Public Order Act 1986: Section 5

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 10th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. The Government keep all legislation under review at all times. The very fact that this discussion is taking place on this question means that we have looked at the legislation today and looked at the applicability of certain matters. There is a balance to be made. Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 has stood the test of 39 years to date, through a range of protests, a range of measures and a range of Governments. It has stood the test of time.

We keep it under review, but the important principle behind it is that Section 5 of the Public Order Act gives a clear definition of harassment and intimidation. Protest crosses the criminal threshold where it goes into harassment and intimidation. That is why the prosecution was taken in the case to which I believe the noble Baroness referred, and why, in other cases, prosecutions have not been taken.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it is vital, of course, that, despite social trends, the law remains consistent and is applied in a way that is fair and even. Concerns about political correctness and what is socially acceptable should not determine how a statute such as Section 5 is applied. Recent protests have seen the law applied unevenly in the opinion of some, and clearly threatening antisemitic slogans have been permitted without question. I therefore ask the Minister what discussions he has had with police forces about the thresholds for using Section 5 of the Public Order Act. Can he guarantee that, following these discussions, the police will be under no doubt as to what is and is not permissible under this threshold?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

What I can give the noble Lord is an assurance that the police will treat all members of the community on an equal basis before the law. Where actions have been taken by any protester—be they antisemitic, anti-Islamic, anti-Christian or anti any faith—if they cross the threshold of potential investigation/prosecution/conviction, that will be taken forward on an equal basis by the police. We keep these matters under discussion all the time. There is in my view no such thing as two-tier policing. The police do a job effectively and they will take action when matters are brought to their attention.

Electric Cycles: Illegal Use on Roads

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 10th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the work that the noble Baroness has done on this matter. The Private Members’ Bills that she has brought forward have been very instrumental in raising this issue. It is self-evidently an issue: in the course of the day, none of us will drive or walk around and not see somebody committing an offence that should be taken to court and dealt with. The police have many calls on their time, and they have to be there to see the potential offence and catch the individual at that time. I am very hopeful that the 13,000 extra neighbourhood police officers that this Government are putting in place will be able to help support that enforcement and that action. I remind the noble Baroness that those are 13,000 officers that were not there over the previous 14 years.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, leading on from the Minister’s answer, this is a serious matter, which needs to be addressed by government. I wager that every noble Lord has seen some sort of illegality related to electric cycles, such as speeding violations or people riding them on pavements, and by cyclists, such as running red lights and failing to stop at zebra crossings. In light of this, can I ask the Minister whether the current legal framework around e-cycles and e-scooters is well understood by the public and, indeed, the police? If not, what steps are being taken to address it? Does he consider that sufficient attention is being given by the police to this issue? If not, what is his department doing to remedy it?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. It is important that cyclists particularly understand and know the legislation that appertains to their responsibility in using a bike or e-bike. Going back to the point made earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, 324 offences were undertaken and arrests were made in the City of London; over 1,000 were undertaken in the remainder of the Metropolitan Police area, and there were many more across the country at large. For those offences, individuals need to know that, if you go through a traffic light, ride on a pavement or crash into somebody, there is a consequence for you if you are seen by a police officer and brought to account. The new offences will mean that the dangerous behaviour that the noble Lord has mentioned of potential injury or potential death by going across a zebra crossing or going through a red light will face a significant punishment of custodial terms. People—drivers, pedestrians and, dare I say it, cyclists—need to understand that.

National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations 2025

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Thursday 5th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Cryer. I have a high level of sympathy with the points that he raised. Indeed, when we discussed the Iran sanctions regime in Grand Committee, many of those arguments were made and made powerfully. I hope that the Minister will respond to that specific point. I also associate myself with the questions asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate. I want to expand on a couple of them and ask some further supplementary questions.

First, I thank the Minister for outlining in clear terms the instruments. There are areas where I agree with him very strongly. The FIR scheme, which was passed as a result of considerable cross-party work, is one that I and my party support. As a veteran of each stage of that Bill, now Act, and all of the discussions there, I am very pleased that the Government are now in a position to bring this scheme into effect. It is an important measure. I thank the officials for their work in putting it together because its importance will rely on the fact that it is both reliable and enforceable; it therefore has to be right. I know that there has previously been some debate around the speed at which the Government are doing it but, from my point of view, it was always about getting it right.

