Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Wills Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton]

My Lords, I keep hearing the words, “It is a matter of judgment”. I heard them from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, on several occasions in connection with giving the electorate the power to decide. I just heard a reference to the importance of time for pre-legislative scrutiny and allowing people who are about to vote an opportunity to maturely evaluate the Government’s policy. I am beginning to feel as though we live in a different place, because we have a whole plethora of constitutional reforms before us, who have to vote on them, with no opportunity for pre-legislative scrutiny and no opportunity to see how the first bit, the second bit, the third bit and the fourth bit come together.

Then, in the middle of it all, is the bit of the Bill that perhaps worries me even more than the five and four years: who, how and in what circumstances the proposed five or even four years could be varied. I have heard a variety of ways in which a Prime Minister can decide that it is a good time for an election if he thinks it is in his interest, although I think that convincing the Opposition that it is a good time for an election will be quite a hard task. Having heard all these arguments, however, I am not allowed to see what this coalition Government propose to do. This is against a background of assurances that I keep getting that they know where they are going and they know who is going with them, but it sure ain’t me because they are not telling me where they are going.

I have been asked to vote on changing the system of votes, which is being put to the people in the AV referendum, without being told what is being proposed for people being elected to this House. All these things keep being thrown at me by people who say, “Oh well, it is a matter of judgment”. In the end, a bit like the dance of the seven veils, all will be revealed. However, I want to know the whole picture now before I am asked to start pulling apart some of the parts of the structure of our constitution. The argument is therefore surely that it would have been better if the coalition had concentrated on fewer Bills that made fewer changes to the constitution, had put them out for quick pre-legislative scrutiny and did not Christmas-tree them. Those who have been in government know that the minute the whole plethora of people in any department see a Bill looming, they start hanging little baubles on it, complicating it and muddying the whole picture. I am therefore uneasy.

On the use of the term “judgment”, I think that it is a bit arrogant of the coalition—a new form of government in this country for a long time—to say, “We are making a judgment about when you can vote to judge us, and we are restricting the way in which it is going to be done”. Perhaps, having a somewhat warped political mind, I can see that it is just possible, in reaching an agreement to form a coalition, that neither party trusted the other and so the five years had to be set in concrete in case either one pulled the rug from under the other. However, I am then assured that in the middle of the Bill is the opportunity for the Prime Minister of the day suddenly to pull the rug out anyway, although I suppose he would have to get his Deputy Prime Minister to support him.

On the argument about the length of time that it takes to bring in legislation, in my view the public out there have the right to expect to be able to voice their view on what happens in the future. It is just possible that, within the next two years, some people who are currently members of the coalition will not want to be tied to a fixed term of five years. They could be members of either party; it is not always the most adulterous one who ends up getting divorced.

I am concerned. Why cannot we have a big picture for all these constitutional changes? Why cannot we substitute this judgment that we ought to be laying in concrete an agreement of convenience for this particular Government? Why are we wasting our time legislating to set that in concrete? We are wasting our time because they can do that anyway. They do not need this Bill to do that, so why on earth are we being told that they do? I am beginning to get suspicious, because from certain Benches—from parties to this Government—I keep hearing, “Well, we are voting for this now. It is not what we really want, but we will get what we want next time”. I have met the odd person out there who has said to me, “Hey, I watched that debate, and the Lib Dems said that they do not really like AV, but it is better than what we have, and anyway it is a road to somewhere else”.

Finally, I cannot resist remembering when I sat on those Benches over there during the first stage of House of Lords reform. I heard a member of Her Majesty's loyal Opposition at the time—a former Home Secretary—come out with the words, “The wicked thing the Labour Government are trying to do is force an extension of the life of government”. Who is doing it? Not us. Can we please have the big picture, can we ask the British people what they think, and can we not patronise them by saying, “You need longer to be able to judge us”?

[Lord Wills]

My Lords, I think most would agree that there is merit in the arguments on both sides of the debate on whether the term of Parliament should be fixed. However, if there is merit in the argument for the term being fixed at five years, it is merit that passed by both the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats until the coalition agreement enlightened them. Nearly a year after that agreement, Ministers have still not managed to find a way of articulating that case persuasively.

