton]

My Lords, I know that the Minister is about to speak but can I give a slight and practical example of how witnesses will approach these different inquiries. I find myself entirely in agreement, as any Cross-Bencher should be, with both sides of the House. How does a witness approach these different inquiries? They approach the criminal inquiry with the narrowest possible dimension about the facts in dispute. I have appeared at the No. 1 court at the Old Bailey, so I know what it feels like. You are always told that you should answer only the question you are asked. When you appear in front of a parliamentary inquiry, you have the same approach with a view as to where the political issues will come from, which you have to think about. When you appear, as I did, in front of Leveson, you do so on a completely different basis. My evidence to Leveson began in the 1820s. In other words, you are looking at the whole issue in the round. I do not understand why there needs to be any dispute between the two sides of the House in this debate. Have a criminal inquiry, have Tyrie and have a judge-led inquiry into the ultimate circumstances of the way in which the banking culture has taken over parts of our society.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, first, let us be clear that these amendments have very little to do with the Bill before us today. They are all about the Opposition’s misguided attempts to slow down what we need to do to deal with the consequences of the LIBOR scandal. We need rapidly to restore public confidence in the financial services industry, which the Government are pressing on with. We do not need to kick these very serious matters into the long grass, as the Opposition now propose. It is time for Parliament, as well as the Government, to take clear leadership on these matters. The events of recent days have highlighted that the culture of banking is badly broken. The Government are in the process of fixing the system, but we need to change the mindset of the profession and those working in it. This is about restoring banking to what it should be about: to be the most, and not the least, trusted profession.

The basic facts of the attempted LIBOR manipulation are clear. There have already been published reports from three regulators in the UK and the US. We do not need a judicial inquiry to tell us what the facts are. A judicial inquiry would be principally aimed at establishing the facts; it would likely take years to complete, might not be able to start until after prosecutions had been completed and would cost the taxpayer millions of pounds.

Now we need three things. First, we need the rapid prosecution of individuals who may have broken the criminal law. This is what the SFO and the Crown Office in Scotland are looking to do. Secondly, we need to look at how LIBOR cannot be fixed again, which is the subject of Martin Wheatley’s review. Thirdly, we need to look into the ethical and professional standards of the financial services industry and we need to do so urgently to ensure that the banking industry is serving the needs of the wider UK economy and the continued global competitiveness of London and the UK.

For this reason, the Government recommend that Parliament considers undertaking an urgent inquiry into the culture and ethics of the banking industry to help shape the urgent reform that is so much needed. The Government propose the establishment of a full parliamentary committee of inquiry, comprised of representatives from both Houses, and set up by a joint resolution of both Houses. The proposed terms of reference for the committee are building on the Treasury Select Committee’s work and drawing on the conclusions of UK and international regulatory and competition investigations into the LIBOR rate-setting process, consider what lessons are to be learnt in relation to transparency, conflicts of interest and the culture and professional standards of the, financial services industry, including the interaction of these with civil sanctions and criminal law. While I hear noble Lords seeking to paint this as a narrow inquiry, on any construction, these words will give the Joint Committee a very wide remit.

I am also glad that the Opposition now seem to support the creation of this committee. I have laid out what is required. We certainly do not require a proliferation and duplication of reviews that could go on for several years. We recommend that the inquiry should commence immediately and conclude by Christmas. As noble Lords are aware, the Government plan to introduce the banking Bill that will implement the recommendations of Sir John Vickers’s Independent Commission on Banking in January next year. This will bring far-reaching and lasting changes to the structure of British banks. The Government’s preferred timetable for the committee of inquiry would allow the Government to use the Bill to make any appropriate further changes needed to the standards of the banking industry and the criminal and civil powers needed to regulate it, and hold people to account for their behaviour.

The Joint Committee will do its work well and comprehensively and will report by Christmas. However, if, at that stage, this House or another place was not satisfied with the work of the Joint Committee, it will be possible for Parliament to press for a further inquiry. At that time, the inquiry proposed by this amendment would not even have started. The Government fully intend that Parliament should play a significant role in getting to the bottom of what happened and helping make the system more robust. It is surely highly desirable and consistent with many of our previous discussions in recent months that your Lordships’ House should be fully engaged in the process, bringing the full breadth of its expertise to bear from Peers of all the main parties and none.

