Computer Systems: Independent Testing

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 12th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend raises a very good point. If I may, I will look into the specifics of her question and write to her.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, Article 40 of the French criminal procedure code provides for cybersecurity specialists who are acting in good faith and solely in the national interest to be protected from prosecution. Does the Minister believe that a similar provision would be suitable here?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, we are always interested in learning from the approaches taken by other countries and jurisdictions. We speak with our international counterparts, including all our major allies, to understand how they approach the issue of whether there should be defences to these types of offences. But the majority of our like-minded partners do not have statutory defences and are instead in favour of prosecutorial guidance. For example, the US Department of Justice introduced guidance for prosecutors on when to prosecute instances of potential breaches of its Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 29th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this is the third time in as many years that the Government have asked this House to consider legislation to stop boat journeys and to reform the asylum system—our third year of being presented with increasingly rushed, unworkable and inhumane solutions to the problem of small boats and asylum. There is a very real problem that needs fixing, but this Bill, like its predecessors, will not do so. The Opposition do not support the Bill or the schemes that underpin it. The record of votes cast at Second Reading in this place and Third Reading in the other place will attest to this.

However, the Bill completed all its stages in the House of Commons. Our role is not to undermine the will of the elected House, but nor is it to rush through legislation without due consideration. We must treat this Bill in the usual manner. We must scrutinise the details of these proposals and advise changes where we think the Government have got it wrong. We should not deny ourselves the opportunity to do so or our neighbours the chance to consider our work. In this spirit, we will not support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord German.

The Bill, as it stands, threatens the UK’s compliance with international law. I know that this point will be spoken on at length in further stages, so I will not dwell on it for too long here, and nor will I speak for very long on what the Bill demands of our domestic courts. When introducing the Bill, the Secretary of State claimed that

“the UK is a country that demonstrates to the whole world the importance of international law”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/12/23; col. 748.]

Is this the message that the Bill sends to the world about the UK’s respect for international law? How will the decisions we make now be cited in future when other countries are asked to follow international law or to respect human rights? Is this the contribution we want to make?

What does the Bill say about our respect for our own courts? If the treaty fails, if refoulement happens, if there is a coup or if asylum seekers are shot at or killed, the Government say that British courts cannot consider those facts.

It is a large price to pay for what is ultimately a hugely limited scheme. The Government have stated that the Rwanda Government have made an initial provision to receive a few hundred people. To put this figure in context I say that, over the first nine months of 2023, 63,000 people claimed asylum. Therefore, this Bill and this plan, even if they somehow worked out in exactly the way the Government hope, would relocate only a small proportion of asylum cases. Can the Government confirm whether Rwanda can still receive only a “few hundred people”? Can they outline what is to happen to everyone else?

Given that the Illegal Migration Act—a majority of which has not yet been brought into force—rests on the use of third countries rather than returns to countries of origin, are we right to question what will happen to the 99% of people who will not be sent to Rwanda?

We still do not know the full cost of this scheme. The Government have been reluctant at every stage to divulge the cost of this flagship policy. In December, the Secretary of State appeared to indicate that around £400 million will have been sent to the Rwandan Government by 2027. Can the Minister confirm this figure? It is an extraordinary sum of money, but not the whole picture. According to the treaty, there are additional per-person costs of the scheme.

The economic impact assessment for the Illegal Migration Act was published only after considerable pressure from noble Lords from across this House. In this document, the Home Office was prepared to tell us that the average imagined cost of sending an asylum seeker to a third country would be £169,000. However, the details of the treaty suggest that these costs may be higher for sending someone to Rwanda. Before we begin to fully debate the details of this legislation and its role in the implementation of the Rwanda plan, will the Minister be clear about how much this plan is actually going to cost?

This Bill, whatever its impact, will not address the state that our asylum system is currently in. The UK deserves a managed asylum system that upholds strong border security and that can process claims fairly, accurately and quickly—a system that can return those with no claim to stay and help those who rightfully seek sanctuary. That is not our current asylum system. We have a backlog of 100,000 asylum claims waiting for a decision, 40,000 people who have yet to be removed from the UK, and up to 17,000 people whom the Government cannot account for.

The pace of decision-making is improving, but the backlog that has been permitted to develop will take time to fully clear and more work is needed. Nor will the Bill help us to negotiate returns agreements. Threats to our compliance with international law undermine our ability to establish returns agreements with other countries. Far from helping us, the Bill may greatly harm our ability to reform our asylum system.

The Government have repeatedly said that they are motivated by a desire to see the end of criminal smuggler gangs and to prevent boat crossings in the first place, yet this is now the third Bill that seeks to end small boat crossings without any measures to directly target the gang activity behind them. In fact, the latest police workforce statistics show a fall in the number of National Crime Agency officers, the law enforcement body responsible for fighting back against smuggling gangs. Between March and September 2023, their numbers fell by 343 personnel. Four hundred million pounds is just under half of the total budget this year for the NCA. Would the Government’s money not be better spent increasing the size of operations fighting against human traffickers, working with our European counterparts and going after the supply chains?

This Bill, and the deal behind it, will do nothing to stop boats coming to our shores. The Government’s plan hinges on the idea that the Rwanda scheme presents a deterrent effect, without presenting any evidence that this will be the case.

It is certainly difficult to imagine what deterrent effect a 1% or 2% chance of being sent to Rwanda would have. It is even more difficult to imagine why this would stop criminal traffickers; nor would the Bill present those fleeing conflict and persecution with safe alternatives to channel crossings. Last summer, the Government committed to publishing a report detailing existing and proposed additional safe and legal routes. A report has arrived, but it contains no proposals for creating safe routes for those seeking asylum. Can we assume, then, that the Government’s additional pledge to implement any proposed new routes by the end of this year is to be broken too? This was an issue raised repeatedly in both Houses during the passage of the then Illegal Migration Bill, and it is disappointing that the Government have not taken the request seriously.

If we are to truly address the challenge of migration, we must accept that we cannot do so alone. The Government are acting as though the challenges here are not related to those in other countries, particularly those of our European friends. The UK lacks the leadership needed to succeed in a world now marked by increasing conflict, the climate emergency, and the erosion of law and order, all of which fuel migration. We need an approach that restores the aid budgets, puts a renewed focus on conflict mitigation and resolution, and seeks international agreements and co-operation—an approach that is workable, strategic, humane and rooted in the conventions that we have signed.

I will conclude shortly, but I want to mention that one colleague—my noble friend Lord Dubs—is unable to join us today. He is in Berlin taking part in events to mark the anniversary of the Kindertransport, which began in late 1938. In June, it will be 85 years since he arrived in Britain, having been put on a train by his mother in Prague. Although we miss his contribution today, we can be reminded of what and whom we gain when we play our part in helping those who flee conflict and persecution, and we look forward to his return.

I hope the House will not be deterred from changing the Bill where it sees fit: it certainly needs our help. I hope too that the Government, rather than trying to communicate through press conference, engage with this House in good faith and through more conventional channels. We are faced with a deeply broken system and layers of bad legislation, which have only made things worse. I hope that the Government rethink this Bill, this plan and this approach to migration, but I fear we will be left without the change we need until we change the Government.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 23rd January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

I shall be brief. Not for the first time, your Lordships are in debt to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for intervening on an issue that I think all of us failed to note. His request of the Minister is helpful, and I hope the Minister will be able to respond. There is an alternative process which I could suggest to the Minister—I have not had a chance to talk to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about this. If the Minister wanted to withdraw this amendment and bring it back at Third Reading, which is applicable in certain circumstances. I am sure we would be very flexible in permitting that as well.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we support the introduction of the Government’s amendments. I echo what the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said about the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and I look forward to the Government’s response on that point.