The Government’s proposition is that they have a mandate for this proposal—this was one of the arguments used by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, on Second Reading—because an appetite for political reform was manifested at the last general election. That is a questionable proposition, to put it at its politest, because it conflates an arguable general distrust and dislike of politicians with a wish for a specific proposal for a five-year fixed term for Parliament. The Government’s argument that five years is somehow part of our political culture—the Deputy Prime Minister has made this argument—ignores inconvenient facts about the average length of post-war Parliaments. Of the last seven Parliaments, for example, four have lasted for about four years and three for five years. Moreover, the proposition, which Ministers have also advanced, that the Parliament Act somehow supports this proposal confuses setting a maximum term with fixing a norm. Then, of course, there is the selective quoting of international examples, nearly always in discussions of constitutional reform—a refuge for the intellectually desperate.

Does it matter that the Government have so inadequately made the case for a fixed term of five years? I think it does. This is not a matter of a finely balanced judgment one way or another, with there being really nothing very much to choose between a four-year term and a five-year term. Of course there is an element of judgment in these things, but, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, so eloquently set out, the overwhelming weight of expert opinion is in favour of four years. Anything longer inevitably—logically, inevitably—delays the calling to account of the Executive, and it creates an accumulating democratic deficit.

In the absence of any persuasive arguments for a five-year term, this flaw is toxic. It is particularly toxic because of the process by which this Bill has been brought before Parliament and the damaging perception that this has created the motivation behind the selection of five years as the fixed term for Parliament. Due process and perceptions of motivation matter especially for constitutional legislation because they can create public trust in the integrity of our constitutional arrangements or they can destroy it. A constitution which does not command the trust and respect of the citizens it serves is a constitution without value.

So what has been the process for this Bill? There has been no manifesto commitment to its key detail or any compelling argument for it. There has not been a Green Paper, a White Paper or public consultation. The process has consisted simply of ramming this hastily and poorly drafted Bill through Parliament as quickly as the business managers can get it through. This creates a perception which has been widely voiced. I am very grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer for telling the House about the account given in Mr David Laws’ history of the formation of the coalition agreement. I am sure that Mr Laws did not wish to be quite as unhelpful to his colleagues who remain in government as he has turned out to be. Nevertheless, the citizen might legitimately ask, “Why did the Government suddenly abandon a historic Liberal Democrat commitment to a fixed four-year term?”. Why would two parties which are locked in an uneasy embrace, trying to find a way to govern together that does not lead to an electoral annihilation for one or other or both of them, suddenly decide to extend the fixed term to five years?

My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer’s quote from Mr George Osborne tells us everything that we need to know about this. The Government have yet to come up with one good argument about why the motivation for this move to a five-year term is nothing more than the search for short-term, partisan, political advantage, seeking to stay in power, locked together, for as long as they possibly can. Sadly—I say sadly because I know that many Members on the Liberal Democrat Benches have long and honourable histories of espousing constitutional reform—this sort of short-term partisan manoeuvring is coming to characterise this Government’s constitutional legislation. It injects poison into the system. It creates suspicion where there should be trust and volatility where there should be stability. This really is no way to legislate for constitutional matters.

Accepting this amendment would help to neutralise this poison, but I fear that the Minister—characteristically amiably, no doubt—will try to find reasons for resisting it. I fear that the Government will ignore the reservations, which we have heard over and over again in this debate, which has gone on now for nearly one and a half hours, just as they have ignored all the other doubts about their constitutional legislation, and that they will just whip this Bill through. Despite that, I hope that the noble and learned Lord who moved this amendment will test the opinion of the House on the matter, if not now then at Report. This House should do its constitutional duty whatever view Ministers take of theirs.

[Lord Dobbs]

This House pursues this discussion with considerable passion and at times almost with an element of ferocity, which is how it should be. But I have to admit that it has left me rather confused. I have done my best to follow the arguments. Should it be four years or five years? Should it be three years and 10 months or some other figure? Statistics have been hurled around this House and given a mythical, almost mystical, significance and, at times, even an ethical significance. Some say that “this figure is right and that figure is wrong”, and not just wrong but downright wicked. It is enough to make a young chap giddy.

For better or worse, as a party official and a prime ministerial adviser, I was involved with the process of helping to choose one or two election dates in the 1880s and 90s.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wills]

Before the noble Lord finishes telling us why he changed his mind, perhaps I may point out that all the considerations in favour of a five-year term that he is now advancing, and the issues that he has brought into play, have been well known for many years—in fact, all the years during which he was in favour of a four-year fixed term. Can he tell us now precisely why he changed his mind?

