(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it would be helpful to the House if the noble Baroness could give some indication of the Government’s intention. My reckoning is that there are 18 groups left to be debated on Report. Can she tell me at what point she intends that the House be adjourned tonight?
My Lords, I come to the Floor of the House tonight ready to complete Report. I do that particularly for this reason: there have been times during the course of this Bill when we have made quite rapid progress, with the co-operation of both sides of the House, but noble Lords will know that I have amended this Bill so that Members of your Lordships’ House could apply for and carry out the function of a full-time police and crime commissioner. During that debate, I was persuaded by Members of this House that your Lordships could not only carry out their functions in this House but hold down a very demanding full-time job as PCC as well. Everybody will know that people who engage at that level are people who do not clock-watch but get the job done. They stay until the job is finished; that is what I intend to do.
My Lords, I found that the most remarkable response. The Opposition have been very co-operative on this Bill. We agreed to do Committee in six days and Report in four days. We did not agree that the clock should start at 8.35 of the evening. On average, we have taken about half an hour per group. At that rate, we would be meeting for another nine hours. I regard that as wholly unacceptable, as I am sure that other noble Lords will do. I suggest to the noble Baroness that a discussion should take place in the usual channels on an appropriate way forward. It is not acceptable to say to the House that, at this time of the night, we should start a full day’s debate on Report.
My Lords, before my noble friend replies, will she bear in mind that some of us who have amendments tabled for debate this evening intend to keep our speeches very short so that we will be able to conclude this stage of the Bill?
My Lords, we come to a very important matter: the appointment of acting police and crime commissioners. Whatever our views on this Bill, one thing is clear: the police and crime commissioners will have considerable power and authority over policing matters in their local police force area.
A second point is that, with the numbers so elected, inevitably there may be circumstances in which a police and crime commissioner may become incapacitated: they may be suspended, they may decide to leave office voluntarily, or they may die in office. Quite rightly, the Bill contains provisions for the appointment of an acting commissioner. That is well and good. However, the problem with Clause 63(2) is that an acting commissioner, appointed by the police and crime panel, can only be appointed if they are a member of the police and crime commissioner’s staff at the time of the appointment. The acting commissioner can exercise all the functions of a police and crime commissioner, other than issuing or varying a police and crime plan under Section 6, so the acting police and crime commissioner can dismiss the chief constable. They can set the precept and, as my noble friend Lord Beecham has reminded us, that can be around 9 to 11 per cent, depending on whether you are in England or Wales, of the total council tax bill.
My Lords, I think the point has been well put that the powers of the acting PCC could be considerable. I apologise to my noble friend Lord Beecham for underestimating the size of the precept. It seems to me that it has grown between Committee and Report stages. But it involves the precept, the budget, the appointment of the chief constable and the dismissal of the chief constable. I am still concerned that the problem here is the construct of the Bill. As my noble friend Lord Harris has said, once you decide to place on a political individual so much power and responsibility, you clearly have a big problem in deciding what to do if that person is no longer able to carry out the job.
It seems to me that this is a very important issue, which has been debated in the other place as well. The Government clearly still do not have a clue about how to deal with it. The noble Baroness said that she is concerned about appointing the acting PCC from the police and crime panel, which is an inherently political body. But what is the PCC but politicisation? In terms of the idea that the staff will be wonderfully neutral, what on earth will the staff be doing? I am horrified at the thought that the PCC will employ an army of people. It will have one point, which will be to ensure the re-election of the police and crime commissioner. What else are they there for but to support that person?
The noble Baroness has said that she will take this away. I am very grateful to her, but can she confirm that that means that she accepts that I can bring an amendment back at Third Reading or that she will? It cannot be dealt with in the Commons on ping-pong. It is impossible to deal with this issue in that way. It has to be dealt with by this House. We have only a few days left. Will the noble Baroness confirm that she is saying that this is a matter that requires further clarification and can be brought back at Third Reading?
My Lords, I will commit to bringing it back at Third Reading for clarification.
My Lords, in that case I am extremely grateful and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I wonder if I might put a different gloss on the matters that we are debating in this group of amendments. We know that there is a strong likelihood that there will be a national crime agency some time in the next calendar year. We already have a discussion document about that. It refers to tasking, which I am confidently assured means direction from the centre. That means that there is bound to be tension between local and national issues, which is a good thing. It is democracy in action. It is inevitable that the inspectorate will become involved, at the behest of local or national figures. That is what it is there for and that is my experience, having served in it for more than five years, albeit some time ago.
I am concerned that the Bill is in grave danger of becoming overprescriptive. We are covering detail, which is good as far as it goes. However, to put it in the Bill rather than take it as a matter of good sense or encompass it in regulation stretches too far the issue of what should be in the Bill.
I shall refer to Amendment 235A. Having followed an all-encompassing definition of national crime, we are then invited to put in something about children, vulnerable adults, members of minority groups and so on. I do not at all underestimate the threat to those groups; terrible things are done to and with them. However, if we are to pick out those groups, why do we not put in something about drugs, counterterrorism, and the theft of high-value motor vehicles and plant, all of which happen on a European—if not a more international—scale? Why do we not put in something about cybercrime or identity theft? I shall sit down soon because I want to brief, but my point is that we should not drop into the trap of being overprescriptive. Valid though all the comments from speakers so far have been, it is asking the Bill to accept too much.
My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate. I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Dear, is saying about the risks of overprescription. However, we are talking about strategic policing requirements. This is a matter of national importance. My noble friends have argued very well for their respective amendments.
No election will be won by a police and crime commissioner on issues to do with national policing. They will be won on local manifestos. Almost every candidate will promise more police on the beat. The question will be an auction over just how many police will be on the beat at any one time. That is fair enough and clearly responds to a general view held by many members of the public, who like the police to be visible. I do not argue with that. However, it will have some consequences. It will put the squeeze on the specialist units that the police forces have developed. It will also put the squeeze on each force’s responsibility to the national policing requirement. In some way or other, without being wholly prescriptive, we need to find a way in which to reassure Parliament that the national strategic policing requirement will be carried out as effectively as possible. It is not just terrorism; it is also about serious organised crime. My noble friends Lord Harris and Lord Foulkes were absolutely right to develop the argument about the threats that we face. We are in no position today to be complacent about those threats.
In their approach to the Bill the Government have really rather pooh-poohed the current tripartite relationship. They have criticised police authorities for a lack of visibility—although I have yet to hear any conclusive evidence put forward on why they ought to be visible. Furthermore, they believe that the tripartite arrangement is at fault because Home Secretaries have indulged in too much target-making. There will be a debate about targets and their place but there should be no doubt that in the end the Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament and ought to be accountable to Parliament for national policing strategy and the effectiveness of police forces in making a contribution to that strategy.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Dear, about the implications of the national crime agency. I also agree with him that some tension will be constructive—but tension could also be destructive. In the Bill we see that the requirement in relation to the strategic policing requirement is placed on chief officers of police. In exercising the functions, they must have regard to the strategic policing requirement. In other words, they can ignore it, because “have regard to” is a very weak use of parliamentary language. They have to have regard to it, alongside other matters that are placed in the Bill.
We then look to page 2 of the Bill and see that in Clause 1(4) that the,
“police and crime commissioner must … hold the chief constable to account for”,
a series of actions, but also,
“the exercise of the duty under section 37A(2) of the Police Act 1996 (duty to have regard to strategic policing requirement)”.
All we have in statute is a requirement on the police and crime commissioner to hold the chief constable to account. Then we find that the actual requirement is simply to have regard to. What if the police and commissioner does not effectively hold the chief constable to account? What if the chief constable has regard to but does not take the necessary action? Where are the safeguards and sanctions? There are none. That is really our concern.
The amendments seem to be helpful and constructive. My noble friend Lady Henig asks for a report to be prepared assessing the extent to which the strategic policing requirement has been met in each police area. That does not seem overprescriptive; it is simply giving an assurance to Parliament that there will be a process by which Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary has a means of looking at each police force area and reporting on how they are doing in their contribution to the strategic policing requirement.
My noble friend Lord Harris has another constructive amendment around the inspection programme. In our first debate the Minister was very helpful, although I did not really follow her arguments. She was very constructive in being willing to engage in the area of the acting police and crime commissioner. Nothing is more important than the national strategic policing requirement. I hope that the noble Lord, who, I suspect, is going to respond to the amendment, will be able to be as constructive as his noble friend.
My Lords, before the Minister replies to the debate, he will recall that nearly an hour and a half ago the government Chief Whip indicated that she would return speedily with a new timetable for this Bill to propose to the House. We are now approaching the normal time of rising of this House. I hope that the Minister will give an indication as to when the government Chief Whip will do us the courtesy of returning to indicate what the new timetable for this Bill will be.
There was a tension also about how much detail one writes into the Bill. We spent some time on these amendments with people wanting reassurance that there should be much more detail in the Bill than is required of them.
With the greatest respect to noble Lords, a requirement for HMIC to publish a report annually is not a target; it is simply information to Parliament. Surely the Minister is prepared to consider that. As I have said, it is a very short time until Third Reading, but will he take this back without commitment and consider whether some reassurance might be made to Parliament on this?
In the next group of amendments we will move on to HMIC, and it is part of the requirement for HMIC that it will publish reports for the public, so HMIC will be publishing regular reports. The question of whether it should have to publish reports on a regular basis for Parliament is an additional thing of which I am not persuaded. I will certainly consult further but I am not currently persuaded that that is a necessary addition. Many years ago I took part in a debate which required the Government to report to Parliament twice a year on developments in the European Union so that there could be a six-monthly debate. Those reports have continued to be published and somewhere in my attic I have a number of them. I am a little doubtful about additional reports.
Surely the Minister will know from the debate that we have had on the European Bill that many noble Lords in this House talk of little else.
Before Minister comes back on this, I say that this is not just about whether or not this is a document published for Parliament; it is about ensuring that there is a focus on the strategic policing requirement. That is something which the Government have not yet conceded. While I am on my feet, and to prevent me getting up again, can he tell us what he actually means by a situation report? Does that mean that when we get to Third Reading which, as far as I am aware, is still only a few days away, we will have in front of us some idea as to what this document will look like?
My Lords, I am much relieved that I was interrupted, because Amendment 235A is in the name of Baroness Hamwee.
Amendment 236 is grouped with Amendment 235, on which we have just had a Division.
With the greatest respect, it was pointed out earlier that there is a misprint in the grouping list. My noble friend made it clear that there is a group starting Amendments 236, 237 and 238.
I beg your Lordships’ pardon. That information had not reached me.
Clause 85 : Functions of HMIC
Amendment 236
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendments 236, 237 and 238 which were tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig. We are being asked to support nothing less than a revolution in policing governance in the absence of any evidence base on which the benefits of such drastic changes are set and in the absence of any public clamour for costly reform—indeed, the opposite. We are being told that these changes will not be piloted or introduced in stages since reform is urgent and cannot possibly wait. I beg to differ on all those counts.
However, if we are to press ahead with such an untried system, I am absolutely determined that we should do our duty to ensure that all means possible are employed to insert safeguards into the Bill. HMIC inspections seem to me to be a bedrock of any such safeguards against potential pitfalls and I share the high regard in which Sir Denis O’Connor, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, is held, together with his extremely able team.
In short, HMIC inspections are at times a difficult and challenging process for those undergoing them and they have repeatedly yielded the improvement across policing, which is at the heart of HMIC’s mission. So I am left, frankly, bemused when the Government propose not to expand but to constrict the use of this valuable tool for improvement. It makes no sense at all effectively to exclude these completely new systems of oversight from an inspection regime when that regime has already helped the current system to improve.
Next, I shall draw out the intention of Amendment 238, which removes the proposed new obligation on the local policing body to reimburse HMIC for the costs of its inspection. We have heard what the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, thinks of that. We have sought to replace this with a statement that the panel may request that HMIC conducts an inspection if its concerns warrant such an intervention. I am unaware of any other inspection regime in which those delivering a public service, or who invite in or are made the subject of an inspection in the interests of public trust and confidence in their work, are expected directly to cover the costs of their inspection. Surely, in some cases an inspection will be called amidst quite serious financial issues or challenges. This idea that those opening themselves up to scrutiny in the public interest must pay for the cost of such transparency seems decidedly odd to me, even bearing in mind the parlous state of Home Office finances at the present time.
It also seems to me to be the most bizarre disincentive to those on the panel or on the commissioner’s staff who are considering whistleblowing on what might be significant issues of public interest or concern. A whistleblower or concerned panel member or local policing body member would have to gain pre-emptive approval for the costs of a possible investigation from someone who might be implicated in the very dubious activity that necessitates the inspection.
This parcelling of costs on to the petitioner for an inspection feels wrong to me on a very instinctive, but also on a very practical, level. Surely the Home Office should be seeing fit that the costs of HMIC’s absolutely essential work should be met by a Home Office grant. It would seem to be neglect approaching a dereliction of the Government’s duty to do otherwise. We have proposed that this apparently ill suited new subsection (2BB) should be replaced by a positive power for the panel that it should be able at any time to request that HMIC carry out an inspection of the PCC.
No one will be more aware of the PCC’s action or inaction in some areas than the police and crime panel since it is designed as her or his safeguard and strict check and balance. However, while the panel will be equipped to oversee the PCC in most areas, it may feel that there are issues on which it lacks a professional operational judgment on a matter of controversy. In such circumstances, it may not be appropriate to pull the chief constable into what could amount to a difference of opinion with the PCC. Who then can the panel turn to for that necessary professional advice and impartial opinion?
Finally, there should be a direct and clear ability, and a responsibility on the panel, to be able to involve HMIC appropriately. HMIC could, of course, take a view that it was being asked to get involved in a petty or irrelevant matter and could decline the invitation. However, we anticipate that this referral mechanism to HMIC will provide a helpful bridge to practical improvement for many forces facing difficulty in the future, as it so often has in the past.
My Lords, all I would like to say on the amendment is that we have discussed in previous debates the inconsistency between different parts of government in relation to inspection. I must declare my interest again as chair of an NHS foundation trust and as a consultant trainer in the NHS. NHS foundation trusts, which the Government support, were meant to be given much more freedom than other NHS bodies but they are still subject to the tender mercies of a regulator called Monitor. For the life of me, I cannot see why the Government have taken such a light-rein approach to the construct in the Bill when we have such an excellent inspectorate in the form of HMIC. These amendments seem wholly constructive. By the grace of the usual channels, we have been given a little extra time—a day—to consider these matters. Is this not a matter which the Government might take back and consider?
My Lords, with regard to fees, I do not know whether my noble friend is in a position to give any comparables, but I think that local authorities have to pay—or have had to pay—for Audit Commission inspections and that it is the Audit Commission that has set the rates. There must be comparables. Maybe there are comparables which go either way; I do not know.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we on this side of the House support the legislation, which is needed to overturn the High Court ruling in the circumstances described by the noble Baroness. It is clear that the judgment causes serious problems for policing operations, for ongoing investigations, potentially for the delivery of justice and, most seriously of all, for the protection of victims and witnesses.
As the noble Baroness so lucidly explained, it had previously been assumed that releasing a suspect on bail effectively paused the detention clock. It was thought that the clock could then be restarted when the suspect answered police bail and was redetained, even if that point was later than 96 hours after the relevant time. The recent High Court ruling is that that is not the case under the precise wording of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Instead, the maximum 96-hour period specified in that Act runs immediately from the relevant time and cannot, as has been common police practice, be suspended by releasing a suspect on bail and be restarted later beyond the 96 hours by redetaining the suspect. The detention clock continues to run even while the suspect is on bail.
Understandably, Parliament has always been concerned to ensure that emergency legislation should be brought only on the basis of very serious considerations, and is never to be done lightly but with a clear understanding of the risks involved. However, Parliament needs to balance that with the risk to the public and to justice if we do not legislate immediately. The situation apparently means that the police are unable to recall people from police bail if they have been bailed for more than four days unless the police have new evidence that allows them to rearrest. The situation also raises serious issues about the application of bail conditions, particularly in domestic violence cases, as those conditions can include important protection for the victim. Such conditions could include someone being prohibited from going to his ex-wife's workplace, the family home or the children's school. Some bail conditions are an extremely important part of protecting the safety of victims and witnesses; and if they cannot be enforced, protection is clearly at risk.
We therefore support rapid action but, unfortunately, rapid action has not entirely characterised the response of the Home Secretary. I noticed that, in her introductory remarks, the noble Baroness emphasised the written judgment. She will know that the oral judgment was given on 19 May and her officials were informed soon after that—certainly before the end of May. The Home Secretary has said that she had to wait for the written judgment, but that has not meant that the Home Office had to suspend any action and judgment of what advice should be given to Ministers until the written judgment was received.
It is now seven weeks from the original judgment, three weeks since the written judgment was put in place, and two weeks, apparently, since Ministers were informed. The gap alone between Home Office officials being informed of the written judgment, the written judgment being published and Ministers being told has put Ministers in a difficult position. Our first concern is about the initial delay before the Home Office received the written judgment. More work should have been done between the oral judgment and the written judgment, and once the written judgment arrived, advice should have been given very quickly to the Home Secretary and the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice about the risks in this case.
It is common practice for solicitors to note the judgment beforehand, so it is not necessary to await the written judgment as it unfolds.
My Lords, that is a very telling intervention from my noble friend. Surely that is the case. All I would say to the Minister is that I hope lessons will be learned from this matter.
Changing the law retrospectively is in general undesirable and creates great uncertainty. It threatens natural justice if people end up breaking up a law they did not know existed. In this case, my understanding is that the Government are seeking simply to restore the law to what we in Parliament thought it was, to what it had been intended by Parliament at the time to be and to what the police, the CPS and others have followed in good faith for many years.