I would also be interested to hear what the Government have to say about my noble friend Lord West’s amendments. He has taken a keen interest in this part of the Bill, and I hope the Government will be able to answer the questions, in particular on data disclosure powers, as I think they can give a more detailed response to the expansion of disclosure powers to regulatory bodies than was given in the original legislation. It is also very likely to be further analysed and looked at as the Bill moves down to the other end of the Corridor. Nevertheless, we support the amendments as they are currently.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for this short debate and the scrutiny on these important issues. First, I will address Amendments 15 and 16 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, which seek to remove Clause 13 and the Schedule from the Bill. We have covered some of the same ground as we did in Committee, and I am afraid that much of my response will make similar points to those I made then. However, I can appreciate why he has raised the points he made about these provisions, and I hope that I can still provide him with assurance on why these measures are needed and proportionate.

As the Government have been clear, the purpose of Clause 13 is to ensure that bodies with regulatory or supervisory functions are not inhibited from performing the roles expected of them by Parliament. It restores their pre-existing statutory powers to acquire CD in support of those functions. When the IPA was passed in 2016—under the expert stewardship of the noble Lord’s fellow ISC member in the other place, the right honourable Member for South Holland and The Deepings—it made specific provision, at Section 61(7)(f) and (j) respectively, for the acquisition of CD for the purposes of taxation and oversight of financial services, markets and financial stability. The noble Lord and his fellow committee members have queried whether we are “unmaking” these measures in the 2016 Act through Clause 13 of the Bill. I would therefore like to put beyond doubt what has happened since then to lead us to this point of needing to refine rather than unmake these provisions.

Following the Tele2 and Watson judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2016, the Government took the opportunity to streamline the statute book, including but not limited to some changes in response to that judgment. This streamlining included the removal of the regulatory provisions contained in the IPA because, at that time, those public authorities with regulatory or supervisory functions were able to acquire the data they needed using their own information-gathering powers, and Section 12 of the IPA had not yet been commenced, removing many of those powers. The relevant data was outside of the provisions of the IPA at this time and therefore not considered to come within the definition of CD.

Since then, businesses have operated their services more and more online. This has meant that many have become, in part at least, telecommunications operators as defined by the IPA. As a consequence, growing amounts of the data that they collect—which regulatory and supervisory bodies would have previously been able to access using their own information-gathering powers—now fall within the IPA’s definition of CD. The effect of this is that public authorities are increasingly unable to acquire the CD that they need to perform their statutory civil or regulatory functions.

In summary, the IPA has been changed since it was commenced in 2016 to remove tax-related and financial stability-related powers to acquire CD and to introduce the serious crime threshold. Technology and society have moved on, with the result that more relevant data amounts to CD. Section 12 of the IPA has been commenced to remove general information powers. The combination of these changes has meant that public authorities are experiencing increased difficulty in carrying out their statutory functions. For example, the Financial Conduct Authority, His Majesty’s Revenue & Customs and the Treasury are all examples of public authorities that already have the power to acquire CD using a Part 3 request but that may be unable to do so in the exercise of some of their functions as a result of the issue I have just set out.

These bodies perform a range of vital statutory functions using CD, including tackling breaches of sanctions regimes, enforcing the minimum wage and providing oversight of banking and financial markets. Schedule 4 to the IPA provides a list of public authorities that can acquire CD under Part 3 of the Act. The new definition of public authorities inserted by this clause will apply in the context of the sharing of CD between public authorities. This will include government departments and their arm’s-length bodies, and executive agencies administering public services. While data sharing between government entities is covered under other legislation including the Data Protection Act and GDPR, or under separate data-sharing agreements, its sharing for legitimate purposes should not be discouraged or prevented by the IPA.

Clause 13 is needed to ensure that such bodies can continue to fulfil these existing statutory duties in the context of a world that takes place increasingly online. It strikes an appropriate balance between necessity and proportionality. In particular, I re-emphasise that it makes clear that the acquisition by these regulatory bodies should be only in support of their civil and regulatory functions, and not used in support of criminal prosecutions. Furthermore, the Government have retained the serious crime threshold that applies when acquiring CD for the purposes of a criminal prosecution.

The codes of practice will also provide additional safeguards and clarity on how this should work in practice. The Government published these in draft ahead of Committee to illustrate this. Any changes to the existing codes will be subject to statutory consultation before being made and will require approval from Parliament under the affirmative procedure. I am therefore confident that the changes will be subject to a high level of scrutiny. To be clear, this applies to a limited cadre of public authorities with the necessary statutory powers conferred on them by Parliament and only specifically when in support of regulatory and supervisory functions—it is not creating a way to circumvent the safeguards in the IPA. It ensures that the acquisition routes and associated strong oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner are reserved for those areas where it is most essential and has the most serious potential consequences in terms of criminal prosecutions.

I am happy to provide the reassurance—or I hope I am—that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, sought. I am grateful to him for his comments regarding government Amendment 14, for engaging with officials to work through the concerns they raised and for his generous comments about the officials.

Our view is that the amended Clause 12 will be narrower in scope than the original drafting, which carried a risk of permitting access beyond the “who” and “where” of an entity. I assure noble Lords that the codes of practice will set out the further safeguards and details on the practical effect of Clause 12 so that operational partners are clear on the lawful basis of CD acquisition. It is appropriate that the technical detail is set out in this way rather than in primary legislation. The codes of practice will be subject to a full public consultation and will be laid in Parliament under cover of an SI, via the affirmative procedure. I reassure the noble Lord that we will consult with partners and the regulators of the IPA to ensure that the high standards of the CD acquisition regime remain world leading. I am happy to continue this conversation, and for my officials to continue with the extensive engagement already undertaken with the users of the CD powers, to see whether any further refinement is needed.

Finally, I confirm that the intention behind the amendment is to include the type of subscriber data that is necessary to register for, or maintain access to, an online account or telecommunication service. Examples of such data would include name, address and email address. It is not intended to include all types of data that an individual might give a telecommunication service that is not necessary for the purpose of maintaining or initiating access to that service.

I turn to Amendments 17, 19 and 20 on internet connection records, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord West. Much of the argument I have heard relies on a perception that the new condition D is inherently more intrusive than the existing conditions B and C. I will set out why this is not the case.

The safeguards for the new condition D replicate the well-established and extensive safeguards already in place for CD authorisations. The authorisation process for CD varies according to the purpose for which the data is being sought and the type of CD to be acquired. This regime works effectively and has been considered by the Court of Appeal and found to be lawful.

The purpose of new condition D is to enable ICRs to be used for target detection, which is currently not possible under existing Part 3 authorisations. The level of appropriate oversight and safeguards is linked to the sensitivity of the data to be disclosed and the impact that disclosure may have on the subject of interest.

As I have said, the Government do not believe that condition D is inherently more intrusive than conditions B or C. Conditions B and C authorise “target development” work, and as such enable the applicant to request data on a known individual’s internet connections. As an example, this means that the NCA could request records of the connections a known subject of interest has made in a given time period, provided that request was judged to be both necessary and proportionate by the Office for Communications Data Authorisations. In comparison, condition A enables the requesting agency to request who or what device has made a specific connection to an internet service.