This is already a big Bill, on which time is now being taken up by debating the merits of an inquiry—a debate that will not help noble Lords with the key business of the House today, namely scrutinising the detailed contents of the Financial Services Bill. It may help your Lordships to know that in another place on Thursday there will be debates on two Motions—one an opposition Motion, another a government Motion—to consider in detail the questions that we have debated at some length this afternoon. It is appropriate to leave another place to debate those Motions on Thursday so that we get on with and stick to the Committee’s core task today on the Financial Services Bill.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his response. Will he confirm that, if there is to be an SFO-led inquiry into any criminality arising from the LIBOR incident, the SFO will not be expected to meet the cost of that inquiry from its existing budget but will be given the separate funding needed so that the inquiry can be full, complete and properly resourced?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, as was in the Statement yesterday, I can confirm that the SFO is on the case, looking at all the possibilities for criminal prosecutions and that the Crown Office in Scotland is doing likewise. There has been no request of which I am aware from the SFO for additional resources. I assure my noble friend that, if there was such a request, it would be looked at sympathetically by the Government. It has been an important and lively debate because these are critical issues for the financial services industry and I hope that, with those further explanations, the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Barnett]

I am sorry to hear that it has been a wholly non-party political debate today until the noble Lord got up. However, will he at least consider—or, if not him, get somebody in government to consider—the point that my noble friend Lord Peston made? Given the circumstances of great national interest involved here, the Prime Minister should take the trouble to talk to the leader of the Opposition with a view to finding a way through that would be accepted on all sides. In those circumstances—if he could give us the kind of assurance that we need—I would certainly press my noble friend to withdraw the amendment. Can he give us any kind of assurance?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, even better than that, two Motions will be tabled in another place on Thursday which will give an opportunity for the different views of the Government and Opposition on these matters to be aired fully. We should look very seriously at where that debates leads to.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

35B: Clause 3, page 3, line 37, leave out “of that objective” and insert “by the Bank of the Financial Stability Objective”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, this group of amendments is a rather mixed bag but all of them refer to various duties of the Financial Policy Committee. The first, Amendment 36, which is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hayter, adds to the definitions of systemic risk in new Section 9C(3) of the Bank of England Act 1998 the collapse,

“of confidence in the financial system as a whole”.

Academic research has identified four major sources of systemic risk, at least to date: first, linkages, or the connections between markets, referred to in new Section 9C(3)(a); secondly, the distribution of risk, particularly in the context of cyclical variations in risk, referred to in new subsection (3)(b); thirdly, excessive leverage, debt and credit growth, as referred to in new subsection (3)(c); and fourthly, the general collapse of confidence, which is not referred to at all. This is a serious omission—probably a slip in drafting, but none the less a serious omission in the analysis of systemic risk.

There can be a major systemic failure that is not associated with any of new subsection (3)(a), (b) and (c). You can have a situation that is not represented by linkages between firms, is not to do with the distribution of risk, and is not due to excessive leveraged debt or credit growth, but is due to the collapse of a firm in a particular strategic position within the industry, which leads to a general collapse of confidence. There is no necessary visible linkage between the firms, but the collapse of confidence can lead to a general systemic failure. Adding this fourth component—which is completely standard in the usual list of four in the academic literature—would complete the set from which, for some reason, this element has been neglected. To use the felicitous expression of the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, it would plug the gap.

Amendment 37 is a probing amendment, although it has more substance than that. New Section 9C(4) of the Bank of England Act says:

“Subsections (1) and (2) do not require or authorise the Committee”—

the FPC—

“to exercise its functions in a way that would in its opinion be likely to have a significant adverse effect”,

et cetera. The phrase “in its opinion” seems to me to make the new section completely meaningless. How would you ever tell? If something happened and the committee pursued some set of objectives that had a significant adverse affect on the capacity of the financial sector to contribute to growth—something the noble Lord earlier this afternoon pointed to as a very positive provision in the Bill—how would you then know whether this had been “in its opinion” or not? You would go along to the committee and ask, “Why did you do this?”. It would respond: “In our opinion, it was the right thing to do. End of story”. Consideration of the implications of its acts has been ruled out of court. The phrase “in its opinion” seems to make the clause devoid of meaningful content. If we remove it, we will improve the overall import of the Bill and, significantly, of this section that refers to the functions of the FPC.