I noted the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. Like the Minister, I also noted the comments of Liberty, which are worth emphasising. Liberty does not believe that the Government are seeking retrospectively to create a criminal offence, sanction or other burden, so it would not fall foul of Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Is the noble Lord saying that he can envisage what Parliament meant many years ago, when a High Court judge has determined through the language used what was meant? If anybody disagrees with his interpretation, surely the appeal for which leave has been given should be pursued.
My Lords, of course we shall have to see the outcome of the appeal. I do not know whether the noble Lord has read Michael Zander’s piece on this, which refers back to the debates in Parliament 25 years ago. From my reading of the amendment moved by Clare Short for the Labour Opposition at the time and of the response given by the then Home Secretary—the noble Lord, Lord Hurd—it is apparent that Parliament’s view was pretty clear. In that case, I must endorse the interpretation given by the Minister.
The case for rapid action is clear and that is why we are not proposing amendments today. Equally, the case has raised some important points, both of principle and of detail, which I would be grateful if the noble Baroness would respond to. Some of the commentary since this case came to light has expressed concerns about the possibility of the use of endless police bail. There appear to be cases where people have been left on police bail, including with conditions, long after another suspect has confessed to the offence, or where investigations have run dry but action was not taken to end the bail arrangements. I welcome the Minister’s offer of an opportunity for a wider debate about the appropriateness and proportionality of different lengths of police bail and what safeguards are required.
There are also issues around the fact that the original 1984 legislation has been amended many times. It would be helpful if the Minister could say in the review whether she intends to look at the legislative context in which police bail is enacted, and whether she thinks that it might warrant a review of legislation as well as practice in the fullness of time.
It is also noticeable that in some of the comments that have been made, including those from Liberty, a proposal has been made that Parliament should consider a statutory time limit to restrict the total duration of police bail to no more than six months. I would be grateful if the noble Baroness would say whether that is also a matter that will be considered in the welcome review that she has announced this afternoon.
We have also benefited from the advice of your Lordships’ Select Committee on the Constitution, which drew to the attention of the House one feature of the Bill which the Select Committee felt touches on an issue of constitutional principle. Essentially, the High Court judgment that the Bill seeks to reverse is itself under appeal to the Supreme Court. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, referred to that point. The Select Committee says:
“We are concerned that asking Parliament to legislate in these highly unusual circumstances raises difficult issues of constitutional principle as regards both the separation of powers and the rule of law. We have noted the constitutionally important distinction between legislative and adjudicative functions before. We are concerned that, in the understandable rush to rectify a problem which the police have identified as being serious and urgent, insufficient time has been allowed for Parliament fully to consider the constitutional implications of what it is being asked to do”.
I know that the noble Baroness has responded very rapidly—and it is very welcome that she has done so—by saying that the Government see no constitutional impropriety in the present decision to legislate in advance of the outcome of the appeal to the Supreme Court. She went on to say that it is common ground that the sovereignty of Parliament means that it is competent to legislate at any time, in response to a judgment of a court. I do not disagree with her assessment of that matter, but it seems to me that the Select Committee has raised a number of very important points, which would warrant also being considered within the review that the noble Baroness has promised to undertake.
In supporting this Bill and the actions that she has announced today, I would ask that there be an element of public involvement and input into the review that she has announced. I would also suggest to her, through the usual channels, that it would be opportune if, perhaps in the autumn, we could have an opportunity to debate these matters in this House, possibly as part of an input into the review that she has promised.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I agree with everything he said. It may be that the answer to his final question is that Royal Assent should not be given to this Bill until we have the judgment of the Supreme Court, and then there could be no necessity for it to be repealed.
When the noble Lord was speaking I was reminded of the story of the acorn falling on the head of Chicken Licken, who informed Henny Penny, Goosey Lucy, Turkey Lurkey and others that the sky was falling in. Finally, they all told Foxy Loxy, who listened to their panic-stricken warnings and then ate the lot of them. Much emergency legislation is introduced like the fabled acorn. The Hookway case merely declared that the relevant legislation did not allow the police to save up unexpired periods of authorised detention and to use them to detain and question suspects pre-charge at any date in the future—and this is the important point—even though no fresh evidence had been obtained.
If this is what Parliament meant in passing the legislation, as Mr Justice McCombe has held in his complex judgment, which required to be in writing before it could be properly addressed, then it seems to me as a matter of policy a highly desirable result. If the police and the CPS advising the police do not consider that there is sufficient evidence to charge a person today, why should they be allowed to detain and question the suspect in six months’ time, he having been on police bail, on exactly the same evidence? It is lazy policing. Of course, if there is fresh evidence as a result of a more vigorous or deeper investigation—a matter of some topical relevance today—that is a different matter. In such a case, if there is fresh evidence, a power of arrest would arise and a person could be detained and questioned in relation to the whole case, including the fresh evidence.
The problem that arises in this case is that a suspect can be detained again at a later date—six months, or even more, later—and questioned when no further investigation has taken place. He is simply being questioned on what was in the past. If Mr Justice McCombe’s interpretation of the statutory provisions of what Parliament meant—which is what his judgment is and not what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, thinks from reading an article in a magazine—is correct, then Manchester Police should continue with its appeal, for which, as your Lordships have learnt, it has obtained leave through a certificate that it is a matter of public importance.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, did not continue entirely with the Constitution Committee’s point, which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has also made, that Parliament would then have the benefit of a considered judgment from the Supreme Court to assist its deliberations if the appeal were allowed to go ahead. We would then know what the Supreme Court thinks about Mr Justice McCombe’s interpretation.
This simple Bill ensures that lazy and possibly oppressive policing can continue but it raises a much more important question: has the practice of indefinitely extending police bail become a genuine abuse? There is no statutory limit when a person is given bail pre-charge and invited to come back at a later date. In Committee on the Criminal Justice Bill of 2003, my noble friend Lord Dholakia moved an amendment to insert a provision that police bail should not extend more than 28 days, as had been recommended at that time by the Home Affairs Select Committee. He said that his amendment would limit the pre-charge period and that:
“The CPS will of course progress the case as fast as possible. However, we have concerns about the unlimited bail periods. Set deadlines go some way to ensure that matters are reviewed and less likely to drag on unnecessarily”.
The then Attorney-General, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, responded that pilots that had been carried out suggested,
“that in most cases a five-week period should be sufficient to enable charges to be brought”.—[Official Report, 14/7/03; col. 683-84.]
He thought extending police bail for about five weeks was appropriate. Consequently, on 29 October 2003, I moved an amendment on Report for a limit of 35 days —five times seven, taking the Attorney-General at his word. He said in response that he did not wish to have a statutory limit but that it would be better for guidance and instructions to be issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Association of Chief Police Officers. Were such guidelines ever issued?
I am indebted to Mr Roger Windsor who has pursued this topic with freedom of information inquiries which reveal that in 2008, in three police areas alone out of 43—West Mercia, Sussex and Surrey—358 individuals spent more than nine months on police bail to which conditions were attached. I have supplied his findings to the Minister. I am also indebted to Mr Csoka QC of Lincoln Chambers in Manchester and Mr Joseph Kotrie-Monson for their views, which I have similarly passed on.
Not only are there no time limits in relation to how long the police can keep a suspect on police bail when no new evidence has emerged but there is no mechanism whereby the degree to which the police are acting with due expedition—or, worse, with bad faith—can be independently scrutinised. One wonders whether the cuts in funding for the police and CPS could be translated into restrictions on the liberty of those who have not been charged with any offence. The conditions that can be imposed on those bailed can include reporting, curfews, travel and residency restrictions. It is my own personal experience and that of others that conditional bail can last for months or even years with no sign of any activity by the police or the CPS. In other words, people can be given bail at the police station and are welcome to walk out of there subject to the restrictions but those can continue indefinitely without any possibility of seeing whether the police are carrying out their functions expeditiously.
When the Police and Criminal Evidence Act was enacted the police could bail only without conditions—there was merely a requirement to surrender on a future date. In 1995, after 10 years of PACE, the police were given the power to impose conditions. The use of those powers has now reached epidemic proportions. It is the experience of defence lawyers that conditional bail is used punitively against suspects who the police believe are criminals but against whom there is no or no sufficient evidence. The police can extrajudicially, by the grant of bail subject to conditions, curtail their liberty for an indefinite period. Additionally, those arrested for public order offences at political demonstrations are often bailed for inordinate periods with a condition; for example, not to enter Westminster or not to attend further demonstrations. Often no charges are ever brought. They have been subjected to a form of control order which is effectively outside the rule of law. This happened in 2009 with protesters planning a protest at the E.ON power station in Nottingham and the arrest, detention and bailing of protesters during the occupation of Fortnum & Mason on 26 March this year.
The simple solution is to bring in a legal framework which imposes time limits on pre-charge bail and gives a right to appeal. Defendants who are remanded in custody have the protection of custody time limits. Extensions of custody time limits—normally six months —can be granted only if there is a good and sufficient cause and the prosecution has acted with due expedition. It is a frequent case in court that the prosecution goes along and explains how its inquiries are going and why there has been a delay. There ought to be similar protection for those on police bail. Extensions of time could be granted by a district judge but only if the police show good and sufficient cause—that there are reasonable lines of inquiry which could not, with due expedition, have been completed within the initial time limits.
Such a system would protect not only the rights of a suspect but also the victim: a rape victim, for example, has the anxiety of waiting months to see whether a charge is to be brought. Time limits will prevent inefficiency, poor staffing or indecision from creating a culture of delay.
Unhappily, the acorn at the moment is too small and this Bill is too light to carry the burden of extensive amendments to deal with these problems. I am grateful to Mr Justice McCombe for leading Parliament to investigate this area and I am extremely grateful to the Minister for indicating that an urgent review will be carried out in the autumn into what is potentially a very considerable abuse of the system, which certainly Parliament never meant when it passed the legislation in 1985 or when it was considered at any later date.
My Lords, that was not the point I was making. The noble Lord asked me where I referred to the supposition in relation to putting it back to where Parliament thought it would be. I quoted from an article, which in turn quoted quite clearly from Hansard of the debates at the time. But that was not the point I was arguing.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation. I have made all the points that I wished to make. I look forward to the review. I look forward to participating in a parliamentary debate on that review and we can see whether this abuse, which I believe does exist, can be cured.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have a couple of brief points to make about Amendment 102, and particularly Amendment 104 to which I have added my name. First, I welcome the fact that the Government have shown that they are willing to listen to some of the concerns expressed in Committee and I am genuinely pleased that they have moved to two-thirds the majority required to exercise a veto. I am inclined to agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, that a simple majority might be even better. It would certainly strengthen the role of the police and crime panel, which I think we all agree is essential. Hopefully, when taken in conjunction with earlier amendments about a more collaborative approach, this would guard against too capricious an attitude by the panel, having helped develop the proposals in the first place. I support this amendment but I am concerned about the issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, about the relationship between this Bill and the Localism Bill in relation to the precept and referendum arrangements. I agree that this needs to be clarified. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will be able to provide reassurance on this point.
My Lords, we have had a series of debates during the passage of this Bill about the role of the police and crime panel in scrutinising the performance of the police and crime commissioner. The Minister herself has emphasised on a number of occasions the importance of the panel in doing that.
For these panels to do their jobs effectively, they surely have to have a certain amount of leverage. This Bill in effect gives them only two levers; they can veto the appointment of a chief constable, and they can veto the precept that the police and crime commissioner wishes to set. Of course, on other matters it can be consulted and there can be dialogue, but it is very clear from the Bill that the elected party political commissioner can ignore completely any input from the panel unless it exercises the veto. In the past few days we have seen one of the products of a weak regulator, the Press Complaints Commission. That surely shows the problem of having of weak regulators with very few levers. My concern with these new arrangements is that we are establishing police and crime panels inevitably to fail because their influence over elected police commissioners is likely to be limited. The veto in the original Bill was set at a very high level indeed, with a 75 per cent requirement of the members to vote in favour of veto. The Government hinted in the other place that they would be prepared to reduce it and we now see the product of that in the amendment that I am sure the noble Baroness will speak to in a moment.
The question is whether a two-thirds veto is sufficient. Like my noble friends, I do not think it is. To be effective, the police and crime commissioner must surely feel or fear that if he or she were to go too far there would be a risk that the panel would veto his or her proposals. I am speaking here about the precept.
To get a two-thirds majority of the members still places the bar at an impossibly high level. That is why I very strongly support my noble friend and I have tabled an amendment along the same lines calling for a simple majority of those present and voting. The phrase “of those present and voting” is well known to all noble Lords who have taken part in public life. Remarkably, it is not to be found in the Bill. The veto requirement refers to the members of the panel. I very much support my noble friend Lady Henig in wishing to ensure not only that a simple majority is required but that it should be of the members present at such a meeting. I have also laid an amendment to Amendment 103 of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, so even if the House settles on two-thirds as the majority figure, it ought to be of those members present and voting.
Maybe I have confused the wording of the amendment because I see the noble Baroness perhaps assuming that that is what it says. My reading is that it is two-thirds of the membership.
It is. Why is that? It is normally of those present and voting. It seems to me that simply by not being there you count as an assenter—a dissenter, if you like, from a proposal to veto a precept. It seems rather an extraordinary state of affairs.
I refer the noble Baroness to later amendments where the Government propose that an elected mayor within the area of a police force becomes members of the police and crime panel automatically. I am not arguing about the principle, but elected mayors are going to have many other responsibilities apart from serving on police and crime panels. One can think of a number of metropolitan areas so it is quite likely that under the noble Baroness’s amendment a considerable number of elected mayors will serve on the panels. However, there will be circumstances in which such people will not be able to be present at a meeting of the police and crime panel and because of the noble Baroness’s amendment the numbers relevant to the veto are the members rather than those present and voting. It seems to me a rather extraordinary state of affairs that simply by being away or being ill you add to the threshold that would have to be reached if a veto were to be exercised. I hope the noble Baroness will be prepared to give that point further consideration. It is a very odd state of affairs.
My Lords, I very much welcome the reduction from three-quarters to two-thirds. I think I said at an earlier stage that it can be a bit disconcerting to see that a Minister has her name to the amendment you thought you had tabled. We came in as back-up on this occasion, although clearly on the same day. I welcome it even though it probably only makes a difference of one individual. However, perhaps as important as the proportion is whether it is a proportion of the whole membership or of those present—I will come back to that in a moment—and more important than both is what can be vetoed, which we have debated and will continue to debate.
I know the Government take the view that a simple majority would detract from a commissioner’s accountability through the ballot box. There is a subsidiary argument the other way that members of the police and crime panel indirectly elected are expected by their own electors to have perhaps a greater voice than can be exercised when the threshold for the veto is set so high. As I say, that is subsidiary; it is a different position from the commissioner, but one that may be a little confusing to the electorate of the councillors who make up the panel.
It is right and proper that the calculation should be made based on those present, but I have a couple of questions. I do not know whether this is going to cause the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, a problem, as I am speaking after him, but what would happen to abstentions under his amendment? Where do they count? Some of us—before I get teased about this—are used to abstaining in person in this Chamber. But we need to sort out—
It may help if I intervened at this stage. My assumption in drafting “present and voting” is that you have both to be present and to vote. I do not think that abstention can be taken as a positive vote. I hope that is helpful.
I shall ponder on that. My other question, which my noble friend Lord Shipley may have asked on a previous occasion, is whether, given the importance of the numbers, the Government anticipate providing through regulations procedures for substitutes for members of the panel. Furthermore, is it intentional on the part of those who proposed these amendments that they apply only to the precept and not to the appointments, which is the other candidate for veto? Whatever we end up with should stay the same. I think it is right that a member can affect an outcome by staying away, and I hope that my noble friend the Minister can reassure the House on that point.
My Lords, I was rather disappointed that the Minister did not come back to the point about why the vote should not be of those present and voting. That is a perfectly normal, appropriate action and standing order for public bodies. I see no reason why it should not relate to the precept. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was quite right in spotting that I should I have put down a similar amendment to the Government’s proposal in relation to the appointment of a chief constable. I have no doubt that that can be dealt with at Third Reading. The substantive point is that there will not always be huge amounts of time—you cannot guarantee that. By not attending, one is effectively voting against the veto. I do not think that that is right. I therefore seek to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I am slightly confused now. Those of us who argued for the “of those present” amendment now see the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, talking about the need for substitutes, without which the right result may not come out. That is a little confusing.
I am standing up because I have a déjà vu about a déjà vu. I remember advising the Minister to talk to the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, about the way that he achieved the political balance that her Bill seeks to achieve but I believe, from the contributions today, does not achieve. Like the noble Lord, I, too, live in an area where the police authority has a lot of different local authorities—Essex also has many different local authorities—which is a situation that arises across the country. However, the noble Lord, Lord Howard, as Home Secretary, spent a great deal of time achieving a balance to counteract political dominance of police authorities that was unrepresentative of the local community, and ensuring that no one party—rather than no one person—could dominate and pervert the views of the local area.
The proposal before us today puts most of the power in the hands of an individual who may have been one of the people whom Michael Howard, as he was in those days, thought was unsuitable to dominate what was happening in policing, backed up by a system on the panel that will not give diversity. I hope the noble Baroness will be able to assure me that this proposal, rather than my noble friend’s amendment, carries the Michael Howard seal of approval to ensure balance. Although I did not always agree with him when he was Home Secretary, I recollect that he worked very hard to do something that the present Government are busily unpicking. They ought to stop it.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Farrington takes us back to the core of the debate. Of course, the question is: which Michael Howard? I very much agree with my noble friend that the problem we face is that we do not accept that police authorities have failed in the way that the Government say they have. We also do not accept that the police authority should not be the model that might be used to develop the police and crime panels. These issues of political balance and the role of independent members are very important. I should have thought that the model of the police authority was one to be followed.
