Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 28th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My Lords, I too support the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lady Mobarik. As we have heard, the abolition of child detention in 2014 was one of the landmark achievements of our Conservative Government. Along with the Modern Slavery Act, it was a major step forward in the protection of the most vulnerable in our society. The arguments for this amendment have already been made, so I will keep my remarks short, but I want to make a couple of brief points.

The new detention powers have no time limit in the Bill and apply to unaccompanied children and children with their families. Obviously, this is deeply concerning. The Government have rightly stated that we do not want to detain children, and have acknowledged the vulnerability of unaccompanied children in debates on this Bill. However, there are still no protections enshrined in the Bill to guarantee that protections remain in place for minors, and there has been time for the Government to clarify this. This really needs to change before the Bill becomes law.

Having spoken with the Minister in the other place, I am aware that the Government are considering these arguments, so this amendment gives them the opportunity to think again. I commend my noble friend Lady Mobarik’s amendment to the House.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we on the Labour Benches strongly support the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik, and if she presses them to a vote on Monday, we will be supporting her. Her amendments address the removal of safeguards for children put in place when a Conservative Prime Minister sat in No. 10, and it is clear that potentially thousands of children could be detained, some potentially indefinitely. This would undoubtedly cause long-term damage to their health, well-being and development. We are happy to support those amendments, and we are very interested to hear about the ongoing discussions which noble Baronesses on the other side of the House have mentioned.

Regarding the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, I interpret them as probing amendments into the rules concerning detention and, particularly in the case of barges with the quite astonishing figures he gave today, the cost and where there will be areas for people to walk around and exercise in the vicinity of the barges. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about that in response to the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord German. We are happy to support the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, with these amendments we return to the issue of detention time limits in relation to unaccompanied children and the limiting of places of detention. Amendments 49, 53, 56 and 61, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, limit the “place of detention” in the Bill to those that are presently authorised for detention. We detain persons for immigration purposes only in places that are listed in the Immigration (Places of Detention) Direction 2021. As I set out in Committee, following Royal Assent we will update the direction in line with the new detention powers.

For more than 50 years we have operated a framework where the Home Secretary sets out the places where persons may be detained for immigration purposes in an administrative direction. The provisions in paragraph 18 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 have operated perfectly satisfactorily. I see no case now to change to a position whereby places of detention are to be set out in primary legislation.

I assure noble Lords that the welfare of detained individuals is of paramount importance. Any place of detention must be suitable for the persons we are detaining there, and adequate provision will be made for the safety and welfare of the detained person. The Detention Centre Rules 2001 make provision for the regulation and management of immigration removal centres. These rules set out:

“The purpose of detention centres shall be to provide for the secure but humane accommodation of detained persons in a relaxed regime with as much freedom of movement and association as possible, consistent with maintaining a safe and secure environment”.


The rules also set out the specific requirements which an immigration removal centre must comply with, including, but not limited to, provision for maintenance, general security, healthcare, access and welfare. These rules will continue to apply to detention in immigration removal centres under this Bill. I hope that is a complete answer to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord German. I add that, as their name suggests, these rules apply to detention accommodation, not to non-detained accommodation such as the Bibby Stockholm barge, from which of course people may come and go.

Moreover, we already have robust statutory oversight of immigration detention, including inspection by the Inspectorate of Prisons and independent monitoring boards at every detention facility, and effective safeguards within the detention process which, I would suggest, are efficient.

I turn to the issue of detention time limits. Amendments 51, 57, 59 and 63, tabled by my noble friend Lady Mobarik, seek to retain the existing time limits on the detention of children. It is an unavoidable fact that holding people in detention is necessary to ensure that they can successfully be removed from the United Kingdom under the scheme provided for in the Bill, which is designed to operate quickly and fairly. However, our aim is to ensure that no one is held in detention for any longer than is absolutely necessary to effect their removal.

The duty on the Home Secretary to make arrangements for the removal of all illegal entrants back to their home country or to a safe third country will send a clear message that vulnerable individuals, including children, cannot be exploited by the people smugglers facilitating their passage across the channel in small boats on the false promise of starting a new life in the United Kingdom. The detention powers are an integral part of ensuring the success of this Bill, both as a deterrent and as a means of ensuring that the Home Secretary can comply with the duty to make arrangements for removal.

We must not create incentives for people-smuggling gangs to target children or provide opportunities for people to exploit any loopholes. Children may be put at further risk by adults seeking to pass off unaccompanied children as their own. I know this is not my noble friend’s intention, but that is what these amendments would, perversely, achieve.

Under the Bill, detention is not automatic. The Bill provides powers to detain, and the appropriateness of detention will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, recognising their vulnerability, I remind my noble friend that the Bill makes particular provision for the detention of unaccompanied children.

It is important to recognise that unaccompanied children would be detained only for the purposes of removal in a minority of cases. They are not subject to the duty to remove, and our expectation is that they will generally be transferred to the care of a local authority until they turn 18. Where they are to be detained, the powers in the Bill may be exercised in respect of unaccompanied children only in circumstances to be prescribed in regulations, as we have already discussed during today’s debate. This would be, for example, for the purposes of an initial examination or, where necessary, in the limited cases where they are to be removed to effect a reunion with the child’s parent or to return them to a safe country of origin. As we have already debated, such regulations are now to be subject to the affirmative procedure, as a result of the government amendments to Clause 10.

The Bill also includes a power to place a time limit on the detention of unaccompanied children where that detention is for the purposes of removal. We will keep the operation of these provisions under review, and should it be necessary to introduce a time limit, we have the means to do so.

Given the safeguards we have already built into the arrangements for the detention of unaccompanied children, the Government remain of the view that these amendments, however well-meaning, are not necessary. I therefore ask my noble friend not to press her Amendment 51. However, if she is minded to test the opinion of the House, I ask noble Lords, if and when the Division occurs, to reject the amendment.