Similarly, condition D would enable an agency to request details about who has used one or more specified internet services in a specified timeframe, provided it was necessary and proportionate—for example, accessing a website that solely provides child sexual abuse imagery. The actual data returned with condition D will most likely constitute a list of IP addresses or customer names and addresses. No information concerning any wider browsing that those individuals may have conducted will be provided. Information about that wider activity would be available only under a further condition B or C authorisation. Condition D is therefore no more intrusive than conditions B and C in terms of what data is actually disclosed. As such, we see no benefit or logic to imposing a different authorisation route for condition D when the existing safeguards have proven sufficient in terms of ICRs applications under conditions A, B and C.

I use this opportunity to remind all noble Lords of the importance of this new condition D and how it will support investigations into some of the most serious crimes, as well as supporting the critical work against both state and cyber threats. ICRs could be used to detect foreign state cyber activity. For examples, ICRs could be used to illuminate connections between overseas state actors and likely compromised UK infra- structure. We understand that these actors have an intent to target UK-based individuals and organisations, including government and critical national infrastructure, from within UK infrastructure, which we typically would not see. The ICR data returned from TOs would be highly indicative of the extent of malicious infrastructure and could assist with victim exposure. Furthermore, improved access to ICR data would enable the National Cyber Security Centre to detect such activity more effectively and in turn inform incident management and victims of compromises. Using data to flag suspicious behaviour in this way can lead to action to protect potential UK victims of foreign espionage and attacks.

I now turn specifically to the ability of the intelligence agencies and the NCA to internally authorise condition D applications. The intelligence agencies and the NCA must obtain approval from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner for ICR applications for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, other than in urgent circumstances. In urgent circumstances, such as threat to life or serious harm to an individual, the intelligence agencies and the NCA are able to obtain CD authorisations from internal designated senior officers in the same way that police forces are. In practice, the volumes of non-urgent requests are such that the IPC delegates responsibility for the authorisation of ICR and other CD requests to the OCDA.

In terms of oversight, the IPC could, if he wished to, consider specific types of CD authorisations himself. The IPC also has the power to directly inspect any part of the CD regime. If he wishes to focus attention on condition D applications, he has the necessary powers to do so. The approach we have adopted for condition D authorisations is therefore consistent with the wider CD regime and gives the IPC flexibility in how he exercises his powers and resources.

As is also consistent with the wider CD regime, condition D applications relating to national security will be authorised by a designated senior officer within the intelligence agencies. The CD codes of practice state that the designated senior officer must be independent of the operation and not in the line management chain of the applicant. This independence is declared within each application, and each designated senior officer completes training prior to taking up this role. Furthermore, each agency has one or more single point of contact officer, accredited by the Home Office and the College of Policing, who facilitates lawful acquisition of CD.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I will move Amendment 21 and speak to the other amendments in this group in my name.

Amendment 21 specifies that the enforcement of retention notices applies only to UK recipients of such notices. It is one of a suite of amendments in this group that return to the issue of extra-territoriality— I see the Minister blow out his cheeks at the prospect. Amendments 22, 25, 28 and 31 are similarly directed and each largely seeks to limit extra-territoriality by ensuring that operators can make changes to their services for users outside UK jurisdiction.

The reason for tabling the amendments, the others of which I will not move, is that there remains a huge gulf of understanding between the tech companies and the Government when it comes to the interpretation of the Bill with respect to its territorial reach. I am again presenting the Minister with a golden opportunity to set out in clear language the territorial ambitions that the Government have for this Bill. I believe there is some element of miscommunication going on here, though I am not sure in which direction. I hope that the Minister can dispel that.

Clearly, we have international tech companies that are incorporated in another country with subsidiaries all around the world and data residing in many different domains—companies that offer services to customers all over the world. In essence, we need to understand what would happen as a result of this Bill if such a business proposed to change a global service that is used by consumers all over the world, including in the UK. How do the Government use this Bill to deal with such situations? I am looking forward to the response.

Amendments 23, 24, 29 and 30 would raise the threshold for calling in a change from “negative effect” to “substantially limit”. Again, this increases the bar before the Government can start the process. Negative effect is a very low bar which will catch almost everything. It is not in the interests of the authorities to have everything coming through. There needs to be some sense of funnel. This is an opportunity for the Minister to define what negative effect is and what it is not, because it is a very low bar. He would be wise to take our advice and look at the language there, certainly when it comes to the code coming later.

Moving on, my Amendment 27 is a retread of an amendment I tabled in Committee, and it was there as a placeholder. I am pleased to see that it is unnecessary, as government Amendments 26 and 32 very much embrace the spirit of what I was seeking to achieve in that amendment. I thank the Minister for responding, and therefore will not be speaking to or indeed moving Amendment 27.

I now turn to Amendment 35. Currently, while there is a requirement for the Secretary of State to consult the operator before giving notice, there is no requirement on the Secretary of State to consult ahead of making regulations that will specify what “relevant change” includes, and therefore what needs to be notified. My Amendment 35 therefore introduces a requirement for pre-legislative consultation on the definition of “relevant change”. The amendment specifies that the Secretary of State must consult the Technical Advisory Board. There is a precedent for consultation with this board in Section 253(6) of the 2016 Act. As your Lordships know, the Technical Advisory Board is comprised of independent and industry representatives; the amendment also specifies a wider range of consultees.

The amendment then requires the Secretary of State to have regard to the impact on users, including on their privacy and on operators’ ability to innovate. Again, there is precedent for this in the 2016 Act. Such considerations must be taken into account when a public authority is deciding whether to issue a TCN or NSN, or where a judicial commissioner approves a DRN. As such, we feel it is worth while also to consider these factors when legislating for a “relevant change”, because delaying a critical security update could negatively impact users and operators. In a sense, all we are asking for is consultation. We are not asking to change the law, and this gives the Government a power to abide by that consultation or not. But we feel that this is an important definition, and it needs to be more widely consulted on.

I hope the Minister will agree, but in the event that he declines, I will be moving Amendment 35. I beg to move Amendment 21.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we have had much welcome interaction from stakeholders on the issues summarised in this group, as well as some useful briefings from the Home Office and the noble Lord’s team, for which we are grateful.

As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has just said, there appears to be a gulf in both position and understanding between the Government and the tech companies, both on the principle of the notice and its details, which is, in a sense, frustrating scrutiny of the Bill. I understand that there is a disagreement about the introduction of notification notices in general. It is right that we look at the details to ensure that the process takes place in a way that reflects the realities of international law, and the need of the intelligence services to maintain levels of data access and the necessary safeguards.

Concerns raised by stakeholders keep striking at the same places: how this notice would work with access agreements with other countries; why there is no double lock on the notification notice, despite the clear impact it would have on tech companies’ activities; and why the definition of telecoms operator is perhaps in reality wider than the Government intend.

We will not be supporting Amendment 35, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, although we understand the intent behind it. We encourage the Government to keep talking to stakeholders, and we believe that this part of the Bill will benefit from further discussion in the other place.