I know that the noble Baroness has tabled her own amendments. Their intention is to keep the same model as is currently in the Bill but to allow areas to increase their representation by co-opting additional members from existing local authorities or additional independent members, with a cap of 20 members in all. I welcome that as far as it goes. My concern is that I am not sure it is entirely appropriate to give complete discretion to the police and crime panels themselves. If we are preserving any remnant of a tripartite system, it is right for the Home Secretary to lay down through legislation certain minimum requirements for police and crime panels, such as that there should be political balance and a proportion of independent members. That is why I very much warm to my noble friend’s amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, raised the issue of substitutes. The problem is that the House has now decided, by voting, that the decision will not be that “of those present and voting”. However, the House has not solved the evident problem that, by making sure the veto can be used only in relation to the number of members, there are all sorts of reasons why it will be almost impossible ever to use it. One thinks of illness. I understand that there is no proposal for how to deal with that. What happens if the local authority is setting its own precept at the time that the panel meets and a member of the panel has to attend? In some areas, we are talking about a large number of local authorities. The idea that a noble Lord can come to the Dispatch Box and say, “Oh, but the meeting time with the PCP will be known and, therefore, no other authority will meet”, is unrealistic. In some areas, we will have a number of elected mayors—the Government are forcing referendums on 11 of the largest cities in England. Presumably, if the government amendment is passed, there will be elected mayors in other cities and boroughs who will already, and automatically, be members of the panel. You could have a situation whereby the attendance record at a meeting of the panel is quite low. It would, therefore, make it almost impossible for the veto to be exercised.
The Government and the House have now decided to reject a sensible amendment by which the veto requirement should be “of those present and voting”. I agree with the noble Lord that this matter has not satisfactorily been resolved. The Government will have to think about this matter between now and Third Reading, because this simply should not stand as it currently does in the Bill.
My Lords, I must confess, for the first time in taking this Bill through the House, that I am genuinely disappointed, because in the government amendments in this group we have tried really hard to address concerns across the House that were raised in Committee about giving more flexibility to achieve balance on the panel. As we know from previous debates, that balance ranges across geography, politics, gender and ethnicity. Of course, among the group of people who the panel can co-opt it is sometimes necessary, because of local circumstances, to co-opt people with particular expertise in an area who will be a useful addition to the panel. By raising the threshold of the panel size to 20, I have gone far in excess of anything suggested in Committee in order to provide those additional co-opted places on the panel so that these matters can be addressed.
Let me establish for the record that paragraph 30(3) of Schedule 6 already places the same duty on a panel to ensure that it represents the political make-up of the force area. This, of course, achieves exactly the same political balance as the current police authority regulations do. Therefore, while there is more scope for these additional nominated or co-opted people to be invited to sit on the panel—there is nothing mandatory about this; the panel can decide whether or not it wishes to go up to that threshold of 20—we have retained political balance based on what already happens in police authorities. The noble Baroness mentioned the attempt by the noble Lord, Lord Howard, to do that. I hope she will accept that we have not departed from that principle in the Bill.
However, I was particularly concerned that noble Lords, in speaking to their amendments, did not seem to be aware that it is not mandatory for co-opted members to come from local authorities. They can, if the panel so chooses, but they need not come from local authorities at all. Later, when I speak to my amendments, I will flesh out a little the fact that where the panel opts to co-opt more people on to the panel to achieve diversity, gender balance and ethnicity balance, the Secretary of State is required to approve these co-options because the panel will, in making that submission to the Secretary of State, be required to demonstrate why these particular people are being co-opted on to the panel. At that point, I would expect there to be a case for balance across a range of gender, ethnicity and expertise—whatever the thinking is behind the panel wanting to make these recommendations. The Secretary of State will then have the opportunity to see that the panel is not filling up those places just with chums—people of a like-minded persuasion or of the same political party. The Secretary of State will want it to be clearly demonstrated that the panel has seriously considered who it needs to add to give a balanced mix to enhance its functioning and to give fairness across the piece.
My Lords, perhaps the solution to that is that PCPs can also set out their own rules and practices for all other business and procedures under Part 4 of Schedule 6, at paragraph 24. There is sufficient flexibility already in the Bill, combined with raising the threshold to 20 members, that gives the panel the opportunity to get the right balance that this House has called for. I genuinely mean this.
The problem is that there is too much flexibility. The cases have been quoted to the Minister: there will be panels where the political parties in control of the councils will be almost all of one party. The Minister is saying that you can rely on the panel to which these people are appointed to then ensure greater impartiality. This is why we know it will not work. I have said again and again that the Minister will come back in a couple of years’ time with another Bill to put it right, because what she is in fact doing is leading not just to the politicisation of the police commissioner but also the panel, in a way that will be destructive because it does not guarantee either balance or having truly independent members on it.
My Lords, again I am very disappointed that the House is not able to identify the flexibility that the increase in the number on the panel offers. I want to make some progress now. I propose to place in the Library of the House as soon as possible—I hope within the next 48 hours—a comparison of the current system and the new system and how it will affect each police authority in the country. If noble Lords have a chance to analyse that, they will see that the flexibility is there. I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, that I am now creating too much flexibility in the Bill. The inference I have taken in previous discussions was that noble Lords wanted more prescription in the Bill and not flexibility. I believe that these matters are best decided at a local level, case by case, giving the power to the panel to decide what is needed. I am genuinely disappointed that that point of what I believe is a very generous amendment on the part of the Government has not been accepted.
Before I turn specifically to the amendments before us, my noble friend Lord Shipley mentioned deputies and how the panel conducts its business. We can consider the views that he has raised today as the Secretary of State has power in Schedule 5, set out by regulation, to see whether in regulation we can address the problem he has just identified. I will liaise with him on progress specifically on that matter.
Amendments 106, 116, 121, 123, 132A and 140 seek to vary the composition of the police and crime panel. Although I have heard the views put forward again today, I believe the series of government amendments that have been tabled will address many of the issues noble Lords have been concerned about, and I invite noble Lords who have tabled amendments in this group not to press them.
Amendment 140, from my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Shipley, seeks to limit the Government’s power under paragraph 32 of Schedule 6 to make regulations applying local government legislation to police and crime panels. As I have said, we will take a look at what can be achieved in regulation but the amendment specifically would mean that the power could only be used to the extent necessary to apply the relevant legislation. I can reassure noble Lords that this power will not be used to a greater extent than is necessary. I will say more about it when I come to the Government’s amendments.
Government Amendments 120, 122, 124, 126 to 128, 130 to 132 and 134 to 137 seek to address, as I have mentioned, the composition of the police and crime panel. I thank—and they may be surprised to hear me say this—my noble friends Lord Shipley and Lady Hamwee and, if it is not going to ruin his reputation, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for their input. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, looks horrified. I have tried to listen, across the House, to the points that have been made. There have been some very good points made, particularly in Committee, and I have tried to incorporate them into the amendments I have tabled.
I fully recognise the need to ensure that the police and crime panels are able to represent geographically large and diverse communities. I also understand the significant challenges that local authorities face in achieving this under current provisions in the Bill. These provide for the inclusion of district councils, which previously have not been recognised in their own right, which reflects the Government’s localism agenda but leads to potential issues relating to proportionate representation.
Fundamentally, the Government still believe that the model set out for police and crime panels in the Bill is entirely appropriate and provides for a clear process and structure in establishing such panels. I believe we have created a structure that is sufficiently flexible to meet local structures while being the right size to avoid being expensive and a bureaucratic burden. However, the Government propose to allow areas to opt to increase their representation by co-opting additional members from local authorities—they do not have to come from local authorities—or independent members.
It is still important not to encourage oversized and unwieldy police and crime panels and it was for that reason that the cap was set at 20 members. For example, Devon and Cornwall’s police and crime panel will have 15 members under the provisions originally set out in the Bill; with these new provisions it will have an option to co-opt a further five members. This provision could therefore be used to enable the panel to reflect more directly the geographical representation of the force area. I remind noble Lords that in the Devon and Cornwall force area, Cornwall as a county is a unitary authority. However, we will not prescribe this; increasing co-option will be a local decision. The Secretary of State will retain a role in agreeing to any proposed increase in the number of co-optees, merely to ensure that local areas have considered all the issues arising from their decision, including other areas of balance.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this group contains a considerable number of government amendments that in essence ensure that all the staff, property rights and liabilities of police authorities pass first to police and crime commissioners and the MOPC on the day of creation in order to maintain current arrangements. They then allow for secondary transfer schemes to be put in place to allow staff to transfer to the chief officer of police.
I understand that the Association of Police Authorities supports the Government’s approach. Much as I admire that association, I believe it is misguided, as do a number of staff organisations. The association may envisage the police and crime commissioner retaining the non-operational police staff and transferring the operational police staff to the chief constable. Of course, that is not necessarily the case, but I am concerned at the proposal to split staff into two legally separate workforces under different employers in each force. This increases the number of police employers from the current 43 police authorities to 86 police and crime commissioners and chief constables. At the very least, that will drain resources from front-line policing and lead to the unnecessary loss of both police staff and police officer posts because of the infrastructure cost involved. Indeed, the split between the staff under the PCC and the chief constable is likely to be haphazard and arbitrary, depending on how local relationships work out. The general public, who rely on the force to keep them safe, will surely be confused and indeed concerned at the proliferation of new police employers and the associated bureaucracy, which would risk the confidence of local communities in their police force.
Having two separate workforces in each force is bound to lead to inefficiencies, confusions and the possibility of a two-tier workforce on different terms and conditions. The Government are proposing a two-stage staff transfer, first from the police authority to the police and crime commissioner and then, at a later date, from the police and crime commissioner to chief constables, resulting in twice the opportunity for things to go wrong and for staff interests to be prejudiced. I remind noble Lords of the requirement under the Local Government Pension Scheme for scheme liabilities to be crystallised at the point of transfer between employers; this will have to happen twice and will require the necessary financial undertakings to be given twice.
The Government say that they believe in the concept of a single police force in which police staff and officers come together in unified, effective work. However, these proposals contain the prospect of the police staff workforce being divided between two separate employers, which could threaten all the good work of the last 10 years to build a one-culture police service. I remind the noble Baroness of Tom Winsor’s independent review of police officers’ and staff’s pay and conditions, which has already delivered its part one report in March this year; part two is expected in January 2012. All the evidence in the part one report shows that there is an appetite for harmonising pay and conditions in the police service as a means of modernising the police employment framework. Two of the unions that have talked to me, UNISON and Unite, support that agenda. However, that positive agenda could be frustrated if the police workforce is carved up in the way the Government propose, with their two-stage, two-employer model.
I am grateful to the Minister. My noble friend and I perhaps come at this from different viewpoints, but I am deeply concerned about the power that is being given to individual elected PCCs over the staff. The fact that you would depend on them for the staff transfer to the chief constable gives huge leverage to the police commissioners in their dealings with the chief constable, which raises all my hackles about the problems with this legislation. One point about the need for government amendments on staff transfers related to the risk of mistakes being made because of the shortness of the timetable. I think the Minister spoke of being “hasty”.
That brings me to the substantive point. The rush to have elected police commissioners in place in all the police force areas in a matter of months is going to lead to risks and confusion. Staff deserve to be dealt with in a fair, effective and administratively sound way, and I worry that the result of this two-tier tight transfer is going to be major problems for the staff.
The Minister said that some of these points could be dealt with in another place. I would be grateful if she would clarify that, because there are very narrow rules in the process of ping-pong. I would have thought that as she has promised to write to my noble friend, we should come back to this point on Third Reading. I would be grateful if she could clarify whether from her point of view that might be a sensible way in which to allow us to explore these matters in greater detail in the light of her letter to my noble friend.
My Lords, I do not think it will be possible to come back to this matter on Third Reading. However, I have given the commitment to have it looked at again in another place.
My Lords, my point is that the rules of ping-pong allow that to happen. You cannot simply use ping-pong to table lots of government amendments. It would be better if we had a further discussion on Third Reading.
I was referring only to the chief executive protections for discussion in another place.
My Lords, I hear what noble Lords have said about the use of ping-pong and the other place; I am not a business manager and the matter of when Third Reading of any Bill takes place is not in my hands. I have heard what the House has said tonight and I will take it away for further advice.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister, and I would encourage my noble friend to table an amendment on Third Reading to allow us to debate this further. Clearly, there may be some discussions with the usual channels, so I thank the Minister and beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak also to the other amendments in the group. As we have heard, these amendments seek to ensure that Wales has an appropriate framework for a real partnership working, taking into account the reality that many of the public services important to good policing are devolved to the National Assembly for Wales.
First, it is essential that good operational links exist between the police and local government. Local government in Wales is fully devolved for both the legislative and financial overview under the Assembly. The Assembly is also responsible for highways, housing, community safety and social services in Wales, all of which are greatly important to the work of the police force. In particular, the road safety partnership is an essential feature of such co-operation. Furthermore, education comes entirely under the National Assembly, and that is relevant to the work of the police and schools liaison officers. The Assembly is responsible for youth services, youth justice and substance misuse—all vital to police work.
As the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, said, the National Assembly’s Communities Committee has considered the impact of the Bill, if it becomes an Act, on community safety in Wales. Its report, which I have here, was published in February of this year. It has the headline recommendation which calls for any establishment of police commissioners and police crime panels to be deferred until their impact had been assessed in England. This was a constructive comment to ensure that, if they do come in, they come in with lessons learnt and fit in with the structures that we have in Wales. The committee also recommended that, if the Government go ahead, there should be an equal balance of power and a consensual approach between the commissioners and the police and crime panels.
The evidence garnered by the committee overwhelmingly praised police forces in Wales for developing over the past decade much stronger engagement with communities. As the former chair of the north Wales Crimebeat organisation, I can certainly vouchsafe that that is true in our area. This is reinforced by evidence from a diverse phalanx of organisations that was given to that committee of the Assembly, ranging from Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary to Welsh Women’s Aid, from the Welsh Local Government Association to the Welsh Audit Office, and from ACPO to the Campaign Against Political Policing.
The community dimensions are an essential ingredient of Welsh life and Welsh culture. After a period of working at arm’s length from the community, the police have learnt that they were ignoring a vital tool in their fight against crime. Having a community actively on your side makes a huge difference in the work of the police. This is true everywhere, of course, but particularly in Wales where communities are so close knit. The National Assembly, with the support of all parties, has led the way towards getting this approach accepted. There is now a happy and successful working relationship which is making real inroads into reducing crime. So, if it ain’t broke, why mend it?
The amendments do not do either of two things: they do not transfer responsibility for policing from the Home Office to the Assembly, although chief constables in Wales have pressed for that to happen; and they do not provide for Wales to be totally and permanently excluded from the provisions of the Bill with regard to the establishment of police and crime panels. The amendments facilitate this to be developed organically in Wales, building on what has been achieved by the National Assembly in partnership with the police forces, and to harness the huge community resource we have in Wales in a partnership between not only the National Assembly and the police forces but with local government.
I urge the Government to think again on this matter; to accept that authoritarian centralism is not always the best approach; and to harness rather than throttle the diversity that we have in these islands.
My Lords, we are indebted to the noble Lords, Lord Elystan-Morgan and Lord Wigley, for bringing this back to our attention. The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, asked the Government for some sensitivity. The problem is that the Government have not shown sensitivity when it comes to the way they have dealt with the Welsh perspective.
As noble Lords will know, the Welsh Government made it clear that they did not agree with a proposal for directly elected commissioners. However, they were quite prepared to discuss with the Government a compromise which would have consisted of police authorities remaining—and the noble Lords, Lord Elystan-Morgan and Lord Wigley, gave very convincing arguments as to why they should remain in Wales—but the elected commissioner in Wales would act as chair of those police authorities. For the life of me, I do not understand why the Government were not prepared to accept that very decent offer from the Welsh Assembly. Instead, we have to look at Part 3 of Schedule 6 which gives the Secretary of State the ability to ensure that police and crime panels are established in each police area in Wales, despite the fact that the Welsh Assembly Government do not want those panels established. The only argument that I could recall from our discussion in Committee stage was that this might have a big impact on cross-border crime.
With the greatest respect, I really do not understand the need for Wales and England to have police and crime panels in order to deal with either cross-border crime or cross-border co-operation. One is not aware of the traumas of the relationship between England and Scotland where there are not the police and crime panels north of the border. Indeed, one can look at other aspects of the devolution settlement, like the health service, where one sees different policies developed in different parts of the UK but none the less we still have one National Health Service.
I am delighted that the noble Lords have brought this to our attention. Even now, at this late hour, one hopes that the Minister will show some sensitivity. If not, I hope that the noble Lords will consider other opportunities to bring this to our attention.
My Lords, I urge the Minister to take account of the issues that have been raised by other noble Lords. The Minister will recall that I raised these issues at Second Reading and that my noble friend Lady Hamwee put forward amendments in Committee that sought to deal with this issue. I am concerned that there is still a problem, but the amendments put forward by noble Lords this evening have the possibility of providing some sort of solution. They could, in principle, offer a practical way out of a currently considerable and undesirable impasse.
The UK Government have recognised that they needed the consent of the Welsh Assembly to legislate for police and crime panels. That is why a legislative consent Motion was put to the Welsh Assembly. It is obviously the case that the issues are intermixed and intertwined, and noble Lords have explained how that occurs. But it is worth dwelling on this issue because it is the devolved policy areas which are so closely interlinked that make it impossible for the police in Wales to operate entirely separately from, for example, the highways department, youth services, or the substance misuse strategy, all of which are under the control of the Assembly—there are very many more I could cite.