Ahead of that, I hope that I have been able to satisfy the noble Lord, Lord German, and that he will be content to withdraw his Amendment 49.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 27th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I reiterate what the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, have said: there has been a co-operative approach to this Bill, which I think will make it a better Bill. I was going to make exactly the points that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has just made about the need to build in a way of feeding back to Parliament, particularly given that crypto assets are a very turbulent technology; it is a very turbulent industry. We know about the criminality endemic within these types of so-called assets. The point has been made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that Parliament needs to find a way, through flexibility and feedback, to make sure that the appropriate regulations are kept in place.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their brief points in this debate. Broadly speaking, I agree with all the points that have been made. It is important to maintain a high level of flexibility, because this is a very fast-moving space technologically as well as with regard to the use of these assets in the broader economy and for other purposes. I agree with everything that has been said. Obviously, these amendments allow us to maintain a high degree of flexibility, so I ask noble Lords to support them. There is not much point in saying anything else at this point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the noble Lord. Two key themes emerged from our lengthy debates on the Bill. The first was that the scale of economic crime is a major threat to the prosperity of the country. The second was that there is a significant inequality of arms between the enforcement authorities and the perpetrators of economic crimes. I could weary the House at length but I will not do so. This is an attempt to redress that inequality and not provide a disincentive for the authorities to pursue the perpetrators of economic crime.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, if the noble Lord chooses to move to a vote, we will support him. This amendment would build on last year’s Bill, which introduced similar changes to unexplained wealth orders. It is a welcome development, and I hope that the noble Lord presses his amendment to a vote.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, unfortunately, the Government are not able to accept this amendment, although we are sympathetic to the points made by my noble friend Lord Agnew. The amendment is designed to protect public authorities from having costs awarded against them if they fail to recover the proceeds of economic crime under the Proceeds of Crime Act.

First, the Government are not persuaded that public authorities that lose their case should be protected in this way. Secondly, this is a major breach of the general principle applied in civil litigation in the High Court that the loser pays.

Thirdly, it is a major interference with the discretion of the court on the question of costs. Fourthly, if such a change were to be contemplated, it should be a matter for the Civil Procedure Rules and not something inserted without detailed reflection on Report in your Lordships’ House. Fifthly, it would produce even more inconsistency than allegedly we have already. I do not accept that there is material inconsistency, but you would have one rule for some POCA cases and another rule for other POCA cases, because not all POCA cases are economic crime cases.

However, the Government are prepared actively to consider a consultation to properly consider this matter and the evidence with a view to ensuring that there is a correct balance of justice and the proper consideration of the pros and cons. That, very briefly, is the Government’s position.

I will briefly deal with one or two points. This is not like unexplained wealth orders, which have been mentioned. Those are an investigative procedure and not determinative of civil rights and obligations. In some respects, the UWO procedure is closer to a search warrant than to a recovery of money in civil litigation. It does not provide an analogy to the present case.

It is true that there are various costs regimes in various cases. It is probably not useful to weary your Lordships with particular decisions, but it is not without interest that in the case of Pfizer and Flynn, which involved the Competition and Markets Authority, the authority lost at first instance and was ordered to pay some of the costs. The Court of Appeal overturned that on the basis that it did not want to have the “chilling effect” of public authorities having to pay the costs when they lose litigation. However, the Supreme Court restored the original judgment and said, “This so-called chilling effect is only one factor”. In other words, it is not decisive. You must consider in that jurisdiction all the factors. The Government draw from that case that the so-called chilling effect is not necessarily decisive, and that one must have a regime that enables the court to balance all the relevant effects.

With all respect for the motives behind it and the concerns that have been expressed, this amendment is too blunt an instrument to be a proper exercise of primary legislation in an area which very much calls for balanced consideration under the Civil Procedure Rules. As I said at the outset, the Government are perfectly prepared actively to consider reform of the Civil Procedure Rules with that aim in mind.

I hope that I have persuaded your Lordships that this is not an occasion to make an exception to the well-established rule that has stood for hundreds of years, whether it applies to HMRC, the National Crime Agency or the FCA. If they make a complete Horlicks of a case, there is no reason to let them off the costs. That is the Government’s position.

Illegal Migration Bill: Economic Impact Assessment

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 27th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, yesterday the Government released an impact assessment on the Illegal Migration Bill, two days before the first day of Report on the Bill, contrary to the principles of HM Treasury’s Green Book and the Better Regulation Framework guidance to departments. The impact assessment does not contain an explanation of the costs and benefits, does not outline alternative policy options and was not published on the same day that the Bill was introduced.

The impact assessment quite literally states that it has

“not attempted to estimate the total costs or benefits of the proposal”.

It also does not consider anything other than either implementing the Bill as a whole or not implementing the Bill at all. Do the Government believe there are any other options?

The timing of the impact assessment’s arrival has prevented the other place from improving it with its scrutiny. A significant proportion of the time set aside in this House has been taken up discussing the arrival of the impact assessment. Does the Minister think this is good policy-making procedure?

If this House is to perform its critical function of scrutinising legislation, it is necessary for us to have complete, comprehensive and timely information about the basis on which policy choices are made and the reasons alternative options have been rejected. Can the Government now explain why an impact assessment for such a significant Bill does not conform to government guidance on policy communication with Parliament?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord. The answer is that there are no other options. The option before the House tomorrow and on succeeding days is the Bill; the alternative is the present scenario, which is not tolerable, in the Government’s view. On the questions about the timing and context of the impact assessment, it was drafted, obviously, in the context of the need urgently to address the dangerous and illegal crossings of the channel. Accordingly, the legislation and the IA were prepared in order to address that problem at speed. It is also the case that the Rwanda scheme was the subject of a legal challenge in the courts, and clearly it was appropriate to take that into account in preparing the impact assessment.

On the question about whether the impact assessment complies with government guidance, I suggest that, in the context of the Bill, it does. It sets out, so far as can be ascertained, the likely impact. But this Bill, like others, is predicated on a strong theory of deterrence, and it is therefore important to note that it is hard empirically to provide detailed statistics, because the purpose of the Bill is to deter the illegal crossings, as the noble Lord acknowledges.

