Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

11: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, leave out “fifth” and insert “fourth”

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, this amendment goes to the heart of the Bill in that it seeks to reduce the period of a fixed-term Parliament from five years to four years. This important Bill may well bring about a significant change to our politics by changing the position from a situation in which the norm for our Parliaments is to last around three years and eight months to four years—with a maximum of five years—to a norm for our Parliaments to last for five years, with the possibility of going below that period only in exceptional circumstances.

The reason why the proposal in the Bill has been advanced has been given on the basis of high principle. At Second Reading, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, said that:

“The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill delivers a key strand of the ambitious political and constitutional reform agenda which this Government have pledged to deliver”.

He went on to say:

“There is now a consensus across the country—dare I say brought to a head by the expenses scandal but which had been forming for some time—that the political system in this country needs to be reinvigorated”.—[Official Report, 1/3/2011; cols. 929-30.]

The noble and learned Lord is nodding helpfully. He is putting forward this Bill as part of that reinvigoration process.

His leader, Nick Clegg, has spoken in a similar vein. The Select Committee of this House which reported on the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill had the privilege of Mr Clegg appearing in front of it. Its report states:

“The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill is just one part of a package of proposed reforms intended by the Government to make the political system ‘far more transparent and accountable’. In his evidence, the Deputy Prime Minister told us that: ‘it is an unambiguous judgment on our part that reducing the power of the executive, seeking to boost the power of the legislature, making the legislatures more accountable to people ... collectively introduces the mechanisms by which people can exercise greater control over politicians’”.

The Deputy Prime Minister has also said that the time has come to stop people being allowed to,

“play politics with the dates of a general election”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/6/10; col. 40.]

That is the high-flown basis on which the matter is put forward.

Happily, we have the account of the circumstances in which the five-year term was agreed, provided by Mr David Laws. I quote him from the introduction to his book:

“My intention in writing this book is not to describe an all-too-brief Cabinet career. It is instead to inform those who are interested in this important period of British politics and to make sure that an accurate account is left of what really happened in May 2010 before memories fade, myths grow and the evidence is lost”.

On page 98, he writes that Andrew Stunell pointed out to the Conservative negotiators that,

“trust and confidence was very important to us, and that we wouldn’t want to find the PM calling an election at a time that did not suit us. ‘That works both ways!’ said William Hague. We mentioned that our own policy was for four-year, fixed-term Parliaments. George Osborne made the point that five-year parliaments were better, as they allowed governments to get into implementing their plans before having to start worrying about the timing of the electoral cycle. We made no objection to this, and Britain was on its way to five-year, fixed-term parliaments, for the first time in its history”.

That is how the Liberal Democrats moved from four years to five years; they did it because of the problem of trust. We should look at the proposals that are being put forward by the coalition with a moderately jaundiced eye, particularly because of the disingenuous way in which it is being done.

However, that does not relieve this House from considering as a matter of principle for the British people whether the right period is five years or four years. We are clear that the evidence—and this should be decided on the basis of evidence—is strongly in favour of four years rather than five. A mistake that the coalition persistently makes, and made in relation to the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill as well, is that because judgment is required in coming to a conclusion on whether a particular course should be taken, all evidence can therefore be ignored. One simply, for example, has a conversation with Mr Andrew Stunell which lasts 40 seconds, at which point you abandon the policies that one has adopted for the previous 20 years. That does not sound to me like the exercise of judgment; it sounds like playing politics with the date of the next election, which is precisely what the Deputy Prime Minister said should not happen.

We in this House have an especial responsibility in determining what the length of a Parliament should be. It is an area where the Parliament Act does not normally apply, although I accept that its being five years is not the reason for its not applying. Nevertheless, it is an area where this House has an especial responsibility to ensure that the matter is looked at on the basis of evidence.

What does the evidence show? The Select Committee looking at the Bill heard evidence, which did not happen in terms of pre-legislative scrutiny, and concluded unequivocally that the evidence showed that four years was the right answer rather than five. In her speech at Second Reading, the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, said:

“The weight of evidence from British and international experts to the committee was against a five-year norm as against a five-year maximum”.

We should remember that this legislation involves a change from a five-year maximum to a five-year norm. She continued:

“My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer has already quoted Democratic Audit, which expressed alarm that a five-year term would present, ‘a reversal of a long struggle for more accountable government’. Overseas experience, for example from Canada and Sweden, suggested, in the words of witnesses, that, ‘there seems to be a kind of natural rhythm around four years’, and, ‘four years is more consistent with voter expectations’, all of which appears inconsistent with the Deputy Prime Minister’s evidence to us that his ‘unambiguous aim’ is to, ‘make the legislature more accountable to the electorate and to introduce the mechanisms by which people can exercise greater control over politicians’. Our evidence suggests very clearly that this unambiguous aim may not be achieved by this Bill”.—[Official Report, 1/3/11; cols. 1005-1006.]