With Amendment 39, I have a real mystery. Systemic risks are defined as credit growth, debt and leverage. However, in new Section 9C(7), all those terms are defined with respect to the UK only. Why is that? We live in a global financial market. Why do they refer to the UK? If these conditions had been in place and the FPC was considering the position of the Royal Bank of Scotland, that bank would have been found to be totally secure, because almost all the problems that assailed it occurred outwith the UK. The growth of credit from that bank was excessive outwith the UK. Its debt position was defined not by the debt it owed to individuals in the UK but to bond-holders and individuals throughout the world. I must be reading this completely wrongly but am totally mystified as to why credit growth, debt and leverage, as referred to in the definition of systemic risk, are confined to the UK. I would be very grateful if I could be enlightened and told that somehow I have got this wrong and that this does not confine consideration to the UK but is dealing with some other, wider element.

Continuing the international theme in this pot-pourri of amendments, I turn to Amendment 44, which deals with page 5, line 39, and refers to the overall functions of the Committee, suggesting that it should be,

“assessing its functions in the light of the policies of the European Financial Stability Board”.

As we know, much of the structure of the regulatory rule book for the UK will be written in Brussels. The EU, like the UK, is feeling its way towards defining the proper role of its macroprudential regulator, namely the European Financial Stability Board. The EFSB will, over the next couple of years, build a toolkit not unlike one that we desire for the FPC—rules on leverage ratios, procyclical provisioning, risk-weighted capital ratios and so on.

It is essential that measures taken in the UK are compatible with measures taken at the EU level, and vice versa. That is why the FPC must, at the very least, assess its functions in the light of what the European Financial Stability Board is doing. We will have an independent position, and the EFSB does not have the same European-wide status as the banking securities markets and insurance regulators, but none the less we want the activities of our FPC to be compatible with those of the EFSB.

To sum up, this is somewhat of a bran-tub. You put your hand in and take out amendments to see which aspect you would like to look at, so it is a slightly diverse group. Amendment 36 adds to systemic risk the risk of collapse of confidence in the system as a whole. Amendment 37 removes “in its opinion” from the new subsection whereby the FPC must take account of its impact on the financial sector’s contribution to growth, as the phrase would render the clause meaningless, or at least inoperable. Amendment 39 raises the question of why growth, debt and leverage are defined purely with respect to the UK, when—for goodness’ sake—we in Britain are dealing with some of the largest global financial institutions in the world. Amendment 44 simply adds to the functions and the need to take into account the actions of the European Financial Stability Board. Going back to Amendment 36 and the collapse of confidence in the system as a whole, I beg to move.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I do not know whether this group is a pot-pourri or a bran-tub, but let me attempt to do justice to a number of these amendments. Fine group though they make, they do not entirely find favour with the Government, as the noble Lord will know, because I do not believe they are necessary. I shall address each of them in turn.

Amendment 36 attempts to add,

“factors likely to lead to a loss of confidence in the financial system as a whole”,

to the list of specific types of systemic risks. I can reassure the Committee and the noble Lord in particular that new subsection (3) is not intended to be an exhaustive definition of systemic risk. The types of risk that have been highlighted in this section are generally accepted to be the main types of macroprudential risk, but systemic risks may well arise in future that are not included in these categories. That is why the FPC is free to look at anything else that it believes might pose a systemic risk to financial stability, and I would certainly expect that something that would undermine confidence in the system as a whole would have an impact on stability. It could be argued that market confidence is a necessary component for financial stability. I therefore believe that this is already included in the FPC’s objectives as they stand, and that Amendment 36 is not necessary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Eatwell]

Yes, I can see that. I put a little question mark linking the two new subsections which seem to me to be contradictory, or at least inconsistent. I still do not understand why new subsection (3)(c) says that the systemic risks which the Financial Policy Committee has to consider are those which include,

“in particular … systemic risks attributable to structural features”,

and,

“unsustainable levels of leverage, debt or credit growth”.