Asylum: Channel Crossings

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 27th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My noble friend is right that intelligence exists suggesting that people smugglers give information to those they smuggle. I am aware that allegations have been made against lawyers, but I would not like to say any more at this stage.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I first thank the noble Lord for facilitating my visit to RAF Manston and to Western Jet Foil a few weeks ago. During that trip, I was made aware of a cohort of youths who initially identify as adults because they want to work. Indeed, they may have been working in their home country since they were 13 or 14. Does the Home Office keep any record of whether this group is more likely to go missing or abscond, so that they can perhaps be identified earlier in the process, before they go missing?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for that question, which is clearly important and I will find out the answer. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has a Question about missing asylum-seeking children in the next fortnight, so I will report back to the House then and will of course write to the noble Lord.

Stop and Search

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Tuesday 20th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I remind the House that I sit as a youth and adult magistrate in London and that I regularly deal with knife-crime cases. In concluding her Statement in the other place, the Home Secretary said:

“It is always heartbreaking and distressing to read reports about stabbings and shootings. I am struck by how often mothers of murdered young black men say that stop and search could have saved their sons’ lives. We owe it to them to heed their call”.—[Official Report, Commons, 19/6/23; col. 570.]


I too have spoken to the mothers of murdered young black men, and I have heard some of them say that stop and search could have saved their son’s life. But what I have also heard mothers say, much more forcefully, is that their sons were routinely and repeatedly stopped by the police, and that this led to a breakdown in trust of the police, so their sons felt that they had nowhere to turn when they felt threatened.

Very often in court, when I have a young man in front of me for a knife-crime incident, he says that he was carrying it for his own protection. This is a deadly cycle of mistrust and escalation, which has led to a 70% increase in knife crime over the last seven years. Knife-enabled rapes and knife-enabled threats to kill are at record highs, with some of the steepest increases in the suburbs, smaller cities, towns and counties.

The Statement says:

“Black people account for about 3% of our population, yet almost a third of under-25s killed by knives are black. Ninety-nine young people lost their lives to knife crime in England and Wales in the year to March 2022: 31 of them were black; 49 were white; 16 were from other ethnic minority groups; and three victims did not have their ethnicity recorded”.—[Official Report, Commons, 19/6/23; col. 569.]


This is a profound problem, which calls for an integrated and sustained response.

I welcome the references to the introduction of stronger community scrutiny and better data collection. These were first recommended many years ago. Can the Minister explain what is meant by “stronger community scrutiny”? There are different models of community scrutiny in different parts of the country. Indeed, there are different models within London. What do the Government mean by “community scrutiny” in the context of knife crime?

What about other repeated recommendations such as police training on the use of force, training on de-escalation and communication skills and proper data collection on traffic stops? None of these was referred to in the Statement. How many of the 18 recommendations by the Independent Office for Police Conduct last year have been fully implemented? The noble Baroness, Lady Casey, called for “a fundamental reset” of the Met’s use of stop and search powers. Is this Statement part of that reset?

Body-worn video cameras should have been a game-changer in the effectiveness of stop and search. They should have been, but have they been? Can the Minister say how many stop and search operations are carried out without body-worn video and why that may be?

I agree that stop and search is a necessary tool as part of a proper strategy, but we need that wider strategy too. Why is the violence reduction unit approach being used by the Home Secretary in only 18 areas, when knife crime is rising in communities across the country? Why has there been no new serious violence strategy for five years? Why is there no comprehensive action on youth mentors and support for early intervention?

Stop and search must be applied judiciously, proportionately and legitimately. It can save lives. At present it comes with the cost of distrust and alienation. It must be applied as part of a wider strategy to rebuild trust and re-energise policing by consent.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, we on these Benches look at this Statement in respect of whether it will produce the outcome the Government are seeking, which is, of course, a reduction in knife crime. Regrettably, I believe this Statement is one which ramps up the rhetoric that strong-arm actions will put an end to knife crime. That rhetoric needs to be tested against the evidence to see whether it works.

Police stop and search is an intrusive power that is used disproportionately against visible minorities. You are seven times more likely to be stopped and searched by the police if you are black than if you are white, if suspicion is required; and 14 more times more likely to be stopped and searched if no suspicion is required. The proposal in the Statement from the Home Secretary is based on suspects of violent crime and talks about the implications for the black community, but there is a danger that these figures can be easily misinterpreted. There is a difference between a few people committing a large number of offences and a large number of black people being involved in violent crime. I suspect that the reality is the former. Perhaps the Minister could confirm that when referring to the figures in the Statement.

More than that, the Government’s own research suggests that stop and search is not an effective deterrent in reducing offending. Operation Blunt 2, from 2008 to 2011, demonstrated that ramping up stop and search in order to reduce knife crime has little or no effect, but Operation Trident in the early 2000s demonstrated that where police and the black communities worked together to reduce black-on-black shootings, there was a significant increase in prosecutions and a reduction in the number of offences. Also, the Government’s own evidence, which they chose to look at in respect of the use of stop and search, produces at most a static response, but often, it shows that simply increasing the use of that power is unlikely to reduce crime. That was the Government’s own evidence in the research they commissioned.

On the one hand, we have the noble Baroness, Lady Casey of Blackstock, pulling in one direction, as mentioned by the noble Lord Ponsonby, in wanting stop and search to be based on collaboration, listening and engagement; and on the other we have this Government pulling in the opposite direction, by increasing the number without that necessary collaboration. So, do the Government believe, against their own evidence, that if stop and search goes up, crime will come down? Have the Government considered the lessons learned from Operation Blunt 2? Secondly, do the Government agree that if a community views police activity as unfair, public trust and police legitimacy are weakened?

Finally, how do the Government intend to ensure, as the Statement says, that “every community” is

“able to trust in stop and search”.—[Official Report, Commons 19/6/23; col. 570.]?

How is that going to be brought about? How can it be brought about without the necessary collaboration which was part of the Casey report? I would be grateful if the Minister addressed those issues, because without that certainty, it is more likely that the rhetoric will fail and we will not enable the desired outcome which all of us want, which is to achieve a reduction in knife crime.

