Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 8th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I too wish a swift and full recovery to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. Her colleague has ably set out the thinking behind this amendment. I suspect I am more sympathetic to it than some members of the Committee, but I suggest the following additional observation on a point that it demonstrates, even to those who feel very anti anyone who has committed a crime ever being able to stay in the United Kingdom.

The amendment demonstrates that Article 8 of the convention is broadly drawn, so there is room for considerable debate about where the line should be drawn on what is a necessary and proportionate interference—for example, to prevent crime or for the purposes of immigration control. A great deal of latitude has always been allowed to signatory states as to where, in the first instance, democratic politics and the elected Government of the day think that discretion should be framed. For many years, Governments of both persuasions have attempted to structure that discretion—just as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is doing in one direction in this amendment—by a combination of primary legislation, Immigration Rules and policy. So, anybody who says that one needs to resile from the European Convention on Human Rights because of Article 8 is either misguided or not misguided at all and is doing this for various political reasons.

I have been a lawyer for only 31 years, but my understanding is that there have been only four removal cases since 1980 in which the UK Government have been found in violation of Article 8. So, if people are upset about the way domestic courts are drawing the line in particular cases, I suggest that that is something for domestic legislation—primary or secondary legislation, rules, guidance and so on. It is in no way a justification for some of the toxic debates about international human rights that we have heard in recent days, weeks, months and years.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I too send my best wishes to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. We shall miss, for a temporary period, her distinctive contribution to this House.

I am puzzled by this amendment, essentially for the reasons my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti mentions. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is part of our law. There are suggestions that proposals may be brought forward in relation to its application, but it remains part of our law. The Minister will tell me if I am wrong, but there is nothing in the Bill that purports to remove Article 8.

Article 8 requires adjudicators, tribunals and courts to have regard to family law issues and the interests of children and parents—families—and that seems entirely appropriate. There is a balance to be struck in these cases. We are talking about the deportation of criminals. Sadly, there are people here on a temporary basis who commit serious crimes and who need to be removed. It is right and proper that the interests of families are taken into account, but that already happens. I do not see the need for the amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am sure the noble Lord is aware that there are particular statutory provisions on additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals, and it is those that I understand the noble Baroness is seeking to amplify.

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If you really believe that lawyers are always a problem and always in the way, and that we should remove people with no due process at all, that is all very well, but I do not understand that to be the position of either the Front Bench opposite and certainly not of the Government. Why do I say that? I say it not least because my noble friend the Minister restated the Government’s commitment to international human rights and the rule of law just a few moments ago in the previous group. Given all of that, I really find it difficult to see what reasonable objections there are to the arguments made by my noble friend Lord Bach and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, in relation to the importance of basic access to advice and representation for this group of very vulnerable—incarcerated—people who, in addition to their incarceration, may be facing imminent removal from the country.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a practising barrister including in immigration cases—sometimes for claimants, sometimes for the Home Office. I support this amendment for the reasons so eloquently presented by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and those who have followed him.

I want to add one point, and it is a legal point. The Court of Appeal has explained that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is of course part of our law by reason of the Human Rights Act, imposes obligations on the state to provide civil legal aid in some circumstances. The question of law, says the Court of Appeal, is whether an unrepresented litigant is able to present his or her case effectively and without unfairness, having regard to the complexity of the relevant laws and the importance of what is at stake. Applying those criteria, you decide whether there is an obligation to provide civil legal aid. Those criteria were stated by Lord Dyson, the then Master of the Rolls, for the Court of Appeal, in the case of Teresa Gudanaviciene v the Director of Legal of Aid Casework and the Lord Chancellor—a case reported in vol. 1, 2015, of the Weekly Law Reports, page 2247 at paragraph 56.

If you seek to apply those criteria to immigration detention, it seems to me that the answer is very clear: there is an obligation to provide civil legal aid. Why is that? Because the law in this area is highly complex, and the issues are of great significance to the person concerned. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has emphasised, the person concerned is incarcerated. It is wholly unrealistic to think that an unrepresented litigant, who may after all speak little if any English, will be able present their case effectively—that is the test—and without unfairness, if they lack legal representation.

The Government have emphasised repeatedly the importance of complying with their human rights obligations—the Minister has said that; I have heard him on many occasions. I suggest to him that this commitment requires Ministers to look favourably on this amendment and, indeed, to answer the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, to do so irrespective of the cost. I do not think the cost would be more than a tiny proportion of the legal aid budget, but that is not the point. The obligation is irrespective of the cost. I hope the Minister will be able to tell us, when he replies to this important debate, that further thought will be given to this issue by the Government before Report.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, not being a lawyer, I feel more qualified to speak on this than anybody else.