How do we define leverage? It means,

“the leverage of the financial sector in the United Kingdom”.

Why? Debt means,

“debt owed to the financial sector by individuals in the United Kingdom”.

Why? Credit growth means,

“the growth in lending by the financial sector to individuals in the United Kingdom”.

Why? Why do we have these definitions when the noble Lord is quite right that new subsection (6) seems to contradict them?

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, the most important thing is that we are talking about financial stability in the UK, and the FPC needs to consider first and most importantly the metrics and indicators of financial stability in the UK. After all, the objective is for the FPC to protect and enhance the stability of the UK, so it is quite right that the definitions refer to the effects in the UK. We are not interested in the FPC deeming that it is not its business to deal with leverage in non-UK markets, but on the other hand it is quite right that the risks themselves may come from factors that arise outside the UK; I think that that is the point the noble Lord is trying to get to, which I believe is well covered by new subsection (6) and which we have made clear in the response to the Joint Committee. It is not the responsibility of the FPC to actually engender results outside the UK; it should be engendering results in the UK.

[Lord Eatwell]

I am sorry; the noble Lord must be wrong on that. If a bank is lending excessively outside the UK, then the FPC most certainly should be concerned. The idea that the FPC should be concerned only in managing results in the UK must be entirely wrong and could not be the basis of successful stability for the UK financial sector.

[Lord Sassoon]

No, my Lords, it is not wrong. If we are talking about a British bank, it is a British bank, and that is linked to these metrics and to the remit of the FPC. Of course that is captured in the FPC’s remit. I think we are getting ourselves excessively excited about a simple issue that is perfectly well drafted in the Bill, which is that the FPC has a wide and appropriate remit to deal with financial stability in the UK, but that it should properly take account of systemic risks that may arise both inside and outside the UK. That is exactly what the drafting of the two clauses taken together means. If the noble Lord had been critiquing the Bill as it was introduced in another place, he would have proper grounds for questioning that, but we have plugged a possible gap, and the construction now works.

[Baroness Noakes]

I do not wish to be unhelpful to my noble friend, but I am probably going to be. What the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, says seems to make sense. The systemic risks in subsection (3)(a) and (b) are defined in subsections (5) and (6) as not having any geographic restriction, but subsection (3)(c), which is defined by subsection (7), as the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said, relates only to,

“individuals in the United Kingdom and businesses … in the United Kingdom”,

for credit growth, debt, and so on. That ignores the fact that many banks have global balance sheets. As we do not have rigid subsidiarisation, a UK balance sheet could have significant exposures to other territories, depending on how a particular bank’s overseas operations were organised. Many of them are run as branches out of the UK institution and therefore, I should have thought, would be posing the kind of risks on which the FPC would need to keep an eye. I am unclear why we have chosen that formulation. I accept that for the systemic risks it does not matter where it applies, but when we are talking specifically about credit growth, debt and leverage, it is as if it can impact on the UK only if it happens in the UK, and I do not think that that is correct.

[Lord Sassoon]

I shall have another go, because this is tricky but important. The Financial Policy Committee is charged with responsibility for the overall financial stability of the UK: the systemic risks and the macroprudential role. We need to distinguish that from the situation of individual firms which will or may contribute to the overall systemic risk. In this discussion we risk conflating two things. One is the systemic risk in the system, which the FPC is charged with dealing with. That is credit growth, debt and leverage as defined by subsection (7), which is referenced to the United Kingdom. The financial stability of the United Kingdom is the concern of the FPC. That does not mean that risk may not come from the international financial system—that is made completely clear by subsection (6). However, for individual financial institutions for which the PRA will have first responsibility, if the FPC considers that they contribute to the overall situation, it does not rule out or limit consideration of the factors that affect individual financial institutions. The clause and the definitions do not rule that out. We should not confuse what is being defined here. The definitions are not exhaustive of the systemic risks which the FPC should consider. It may consider whatever else it considers relevant.