On implementation, it is interesting to see these measures. I will ask a couple of questions relating to them. As the Minister indicated, we previously discussed in the Chamber the announcement that Iran and Russia and their state entities are to be on the first enhanced tier list. I will come to China in a moment. I am content on the publication of information under Sections 65, 68 and 70, as these regulations state, but can the Minister say a bit more about how searchable they will be and how easily accessible they will be on GOV.UK? I know that there will be an online portal. Can the Minister say a little more about that? The value of them will be in how transparent and accessible they are, rather than just being available online, but that is a minor consideration.

I now want to ask a couple of questions with regards to publication. The regulations state that, in terms of one of the exemptions from publication, the Secretary of State will be able to make a decision if a person will have information published about them that is likely to be seriously prejudicial to commercial interests. I would suspect that anybody who does not wish their information to be published, even if they have to do so under threat of prosecution, will state that that information is prejudicial to their commercial interests.

I hope that the Minister is able to say that that is an extremely high bar and it will be very hard to litigate, because what I want to see avoided is anybody who is in a position of seeking to hide the information, having been forced to register it, then having a whole phalanx of lawyers to state what the commercial interests may well be. That will drive a coach and horses through the principle of the transparency of this. I hope the Minister can reassure me on that point.

I will come back to some of the aspects of the exemptions in a moment, but first, on Iran, I am satisfied, as I said in the Chamber in response to the Statement. I hope that the Minister will take very seriously the points raised in the Chamber. It was referenced in the impact assessment of the regulations:

“Iran may introduce reciprocal measures to monitor the overseas activities of the UK government. Persons could be prosecuted if engaged in unregistered arrangements or activity, even if the activity itself is legitimate. There is a potential risk of discrimination and exclusion against the diaspora of Iranians living in the UK”.


What proactive work is being done, given that the Home Office has recognised that there may well be a threat to the diaspora within the UK? How has that community been contacted in advance of the scheme being put into operation, given the fact that the risk has already been identified? I hope that the Government are doing this, because we have already seen—as the Minister is well aware, and as we debated in the Chamber—the reach of the Iranian regime within the UK and the threat to those who have sought asylum from it.

The same will apply to Russia: the same risk assessment was provided for Russia, of course. I should state that I have a slight interest when discussing Russia and Russian sanctions, given that I have been sanctioned. I appreciate that the guidance is being issued, but can the Minister confirm that, for the bodies listed in the regulations, any commercial or legal entities in the UK that are providing services for these entities will equally come under the remit of the Part 1 and 2 bodies in the legislation? There should be no loopholes for UK-based entities providing services for those entities because, as we know, Russia and Iran are expert at seeking to circumvent arrangements that the UK puts in place.

I noticed that the impact assessment, under “Rationale for intervention”, mentions

“certain academic and research activities which are directed by the government of Iran”,

and it is similar for Russia. That leads me on to the exemptions. The Government have identified that “academic and research activities” are a tool that is being used, and they are now bringing forward an exemption for them. I do not understand this, and I hope the Minister can say in very clear terms the rationale behind exempting exactly those areas of activity which the rationale in the regulations cites as reasons for their being brought in. I hope that we will be able to have a bit more clarity when it comes to the exemptions. It is important because we know that these very areas, which include academia, research and the use of sovereign funds, and those that are facilitating the investment and advice of those sovereign funds, are exactly the instruments by which we have seen attempted foreign interference. The area where we have seen that on “an epic scale” is from China.

That leads me to the point that the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, indicated with regard to China. This week, we have been debating the Government’s strategic defence review. It starts with reference to China supporting the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine. We know that the director-general and the former director-general of MI5 have referred on the record to the enormous efforts that the CCP and the Chinese Government have deployed with regard to espionage and attempted espionage in the UK. In October 2023, the director-general went public and said that more than 20,000 people in the UK had been approached covertly by Chinese spies. We know that that pace has accelerated since then, but the Government do not believe it is warranted for China state enterprises or state entities to register their activities under the enhanced tier.

The noble Viscount quite rightly quoted the Secondary Legislation Committee of this House, which drew to our attention the threat posed by China, and the Home Office’s response as to why China is not on the enhanced tier list. The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee quoted the Home Office saying, and this may be in the Minister’s notes:

“Countries are considered separately for specification on the enhanced tier and decisions are made based on a robust evidence base”.