Immigration Act 2014 (Residential Accommodation) (Maximum Penalty) Order 2023

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 16th January 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord German (LD)]

I repeat the question I ended with: what is the evidence that this policy has had the desired impact on deterrence since it was introduced in 2014? Last week, I spent some time with a third-sector body that provides support for those with the right to remain in the United Kingdom. I heard direct evidence that, in the competition for rented accommodation, landlords are opting to choose a tenant where there is no need to go through the right to rent checking process and risk a fine. They are opting for someone who can provide the simplest proof of their right to rent. Increasing penalties by so much increases this risk of outlying those who are from a different category of people. It is particularly hurtful because it impacts very much on the bottom end of the rented market sector.

Paragraphs 22, 24 and 43 of the economic note are very instructive to understanding the strength of the evidence. Paragraph 22 says that there is “uncertainty”, paragraph 24 talks about “limited certainty”, and paragraph 43 says that “limited evidence” is available. Is that evidence available?

Secondly, what enforcement action is there against employers and landlords who discriminate against potential employees or potential renters on the basis of nationality or any other protected characteristic? How often has that enforcement been used? In the current housing crisis, where there are many renters for each rental property, to what extent is this policy increasing the barriers for the non-white British population legally in the United Kingdom to access housing?

The Home Office’s equality impact assessment associated with the instruments says:

“Any indirect impact is the result of an employer or landlord choosing to discriminate for which a remedy is likely to be available to the individual under the Equality Act 2010”.


Recently, I saw a sign in a rental agency in east London that said simply “no DWP”. Those of us with long memories will remember signs that said, “No Irish, no blacks”. Given the difficulty of providing proof, what data is there, if any, on the number of people who have used the Equality Act remedy? How will the Home Office keep the impact of this policy on race under review, as it states it will do in its equality impact assessment?

Finally, paragraph 25 of the economic note talks about familiarisation and says, basically, “We don’t need to do anything to inform employers or landlords about this because it’s just a small change and they already know about it”. But given the size of this particular increase in fines, it means there is a case, because we do not have the evidence, for ensuring that those who rent or offer jobs understand the importance of non-discrimination in this whole process.

Creating a hostile environment for those who have been granted leave to remain and who want to contribute to our economy is not an outcome that I would support. I hope the Minister would agree.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, on the draft immigration order for employment of adults subject to immigration control, the Labour Party supports the principle of preventing those with no legal right to reside in the UK undertaking paid employment here and implementing penalties that act as real deterrents for employers who deliberately break the law, so we will support the increasing of the penalties from £15,000 to £45,000 per worker for a first offence. However, given the potential impact on employers, the lack of consultation with businesses, especially small businesses, is disappointing. We would argue that it demonstrates, yet again, the lack of a clear, thought-out strategy towards immigration and tackling illegal work.

The draft order on residential accommodation would increase from £3,000 to £20,000 the maximum penalty for renting a property to someone who does not have the right to rent in the UK. Again, there has been a lack of consultation. I repeat the point made by the noble Lord, Lord German: there are known unintended consequences of right-to-rent checks and penalties for breaches. Landlords are keen to avoid large penalties and might discriminate against British nationals and lawful migrants who have the right to rent but who, perhaps because of their race or nationality, face discrimination and difficulty in getting those rentals. The noble Lord asked how this is monitored: is it done through the Equality Act, which is the remedy for landlords who are discriminating against legal people trying to rent? What are the Government doing to monitor this situation and what levels of enforcement are there against landlords who illegally discriminate against particular groups of people?

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) Order 2024

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 16th January 2024 Grand Committee

Those are the three points that I hope the Minister can cover in his response: monitoring the prevalence of the synthetic opioids in the instrument; how treatment services will be adapted to cope with people presenting as users of these new controlled substances; and the very specific point around prescribing and, in particular, paramedic prescribing of controlled substances.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we too welcome the amendments in this instrument. I will start with two specific questions and then make some more general comments.

First, beyond adding the specific substances which the Minister referred to in his speech and in the document, what more are the Government doing to address the risks posed to our communities from drugs more generally? The second question is about a particular drug, xylazine, a non-opioid veterinary anaesthetic that is being used in combination with synthetic opioids to devastating effect. I understand that the Minister for Crime wrote to the ACMD in June to ask it to consider the harms of this drug and that he is still waiting for a response. How long should the Minister for Crime expect to wait before he gets either action or a response to his letter about this drug?

Those are my two particular questions. More generally, I want to use the same structure as the noble Lord, Lord Allan. The first question he asked was about monitoring the prevalence and usage of synthetic opioids. As I mentioned in other speeches, including in the King’s Speech debate, I travelled to North America in the summer and went to Portland, Oregon. I also went to Seattle in Washington state. I was shocked by the amount of drug use on the streets. I saw hundreds if not thousands of people sleeping rough on the streets of those two cities. I saw people shooting up in front of me in the middle of those cities—and I had young children with me. It was a truly shocking sight.

While I was there, I visited a court that dealt with drug issues. I also had breakfast with a district attorney who is an elected prosecutor. We spoke about the way their current drug policy is working. What was interesting and depressing to me was the uniform agreement across the political spectrum that it was a disaster, yet they did not agree on the solution to that disaster; there was an ongoing political debate on it. The district attorney also said to me—it is relevant to this debate—that there is a strong suspicion, or belief, that synthetic opioids are getting into prescribed drugs. He told me that he had gone on holiday to Mexico but had forgotten some of his normal prescription drugs, so he had to go and buy the drugs while in Mexico. He became aware that synthetic opioids are illegitimately getting into prescribed drugs. This is a very worrying development; it is all over the internet in that part of the world. It is something that we should be aware of as a possible problem over here as well. It really is a huge issue. I am sure that the Minister is aware of it, but it would be good to hear what is being done to monitor the scale of this problem, which is potentially coming our way.

The second point made by the noble Lord, Lord Allan, was about treatment services and more drugs being brought into scope. I am quite worried about the experiments being carried out in Glasgow. I suppose that would be a good question for the Minister to answer: what monitoring are the UK Government doing on the experiments being done around drug treatment centres in Glasgow? I will leave it there.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate. I take on board the personal experience of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in the States; his observations are obviously extremely interesting. Perhaps it is worth pointing out that just under half of all drug poisoning deaths registered in this country in 2022 already involved an opiate of some sort. The noble Lord made some acute points; of course, the Government remain aware of the situation overseas and continue to monitor that as much as they monitor the situation here.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me a specific question about xylazine. The ACMD is independent, so I cannot comment on its timeframes, but we are hoping for its response on this particular drug in early 2024. Obviously, we will come back to this as and when we have its response.

The noble Lord, Lord Allan, asked about monitoring and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, backed that up. As I said, UK agencies are highly alert to the threat from synthetic drugs, including synthetic opioids such as fentanyl as well as synthetic cannabinoids and benzo- diazepines, which have been linked to drug-related deaths in this country. Along with law enforcement partners, the UK Government stand ready to respond to the threat from synthetic drugs. They have established a cross-government task force to monitor that threat and to lead and co-ordinate the government response to the risk from these synthetic opioids in the UK. The aim of the task force is to consider evidence-based policy; programmatic and legislative decisions in response to the level of risk; and the nature of synthetic opioids. Members of the task force include the Home Office, the Office for Health Improvement and Disparities, the Ministry of Justice, the National Crime Agency, HM Prison and Probation Service, Border Force and the police.