[Lord Eatwell]

Let me try this just one more time, because the argument that the list is not exhaustive is a toss-away argument: we did not include that, but it does not matter, because it covers everything. Let us be a bit more serious and deal with precisely what is in the Bill. To make the discussion concrete, I shall deal with the first part of subsection (7), which refers to credit growth. In my opinion, credit growth is an important indicator of systemic risk. Indeed, Professor Shin of Princeton University, who is the authority in this field, has identified credit growth as one of the key variables which any macroprudential regulator should have in its sights.

Let us consider credit growth. We are told that with regard to systemic risks in particular,

“‘credit growth’ means the growth in lending by the financial sector to individuals in the United Kingdom and businesses carried on in the United Kingdom”.

That cannot be right, because the stability of banks and financial institutions in the UK often crucially depends on the nature of credit growth in lending to individuals outside the UK. The businesses to which they lend will operate within and outwith the UK. What is the notion that somehow it must be businesses carried on in the UK? Will, say, British Aerospace be included? It happens to be a British company, but I believe that most of its operations take place outside the United Kingdom. I may be wrong about that, but a substantial proportion of its operations take place outside the United Kingdom. Would British Aerospace be covered in respect of lending to businesses carried on in the UK?

We could take out subsection (7) and lose nothing. It is the old adage that you teach pupils all the time: when in doubt, take it out. It adds nothing but confusion to the specification of the role of the FPC and the definition of systemic risk. Of course, the FPC is responsible for systemic risk in the UK, because that is its juridical domain, but that systemic risk can arise from activities by UK institutions on a worldwide scale. When in doubt, take it out. Let us drop subsection (7) and make the Bill more coherent.

[Lord Sassoon]

As there is doubt about this—considerable doubt, it seems, in the noble Lord’s mind—that is precisely why we need to leave it in. Again, he conflates the role of the FPC, which is to deal with financial stability issues, threats and risks in the UK. He says that it is clear that the Financial Policy Committee's remit is only for the UK. I do not know how he comes to that conclusion. If there were no definition of levels of unsustainable leveraged debt or credit growth, that would precisely raise in people’s minds the question of what is their geographic limit.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords—

[Lord Sassoon]

If the noble Lord will let me continue, this discussion precisely makes the point that the FPC is responsible for systemic risk, which may be measured in terms of these factors and others listed in the clause. In that respect, we are talking about the UK. That is independent of whether banks are or were lending excessively to foreign companies. That is dealt with in other ways, as I have explained: partly through the PRA looking at the individual leverage ratios or whatever for the individual bank. Equally, if there is a systemically important institution about which the FPC is concerned, this in no way limits the considerations to the business of that institution simply in the United Kingdom, because this is dealing with something else. This is dealing with the overall systemic risk that the FPC is trying to deal with, not any question about where individual firms are doing business.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, if it in no way limits the consideration of systemic risk, I would say again that it is otiose; it is worthless. It adds only confusion to the Bill. With respect to the noble Lord, the juridical domain of the FPC is defined by the definition of “regulated persons”.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, we risk confusing different things again. The definition of “regulated persons” is wholly different from the question of financial stability for the UK. The concept of “regulated persons” is dealt with elsewhere. We are in a completely different part of the financial landscape. We are risking mixing up the microprudential with the macroprudential. When the noble Lord reflects on this debate, he will understand that these definitions are appropriate. He would say that they are unnecessary; I say that they are necessary in order to define the objectives of the Financial Policy Committee. However, a careful reading will show that they in no way restrict the FPC or the PRA in looking at the activities of individual regulated businesses, wherever they are, in so far as they relate to regulated activities or to the financial stability objective.

I shall move on to Amendment 37, which seeks to remove the words “in its opinion” from the economic growth “brake” that prevents the FPC taking action that would have a significant adverse affect on the ability of the financial sector to contribute to long-term sustainable growth. I disagree with this for three reasons.

First, in principle, the FPC is the best placed to assess the likely effect of its own actions. We do not want the FPC to rely on other people in forming this assessment. The FPC will be the expert macroprudential regulator. It is the right body to decide how the brake applies and the drafting should reflect that. Secondly, that assessment will be completely open, transparent and subject to outside scrutiny via publication of the decisions in the FPC’s meeting records. The government amendment, which we will discuss shortly, will go further and require the FPC to explain how it has complied with the duty to consider the “brake”. Thirdly, in practical terms I do not believe that there is any sensible alternative to this approach. In whose opinion would it be, if not that of the FPC itself? I am sure that the noble Lord does not envisage the FPC’s meeting adjourning while it seeks the opinion of some other body.

