Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Dobbs Excerpts

Monday 18th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

My Lords, I shall not delay the House long. I supported the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for a sunset clause when it first came in front of us. I totally accept the rationale to which my noble friend Lord Cormack referred: this was part of the coalition agreement. Whether, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, this was written on the back of an envelope or a fag packet, I do not quite know, but it was certainly cobbled together to try to cement the coalition together. I always took the view that it was quite legitimate for the coalition Government to decide, if they wanted to, that they wanted to go the full five years. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, made the point that that undertaking could be made by the Prime Minister because it did not need legislation. One rather suspects the reason why the coalition Government have decided that this should go into future Parliaments is to give that agreement a bit of respectability, but I cannot see why it should bind future Parliaments.

However, I will not be supporting the concept of a sunset clause this time round because the whole idea of a fixed-term Parliament is completely nonsensical and is not even worth the paper the Bill is written on. The reasons for that are those put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong. I think the Prime Minister of the day could organise things so that a vote of no confidence was achieved which would bring down his own Government even if his own Back-Benchers voted against the Government. Therefore, we could well end up with a four-year Parliament if the Liberals decide no longer to support the coalition. Indeed, four-year Parliaments could happen in the future with this Bill existing. That is the real flaw in the whole thing. There would obviously be an amazing row and accusations of bad will if the Prime Minister organised things that way but, on the other hand, knowing the way that elections kick in, that row would last 24 hours and then we would all be campaigning on the election and who we wanted as the next Government so we would all forget about how the election was brought about in the beginning.

[Lord Dobbs]

My Lords, I am rather torn over this issue—after all, I am much in favour of opportunistic Prime Ministers. I enjoy sunsets and I also enjoy flexibility and preparations for the unexpected, which is the point raised by the noble Lord. After all, I was an aide to Margaret Thatcher when, as leader of the Opposition, she advised us all to store tins in our larders for just such an event.

This is an important constitutional Bill, and sunset clauses are entirely inappropriate here. Noble Lords have questioned the manner in which this Bill has been conducted and introduced, and I share some of those reservations, but surely, even if they believe in their claim of constitutional purity, they cannot respond with a constitutional absurdity, which is what a sunset clause would be in this matter. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, suggested that no Minister in a future Parliament would ever dare argue—I quote him as far as my memory will allow—that this Bill should be overturned in order to give power back to Prime Ministers for narrow party-political reasons. Surely Prime Ministers acting for narrow party-political reasons is entirely the point. Where is the constitutional purity in that?

This Bill does not mean that elections can be held only every five years. I believe that almost all the early elections of the past 60 years could still have been held under this legislation.

I wish to be very brief because we must move on. As to the call for second and third thoughts on the part of the other place, we should be clear about the purpose of this amendment. We are not looking into a sunset here. What we are looking at are the lamps of wreckers, lined up on the cliff top, waiting to lure the ship of state on to the rocks and destroy it. No matter how much better dressed they may be than their forebears, and how much better their manners, that is still the purpose of this amendment.

This issue has effectively been decided in this House and in another place, whether we like it or agree with it or not. I would not say that to support a sunset clause on this occasion is unethical, but it is entirely inappropriate. We do not use it on any of the other constitutional Bills; it is not the time to start doing it now.

Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Bill

Lord Dobbs Excerpts

Wednesday 15th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dobbs]

I beg the noble Lord’s pardon but some of us still have something to say on this. I hope that he will indulge us. You were talking about sunsets and sunset of course is, as we have heard, the time before darkness descends, a time when hobgoblins and wicked elves come out to play—or stand up at the Dispatch Box. On Monday the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, in one of his passionate interventions, suggested that:

“We are not wrecking this Bill; we are trying to improve it”.—[Official Report, 13/06/11; col. 582.]

I trust that he will not be standing up this evening to say the same thing or, if he does, I hope he has a different scriptwriter. This amendment is clearly designed to wreck this Bill, to cast it into darkness.

A sunset clause is a wholly inappropriate tool for such a mighty matter. It is like promising to love a woman faithfully for this night and for all nights, but then wanting a review after the weekend. I have never found that much of a basis for a healthy romantic relationship. This amendment once again is an attempt to duck and dodge the will of the people. That is not much of a basis for a healthy political relationship, either.

It has become clear in these debates that the usual suspects have little trust in the people. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, as good as admitted it just a moment ago. But now they go even further—they do not want to trust this Mother of Parliaments either. They want to bind her hands, throw her into the sea, watch her float off into the sunset and disappear. They have made great cause in these debates around the proposition that Parliament must decide, and I must admit that I have some sympathy with their position. They have argued their case with passion, but they have failed to argue it with consistency. It is clear that they are promoting the sunset clause because they do not want this Parliament to decide, any more than they want the people to decide.