Something that has not been mentioned is the fact that only 40 per cent of the money that goes to the police comes from the Home Office. Policing may not be devolved but only 40 per cent of its funding comes from the Home Office. Some 25 per cent comes via the Assembly and a third from the police precept from local taxpayers. The Government have recognised the need for there to be a solution to this. I am sorry that there has been no way out of the impasse so far. The Assembly of course refused legislative consent and the Government have sought to circumvent the problem therefore created by making the Home Secretary responsible for bringing together locally elected representatives. The fact is that the Home Office does not have the infrastructure in Wales to support that. There are considerable practicable problems about how that will actually work in practice.
I make it absolutely clear that I am also critical in particular of the Welsh Assembly Government. There is something rather foolish in the Minister concerned negotiating a solution, putting it to the Welsh Assembly and then abstaining on his own solution—which he had agreed with Ministers in Westminster. There are obviously considerable problems there.
I am also disappointed in the Welsh Assembly Government for their lack of vigour in trying to overcome these problems. I am grateful to the Minister for the information that she has supplied to me and I know that there have been meetings between her officials and those of the Welsh Assembly Government. There have not been meetings at a ministerial level. If I were the Minister in Wales, I would seek to solve this problem with a little bit more vigour. My purpose in speaking tonight is to make clear that we still have a constitutional stand-off. It is a very unfortunate situation. It is clear that negotiations have failed to resolve the issue but it is disappointing that the Welsh Assembly Government have not entered into more positive and effective negotiation. Unfortunately, as the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan said, the amendments as put forward do not really solve the problem.
My Lords, I am interested in that last comment but it strikes me that retaining police authorities with an elected commissioner as chairman was a pretty good offer to start discussions. I would be interested in the comments of the noble Baroness on that.
The original plan—the legislative consent Motion—that was put to the Assembly was on the basis of the Assembly Government appointing representatives to that panel. That was the offer that the Assembly rejected. The other proposal that the noble Lord mentioned earlier was not put formally. For the purposes of our discussion here this evening, that cannot be regarded as a formal offer. It is a great pity that that offer has not gone further but it was never put to the Assembly.
It is just that I have a briefing here, which the noble Baroness probably has herself, which says,
“in a statement to the Assembly on 12th October, the Welsh Minister for Social Justice and Local Government … offered a compromise: ‘I have told the Home Secretary that we believe a compromise whereby, in Wales, police authorities remain, but with the elected commissioner as chair, would offer the democratic accountability that the Home Office is seeking, while maintaining the important strengths of the current system’”.
That was a statement made to the Assembly, but it was not the legislative consent Motion that the Assembly was asked to vote on. The Minister will, I am sure, correct me if I am wrong, but my recollection is that that the Assembly was asked to vote on the issue of the appointment of representatives appointed by Welsh Ministers to serve on the new bodies.
With the greatest respect, there is no agreement except to go to 11 pm so I would have thought the noble Lord could go home.
My Lords, my recollection of the transition/shadow period for the Greater London Authority was that it was very short and clearly not long enough, but that is not the point I will make tonight.
I sometimes think that, faced with a difficult decision, it is wise to ask oneself, “How will I feel, looking back in six months or a year, if I did or did not do something?”. In this situation, if the Government postpone the changes in London, they will be able to look back a year and a half from now and say, “Phew, that went okay. What damage did we do by not making the changes? Well, none really. What damage have we suffered? Maybe a little to our egos, but does that matter?”. How much better to be in that situation if there has been a problem, which may or may not be related to the changes in governance, than to be told by the noble Lord opposite or my noble friend behind me, “Well, we did warn you”, and for the world to say, “You were warned”.
I do not see a problem if the Government make what is hardly even a concession but more a slight shift in thinking. The balance is between very little on the one hand, and possibly nothing but possibly something catastrophic on the other.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness and my noble friend for raising this matter. The Government’s approach to the Bill is on a par with their approach to other pieces of legislation. We have already seen the debacle of the Public Bodies Bill, and the Government are replicating the approach with the Health Bill. I declare an interest as chair of a foundation trust and as a trainer consultant in the NHS. The NHS is facing the biggest challenge that it has ever faced in reducing its spending and in its efficiency programme. At the same time, the Government are drawing up all the structural bodies that are in place and forcing the health service to devote a huge amount of time to structural issues when it should be focusing on how on earth it will cope with the largest reductions in real-terms funding that it has ever faced.
It seems that the same thing is happening to our police forces. The Government have drawn all the wrong conclusions from the first Blair Administration. They feel that they need to speed on, but destruction is inevitable because of the speed with which they are moving. I can only conclude that it is because no senior Minister in the Government has any experience whatever of running anything. If they had, they would not rush in the way the Government are rushing, with no understanding of the impact on essential public services.
When one considers the challenges facing the Metropolitan Police—I shall not go through the list again but they include: the Olympics; the continuing threat of terrorism; the mayoral elections; the budget reductions; staff issues, to which my noble friend referred, including pensions; and the phone hacking issue—it is obvious that over the next months and years there will be intense scrutiny on the force and its senior officers. There are to be two inquiries into the phone hacking issue, one of which is bound to look in close detail at the actions of the Metropolitan Police. The last thing the force needs during the next two to three years is to cope with a structural change in governance. The noble Baroness’s amendment is eminently sensible, and I hope that even at this late stage the Government will give it sympathetic consideration.
My Lords, I reiterate what I have said in previous discussions on this subject to my noble friend Lady Doocey: the commissioner has personally asked the Home Secretary to go as early as possible with London. That is a fact. The commissioner, deputy commissioner, the mayor and deputy mayor are very keen for the London provisions to be commenced as soon as possible.
My noble friend mentioned a letter. That letter outlines issues that the commissioner has flagged up for the Government to look at so that London can go early. The issues in the letter are being looked at and many of them have already been agreed in earlier amendments in the House. We debated earlier today the government amendments to the transitional provisions in the Bill to ensure that the PCCs and the MOPC can operate effectively from the outset and that there is no need for a period of shadow operation. The changes to policing governance do not affect operational control and so will not impact on operational issues.
We are going round this circuit for about the third time. My noble friend may totally disagree with me but I have checked and double checked—as has my right honourable friend the Minister of State in another place—to make sure that our understanding of both the commissioner’s and the mayor’s view on this subject are as we have described them in this House. I can but repeat what I have already said to my noble friend in the House: they are keen to commence as soon as possible and they have in no way sought to delay London.
My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 231 and Amendment 234 in this group. I hope your Lordships will have noted the balanced symmetry of my amendments, one with the Minister for the Government and the other with my noble friend Lord Hunt, leading for the loyal Opposition, so I have one with each person in this group.
Amendment 231, which I have tabled with the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, and my noble friend Lord Hunt, suggests that no serving police officer or a person who has served as a police officer in the past 10 years may stand as a commissioner. Amendment 234, tabled, I am delighted to say, with the support of the Government, will ensure that noble Members of this House may be elected as commissioners and continue to fulfil their duties within the House. It removes Clause 74 which would have barred your Lordships from being both a commissioner and an active Peer, a proposal which, as I recall, caused considerable disquiet in Committee. I am very happy that this amendment provides the Government with a way out of what I am absolutely certain would have been a defeat on this proposal and spares the Benches opposite from any further blushes on this Bill. I look forward to the possibility of noble colleagues—not myself, I hasten to add—who may consider putting themselves forward to be commissioners. If they do that I will look forward to hearing about their experiences on their probably infrequent visits back to this House. That option should be open. Under this amendment it will be open. I am grateful to the Minister for agreeing to that amendment.
On serving police officers—or people who have served as a police officer in the last 10 years—then serving as a commissioner, that proposal is not intended as a slight on the noble profession of police officers in England and Wales. There may well be individual police officers whose skill sets would enable them to be very effective commissioners. The valued contributions in your Lordships’ House of noble Lords who have previously served as chief commissioners are testament to that. Yet here, we are 827 noble Lords. The expert contributions of the noble Lords, Lord Blair, Lord Condon, Lord Dear and Lord Stevens, and others are a valuable addition to debates on policing, alongside the views of a whole host of others—civil libertarians, local government experts and those with other viewpoints from outside the policing profession. Peers with a policing background bring a valuable perspective but they are not the sole arbiter of policing policy. I dare say that they would not wish to be.
The fact is that these commissioners will be a novelty introduction to British politics—a sole, directly elected arbiter of policy in one particular area, effectively unconstrained by his or her peers, or by Cabinet or other collegiate responsibility and elections every four years. It is incumbent on us to ensure that such a single individual can carry as much public trust and confidence as possible. He or she must be seen to be impartial in holding the police to account. Perhaps controversially, I am not convinced that under this system, reliant on a single individual, one person who is associated exclusively with the police service could carry the perception of impartiality from the police force that is necessary if every section of the community is to trust that their police force is being held rigorously to account.
We have an established principle in our public life whereby there are safeguards against what the public could reasonably perceive as potential conflicts of interest, or undue or improper influence, as individuals with relevant experience move between related fields. For instance, the Ministerial Code of May 2010 makes it clear that no former Minister may take up an appointment with a lobbying company for at least two years after leaving office. I am not suggesting that the parallels with policing are exact but the public has an expectation that, if an individual has been on one side of the fence and decides to swap over, there should be an appropriate break between the two to mitigate against the perception of conflicts of interest.
The noble Baroness, my noble friend and I are not wedded to 10 years but believe that there should be some separation between people serving as police officers and then standing as commissioners. Maybe 10 years is not considered appropriate but there should certainly be some period of time. That period would also enable any police officers who would be commissioner candidates to broaden their experience of fields beyond policing, perhaps trying business or community-based endeavours, not to mention developing the contacts and support that they would undoubtedly need in order to be elected.
One or two other matters are worth mentioning briefly. One that bothers me is that, without the safeguards offered by the amendment, it is possible that a disaffected police officer could choose to stand as a commissioner so that he or she might laud it over his or her chief constable or force. I hate to mention that but I have come across individuals who have had those motives. One cannot rule that out completely. It may sound fanciful but it is a real risk and one that we should take the opportunity to remove now.
Given the hour, I am trying to be as brief as possible. I encourage the House to look at this carefully. The amendment in relation to police officers would be a step towards preserving and not diminishing the recent substantial gains that the police and authorities have together made in raising public trust and confidence in the police and the impartiality of those who hold them to account.
My Lords, I welcome the two government amendments, which we are glad to support. On Amendment 218, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has done a great service by bringing this issue to your Lordships’ attention.
I am assuming that the noble Baroness will be able to say that the order-making power in the Bill is sufficient, but if not, it would be helpful if she acknowledged that. She will be equally helpful in relation to my own Amendment 231; alas, perhaps I am wildly optimistic on that.
I agree with the worries expressed by my noble friend Lady Henig about whether it is right and appropriate for former police officers to stand for election as police and crime commissioners. There are two areas we might discuss. First is the question raised by my noble friend about disaffected police officers. There are known to be disaffected police officers; they do surface from time to time. I worry about such a person being elected as a police and crime commissioner and the approach that they would then take to the chief constable and the force over which they had such influence. I also worry about any police officer elected as a police and crime commissioner.
Noble Lords will know that one of my major concerns about the legislation is that, in effect, the police and crime commissioner will act as the chief constable. We have still to hear about the Memorandum of Understanding—I assume we will come back to that on Third Reading—but even with a statutory Memorandum of Understanding, in the end all the levers are with the police and crime commissioner. I believe that it is almost inevitable that that person will seek to unduly influence the way in which the chief constable operates. It would be even worse if the police and crime commissioner is a former police officer. The temptation, the itch, to intervene in the details of that force would, I believe, be overwhelming. I know that it is unusual, when it comes to elections, for us to say there is a category of people who ought not to be able to stand, but in the case of police and crime commissioners, who are corporations sole, we have a huge responsibility. I wonder whether it would be appropriate for a former police officer to stand.
My Lords, the House will be aware that, as originally drafted, the Bill provided that a PCC could only serve two terms and would not be able to stand in a third election. I know that many noble Lords were concerned that for a PCC in his or her second term, being unable to stand again would effectively mean not being accountable to the public. The Government listened carefully to these concerns and looked at other elected posts in the UK, none of which has term limits. We have concluded that there is no need for PCCs to have term limits. It should be a decision for the public as to whether they want their PCC to serve a third term, rather than for the Government to dictate centrally that they cannot.
Noble Lords will also be aware that, as originally drafted, the Bill provided that Members would not be able to sit or vote in this House during the period they served as a PCC. Our thinking was that being a PCC was a full-time job and therefore was incompatible with active membership of this House. In Committee many noble Lords expressed concern about this and, indeed, set out to the House the many important and time-consuming roles they fulfil while being active in this House. I was extremely influenced by that and on reflection the Government agree. Membership of this House—like being a councillor, for example—very often goes hand in hand with full-time employment elsewhere and there is no reason why someone could not fulfil both roles. It is for that reason that we have tabled amendments to put that on the statute book and I am grateful for the support of the House.
On Amendment 231, which would prevent police officers from standing as a PCC within 10 years of leaving their force, noble Lords will probably know that the Home Affairs Select Committee suggested a cooling-off period for senior officers of four years and the Government committed to considering that.
As I set out in Committee, the Government feel that senior officers can bring much to the role of a PCC. Their experience of policing and the relationships necessary to make the role of PCC work would be invaluable. The Government are generally of the view that, apart from in extreme circumstances, it should be the public who decide whether or not a person should be a PCC. I cannot agree with the noble Lord’s case or his amendment. We believe that the public should be able to see the potential tensions of a former chief officer taking on this role if it was very shortly after they had left their post, and it is for the public to decide whether or not they want that person to represent them.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee spoke to Amendment 218 to Clause 59, which would allow the Secretary of State by order to make provisions about the regulation of spending by campaigners who were not themselves standing in an election to be a police and crime commissioner but who intended to influence the outcome of the election. I am grateful to her for tabling the amendment; this is an important principle, and the Government must ensure that it is given proper consideration. I will commit to coming back to the House at Third Reading to set out how we will deal with this important issue. For now, I ask my noble friend to withdraw her amendment.
I will move the government amendments standing in my name and invite noble Lords to withdraw theirs.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this group of amendments seeks simply to ensure that local authorities are consulted by the police and crime commissioner, along with the police and crime panel, in connection with any preparation or variation of a crime plan. Surely it is axiomatic that a close working relationship between the police and other authorities, particularly local authorities, is essential in dealing with matters of community safety and law and order. A wide range of local authority functions clearly impinge on the duties of the police and vice versa, so it is clearly desirable, if not essential, that in the preparation of any police and crime plan, given the commissioner’s responsibility to liaise and work with a wide range of statutory bodies, local authorities should be among the prime consultees.
The Minister has charmed the House over the past few weeks. I hope that her charm will be matched by a willingness to accept that this is a constructive amendment, designed to ensure the closest possible working relationship between the two most important arms in any approach to the issues which this Bill seeks to address and which the relevant authorities have to address on a day-to-day basis. I hope the Minister will accept these modest but important amendments to reinforce that relationship. I beg to move.
As my noble friend inferred, we are debating the Localism Bill through which the Government wish to give more freedom to local authorities. As part of that we are seeing the Government present local authorities with an opportunity to have some of the constraints around their leadership role in a local area taken away from them so that the local authority is seen as having a leadership role which is not necessarily tied into statutory responsibilities. We are also seeing in that Bill a requirement on the 11 largest local authorities in England to hold referenda next year on whether there should be an elected mayor. The Government are therefore acknowledging the importance of local government and its place in the wider community. I support my noble friend’s amendments because they seek to ensure that when draft police and crime plans are prepared or varied, the local authority has a right to consultation. In our first discussion my noble friend referred to the potential of an elected mayor in Birmingham. I find it quite remarkable that we have the prospect of the elected mayor in Birmingham not having an ability to be statutorily consulted by the police and crime commissioner when it comes to a police and crime plan or a variation. This is a symbol of the importance of local government and I hope the noble Baroness will accept my noble friend’s amendment.
This issue is an important one and relates back to what I have said before on crime prevention. It took many years to get a good relationship between the police and local authorities on crime prevention and we should not lose that again. Local authorities and the police work together and when the police listen to what locally elected people and local authorities have to say, there is a much better chance of reducing crime and coming up with good crime prevention schemes. So I strongly support my noble friend’s amendments.
I have Amendment 47 in this group. I will be very brief. This is about partnership arrangements and improving the link between policing bodies and other partners, particularly community safety bodies. I note the Minister’s Amendment 43 on behalf of the Government specifying that the local policing body has to have regard to the priorities of the statutory partners—
I apologise. I am so relieved. I was desperately looking through my notes to see if there had been a major omission.
The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, provide for local authorities to have the same degree of involvement as the police and crime panel in the police and crime commissioner’s preparation of the police and crime plan. In Clause 6 the PCC is placed under specific duties to send the plan to the PCP and have regard to any report or recommendations made by the PCP in relation to the draft, to give a formal response to any recommendations from the PCP, to afford as much time as reasonably possible for the PCP to consider and review the plan, and to review the plan in light of any recommendations made to the PCC by the police and crime panel.
That is already quite a lot of involvement with the PCP, which is made up of and structured with a representative of every local authority at whichever level, whether it is a two, three or one-tier local government structure. Through the representatives on the police and crime panel—we have discussed the need for those other than local government representatives, but looking specifically at those members—I would expect the views of the local authority to be taken forward by those representatives so that specific local authorities’ views on the plan or any other matter are reflected on the panel.