Amendment 44 would add to the FPC a function of assessing its functions in the light of the policies of the European Systemic Risk Board, or ESRB. I appreciate the sentiment behind this amendment. The Government believe that, given the international nature of financial markets, macroprudential policy will be most effective when co-ordinated internationally. I assure the Committee that, in the Government’s view, the current measures in the Bill and other arrangements are more than sufficient to achieve this.

The Bill requires the FPC to have regard to the international obligations of the United Kingdom. This will encompass the obligation to have regard to any warnings or recommendations from the ESRB that apply to the UK. It is also worth noting that the Governor of the Bank of England, like all European central bank governors, is a member of the ESRB. The current governor is also the first vice-chair of the board. The Bank is, and will continue to be, closely involved with the work of the ESRB and this will be reflected in the work of the FPC. The governor will be able to feed back the decisions and policies of the ESRB directly to the FPC. As the governor and the Bank will influence the policy of the ESRB, I expect that it will often be closely aligned to that of the FPC. As I am sure the Committee is aware, the UK authorities are required to respond to any recommendations that they receive from the ESRB. I am sure that they will give careful consideration to the policies of that board.

On the basis of this more extensive debate than I had anticipated, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, will agree, on reflection, that his bran tub of amendments is not completely necessary. I would ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I think I am naïve, because I am bemused by the drafting of this Bill. Sometimes we are told that things are unnecessary; of course they are being done, but they do not need to be on the face of the Bill. At other times we are told, “We have got to describe everything in extreme detail. Even though there might be some apparent internal contradictions, at least it covers every base”. We do not seem to care very much, with respect to the logic of the story, whether we have the one or the other. I will comment on the amendments, so that we can take them formally as we go through.

With respect to the collapse of confidence in the system as a whole, that is just leaving a hole in the Bill. If the Minister wants to leave a hole in the Bill, that is up to him. I was trying to make it a bit better, and more comprehensive; just the sort of thing we are told that we should do. It would have helped; it would have provided the FPC with another stimulus in its overall definitions of its objectives, which would have contributed to its effectiveness. The idea that it is just rolled into everything else is not true. It is easy to construct models which do not have the other elements, and this element is important. I refer noble Lords to the literature: Professor Shin is the name reference.

If we turn to “in its opinion”, the noble Lord was very convincing on that one, so I take his arguments. On Amendment 39, and the whole addition of this business about the UK, I think that it is a mess. The noble Lord has been completely unconvincing. He has not been able to justify in any coherent way subsection (7) and that is regrettable. It is regrettable that the Bill is left like this. One would think that the Minister would at least say, “Let’s take it away and look at it, just to make sure that I have got it right”, since he cannot defend it on this occasion.

On Amendment 44, we are told, “Oh, it’s all going to happen anyhow. There are nice informal procedures, whereby these things will be taken into account. So you don’t need it, because it’s going to happen anyhow.” It is going to happen anyhow because the governor happens to have yet another hat: was it vice-president of the organisation? I am sure that the vice-president of that organisation is busier and better informed than the Vice-President of the United States is reputed to be on policy there. None the less, how can we be sure that our next governor—whoever it might be; maybe it will be the noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell, who is not in his place—will not also be the vice-president and be as engaged and whatever else it might be?

We cannot make laws on an ad hominem basis; that is not the right way to do it. Surely, if the noble Lord accepts that these functions are appropriate—indeed necessary—he should accept Amendment 44 or agree to have a look at it and come back with some rather better drafting than mine. In the mean time, I am sorry to be grumpy about this process, but I really thought that we were trying to improve the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

36A: Clause 3, page 4, line 4, leave out “(1)” and insert “(1)(a)”

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[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord McFall, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. This is—reflecting our earlier discussions—one of the Tyrie amendments. It is very cleverly drafted because it does not attempt to specify a particular set of indicators. It knows that the FPC is in a learning experience: that we are all going to be in a debate over indicators, instruments and so on in the years to come. Nothing could further that debate better than to propose a set of indicators, such as, for example, the rate of credit growth, which we have just been talking about, although not just in the UK. This is an extremely valuable amendment which, is, I hear, supported all round the Committee and I would expect the Minister to take account of the weight of this support.