The reality is that legal aid across society is, in effect, a rationed resource; it cannot be universally applied. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made a point about obligations, and Parliament has been perhaps unwise in the past to have open-ended obligations when we cannot deliver them. The Minister will no doubt have some figures on this but, if more money is allocated through the legal aid system to asylum and immigration cases, either the budget will have to expand or money will be taken away from other areas. It is a simple matter of arithmetic. This is about choice and priorities, and they need to be matched with obligations that we have shown ourselves unable to meet.

On the point that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, made in his contribution, it would be invaluable for the Committee to have some factual evidence. A point was made that if cases could be made to go more quickly, with fewer adjournments and appeals, savings could be made—and maybe they could be—but we are flying blind because we do not have the facts. I do not know whether they are obtainable or whether this can be looked at before Report, but it would be extremely helpful to have some factual evidence to support this.

Unless the Government expand the budget for legal aid, something will have to give somewhere. If more money needs to go into this area, less will have to be spent somewhere else. It is not a hugely challenging intellectual concept. It would be most helpful to hear in the Minister’s reply whether he has any facts at his disposal. The Committee would be in a much stronger position to take a decision when we have that information.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. I draw the Committee back to where we are at the moment: an individual in detention can have 30 minutes’ worth of legal advice very quickly after they have requested it. There may be an issue around take-up. We are monitoring take-up on a regular basis and want to increase that take-up, but that 30 minutes is there. If further advice is required, on the merits test that can be taken forward as of now.

My noble friend’s amendment may take that issue wider than that discussion. It is the Government’s objective to speed up claims to get to decisions on asylum. We are doing that through executive action, not legislation, increasing the number of people taking decisions and making it much quicker and fairer, because that is in the public interest, as has been mentioned by all. I do not think we are going to resolve that issue in Committee today. I have tried to set out where I think we are, and my noble friend has tabled his amendment.

Serious questions have been raised on these issues by me, by the noble Viscount and by the noble Lord, Lord Empey. I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment, because I believe the Government’s case as I have put it is the right course of action on those issues. If we are going to have even further discussion on the points he has made, we need to have some better information on which to base it, even though I accept that for some members of the Committee, that becomes a matter of principle.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful. The noble Lord has been very generous with time on this important matter. I entirely understand his point that further factual information is required. Will he do his best to ensure that we do not wait until Report to receive that information, and that at least those who have spoken in this debate and the Library generally receive a written explanation of the factual position as seen by the department on the cost of implementing the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, the 30 minutes, and the take-up? Will he also commit to meeting with noble Lords who are concerned about this matter, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Bach, so we can see whether there is a way forward prior to Report?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for that intervention. The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, are valid and I will do my best to examine them. Some of these issues are within the Ministry of Justice, not the Home Office, but I will examine those points in detail and make sure that we respond to those who have spoken in the debate and potentially put a note in the Library of the House accordingly.

I want to re-emphasise that the Government strongly believe that there is a good offer at the moment. That offer is available to all who seek it, and there is the potential for further advice if the case merits it and for us to examine how we monitor take-up. I will certainly look at the points that have been raised, but in the meantime, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

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I know that the Minister should welcome this amendment, which supports the broad thrust of the Government’s current policy, but I look forward to him telling me that he will not support it. Nevertheless, I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I will add a few words about the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby: I too greatly appreciated all the work he did and the courteous manner in which he addressed this House. I look forward to working with the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, his replacement at the Ministry of Justice.

Amendments 138 and 139 would certainly bring clarity, as the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, said in speaking to them, but they would do so, surely, at the expense of any balance and consideration of relevant factors. Amendment 138 would provide that there is to be no appeal against a deportation order. It would be most unusual and highly regrettable to have a sanction that is simply unappealable; I cannot think of any other circumstance in which that is the case under our law.

If this amendment were accepted, there would be no appeal, however strong the basis for one. If a deportation order were to be made despite the fact that the criteria set out in the UK Borders Act are not satisfied, it would be quite an extraordinary position to be in. There would be no right to appeal despite a deportation order being made to a country which everyone accepts would pose a well-founded risk of torture to the individual concerned; such a provision would be absurd, in my respectful submission.