For each of those duties, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, wants the same duty to apply to each local authority within the force area. That would add bureaucracy for the PCC, because the PCC must negotiate to deliver their plan. At the moment, the core of that negotiation is with the police and crime panel. I also think that it would undermine the core responsibility of the PCP in being the check and balance for the PCC in developing the plan. The burden that will be placed by adding the extra tier is particularly disproportionate. I would expect people on the panel to communicate back to their local authority. For example, if the local authority was concerned, that concern would be expressed through their representative on the police and crime panel. That is why we have extended the scope of the panel to include a representative from every authority, compared to the current structure, where not every authority is represented.
My Lords, can we come back to the place of Birmingham, which I know is dear to your Lordships’ heart? Let us assume that the referendum takes place next May and that a year later we have an elected mayor of Birmingham. Is the noble Baroness seriously suggesting that the relationship on the draft police and crime plan is between the panel and the PCC, and that the elected mayor for Birmingham has to go through the panel to make representations? I do not think that that stands up.
I would hope that elected mayors would be represented on the panel. I see no reason why they should not be. Nothing in the Bill says that they should not and I would expect that link to be formed through those elected mayors. They would not be excluded from the panel. I do not know whether that satisfies the noble Lord’s concern. They will clearly have positions of great authority within the locality and therefore would have that input through the police and crime panel. They would clearly be important in holding to account the police and crime commissioner, and I would expect an elected mayor to have that representation. I will wait to see whether the noble Lord believes that to be a solution to the problem he has raised.
I have no doubt that each representative on the panel will consult their local authority colleagues on the plan in advance of the PCP formally submitting its advice and recommendations to the police and crime commissioner. It is for that very reason that we are placing a duty on the police and crime commissioner: the requirement at subsection (7) for the PCP to be given a reasonable amount of time to consult on the draft plan.
For clarification, it would not be a question of the PCP having the plan submitted to it for a day or two and then having to decide on it. We have included the need for adequate and reasonable time in the legislation.
For the PCC to undertake consultation with a large number of authorities outwith the PCP would, I believe, be bureaucratic and time-consuming. Also it recognises the power which we expect the PCP to have in terms of scrutiny. However, if the PCP utilises its membership, it can, on behalf of the PCC, make a constructive and supportive contribution. Through that local authority membership, it will be able to co-ordinate the views of the authorities and provide an agreed set of recommendations which, I remind the House, the PCP must have regard to.
I appreciate the intention and am grateful to the noble Lord for his kind remarks. However, I am going to disappoint him on this occasion—he is probably thinking “yet again”. I hope that the way in which the Government are seeking to enable the PCP to be involved in supporting the police and crime commissioner is a little clearer, and that the noble Lord will consider withdrawing the amendment.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I now move on to the next group of amendments. I am sorry, I think I have the wrong notes here.
My Lords, we are on the group starting with government Amendment 35. It would be helpful if the noble Baroness introduced the government amendments. We could then have a debate and she could then wind up.
I am very interested in the noble Baroness’s comments on local authorities, but would they not apply to crime plans? I follow her arguments and am very supportive of the general thrust; but if that, why not for crime plans?
If the noble Lord is teasing me about a previous amendment, he can probably read my answer in the fact that I have stayed put. I am not averse to being teased.
Far from it. I was just trying to follow in the noble Baroness’s footsteps with lively engagement.
Let us go on to the Local Government Association. That seems to follow, as Amendment 239A would add police and crime commissioners as statutory partners on community safety partnerships. Under the Bill, commissioners do not replace police authorities as members of CSPs; they simply have a duty to co-operate. The Local Government Association, making the point that this is an all-party view, says that it is concerned about fracturing current local community safety governance arrangements and that placing commissioners as statutory members on CSPs would help to ensure that all bodies involved in local community safety work together through a collaborative approach in the best interest of local communities and that the commissioner does not undertake contradictory efforts to those of the other CSP members.
I apologise to your Lordships for the length of time it has taken me to introduce all those amendments. It is a medium-sized group in the context of the Bill.
I also support this amendment, very strongly so. It follows a number of things that I have argued on this Bill on the relatively few occasions that I have spoken. It is the issue on which I feel most strongly. Although it is not the Government’s intention, there is a real danger of breaking the link between the local authority, the local crime partnership and the police. What the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, has just said is absolutely right. Particularly before the 1998 Act, it was difficult to get really good relationships between police, local community groups and the local authorities. It was not because anybody was actively willing against it; it was because we did not have a structure for doing it.
It is a long time since I was involved in this sort of thing, but I remember those years and I fear very much us going back to that. I would have great trepidation because it will result in crime and social disorder being less well dealt with and it will therefore result in an increase in crime and social disorder. If the Government would cast their minds back to the period before 1998 they will recall that various groups, particularly those led by local authorities, and the police were trying to find new ways of working together. Some police forces, local authorities and groups managed to do it; others did not. It took that structure of the 1998 Act to give force to it. A situation emerged where, slowly, everybody accepted that the key to keeping down crime was not just more police officers on the beat—important as that is—but really good crime prevention programmes and a close link between the community and the police, headed up, but not always necessarily led by, the local authority. When you got that you suddenly found that everybody began to co-operate on a single target. They also began to identify crime hot spots or particular difficult crimes and you began to get co-operation.
I know that the Minister will say, “Don’t worry, it will be all right on the night, everything will be there to follow it up”. I have to say that I cannot see it in this Bill. You are talking about very large police areas and a remote detachment. When the Minister says, as she did on the last group of amendments, that a member of the panel will be able to attend or discuss with the council or the various groups which have been implied here, then my memory—again it is perhaps many years ago—of that sort of arrangement with local authorities often did not work well. The reason was that the commitment to that level of involvement was not satisfactory. What we need is a much more structured way and what my noble friend is putting forward offers that.
If the Minister cannot see her way to accepting this amendment, I would like to see the Government spell out much more clearly how they think crime prevention is going to work in the new structure and make sure that crime panels, local authorities and everybody else are working together on this. There is a danger with this Bill, structured as it is, that that will cease to function and if we lose that, we will go back 20 years, frankly, and the Government will live to regret it. So if the Minister can spell out to me why she is so convinced it will work I will be delighted not only to listen to her now but to reread her comments and try to understand it. For the life of me, I cannot at the moment see how this is going to improve the situation and it may well make it worse and take us back—as the noble Baronesses, Lady Henig and Lady Harris, said—to 1998 and possibly further than that.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Soley has put his finger on it in supporting my noble friends Lady Henig and Lord Beecham. The argument for this Bill is about enhancing local accountability of the police force. Yet, remarkably, in a number of its provisions, it seeks to reduce the direct involvement of local authorities in these important issues. I accept the House has come to a view about police and crime plans, but surely we should be seeking to involve individual local authorities in a partnership with their local police forces and with the police and crime commissioner.
That is why it is right to seek to encourage the Government to ensure that there are references in the Bill to the relationship between police forces and local authorities. That is why this group of amendments is so important. The argument of the noble Baroness is that the police and crime panel, which will have representatives from local authorities, can do the job. I am sure we all hope that police and crime panels will be effective and I certainly think they would be more effective if the Minister could accept the amendment of my noble friend Lady Henig. The argument she put forward is that the panels, while concerned with scrutiny, could also play a valuable role in supporting the police force and the police and crime commissioner.
I certainly hope that, despite all my fears, there will be a mainly co-operative relationship between all three partners. Otherwise, we could end up with a situation in which the police and crime commissioner engages in political argument with the police and crime panel, with the chief constable squeezed in the middle. One thinks of all the energy that these partners in the local policing situation will spend arguing with each other and seeking to get public support when they should be working together to enhance police activity and effectiveness in a community.
I strongly support the amendments, which seek to place clearly in the Bill the role of local authorities and ensure that the police forces and PCCs of the future are required to engage with community safety partnerships. Surely one of the great advances that we have seen over the past few years has been the way that people have worked together to do everything they can to prevent crime and make sure that all the agencies involved co-operate and collaborate. It would be a great pity if as a result of this legislation those bodies were discouraged from so doing. That must be particularly so in the case of crime prevention and community safety partnerships. On those grounds, I hope that the Minister will be able to come back with at least some reassurance to noble Lords.
My Lords, before I deal with these amendments, I would like to clarify the Government’s position on this issue on which we have, as I mentioned earlier, tabled amendments. The Bill already contains provision for police and crime commissioners and the responsible authorities on community safety partnerships to co-operate in the exercise of their functions. The government amendments seek to strengthen that duty at a more strategic level by including provision for both parties to have regard to each other’s priorities. Perhaps I may clarify that. What that new duty adds is that PCCs and CSPs will be required to have regard to each other’s priorities, even in areas where they would not actually be working together—which could be the case—but where there would be benefits in them taking a consistent approach and having a knowledge of, and regard to, what the other’s priorities are. That would at least ensure that they did not take an inconsistent approach, a sort of left hand not knowing what the right hand was doing. We are anxious that they work together. It is a very important relationship, and that is why I have tabled amendments to strengthen it, as I have just outlined.
My noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Shipley have tabled Amendment 42. My noble friend reminded us that she is due a reply from my noble friend Lord Wallace, who promised in Committee to write to her. I will ensure that I chase up that letter tonight. Amendment 42 would remove the wording that stipulates that a plan should set out how a chief officer will be judged in his or her provision of policing and replaces it with a provision about how standards of policing will be measured. In my view, this goes to the heart of what these reforms are about, despite it being, on the face of it, a relatively minor amendment.
The Government’s model is that the panel and the public should hold the commissioner to account who, in turn, must hold the chief constable to account for the provision of operational policing. The original wording of the Bill achieves this, and it is right that the operationally independent commanding officer of a force, who exercises unfettered direction and control, is held personally accountable in law for the provision of policing. This amendment, perhaps interestingly, removes this subtle but very significant difference. That is not to say that standards of policing are not something that the PCC should be involved in. We are just clear that in maintaining operational independence and clarity of roles the PCC should hold the chief constable to account for meeting those standards. I am not in any way suggesting to my noble friends that the standards do not matter, but I believe that the line of accountability as set out in the Bill is the right way forward.
My concern with Amendments 44 and 45 is that they would significantly increase the burden on PCCs and members of the community safety partnerships. I understand the effect to be that they would have to co-operate with each other in relation to all the functions exercised by members of the community safety partnership and not just in their function of formulating and implementing community safety strategies. This would be a legal duty enforceable by the courts. However, I am concerned that it would give rise to considerable bureaucracy. Local authorities, fire services and health bodies would have to keep all their functions under review in order to show that they were co-operating with the PCC where possible, even though many of their functions have a limited connection to community safety or, in some circumstances, none at all.
The Government are proposing a more proportionate approach in that the duty to co-operate would extend only to community safety functions and there would be an additional duty on police and crime commissioners and community safety partnerships to have regard to each others' priorities, the latter being a much broader set of issues. At the beginning of my remarks, I outlined how I see that working in practice.
Similar concerns arise in relation to the proposal to extend the duty to co-operate to voluntary and statutory bodies concerned with crime reduction and victim support. There may be a significant number of these bodies, both local and national, to whom the duty would apply. We would not wish to create a bureaucratic requirement for PCCs and other bodies to show how they are carrying out this duty. More fundamentally, we do not think that the amendment is necessary as the appropriate links between police and crime commissioners and the relevant bodies will be created in any event, as we are providing the power for PCCs to issue grants, including to the voluntary sector and statutory bodies. In providing those grants, there would clearly be a great deal of discussion and recognition of the function and priorities of those groups.
With regard to Amendment 47, tabled by my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Shipley, I see it as primarily reverting to current arrangements for police authorities by requiring members of police and crime panels to sit on community safety partnerships. It will be for the PCC to decide how best to manage relationships with CSPs. That is the strategic leadership they will provide. I have listened to the House's concerns on this issue and have introduced amendments that will enhance these provisions and essentially allow the PCC and local CSPs to manage the relationship locally. I have already spoken on these and will not repeat myself here. Suffice it to say that I have listened and, in seeking to amend the Bill in the light of the concerns voiced in this House at previous stages of the Bill, I have tabled those amendments accordingly.
Anyone who has dealings with CSPs will know that they operate very differently across the length and breadth of England and Wales. There is no one-size-fits-all system. These reforms are about reducing bureaucracy and about responsibility being taken locally for delivering quality services. I fear that the provisions tabled by my noble friends could increase the bureaucratic burden and add prescription to the Bill, which I do not believe is needed. The panel is there to scrutinise, not to share the executive functions of the PCC. I know this is a subject on which we disagree, and I see these amendments primarily as consequential to the removal of PCCs from the Bill under the original Clause 1, but I have to reiterate that that is the Government's position.
My Lords, it seems to me that the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Hamwee, have raised some important points. Like my noble friend, I am puzzled by the inconsistency between government departments when dealing with similar matters in legislation going through your Lordships’ House. We raised this matter previously regarding corporates sole and the absence of effective corporate governance, in contrast to changes that other government departments are making regarding similar governance issues. I specifically referred last week to the Department of Health. As a result of the listening exercise it is changing the proposals on governance to ensure that what were going to be called GP consortia and are now to be clinical commissioning groups, will have effective corporate governance. Another example is the extension of the Assembly’s new power in relation to mayoral strategies not in this Bill to police and crime powers. I cannot see the logic of that. Surely if it is deemed appropriate for the Assembly in certain circumstances to be able to amend plans, why on earth is it not appropriate with the police and crime plan?
I, too, am puzzled about why the panel is not in the last resort able to require the attendance of senior police officers. The Government’s view is that that would blur the line of responsibility. They have also make that argument in relation to police and crime panels outside London. Far from blurring the line of responsibility, it seems to me that two things will happen. When the MOPC goes before the London panel or when—outside London, although I know that it is not part of these amendments—the PCC goes before a police and crime panel, the panel is bound to ask matters on operational issues. That is inevitable. The MOPC will either have to say, “It’s not me guv, that’s down to the commissioner”; or, as I suspect will happen, it will seek to answer on operational issues. Those of us who have been before Select Committees or scrutiny committees know that, in the end, it is difficult not to give an answer.
I suggest to the noble Baroness that the real reason why the Government will not give way on this is that they know we are on a journey towards elected politicians running the police force. That is the inevitable consequence of where we are going. By not allowing the panels to require the attendance of senior police officers, the Government are encouraging that process. Surely on a policing matter that should be the direct responsibility of the commissioner, the panel and not just MOPC should be able to summon the commissioner.
My Lords, I would like to deal with one or two points that have just been raised before I touch in more detail on the amendments that have been spoken to this evening. We want the Assembly to have a role in informing the development of the plan which is in keeping with the rest of the country and the elected mandate of the PCC. We do not believe that there should be a veto, because no other PCP will have the power of veto outside London. It would take away—this is critical—the mandate on which they were elected. I see the noble Lord looking heavenward but this is at the heart of PCCs. They will be elected on a mandate that will spell out to voters how they see themselves managing crime reduction.
I am halfway through the sentence; perhaps I may finish it. At the heart of the Bill is an ability to be elected on a manifesto and on a mandate which people will have heard. People will either support them on that or give their support to an alternative candidate with a different way of taking these matters forward. The right to veto would completely negate what had been put to the people who had voted in good faith on the contents of the strategy. I give way to the noble Lord.
My Lords, there are two issues here. One is London and what happens there and the other is the impact of a decision in London in relation to police forces in the rest of the country. As far as London is concerned, I do not see the difference between the mayor as the MOPC and the mayor as the Mayor of London. The manifesto will contain proposals that relate to both policing and non-policing issues, and since the Government have decided that it is entirely appropriate for the Assembly in certain circumstances to change those strategies, I cannot see the logic of the argument coming from the Home Office. Is it not supporting the overall government position on this? Secondly, if you agreed to this in London, would that differ from the position in other parts of the country? I see the force of that argument but again I refer the noble Baroness to what Mr Pickles said at the conference last week in Birmingham, when he made it clear that elected mayors outside London will not have any additional powers to those held by local authorities at the moment. Already within local government we have a situation where it is accepted, and the Government support, that there will be differences between London and elsewhere. I know that the Home Office is a very distinguished department of state but just occasionally it would be nice to think that it was actually a part of the Government.
My Lords, I assure the House that there is absolutely no question that the Home Office is not part of the Government. I am shocked to the quick that the noble Lord should suggest such a thing. There is a difference between the Mayor of London and the mayor’s election but, unlike mayoral strategies on which the mayor goes to the electorate, within the Bill there is a lot of detail which is already in statute that relates to policing, structure and the mayor’s function in London policing. This is therefore different from other matters which the mayor may go to the electorate on as part of a broader manifesto. I see the noble Lord, Lord Harris, about to rise.
My Lords, as you will see in the government amendments in the group, which I shall come to in a moment, we agree that it is important that information is available to the public and the panel in assessing the actions of the police and crime commissioner and the force. Amendments 51, 52 and 54, in the name of my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Shipley, concern the provision of published information. We are grateful to my noble friends for these amendments. Amendment 51 would compel the PCC to publish information that the panel deems appropriate, while Amendment 52 stipulates that performance information should include data pertaining to the treatment of victims of crime. Amendment 54 states that the PCC must provide documentation as well as information.
On Amendments 51 and 52, the panel already has the right to request information, and provided that it would not jeopardise national security or personal safety it must be supplied, and nothing prevents the panel from publishing it. There is further access to information through regular, light-touch inspections by HMIC and crime mapping. Therefore the panel already has a means of obtaining information, and, as I say, should it wish to see it published, that is perfectly acceptable.