British Nationality (Regularisation of Past Practice) Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 19th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing the Bill. I agree with his first sentence: it is a short Bill with a clear objective and we in the Labour Party support it. Given that it is a short piece of legislation which codifies the long-standing policy position of the Home Office under successive Labour and Tory Governments, we see no need to offer any amendments and look forward to supporting its speedy enactment. In the meantime, we call on the Government to set out further detail on their plans on issues including: data collection on individuals potentially affected by the Bill; provision of information and support to affected individuals on passport applications; and the timing of implementation across the UK, its Crown dependencies and overseas territories.

First, what steps will the Government take to assess the number of people likely to be affected by the Bill? Will they work with the ONS to carry out further research and publish fuller sets of data on passport applications by affected individuals? What discussions has the Minister had with Administrations in the Crown dependencies and overseas territories on the implementation of the Bill? What assessment has he made of the number of people who may be affected in those areas?

Secondly, can the Minister tell us what advice will be made available to concerned members of the public, and to Members of this House making inquiries on their behalf, to ensure that they are provided with all the information they may need? The noble Lord, Lord German, raised this point.

Thirdly and finally, when will the processing of passport applications which were placed on hold in October 2022 be resumed? Given the delays these applications have already experienced, will there be an expedited process for dealing with them without further delay?

We agree that we need to put the citizenship of this group of people beyond doubt. We thank the Minister for facilitating today’s business and for the meetings that I had with his officials earlier in the week.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for introducing her clause stand part debate. As she said, the clause adds behaviours that would be considered damaging to the credibility of an asylum or human rights applicant by amending the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 to widen false “passport” to false “identity document” which ensures that by presenting false documents, failing to produce documents or destroying documents an applicant damages their credibility. It also adds electronic information to the list. If an applicant fails to disclose passcodes or electronic devices, their credibility can be damaged.

In a sense, this would not be a particularly controversial part of the Bill. However, there have been reports about confiscation of mobile devices which has left migrants unable to contact the outside world or to provide the electronic documents needed for their applications. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, referred to the recent High Court case where the Home Office policy on blanket mobile seizure was found unlawful. She also referred to the Minister saying that Clause 14 provides fresh powers through the Bill to respond to the High Court judgment.

I thought that the noble Baroness raised interesting questions about the scope of this clause and whether it goes beyond what is covered in Clause 2 and how widely it will apply. The tone with which she introduced her clause stand part notice seemed to be seeking information and reassurance regarding these enhanced powers. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise to speak briefly only to Amendment 133, to which I would have attached my name had there been space. In the interests of time, I will overlook the other amendments in this group.

I do not know how many noble Lords took the opportunity of our lunch break to join the British Red Cross, which was holding an event with its VOICES Network downstairs. It was launching an excellent report that I commend to your Lordships’ House, We Want to be Strong, But We Don’t Have the Chance: Women’s Experiences of Seeking Asylum in the UK. A large number of the contributors to that report were at the event. It is of particular relevance to Amendment 133 that one of the first things one of them, a very senior medical professional—again, like the right reverend Prelate, I am going to anonymise this as much as I can to make sure that I do not identify anybody—said to me was, “I want to work”; we know how much need we have for her professional skills. Another, a business master’s graduate, also said to me that they wanted to work. These are people who are experts by experience, and that is one of the first things they say when they have an opportunity to speak to a politician.

I also want to make a point that no one else has made; I saw the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, earlier so he may have made this point already but I will make it in his place. In responding to the Migration Advisory Committee’s call for evidence in relation to shortage occupations in the UK, the Welsh Government stressed that asylum seekers should be allowed to work. Their submission said that

“asylum seekers bring with them a wealth of experience, skills and knowledge, and as such it is a missed opportunity to not allow asylum seekers to work. We urge the UK Government to reconsider its decision”

on this issue.

We have been talking in the abstract a lot so I want to draw on one other account—a piece of practical evidence of actual individuals. We have heard a lot about the housing of asylum seekers in hotels and, I am afraid, seen a great deal of horrific attempts to stir up xenophobia and local concern about that. However, I want to tell the story of the 100-plus asylum seekers who have been housed in a hotel in Thatcham in West Berkshire for up to a year. They started a litter-picking group, and then a broader volunteering group. Each charity shop in Newbury and Thatcham now has one or two asylum seekers there regularly to help out. They are a great example of people contributing despite our attempts to stop them doing so; indeed, they have won a local award recognising the contribution of their volunteering.

This is particularly relevant to Amendment 133 when we look at what those asylum seekers who have been litter picking and volunteering in charity shops are. They are doctors, teachers and engineers. They are making a wonderful contribution but surely it would make more sense to allow them to work.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to speak briefly to the two amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker. The new clause proposed in Amendment 139FA

“requires the Home Secretary to establish a process to fast-track asylum claims from safe countries”,

while the proposed new clause in Amendment 139FC

“seeks to require regular reports from the Secretary of State on progress toward eliminating the current backlog of asylum cases”.

As of March, there were 172,758 asylum seekers in the UK waiting an initial decision on their case, with 128,812—that is 75%—waiting longer than six months. The backlog is so extreme that the Government have tried to quietly drop a key measure of the Nationality and Borders Act to speed up 55,000 people who have arrived over the past year.

The purpose of these two amendments is first to re-establish, if you like, the fast-tracking so that the people who are very likely to succeed in their appeals are dealt with as quickly as possible and, secondly, to monitor the situation to see how it is progressing. In the press I read that Robert Jenrick, the Immigration Minister, said he believes that reducing the backlog would increase the pull factor for those seeking to apply for asylum. Can the Minister confirm whether the Government’s view is that by decreasing the backlog you are increasing the pull factor? People taking part in today’s debate would be very sceptical of that, but I wonder whether the Minister can confirm that that is indeed the Government’s view.