Amendments 139 and 203A would impose obligations to make a deportation order with no exceptions or discretion where a person who is not a British citizen is sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Again, this is surely wholly unacceptable because it would mean an obligation to make a deportation order even if it means removal to a country where the person concerned will face torture. It would mean an obligation to make a deportation order irrespective of the circumstances of the offence, any mitigating circumstances or how long the person concerned had been lawfully in this country. Such an absolute provision surely cannot command the support of the Committee.

I very much hope that the Minister will say that the Government will not accept any of these amendments. The right way forward, I suggest, is for the Government carefully to consider the existing work to address what guidance and directions should be given to courts and tribunals, particularly in relation to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, so that a proper balance can be accepted and implemented in this important area.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for his amendment, which seeks to collect and publish data about overseas students who have committed criminal offences leading to the revocation of their student visas.

When immigrants commit crimes, we need to understand whether there are patterns that suggest wider or systemic abuses of the system. Data of this kind has immense practical importance. It allows us to identify risks, ensure accountability and take informed decisions about how to strengthen our Immigration Rules. When we talk about borders, we must do so with an eye to safety, fairness and national interest. The British people rightly expect that those who come to this country will contribute to it through our economy, workplace, communities and civic life. The vast majority of overseas students do just that, enriching our universities and our society. But when a small minority commit offences, we must have the tools to know about it, track it and respond effectively.

As my noble friend Lord Jackson mentioned, he has tried time and again, unfortunately in vain, to get the Home Office to release these statistics. The Answer my noble friend received to his Written Question on 7 April, that official statistics published by the Home Office are kept under review, is not particularly helpful. I hope the Minister will be able to finally give my noble friend the answer that he deserves. This amendment seeks to provide that clarity.

Amendments 198 and 199, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel, go to the heart of what it means to exercise control over our borders in a way that serves our national interest. The first amendment makes it clear that family migration through spouse and civil partner visas must be subject to sensible limits and rigorous criteria. This is about making sure that those who come here are ready to contribute, not to extract; to work, not to remain idle; and to build, not to burden.

Our economy, jobs market, public services and national identity all depend on a social contract: that people pay in before they take out. That is the foundation of our tax system, the National Health Service, schools, housing and every element of our welfare state. Introducing a salary threshold of £38,700 is not a punitive measure; it is common sense. It would ensure that new arrivals will be net contributors to this country, helping us to strengthen our economy at a time when the Government’s mismanagement has left us in a dreadful state. It would reassure the British people that migration is working for them, not against them, and it would help to rebuild the trust that is so essential if public confidence in our immigration system is to endure.

The second amendment addresses an equally important issue: the question of sovereignty. Put simply, we cannot allow this country’s ability to remove those with no right to remain to be dictated by the whims of foreign Governments. Our domestic policy must never be determined by third countries which frustrate deportations by refusing to co-operate with basic verification of identity. This amendment would strengthen the Government’s hand by making visa penalties mandatory when other countries refuse to play their part.

The link between border control and national well-being could not be clearer. Our economy, our jobs market, our communities and our state services depend on a system that is fair, firm and respected. The British people are generous, but they are not fools; they want an immigration system that supports growth, rewards contribution and protects our national autonomy. These amendments deliver on those principles; they are proportionate, robust and urgently needed. I urge the Government to recognise their merit and adopt them.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I will say something about Amendments 198 and 199, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. Amendment 198 would, as I understand it, specify a maximum number of persons who may enter the United Kingdom annually as a spouse or civil partner of another. If I were not already married, I would be exceptionally aggrieved to be told that my spouse, from whatever country she may come, would not be permitted to join me in the United Kingdom, despite the fact that I am a British citizen, because too many spouses or civil partners had already entered this country in the last year or because, looking at proposed new subsection (5), the country concerned cannot exceed 7% of the maximum number specified in the regulations. I do not know where 7% comes from rather than 6% or 8%, but that is what it provides.

It is not difficult to see that such arbitrary restrictions on spouses or civil partners coming to this country would be a manifest breach of this country’s international obligations under Article 8 in relation to family rights. It is also not difficult to see what the reaction of our closest allies—the United States, Australia, New Zealand and many other countries—would be to being told that their citizens cannot join their spouse in this country. Reciprocal measures of this nature would be highly likely to be adopted, to the detriment of everybody. It is also plain from this amendment that these arbitrary restrictions on numbers would apply irrespective of whether the person coming from abroad is to work here and irrespective of whether the spouse in this country, the British citizen, is able to accommodate and provide for them. I am afraid that this is simply not well thought out.