On Amendment 54, the panel can again request any information that it deems necessary from the PCC, and I am happy that it is on the record that we interpret “information” to include documents. This should be provided except where it might adversely impact the safety of the public. I hope my noble friends agree that the provisions in the Bill allow for the outcomes they seek to be met, and I ask that these amendments are not pressed.
Amendment 141, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, and Amendment 142, in the names of my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Shipley, would allow the panel to require the attendance of senior officers from the police force. As I will discuss in bringing forward Amendments 145 and 181, we agree that there are times when it is right that operational matters must be considered alongside the police and crime commissioner’s role. However, these amendments go much further. We do not accept that the panel should be able to scrutinise other members of the force directly. It is the police and crime commissioner’s role to hold the chief constable to account and the role of the panel to hold the PCC to account. Duplicating the accountability of the chief constable is confusing and would only undermine the effective and clear leadership that policing needs.
My Lords, if the panel cannot require the chief constable to come before it, inevitably the police and crime commissioner will be called upon to answer operational issues. If that happens, the line between the role of the PCC and the chief constable will become very blurred. I know the Government say that they resist the amendment because they do not want to blur the role of the PCC overall as being accountable to the electorate, but their approach will bring its own perverse incentives.
I see the noble Lord’s point. He is right to point out that there is a compromise in that concession. However, the chief constable has to be responsible for his force. He or she is the person invited to attend with the PCC. On the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, if they do not know an answer they should go away and find it, like a Minister does at the Dispatch Box. We are trying to avoid a situation where the force is split by allowing the same question to be addressed to different people. That would risk undercutting the authority of the chief constable.
My Lords, I speak in support of the amendments, to some of which my name is added, which deal with delegation.
The amendments are all about ensuring that all senior police force appointments at and above the rank of assistant chief constable will remain with the governing body, as is currently the case. I envisage that as being the PCC but with a strong role for the police and crime panel from the interview stage onwards. In the case of senior officer appointments other than the chief officer, they specify that the chief officer of the force must be included on the interview panel, and therefore have a role in appointing his or her senior team. I certainly agree that the chief officer alone should not be able to appoint senior members of the team.
Moving on, the amendments state that the responsibility for senior officer conduct and complaints should rest with the governing body, the PCC, with the PCP taking a strong role. It is absolutely unacceptable that police officers decide whether to investigate their close colleagues. That is neither transparent nor proper.
During my time as chair of my police authority, I had to deal with some serious matters touching on the conduct of a chief constable. I could not possibly have dealt with the matter on my own. Even with legal help and support, we needed to work together as a body to come to a reasoned conclusion. As it happened, the legal advice that we were given was wrong, so imagine how I would have felt if I had had to take sole responsibility for making such a decision. Having the panel being supportive—indeed, helping to come to difficult decisions—will be by far the best way to deal with often tricky circumstances. I support the noble Baroness’s amendments.
My Lords, I am conscious of the hour and the fact that our Benches are filled to hear this debate, but this is a very important group of amendments. My noble friend Lady Henig and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, have raised some important points about that come back, really, to the consequences of having a corporation sole, in which one person has enormous power and responsibility.
My amendments relate to the powers exercised by the police and crime commissioner. Under Clause 39, “Appointment, suspension and removal of chief constables”, huge authority is given to the police and crime commissioner to appoint a chief constable and to require their suspension, resignation or retirement. When it comes to the appointment, there are some safeguards, because the police and crime panel has a veto power on the appointment. We may disagree about the number of the panel voting in favour, but it has a veto power. When it comes to suspension, retirement or requirement to retire, the safeguard is much less. Although the police and crime panel can undertake a scrutiny process, as set out in Schedule 8, in the end, the police and crime commissioner can ignore the panel's recommendation.
My worry is that the police and crime commissioner who is seeking re-election when year two or year three is coming up and who is in some trouble may well consider sacking the chief constable as a visible sign to the public that he or she is doing something. There are circumstances—my noble friends have hinted at them—where that would be a jolly good thing to do, but at other times it will not; it will be a political action by a police and crime commissioner. Where are the safeguards? In the end, there are none because, whatever the panel says, the police and crime commissioner can ignore it.
I have a series of amendments which relate not only to the chief constable but to the circumstances where the same may be required of other chief officers and also to the situation in London. Essentially, this provision should apply only where it can be shown: that there is good reason—in other words, that it is in the interests of the force, for reasons of efficiency or effectiveness; that there has been appropriate consultation with the chair of the police and crime panel; that there has been proper investigation of the circumstances leading up to such an action; and that the approval of the Secretary of State is given. If Ministers consider that that gives the Secretary of State overweening powers, I must say that I have not been persuaded that the essential nature of the tripartite arrangement—the role of the Home Secretary, the police authority and the chief constable—should be so torn up that there are no safeguards to be undertaken by the Home Secretary if the police and crime commissioner decides to take such an action where, as I said, there is virtually no effective scrutiny other than the PCP recommendations.
This is a very important group of amendments. There is unease about the power to be exercised both by the police and crime commissioner in relation to the chief constable and other senior officers and then by the chief constable in relation to those employed by him as a corporation sole. We would look to the Government to recognise those concerns and to give some reassurance.
My Lords, two amendments in this group, Amendments 189A and 192CA, stand in my name. One refers to the appointment of a chief constable and the other to the dismissal of a chief constable.
In Amendment 189A, I suggest that new words are inserted into Schedule 8:
“A police and crime commissioner should take advice from HMCIC before making any decision as to the appointment of a chief constable”.
I shall come back to the word “should” in a moment. This relates to the suggestion that the advice from an outside agency is taken prior to any decision being made by the PCC and prior to the subsequent discussion of that by the panel. We are looking at this in the context—we have talked a lot about context through the various stages of the Bill—of the fear of the untrammelled exercise of power by the PCC. There are a good many examples over the years of police authorities looking only around their own feet rather than at the broader horizon. The risk is somewhat greater when one has a fully elected individual who has very few of the constraints that police authorities have.
Although I am absolutely sure that, in the majority of cases, if PCCs come into being, they will exercise their power sensibly, in your Lordships' House we are often preoccupied with the thought that some of them might not. In this case, the lack of exercise of the sort of expertise that one would look for would lead to the risk of a blinkered mentality or, as has already been mentioned this afternoon, a silo mentality and a failure to take account of the talent that is available in the wider sphere nationally. Quite obviously, that would lead to a very insular approach from that PCC, the appointment of safe bets, perhaps the appointment of candidates who are personally known and favoured by the PCC, and the appointment of people who are locally or regionally accented. In other words, the whole thing would be driven inwards rather than outwards.
At the moment, there is no national pool of talent within the police service, which is managed in much the same way as some multinational corporations, national organisations or the Armed Forces manage their emerging top positions. The report by Mr Neyroud, which was published earlier this year, and the report that we expect to have from Mr Winsor, which is expected at the end of this calendar year, will have an emphasis on leadership within the police service and I dare bet will propose a whole raft of new developments, formalisation, and improvement of the present structure. I hope they do. On various occasions in your Lordships’ House, I have spoken at length about the crying need for better leadership and structured leadership within the police service.
The system at the moment involves a mixture of advice given to police authorities by ACPO, by the Home Office and by the inspectorate. The inspectorate, which I have included in the amendment, offers advice at varying stages prior to the shortlist being constructed by the Home Office and then offered to the police authority. It offers advice on the shortlisting carried out by the police authority itself and then at the interview stage. My experience of seven years as an inspector of constabulary was that I was asked by police authorities to sit on a large number of appointment interviews when chief constables were being considered. Usually, the advice that I gave was followed and sometimes it was not. I did not take it personally when my advice was rejected, but I saw it as an exercise of democratic accountability in the best possible sense.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI speak briefly in support of Amendments 108 and 111 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig. I must say that it is without much hope of any movement, as we have seen most of the evening from the Government. Much of the debate and many of the negotiations between the Government and Peers who have expressed concern in Committee have been focused on checks and balances and getting the role of the panels right. I am grateful that the Government have accepted that a more co-operative approach is needed through the amendment that the Minister is about to put forward, which I welcome.
However, I agree that some greater description needs to be included in the Bill about what a co-operative relationship looks like in practice. I therefore support the more detailed amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig. The proposal that the panel should be involved in some of the really key functions brings some important clarity to what this might involve, particularly around shaping the police and crime plan, the budget that will help to deliver it and the precept that will need to be raised locally to support it.
I also welcome the role envisaged for panel members at a more local level in helping to engage with communities and monitor force performance. This, of course, goes back to concerns that the PCC is too big a job to be able to engage in detail at very local level on a consistent basis; and I think it is helpful to suggest that the panel should do so. This would enable it to bring concerns and issues to the attention of the governing body, as well as adding to the sources of information available to the panel to assist in its scrutiny of the PCC. I believe that these are helpful suggestions to assist in drawing out how the role of the panel can be strengthened, and I support them.
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate with slightly curious groupings. I think I should take out my Amendment 109A, which relates to a review by the panel of the police and crime commissioner’s human resources policy. I do not think it belongs here. It might be better taken when we reach Schedule 15.
There is a theme in relation to most of the other amendments in this grouping around the role of the panel in relation both to the public and to the precept. My noble friend Lord Beecham is absolutely right. The precept is a significant proportion—between about 11 and 13 per cent—of the total council tax. We debated this in Committee and I know that when we get our council tax information, we have different leaflets in relation to different bodies. However, my noble friend is right: because of the significance and the fact that this is made by one person, it should be completely separate and completely separately identified. That would discharge more effective public accountability.
In previous amendments, we have debated the role of the PCC, and noble Lords on the government Front Bench have rejected many amendments because, for instance, when it comes to requiring chief constables to appear before the police and crime panel or the equivalent in London, it is argued that that blurs the line of accountability. I think that unless you have completely separate precepts, that also blurs the line of accountability when it comes to raising resources from council tax payers.
My Amendment 96A reinforces the requirement for openness in relation to the precept. I think it quite extraordinary that local authorities are not going to be consulted formally on the precept that the police and crime commissioner proposes to make. The Minister will no doubt say that that can be done through the panel. Of course the panel exists to provide scrutiny, but given the importance of the precept, I think there is a strong argument that each individual authority ought to be consulted as well. I hope the Minister will be sympathetic to that.
My noble friend Lady Henig made some very important points in relation to the panels and the question of public meetings. Her amendments link the panel to local areas. West Midlands Police force, which covers the area from Coventry to Wolverhampton, will have one person to be elected the PCC. There is a risk that some of the great work that has recently been undertaken by the police force to develop links at the local level will be dissipated, and the role of the panel to reinforce those links would be very valuable indeed.
The government amendment essentially states that the responsibilities of the panels must be exercised with a view to supporting the effective exercise of the functions of PCCs. It is a tribute to the draftsmanship of parliamentary counsel that such an anodyne amendment could be put forward. It is, of course, completely meaningless because who is to say whether what a PCP does is exercised with a view to supporting the effective exercise of the functions of PCCs? Unless we find ourselves in judicial review territory, I presume that this will never be tested. If I were a panel chair, I would, of course, always argue that everything I did was about ensuring the effective exercise of the functions of the PCC. I think we should congratulate the Government on their ingenuity, but I hope the Minister will confirm that it is meaningless.
My Lords, if I may deal with that last point first, it is certainly not meaningless. I will come later in my remarks to why I think it is an important addition to the Bill.
In resisting these amendments before the House tonight, I note that many are addressed through proposed government amendments to which I will speak later. I shall begin with Amendments 92, 93 and 95, which were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, in relation to precepts. Amendment 92 would compel the PCC to bill the public separately from the precept of the local council. I thank the noble Lord for tabling this amendment because I think the effect would be positive. In essence, it would provide clarity to the public about exactly where their money is going and how much they are paying for policing services. However, this is also a matter of proportionality. The debate about hypothecating the local authority’s bill is quite an old debate. I recall having discussions about it on many occasions in the other place. Everybody thought it would be a good thing because there would be more clarity, but nobody has taken it forward, including the former Government, I have to say. To issue separate bills would increase costs, not just in the production of the bill itself but because, if it were separately sent, there would be questions about collection and payment on time which would add cost to collecting the money for the precept.
PCCs will be high-profile figures, and part of the point of these reforms is that nobody should be in any doubt as to who is responsible for the policing precept, strategy and budget. The council tax bill will, as now, clearly set out where the money is going. With that in mind, and looking at the balance of the proportionality of what the noble Lord has put before the House tonight, I feel that the current arrangements will be sufficient. For that reason, I ask him to consider withdrawing his amendment.
Amendments 93 and 95 would require the police and crime commissioner to notify the local authorities in the police area of the proposed precept, and the commissioner would be required to consult with the police and crime panel and the local authorities. The panel already has the power to review the precept, and will be able to reflect the views of the local authorities in doing this. We have already had this discussion with regard to an earlier amendment. Although not exclusively made up of local authority members, the panel will represent every local authority in the police authority area and therefore will be able to reflect the view of the local authorities. For that reason, I see no need for further prescription on this issue.
In addressing the precept, I also refer to Amendment 96A, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, Lord Beecham and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. I understand your Lordships’ view that the views of local authorities should be heard on this issue. However, the police and crime panel membership, with its strong link to local authorities, will be able to make sure that those views are represented in considering the precept. Indeed, this access to local knowledge is one of their strengths. We have not touched on this very much but the representation of local authorities will bring that specific local knowledge to the table. Therefore, I do not feel that this provision is necessary.
The next series of amendments seeks to give the panel a greater role in relation to the budget and the police and crime plan. I reiterate that the Government are fully committed to the model of directly elected police and crime commissioners and it is they who will have the public mandate to develop the police and crime plan and the associated budget. It is imperative that the lines of accountability that run through this reform are clear and that the public know whom they can hold to account for the performance of their police force.
I turn now to Amendments 94, 96 to 100, 146 and 147. First, I will address those amendments tabled by my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Shipley, which seek to give the panel a direct role in the setting of the budget and heads of expenditure. We have already set out provision for the panel to review and to produce a report and recommendations on the precept level set by the commissioner, and in extreme cases, to veto it. This already gives the panel considerable power in relation to the budget that the Government consider proportionate to its role.
Amendment 109, tabled by my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Shipley, concerns the power of a police and crime panel to veto the police and crime plan of a police and crime commissioner outside London. I am clear that setting the strategy for the force must be an unfettered decision of the PCC. This is precisely where its electoral mandate will come into play, and where the public will most visibly see their views and opinions reflected. There is provision in the Bill for the panel to provide recommendations on the plan, which is in line with its scrutiny role. However, the final decision on the plan must rest with the commissioner.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee has tabled Amendments 112, 113 and 114. In relation to Amendments 112 and 113, I note that the police and crime panels already have powers appropriate to the scrutiny role that they will perform. Therefore, I do not see what further value these amendments would bring. In addressing Amendment 114, I am pleased to note that my noble friend’s amendment is in the same vein as the government amendment to which I shall speak now.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if, at the beginning, I apologise for the fact that the government amendments tabled for Report were not put down within the one-week period usually given by the Government. I particularly apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, for any inconvenience that this has caused Her Majesty’s Opposition.
There were reasons for the delay in tabling these amendments. As I promised in Committee, I met opposition, Cross Bench, Conservative and Liberal Democrat Peers, and we had a series of very helpful and constructive discussions. Noble Lords will also be aware that more than 600 amendments were tabled in Committee. We considered fully what was said at that stage and in the meetings held subsequently before deciding what changes would be acceptable to the Government. As noble Lords will know only too well, before government amendments can be tabled, they must first receive collective clearance, and it was this that caused the delay. However, I am aware that it might have been more helpful if, on tabling the amendments, I could have provided a more fulsome explanation of them and the thinking behind them. I am very willing to do that now if the House wishes me to go into more detail but perhaps I may begin by giving a flavour of them.
Much of our discussion in Committee resulted from concern across the House about checks and balances on police and crime commissioners. We listened to the representations from all sides of the Chamber and have put forward a substantial package of amendments specifically on checks and balances. We have, I believe, increased the powers of police and crime panels, reducing their veto from three-quarters to two-thirds, and we have introduced confirmation hearings to panels for the appointment of chief finance officers and chief executives. Panels will now be allowed to invite chief constables to attend hearings with police and crime commissioners. Furthermore, it became clear from discussions with colleagues across the House that there had been an omission in our deliberations. The panel will hold the PCC to account and scrutinise its activities but perhaps we did not emphasise enough that it will also support the police and crime commissioner. Therefore, we have made amendments to the Bill to make it very clear that, while the panel will have the role of holding to account, it will also have a supportive role. That is just a flavour of what we have attempted to do on checks and balances.
Noble Lords will know that many other amendments have been tabled on which we shall deliberate in some detail in the days ahead. We have also listened on some of the more controversial areas of the Bill. I recall that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, advised me that, if on Report we were to put to a vote the question of Members of your Lordships’ House not being able to stand as PCCs, we would most certainly lose. I have taken his words to heart and have removed that clause entirely from the Bill. I hope that people who had seen their future going in that direction will now feel encouraged to start making their representations.
I apologise if this introduction to the Report stage is not quite what is normally expected in your Lordships’ House. I promise to write to all those, including the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, in a lot more detail about the proposals before us and, on that basis, I hope that we can proceed to Report.
My Lords, there will be joy all over the land at the prospect of Members of your Lordships' House standing for election to these new bodies. I thank the noble Baroness very much for her remarks, which are much appreciated.
My Lords, the noble Lord advances his argument with his customary eloquence, seductiveness and wit. Given the Government’s propensity to engage in deep cuts, I would not join him in proffering any sort of razor to them, Occam’s or otherwise. However, his argument is quite significantly flawed. First, he suggests the election of a completely separate body to administer part of the public services. That represents a rigidified fragmentation of local governance that takes us back in some respects to the 19th century of elected school boards and boards of that kind. That route does not commend itself to me or to many of us who are concerned to see local government strengthened and responsible for the strategic direction of affairs in a locality.