The noble Lord, Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield said:

“As well as the biorhythmic arithmetic, we need to consider the quality of government and political life in the fifth year of Parliaments that have gone to the wire. They have rarely been shining patches in the life of Administrations. Ministers are often tired and accident prone. The palette of the electorate becomes progressively more jaded. A kind of pre-electoral blight sets in. Of course it could be argued that the final year of a fixed-term four-year Parliament would be similarly blighted. Certainly, the press would succumb to its customary pre-election frenzy as the last year deepened. However, the blight is likely to be less pronounced towards the end of a four-year span than a five-year one, and accountability is more likely to be enhanced by a four-year cycle”.—[Official Report, 1/3/11; col. 935.]

My noble friend Lord Grocott said:

“There is no doubt that the fifth year of a Parliament, in our constitutional history and experience if not in theory, is nearly always a completely unsatisfactory year”.—[Official Report, 1/3/11; col. 958.]

The overwhelming view expressed during the course of the Second Reading debate, with the exception of the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, and some Back-Benchers on the Government’s side, was that five-years as the norm is a bad idea. That was the weight of the evidence before the Select Committee and the experience of active politicians such as my noble friend Lord Grocott, so where is the evidence in favour of five years? I have looked hard to find it. I have read very carefully the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, to see what arguments he advanced. He said that it would be possible to plan more easily if you had five-year terms. I fail to understand why planning cannot take place whether the norm is four years or five years. It is an entirely bogus argument.

Secondly, the point was made that you would have a longer time in which to implement your provisions. The throw-away remark of Mr George Osborne which appears in Mr Laws’s book appears to be the reason for five years. It states:

“George Osborne made the point that five-year Parliaments were better, as they allowed governments to get into implementing their plans before having to start worrying about the timing of the electoral cycle”.

Presumably, that would depend entirely upon the length of time their plans took in any individual case. It is therefore difficult to see the force of that argument.

As was said at Second Reading, when Asquith introduced the current arrangements he made it clear that he thought a five-year maximum would, in practice, lead to a four-year period of time, which he said was sufficiently close at some stages to the previous election and sufficiently near to the next election to lead to accountability. If the coalition were serious about trying to reinvigorate our politics, it would at least address that issue. The consequence of there having been a four-year fixed term is that there would have been four fewer general elections between now and 1945. If your aim is to connect more with the electorate, surely reducing the number of general elections rather than increasing them will have precisely the opposite effect of that which Mr Nicholas Clegg and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, put forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Dobbs]

I think it takes us back to 1974. I well remember Lord Callaghan, as he became. Indeed, he first introduced me to this House by giving me tea here. I owe him a great deal and I have the most profound respect for him. But I am surprised that the noble Lord should quote 1979 as being the pinnacle of constitutional principle. It was sheer self-interest based on the opinion polls, like it was for all other Prime Ministers.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I may be wrong, but my recollection is that Mr Callaghan went to the country because of a Motion of no confidence passed in the House of Commons. To describe him as choosing an election date seems, if I may say so, a little misplaced.

[Lord Dobbs]

The noble and learned Lord misunderstands me. The election date that he was going to choose was in the previous October, and that is where he got it wrong. In his own self-interest, he thought that he should soldier on, despite the evidence. Let me not be distracted, but I am surprised that the noble and learned Lord remembers 1978 and 1979 so fondly. I have to say that it is not an example that I would wish to follow.

Statistics will not resolve this issue. In the decision over whether it should be four years or five, I find myself, rather oddly, agreeing with the Deputy Prime Minister who, in a celebrated quote of his when asked if he thought 12 months here or there mattered very much, replied, “No, I do”. I think that he summed up the situation admirably. So let us have five years. I do not know if it is a matter of principle, as my noble friend Lord Marks says—I probably would not go that far—or of sheer practicality, but it is as close to the norm as four years. If any of the political parties find it somehow offensive, they are entirely at liberty to change it. All they have to do is to win an election, and because of this Bill they will have the immense benefit of knowing precisely when that election will be held.

