Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Lord Beecham Excerpts

Wednesday 29th June 2011 Lords Chamber

It is in that general spirit that I invite my noble friend to respond in due course to this suggestion. I believe it is constructive and I hope—though I do not expect—that she will accept what is intended to be behind it.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, the noble Lord advances his argument with his customary eloquence, seductiveness and wit. Given the Government’s propensity to engage in deep cuts, I would not join him in proffering any sort of razor to them, Occam’s or otherwise. However, his argument is quite significantly flawed. First, he suggests the election of a completely separate body to administer part of the public services. That represents a rigidified fragmentation of local governance that takes us back in some respects to the 19th century of elected school boards and boards of that kind. That route does not commend itself to me or to many of us who are concerned to see local government strengthened and responsible for the strategic direction of affairs in a locality.

There are other significant arguments too. A single body constituted only of directly elected members would not include independent members, who have made a very significant contribution to the police service since they were introduced some years ago, as we have heard in earlier debates. There would also be great difficulty in securing a diversity of members, reflecting the ethnic and geographical diversity within police authorities. That would potentially weaken the effectiveness of the bodies that the noble Lord would seek to construct.

Furthermore, I cannot agree with him that it is unlikely that there would always be a degree of political balance. For example, in a region like the north-east, given the very limited number of members—11—that the noble Lord is proposing, in the case of the Northumbria force they would represent some 18 or 19 parliamentary constituencies. It is extremely likely that virtually all would be Labour members—if not all. That might have some appeal on this side of the House but it would not be recommended. Despite seeking to avoid the politicisation of the police force, one would see an authority constituted in such a way as to appear to reflect the views of one political party only. In other parts of the country there might be a similar situation with political parties of a different complexion. That is clearly something to be avoided.

The concern about politicisation of policing has been constantly referred to in your Lordships’ House on all sides and I fear that the noble Lord’s proposals tend—unintentionally—in that direction rather than otherwise. He relies on a democratic principle, and of course elections are important. But there is more than one way of construing the application of a democratic principle in the way in which a service of this kind is to be administered. If the majority of members of a police authority, as now, are elected councillors, they can claim legitimately that they are reflecting a democratic principle. They are not directly elected for that purpose only. That is a good thing because the police authorities have to relate to local government and take on board working relationships across a range of local services, which in their ordinary course of life as elected local councillors they will enjoy in any event. They are bringing that current experience to the position that they would hold. There are different ways of construing democratic principles. The noble Lord’s version, for the reasons that I have advanced, do not seem to fit the circumstances of this case and I hope that he will not press his amendment to the vote.

It might be argued that the noble Lord’s suggestion is preferable to that of a single police commissioner, which is arguably the case, but it is not in my view as good as relying on the proposals that have emanated from this side in the past, and which appear to have attracted a certain measure of support in the House, for an authority constituted, as now, of directly elected councillors serving their areas and of independent members. In my view, that is the best application of the democratic principle and secures also some of the other factors which should be taken into consideration. I do not expect the Minister to accept this amendment for different reasons from those which I have advanced but on this occasion she may find a degree of support, or at least acquiescence, which she might not otherwise gain over much of the rest of this Bill.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I am sure that we are all indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for allowing us to have an almost Second Reading debate on the principles of the Bill. I must say that I feel that his unduly modest fees are almost always worth it. As I say, this takes us back to principles. I remain deeply puzzled about the merits of the legislation and am yet to be convinced that there are so many problems in policing as to warrant such a dramatic and potentially very damaging shake-up in the way that our police service will be run.

I was very interested to receive an email this morning from Liberty in which it says that it believes that the Bill’s premise is fundamentally wrong and that the Bill, if implemented as proposed, will cause irreversible damage to the relationship between the police and their communities. Indeed that is so. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, did not really address that point. I understand his point about democratic accountability, but surely he will recognise that there are huge risks in the politicisation of our police force. There are very few guarantees that the elected police and crime commissioners will not seek unduly to influence the operational behaviour of chief constables.

I remain concerned that the construct of the Bill still provides too few safeguards against that undue exercise of authority by the elected police commissioner. Although I disagree with the noble Lord’s amendment, it is interesting that he has raised issues of good corporate governance. This is the problem of the concept of corporate soles: individuals—the elected police and crime commissioner on the one hand, and the chief constable on the other—who have enormous powers without being subject to effective corporate governance. I am with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to the extent that it would be much better if a group of people were collectively responsible, rather than leaving it to an individual. We will come on to issues of corporate sole later today but I welcome the noble Lord’s attention to the issue now. He is right to do so.