The amendment is not only bizarre but unnecessary. There is an alternative, of course, which would cover every one of the arguments put forward by those supporting it. It is simple: campaign at the next election to repeal the Act, campaign on a platform that the powers given to the people should be taken back, fight on that basis, win the election and do it. Then we could all go back to counting flocks of phantom sheep and dumping tens of thousands of tonnes of fish back into the sea—problem solved. To achieve that, they do not have to persuade this Parliament but simply their own party. However, I sense that that will not happen, and I suspect that we all know why. Even if they managed to persuade their party, they fear that they would never be able to persuade the people.

I am surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, objects to the amendment. If it is passed, it will turn our general elections on their head. It will drench them in one issue: do you want to continue to have your say on Europe or not? I know that the noble Lord is a modest and moderate man, but I cannot understand why he is not jumping to his feet in excitement at the prospect. It would hand him exactly the election tool that he wants.

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

The noble Lord, Lord Pearson, is also a bear of remarkably small brain. The noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, has made a very good point, and I may well vote in favour of the amendment.

[Lord Dobbs]

I ask the noble Lord to consider carefully at this point. A sunset clause is like a great sulk. It is like retiring to our castles after the battle is lost and pulling up the drawbridge. The world is not like that any more—although, gazing along these Benches, I see that there may be one or two noble exceptions with castles and drawbridges. Our duty today in this place is clear. We are here not to indulge our own interests, but to serve the people. I mentioned that great film “Casablanca” on Monday. There comes a point in the film, after the usual suspects have been rounded up—it is the most important point of the film—and as the plane is waiting to take off, when Bogart turns to Bergman and reminds her that there is a bigger game to play that overrides their own interests, and that if they fail to recognise that, they will come to regret it: maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow, but soon and for the rest of their lives. There is a higher cause here—a bigger game to play. It is the future of the European Union. It is in question as never before and only the people can rescue that future. That is what this Bill is all about: giving the EU back to the people.

It is also much more than that, for in a sense it is not about Europe but about us and about this country. It is not about little England but about the great British people—about how we govern ourselves and how we show the people, at last, that we give a damn about what they think. The principle of placing our trust in the people is something that is eternal and indivisible. It is not just for a few days or for a single Parliament—and most certainly not for the convenience of politicians who have failed to carry the argument. We have a duty to listen to ordinary men and women of great common sense. If we do not—if we refuse—we deserve to be thrown on that rubbish tip that Mr Clegg is even now preparing for us.

[Lord Empey]

My Lords, I was amazed that the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, is not on the amendment. I was also surprised at the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, who is well known throughout the country as a very wise head. However, the effect of the amendment, and the idea of a sunset clause, would be to give those who want to sever any relationship between this country and the European Union an opportunity at least every five years to have a platform with a specific objective in mind and to achieve it. That would be unwise. I am not sure whether anybody in the Chamber has not made up their mind on the Bill, but I will assume that one or two noble Lords are subject to persuasion. There could be nothing less attractive for somebody who believes in European Union than putting in a sunset clause. It would turn every election into a referendum on the European Union. Nothing would do more damage to the European cause because everybody would come out of the woodwork to oppose it and to run single-issue campaigns. We know that they work, because campaigners for hospitals, and environmental campaigners, have won seats in different countries. Single-issue elections are the most dangerous type, and I fear that we would open up a Pandora's box. Those who passionately oppose the Bill are shooting themselves in the foot with this amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, made the point that he had seen the Irish constitution in action. The Irish are very proud of their constitution. The Irish Government accepted, after the first referendum on the Lisbon treaty, that they had provided an overcomplicated form of information to the people, and subsequently corrected this at the next referendum. Nevertheless, people are still passionately in favour of their constitutional rights. If one goes to anybody in the Republic and says, “This is too complicated—the Government put forward all this stuff and we could not understand it because it referred to treaties and articles”, and then asks them whether they want to retain the right to have the final say, they will say yes. Even though there is a complication in a referendum on a single issue—it can be very difficult—the people in the Republic passionately believe in their right to choose. You would not find anybody in the political establishment in Dublin who would challenge that.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Dobbs Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

My Lords, I support—along with everyone else—Amendment 20 and a new Clause 2. I put on record my thanks to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, and to Mr Mark Harper, the Minister in charge in the other place. We said in Committee that we would like to meet the Minister, and it was good of him to meet us. I also put on record the great work done by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. In these situations, there is always someone who has to do the phoning, the texting and the e-mails, and it was the noble Lord. I am very grateful to him for keeping me and my colleagues fully informed.

I am glad that the pressure has been taken away from the Speaker. Things have changed, and if the certificate has to be issued by the Speaker—unless we pass this amendment, it will have to be—there is the new dimension. When there was a majority Government, the Speaker would have to look at what the Prime Minister said. If the Prime Minister said, “I consider this vote on the Floor of the House to be a vote of confidence in me”, he would be one person alone that the Speaker would have to look to. However, where we have a coalition, the Speaker would have to look not only to the Prime Minister, but to the Deputy Prime Minister. If the Deputy Prime Minister said that he considered a forthcoming vote to be a vote of no confidence, the Speaker would have to look at that. I am glad that that pressure will be taken away because there is no doubt that things have changed as far as Speakers are concerned.