I have not seen any evidence base published by the Government as to why China would not be on an enhanced tier, given the “epic scale” of its attempts not only to subvert our institutions but to co-opt them to act in espionage. The director-general of MI5 gave examples of more than 20 instances where China was actively seeking to use UK companies and universities, through investments and learning agreements, to access sensitive information and technology. The Government are proposing to exempt those exact areas from these measures, and I do not know why.

The Minister also referenced the exemption of sovereign wealth funds. This piqued my interest, because I raised this during the passage of Bill. I raised it in January 2023 when I specifically cited the

“sovereign wealth fund of a state, which might or might not be listed on a stock exchange and which may or may not, in effect, be a private sector arm of the interests of a foreign power”.—[Official Report, 11/1/23; col. 1476.]

I sought clarification from the Minister in the previous Government with regard to that, and I was told that sovereign wealth funds would be within the scope of this legislation. I just cannot understand why this Government have changed the assurance that I received from the previous Government, so that sovereign wealth funds will no longer be part of this. The deployment and the investment of sovereign wealth funds and pension funds in key UK infrastructure is of course something that we should focus on, whether or not it is part of the information to be published. I hope very much that Chinese investment, sovereign wealth funds and pension funds, and also the lack of published information for those who will claim some form of commercial sensitivity, will not be used to circumvent what we worked very hard to achieve, which is to prevent the kind of interference that the Government have said they are concerned about. I hope that before we are asked to support these regulations in the Chamber, we are given very clear reassurances, so that my concerns can be assuaged.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, these four draft regulations represent the next step in operationalising the foreign influence registration scheme established under Part 4 of the National Security Act 2023, a piece of legislation introduced by the previous Conservative Government. I am sure that the Minister will be pleased to hear that we support these instruments. They provide essential tools better to protect our national security from covert foreign influence, a matter of the utmost importance.

As the Minister explained, the regulations are designed to enhance transparency, deter malign activity and enable earlier disruption of potentially harmful arrangements directed by hostile states. In an increasingly complex and contested geopolitical environment, this is both necessary and timely.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The noble Lord has obviously made a decision that, even though China is not on the enhanced tier, Confucius institutions, Chinese pension funds and Chinese state funds will now be exempted. I assume that the Conservatives support that.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Indeed—I think I will cover that point as I go along.

Although we support the intent and scope of these measures, scrutiny must not end there. These regulations are not purely technical instruments; they go to the heart of how the UK responds to evolving and increasingly sophisticated state threats. It is in that spirit that I raise three points.

First, the omission of China from the enhanced tier is quite simply a glaring absence. There is now consistent cross-party consensus, reflected in previous debates in both Houses and across the intelligence community, that China poses a systemic and strategic challenge to the United Kingdom. China has targeted Members of this Parliament, launched cyberattacks on UK institutions and engaged in covert activity on British soil. In 2021, it sanctioned two Members of this House and, in 2024, the Government publicly attributed malicious cyber campaigns against MPs and the Electoral Commission to the Chinese state. These are not isolated incidents; they are part of a wider sustained pattern. Given this record, it is difficult to understand why China has not yet been put under the enhanced tier of this scheme.

The Government have stated that they do not comment on individual countries, and that designations are made on a case-by-case basis. However, this is not about speculation but about providing clarity and strategic coherence in our approach to national security. The public and Parliament are entitled to understand the rationale behind such decisions, particularly when the state in question has been repeatedly named by the intelligence community as a principal source of hostile activity. Indeed, the Home Office’s own professional guidance lists Russia, Iran and China as the foremost state-based threats. The director-general of MI5 has echoed this view, as has already been said this afternoon. So why the inconsistency? What message does it send, either to those carrying out covert activities or to our international partners, when a state widely recognised as a threat is excluded from a scheme specifically designed to counter exactly this kind of behaviour? I therefore urge the Government to reconsider this decision, or at the very least to provide a clearer public explanation of their current position.

On enforcement and oversight, effective implementation is vital and registration requirements must be communicated clearly. Guidance must be accessible, and enforcement must be proportionate and consistent across sectors and regions. Can the Minister confirm that the necessary resources are in place to support enforcement, and that compliance will be monitored in a structured and transparent manner? We note that Section 82 of the National Security Act 2023 requires the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on the scheme’s operation, which is welcome, but can the Minister confirm whether that report will include an assessment of the effectiveness of the current exemptions, and whether further exemptions or additional country designations are under active consideration?