Through the UK’s drugs strategy, which was published in December 2021, we are implementing an end-to-end plan to disrupt the supply of all drugs at every stage of the supply chain from a source to the street. As part of that strategy, we have provided additional resources to the international networks of the NCA and the Home Office in key source and transit countries; this is for them to work with other Governments in identifying and disrupting cartels that seek to exploit the UK, as well as to seize drugs before and during their journey to the UK and the EU.

Also outlined in the strategy, we have increased the availability of naloxone, including naloxone nasal spray, to prevent drug-related deaths, and have committed to supporting local provision of a broader range of medicines, including newer medicines such as long-acting buprenorphine injection. We believe firmly in the importance of engaging with experts and delivery partners to respond swiftly to the evidence of emerging drug threats, including learning from international partners through international fora such as the US-led Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

On the health situation that was brought up by both noble Lords, FRANK, the Government’s free drugs advice service, contains information on synthetic opioids, synthetic cannabinoids and benzodiazepines, which will be updated to reflect the changes when this legislation comes into force. The Department for Education has also worked with the Office for Health Improvement and Disparities to make sure that good-quality teaching resources are available for teachers providing drug, alcohol and tobacco education, and lesson plans on drugs, alcohol and tobacco are available on the PSHE Association website.

We are of course concerned that banning these substances will discourage people from access to treatment services, but the Government’s drugs strategy, From Harm to Hope, published in December 2021, is clear about the Government’s ambition to achieve stigma-free treatment, providing the full, positive impact of treatment services for those seeking help. But, noting the potential harms associated with misuse of these substances, we believe it is necessary to take action to restrict access to these drugs and reduce their misuse. Through the drugs strategy, we are investing more than £2.8 billion over three years to support people through treatment and recovery, which includes support for those who have used a range of drugs and suffered various health harms.

Of course, key to all this is reducing the demand for drugs. We are committed to reversing the rising trend of drug use in society, to protect vulnerable people from harm and exploitation. It enables us to keep our communities safe and we must therefore reduce the demand for drugs, which fuel violence and exploitative criminal markets. Around 3 million people in England and Wales report using drugs each year, putting themselves at risk and driving a violent and exploitative supply chain, including through so-called recreational drug use. Through programmes announced as part of the drugs strategy, such as drug testing on arrest, and our plans to roll out pilots to change behaviour and attitudes towards drug use, we will provide the powers and access to appropriate interventions and support. We also know that we need to step up action in addressing the visible forms of drug use within our communities, so we will work with our enforcement partners to see what more we can do to tackle this, while ensuring that those who need treatment and support are diverted into the appropriate services.

The noble Lord, Lord Allan, asked a very specific question about remimazolam. There are no known established legitimate uses for any of these substances except remimazolam. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that that in particular remains available for legitimate and lawful purposes, so in line with the recommendations from the ACMD, remimazolam will be placed in part 1 of Schedule 4 to the 2001 regulations, as I said in my opening remarks. That will enable lawful access in healthcare settings, subject to the requirements of the 2001 regulations. The remaining 19 substances will be placed in Schedule 1, as I mentioned, and access will therefore be permitted only under a Home Office-controlled drug licence. That will ensure that organisations can still lawfully undertake research with these substances, should they choose to do so.

On the specific question about paramedics, that is a Department for Health situation: it would have to request that paramedics be able to prescribe or use this drug in the appropriate way. I hope that answers the questions that I have been asked and, again, I thank both noble Lords for their participation in this debate. These are dangerous substances with the potential to cause significant harm, and they should therefore be subject to the strict controls under the 1971 Act. With that, I commend this order to the Committee.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I specifically asked about the Glasgow drug consumption rooms and whether there is a UK oversight of the way they are operating, rather than just a Scottish Government oversight.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

With apologies, I forgot that question and, as it happens, I also do not know the answer—so I will have to find out and write to the noble Lord.

Tackling Spiking

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 19th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, yesterday’s Statement on tackling spiking was welcome. It said that 5,000 cases of spiking had been reported last year—as it very realistically said, this is likely to be just the tip of the iceberg. As it also said, spiking is not just the spiking of drinks but by needles and sometimes of food. It is a prevalent problem that needs tackling.

The danger is to everybody, but it is particularly to young women in nightclubs and bars. There is very often a sexual motive to those who perpetrate spiking. The other point the Statement made, which is worth saying, is that it is often a trigger to secondary offending as a result of the spiking itself.

I have spoken to a number of young people about this and every one of them knows about spiking. They either know it through their own experience or that of close personal friends. Everybody who I have spoken to says it is an issue for undergraduates at universities, for example. They have all got their story to tell about spiking.

As a magistrate, I have dealt with spiking a few times over the last few years. However, on reflection, I have mainly dealt with cases where it is not the perpetrator who is in front of me in the court, but a defendant who claims their alleged criminal activity is because of the spiking. That is something for the court to try and disentangle, but from my own experience that is what I have actually seen in court. It must be quite difficult to bring these cases to court.

The other point worth making, which I am sure the noble Lord will be well aware of, is that the vast majority of young people who have experienced this do not report it to the police. They do that for a variety of reasons, but that is a common thread from what they have said to me.

In the Statement, the Government said that they are going to bring forward amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill that will modernise the language of the Offences against the Person Act 1861—clearly, that is welcome—and that there will be additional funding, which will be provided to the police to run spiking intensification weeks. The other undertaking within the statement is that the Security Industry Authority, the regulator of the UK’s private security industry, has committed to introducing spiking training for door supervisors as part of its existing licence-linked qualifications. One question for the Minister is: what responsibilities do nightclub owners have to try and stamp out spiking from their premises?

A further commitment of the Government is that they will support the police rolling out their spiking reporting and advice tool to improve the quality of data. We of course welcome these announcements as far as they go, but they are long overdue. I have had correspondence with the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, when she was a Home Office Minister, on exactly this matter, so I know that the Government are seized of the issue. Can the Minister say something about how much longer he expects it to be before the legislative changes which may be proposed are made, and how much longer it will be before any funding support which may be provided to the police will be made and get off the ground?

I conclude on a slightly different note. I am very conscious of the limits of changing the law. Of course, we must change the law to make sure there is adequate punishment and to recognise spiking in its many manifestations, but really, the best defence is information. As I said, young people are aware of this but are not necessarily aware of the best ways of defending themselves against spiking. It may be the responsibility of universities, and maybe also of police forces, but also of the Government to make sure that the right information is made available to young people to try to reduce this crime.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for this Statement about understanding and tackling spiking, and indeed for the document which accompanies it. It is good that the Government are making a series of proposals. If I pick up where the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, finished, on the change of the law, that is a useful clarification because if the law—even though it is there—is not being used by the criminal justice system, it is failing. I hope we will all be able to get behind that amendment when it comes through in the Criminal Justice Bill.

When I read the report, my heart sank. There are some good points, and I will come on to those in a minute. However, there is very little emphasis on tackling the prevalence of behaviour by perpetrators. There is a mention at the very end of the recommendations in the document that prevalence will be part of trying to highlight spiking, including

“increased arrests, detections, and prevention activity taking place”.

However, that prevention activity is unlikely to change the mindset of a young man—it is usually a young man—going out with some drugs that he wishes to use to spike somebody’s drink or even to use a needle. It always worries me that victims are the ones who need to read up and learn about how they can best protect themselves, while nothing is done to attempt to change the culture of the behaviour of the perpetrator. It seems to me that that is a big issue. Can the Minister say what is planned on this? For example, are there advertising schemes? We must get the perpetrators to think that it is absolutely unacceptable even to think about it—but I am struggling to see that.