I had great affection for the late Edward Heath. He used to come and see me up in Speaker’s House. We would have tea and a chat about old times. He used to reminisce about when he was Chief Whip. I thought that I had better ask him about my situation. I said: “The government Chief Whip comes to see me on a weekly basis, as does the opposition Chief Whip, and every second week the Liberal party Chief Whip comes. Did you have that in your day?”. He said: “We didn’t bother the Speaker. The Speaker was too busy for those things”. That indicated that a change took place between the 1960s and today so that Whips now come to see the Speaker on a weekly basis. I can tell noble Lords that they were always moaning. They were never happy. They were like constituents at tenants’ association meetings. You always knew that they would have a complaint. At least, if the government Chief Whip was happy, you could bet your boots that there was something wrong with the opposition Chief Whip. All these pressures have been taken away by what we have before us, and I am very pleased about that.

[Lord Dobbs]

My Lords, I rise with some trepidation after so many distinguished noble Lords. The first thing I want to do is to thank, like so many other noble Lords, my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness for his care, consideration and courtesy in dealing with various issues that I have raised with him. I have been able to support the Bill because of the two great principles of certainty and stability which it enshrines, but there is a third leg of that constitutional stool, which is simplicity, as my noble friend Lord Cormack, pointed out earlier.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, explained, there is a problem with the 14-day cooling-off period. It is in danger of failing those three fundamental principles. Let me briefly take the example of 1977-79, which some of us remember so well. Those years showed the best and worst of our current system. The best was that it allowed sufficient flexibility for the formation of the Lib-Lab pact—before my noble friends begin to swoon in surprise, I emphasise that I do not hold the Lib-Lab pact as the best example of government, or even a good example of government, merely a flexible example.

How flexible our current system was became even clearer after that when the Liberals withdrew and everyone from Bill Brewer to Uncle Tom Cobbleigh got in on the act. That was the worst of the current system. Deals were done—not just with the Liberal Party, but with Ulster Unionists, Scottish nationalists, Welsh nationalists and even Irish republicans. Goodness’ knows what would have happened if UKIP had been present there. Offers and inducements were made, from extra parliamentary seats to expensive pipelines to promises on devolution—even, I understand, to the occasional odd bottle of Scotch. The only reason why some of us can smile about it is because it was so very long ago.

The country was rescued from that misery by a vote of no confidence. Every man and woman in the other place that night understood precisely what that vote entailed. If the Government lost, they would fall. The stakes were extraordinarily high: so high that some Members clambered from their sick beds to get into ambulances and make that long haul to New Palace Yard—simply in order to be nodded through. A few, I believe, put their lives on the line simply in order to do that duty. How could we countenance a system which, after such an effort and such a sacrifice, responded by saying, “Thank you, but now you have another 14 days to cool off, to change your mind”? Fourteen days of dodgy deals, 14 days of pipelines and parliamentary fixes, 14 days to deny the electorate their right to decide—and every bit of it enshrined in law. Far from the Prime Minister giving up his powers to Parliament—

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, the convention is that if the Government lose a vote of confidence in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister has the option of either requesting a Dissolution or resigning. Callaghan did not have to go to the palace: he could have chosen to resign.

[Lord Dobbs]

Yes, indeed. I shall try to deal with that issue in a second.

Far from the Prime Minister giving up his powers to Parliament and the people in these provisions, he would be handing them over to party bosses operating in back rooms. I have been there and I have been one of them, and I doubt if things would become any more fragrant simply because those back rooms are no longer filled with smoke. Let us go back to something like 1979. Imagine the haggling: “No, I won’t vote for you, Jim, because if I help defeat you on this no-confidence Motion, I will be able to squeeze even more out of you tomorrow”.

A no-confidence Motion should be more than simply a hand at poker, with players raising the stakes both before and after the vote. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, I fear that Clause 2 as drafted would allow just that—with the players pleading that haggling is precisely what the law allows, precisely what the law approves of. Fourteen days of it: crisis, what crisis? But that is not what anyone here wants, so I urge my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace to look at this yet again. If he feels he must codify this matter of no-confidence Motions, he should ensure that this part of the Bill is made more clear. I am not against safety valves, not against 14 days in all circumstances. But 14 days should not be so inflexible that it becomes a charter for chaos and an excuse for political fixes. What we do today in good faith must not become an excuse for excess at some future date.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I begin by thanking all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate—not just for their contributions to the debate on the Floor of your Lordships’ Chamber today but for all their comments and amendments, which have reflected a view to try to find a way forward. As I indicated originally at Second Reading, and certainly in Committee, the Government were willing to listen to the views of your Lordships’ House. In the debate on Second Reading, I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, who mentioned that you could have absolutely rigid fixed terms or the complete flexibility that we have at the moment. The rigid fixed term brings its own set of difficulties, but if you are going to have something less rigid, you have to have the mechanisms in place to provide for an early election. That is what we grappled with during our deliberations in Committee and has been reflected in our debate today.

