Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Lord Condon Excerpts

Wednesday 29th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howard of Lympne]

Convenient though that rewriting of history is for the noble Lord’s arguments, it is very far from the case. He need look no further than the recently published memoirs of my noble friend Lord Ferrers to see that your Lordships remained obdurate, even when I was prepared to amend my original proposals. If my recollection is correct, it was only after a protracted game of ping-pong that I was eventually able to get my proposals on to the statute book in the face of persistent and continued opposition from your Lordships' House. But that is ancient history. I wanted to put the record straight.

The fact is that when those proposals found their way on to the statute book I was very hopeful that they would provide the basis for strong police authorities who would carry out the functions, which I am sure we would all want them to carry out, and who would be recognised in the areas that they served as the voice of the public in relation to policing. Alas, despite the splendid efforts of many of those who have served with distinction on police authorities during the nearly two decades that have passed since those proposals became law, my expectations have been disappointed. The proposals that have been put in place have not led to the kind of police authorities that I hoped they would. It is because of that that I am an enthusiastic supporter of these proposals. Indeed, I do not want to embarrass my noble friend on the Front Bench, but I think that in some ways I can claim to be their author, although it will not do me much good in the eyes of your Lordships, and I remain an enthusiastic supporter of them.

As to this particular amendment and the proposal put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, there is no difference between the term “direction and control” used in the protocol and the term used in existing legislation. That is the answer to the point made a few moments ago by the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan. The question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is whether the protocol should become statutory. We know that ACPO has said—I think absolutely rightly—that it would be wrong to seek to define operational independence in the statute. If you gave the protocol statutory force, you would in effect arrive at a statutory definition of operational control. That would be a mistake for the reasons given by ACPO. It is for that reason that I oppose the amendment proposed by the noble Lord.

[Lord Condon]

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has served us well by this amendment. The arguments remain finely balanced as to whether or not the protocol or memorandum of understanding should have a statutory footing. Having been privileged to be in some of the earlier discussions about whether there was indeed a need for a protocol at all, the journey has been a very interesting, and very supportive, iterative process. Certainly in the meetings that I have been privileged to attend, there has been an acceptance on the Government’s side that a document of this nature or something like it was necessary to reassure and to confidence-build around operational independence and the legacy of operational independence, which is so important to the model of British policing. We have now reached decision point: should it have statutory footing or not?

My own journey on this route was that I was hopeful that as much as possible that came out of these discussions should be in the Bill. Whether it should be in the Bill in penny packets, at the relevant point, or in one comprehensive document of a protocol or a memorandum of understanding is a finely balanced question. However, I accept that ACPO is concerned that if it has a statutory footing, a once and for ever attempt to define operational independence will be a formidable task. The arguments are very finely balanced and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, does a service by raising this. If it is pushed to a Division, I am still uncertain which way I will vote and I look forward to further discussion. It is so important but it is very finely balanced, and the arguments on both sides are very strong.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Howard, and the noble Lord who has just spoken both infer that the purpose of the amendment is to put a memorandum of understanding into the Bill. My interpretation of it is not that but that this amendment, if adopted, would require there to be a memorandum of understanding and commissioners would have to exercise their functions under it. However, the memorandum itself would be drawn up and issued separately and would be capable of being amended from time to time in the light of changing circumstances. The actual memorandum would not be in the Bill, merely the effect of one. It would obviously be helpful to discuss the first of such memoranda, but it would not actually be incorporated into the Bill when finally enacted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I was going to go back to the Roman Empire. With all this talk about Roman emperors, I wondered whether I should claim for myself the role of Caesar’s wife, but I think I ought to leave that for the Minister.

I have two amendments in this group and was very persuaded by arguments made at the previous stage by noble Lords who spoke in support of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Harris. When the Government objected to the term “shall”, I asked whether “may” would be more acceptable. It was almost before the words were out of my mouth that I knew that I was going to be challenged by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, who quite rightly made the point that police and crime commissioners who do not understand the need for robust governance arrangements are the ones who most need them.

My Amendments 4 and 18 break my own rules about providing for more regulation-making powers for the Secretary of State, but I have worded them in that way because I am not quite convinced that Amendments 3 and 20 quite capture everything. I have added to my list, in what would be new subsection (4B),

“provision for arrangements to ensure probity”.