Finally, although this scheme is a welcome development, we must acknowledge that it is only one part of a much broader challenge. Hostile states are adapting constantly. Disinformation, cyber interference, economic coercion and influence operations now span multiple domains. Responding effectively demands not just new legal frameworks but a whole of government approach, with sustained investment in resilience, cross-sectoral co-ordination and continued international alignment.

In conclusion, we support these measures, which are necessary, appropriate and overdue, but they must be implemented in a manner that is robust, proportionate and responsive to the evolving nature of state threats—not just today but in the years ahead. We remain concerned about the exclusion of China from the enhanced tier. We urge the Government to keep this matter under close and continuous review, and to act with greater transparency about the strategic direction of our national security posture.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful both to the contributors to this short debate and for the broad support that has been given for the regulations before the Committee. I will try to answer each noble Lord in turn. There might be a bit of overlap, because some of the issues that have been raised do overlap, but I will try to cover the points raised by each noble Lord in turn.

I shall start with my noble friend Lord Stansgate, who mentioned cyber and cyberattacks. I assure him that the security services, the agencies, the Home Office and the UK Government are acutely aware of hostile states potentially undertaking attacks, and of criminal gangs doing the same. Significant work, which my noble friend would not expect me to talk about in public, is ongoing to ensure the safety and security of our citizens. I give him that assurance as a whole.

My noble friend asked in particular about the exemptions for students and the impact on small businesses or small organisations. I will take the latter first. The registration process is designed to be as simple as possible—this touches on a point mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. The Home Office anticipates that the process should take a maximum of 30 minutes. We are not expecting small businesses or micro-businesses to register in large numbers if they are in direct relationships with foreign powers, but—again, this goes to a point made by a number of noble Lords—there is comprehensive guidance online to support the registrant and their process, and to support individuals and larger organisations. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating, self-evidently, but we are confident that that will be a relatively simple process from 1 July onwards. Again, I put out the hand of friendship to all noble Lords: if there is feedback downstream on how the scheme operates, from any perspective that is brought to their attention, we would welcome it.

My noble friend Lord Stansgate also asked for clarification on the education exemption. Where someone is in an arrangement with a foreign power and is completing a course in further study, they do not necessarily need to register activities, but it is reasonable to complete the course of education; to uphold the reputation of the provider; to meet the standards of conduct expected by the providers of financial assistance; and to notify any person of personal information. Again, I hope that that is helpful.

My noble friend Lord Stansgate and the noble Lords, Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned China. I may as well hit that point and discuss it at this time. I think that they all know the answer to the question they asked, but I will give it in the phraseology I have to use. Each country is considered on its merits and no decisions have been made. Countries are considered separately for specification and decisions are made on evidence.

On China more broadly, we have been clear as a Government that we are going to take a consistent, long-term, strategic approach to managing the UK’s relations with China. This means co-operating where we can, competing where we need to and challenging robustly where we must, including on areas of national security. However, each country is considered on its merits and no decisions have been made. The regulations before the Committee highlight two specific nations where we believe there is a significant threat—Russia and Iran—which is why we have brought them forward. I hope that helps my noble friend Lord Stansgate on his points.

I am pleased to see my noble friend Lord Cryer continuing his long interest in issues related to Iran. I know that he has raised this in the Chamber on a number of occasions. He asked what happens if there is a failure to register. That will be a criminal offence in the event of an individual’s activities coming to light linked to a registered nation under the regulations before us today and will carry a potential penalty of five years’ imprisonment. That is not for me to judge. That is for the courts to judge and the police to prosecute, but that is certainly part of this issue today.

My noble friend mentioned in particular the impact on parliamentarians. There is no requirement for parliamentarians who are being lobbied to register with the scheme, and that allows the democratic process to continue. He commented on proscription and mentioned Hamas. Hamas is not specified. The regulations would cover anyone in a relationship with the IRGC in Iran but, as ever, for any organisation, at any time, the Government keep under review the question of proscription. At the moment, this is where we are, but we keep everything under review at all times accordingly. As my noble friend will know, the arrests on 17 May of three Iranian nationals who have been charged with offences under the National Security Act show that the Government are consistent. That matter will go before the courts and be determined by the judiciary in due course.