It also requires in proposed new subsection (10)(b) that the applicant in this country provides evidence that the happy couple were married or formed a civil partnership at least two years prior to the application. So, my beloved and I are to be arbitrarily prevented from living in this country together for at least two years. I cannot begin to understand the logic, the rationality or the justification of such a measure. I hope the Minister will tell the Committee that Amendment 198 is unacceptable.

Amendment 199 is equally unacceptable. It would impose, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, a mandatory obligation on the Government to impose visa penalties on unco-operative countries. The Government already have ample powers in their discretion to impose visa penalties on unco-operative countries. It makes no sense whatever to impose a mandatory duty on the Government to impose visa penalties. For this reason, the Government may well take the view that it is far more productive and effective to inform the country concerned of its failures, to negotiate with it and to seek to secure a resolution to the problem. A mandatory duty simply serves no sensible purpose.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Thursday 3rd July 2025 Lords Chamber

The suffragettes, too, have gained iconic status, rightly treated as heroines today, yet they could have been suppressed under this proscription. They used violence against property in a strategic manner to demand voting rights for women as part of civil disobedience protests when their peaceful protests seemed futile. They intended to highlight the injustice of denying women the vote and to provoke a reaction that kept the issue in the public eye. Like Nelson Mandela, they were vilified at the time, including strident denunciations by Members of your Lordships’ House. Suffragettes attacked shop windows, government buildings and political party offices, sometimes using hammers, stones or iron bars. They also set fire to unoccupied buildings such as churches, railway stations, sports pavilions and empty country houses, intending to cause material loss without causing personal injury. Suffragettes cut telegraph and telephone wires to disrupt government and commercial operations. They even hid small homemade bombs inside mailboxes and attempted to bomb Westminster Abbey and Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s unoccupied house.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Is there not a fundamental distinction between Nelson Mandela and the suffragettes on the one hand and our society today in which everybody has the right to vote? We live in a democratic society in which there are ample means of expressing your views.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

Of course democracy did not exist in South Africa at the time and women did not have the vote at the time. I concede that point but, frankly, Palestine Action members spraying paint on military aircraft in Brize Norton seems positively moderate by comparison with what the suffragettes did, and those alleged to have done this are being prosecuted for criminal damage, as indeed they should be.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, was brave in moving this regret amendment, and she should have been heard with more respect. I was one of those who suggested that she should give way, but I know it can seem like bullying in this House, and I think we should reflect on that. It is not a very good thing to gang up on someone who has a difficult job to do.

I would also like to mention two others who have contributed and for whom I have great respect. The noble Lord, Lord Hain, joined the Cabinet in 2002, as I remember, as Secretary of State for Wales. He was a successful Secretary of State for Wales and then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The Terrorism Act 2000 was in existence in 2002. Offences were added and other legislation was introduced while he was in the Cabinet, and I do not recall any occasion on which, publicly at least, the noble Lord protested, objected or resigned as a result of the creation of the body of terrorism law that now we have—he is confirming that—so I think that what he has said today is perhaps a little inconsistent with his history. Forgive me for saying so.

I also commend the Minister strongly. I thought he gave a very balanced description, which in factual terms nobody has contradicted. He said that three bodies are being proscribed now. It is interesting that objections have not been made in relation to two of those bodies—probably because noble Lords do not really like what they do very much, because they are extreme right-wing terrorists—but exactly the same process has been gone through with them as with Palestine Action. What is that process? To examine intelligence that no doubt exists, but that we have not heard about. In this House, we have to be responsible and take it that there is an intelligence case behind what is proposed. Material evidence has been brought together that shows that this organisation, Palestine Action, like the other two, has carried out activities that fall within the definition of crime that can, and I emphasise “can”, be treated as terrorist.

The context is that what has happened since the Terrorism Act 2000—since 9/11, in fact—is quite different from the world in which the suffragettes, the Greenham women and all the other examples that have been mentioned, including very successful anti-apartheid demonstrators such as the noble Lord, Lord Hain, lived. It is a given. That has not been objected to. Even the noble Baroness has not said that Palestine Action does not commit crimes that qualify as terrorist crimes, if they are prosecuted as such.

Noble Lords should not assume that every time a crime is committed that could be prosecuted as such, it is. The Crown Prosecution Service and the Director of Public Prosecutions have to make a decision. One of the most important protections in our constitution, which we talk about all too rarely, is the discretion of the DPP not to prosecute in the public interest or for other reasons covered by the two-stage code test. It may well be that if silly supporters of the criminal acts of Palestine Action or these other two bodies are interviewed by the police, they will not be prosecuted under the Terrorism Act. We have to trust juries, and magistrates in summary cases, to ensure that the prosecution system is run fairly. In this House, and particularly in the other place, there is a huge amount of control available over the prosecution system.