Financial matters are within that, but probity covers a wider area.

I spotted what some might regard as a flaw in my amendment by providing for consultation with police and crime commissioners, or their union as it might be, before their coming into being, but I have assumed, for the purposes of this argument at any rate, that the transitional arrangements might give time for this as well as consultation with local authority representatives. That is because of the important role of panels, police authorities and local authorities in this area.

My noble friend Lord Wallace spoke in Committee of the importance of personalities and personal relationships, and a willingness to co-operate. He was quite right, but I would say, “Yes, but”, or maybe, “Yes, therefore”.

There was also concern about how much detail should be in the Bill. Well, there is quite a lot of detail in it, so I would like to see some that I would be comfortable supporting. My noble friend also talked about the roles undertaken by the chief executive and the chief finance officer. He said that they would ensure that propriety and that:

“They will be subject to established public authority duties, as are their equivalents in police authorities and elsewhere”.—[Official Report, 18/5/11; col. 1466.]

They do have those duties, but that is not the same as governance in the round. I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Howard, that the police and crime panels, with their limited checks, are not governance. Most of their duties are to be carried out in arrear. They do not have a contemporary role and that is what governance is about. If it is to be their function, the Bill needs a lot of amendment and I for one would be very happy to see that, but the check, balance and scrutiny role in police and crime panels is a different role from governance.

There have been major developments in governance in public life recently. Many of your Lordships will be involved in charities where hugely different arrangements have had to be put in place over recent years. It is proper that there are such standards in public life. This is another such position. I am not convinced that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, is spot on and I am sure that he and the Minister will say that mine is not either, but something needs to be provided that surrounds, supports and controls this new office.

[Lord Condon]

My Lords, the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, gives us some comfort and takes us in the direction of more reassuring corporate governance than the Government's current proposals. Like the noble Lord, Lord Harris, I accept that the Government will probably be successful in reinstating their provisions for elected police and crime commissioners, but there remains an element of the doctrinaire in their proposals. There is a feeling that the election by the public of a single person who is then unencumbered by advice, support or challenge is the only way forward. I fear that the only people around the elected police commissioner offering expert advice could well be sycophantic staff whose very livelihood relies on the elected police and crime commissioner.

The dilemma is that we are in an either/or situation. Either police and crime panels with an independent element must be given greater strength and authority than is currently proposed—and I was reassured by the Minister that we are moving a little way that direction—or we should have the model offered by the noble Lords, Lord Harris and Lord Stevens, of a board of non-executive directors.

I have spent 10 years in the private sector as a deputy chairman and non-executive director of one of the biggest companies in the world and I know the value of non-executive directors. The Government also know their value, because under their proposals this week for reform of the defence of our country the individual service chiefs will be removed from the Defence Board and replaced by non-executive directors. The Government know in their heart of hearts the value of non-executive directors.

I hope that the Minister will give us some comfort that we are moving away from this doctrinaire notion about the purity of the electorate electing the police and crime commissioner and the commissioner not being encumbered by any advice other than that which they choose to hire themselves. I am not sure that I could wholly support the amendment put forward by the noble Lords, Lord Harris and Lord Stevens, but we need either that or stronger police and crime panels, and words of comfort from the Minister.

[Lord Newton of Braintree]

I was wondering whether one was allowed to take part in the debate if one was not a former chief constable or Home Secretary, but I have decided to take the risk, having listened rather carefully.

I only want to add a few sentences. I thought that the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, was one of the most persuasive that I have ever heard—that is, until I heard the speech of my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne about overlapping bodies. That brings me to the same position as the noble Lord, Lord Condon, who has just spoken, with his distinguished and long experience. We certainly do not want two boards or panels with overlapping responsibilities treading on each other’s feet—that was my noble friend’s point. Equally, we do not want a police commissioner who is a lonely figure with massive responsibilities and nobody to turn to.

It seems that the answer to this is not to set up a non-executive board but to look at the panel, as has just been suggested, and make sure that its powers, responsibilities or however they are defined reflect the need for the commissioner to be able to turn to people for advice, support and sometimes comfort—or, indeed, unwelcome advice—in the way that has been reflected in this debate. I hope that may be of some help to my noble friends on the Front Bench, as the view of one modest Back-Bencher who has listened to the debate.