We have had a wide-ranging debate, and I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, that the debate has gone far wider than the Bill and has been focusing on right to work and issues such as that, but what I seek to do in this brief contribution is to talk specifically to the amendments in my noble friend’s name, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we support all the amendments in this group. On Amendment 133 in the name of my noble friend Lady Ludford, it makes complete sense to ensure that asylum seekers are not a burden on taxpayers as soon as practicable. If the Government do not agree, perhaps they should ensure that claims are decided within the three or six months suggested in the amendment.

As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham says, a lot of asylum seekers who are granted permission to work send money back home, as it were. Surely that helps to ensure that people stay in the country where they are and do not add to the problem of asylum seekers.

On Amendment 150, there is no point in creating an even greater backlog until the Government have addressed the existing one.

On the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, fast-tracking claims from countries with high rates of success makes complete sense and any ongoing impact assessment should include the impact of the Act on the backlog.

The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, made a significant contribution and I hope she does not mind me responding to it. I think she is absolutely right that we have to bear in mind how all this is viewed by members of the British public, but we have already heard one noble Lord— I cannot remember who it was—saying that 77% of the public support allowing asylum seekers to work.

On the issue that the noble Baroness raised around job vacancies versus UK citizens who are jobless, the adult social care system cannot attract British workers, to the extent that the Government allow special provision for foreign workers to come in and fill those vacancies. The agriculture sector cannot attract British workers—for example, seasonal workers to pick crops—and the Government make special provision to allow foreign workers to come into the country. I do not know whether the figure that the noble Baroness quotes of 5 million is right, but the Government allow foreign workers to come in and do those jobs. Why can asylum seekers not do those jobs while they wait for their application to be decided by the Government?

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, we on these Benches support all the amendments in this group, for the reasons my noble friends have explained.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

The noble Lord has caught me out as I gather my notes.

Amendment 139A, which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, spoke to, is about encouraging victims or witnesses to report offences. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham also spoke to this. I absolutely understand and support the sentiments behind that amendment. I thought I would reflect a little on my experience as a magistrate in Westminster Magistrates’ Court, where I remember that, about 10 years ago, we had officials from the Home Office sitting in our courts. They were basically there to try to pick up business to do with illegal migrants and asylum seekers, whether they be offenders, witnesses or people who just appeared in court.

It just so happened that one of my magistrate colleagues was a Home Office official—particularly, part of the Border Force organisation but within the Home Office. She explained to me that it was a pilot that had worked for three months, I think from memory, but which was stopped after that period because they just did not pick up enough business. It was not worth the officials sitting in court for that period. I thought that was an interesting reflection on the points which the noble Baroness made. I absolutely understand the point which she and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham made about people being reluctant to come forward, because of their distrust of the criminal justice system as a whole, However, my practical experience of that, as just described—and Westminster Magistrates’ Court deals with perhaps the most diverse group of people to pass through the doors of any magistrates’ court in the country—was that not a lot of business was picked up. That is my first reflection.

My second reflection is on Amendment 139B, regarding the implementation of the report by the Chief Inspector of Prisons on immigrants in detention centres. This also goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord German, about the Brook House inquiry. Again, a few years ago I was a lay inspector and in that role I went to Littlehey Prison with the then chief inspector. It was an unannounced visit and extremely illuminating to see the prison itself, which was a sex offenders’ prison, but also to talk to the inspectors about how they conduct their activities and how important it is to have unannounced inspections. The way they explained it to me was that the inspections need to be, on the one hand, unannounced, but perhaps even more importantly, regular, and there need to be follow-up inspections. The prison officers and governors whom I met were very sure that they would be continually inspected over a period of time. It would be a working relationship with the inspectorate to try to ensure that standards were kept up.

I am sympathetic to Amendment 139B, as it is a process; it is not a one-off. I very much hope that the Government have confidence in their inspectorate to put in place, over time, an inspection regime which is in-depth and can do its best to maintain standards, while identifying any shortcomings it may see on its inspections. Nevertheless, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)]

My Lords, I will not detain the Committee by going through Clauses 61 to 67 in turn. They contain entirely standard provisions, relating, for example, to the making of regulations under the Bill, commencement, extent and the short title. Instead, I will focus on the various amendments in the group and on the contributions that noble Lords helpfully made from a variety of perspectives.

I will first deal briefly with government Amendment 139D. This relates to the standard power in Clause 66(5) which enables the Secretary of State, by regulations, to make transitional or saving provision in connection with the commencement of any provision of the Bill. Amendment 139D simply enables such regulations to make consequential, supplementary and incidental provision and different provision for different purposes. Again, this is an entirely standard provision to facilitate the smooth implementation of an Act.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Ludford said, proper scrutiny of the Bill rests with this House, as the Commons was not given sufficient time to scrutinise it, so that is what we are determined to do.

Bearing in mind the draconian measures in the Bill, proper legal aid must be provided, including for those referred to the national referral mechanism, particularly in light of the changes introduced by the Nationality and Borders Act that adjusted the reasonable grounds threshold and the standard of proof required—and not just to those served with a removal notice. We also support Amendment 120A to ensure that legal aid is provided, rather than just allowed.

In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, it seems an extraordinary argument to say that, because British people are denied justice and cannot access legal aid, people seeking asylum should also be deprived of justice. Surely, the answer is to provide justice to everyone who needs it.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this group of amendments looks at legal aid in the context of the Bill. Prior to a removal notice, the Bill does not provide legal aid to a person in detention in England and Wales. There is no provision for a person awaiting a decision on removal in Northern Ireland and Scotland, so I wonder whether the Minister can say something about the position in Northern Ireland and Scotland.

The Bill provides an extremely short timeframe of eight days for an individual to seek legal advice and representation and provide sufficient instructions for a representative to lodge a suspensive claim with compelling evidence against removal to a third country. The non-government amendments in this group would expand legal aid provisions to persons potentially facing removal. The government figures suggest that around half of asylum seekers already do not have access to legal aid advice, with advice being much harder to obtain outside of London. My noble friend Lord Bach amplified that point very powerfully, when he gave the figure of the gap of 25,000 between the numbers of asylum applicants and legal aid provisions in 2022, showing that about 50% of asylum applicants have no legal advice.