Amendment 20 was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, with the support of the noble Lords, Lord Martin and Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd. It sets out an alternative version of Clause 2 and addresses a number of issues of concern, not least the Speaker’s certificate and the certainty of the wording of a Motion of no confidence, both of which were raised in Committee. I am particularly grateful for the constructive way forward that has been devised by those who I know do not like the idea of fixed-term Parliaments but who nevertheless have accepted that the role of this House is to improve and revise and to bring forward amendments in that spirit. I was pleased to be able to consult not only the noble Lords, Lord Howarth and Lord Pannick, but particularly with the two former Speakers. This House has had the advantage of having their experience related to us both in Committee and in the debate this afternoon. On that basis, I have been willing to add my name in support of the amendment on behalf of the Government.

The amendment would retain the two triggers for an early general election and has clarified what a Motion of no confidence should say, and in that regard would not require a Speaker’s certificate. There was also a suggestion in an earlier iteration of the amendment that perhaps there should be some reference to the journal. Having considered it, we did not think that was appropriate either because it might then reflect other things in the journal that would be somewhat undermined by making it specific in this one. I think that that consultation bore fruit. We certainly have no desire to draw the Speaker of the House of Commons into political controversy, and therefore, given that the architecture for an early election is drawn up with a degree of certainty with no need of a Speaker’s certificate, the Government are willing to support the amendment.

I will come back to the amendments to this amendment that were moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, because they raise issues that were raised by other noble Lords, but first it is important that I should address the points made by noble Lords in speaking to their amendments in the group.

Amendment 21, tabled by my noble friend Lord Norton, again would provide an alternative version of Clause 2 and retains some of the basic architecture. It sets out a mechanism to allow for an early general election in the event of a two-thirds majority on a Motion, and one to provide for an early election in the event that the Government lose the confidence of the other place and no Government who hold the confidence of the House are formed within 14 days. Having listened to the concerns expressed in this House, it is clear that there is a certain shared sense of the direction in which we have been moving. However, my noble friend seeks to provide that the failure to pass a Motion of confidence in the Government—an important distinction—should have the same effect as passing a Motion of no confidence.

Following on the specific points made about this in the Constitution Committee’s report, we certainly did reflect on this long and hard. The reason why we came down against it in the end has been anticipated by my noble friend. It is that one of the objectives is to try to minimise the opportunity for manipulation. I accept, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, has indicated the Deputy Prime Minister has accepted, that there is no way this is going to be foolproof, but there are some things you can do to make it more difficult. We have reached the judgment that a Motion of confidence would be easier for the Government of the day to table and then have voted down than for the Government to lose a Motion of no confidence. The noble Baroness also mentioned Germany in 2005. The position there was that there was a general consensus for an election but that they did not have a trigger mechanism to do so. However, we do provide for it where there is consensus for a Dissolution that is supported by a two-thirds majority of Members of Parliament.

My noble friend Lord Norton wishes to add a third mechanism leading to an early general election. Where a Prime Minister felt unable to continue in government, his or her resignation could bring about an early election. The Bill does not prevent a Prime Minister from resigning or tendering a resignation on behalf of the Government, but, under the Bill as it stands, an early election would not follow automatically. As I have indicated, should there be a consensus that an early election should take place, the Bill provides for this under a two-thirds Dissolution vote. However, if there is no consensus, the alternative provision—for a no-confidence vote followed by a period of 14 days’ government formation—prevents a situation in which a Government stagger on without the confidence of the House.

My noble friend has suggested a government formation period of 60 days following the Prime Minister tendering the resignation of the Government. That could undermine the principle of fixed-term Parliaments by allowing the Prime Minister to trigger the government formation period at any stage in the Parliament. If one is looking at ways of minimising the opportunity for manipulation, that is one reason why we would not wish to go down that road. I also believe that 60 days is too long a period for there to be no effective Government in place. I hope that on reflection my noble friend will not—I think he indicated that he had some sympathy for the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth—press his amendment.

The amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Cormack and supported by my noble friend Lord Hamilton of Epsom is a further variation that suggests the exact wording of the Dissolution Motion and frames the 14-day government formation period in a different way from that proposed in the Bill. It provides for two scenarios that would determine a Motion of no confidence. Where a no-confidence Motion is passed in those circumstances, the Prime Minister must request Her Majesty to dissolve Parliament.