Having been a health spokesperson, I am interested in the research into the capability of existing test kits. I know that most of the current test kits involve using a urine sample, which is impractical at the time: you can find out only afterwards if you have one of those tests. If it is the equivalent of the lateral flow test that was developed during the Covid pandemic, it would be enormously useful—but 150,000 will not go very far. I note the wording in the document is very careful in talking about the plan “to begin research”, but we ought to put some urgency on this. If there are 5,000 cases a year that we are aware of, they are putting a considerable burden on not only the victims but the entire criminal justice system. It seems that this should be a bigger priority for prevention.

My final point is on the training programme. Noble Lords will know that I go on and on about training programmes in relation to victims and the criminal justice system. They are really helpful for upskilling staff in the night-time economy. I declare an interest that one of my children works in the night-time industry, as a security guard. I know that she would welcome some training to accompany the other training that she has on safeguarding and other matters; it would be extremely helpful. It would be useful for particular sectors that work very much with young people—universities and further education providers—as well as the night-time industry.

My real concern is that we need to get to the people who think that it is acceptable to perpetrate this crime. I do not see any of that in the Statement.

Refugees: Homelessness

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Wednesday 13th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes, I think so, because the refugee will have been processed under a legacy asylum case and will therefore have been in that accommodation for a very long time—over a year. They would have had ample time to learn English and embed themselves to some extent into British society. An extra month is perfectly generous.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, some of those in Home Office asylum care will be under 18. How confident is the Minister that none of those under-18s will ever be made homeless and that they will find their way into some form of social care provided by local authorities?

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 11th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I will make a brief comment on two aspects of Clause 14 which have been developed today and which were considered in my report. Amendments 23 and 25 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, would restrict the changes relating to internet connection records in Clause 14 to the intelligence services only. The noble Lord correctly noticed that, while I support the use of ICRs for the new target detection purpose in condition D1, I mentioned at paragraph 4.18 of my report that it would be

“open to Parliament to require further safeguards”

and suggested that those safeguards include

“making the extra condition available only to UKIC”—

in other words, the intelligence services—

“at least in the first instance”.

I pointed out a range of safeguards that already apply to ICRs. These are fully set out in the draft addition to section 9 of the code of practice that was helpfully provided in advance of these debates. I also pointed out, by way of mitigation to my proposal that only UKIC should have access, that

“working arrangements … could facilitate the use of UKIC powers in the service of NCA or CTP in particular”.

That is as much as I am told I can say on working arrangements, though noble Lords may be able to use their imaginations.

Clause 14, instead of going for this workaround, opted to give the NCA, though not counterterrorism policing, its own direct access to the new power. It is certainly true that the NCA has primary responsibility for many of the crimes where the new power may prove most useful—in particular, child sexual abuse, where it has strong potential. I will listen to what the Minister says about that, but I think there is no great division of opinion between us on this issue. We are really debating different mechanisms by which the NCA might get access to this material, and although it is not precisely what I suggested, I have no objection to the more direct route taken in the Bill.

I turn to Amendments 21, 24 and 26 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, which would introduce a requirement for requests by the intelligence services and the NCA to be independently authorised by the Office for Communications Data Authorisations. This would be an exceptional state of affairs for communications data requests by the intelligence agencies. Existing ICR requests are internally authorised and some of those, in particular under condition B and C, will be arguably, as I said in my report, as intrusive as requests under the new condition.

However, the noble Lord has emphasised the undoubted intrusiveness of the new condition and I know from my own correspondence with the ISC that, very much to its credit, it has looked at this issue in considerable detail. Furthermore, I raised the possibility of independent authorisation for such requests in my report. While I said that the full double-lock procedure would be disproportionately burdensome, independent authorisation by OCDA, which is not a possibility on which I commented expressly, sounds as though it could be a more manageable proposition. I have some sympathy with Amendments, 21, 24 and 26. They raise an important issue on any view, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about them.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the three previous speakers in the short debate on this group. There are no opposition amendments in it, so I shall set out some more general questions that arise out of the amendments spoken to.

Why have the Government brought forward the widening powers to obtain communications data when the original Bill did the opposite? Can the Government provide an exhaustive list of the bodies that will be able to use these communications data collection powers? Why are they not in the Bill or the Explanatory Notes? Giving bodies such powers during any criminal investigation appears out of step with the rest of the Bill, which covers investigatory powers for national security or serious crime reasons. Why is this power so broad as to cover any criminal investigation? Given that the double lock exists for most of the powers in the Bill, why have the Government given wide-ranging powers for intelligence authorities and the NCA to self-authorise accessing internet connection records while undertaking subject discovery work? How does this compare to the powers for conditions A, B and C, which cover access to ICRs, for more restrictive purposes? Finally, what will the role of the IPC and the ISC be in monitoring how the new powers are used?

I was particularly interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said when he was commenting on the two other speakers in this short group. I, too, will listen with great interest to what the Minister has to say on this, but this is all done in the spirit of exploration, as my noble friend Lord Coaker said. I look forward to the Minister's comments.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this group. I will first speak to Amendment 20, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, which would amend Clause 11. I want first to make it clear that Clause 11 does not enable any new activity under the Investigatory Powers Act but places into primary legislation the existing position set out at paragraph 15.11 of the Communications Data Code of Practice.

Paragraph 15.11 clearly sets out that it is not an offence to obtain communications data where it is made publicly or commercially available by the telecommunications operator or postal operator or otherwise, where that body freely consents to its disclosure. In such circumstances, the consent of the operator provides the lawful authority for the obtaining of the data on which public authorities can rely. Making this position explicit within primary legislation will provide clarity that acquiring communications data in this way will amount to lawful authority for the purposes of the offence in Section 11. As such, there will be no doubt that acquiring communications data in this way means that an offence will not be committed in such circumstances.

The purpose of new subsection (3A)(e) is not permitting so-called surveillance, as the noble Lord’s amendment asserts. Rather, it is about clarifying the basis for lawful access to material which has already been published and should not require additional authority for its disclosure by a telecommunications operator, with the consent of that operator, to a public authority. I can assure noble Lords that telecommunications and postal operators will still need to satisfy themselves that any communications data disclosure is in accordance with the Data Protection Act, and any subsequent processing by public authorities must also be compliant.

The inclusion of this paragraph in the definition of “lawful authority” in the IPA will provide reassurance to public authorities on the basis for which they have lawful authority to acquire communications data where this authority falls outside the IPA itself. Inserting a definition of lawful authority does not remove the offence of knowing or recklessly obtaining communications data without lawful authority; it is still possible to commit this offence if the disclosure by the telecommunications operator is not lawful or if the public authority knowingly or recklessly acquires the communications data without lawful authority. The inclusion of this definition of lawful authority will encourage public authorities to ensure that they have lawful authority before they acquire communications data. I therefore respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

I turn to Clause 13 and the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord West, to remove this provision and the associated schedule from the Bill. The purpose of Clause 13 is to ensure that bodies with regulatory or supervisory functions are not inhibited in performing the roles expected of them by Parliament. It restores their important pre-existing statutory powers to acquire communications data in support of those functions. When the IPA was passed in 2016, it made specific provision, at Section 61(7)(f) and (j), for acquisition of communications data for the purposes of taxation and oversight of financial services, markets and financial stability.