Also in this group is a series of amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hayter. I would like to take a few minutes to address these. They are all concerned with the reports that the Financial Policy Committee is required to make and they all specify characteristics of the report. The first one requires the presentation of scenarios: the attempt by the Financial Policy Committee to look at various potential crises—stress-testing, we call it at a micro level—and assess the impact of their policies and of various events. We have learnt from the Office for Budget Responsibility how useful this technique can be and I am sure it will be extremely effective in the assessment of macroprudential measures. Amendment 73, requiring the presentation of scenarios, fits in with the philosophy of policy-making and of the empirical basis of evidence-based policy-making in finance today. I therefore hope the Government will accept it.

Amendment 74 is consequential upon today’s acceptance of the Government’s Amendment 35A, which we agreed earlier this afternoon. After all, if the Financial Policy Committee is required to take into account government policies on growth and employment, then it is surely appropriate that it should report on its performance on what it is required to take into account. This should really have been down as a consequential amendment to Amendment 35A but I am happy to help the Government out and introduce their consequential amendment for them.

Amendment 75, on the issue of indicators, referred to by the noble Lord, Lord McFall, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, places those indicators in the reporting structure of the FPC. Amendment 76 would relate the FPC’s report to the functioning of financial markets and of the wider economy. If they do not discuss that then I am blowed if I know what they are going to discuss. So let us at least hope that that is agreed by everyone around the Committee.

These are just four amendments to flesh out the characteristics of FPC reporting which will be a crucial part of FPC accountability. Given that we are handing these powers to unelected officials, the reporting structure is an important component. That reporting structure— and the debates over the role of the FPC—would be enormously enhanced by the acceptance of Amendment 40 in the name of my noble friend Lord McFall and of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.

[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I wish we had a simple tag that we could use for amendments which come up so often when talking about legislation where we all agree on the substance but there is a kind of debate on whether it needs to be in or not. We are substantially in that territory with a number of amendments in this group. I will take them in turn.

First, Amendments 40 and 75 seek to require the Financial Policy Committee to publish a set of indicators of financial stability. I agree that financial indicators will aid the Committee, Parliament and the public in assessing the effectiveness of the FPC’s actions, but I hope I can assure the Committee that the amendments are unnecessary. The noble Lord may groan, but I acknowledged at the outset that this is one of those “is it necessary or not” amendments. Let me try to give the evidence because it is important to adduce the evidence of how things are going already—of which there is quite a lot—to put flesh on to the bones of why I believe it. We have looked very carefully at the Treasury Committee’s recommendations and have accepted a lot of amendments as a result. The Government’s record in picking up the Treasury Committee’s recommendations is very clear. We have been through them very seriously, and we have accepted a lot of them. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith, and my noble friend Lady Noakes for assiduously going through them and provoking a further debate on the ones we have not picked up. That is quite right and proper. This is one amendment that we believe is unnecessary. I will give some reasons why I think the Committee should be satisfied on this.

The starting point is the Bank’s statement, in its response to the Treasury Committee’s report on bank accountability, that the FPC will publish and report against a set of indicators. Further than that, the FPC has already given some signals of the indicators it finds most useful for assessing risk through its oversight of the Bank’s financial stability reports over the past year and so too has the governor via a letter to the Chairman of the Treasury Committee last year.

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[Lord Sassoon]

My Lords, I am sorry if my noble friend thinks that I mischaracterised her argument. My interpretation of the words,

“The Treasury and the Financial Policy Committee must agree … a set of indicators”,

is that effectively the Treasury would have a veto over the set of indicators. What would happen if the Treasury and the FPC did not agree? It states in the amendment that they must agree. They would therefore have to find some common ground and it would be difficult if the Treasury dug its heels in and said, “We believe that this and that should be in the indicators”. Our starting premise here is that the FPC is the expert body and it should be left to define the indicators. As I have tried to indicate to the Committee, the Bank and the FPC are already on the case, providing a high degree of transparency, and there will be a series of draft policy statements available in time for consideration of the passage in the relevant secondary legislation. There will be appropriate scrutiny, but we would be going into pretty dangerous territory if we were to hard-wire the Treasury into the set of indicators that should be for the experts to set. Appropriate parliamentary and public scrutiny is allowed for in the Bill in the way that I have described.