There are other significant arguments too. A single body constituted only of directly elected members would not include independent members, who have made a very significant contribution to the police service since they were introduced some years ago, as we have heard in earlier debates. There would also be great difficulty in securing a diversity of members, reflecting the ethnic and geographical diversity within police authorities. That would potentially weaken the effectiveness of the bodies that the noble Lord would seek to construct.
Furthermore, I cannot agree with him that it is unlikely that there would always be a degree of political balance. For example, in a region like the north-east, given the very limited number of members—11—that the noble Lord is proposing, in the case of the Northumbria force they would represent some 18 or 19 parliamentary constituencies. It is extremely likely that virtually all would be Labour members—if not all. That might have some appeal on this side of the House but it would not be recommended. Despite seeking to avoid the politicisation of the police force, one would see an authority constituted in such a way as to appear to reflect the views of one political party only. In other parts of the country there might be a similar situation with political parties of a different complexion. That is clearly something to be avoided.
The concern about politicisation of policing has been constantly referred to in your Lordships’ House on all sides and I fear that the noble Lord’s proposals tend—unintentionally—in that direction rather than otherwise. He relies on a democratic principle, and of course elections are important. But there is more than one way of construing the application of a democratic principle in the way in which a service of this kind is to be administered. If the majority of members of a police authority, as now, are elected councillors, they can claim legitimately that they are reflecting a democratic principle. They are not directly elected for that purpose only. That is a good thing because the police authorities have to relate to local government and take on board working relationships across a range of local services, which in their ordinary course of life as elected local councillors they will enjoy in any event. They are bringing that current experience to the position that they would hold. There are different ways of construing democratic principles. The noble Lord’s version, for the reasons that I have advanced, do not seem to fit the circumstances of this case and I hope that he will not press his amendment to the vote.
It might be argued that the noble Lord’s suggestion is preferable to that of a single police commissioner, which is arguably the case, but it is not in my view as good as relying on the proposals that have emanated from this side in the past, and which appear to have attracted a certain measure of support in the House, for an authority constituted, as now, of directly elected councillors serving their areas and of independent members. In my view, that is the best application of the democratic principle and secures also some of the other factors which should be taken into consideration. I do not expect the Minister to accept this amendment for different reasons from those which I have advanced but on this occasion she may find a degree of support, or at least acquiescence, which she might not otherwise gain over much of the rest of this Bill.
My Lords, I am sure that we are all indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for allowing us to have an almost Second Reading debate on the principles of the Bill. I must say that I feel that his unduly modest fees are almost always worth it. As I say, this takes us back to principles. I remain deeply puzzled about the merits of the legislation and am yet to be convinced that there are so many problems in policing as to warrant such a dramatic and potentially very damaging shake-up in the way that our police service will be run.
I was very interested to receive an email this morning from Liberty in which it says that it believes that the Bill’s premise is fundamentally wrong and that the Bill, if implemented as proposed, will cause irreversible damage to the relationship between the police and their communities. Indeed that is so. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, did not really address that point. I understand his point about democratic accountability, but surely he will recognise that there are huge risks in the politicisation of our police force. There are very few guarantees that the elected police and crime commissioners will not seek unduly to influence the operational behaviour of chief constables.
I remain concerned that the construct of the Bill still provides too few safeguards against that undue exercise of authority by the elected police commissioner. Although I disagree with the noble Lord’s amendment, it is interesting that he has raised issues of good corporate governance. This is the problem of the concept of corporate soles: individuals—the elected police and crime commissioner on the one hand, and the chief constable on the other—who have enormous powers without being subject to effective corporate governance. I am with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to the extent that it would be much better if a group of people were collectively responsible, rather than leaving it to an individual. We will come on to issues of corporate sole later today but I welcome the noble Lord’s attention to the issue now. He is right to do so.
Ultimately the question is whether adding on an elected police authority to an elected police and crime commissioner would risk far too much politicisation of our police force. As the noble Lord will be aware, when we were in government we looked at this issue and originally made proposals for partly elected police authorities. However, we stepped back from that partly because of a lack of support out in the community and partly because of the risk of politicisation. We remain of the view that this is not the right way to go. However, the noble Lord has done us a service by raising some of the issues surrounding the lack of corporate governance in the Government’s approach.
My Lords, I have nothing but respect for the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and for the certain merit that is involved in this amendment. However, I respectfully disagree with him in so far as it can be regarded as a full and complete solution. For many years England and Wales have been blessed with a system in which there is a generally accepted tripartite balance between the Home Office, on the one hand, and the chief constable and the police authority on the other. So far as I am aware, I do not believe that that tripartite balance, or indeed the system, has ever been spelt out in statute, and in many respects it may well be that that is its strength.
One might find that, over the decades, certain segments of that balance have grown more substantial and influential than others, but the balance remains. That balance imposes a duty to consider something that is central to the role of the chief constable, which is that it is the chief constable who is responsible for direction and control. Direction and control is already a well established statutory principle and will not in any way be materially affected by the Bill. It will remain exactly as it is at this moment, and a former Home Secretary in his place to my left is nodding in agreement. But what does direction and control mean? Too often over the past few weeks we in this House have equated direction and control with operational control, but it means much more than that. It means that a chief constable is entitled, in a professional way, to the independence to run the strategy of a particular police force unaffected by and untrammelled by any unprofessional interference, political or otherwise.
As I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, will remember, the rules are set out clearly in Lord Denning’s judgment in 1968 in R v Blackburn. Those principles have stood the test of time. Therefore, although the amendment proposed by the noble Lord is probably an improvement on what was originally set out in the Bill, I still believe that both are misconceived. I am prepared to accept that the misconception in both cases, by the Government and by the noble Lord, comes from the best of motives, which is to try to strengthen the segment of public control that relates to the tripartite balance. However, I still think that this is the wrong way.
My Lords, Amendment 1A and the two other amendments in this group come to an important matter that goes to the heart of the Bill: the relationship between the elected police and crime commissioner and the chief constable. Whatever one’s view of the Government’s proposals, no noble Lord will underestimate the importance of this relationship or of ensuring that it is appropriate, proper and constructive.
The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, who is now not in his place, spoke eloquently about the meaning of direction and control of a police force under a chief constable. We know that there are inevitable tensions between police authorities and chief constables. That is healthy and entirely proper. The risk is if an unhealthy tension is created. On the one hand, there is the risk that an elected police and crime commissioner—with clearly more authority from being elected—will seek to interfere unduly in the performance of the duties of the chief constable. Equally, I am sure that some chief constables might resist the proper use of the powers of the police and crime commissioner and seek to keep them away from discussion on issues that are perfectly legitimate.
The relationship between the PCC and the chief constable is very important. The Minister has kindly shared with us some of the discussions and draft papers that lie behind the production of a draft protocol or memorandum of understanding between the chief constable and the police and crime commissioner. I am grateful for that. When we discussed this matter in Committee, I asked whether such a memorandum of understanding or protocol should be placed on a statutory footing. The Minister accepted that this was an important matter and agreed to consider it and come back to the House at a later stage. I would be interested in her response.
I fully accept the point made by a number of noble Lords that if chief constables and police and crime commissioners have to have recourse to a document to interpret whether a particular behaviour is in accordance with the memorandum of understanding or protocol, the relationship has already broken down. It is rather like the partnership agreement between general practitioners. Once they get that out of the safe, they have reached a stage where a break-up is only too likely. However, a protocol or memorandum of understanding provides at the very least a backcloth to this important relationship. Even if it does not have to be taken out of the drawer, both the chief constable and the police and crime commissioner will be aware of its existence and the principles that it seeks to underpin. Given the importance of that protocol or memorandum of understanding, I would have thought that it might have benefitted from having a statutory basis. That would give it the important signal of parliamentary legitimacy, and would be helpful in setting up the relationship as constructively as possible. I hope the noble Baroness will be able to come back with a positive response. I beg to move.
My Lords, may I take this early opportunity to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Farrington, in her absence, for immediately withdrawing any suggestion that she sought to confer a halo upon me? I am not sure I can be quite so fulsome in my comments on the remarks of my noble friend Lord Carlile, but there we are.
I have observed with a great deal of amusement the numerous accolades, including those from the lips of the noble Baroness earlier this afternoon, which I gather have been often repeated during the course of proceedings in this Bill—usually, alas, in my unavoidable absence—on my proposals nearly 20 years ago, which form the basis of the current provisions and current constitution of police authorities. I do not think that anyone has yet drawn attention to the fact that when I brought forward those proposals they were bitterly opposed by your Lordships and your Lordships’ predecessors. To listen to the words that have been expressed on them now, anyone would think that they had been welcomed with open arms by your Lordships and seen by those on all sides of the argument as a long-awaited answer to the problem.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Harris. I am not one of the business managers in this House. I sometimes wish that I had more say in these matters, as I am sure most Front-Benchers do from time to time, but I shall have to leave with the business managers the timing of the various stages of finalising the Bill. However, I hope that the House will be reassured—particularly noble Lords who tabled these amendments—that this is a working document. We are still considering the most appropriate way in which to involve the protocol in the Bill, but I hope that I have provided assurances to those who think we might make a hasty decision that would undermine the way in which the independence of policing has been seen hitherto. On that basis, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her very constructive response and for her work in making the draft protocol available. I am also grateful for the input that noble Lords have been able to provide. Let me make it clear that I am not seeking to put into the Bill the details of the memorandum. I absolutely agree with the ACPO position, which is that a reference to the memorandum is needed. I had hoped that my amendment, imperfect as it is, pointed in the direction of how that might be done.
As my noble friend Lord Harris said, having some statutory basis for the memorandum would indicate to the police and crime commissioner and the chief constable that there was a framework in which one would expect them to operate. As the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, said, it would be a clear message to the public, in relation to the character of the people that they elected as police and crime commissioners, that they would be expected to operate within a clearly established framework. Some statutory recognition of that would be helpful.
The rules on what one can bring back at Third Reading have become ever tighter. I am happy to withdraw my amendment on the basis and understanding that I will bring it back on Third Reading. That will give the Government a little time to give further reflection to it. If the business managers—the usual channels—were minded to take the advice of my noble friend, I, for one, would not object.
My Lords, Parliament has indeed produced a lot of Acts and, in my view, one of the problems is repeating bits of legislation time and again. A piece of legislation should be good enough to stand on its own and not require repetition or reference in other legislation.
My Lords, I was very interested in the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. She will know that lists are often proposed in amendments, not least from her own Benches. If you list certain duties and responsibilities, there is always the problem that you might detract from other important duties and responsibilities. One has to use one's judgment. We certainly support the government amendments and I am sure that the noble Baroness will be able to confirm that, by listing the Children Act matters in the way that the Government propose, that does not exclude many other important matters from the chief constable's responsibilities.
I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Laming, on his success in persuading the Government today to bring forward this amendment. This is a significant day for him as he has been elected Convenor of the Cross Benches. I wish him future success in bringing forward further amendments to which the Government will no doubt respond.
I have one question for the noble Baroness. When we debated this matter in Committee under a number of amendments, at col. 1428, the debate concerned the Children Act and the Human Rights Act. I wondered whether there was a reason why the Government have brought forward an amendment in relation to the Children Act but not in relation to the Human Rights Act. Referring to the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, does focusing on the Children Act detract from responsibilities under the Human Rights Act?
My Lords, I am very grateful for all contributions to this debate and particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Laming, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, for having introduced this matter in the first place.
On the last point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, in no way does this detract from the human rights requirement that the chief constable must keep in focus. I have been very cautious because, once one starts a list, one can add to it. I seek to reassure my noble friend Lady Hamwee that we considered the points that she made in Committee about singling out pieces of legislation. That is why we have put the Children Act into the Bill as a particular reference. We felt that was a measured response. As we were putting one piece of legislation in the list of specific functions that the chief constable must consider, we did not want to feel that in some way we were starting a new list. I shall not read it out, but in Clause 1(8) of the original Bill, there is a list of specific functions that the chief constable must take into account. As the issue of children's safety is so important, we felt that it stood out head and shoulders above others and that it should be on the face of the Bill. We agreed to make this amendment for that reason. This has been a reflective part of the Bill to consider, and a very important part. I am grateful for the support given to it across the House.
I wish to add a word or two. I heard very much what the noble Lord said, and I very much sympathise with the idea of strengthening the panel. Nobody has tried harder during the Committee stage of this Bill than I have, with the assistance of the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, to strengthen the function of the panel. I have put five amendments to that effect. Thus far, the Government have not been minded to strengthen the panel, for a very clear reason. They feel that the only role of the panel is to scrutinise the commissioner and that the panel should be able to scrutinise the commissioner only on very specific areas. Thus far, I have to say that I do not believe that that constitutes strict checks and balances, which is a different issue. None the less, if I was confident that at Report the Government would change their views and accept some of the amendments that I have down later for strengthening the panels, I would feel differently. But I cannot say to the Minister that I have that confidence at the moment, because of the very strong line that the Minister has taken. The issue is the relationship of the panel to the commissioner. If the Government maintain their attitude on that issue then this is the only other mechanism to accomplish what I was trying to do with the panels.
I wanted to raise one slight point with my noble friend Lord Harris, which I asked him about very early on when he was putting together his ideas. Is it an either/or situation? Is there any way in which some or all of the independents who we have been talking about, and who we all value so highly for their expertise, could also serve on the panel? Perhaps he could say in due course whether it is an either/or situation, because I am not absolutely convinced that it needs to be.
My Lords, this has been an interesting and, I believe, an important debate. My noble friend Lord Harris, in what I thought was a powerful introduction, pointed out the huge power and authority that is being given to an elected police and crime commissioner if the Commons decides to send this back to your Lordships’ House in its original construct. I noted the comments on that of the noble Lord, Lord Howard, but when he referred back to his legislation of 20 years ago, I think he also referred to a number of ping-pongs. That is a salutary reminder to your Lordships’ House that if we do not think that the House of Commons has thought sufficiently, we can send the Bill back to give it a bit more time to reflect—but we will come to that in a few months’ time, no doubt.
The issue of governance is very important. My noble friend was right to point out that we are giving huge responsibility to police and crime commissioners, if that is the final outcome of the Bill. The need for some way in which the individual can be allowed to test out their ideas and have them challenged as my noble friend describes seems an important issue. We know that when individuals are given great power, sometimes they abuse it. We are talking about a considerable number of police forces. It is inconceivable that we will not have one or two persons who are unsuitable but who are elected to those positions. Earlier, we were referred to a number of local authorities where mayors have been elected. I would say that the experience of elected mayors has been mixed. Some have been outstanding, but there have been one or two who ought not to have been elected and great problems have been caused there. I think of them when it comes to the issue of governance around police and crime commissioners.
Other noble Lords have pointed out that the Government do not seem to speak with consistency in these matters. Earlier this week, as the noble Lord, Lord Condon, pointed out, we had the change in governance relating to the MoD. My own area of knowledge is in the National Health Service: I declare an interest as chairman of the Heart of England NHS Foundation Trust and as a trainer consultant in the NHS. The NHS Bill had gone through most of its stages in the Commons when the Government instituted a pause and, only 10 days or so ago, announced the results of it. One of them was to strengthen governance within clinical commissioning groups. Originally, they were going to be GP consortia and a few GPs were going to sit round the table deciding how to spend £80 billion of public money. The result of the listening exercise has been that they are now going to be called clinical commissioning groups, because there has been recognition that you cannot just give that huge power to a few individual GPs.
We are now going to have two lay people appointed to those commissioning groups: a nurse and a consultant from outside the area. Why outside the area? It is because there is recognition that there might be a conflict of interest if a hospital consultant in the catchment area of the commissioning group were to be appointed. As a result of the listening exercise, what has happened is that a much stronger corporate governance structure is being put into place. What I do not understand is why the Home Office seems oblivious to what other departments are doing in relation to legislation or, for instance, to the changes in defence. It is difficult to see where there is any consistency of purpose.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving this amendment, I will also speak to two other amendments in my name in this group. We come to the question of pilots on which we had a good discussion in Committee. The introduction of police commissioners alongside police and crime panels is a new departure. The House will know that we on this side of the House have many worries about the impact of unelected police commissioners in terms of the potential politicisation of the police force. We think that it would be worthwhile testing this out in a number of police force areas to see the benefits and potential pitfalls.
We discussed this in Committee, as I said, and I was struck that a number of our former commissioners of the Metropolitan Police expressed some reservations about pilots. I well understand the kind of reservations that they were expressing. Essentially, they were saying that pilots create uncertainty among the other forces and chief constables. I have seen government proposals in relation to other public services where proposals are made and you have what are sometimes called pathfinders. You then implement changes in some areas over a couple of years. People in other areas are then not sure when they will come on to the tranche that will introduce changes to their particular part of the country, and clearly there are therefore some uncertainties. But this is such a major departure from the current arrangement that some uncertainties are worth it.
Overall, we do very well by our police service. There are issues and problems in some areas and there are no doubt areas where the efficiency of the force could be improved, I do not doubt that. But many advances have been made in the past 10 or 20 years, not least in the effectiveness of the forces and the strong relationships that they have built between themselves and their communities, particularly at neighbourhood level. There are considerable risks in moving away from that. Pilots would be a great chance to try this out, see what some of the problems are and see, too, some of the advantages. We could learn from that and then look to general introduction.
I hope that I will find some sympathy around the House for this suggestion. After all, if one were looking for a way through the potential disagreement between this House and the other place, I would have thought that pilots might be one way in which we could find some agreement. I beg to move.