Ultimately the question is whether adding on an elected police authority to an elected police and crime commissioner would risk far too much politicisation of our police force. As the noble Lord will be aware, when we were in government we looked at this issue and originally made proposals for partly elected police authorities. However, we stepped back from that partly because of a lack of support out in the community and partly because of the risk of politicisation. We remain of the view that this is not the right way to go. However, the noble Lord has done us a service by raising some of the issues surrounding the lack of corporate governance in the Government’s approach.

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[Lord Condon]

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has served us well by this amendment. The arguments remain finely balanced as to whether or not the protocol or memorandum of understanding should have a statutory footing. Having been privileged to be in some of the earlier discussions about whether there was indeed a need for a protocol at all, the journey has been a very interesting, and very supportive, iterative process. Certainly in the meetings that I have been privileged to attend, there has been an acceptance on the Government’s side that a document of this nature or something like it was necessary to reassure and to confidence-build around operational independence and the legacy of operational independence, which is so important to the model of British policing. We have now reached decision point: should it have statutory footing or not?

My own journey on this route was that I was hopeful that as much as possible that came out of these discussions should be in the Bill. Whether it should be in the Bill in penny packets, at the relevant point, or in one comprehensive document of a protocol or a memorandum of understanding is a finely balanced question. However, I accept that ACPO is concerned that if it has a statutory footing, a once and for ever attempt to define operational independence will be a formidable task. The arguments are very finely balanced and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, does a service by raising this. If it is pushed to a Division, I am still uncertain which way I will vote and I look forward to further discussion. It is so important but it is very finely balanced, and the arguments on both sides are very strong.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Howard, and the noble Lord who has just spoken both infer that the purpose of the amendment is to put a memorandum of understanding into the Bill. My interpretation of it is not that but that this amendment, if adopted, would require there to be a memorandum of understanding and commissioners would have to exercise their functions under it. However, the memorandum itself would be drawn up and issued separately and would be capable of being amended from time to time in the light of changing circumstances. The actual memorandum would not be in the Bill, merely the effect of one. It would obviously be helpful to discuss the first of such memoranda, but it would not actually be incorporated into the Bill when finally enacted.

[Lord Dear]

My Lords, I do not speak in favour of this amendment. We are probably dancing on the head of a pin. It seems we all agree that a protocol or a memorandum of understanding is vital. It is the form that it will take that is a matter of debate for us today and, perhaps, in further stages of this procedure. It seems that one can hardly discuss the detail of this while it is still in draft. We are promised the draft before the full stage is passed in your Lordships’ House, but I find that a difficulty in itself.

My main concern is that by putting it into the Bill or having it standing part and parcel alongside the Bill with statutory force, it would become too prescriptive. This Bill is already in grave danger of being too prescriptive on a number of issues. One has to leave things such as this to the good nature, good judgment and experience of those who will be handling those issues, and while I support the protocol we should not necessarily go so far as to give it statutory authority.

I would say in passing that although ACPO has quite wisely kept well away from making political statements about this Bill—its fingers were burned two or three years ago by getting too closely involved in politics, and it is wise to keep out of this at the moment—I would be surprised if chief constables and chief officers of police would want to see a protocol bound into such an Act. I would think that they would want to operate against a background of advice that can be amended in the light of experience. That is my view, not theirs; I am not in a position to speak for them but that is how I would expect them to react.

On a small point of detail in Amendment 4B, I noticed that the Central Motorway Police Group is included in a group of police authorities. I ask those who tabled the amendment, if they take it to a vote, to check whether the Central Motorway Police Group now has the same statutory basis as a police force. When it was set up it was subject to a collaboration agreement. To the best of my understanding it is still subject to such an agreement, which is very different from the statutory basis that other forces enjoy. It is a small point of which I ask noble Lords to take note. I do not support the amendment.

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This amendment would ensure that, through a non-executive presence in the structure, additional expertise could be tapped into. I understand where the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, is coming from on this and I of course respect his views—I do not think that anyone could respect his views more than I do, having worked with him quite closely over a period of time. However, the amendment seeks to address some of the concerns expressed by Members of this House. As a result, we must listen. Again, I pay tribute to the Minister, who, without any doubt whatever, is a listening Minister, and it has been a delight to see that approach.

[Lord Beecham]

Bearing in mind the rather surprising assertion of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who is not now in his place, that this amendment originates from what he would describe as the dark days of old Labour, would the noble Lord who has subscribed to it care to say whether he is now, or has ever been, a card-carrying member of the Labour Party?

[Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington]

Certainly not. The two most successful Home Secretaries that I know of in history is the one who is sitting opposite, the noble Lord, Lord Howard, and the second—you would never get the name out of me if you tricked me—was Jack Straw. He of course would be represented in Labour. How about that for an apolitical comment?