There may be circumstances in which, within a fixed-term period, a viable, legitimate Government may be formed from the composition of the House after a no-confidence Motion. As my noble friend Lord Tyler reminded us, it is Parliament that is fixed; it is not the Government who are intended to be fixed by the legislation. The Government can exist only if they enjoy the confidence of the other place. That is why Clause 2 provides for a vote of no confidence to trigger a period of 14 days for possible government formation. If the Government have not been able to secure the confidence of the House of Commons, Parliament will be dissolved. At present, the Prime Minister decides whether, after the loss of confidence, to ask Her Majesty for Dissolution, as in 1979, or, as my noble friend Lord Norton pointed out, to resign, thereby creating the opportunity for another Government to be formed from the existing House, as in 1924.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Dobbs Excerpts

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rennard]

We are rather going off the subject of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. Briefly, I remind the noble Baroness that her party's manifesto promised a referendum on AV but no other subject. The Conservative Party promised as part of the coalition negotiations to have a referendum on AV but on no other subject. The Liberal Democrats won only 57 out of 650 seats and were therefore not in a position to insist on what we really wanted, which was a referendum on proportional representation.

[Lord Dobbs]

I have listened to this debate and the previous one with fascination. We have gone today from Herbert Asquith in 1911 to Mr Chris Huhne and Mr David Laws—and other notorious parliamentary double acts. We have been from the dog to the duck and all the way to Battersea Dogs Home. We have heard that this is a matter of high principle. Perhaps that is right. I can just imagine the scene when Mr Gordon Brown in 2007 was urged to go for an early election. Did he say, “No, Miliband. Get behind me with your temptation. It has been only two years since the last election and I must soldier on to the end as a matter of principle?”. It might have been like that, but I thought that it was my task in my other life to ask for the suspension of disbelief. Certainly it was not like that with John Major in 1996. The question then was simple; can we win in four? “No? Okay, we’ll try five”. Of course, I was not with Jim Callaghan in 1978 or Alec Douglas-Home in 1963, but I suspect that the conversations in No. 10 were along much the same lines.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Dobbs Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wills]

My Lords, I think most would agree that there is merit in the arguments on both sides of the debate on whether the term of Parliament should be fixed. However, if there is merit in the argument for the term being fixed at five years, it is merit that passed by both the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats until the coalition agreement enlightened them. Nearly a year after that agreement, Ministers have still not managed to find a way of articulating that case persuasively.

The Government’s proposition is that they have a mandate for this proposal—this was one of the arguments used by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, on Second Reading—because an appetite for political reform was manifested at the last general election. That is a questionable proposition, to put it at its politest, because it conflates an arguable general distrust and dislike of politicians with a wish for a specific proposal for a five-year fixed term for Parliament. The Government’s argument that five years is somehow part of our political culture—the Deputy Prime Minister has made this argument—ignores inconvenient facts about the average length of post-war Parliaments. Of the last seven Parliaments, for example, four have lasted for about four years and three for five years. Moreover, the proposition, which Ministers have also advanced, that the Parliament Act somehow supports this proposal confuses setting a maximum term with fixing a norm. Then, of course, there is the selective quoting of international examples, nearly always in discussions of constitutional reform—a refuge for the intellectually desperate.

Does it matter that the Government have so inadequately made the case for a fixed term of five years? I think it does. This is not a matter of a finely balanced judgment one way or another, with there being really nothing very much to choose between a four-year term and a five-year term. Of course there is an element of judgment in these things, but, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, so eloquently set out, the overwhelming weight of expert opinion is in favour of four years. Anything longer inevitably—logically, inevitably—delays the calling to account of the Executive, and it creates an accumulating democratic deficit.

In the absence of any persuasive arguments for a five-year term, this flaw is toxic. It is particularly toxic because of the process by which this Bill has been brought before Parliament and the damaging perception that this has created the motivation behind the selection of five years as the fixed term for Parliament. Due process and perceptions of motivation matter especially for constitutional legislation because they can create public trust in the integrity of our constitutional arrangements or they can destroy it. A constitution which does not command the trust and respect of the citizens it serves is a constitution without value.

So what has been the process for this Bill? There has been no manifesto commitment to its key detail or any compelling argument for it. There has not been a Green Paper, a White Paper or public consultation. The process has consisted simply of ramming this hastily and poorly drafted Bill through Parliament as quickly as the business managers can get it through. This creates a perception which has been widely voiced. I am very grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer for telling the House about the account given in Mr David Laws’ history of the formation of the coalition agreement. I am sure that Mr Laws did not wish to be quite as unhelpful to his colleagues who remain in government as he has turned out to be. Nevertheless, the citizen might legitimately ask, “Why did the Government suddenly abandon a historic Liberal Democrat commitment to a fixed four-year term?”. Why would two parties which are locked in an uneasy embrace, trying to find a way to govern together that does not lead to an electoral annihilation for one or other or both of them, suddenly decide to extend the fixed term to five years?