Even taking the extreme position of supposing that every Parliament runs its full term, a premise that personally I doubt very much, surely extending the average length of a Parliament from the present four-and-a-half years to five does no great disservice to our constitution, and by enhancing the possibility of sensible, long-term government, it offers considerable benefits in compensation.

[Lord Rennard]

My Lords, in 2005, together with my noble friend Lord Razzall, I was responsible for the Liberal Democrat general election campaign. The manifesto for that campaign contained a commitment to fixed-term Parliaments and specified terms of four years. Obviously I have changed my mind, and I should like to give the Committee three good reasons why I have done so. However, before I do that, I would point out to some noble Lords opposite that only last year they fought a general election on a manifesto promising that, if re-elected to government, the party would legislate for fixed-term Parliaments. The party has still not said how it would have legislated to “ensure” that there would be fixed-term Parliaments, and made no mention whatever of what the term of those fixed-term Parliaments would be. If the case for four years rather than five years was so absolutely clear cut, as suggested by some noble Lords opposite, I wonder why it was not included in the Labour Party manifesto of only last year.

The first reason why I think I have changed my mind is through simply looking at the balance of a five-year term for a Parliament and how much of that time might be spent governing or how much doing anything else. My noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames referred to the case for more pre-legislative scrutiny. I feel quite strongly that in the circumstances we have in this year in this Parliament, our legislation would be rather better if there was more draft legislation and more pre-legislative scrutiny, and I hope that when fixed terms of five years become the norm, there will be more of a case for such scrutiny in the first year of a Parliament, which would be good for the governance of the country.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Knowing that this Parliament is going to last for five years, surely there is time for pre-legislative scrutiny of this Bill. Why does the noble Lord not support that position in relation to this Bill?

[Lord Rennard]

In this Bill, we do not necessarily know whether we will have five-year terms or not. If the noble and learned Lord has his way, we will have four-year terms, not five years.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Am I given to understand that the reason for not giving this Bill any pre-legislative scrutiny is fear that it may not get through?

[Lord Rennard]

No, indeed. There are many things that require considerable scrutiny. But it seems to me that the actual principle of a fixed-term Parliament has been considered a number of times in a number of ways. I happen to think, for the reasons I am trying to advance, that five years is more logical. The first reason is that the first year of a Parliament would, more normally in the future, provide more time for draft legislation and pre-legislative scrutiny. As we all know, the last year of a Parliament tends to be given over to government campaigns rather than legislation. If we had only four years and the first year was dominated more by pre-legislative scrutiny and the last year dominated more by campaigning, only two years of government out of the four would be effective. That, as my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames said, is the problem with the US system. There, the period is four years, but everybody knows that in the first two years the President governs and then, after the mid-term elections, the second two years are all about campaigning for re-election.

There are two other points which are quite significant. They have not been made in this debate and some noble Lords opposite may wish to address them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

I should like to comment on that because the experts were, for the most part, either politicians or distinguished academics; they were not people who had seen government from the inside. That is why I am anxious to express this alternative point of view.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

First, a number of the politicians had been Ministers. Does the noble Lord regard that as government from the inside—or were they kept from the inside by Sir Humphrey on a regular basis? Secondly, on the basis of the argument he has made, if the noble Lord was given a choice between five and six years, I assume he would choose six years because there would be even less wearisome elections then.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

The noble and learned Lord tempts me.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Please be tempted.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

A balance has to be struck and I would strike it at five years.

On the previous day in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, urged a referendum on the question of the day of the week that polling should take place. In his speech today, he did not urge a referendum on going to a four-year term, which is a greater constitutional change than a change in the day of the week for voting.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Well, he can be accused, because noble Lords opposite will accuse him. But any reasonable person would see that, in setting the basis for a fixed-term Parliament, one could not take account five years out of the possible political vicissitudes, waves and currents in the intervening five years. If this Bill becomes law, the Prime Minister will be locked in, as will any other Prime Minister in future.

I was going to make this point later, but this is an opportune time to make it. I thought that a large part of the noble and learned Lord’s argument was that this measure is the glue that holds the coalition together. However, unless I am mistaken—and I stand to be corrected if I am—the terms of his amendment would still leave standing the election to take place on 7 May 2015. The noble and learned Lord shakes his head.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I want to correct that, because it is certainly not my intention, which is to have four years, four years, four years and so on. It is certainly not to have five years and then four years. There may be an issue with the drafting, but this is intended to set four years as the term, so be under no illusion.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am grateful for that clarification because I had interpreted his amendment as leaving 7 May 2015 to stand and that thereafter there would be four years. I am grateful to hear the noble and learned Lord say that that was not the intention, because that was going to be the answer that I gave to my noble friend Lord Cormack. I accept that it may well be an error in the drafting.