As a result of the Tele2 and Watson judgment from the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2016, a number of changes were then made to the IPA. Crucially, not all the changes made at that time were a direct response to the judgment itself, but instead the opportunity was taken to streamline the statute book. This included the removal of the regulatory provisions contained in the IPA because, at that time, those public authorities with regulatory or supervisory functions were able to acquire the data they needed using their own information-gathering powers. At that point, much of the relevant data fell outside the definition of communications data and therefore outside the provisions of the IPA. However, as businesses increasingly move their services online, so many have become, in part at least, telecommunications operators under the definition in the IPA. Therefore, more of the data they collect, and which regulatory and supervisory bodies would have previously been able to access using their own information-gathering powers, now falls within the IPA’s definition of communications data, and regulatory and supervisory bodies are, inadvertently, unable to acquire it.

The Financial Conduct Authority, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and Border Force are all examples of public authorities in Schedule 4 to the IPA and already have the power to acquire communications data using a Part 3 request. However, many of the matters that these bodies regulate or supervise fall short of serious crime, as defined in the Investigatory Powers Act at both Section 263(1) and Section 86(2A), which means that they are unable to acquire a Part 3 authorisation to get the data they need to perform the statutory functions expected of them.

The UK is not alone on this issue; European colleagues have identified similar issues for their equivalent bodies with regulatory and supervisory functions. The functions these bodies perform on behalf of the UK are simply too important to let this situation continue. They go to the heart of our safety in preventing terrorist funding, seeking to ensure financial stability, and the oversight of banking and financial markets, among other matters. For example, the Financial Conduct Authority has responsibility for supervising some 50,000 regulated firms to ensure they have systems and controls in place concerning the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017. Border Force has the responsibility of quickly identifying from the huge volumes of packages crossing our borders each day, those that may contain illegal items such as drugs, firearms and other illicit goods that present a risk to the UK. It is vitally important that these bodies are not inhibited in carrying out their core functions because of the way the world has changed since 2016.

The changes to the IPA brought about by Clause 13 strike an appropriate balance between necessity and proportionality, making clear as it does that the acquisition by these regulatory bodies should only be in support of their civil functions and not used in support of criminal prosecutions. Additional safeguards are provided for within codes of practice governing how this should work in practice. To be clear, this applies to a relatively small cadre of public authorities in support of specific regulatory and supervisory functions; it is not creating a way to circumvent the safeguards of the IPA. It instead ensures that the acquisition routes and associated strong oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner are reserved for those areas where it is most essential.

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, Amendment 34 is a further attempt to place some safeguards into Part 4. Our final amendment to this part would ensure that the decision by the Secretary of State to give notice requiring operators to notify them of system changes is approved by a judicial commissioner. As we know, judicial commissioners play a crucial role in providing the independent oversight of the decisions around notices and other authorisations in this Bill. The 2016 Act essentially ushered in that role. There does not appear to be any good reason why the same safeguards should not apply for notices issued under Clause 20. We have also suggested that such notices be time limited but can be renewed following approval, again from the judicial commissioner. This is an attempt to ensure that there are appropriate safeguards around the Secretary of State’s powers in this regard.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I will briefly speak to the five amendments in this group in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker. Amendments 35 and 37 would introduce a double-lock process to notices given under the notification of proposed changes to telecommunications services, bringing it in line with the procedure for the three existing types of notices that can be issued to telecommunications operators. Amendment 36 would add a further factor that the Secretary of State must consider when deciding to give a notice under this section, bringing this type of notice into line with the three existing types of notices that can be issued to telecommunications operators. Amendments 38 and 39, along with the others in my noble friend’s name, would introduce a potential double-lock process to the variation of notices given under the notification of proposed changes to telecommunications services, bringing it in line with the procedure for variation of the three existing types of notices that can be issued to telecommunications operators.

In introducing this group, the noble Lord, Lord Fox, set out very comprehensively the concerns of the various tech companies. I have read the same briefings that he has. He was right to see this as an opportunity for the Minister to address those concerns.

I have a few questions arising out of these amendments. First, why have the Government not included a double-lock structure of approval to this new type of notice, given that the three other types of notices that telecom companies can be issued have the same structure, along with many of the provisions in this Bill and the IPA? Further, why does it not have the same review structure as the other notices? What will companies be able to do to challenge this decision? New Section 258A states that companies must respond within “a reasonable time”. What would the Government consider a reasonable time to be in this regard? What assessment has been made of what other companies are doing to ensure they are aware of changes that would potentially impact national security? Finally, can the Government be more specific about the types of changes that would be considered relevant for this new notification of the proposed changes?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, once again, I thank noble Lords for their amendments and the points they have raised in this debate. I will do my very best to answer the questions that have been asked. Again, I am afraid I am going to do so in some detail.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, has proposed removing Clause 16 from the Bill in its entirety. Clause 16 concerns the extraterritorial enforcement of retention notices. Under subsections (9) to (11) of Section 255 of the IPA, any technical capability notice—TCN—is already enforceable by civil proceedings against a person in the UK. Only TCNs that provide for interception and targeted communications data acquisition capabilities are enforceable against a person overseas. Section 95 of the IPA also provides that a data retention notice—DRN—is enforceable by civil proceedings against a person in the UK. DRNs already have extraterritorial applicability within the IPA, meaning that they can already be given to a person outside the UK. However, unlike TCNs, the current legislation does not permit the enforcement of a DRN against a person outside the UK.

Clause 16 therefore seeks to amend Sections 95 and 97 of the IPA to allow extraterritorial enforcement of DRNs to strengthen policy options and the legal levers available when addressing emerging technology, bringing them in line with TCNs. As technology advances, data is increasingly held overseas. The clause will ensure that, if required, there is a further legal lever to protect and maintain investigatory powers capabilities overseas. This will ensure that law enforcement and the intelligence agencies have access to the communications-related data that they need to tackle serious crime and protect national security. It will also ensure consistency across the regime.

Legal Migration

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 5th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, legal migration is important to the British economy, but it needs to be properly controlled and managed. In the past decade we have welcomed more than half a million people through humanitarian routes, principally from Ukraine, Hong Kong and Afghanistan. We in the Labour Party support these humanitarian routes, but the overall figures, which are way above these humanitarian routes, are out of control. People are understandably worried about housing, getting local GP appointments and access to public services when they can see that their communities are growing. The net migration figure stood at 672,000 last year, which is three times the amount at the 2019 general election. There has been a 65% increase in work migration visas this year, and this includes a 150% increase in health and care visas.

Yesterday’s announcement is an admission of the Government’s failure on the immigration system and the economy. The Prime Minister is now proposing policies he opposed six months ago and opposing policies he helped introduce. The Labour Party has said repeatedly that net migration should come down and called for action to scrap the unfair 20% wage discount, raise salary thresholds based on economic evidence, and bring in new training requirements linked to the immigration system as well as a proper workforce plan for social care. While the Government have been forced to abandon the unfair wage discount that they introduced, they are still failing to introduce more substantial reforms that link immigration to training and fair pay requirements in the UK, meaning that many sectors will continue to see rising numbers of work visas because of skills shortages. The Labour Party is also calling for a reformed and strengthened Migration Advisory Committee that could advise on the impact of all policies to ensure that the details are correct.