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I preface my remarks with an apology to the Minister and to the House if, in the very limited time that has been available to us to try to understand and assimilate the thrust of the amendments tabled yesterday, I have been unable fully to appreciate what the drafting has led us to in terms of the substantive changes that the amendments seek to make. I entirely concur with the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, in relation to Amendment 63—particularly in new subsection (2A) of that amendment—which allows the deputy police and crime commissioner to arrange for any other person, without any qualification, to exercise any function of the police and crime commissioner which, in turn, the deputy police and crime commissioner could carry out. That seems to be an extraordinarily wide power to delegate to whomever the deputy pleases, bearing in mind that under Amendment 72 the deputy police and crime commissioner is to be a member of the police and crime commissioner's staff. We have an appointed staff member with a capacity to appoint anyone else to exercise functions which he would delegate to or select for that person. That seems to go very wide indeed and much wider than one would normally anticipate in the context of an organisation of this kind.

Furthermore, the effect of paragraph (c) of Amendment 63, which amends Clause 19, seems to me to allow the deputy commissioner to determine police and crime objectives—Clause 19(4)(b)—or to prepare an annual report to a police and crime panel, although admittedly it does not allow him to make decisions relating to issuing a police and crime plan, nor the appointment of a chief constable—hardly surprisingly—nor calculating the budget requirement. That seems to be a very wide power to confer on a deputy. As I understand it, these are not provisions that would apply only in the absence of a police and crime commissioner for any reason—suspension, incapacity or something of that kind—but these are powers at large. I do not understand why such sweeping powers should be conferred on anyone, particularly someone who does not have any kind of electoral mandate, either by virtue of direct election, as in the case of a commissioner, or by virtue of being an elected council member who serves as a member of the panel. It seems to me to be much too broad a power to offer to someone occupying the kind of position that presumably would be encompassed by these amendments.

Like the matters to which my noble friend Lord Harris and others have referred, I wonder whether these should not be re-examined with a good deal more care and perhaps more time so that we can get this right. It seems to me that we are conferring very wide powers without qualification on people whom we have no idea will be able to fulfil the jobs and with a very wide discretion available to them.

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[Baroness Browning]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I shall pick up some of the points just raised before giving a fuller explanation. The appointment, suspension or dismissal of a chief constable, which was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, cannot be carried out by the deputy; nor can setting the precept, which the noble Baroness specifically asked about. There are proscriptions on what the deputy can do and the delegation of powers to a deputy would be subject to paragraph (b) in Amendment 63. Such powers would be restricted. However, I want to make it absolutely clear that the PCC has ultimate responsibility for whatever he or she delegates to the deputy. Whatever decisions are made in the areas where the deputy is able to act, the PCC is the person who will be answerable. There is no question that the PCC’s responsibility and accountability to the police and crime panel, and ultimately to the general public who elected him or her, is in any way reduced by delegating specific functions or authority to the deputy.

Several questions have been asked. I shall pick up the point which the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, raised about whether the deputy can be a member of the PCC’s staff. As a member of staff, when the deputy exercises a power he or she does so in the name of the PCC. As the PCC will, as I said, retain ultimate responsibility for it, wide powers are being conferred on the deputy. The deputy will be regarded as a member of the PCC’s staff for that purpose, so the checks and balances will apply as much to him or her, as a member of the PCC’s staff, as to anyone else carrying out a function within that office.

[Lord Beecham]

Does that mean that the person appointed will already be a member of the PCC’s staff; or that if he comes from outside and was not already a member of staff, his appointment will make him one? There are two different positions there.

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I will now discuss those amendments which address the role and appointment of an acting PCC. The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, and my noble friend Baroness Hamwee to secure the appointment of an acting PCC from the panel rather than the PCC staff are also captured in this debate. The government amendments in this group do not affect our provisions for the appointment of an acting PCC. Therefore, irrespective of the appointment of a deputy PCC, were the incumbent PCC to be incapacitated and unable to undertake their statutory duties and functions, it will remain the case that the acting PCC must be drawn from the PCC’s staff. I hope that we have gone some way in this area to meeting some of the concerns that were raised in Committee. The Government believe that we have got that balance right, and therefore I hope that noble Lords who have tabled amendments in this grouping will feel able to withdraw them.

[Lord Beecham]

In the circumstances just outlined by the noble Baroness, there might be a deputy commissioner who would not be eligible to be appointed acting commissioner. However, if the deputy commissioner is a senior member of staff, is it possible that an acting commissioner might be appointed who might be junior in status to that deputy? Would that not create an extremely anomalous position?

[Baroness Browning]

I have said that I will write to the noble Lord on this whole question of staff. Clearly there are different categories of staff and I would like to take some advice on those before I give him a definitive reply. I promise to write to him very quickly on that matter. The point was raised particularly about chief finance officers but, as I have mentioned, they are appointed on merit and are politically restricted. I will look at other categories of staff that he has just raised.