My noble friend also gave a powerful exposition on the background of legal aid following the cuts we saw with the LASPO Act. The noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, also acknowledged those cuts, which have been extended from when the LASPO Act originally came into force. As my noble friend Lord Bach summed up very effectively, the overwhelming danger of Clause 54 is that it becomes a sham and a fig-leaf; the rights may be there on paper, but they will never be provided in practice. The amendments in this group are seeking to ameliorate that fear.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, also summed up this group of amendments very effectively, when she talked about the importance of legal aid for making fair decisions. I agree with her that this will reduce appeals, will let applicants properly understand the process of what is happening to them, and, perhaps above all, will uphold the UK’s reputation as a country which is ruled by law, as people need to understand the laws being applied to them.

This has been a relatively short group, but it goes to the heart of the Bill, because it concerns what is available in practice to people coming over and applying for asylum. They need to understand the situation they are in and that they will be treated fairly. Reflecting on my own time sitting in courts, I say that people may not like the decisions being made, but it is a much better position when they understand them. It will resonate beyond the courtroom itself, if people understanding the decisions being made about them.

Illegal Migration Bill

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 12th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, as we have just heard, Clauses 29 to 36 place a permanent bar on those who fall within the scheme outlined in Clause 2 from lawfully travelling to the UK or securing settlement or British citizenship through naturalisation or registration; this is subject only to exceptions to comply with international agreements or where there are compelling circumstances. If the Bill fails to succeed in its aim of removing people, there will likely be a whole class of people stuck in the UK for extended periods without access to a system through which they can obtain lawful status. Therefore, they will be unable to work or rent a home. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, expanded on this point eloquently. To sum up the noble Baroness’s speech: she wants compliance with international law. We support her Amendment 98EA.

The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, gave a clear exposition of the Government’s intentions with this Bill, and on the different statuses on the second step, as he put it—the ban on acquiring citizenship by naturalisation but also by registration. As he said eloquently, registration is not a concession or a reward for good behaviour but an entitlement. His amendment seeks to address that point, with particular examples given in his speech.

The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, also spoke about the specific cases of Hong Kongers and BNOs, and how this Bill could cut across—or seems to cut across—their potential rights. My noble friend Lady Lister, who added her name to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, attacked the problem from the perspective of concern for children who could be subject to this ban because of the actions of their parents. As she rightly argued, this is not fair on those children; she wants to revert to the original wording of Clause 35.

We support the amendments in this group. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Murray of Blidworth) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. It has been particularly illuminating; I have noted the quality of the speeches and hope that I can answer the questions that have been put in relation to these clauses.

Clauses 29 to 36 prevent a person who has entered the United Kingdom unlawfully, and meets the conditions in Clause 2, being able to lawfully re-enter the UK, secure settlement or become a British national through naturalisation or most registration routes. A person who arrives in the UK illegally should not be able to make the UK their home and eventually settle here. Settlement in the UK confers significant benefits, such as the freedom to study, work and access healthcare and public funds; of course, it is also a pathway to British citizenship which, in turn, confers further benefits.

Allowing someone who arrives in the UK illegally to settle clearly creates an incentive for people to make those dangerous journeys. It is a vital part of the deterrent effect that those categories should be included. This is because people taking advantage in that way is unfair. It is unfair on those who play by the rules and come here legally, it is unfair on those who are genuinely in need, as it constrains our capacity to help, and it is unfair on the British public.

Clause 29 precludes people who meet the conditions in Clause 2 from ever settling here and, once removed, being able to re-enter. This is achieved by preventing them from being granted any form of permission through the immigration system. We do, however, recognise there will be occasions when we will need to waive the bans and grant permission; for example, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, noted, where not granting permission would contravene our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Clause 29 balances our need to disincentivise people from making dangerous journeys to the UK by ensuring that there is no benefit to be gained from entering the UK illegally, while recognising there may be a limited number of scenarios in which it is appropriate to grant permission. I put it to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, that this is a proportionate and balanced provision. Therefore, I do not recognise her description of the Bill as “wielding a sledgehammer”.

Clause 30 sets out that a person will not be eligible for British citizenship, British Overseas Territories citizenship, British overseas citizenship and British subject status if they enter the UK unlawfully and meet the criteria in Clause 2. The ban will also apply to someone who enters a Crown dependency or British Overseas Territory unlawfully in a similar way. We have included the other types of British nationality as we do not think it is right that illegal entry should allow a person to acquire any form of British nationality, but also to prevent a person using it as a stepping stone to register as a British citizen. Illegal entry into the UK, a Crown dependency or an overseas territory will have the same effect. We do not want people to be able to enter illegally in any of those locations and use that as a way to acquire citizenship and, ultimately, a right to enter and live in the UK.

Clauses 31 to 34 set out the routes to which the citizenship ban will apply. The key citizenship route which will be affected is naturalisation, as my noble friend Lord Moylan noted. This is the main way in which adults born outside the UK can acquire British citizenship and British Overseas Territories citizenship. The ban will also apply to certain registration routes. However, those applying under provisions that address historical inequalities in British nationality law will not be affected. This includes people born before 1983 to British mothers, those who missed out on citizenship because their parents were not married or those applying on the route for descendants of Chagossians.

Clause 35 allows us to exempt a person from the citizenship ban if treating them as ineligible for citizenship would contravene our obligations under the human rights convention. This means that if a person can demonstrate that, for example, their right to a family or private life can be met only by us considering a grant of citizenship, we will not exclude them from applying. We do not think that acquiring citizenship will usually be essential to allow a person to have a private or family life in the UK; other options, such as leave to enter or remain, may satisfy that. However, in very exceptional cases where considering a grant of citizenship is needed to prevent us breaching our ECHR obligations, Clause 35 may apply. We will publish guidance for nationality caseworkers setting out how to assess human rights in the nationality context.

The amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Moylan would remove registration routes for British citizenship and British Overseas Territories citizenship from the ban so that it applies only to naturalisation. They would also remove the bans on becoming a British overseas citizen and British subject through registration. My noble friend Lord Moylan has described registration as an “evidence-based process”, with decisions not based on the Secretary of State exercising discretion. I am afraid to say that I disagree with my noble friend as this is not universally the case: some registration routes are dependent on ministerial discretion and there is no automatic entitlement.