My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer’s quote from Mr George Osborne tells us everything that we need to know about this. The Government have yet to come up with one good argument about why the motivation for this move to a five-year term is nothing more than the search for short-term, partisan, political advantage, seeking to stay in power, locked together, for as long as they possibly can. Sadly—I say sadly because I know that many Members on the Liberal Democrat Benches have long and honourable histories of espousing constitutional reform—this sort of short-term partisan manoeuvring is coming to characterise this Government’s constitutional legislation. It injects poison into the system. It creates suspicion where there should be trust and volatility where there should be stability. This really is no way to legislate for constitutional matters.

Accepting this amendment would help to neutralise this poison, but I fear that the Minister—characteristically amiably, no doubt—will try to find reasons for resisting it. I fear that the Government will ignore the reservations, which we have heard over and over again in this debate, which has gone on now for nearly one and a half hours, just as they have ignored all the other doubts about their constitutional legislation, and that they will just whip this Bill through. Despite that, I hope that the noble and learned Lord who moved this amendment will test the opinion of the House on the matter, if not now then at Report. This House should do its constitutional duty whatever view Ministers take of theirs.

[Lord Dobbs]

This House pursues this discussion with considerable passion and at times almost with an element of ferocity, which is how it should be. But I have to admit that it has left me rather confused. I have done my best to follow the arguments. Should it be four years or five years? Should it be three years and 10 months or some other figure? Statistics have been hurled around this House and given a mythical, almost mystical, significance and, at times, even an ethical significance. Some say that “this figure is right and that figure is wrong”, and not just wrong but downright wicked. It is enough to make a young chap giddy.

For better or worse, as a party official and a prime ministerial adviser, I was involved with the process of helping to choose one or two election dates in the 1880s and 90s.

[Noble Lords]

You said the 1880s.

[Lord Dobbs]

Did I? My memory does not go back quite that far but I thank noble Lords. I can confirm that there was nothing mythical or mystical about it and least of all could the process be described as ethical. There is only one reason why Prime Ministers choose this or that election date and that is because he or she thinks that the chosen date gives them the best possible chance of winning. For a party leader, elections are rather like the gunfight of the OK Corral. There is no future for the loser; they are likely to be dragged out of the arena feet first and never seen again. Prime Ministers sweat over these decisions—even the fragrant ones.

We keep hearing that four years is best. The question remains: why have Prime Ministers so often chosen to hold an election after just four years? The answer is very simple. Except in the most extreme circumstances they do not go earlier because there is nothing to be gained: they will only be accused of cutting and running. They do not often carry on beyond four years for fear of running foul of events or the economy or the private excesses of some wayward Cabinet Minister. I am afraid that these decisions have nothing to do with the astrological significance of the figures four or five. It has simply been a matter of self-preservation.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, spoke about the natural rhythms. I think that in a previous debate we heard someone refer to the natural biorhythms of the British constitution, a point picked up in the Select Committee report. I admire the noble and learned Lord almost beyond expression. His knowledge of our constitution is profound but I fear that his romantic nature might have led him astray on this one. In my less than humble experience—Conservative chiefs of staff do not usually do humble or, if they do, they do not tend to survive—it has nothing to do with biorhythms: it is simply the uncertainty of that fifth year that leads Prime Ministers to opt for four—nothing else. But remove that uncertainty, as this Bill does, and I suspect that we will find that Prime Ministers are more than delighted to soldier on to the end with absolutely no complaint. They will carry on in Downing Street, their biorhythms entirely undisturbed. After all, Prime Ministers love office. They never know when to give up. They hang on as long as possible, and almost always too long, leaving their fingernails in the Downing Street carpet as they say goodbye.

Another argument, which was picked up by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Martin, is that somehow a fifth year is always unsatisfactory; that for some metaphysical reason the Government will run out of steam after four years. We have heard of the term, the lame duck—the least glorious of years—but it is only the uncertainty that causes distraction, which is what this Bill does away with. Give a Prime Minister a certain election date and, instead of confusion, there will be a reasoned, possibly somewhat reckless, campaign of tax cuts, heady promises and kissed constituency babies—in other words, business as usual.

Of course, another argument has been put forward; namely, that a five-year term deprives the electors of a more frequent choice than four years. The logic of that is, of course, indisputable. But, if the noble Lord will forgive me, it is also absurd. Follow that logic and we would end up with elections every three years or two years or perhaps every year. Looking at the US congressional system where politicians are constantly campaigning, I am inclined to suggest that there is no obvious connection between more frequent elections on the one hand and better government on the other. Above all else, it is better government that we should be seeking.

There is no democratic deficit of the sort suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. There is no shortage of elections. We have more elections for more Parliaments than at any time in our history. But whether all those elections and elected politicians have given us better government I suspect is a matter to be discussed on another day.