The point that I would make is that this Parliament was elected for a maximum of five years, so in moving to a fixed-term Parliament regime we are embodying that in the Bill—and then thereafter also to have five years. That is the point that I make to the noble Lord, Lord Butler. Of course it is right and it goes without saying that no Parliament can bind its successor. The noble Lord and others say that there is no need for this legislation, but what we are seeking to do is to have fixed-term Parliaments on into the future. Other Parliaments can repeal that, but obviously it would take primary legislation to repeal a system of fixed-term Parliaments. I would very much hope that, having established the principle of fixed-term Parliaments, in the same way as we have fixed terms for devolved Assemblies, for local government and for the European Parliament, fixed terms would become the norm.

I take the point made by my noble friends Lord Marks and Lord Rennard with regard to pre-legislative scrutiny. I have been at the receiving end of many complaints about the lack of such scrutiny. There is an issue about the first year of a Government, because when they come into office they want to get on and start dealing with things. One can readily imagine the criticism that would come from the Opposition if a Government were not doing anything. However, there has been a move over the years to having more pre-legislative scrutiny, which has the effect of increasing the workload on both Houses. It is not fanciful to imagine that, following the election in 2015, a Government of whatever colour will not be able to commence their first Session of legislation with more substantive Bills until there has been a considerable amount of pre-legislative scrutiny. So we are talking about the beginning of 2016 as the time when some key pieces of legislation are introduced, having properly been looked at beforehand.

The final year, whether the term is four years or five years, is always going to be one when those seeking re-election look to their constituencies. That would reduce by some way the effective time for legislation by a Government. My noble friend Lord Norton made the point in one of our debates on the first day in Committee that Governments might run out of steam in the fifth year. Allowing for pre-legislative scrutiny and knowing that there will be five years allows for the legislative programme to be planned more effectively. The fifth year, particularly if it is a full year, not one starting at the end of November with a wash-up in the middle of March, would then be used much more effectively.

I defer to the huge experience of the noble Lord, Lord Martin, as he was Speaker of the other place and has an understanding of the parliamentary process. However, the final year, be it the fifth or the fourth year, would inevitably be one when the shadow of the coming election loomed. I also point out that my understanding is—although I may be corrected—that now Thursday debates in the other place are very often chosen by a Back-Bench Committee and that the Government have given power to the Back-Bench Committee to determine the subject matter for debate. I would be interested to know how many Divisions there have been on Thursdays in the first Session of a Parliament, as the noble Lord made the point about how few there were in the fifth Session. That is another measure that this Government have taken to put more power in the hands of Parliament rather than the Executive.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, will get an opportunity in future to intervene. I am sure that he will make a speech on another set of amendments, to which I shall be more than happy to reply.

At the moment, we have a system that allows up to a maximum of five years. In fact, three of the past five Parliaments have gone for five years. To remove that possibility requires a more compelling argument than we have heard. To move for four years would leave the effective working life of a Parliament and a Government sufficiently curtailed that they would not be able to implement their manifesto provisions. Therefore, I ask the House to support the idea of a five-year fixed term and ask the noble and learned Lord in those circumstances to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, I will of course withdraw my amendment at the end of the debate because the purpose of debate at this stage was in order to probe and examine the arguments. The noble and learned Lord’s speech was well delivered but disappointing because it ultimately did not address the central argument being put against him: that the effect is to change our constitution, where there is a five-year maximum but the norm is around four years, to one where the norm becomes five years save in exceptional circumstances.

What everyone around the House was asking him was: why are you making this change if we have to make the judgment on what is in the best interests of good governance in this country? The Minister never answered that question at all but it is at the heart of the debate. This is not a party-political point. The reason that the noble and learned Lord cannot answer the question is that good old Mr Laws, in order to make it clear that the record should not be perverted in any way, has explained why it is five years. I do not know why the noble and learned Lord, who is an honourable man, is weaving and dodging on this. Just say, “They wouldn’t do a deal with us unless we agreed five years”. Do not try and make it something that it is not.

One of the other things that emerged so strongly from this very powerful debate was the sense that the more one talked about it, the more this House felt uneasy about being locked into this straitjacket that the Bill brings. I am in favour of fixed-term Parliaments, in the sense that I can see it to be appropriate that Parliament should in some way endorse what the Prime Minister has decided about an election. However, the Government are saying, “You have to choose between five years and four years”. I detected a real sense of unease around the House on this, but the Government are putting it that we have got to make this choice. Therefore, looking at the arguments, let us see which the best choice is. The noble and learned Lord himself said what the reason is that the Government are doing this.