[Lord Rennard]

The first reason is one about which the noble Lord, Lord Wills, should know a great deal. I pay great tribute to him as a genuine constitutional reformer. He was responsible in the previous Parliament and in the previous Government for changing significantly some of the rules on party political expenditure. Noble Lords opposite shared my concern throughout much of the 13 years and the three Parliaments of the previous Government about the lack of a level playing field in this country in party financing, which gave too much opportunity to extremely wealthy individuals to influence an election, particularly in constituencies, in the immediate run-up to it. The noble Lord, Lord Wills, introduced legislation in the previous Parliament which provided for control of that expenditure after four years and seven months of a Parliament. There would be no controls before that; they would apply only after four years, seven months. I opposed that legislation on the ground that it would work logically only if you had a five-year fixed-term Parliament. Noble Lords opposite had no answer to that point, but decided that four years, seven months was how it should be. So, now, our legislation to regulate party political expenditure is entirely dependent on there being a five-year fixed-term Parliament and on those controls coming in after four years and seven months through to the 60th month of the Parliament, and no other period.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for introducing the amendment. It has given rise to considerable debate in all parts of the House and a number of important and interesting arguments have been put for and against. The duration of the parliamentary term proposed in the Bill has been discussed not only at Second Reading but in some of the earlier amendments we debated on the first day in Committee. It has also been debated in the other place where, it is worth noting, amendments similar to those tabled by the noble and learned Lord were debated and rejected.

On the debates in the other place, I should indicate to the noble Lord, Lord Wills—who, at one point, suggested that the business managers were ramming the Bill through—that the Bill was introduced on 22 July 2010; it had its Second Reading in the other place on 13 September; it had two and a half days in Committee in November and December; Report and Third Reading were on 18 January; and it was introduced into this House on 19 January. We are now on the second day in Committee on 21 March and, with the best will in the world, we would be unlikely to reach Third Reading of the Bill before the Easter Recess. That does not sound like ramming a Bill through. I shall come later to the point the noble Lord made about the partisan nature of the Bill, which I strongly reject.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, suggested that I had indicated that the issue of four or five years was one of high principle, and I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, for quoting what I did say. I indicated that I did not believe there was a right or wrong answer. I think that there is a matter of important principle in terms of a general constitutional reform package. I have always strongly believed in the argument for a fixed-term Parliament, and I thought that the Labour Party supported that argument as well at the last general election.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, went on to say that he considered this a matter of high principle, although many of us are waiting to hear exactly what that principle is. I did not discern it in any of his remarks. He put forward arguments on the basis of practicality and why he felt four years was better than five. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, cited a number of academics and politicians who had given evidence to that effect as well. However, my noble friend Lord Rennard quite properly pointed out that the legislation on candidate expenses which the noble Lord, Lord Wills, took through the other place under the previous Government—which, I assume, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, was responsible for in this House—presumed that there would be a five-year Parliament. Indeed, that legislation would have been otiose if there was a four-year Parliament. No doubt we could amend that legislation but it is an insight to what the Labour Party was thinking at the time. Therefore, to elevate this to a matter of high principle is overegging the cake.

However, it is a matter of principle that the constitutional reform that the Government are working hard to achieve should have a framework for strong and stable government that can deliver results to the electorate. This Bill and a fixed five-year term would help to ensure that.

Perhaps I can now address some of the issues and explain why a five-year term would be beneficial. The current constitutional position is that any Government who retain the confidence of the other House may, if they wish, stay in office for a full five-year term. We should not kid ourselves that curtailing the length of time would be a significant change beyond simply the important change to fixed terms. On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Desai, that the Bill made provision for five years and two months, that would be the case only if an order was brought forward in unusual circumstances—for example, if there was an outbreak of foot and mouth—and it would require a resolution of both Houses of Parliament to be implemented. Amendments will be introduced later—this evening, I hope—which will require the Prime Minister to give an explanation to both Houses as to why he or she was doing this. In fact, a Parliament need not be dissolved until five years after it is called but it is certainly possible under our existing constitutional arrangements to go beyond the five years. Under the Bill, unless there is the exceptional circumstance to which I referred, it would not be possible to go beyond five years. I understand the noble Lord’s concern but hope that he, on listening to the later debate when this comes up, will be reassured on that point.