The crucial point is this: should it be four years, should it be five, or three point something or other? Having dismissed the relevance of so many statistics, let me offer a few of my own. Looking back over the last eight elections, which takes us back an entire generation or more to the dark days of 1974, the average lifespan of a Parliament has been nearly four and a half years. To me that is just as legitimate as the figure which is so often quoted, that of three years and 10 months. But we are told that four years is what the people demand. If that is the case, where is the surge of public indignation, the outrage that our biorhythms have been disturbed and the voters left short-changed by four-and-a-half year or five-year parliaments? The argument about four years and only four years simply will not wash.

To garble the phrase, there are exaggerations, irrelevancies and political evidence. We have heard plenty of all three in this debate. If we are looking for a norm, it is four and a half years, not three years and 10 months, at least in our recent history. What should we read into that? Precisely nothing. Except that in every one of the last eight elections, the Prime Minister chose a polling date that was thought to be in his or her interest. It is self-interest, not the national interest, and there is no magic in a term of four years. That is because, of course, Prime Ministers have a terrible habit of stumbling to the conclusion that they are the national interest, and that is what lies behind these statistics, nothing more. Statistics will not resolve this issue for us; it is up to us.

[Lord Bach]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. He has mentioned the last eight elections. I may be slow in my arithmetic, but I think that would take us to 1979 as the first one he has chosen since there have been eight elections since then. I think he said that in the last eight elections, the Prime Minister has always chosen the date for his own benefit. I do not think that that is something James Callaghan could be accused of.

[Lord Dobbs]

I think it takes us back to 1974. I well remember Lord Callaghan, as he became. Indeed, he first introduced me to this House by giving me tea here. I owe him a great deal and I have the most profound respect for him. But I am surprised that the noble Lord should quote 1979 as being the pinnacle of constitutional principle. It was sheer self-interest based on the opinion polls, like it was for all other Prime Ministers.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I may be wrong, but my recollection is that Mr Callaghan went to the country because of a Motion of no confidence passed in the House of Commons. To describe him as choosing an election date seems, if I may say so, a little misplaced.

[Lord Dobbs]

The noble and learned Lord misunderstands me. The election date that he was going to choose was in the previous October, and that is where he got it wrong. In his own self-interest, he thought that he should soldier on, despite the evidence. Let me not be distracted, but I am surprised that the noble and learned Lord remembers 1978 and 1979 so fondly. I have to say that it is not an example that I would wish to follow.

Statistics will not resolve this issue. In the decision over whether it should be four years or five, I find myself, rather oddly, agreeing with the Deputy Prime Minister who, in a celebrated quote of his when asked if he thought 12 months here or there mattered very much, replied, “No, I do”. I think that he summed up the situation admirably. So let us have five years. I do not know if it is a matter of principle, as my noble friend Lord Marks says—I probably would not go that far—or of sheer practicality, but it is as close to the norm as four years. If any of the political parties find it somehow offensive, they are entirely at liberty to change it. All they have to do is to win an election, and because of this Bill they will have the immense benefit of knowing precisely when that election will be held.

Even taking the extreme position of supposing that every Parliament runs its full term, a premise that personally I doubt very much, surely extending the average length of a Parliament from the present four-and-a-half years to five does no great disservice to our constitution, and by enhancing the possibility of sensible, long-term government, it offers considerable benefits in compensation.

[Lord Desai]

My Lords, I have a brief point to make, but first I agree with the noble Lord who has just spoken that you cannot compare the frequency of Parliaments under a fixed-term arrangement with the frequency of Parliaments under a variable-term arrangement. They are not comparable things. I would also say to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, who expressed his distress that a Government would have only two years to legislate, not three, that if he had been in Parliament as long as I have, he would pray for fewer Bills to come from a Government rather than more. So I do not think that the quality of a Government is measured by the number of Bills they introduce; I think exactly the reverse.

I have one anxiety, which I shall explain. This Bill does not actually fix the term at five years, but at five years and two months. There is a distinct possibility that, again and again, a Prime Minister would be able to breach the standard convention that a term of five years is the limit. That is a fundamental part of our constitution. This Bill breaches that by allowing, in Clause 1(5), for an extra two months. We ought to take this very seriously. Prime Ministers can find good excuses to delay elections. As has been pointed out, if they see better a better chance two months hence, they will find a way of waiting. I do not care how long this goes on for—whether it goes on for 10-and-a-half years—but we should take the breach of a very fundamental political principle seriously. The advantage of my noble and learned friend’s amendment is that, even if a Prime Minister uses the two-month option, we would never breach the five-year rule. That is a telling argument in favour of the amendment.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Dobbs Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dobbs]

My Lords, it is a pleasure for me to be able to participate in a debate which has seen the maiden speech of my noble friend Lord Cormack. It was joyous and I look forward to listening to his speeches for many years to come.

It is also a great pleasure to speak on St David’s Day, as the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, has pointed out, and to listen to the fine speeches of so many Welshmen. As a naive newcomer to this place, I might have been forgiven for jumping to the conclusion that the vast majority of Members of this House were Scots.