Now, I cannot find my note. That would give my noble friend Lord Foulkes an opportunity to ask me a question, but I do not think that he wants to ask me any questions. I am sorry about that.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My noble and learned friend is aware that I have just spent the last year of a four-year term in the Scottish Parliament. We happen to have been legislating right up to the very last day of that Parliament. There has been none of the kind of lassitude, or the feeling that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, described as an end-of-term—what word I am I looking for?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Yes, I mean lame duck; I knew I would get it eventually. I can tell my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer that one of the architects of the four-year fixed-term Parliament in Scotland was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

How grateful I am for all that. I know that the Minister will have listened to it all.

To go back to my point, the noble and learned Lord is making us choose between five and four years, but the arguments that his Government put forward are all on the accountability side. That is what makes the case being advanced so absurd. Again, in the evidence that the Deputy Prime Minister gave to the examination of the Bill, he said in justifying it that,

“it is an unambiguous judgment on our part that reducing the power of the executive, seeking to boost the power of the legislature, making the legislatures more accountable to people ... collectively introduces the mechanisms by which people can exercise greater control over politicians”

How could he have been trying to justify the Bill as giving more accountability in a process that left the electorate with less ability to get rid of Governments, because there would be fewer general elections? What is so odd about the Government’s position is that they rely upon accountability and then propose something that produces less of it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

Is the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, not prepared to concede that it may just be that, in spite of the frivolous tones in which he dismisses the arguments, my right honourable friend Mr Osborne may just have been right?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

He might have been, but I would not rely on anybody whose point of principle—this one was adopted for years by the Liberal Democrats—evaporates in the course of one sentence in a negotiation. Say that it is a compromise or a deal done to benefit the country, but do not say that it is a point of principle which switched in the course of negotiations. That is the weakness of the argument, in my respectful submission, that the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, was making.

The noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, made an impressive speech. I have never heard statistics more blatantly abused than by him. Perhaps I might draw attention to two particular points. First, he chose his starting point as October 1974 to ignore the February to October 1974 point, as he explained. Secondly, the difficulty with the fact that there was one election where the date was forced upon the Prime Minister by a Motion of no confidence was simply obliterated from his mind completely, so that he focused only on 1978. What he said was accurate in that, obviously, in choosing the date that they have for elections Prime Ministers are motivated by the chances of winning. That is the basic reason why one has a fixed-term Parliament but it does not really assist in determining between four and five years.

The speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, was the most admirable. I say that genuinely, having worked with him. He was the Cabinet Secretary in 1997 when we took power and, having seen the talent of the noble Lord, I can genuinely understand how he would find the elected politicians quite wearisome to start with, particularly when they come into power with no experience of any sort of government. If I were him, I would have the least often elections as possible but, as people have made the point, this debate is just as much about accountability as about stable government. The reason that the Bill is being brought forward—this is the Government’s defence—is because the public are fed up with the politicians and want more accountability and more mechanisms to have control over them. The idea that you do that by extending the length of a Parliament, which is the effect of this, seems, with the greatest respect, to be nonsense. Nothing could be better designed to reduce confidence in government than the disingenuous explanations that have been put forward for the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill in the course of this debate. I will withdraw my amendment, but it will be back. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, since he had a go at me, can he quote one piece of evidence that the public generally want four-year elections?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Can the noble Lord quote one bit of evidence in favour of five years? I suspect that the public have no view on whether it should be four years or five; it is for us to judge.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

I shall answer on the noble and learned Lord’s behalf. The evidence given to the Power commission was clearly in favour of more elections rather than fewer, not more than four years apart.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, the noble Baroness has done us a real favour in introducing her amendment. It is a mischievous one, as she knows, but she has brought before us a subject that may come again. Personally, I hope it does not. As one who believes strongly in the virtue and value of a non-elected second Chamber, I hope that this Chamber will not be abolished and replaced by another. The noble Baroness has indicated the sort of things that could happen if there were two elected Chambers. There is the challenge over which is the more legitimate, and the challenge as to whether you can possibly—even though you may wish to—retain the supremacy of the other place if a second Chamber here is elected. Many of us believe that you cannot. Many of us believe that it is far simpler, better and less ambiguous to have one mandate held by one House, rather than a mandate divided between two.