There has been a failure to invest in skills and apprenticeships. Some 160,000 fewer people have taken up apprenticeships under this Conservative Government. For engineering and manufacturing, apprenticeships have fallen by half while engineering visas have increased. The Government have resisted calls to link requirements for skills training to the immigration system, and the UK is failing to train and pay people in the UK properly, leading to a skills shortage and a low-wage economy that relies on migrant workers.

In addition to this, the asylum system is broken. As of October, the number of legacy asylum cases waiting over a year for a decision to be made stood at 32,109. There were, in addition, 85,000 cases under a year old that had not been dealt with; thus, the overall backlog has not been reduced.

The Home Office has now hit its target for the number of caseworkers working on asylum cases, reaching 2,500 full-time staff by the end of the summer. However, the turnover of staff rose between April and August 2023 to 36%, having previously dropped to 25%. This puts into question the level of expertise in the team and the quality of decisions being made.

Following changes to Immigration Rules, which make it easier to withdraw an application on behalf of an asylum applicant, the number of asylum withdrawals has risen to 17,000. In a recent Select Committee hearing, the Permanent Secretary stated that he did not know the whereabouts of these 17,000 people. It may be that the length of time that cases are being left before being processed allows people to abscond, or that details have become incorrect over time, particularly when they move address so frequently; or it may be that the Home Office is being stricter with its criteria for withdrawing cases.

I understand that the reason for the withdrawal is not noted. I ask the Minister: why is the reason for withdrawal not noted and does he believe that it should be? Either way, losing track of 17,000 asylum seekers is representative of the danger of allowing such a backlog to build up in the first place. Of course, legal immigration is important to our economy and, of course, we should meet our humanitarian obligations. But with net migration figures at 672,000 last year, with government policies that flip and flop, and local public services under pressure, it is inevitable that the voting public become sceptical and disillusioned. The Labour Party says there should be a longer-term plan for immigration for the economy and for our country.

I turn to a separate matter, which I received an email about today. I see that the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, is not in her place, so I will repeat the questions from Universities UK about the higher-education sector and how it may be affected. First, is the Minister able to outline timescales in terms of reference for the Migration Advisory Committee’s review of the graduate route visa?

Secondly, do any changes to the salary threshold and financial requirements for work and family visas apply to new entrants only and, if so, what is the situation for existing visa holders? Thirdly, can the Minister give clarification on what the new salary discount will be for roles listed on the immigration salary list if they are not part of the 20%?

Lastly, will the Government promote a clear message that international students are welcome in the UK, and that the Government remain committed to the international education strategy?

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, yesterday’s Statement to the other House was one where figures were plucked from the air; one must draw the conclusion that they are arbitrary, in the sense that they do not have any background in what one might call a forward workforce planning regime for the country as a whole. One would have expected that, if you were to do a workforce planning regime for the future, it would be timed, looking forward as to the requirements on our workforce in this country.

It is certainly the case that the Government are well aware of the length of time that it takes to train individuals and get people moving along that pipeline. It is also certainly the case that the issue of medium-salaried people has come out as one of the major concerns of the document put before us yesterday.

The Statement, when examined for the sorts of people that the country needs who are going to be excluded by the regime, includes such people as butchers, chefs, welders and joiners. It is quite clear to anyone who has been around this country looking at the hospitality and tourism sectors that there are significant shortages of people to fill those places. It is not infrequent that you see a sign for a chef outside a restaurant where they are short of staff. The question to which we need to address ourselves is: where is the forward planning behind the figures that have been put before us?

Equally, the regional pay disparities around the United Kingdom mean that the wage levels in London and the south-east of England are very different from those that you find in other parts of the country. The wage levels that we are being told about have a bit of a sniff for the London and the south-east but are damaging to other parts of the economy where wage levels are different. The correct form of workforce planning would have had all these issues under review.

The issue of social care visas is obviously one of a lack of investment in the past. The Migration Advisory Committee has previously said that the Government’s persistent underfunding of local authorities, which of course fund adult social care, is the most important factor in the staffing crisis. The Government now say in the Statement that care workers without families will ensure that we have enough people to meet the demands of our caring services.

Equally, we are assured that the CQC will now oversee all this information, but there are problems for the CQC because its inspections do not actively address the working conditions and well-being of care workers. In that sense, the independent regulation of health and adult social care contains significant oversight gaps. How is the CQC going to ensure that those are fulfilled for those filling these vital posts from our immigration system?

I have questions about the impact upon companies in the sectors that are most impacted by the Statement. This comes on the back of last night’s discussion in this House. The Minister at that time did not recognise where I got my figures from: it was paragraph 12.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum for the regulations on fees that we were talking about last night. It says, and the words are quite clear, that there will be a significant impact on companies—these are the Government’s words—of

“tens of millions of pounds”.

On top of that, companies are now having to think whether they can afford to pay these amounts of money in order to recruit. A failure to recruit sufficiently for a company to operate means that the UK company itself might be in danger of not being able to continue to operate, and so UK workers might be affected by that decision. It is worth understanding what training and workforce plan is behind the migration strategy.

I have what might be thought of as a cheeky question, but it is one that worries me considerably, regarding the ability of British citizens to bring their partner to the United Kingdom to live with them, and with their children if they have any. I had a think about this and it was clear to me that a significant number of current government Ministers have partners from another country —we can all think of examples of that. My question is: what number of our population have partners from another country, given that £38,700 is a large figure for someone to be able to bring their partner to this country to live with them?

The danger here is that, in that development of a partnership between two people, the British citizen could think, “I can’t bring my partner to this country, so I will go to their country instead”. If they decide that, we might lose some of the vital people whom we need for our country, especially remembering that we are heading towards a time in our society where, for every elderly person, we will have only two people of working age. There is a big change coming, and we need to be prepared for it.

Have the Government assessed how these restrictions to legal migration will impact the numbers on overstaying visit visas? How many British citizens will be driven out of the country to live with their partners and children elsewhere in the world, as in the question I just addressed? Will the restrictions apply to workers who are already sponsored? Sometimes people have to renew and, when they do, will the restrictions that apply in this new Statement apply to them when they renew their work permissions in this country? Will an existing migrant worker’s salary have to rise in order to extend their visa? Finally, have the Government considered the disproportionate impact that the increase in family visa requirements will have on British citizens who live outside the south of England and London, because of the wage disparities around the rest of the United Kingdom?

That is a range of questions which we need to have answered, but the context of it all is: what is the plan? Is it merely a decision to have an arbitrary number which looks good to the public—or looks good in an election manifesto—rather than one which faces the problems which our economy, and our future as a country, will be needing?

Asylum Seekers: Deportation from France

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Monday 4th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I think it would be wise for me to restate what the Prime Minister has said, which is that he is taking

“the extraordinary step of introducing emergency legislation”.

He made that point on 15 November. He went on to say that he does not believe that

“anyone thinks the founding aim of the European Convention on Human Rights was to stop a sovereign Parliament removing illegal migrants to a country deemed to be safe in Parliamentary statute and binding international law. I do not believe we are alone in that interpretation”.

So I say to my noble friend that I look forward to informed discussion on the recent French decision.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I have a simple question for the Minister: have either the new Home Secretary or the new Foreign Secretary met the French Interior Minister?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid I do not know.