Let me explain this further. As my noble friend Lord Moylan said, not all registration routes are included in the ban. Those that allow people to acquire British nationality they missed out on because of previous unfairness are not included; nor are the specific routes for children born in the UK or stateless persons. However, registration routes that rely on residence or specifically for children born outside the UK are included in the ban, as we expect people who want to become citizens to have followed a compliant pathway, including having entered lawfully.

For example, Section 4(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 allows people who already hold another form of British nationality to register as a British citizen on the basis of five years’ lawful residence in the UK. The residence requirements mirror those for naturalisation: the only significant difference between the routes is that other British nationals wanting to register under that route do not need to meet the knowledge of English and life in the UK requirements. Given that the residence requirements are the same as for naturalisation, it would be appropriate for them to be subject to the ban in the same way as naturalisation applicants. This is the route that BNOs can use if they come to the UK under our scheme and become settled: they can go on to apply for citizenship. It is right that those who apply and come through legal routes should have the right to become citizens, but we do not think it is right that those who enter unlawfully should benefit.

The registration routes for children who are subject to the ban include two routes for children born abroad to British citizens by descent. Both have a residence element: either that the parent lived in the UK for a period of three years before the child was born or the family lived in the UK for the three-year period before applying to register the child. We do not anticipate that children of British citizens would be brought to the UK on a small boat when there are routes available to them as family members, but should that happen, the child will not be able to register as a citizen.

The other child route that is included in the ban is registration of children at the Home Secretary’s discretion. The only statutory requirements are that the child is under 18 and is of good character if over 10. However, guidance sets out expectations about when a child will be registered. The normal expectation is that the child will be settled in the UK, and that the parents will be British, or at least settled. It is unlikely that children who enter the UK unlawfully would be able to meet the normal expectations of having a British or settled parent, being lawfully present and having completed a period of residence, as under the Government’s proposals, children who have entered illegally will be removed. The citizenship ban will, however, prevent a child being registered under this provision unless there are ECHR grounds. This fits with the Government’s intention to discourage parents from bringing children to the UK via dangerous methods, including crossing the channel in a small boat, and that such a child cannot become a British citizen and create a means for the family to stay.

My noble friend raised, quite rightly, the issue of compassionate cases. As I have said the ECHR exemption will allow us to consider registering, in rare and exceptional cases, where a person meets the statutory requirements and granting citizenship would be essential to allow them to exercise their family or private life.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Ludford has clearly explained why Clauses 43 to 51 should not stand part of the Bill. The Government just seem to dismiss all the safeguards around access to justice and making sure that the court process has integrity, to speed up any sort of appeal process against decisions under this Bill, to the extent that they are destroying the whole principle of justice. That is why we do not believe these clauses should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, for explaining this really quite complex area. The only thing I was going to ask the Minister was whether he could explain the timeframes within which the appeal must be lodged: seven days for the Upper Tribunal and then 23 days for a further appeal to the Court of Appeal or the Court of Session. Are those timeframes standard in these types of cases? How have they arrived at them?

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, expressed the case very fully and I thought the way the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, summarised it was a fair comment about the accessibility of these processes to people taking part in them.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Bellamy) (Con)]

My Lords, Clauses 43 to 51 are an essential part of the scheme of the Bill, just like Clause 54 on legal aid, which we discussed earlier. I think by now your Lordships are very familiar with the scheme of the Bill but, just briefly, for the record, I will try to outline these clauses and answer the questions that have arisen as we go through.

The first thing the Bill does is to render certain claims —protection of human rights and modern slavery claims—non-suspensive so that making them does not delay the removal of an illegal migrant to a safe third country. However, the Bill then provides safeguards for removal in two cases: where there is a serious harm suspensive claim and where there is a factual suspensive claim—there has been a mistake as to whether the conditions are met.

Then the Bill goes on to provide that if the Secretary of State refuses those claims there is then an appeal to the Upper Tribunal. In general, the Government’s position is that that provides proper safeguards. It does not dismiss safeguards—if I may use the phrase just used by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—it strikes a fair balance between expedition and fairness to the migrant. It does not in any way destroy justice because the ultimate decision in relation to the suspensive claims is in the hands of a very respected and senior judicial body and legal aid is available in order to bring those claims.

The basic timetable, to answer the question from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is that there are seven working days from receipt of the notice of removal to bring the claim, subject to the possibility of an extension if that is necessary to secure justice in a particular case. The 23-day period—I think I am right although I will correct myself in writing if I am wrong—is for the Upper Tribunal to take its decision. Those time limits for appeals are specific to this Bill. This is an expedited procedure that provides strict time limits, but in the Government’s view they are fair time limits.

One should make it clear that we have two situations. The first is where the Secretary of State certifies that the claim is clearly unfounded. In that circumstance, the person concerned has to apply for permission to appeal. That is the current approach, as I and the Government understand it, in the asylum and human rights system. It is effectively to weed out unmeritorious appeals as those designed to do no more than frustrate removal. Those cases are decided by the tribunal on the papers. Similarly, if you make a late suspensive claim—a claim out of time—it will be considered only if there are compelling reasons. That is at the level of the Secretary of State but if they consider that there are no compelling reasons, you can go to the tribunal and say, “There are compelling reasons why I was out of time”. Again, that is for the tribunal to decide on the papers.

These provisions are designed to ensure that claims are made at the earliest opportunity and prevent late claims being used to frustrate removal, undermining the overall effectiveness of the claims process. Once a claim has been made to the Secretary of State but not refused, and then to the Upper Tribunal as well, the whole process is suspended until the tribunal has taken a decision, so there is protection during that period.

Clause 47 also deals with another problem that constantly arises in this kind of case, where somebody tries to raise something new at a late stage. Again, there is a procedure for dealing with that: effectively, that the new matter can be considered by the Upper Tribunal only if there have been compelling reasons for it not to have been raised earlier. In relation to late claims, claims out of time and new matters, there are those checks to prevent the system being abused.