I take the stricture of my noble friend Lord Dobbs about the dangers of trading figures. It is the case that most Parliaments since the Second World War, some 10 out of 17, have lasted at least four years. Three of the last five have lasted almost five years. Some have pointed to examples of Parliaments that have lasted closer to four rather than five, making the argument that four is somehow the norm and five is only for Governments who are clinging on to power. Yet, as was well put by my noble friend Lord Marks, those who point to the examples where the fifth year has been, if one wished to use the term, a lame duck almost make the point. These arose because the Prime Minister of the day looked at the runes, did the calculation and estimated that it would not be worth going to the electorate because he was probably not going to win. The very nature of the Government being in that position means that they are almost inevitably limping into their fifth year. That is a different situation from Governments knowing that there is a five-year fixed term and having to plan accordingly.

The noble and learned Lord also mentioned what Mr Asquith said back in February 1911. We could have a legitimate debate on what Mr Asquith was actually saying. He is quoted in the Official Report as saying that reducing the Parliament from seven years, as it previously was, to five would,

“probably amount in practice to an actual legislative working term of four years”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/2/1911; col. 1749.]

He clearly did not say that the term would be for four years but that the practical legislative working term would be for four years. That is an important point and one I will pick up later in light of the comments made at Second Reading by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster. As I said, the fact that an election is called before the end of the fifth year of a term has often been cited as the Prime Minister of the day seeking to give his or her party a political advantage. The noble Lord, Lord Martin, gave examples where a Prime Minister has exercised that power and it has not come off. It is fair to say that those Prime Ministers were mightily surprised and upset by that. They could not have foreseen it: it was their wrong judgment. That cannot get away from the fact that that is what they were trying to do. My noble friend Lord Dobbs made it clear from his inside track that that is precisely what Prime Ministers try to do in those circumstances.

At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, said—although I accept that he indicated his objection to fixed-term Parliaments as a whole—that there are merits, if you are having fixed-term Parliaments, to a term of five rather than four years. The noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, made the same point today. I remind the House what the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, said:

“If legislation were to set a fixed term of, let us say, four years, that period would be reduced to more like three years. That would not leave enough room for sensible policy-making and good parliamentary debate before the imminence of the forthcoming election began to cast its distorting shadow. So I hope that, if this Bill becomes law, the fixed term will be five years, as is proposed in the Bill, and not some shorter term”.—[Official Report, 1/3/11; col. 971.]

That echoes the point made by Mr Asquith about what would practicably be the working life of the Parliament. Many commentators—politicians and the public—would argue that Governments can be too short term in their planning and decision-making, a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Butler. Many major decisions and investments often take a significant time for their consequences to appear. We want—I hope there is a consensus in the country that people also want—to encourage future Governments to take that longer-term view rather than always to be looking for the short-term advantage, be that from being able to pick the date of the election or shortening the length of the Parliament.

[Lord Wills]

The noble and learned Lord said earlier that he was not quite sure what the high principles were that are at stake here. He has just set out one of them—the interest of stability and good government. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, also made the case for this. Against that has to be traded the principle of accountability, which has informed a lot of the remarks on this side of the House. The noble and learned Lord has just referred to what the British public might want. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, also referred to this. Why precisely have the Government taken so few steps to consult the British public on this? There is no Green Paper or White Paper as far as I am aware, and no going out to the country to ask the British people how they think these respective principles of accountability and stability should be weighed in the Bill. Why have the Government not done this?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I take seriously the issue that somehow democratic accountability is being reduced. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, made the point in speaking to his amendment on the first day of Committee—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, also expressed this view—that if we had had fixed-term, five-year Parliaments there would have been a reduced number of elections. I cannot accept that that automatically follows. Taking up the point of democratic accountability, the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, cannot ignore the possibility—or, more, the probability—that there would have been Parliaments that did not run their full term of five years. Perhaps February 1974 would have been an example, or October 1974, or the 1951 election.

My noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames also indicated that it is important to put the ducks—as they were described by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott—in perspective. It is almost inevitable that during the past 65 years some Parliaments would not run their full course. You cannot say that every Parliament would automatically run the five years. Indeed, that is why we have the provisions in Clause 2 of the Bill.