Let us be clear. If we do not like the definition of terrorism we have in our law, it is our duty as legislators to change it—and we have all decided not to change it. When it suits us, we encourage it to be used: something has to be done. When it is a bit inconvenient, we say that it is the most terrible thing on earth. The truth is the middle road, which has been given to us by the Minister. I urge your Lordships to act responsibly today, listening carefully to what has been said, taking into account what we can do in future, but accepting this instrument.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I have a few short points. I entirely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just said.

First, I hope that when we vote, if we vote, we will entirely put out of our minds whether we sympathise with the Palestinian cause, as most of us do, and whether we regret what Israel has done in various respects. We are concerned with a violent group. It really does not matter whether the cause it articulates and supports is justified. The law in a civilised country simply cannot accept people using violence against people and property in support of a cause they believe to be right. No such law can survive in a civilised society.

Secondly, if I understood him correctly, the Minister has explained why it is not sufficient for the law simply to prosecute people who commit criminal acts of the sort that are alleged—I agree that we have to be very careful here, for sub judice reasons—against members of Palestine Action. The point, if I have understood the Minister correctly—and he will say if I have not—is that there is a vital public need to prevent these people organising and recruiting, and the only way in which the law can do that is to take the action that the Minister is proposing today, which I strongly support.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I am a little concerned about how the sides are being laid out in this discussion. I have some serious worries about proscribing Palestine Action and have a lot of sympathy with the regret amendment, but not because I consider Palestine Action to be some idealised, cuddly, heroic campaign for peace. I have no sympathy with its destructive, wanton, often violent and nihilistic assaults on factories, air bases and so on. The individuals deserve criminal prosecution and punishment. God knows, we have enough draconian laws on the statute book to throw the book at them.

What we are challenging here is whether the concept of them being proscribed as a terrorist organisation is appropriate, not whether they are nice, peace-loving, wonderful Greenham Common types. That is the wrong way to look at it. In an earlier intervention, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, asked whether these could indeed be terrorist acts. I think that they could well be assessed as acts of terrorism without proscribing a whole organisation.

These are my reservations. I am worried about criminalising the vocalising of support for this organisation. Vocalising support for a reprehensible law-breaking protest group is one thing, but once it is proscribed, we are talking about the possibility of prison sentences of up to 14 years. All of this was brilliantly explained legally by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. You could, even if you only say that you support them, end up in prison.

The problem we have is that it is true that Palestine Action’s cause and its broader support are very popular —we have heard it here today. I do not mean that it is populist; I mean that many young people support that outlook. I do not. I spend a lot of time at the moment going around arguing with those young people about what I consider to be the growth of casual antisemitism and an intense hatred of Israel that seeps into Jew hatred. I talk a lot about that wherever I go, but it is certainly the case that I am not on the winning side on this one. If you go into universities and sixth forms, many support them. I am worried about the consequences of proscribing this organisation because it can threaten free speech. There are also going to be a lot of people who could be classified as in breach of it.

We should note that, for the first time since records began, this week the UK is no longer classified as an open country in the global expression rankings, which is shameful. In case noble Lords think the global expression rankings are some JD Vance-like prejudice or something, it is actually an annual report by Article 19, which noticed that free speech is seriously deteriorating in this country, so I put that warning out. We have to be very careful that this proscription does not have a chilling effect or, even worse, give some credibility to the idea that supporters of Palestine Action are some kind of free speech heroes and martyrs along with, undoubtedly Bobby—what is his name?

Product Regulation and Metrology Bill [HL]

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 26th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

I shall speak to my Amendment 4 in this group, which, we are advised, would be pre-empted if Amendment 2 were to be passed, by reason of the deletion of the relevant provision in Clause 1(1), to which it would add an additional subsection. It would add to the overarching objective of making regulations, which is to secure safe products:

“In considering whether regulations should be made … the Secretary of State must have regard to the likelihood of the United Kingdom being seen as a favourable place in which to develop, manufacture or supply products”.