Clause 48 then requires the various timeframes to be respected. It places a requirement on the tribunal procedure rules to secure that those timeframes are respected. As I have just said, there are seven working days for the submission of a substantive appeal—I think that is in Clause 48(1)(a)—and a 23 working-day period for the tribunal to decide that substantive appeal. Those timeframes may, as I say, be extended. What we have here is a process that, in the Government’s view, is essentially a fast-track process but none the less a fair and balanced one.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

These very short timescales are no doubt part of the deterrent effect which the Government are seeking to put in place through the Bill. What estimate have the Government made about the workload on the tribunal process? Is it really sustainable to have such short timescales?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, the Government have been working closely with the senior judiciary to ensure that we have the relevant judicial manpower and resources to deal with the workload. I am not, as of this moment, in a position to give specific details but one of the reasons for allowing the judges of the First-tier Tribunal to sit in the Upper Tribunal, which gives us a pretty wide pool to draw upon, is that it enables us to draw upon recorders, retired judges and others. The Government are at the moment satisfied from the discussions they have had that there will be sufficient judicial capacity to meet any reasonably foreseeable workload, but that is a perfectly good question and I thank the noble Lord for raising it.

I will come in a moment to the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, about judges in general, but I will first deal with government Amendment 115A, which provides for the first set of tribunal rules effectively to be made by the Lord Chancellor rather than, as would normally be the case, by the Tribunal Procedure Committee. That committee normally takes quite a long time to make new rules—maybe 12 months or more—so, since we are working to implement the Bill as soon as practicable, government Amendment 115A provides for the first set of tribunal procedure rules, including these time limits, to be made by the Lord Chancellor so that we have the relevant tribunal procedure rules in place as soon as possible after Royal Assent.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

What I am hearing from the noble Lords opposite is that if the Government ignored Rule 39 it would not be a breach of international law. But the Government accept that Rule 39 is binding on them; otherwise, there would be flights to Rwanda, surely.

The other thing to say about the two clauses is the stunning silence about Clause 52—absolutely no comment at all. For the noble Lords opposite to say this is not about the rule of law when they have said nothing at all to defend Clause 52 is quite extraordinary.

I think enough has been said—and there has been a very interesting sideshow for 20 or 25 minutes from the noble Lords opposite—but it takes us no further forward as far as the arguments here are concerned. Even if one was to accept the arguments of Policy Exchange, there has been no argument about the fact that Clause 52 is contrary to the rule of law, and that is why we believe that neither Clause 52 nor Clause 53 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I think everybody is really waiting to hear what the Minister has to say about this. It has been a fascinating debate and, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, it appears that Government, whatever the rights and wrongs, accept Rule 39—the Minister made that very clear in what he read out—and yet we have had the silence about Clause 52. I do not think I can add anything of substance to the debate at this stage and I look forward to what the Minister has to say.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 52 underpins the suspensive claims and appeals process by prohibiting the courts from granting interim remedies in relation to any other proceedings which would prevent or delay the removal of an illegal entrant subject to the duty. Amendments 116 and 117 would require the Home Secretary to provide a statement to Parliament, on a case-by-case basis, explaining why the courts should prevent the granting of an interim remedy and for this to be approved by the other place—and only the other place, I note—before the restrictions set out in Clause 52 could come into effect.

These amendments seriously risk undermining our efforts swiftly to remove illegal entrants from the UK. To prevent the courts granting an interim remedy and delaying removal, it would be necessary to seek parliamentary approval in every case subject to the duty to remove. This, I am sure the Committee will agree, is simply not practicable; nor is it necessary or appropriate.

These amendments are fundamentally misconceived. They proceed on the basis that there is an individual rationale for barring interim remedies in each case, but the rationale is universal; namely, that the Bill itself provides for a mechanism for a person subject to the duty to remove to challenge their removal and for removal to be suspended while the claim and any appeal to the Upper Tribunal have yet to be determined. That being the case, it is the Government’s contention that there is no case for the courts separately to grant interim remedies. The blanket approach taken by Clause 52 is therefore entirely appropriate, and I suggest to the Committee that that is an entire answer to the second point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

Clause 52 will encourage compliance with the suspensive claims process. It also provides an effective safeguard against other types of legal challenges being brought in an attempt to thwart removal. This will ensure that our ability promptly to remove those with no legal right to be in the UK is not undermined.

Turning then to what may be seen as the main event, Clause 53, I want to make it clear from the outset that the UK is fundamentally committed to the international rules-based order and there is nothing in this clause which requires us to act incompatibly with our international obligations. Under Rule 39, an interim measure may be indicated by the European Court of Human Rights where there is an imminent risk of irreparable harm. The inclusion of Clause 53 reflects the concerns we have raised with the Strasbourg court about its interim measures process, as identified by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti.

We want the interim measures process to have greater transparency and fairness to ensure the proper administration of justice, reflecting what we would apply in a domestic scenario, as identified by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. This includes clear and reasoned decisions and an opportunity to make meaningful representations before and after a decision is made. It cannot be right that our ability to control our borders is undermined by an opaque process conducted at the last minute, with no formal chance to put forward our case or to appeal that decision. This process risks derailing our efforts to tackle the people smugglers and prevent people making dangerous, illegal and unnecessary journeys across the channel.

Clause 53 affords the Home Secretary, or other Minister of the Crown, personal discretion to suspend the duty where an interim measure has been indicated. This will mean that a Minister may suspend removal in response to a Rule 39 interim measure but, crucially, is not bound by UK law to do so. This will be dependent upon the individual facts of each case. For broader context, I direct noble Lords to the recent and well substantiated paper by Professor Ekins of Policy Exchange, already discussed by the Committee, together with its valuable forewords written by Lord Sumption and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann. The key arguments made by Professor Ekins were helpfully summarised and powerfully expanded upon by my noble friends Lord Sandhurst and Lord Wolfson, who I know will have given great consideration to the Strasbourg court’s jurisdiction and procedural rules in their preparation for the Committee.