Amendment 73, which would require the financial stability report to include the FPC’s predictions about the likely future state of the UK financial stability, is unnecessary. Subsection (3)(d) of new Section 9T, which appears at the bottom of page 11 of the Bill, already requires the report to include an assessment of the risks to stability that is very similar to the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that it includes a “range of … possible scenarios”. Subsection (3)(e) of new Section 9T already requires that the report includes the committee’s view of the outlook for the stability of the UK financial system. The interim FPC has already published three financial stability reports since its establishment. As I am sure the Committee is aware, the most recent report, published just last week, contains a whole chapter devoted to the committee’s outlook and the actions that the FPC felt necessary to tackle risks that it had identified.

I move on to Amendment 74. It is important that we learn from the mistakes of the previous system of regulation. In that system, the Bank was given responsibility for maintaining financial stability but no means of achieving that objective. That is why it is vital to give the FPC effective and proportionate powers to use certain macroprudential tools. However, the use of those tools will need to be monitored carefully. That is why the Bill already requires that the financial stability report includes an assessment of the extent to which the committee’s actions have succeeded in achieving its objectives, including its new secondary objective for economic growth. That is also why the FPC is required to publish and maintain policy statements for each of its macroprudential tools. We expect these statements to include estimates of their impact on both financial stability and growth. As we will discuss in due course, other amendments will require the FPC to produce explanations of how its actions are compatible with its objectives, including the costs and benefits of those actions. I do not therefore think that Amendment 74, which would require the financial stability report to include an assessment of the impact of each of its macroprudential measures on employment and economic growth, is needed.

Lastly, on Amendment 76, the smooth and efficient functioning of financial markets is a key requirement for financial stability. As such, the FPC’s objective to protect and enhance the resilience of the UK financial system extends to the functioning of markets. As I have mentioned, the Bill already requires the FPC to include an assessment of its actions as part of the financial stability report. The amendments that I have made require the FPC to explain how its actions are compatible with its objectives with regard to financial stability and supporting the Government’s economic policy. I therefore regard Amendment 76 as unnecessary because the same ground is already amply covered by the Bill.

I hope that on the basis of those explanations and reassurances noble Lords will withdraw or not move their amendments.

[Lord McFall of Alcluith]

My Lords, this was the gentlest of amendments ever. The genesis of it was the tripartite authority, and how the link between the Bank and the Treasury did not work as well as it could. Here we have an ill-defined term—financial stability—for which there is no definition whatever. On that basis, in getting the balance right between the two institutions, the Joint Committee at the time recommended—and I promoted, because I did not want anything prescriptive—that they should agree indicators. That is a very general term, so that people knew what the Treasury was expecting, and what the Financial Policy Committee was asked, and tasked, to do. That was the genesis of it. If we do not get that balance right we could find, in a few years time, someone saying in this very place—if it still exists—why did they not come to some agreement, so that there was a general consensus on what was happening?

Far from it being dangerous territory, I think it is nothing more than plain common sense. I hope that the Minister will look at this again, particularly when we come back to the Report stage, but I do not intend to move the amendment tonight. I beg leave to withdraw.

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Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

40A: Clause 3, page 4, line 21, at end insert—
“9CA Specification of matters relevant to economic policy
(1) The Treasury may by notice in writing to the Financial Policy Committee specify for the purposes of section 9C(1)(b) what the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government is to be taken to be.
(2) The Treasury must specify under subsection (1) the matter mentioned there—
(a) before the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the day on which section 9C comes into force, and(b) at least once in every calendar year following that in which the first notice under that subsection is given.(3) Where the Treasury give notice under this section they must—
(a) publish the notice in such manner as they think fit, and(b) lay a copy of it before Parliament.”

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Moved by

[Lord Sassoon]

41A: Clause 3, page 4, line 29, at end insert—
“( ) the responsibility of the Committee in relation to support for the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including its objectives for growth and employment;”