I have never been elected. I have never even stood for election, although many years ago I did suggest to the Conservative Party that it should adopt me as its candidate in the constituency of Manchester Moss Side. Very wisely it turned me down, as no doubt the electors would have done had they been given the chance. However, I have had various other roles and have come to revere elections—the unelected in pursuit of the uninterested, to mangle Oscar Wilde, although I have never been entirely sure which is the hunter and which is the fox.

I was fortunate, indeed honoured, to be with my noble friend Lady Thatcher in Barnet town hall in 1979 watching her own count on the night of her election victory. I was the first to be able to tell her that she had won. I was with her the following day in Downing Street as she took her first steps across the threshold as Prime Minister and quoted St Francis of Assisi:

“Where there is discord, may we bring harmony”.

Yes, I have to admit that I thought we had lost her there for a moment. I was there when she went in and I was there with John Major when we were kicked out, so I know a little about both the triumphs and the tears that go with these great outbursts of the people’s will.

I do not wish to tread over ground already so well trodden during this debate and will perhaps find a slightly different path in considering the Bill. I do not relish change for the sake of change. If in doubt, don’t. If our constitution has to be changed, it must be for sound and solid reasons. But I think there are good reasons for looking favourably on fixed-term Parliaments, one of which probably will not be considered in Committee. That is money—party-political money to be precise, which is not a subject we like to shout about but perhaps one that in quiet moments we all know is of real practical importance.

The costs of running political machines are huge, and those costs regularly leave our political parties in a state of financial chaos—often near bankruptcy. Of the millions that are raised, so much is spent—some would say squandered—during a few weeks of electoral warfare, leaving the parties to starve in the following years when issues on which those elections were fought are pursued through Parliament. Great political machines are built to win the campaign only to be ripped apart immediately thereafter. Party workers are sacked and discarded just at the point when they might have been working for the long-term health of their parties and our political system. It is a sad and desperately inefficient way to run a democracy.

Perhaps I should declare an old and perhaps expired interest because I was once an employee of the Conservative research department—a place where I laboured many long hours and for very little money under the direction of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport. As I said, it was a long time ago. Finding the money to run a healthy political system is not easy but I believe that this Bill will help. Under the present system, party managers never dare take the risk of being unprepared, so at the first whiff of a possible election they gear up before any spending caps ever come into consideration. Staff are employed, premises are leased, equipment is found, posters sites are booked and battle buses are commissioned. The troops are brought up to speed and made ready for war, but having been marched up the hill, under present circumstances, they are often then marched down again until the next scare, and much of the precious money raised is wasted.

We have not yet found the right answer to funding political parties but I believe that fixed-term Parliaments will help by allowing party managers to plan more effectively and party treasurers to fund more wisely. That may not be the most important outcome of this Bill but it must be a good outcome. I have no doubt that in Committee my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness will listen with all his characteristic sensitivity to suggestions for improvement that are already being put forward. I hope that he will not close his mind to them even if they take matters a little beyond the fixed wording of the coalition agreement. I mention just one. It is not the matter of thresholds—although I have to say that a two-thirds threshold is a very generous offer and one that I would happily have accepted a couple of weeks ago. I want to endorse the point raised by many Members here. The noble Lords, Lord Foulkes, Lord Wigley and Lord Howarth, have asked, why May? Why not, for example, June or October? I hope we will be allowed to identify a date that is most suitable in the long term, not just one which, through present circumstances, is temporarily convenient.

The month of May creates issues with elections for devolved institutions which others will raise, but May is not often an ideal general election date. Campaigns fought over April almost inevitably run into the barriers of Easter and school holidays. Asking party workers to campaign through these periods and then to give up their May Day bank holiday seems unnecessarily clumsy. Of course, an election fought on the first Thursday in October would also have its drawbacks. It would require us, for instance, to abandon our party conferences, but somehow I feel that the electorate would find it in their hearts to forgive us.

Underlying the Bill is the decision to take away from the Prime Minister the right to choose the election date. I can recall very few occasions in recent years when Prime Ministers have given up anything, let alone a key prerogative such as this. I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Morgan, on that—I believe that this is an entirely genuine matter. I am all in favour of the Executive giving up powers to Parliament. I think that we should have more of it and I applaud the Prime Minister for taking this step.

In any event, Prime Ministers are often very poor at taking these decisions about election timing. They gather their soothsayers, the entrails are extracted, the runes are read and, as the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, pointed out, still they make a mess of it. How different might things have been. Ted Heath going to the polls in February 1974; Jim Callaghan not going in October 1978; Gordon Brown too—how might history have been rewritten if they had made different decisions?

There is an inherent uncertainty that accompanies all elections; that is one of the many splendours of democracy. After Winston Churchill’s extraordinary election defeat in 1945, his wife, Clementine, tried to comfort him. “Darling, it is a blessing in disguise”, she said. “If it is a blessing”, the old man said, “it is very well disguised”. The Bill contains many blessings, even if at times some of them seem to be rather well disguised.