Of course, many of the debates that we have on the Bill will relate to the question of alignment, or otherwise. One of the reasons why we are considering this legislation is because there would be significant issues to do with the manufacture, distribution and supply of products in this country were we to diverge significantly from the standards that lie behind the CE marking from the European Union. Rather than continue, as we have done, with reliance on the retained EU law legislation, it is the Government’s intention, through this legislation, to enable us to accept CE marking. That is not necessarily on a dynamic basis—I agree that it is a matter of choice whether we do so—but the Bill’s structure is intended to enable that to happen. Because we seek to do that by reference to the adverse economic consequences that may flow from failing to be able to bring products here, which may drive some economic activity elsewhere, it seems important that Ministers making regulations under this legislation should consider whether, as a result, the UK is an attractive place in which to manufacture, distribute or supply products.

This is not a new concept. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, on the Government Front Bench will recall that the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 includes effectively the same provision in relation to medical devices. Medical devices are outside the scope of this Bill but it is relevant to a wide range of other industrial products. I do not understand why it should not be an essential part of the way that Ministers consider making regulations that have such an impact to have regard to the positive benefits that can accrue to business from ensuring that we have the right product regulatory framework for them, so I commend Amendment 4 to the House.

I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that Amendment 2 is a wrecking amendment. Why not? Because, if the first subsection were to be removed by that amendment, the regulation-making power would be removed from the Bill so the Government would have to think again. However, the noble Lord and the House will note that later in this group is government Amendment 44. The original formulation in the Bill was to have consequential amendments to Parts II, IV and V of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. In response to the suggestion from the Delegated Powers Committee, which was unhappy with the sweeping power to amend that Act, the Government have instead said, “We’re going to omit Parts II and IV now”. Part II is the bit I am interested in; it is the part of the Act that relates to product safety. The Government simply propose to remove Part II of that Act.

I say to the House and to my noble friend on the Front Bench that if Amendment 2 were to be passed the Bill would clearly have no further regulation-making power in it. However, if at the same time the House were to resist government Amendment 44 then there would continue to be powers in the Consumer Protection Act 1987 for the purpose of making regulations for product safety. The House will be reminded that Section 11(1) of the 1987 Act says:

“The Secretary of State may by regulations … make such provision as he considers appropriate for the purpose of securing … that goods to which this section applies are safe”.


More detail follows, including the respective ways in which provisions can be determined.

The Government should tell us either how they are going to legislate using the powers in the 1987 Act or, if they want to get rid of them, how they are going to replace them in detail. They have done neither of those things. I know we are going to come back to talk about legislation on product liability at a later stage. The Consumer Protection Act is nearly 40 years old and we know it needs updating, but the Government are not doing that; they are sweeping it away and not giving us anything like the detail that was in that Act as to how the powers are going to be used. Nearly 40 years’ worth of scrutiny of the Section 11 provisions on product safety will also be swept away, because the language in this Bill is not the same as in that Act.

The House will have to forgive me: I am slightly anticipating the next group and Amendment 3, because if Amendment 2 is passed, Amendment 3 will not be debated; it will have been pre-empted. I want to make it absolutely clear that although I support my noble friend’s criticisms of the way the Bill is constructed, there is a route available to maintain the powers for determining regulations for product safety. That would force the Government to come back and amend the Consumer Protection Act in ways that are more substantive and clearer than what the present Bill offers us.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I recognise and value the constitutional principle that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, eloquently draws to our attention. Ministers should not be given broad delegated powers, but constitutional principles are not absolute; they have to recognise practical reality.

In the context of this Bill, the practical reality is that technical regulations of the breadth and complexity that will be produced cannot sensibly be enacted by primary legislation. We are dealing, in Clause 1(1), with regulations that reduce or mitigate risks presented by products; to ensure that products “operate efficiently and effectively”; and that ensure that products designed for weighing or measuring operate effectively. Are we really to debate each and every such regulation in this House, either on the Floor of the House or in Grand Committee? We would have little, if any, time for anything else.

If the regulations raise issues of principle, Parliament retains control. Parliament does not have to accept the regulations; it can vote against them under the normal principles. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, suggested, quoting someone from one of the committees—I cannot remember which—that this is Government by diktat. I suggest to him, with the greatest of respect, that that is unfair and inappropriate in this context, for the reasons I have given.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I make it clear that, having disagreed with Amendment 1, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, in his discussion here. I fundamentally disagree with the words of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, because this is exactly the moment when we give away basic parliamentary control. We know perfectly well that, although it is better than it was, it is still true that a great deal can be done by ministerial diktat which ought to come to Parliament.

I am not in any way suggesting that everything should come to Parliament. Of course, it is very easy to say, “You can’t have everything”, but that does not mean that we should allow this to go through without insisting on having a much clearer definition of where ministerial diktat is proper and where it is not. Until we get that right, this is, if I may dare say so to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the slippery slope.