First, I take the opportunity of associating myself with the remarks just made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about the improvements in the effectiveness of the police over, I am very glad he had the grace to say, the past 20 years—otherwise, it might have been a little more difficult for me to agree with his sentiments. He started off by saying 10 years, but he modified that to 20 and he got it right in the end. I am happy to associate myself with that tribute, but of course there is always room for improvement. The purpose of the measures before your Lordships is to improve the accountability of the police.
I am opposed to pilot schemes for two reasons. First, I very much doubt, and I think it is difficult to make the case, that pilots will prove any true test of the effectiveness of the measures contained in the Bill. The Bill proposes to introduce an element of democratic accountability into the way in which the police operate. The essence of democracy is that it does not lead to uniformity. Democracy is the enemy of uniformity. In a democratic system, some elected police and crime commissioners will be more effective than others: that is in the nature of a democracy.
It would be very difficult to draw general lessons, which is presumably the purpose of pilots, from a few pilots, whatever attempts are made. I recognise that attempts have been made in the amendment to make them representative, but there is no such thing. There cannot be any such thing as representative arrangements. Whatever arrangements are made and whatever areas are chosen, it will not be possible to draw general lessons from whatever happens in the particular pilot schemes that would be set up.
Secondly, there is the element of uncertainty. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, had the grace to refer to this. Amendment 7A proposes that these pilots should last for at least four years and then there should be an independent review of them. I hesitate to suggest that this is simply a delaying tactic or that the noble Lord has in mind, in effect, a wrecking amendment. Far be it from me to make any such suggestion but this is to contemplate a delay of some six years—taking “at least” four years, then adding an independent review and the time to examine and reflect upon the consequences and results. That is six years of uncertainty for the police service. That would not be doing it or the community at large any kind of favour. For both those reasons, I urge your Lordships to reject these amendments.
My Lords, to what does the noble Lord attribute the huge reduction in crime in this country during the previous Government’s administration?
There were many factors, including effective policing. I do not deny that, but the limit in the reduction in crime has not been reached. Many larger reductions—
My Lords, all the indications from preliminary figures are that police authorities are reporting that crime is starting to increase.
I have seen that, and I am sure that we will discuss it on another occasion. However, there is plenty of evidence for the changes that individual elected mayors in crime-ridden cities in America have been able to make when they put their mind to it, and when they provided their police chiefs with the political cover and resources to do the job.
My Lords, I am sure we would all agree that this has been a very good debate, and I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in it. The noble Lord, Lord Howard, and I would agree that there have been advances over the past 20 years. He said that he thought there was room for improvement. I agree with him, of course. However, I hesitate to agree with him that the need for improvement is such that the current government structure should be ripped up and that a potentially very dangerous option should be put in its place.
I listened with great interest to the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, who talked about public appetite for change. I have seen no appetite whatever for party political police chiefs to come into the UK in the way in which I think this Bill will lead us.
The noble Baroness has given us the good news that noble Lords can stand for election, and we have already speculated on the elections in Kent and Lancashire. Thinking of the West Midlands, if I were fortunate enough to stand, to be selected and to be elected, the idea that I would stay out of operational policing issues when faced with the legitimacy of being elected is naive. An elected police and crime commissioner will become the police chief of a force. Some noble Lords who support this have said openly that that is where they expect the journey to end. That is why we are so concerned about these proposals.
This is rather like Lords reform; I am sorry to refer back to our debate last week. I support reform of your Lordships' House but I disagree with most of the noble Lords who have spoken in its favour, particularly from the Liberal Democrat Benches, because they and Mr Clegg seem to be proposing that an elected House of Lords will carry on in the same way as the appointed House of Lords. That is nonsense. The election of a House of Lords will change the dynamic of this place considerably, and that is what I would expect to happen with elected police and crime commissioners. After all, what is the point of proposing that unless it is to happen? Surely we are not seriously talking about simply taking the police authorities as they are, adding a dose of democracy and thinking things will be great. No. We are on a journey on which elected people will run police forces in the future. I am convinced that that is where we are going to end up, so I think there is merit in testing this out.
The noble Lord, Lord Howard, said that democracy is the enemy of uniformity and that you cannot draw a general lesson. I follow that argument, and I understand that if you are looking at the relationship in, say, four areas between a police and crime commissioner and a chief constable, those are going to be distinctive areas and there are going to be distinct circumstances, but I would have thought that there are still lessons to be learnt that would enable the Government to take note and make adjustments so that if the system were then rolled out it would be in the light of experience. I am not proposing a wrecking amendment. I am not beholden to four years. I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, tabled an amendment in Committee that proposed two years. I would always be open to discussion about this.
The noble Lord, Lord Wasserman, is widely regarded as the architect of all this, and I am not surprised that he does not want pilots. He said that you cannot evaluate this in advance, but he then asked us to take this huge leap in the dark based on experience in some parts of the US. I have yet to hear any convincing argument about why this change is going to be made. Over the past few years, we have seen a dramatic reduction in crime levels in this country. We have seen huge improvement in the relationship between police forces and communities, particularly at the neighbourhood level. Why is this being ripped up to make this huge, potentially damaging change in our police forces and their relationship with the public? I have yet to understand what the party opposite has against police forces that it wants to do this or to hear a coherent argument in favour of the changes.
The Minister said that the coalition agreement provides for this. It does not. The coalition agreement is an agreement between two political parties. It does not have the status of a manifesto. It is very important that noble Lords understand that. I echo the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, and the noble Baroness because my understanding was that this reform was to be accompanied by strong checks and balances. So far, those checks and balances are very weak indeed.
The Minister then said in relation to pilots that we would have different forms of police governance. What do we have in local government? Indeed, the Localism Bill gives us even more forms of governance. I am not an expert on it, but my understanding is that if councils want to, they can go back to the good old committee system—a blessed memory to those of us who remember the allotments sub-committee of Oxford City Council, on which I was not qualified to serve but I have always wished that I had been so appointed. We are well used to different forms of governance within the same structure. I do not see why that should differ in relation to police forces.
I have been a serial culprit as a Minister in restructuring public services. I cannot remember how many NHS Bills I took through in restructuring the health service. The one thing I learnt from that is that it might be better to test ideas out before tearing things up by the roots. In the absence of pre-legislative scrutiny, the noble Baroness had to produce all those amendments on Monday night, after discussions with noble Lords, because this Bill has been constructed too hurriedly. It has not gone through pre-legislative scrutiny and I suspect that more amendments will be necessary when we are able to analyse the full effect of her amendment. There is a very convincing case for some trial and evaluation. I am not going to put this to the vote tonight, but as we move on to further stages of the Bill, I think that in order to resolve differences between this place and another place, pilots might have their place in the sun.
I support all my noble friend’s arguments. In doing so, I have to say that I struggle with all this. I have tried to understand it; I have studied extremely hard. I would hate, however, to have to be in that police authority environment and explain all this to the police and crime panel, and explain to local people exactly how all this is working out. I would find that extremely difficult. As my noble friend Lord Harris said, this has led to enormous fears among police staff, which is a problem. We should not be increasing insecurity among the people working in the policing environment.
I am almost led to make the point that while the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and I do not always agree on things, we have one thing in common; both of us, every now and again, are less than fulsome in our praise of the Home Office—rightly or wrongly. I have great concerns about this legislation and what has been drafted. That might not be the fault of the Home Office, but somewhere along the line there are problems with this.
Because of that, the Minister will know that I have written to her in conjunction with my noble friend Lord Harris and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, to try to put our concerns on the record. We are looking for a meeting with the Minister to try to thrash all this out. It is an extremely difficult and complex area, but it is an important area. If we get it wrong there will be a big impact on a lot of people who might suffer as a result. We want to avoid that. In her response, will she let us know the timescale for her reply to our letter and whether there is a possibility of talking about this in more detail? This would be a productive area to explore further.
My Lords, before the Minister responds, I want to thank my noble friend Lord Harris, who made a powerful speech, and echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, just said. Although the Government have responded to a number of concerns, which is welcome, so far there has been no real recognition of some of the risks of the governance structure that has been put in place. Whether that is because the government lack confidence in it and are therefore not prepared to engage or whether they really do not understand the legitimate concerns, I do not know, but I am puzzled by the response. I know that if I, as a government Minister, proposed something like this, the Conservative Opposition at the time would have attacked very forcefully this kind of proposal.
The corporation sole model is flawed for the reasons that my noble friend gave and in relation to the issue of staff and the bizarre process, now, of staff transfers between the PCC and PCP—with all the uncertainty that that raises. It renders me almost speechless to understand that this bizarre corporate structure is being proposed at a time when the police service is going through 20 per cent cuts. There is a reduction in the number of police officers and we know that some of the most experienced police officers were retired because that was the easiest thing for chief constables to do. We know that chief constables are being taken off the front line and put into the back office because back-office staff have been made redundant.
I pose my only question rhetorically: when will another police reform Bill have to be put before Parliament? If we cannot have pilots, I suspect that problems will arise within about nine months of elected police commissioners coming into being. The public will have serious concerns in the huge powers being given to individuals. Then the noble Baroness will bring forward a Bill to put right the problems that are being identified as we go through your Lordships’ House. If only the Government would pause for just a little time to reflect on these concerns.
My Lords, it is quite right that I have received a detailed and lengthy letter from the noble Lord, Lord Harris, the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, and my noble friend Lady Harris. I am of course happy to meet them to discuss the contents. I have asked officials to draft a reply, which I have yet to see—it has only been received recently. I will do my best to speed that up as much as possible now that we are on Report. Some of the issues raised in that letter are of a very technical nature so I am not able to respond to it from the Floor of the House tonight. I hope that they will accept that I will try to get a meeting organised. I understand that there are issues around this. People want to feel that they confidently understand the position if they are relaying it to third parties.
I begin with this question of the corporation sole. One thing that the Bill seeks is to give chief constables the opportunity to employ their staff. That is at the heart of operational independence. Chief constables will welcome the fact that they have that control. In order for them to do so and also carry out other functions that involve resources, it is necessary for them to be a corporation sole. I remind the House that a corporation is a body that has its own legal personality, distinct from that of its members. This means that a corporation can own property, enter into contracts and take part in legal proceedings in its own capacity. Its assets, rights and liabilities are those of the corporation rather than of its members. Typically, corporations have more than one member. These are of course known as corporations aggregate. Local authorities are one example. However, corporations can consist of only one person—known as the corporation sole. This is so that they can carry out those same transactions that a corporation can carry out—but it is not the individual personally who has the legal responsibility for that, it is in their role as the corporation sole. It would be quite inappropriate—for example, in the case of employment contracts—for the chief constable to personally enter into an employment contract with each and every one of his employees. As a corporation sole, he then has that legal position, rather as a corporation in commercial terms.
I am not quite sure how this works. Does the chief constable of the PCC have to divide their head into two? I understand what the Minister is saying in terms of legal definition but at the end of the day the fact is that the corporation sole is the same person as the individual. Does she not see the huge power that is being given to individuals without any corporate governance structure around it? The House has rejected the sensible idea of non-executives. Does she not see that that is open to abuse? The world is full of examples of how, where individuals have huge power without checks and balances, it leads to one thing: corruption.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. I am not a lawyer, as he knows, but I have in a previous existence been a businesswoman, so I am used to dealing with corporate matters per se. Therefore, I feel that I have a clear understanding of what the provision is trying to do.
The amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, to Clauses 5, 19 and 20 and Schedule 16 would limit the police commissioner’s status as a corporation sole to employment purposes only or, alternatively, remove the corporate status entirely. Instead of a corporation sole, the amendments would allow PCCs to delegate functions to a chief officer, which the Bill currently prohibits.
The noble Lord has asked that Amendment 84 be added to this group. I think that the intention of Amendment 84 is to discuss the ability of the PCC to delegate to the chief constable. I get the point that he is making, to get rid of the status of corporation sole and reintroduce the idea of delegation of functions from the PCC to the chief as is the case with the police authority and the chief. This continues the severe lack of clarity between the bodies that results in poor accountability. As I have just said in the beginning of my remarks, it is important that there is clarity and separation between the two. The amendments to Schedules 4 and 16 would remove the requirement for the commissioner to have a qualified chief finance officer on his or her staff.
I will address the amendments on corporations sole first, but I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, that I do not quite follow his concerns about the medieval basis of this. In this country, we have an understanding of the common law, which is at the heart of our criminal justice system and has been developed over hundreds and hundreds of years. The fact that something has a long history does not necessarily mean that it is not functional. I have to tell the House—and I must admit that I was rather surprised to find this—that I am a corporation sole, as a result of being a Minister of State who is able to sign off public expenditure. I have a particular personal interest now in making sure that I understand every single aspect of this role, so I can assure noble Lords that it is not something that would be regarded as archaic or medieval. I do not see myself in my role as a Minister of State as archaic or medieval. At the same time, we should not denigrate this role, which is widely used—we have already had some examples of it—just because it comes from our ancient history.
The Government are clear on our need to establish chief constables as corporations sole. It is that legal status that allows them to employ staff in their official capacity—a vital function in the context of providing greater autonomy over the day-to-day management of the force.
During our Committee debate, the noble Baronesses, Lady Henig and Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, also tabled amendments to limit the ability of a chief officer to enter into contracts so that it applied to employment matters only. These amendments would have removed the chief officer’s ability to enter into other contracts and agreements unless the chief officer had obtained the PCC’s permission to do so. The Government recognise fears, which have been expressed, that we may have given chief officers too much unfettered power. We agree that the powers that we are giving to chief officers, along with their corporate status, should be subject to appropriate safeguards. We agree that to give chief officers an unfettered power to enter into contracts and agreements, potentially committing the force to multimillion pound deals, does go too far.
In government Amendments 13, 15, 33 and 34, we still believe that in the interests of flexibility, chief constables should be able to enter into contracts other than simply those in relation to the employment of their staff, but we believe that it should be subject to a requirement to obtain the authorisation of the PCC. We believe that there can be flexibility in this; the authorisation could be given in general terms—for example, a PCC could give a general consent for a chief constable to enter into any contract in relation to a particular kind of service, such as provision of forensic services, which are often required as a matter of urgency in an investigation. Or the PCC could give a general consent for the chief constable to enter into any contract with a value less than a specified amount.
I realise that the Minister is introducing an amendment at this late hour and that this is our only opportunity to discuss it, but the provision gives huge power to the police and crime commissioner. It gives a total hold over the chief constable in budgetary terms. I know that there is some tension here between those who think that that is a right way to go and those who do not, but what is clear is that the PCC is in total control. This amendment actually adds to that. That is why it would have been much better for the Government to have constructed a corporate governance model around the chief constables which would have allowed them to have much greater freedom over their own budget. In essence, the construct here is that the chief constable will become the deputy to the PCC. I wish that the Government would come clean on this.
My Lords, that absolutely is not the case because we have listened carefully to what noble Lords have said on this matter. Concerns were expressed, which we looked at carefully, and we have tried to strike a balance here. If I look at the current situation in police forces, in some forces—not all, I hasten to add—it is the practice for the annual budget to be identified and handed over in advance at the beginning of the year. We do not believe that is an acceptable practice at all. We have therefore tried to find a way in which we can enhance the autonomy of the chief constable but at the same time, particularly bearing in mind that the biggest part of the budget will most likely be the employment or staffing budget, make sure that with these powers the chief constable has some checks and balances in here.
Again, on the working relationship with the PCC, one would expect these matters to be discussed so that they could make sure that there were no problems. I have just described one example. It would be quite inappropriate for the chief constable to constantly have to keep going to the PCC to get authorisation for services that are clearly needed at short notice. The chief constable would know exactly what sort of services they were and in initial discussions with the PCC would say, “Look, these are the things that we need to access rapidly. Can we come to an agreement?”, and draw up their own needs, together with the PCC. That would be at the heart of the relationship between those two people.
I believe that in putting in some checks and balances we have gone a certain way to addressing the concerns that were expressed by Members of this House, without constraining the chief constable in a way that meant it would affect them operationally. For example, the PCC could give a general consent for the chief constable to enter into a contract with a value less than a specified amount. If they came to those agreements at the beginning of the contract, this would almost certainly reduce the bureaucracy required. The important point is that the PCC would have control over what the chief constable could do, in the same way that the chief constable can only act, at the moment, within the scope of the delegated authority given by the police authority. It is not as though chief constables have a completely free run on these matters at the moment with police authorities.
My Lords, what is now becoming clear is that political control is to be exercised over the budget by one person, the elected police and crime commissioner, without any effective corporate governance at all. That is the problem with the corporate sole: it is the same person. Of course, I understand that there is the entity of a corporate sole and the individual, but they are the same people. In a sense, the noble Baroness has said, “We have rebalanced this because of concern that the chief constable has too much power over the budget in the terms of the original Bill”, but we are now transferring that to an elected party politician without any corporate governance safeguards whatsoever.
My Lords, if in practice the PCC discharged his or her duties in respect of coming to a practical and non-bureaucratic agreement with the chief constable, I would expect the panel to talk immediately to the police and crime commissioner about the way they were conducting themselves. When the noble Lord talks about checks and balances, this is exactly the sort of thing where one would expect the panel to call that commissioner to account. It would soon become known to the panel if the arrangement between the PCC and the chief constable over these financial arrangements and budgets was causing such a constraint that it was affecting operational activities.
It is not that this is a completely open situation, where nobody would call the PCC to account. Later in the Bill, we have tabled additional amendments that give far more access for the chief constable to the police and crime panel, which would be a very good thing. I am sure that if the chief constable thought that the financial arrangements with the PCC were affecting operational independence or causing problems, they would soon make that known to the police and crime panel.