It will be interesting to see whether my noble and learned friend the Minister can give us some of the answers that the noble Baroness sought. He ought to reflect, as should others in government, on the wise words of Ernest Bevin, one of the greatest Foreign Secretaries that our country has had in the past century. Talking of some political problem, he said:

“If you open that Pandora’s box, you never know what Trojan horses will jump out”.

I urge the wisdom of those words on my noble and learned friend before he replies.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Cormack: we are grateful to my noble friend Lady Hayter for raising these issues. It is important to emphasise that the Government have put forward these proposals for constitutional reform so that they are all part of a package. The three parts of the package are the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill, the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill and the House of Lords Reform Bill. It is important for the noble and learned Lord to give at least some answers to what my noble friend Lady Hayter has said, but there is a more important underlying point. At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, said to my noble friend Lord Rooker, “Oh, you can’t say that, because we voted for the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill on the basis that it is a five-year fixed term”. I very much hope that we will not hear any more of that sort of talk from the Government, because they were given the opportunity to put the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill together—

[Lord Rennard]

My Lords—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I am not going to give way, if you do not mind. As I say, the Government were given the opportunity to put these things together but they did not take it. It seems to me that the consequence of not taking that opportunity is that when Parliament debates these issues again on the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill or on Lords reform, we will not regard ourselves as bound by the previous decisions that have been made—for example, we might conclude that four years was better than five for a fixed-term Parliament—because the Government explicitly refused the opportunity to put these constitutional reforms together despite the fact that they were urged to do so not just by the Opposition but by the cross-party constitutional committees in both Houses of Parliament.

I shall be interested to hear the noble and learned Lord’s view on how we deal with possible inconsistencies between one of the Government’s constitutional reform package Bills and another. Presumably, that is done by amending the later Bill when we see what the right answer is. I now give way to the noble Lord, Lord Rennard.

[Lord Rennard]

I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord is being consistent in his arguments. There seemed to be a lot of criticism of the fact that in previous legislation two items were put together—the voting referendum and the constituency boundaries. Now he is suggesting that the third item—this Bill—and House of Lords reform should all be put in the same package. I do not understand his argument. I was simply suggesting that when we have decided things we should try to be consistent about them.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

As regards the AV referendum and the parliamentary boundaries, we saw what was proposed in relation to both of those. The issue was whether they both needed to be included in one Bill. We knew what the proposals were.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McAvoy]

My Lords, I rise briefly in support of the principle in my noble friend’s amendment, because it would bring a discipline into what has happened ever since this Government took power, which has been the continual tampering with the constitution for petty party-political advantage. That is a fact of life. I do not like to be provocative, but I am trying to find the words that would best describe this matter. I have mulled over words such as “sleazy”, but if I continued, my words would probably be unparliamentary, and I would not wish to be responsible for any more damage to the office furniture. However, as a former business manager in the Commons, I consider that we are dealing with a completely foolhardy approach to the constitution. We have conventions here, but ever since the advent of this coalition, particularly for the party advantage of one of the partners in the coalition, the majority party opposite is being driven along to stay in power. Precedents are being set that are damaging to the conventions of this House, the other House and the constitution. I appeal to Conservative Members of the coalition, such as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, whose comments are welcome, that it is past the time that they should put a stop to the roughshod treatment of the constitution.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, I support what my noble friend Lord McAvoy said; I support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Grocott; and I support the approach taken by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack. It is worrying when everyone who knows anything about this says—and I do not include myself; I refer to three distinguished ex-Members of the other place—that the effect of there being no control over the Government on how long a Session lasts means that they can play fast and loose with however long it takes them to get the legislation that they want through Parliament. That weakens the power of Parliament. A lot of the constitutional rhetoric of this Government was on strengthening the power of Parliament.

I wish to ask a specific question, because it would appear that the Government understood this position on 25 May 2010, when the Deputy Leader of the House of Commons said in relation to the Bill:

“There is a strong case for pre-legislative scrutiny, but I do not want to extend the consideration of this legislation into the following Session, because that would not be appropriate”.—[Official Report, Commons, 25/4/10; col. 152.]

He understood the importance of Sessions. He said that on 25 May 2010. Happily for him, on 13 September 2010, the Session was then extended until May 2012, thereby getting rid of the one problem that stood in the way of pre-legislative scrutiny. Can the noble and learned Lord specifically answer as to why the Deputy Leader of the House broke that promise? “Promise” may be overstating it. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord should characterise what the Deputy Leader meant. Was it wild musing as to what might happen? Why did he not go ahead with what he had said?