My noble friend also mentioned proxies. Although I have touched on this, I think it is important that I say that it is the person who is in a relationship with the foreign power who has to register. Therefore, those who are proxies are within the scheme, for example, companies acting under the direction of the Russians or the Iranians. If the proxy is not registered, then the person in the UK acting on their behalf could well be committing an offence. Again, it is our intention to ensure that we act in the interests of national security and of the United Kingdom as a whole.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, raised a number of points. Again, I am grateful for his broad support and thank him for that support to date and in getting the legislation in this House in the past. He mentioned commercial interests and asked whether this is a high bar. Let me, I hope, reassure him that the Government’s intention is that it should be a high bar. UK companies providing services to bodies listed will have to register. The exemptions are carefully crafted to ensure that what is out of scope is as narrow as possible, while still fulfilling the scheme’s aim. We have put in place exemptions on sovereign wealth funds, which he talked about. The exemption for sovereign wealth funds is not about prioritising growth over national security as national security remains the first priority of Government, but about ensuring that the scheme remains proportionate. The link between a sovereign wealth fund and a foreign power is inherently transparent, so requiring them to register with the scheme would bring very limited benefits. I hope that answers his point.

Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment, Surrender and Compensation) (England and Wales) Order 2025

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Thursday 5th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I join the Minister’s expressions of gratefulness towards the family of Ronan Kanda for the way that they have taken forward this campaign. I also thank the Minister and his Home Office team for the really careful way that the order has been drafted. They have considered thoroughly the representations made by members of the antique trade, collectors, historical re-enactment groups and martial art practitioners, when the easiest thing would have been to have a blanket ban on every straight-bladed sword. This would have criminalised people involved in land management, antique collecting, living history and sporting activities. I am therefore very grateful for the care and trouble that the Home Office team have taken.

I am confident that this definition is precise and specific to just these swords, but it is complex in nature and needs to be accompanied by illustrated guidance notes, as was done with zombie knives. A great deal of very well-informed amateur effort is available to help the Home Office compile these notes. Perhaps, given the enthusiasm in some bits of this Government for AI and the progress that they are making, we could equip each constable with an app on their phone that, based on the detailed knowledge that can be provided, the illustrations and other details, would enable instant identification—at least in principle—for police officers, who would not have to receive deep, separate training. Maybe there is something that we can do here to improve enforcement. There is so much complexity in this area that the idea that we are going to train constables in how to recognise whether a knife is within or without this legislation is not practical, but there are ways in which it can be done.

I am delighted that the Government have recognised the importance of historical items by including defences that are identically worded to those in previous legislation. The role of amateur collectors and people who are interested in preserving our history is really important at a time when museums are strapped for cash and resources. That being recognised and supported is enormously appreciated.

I hope that we will—well, I am sure that we will—have an opportunity when the Crime and Policing Bill comes through the House to consider extending this defence consistently across the entire area of historical weapons. There is a set of inconsistencies at the moment, particularly around World War II items, such as the sort of stuff that the SOE used—I declare an interest as someone who is descended from the political head of the SOE. It is really important that this aspect of our history is preserved. There will be an opportunity with that Bill—not, as I say, to extend the idea of the legislation but to extend its ambit—to make sure that what has been done in this order can be extended to weapons of historical significance generally.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by making it clear that we support the order before the Committee. The use of offensive weapons, such as so-called ninja swords, in violent crime is a matter of profound concern, and we recognise the devastating circumstances that led to this legislative action. The tragic death of Ronan Kanda was a heartbreak that no family should have to experience. We pay tribute to his family’s dignified and determined campaign, and acknowledge the Government’s response in bringing forward this measure.

As the Minister outlined, the order makes it an offence to manufacture, sell, import or possess ninja swords, a specific category of bladed weapon characterised by their tanto-style points and multiple cutting edges. It also introduces a surrender and compensation scheme modelled on the previous amnesty for zombie knives and machetes. These are measured and proportionate steps, and we recognise the effort that has gone into ensuring that this is a targeted and carefully drafted order.

However, we must consider what else is necessary and required beyond this intervention if we are serious about tackling the wider and more complex challenge of knife crime. We must be clear about what the order can and cannot achieve. Banning a specific category of weapon, although entirely sensible, will not address the root cause of knife crime. Tragically, those intent on violence will find other means. We must not fall into the trap of believing that legislation alone—in particular, legislation focused on the design or appearance of a blade—can resolve a problem that is systemic and growing in scale.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 2nd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for opening this debate today. It promises to be both an interesting and informative debate. I look forward to the maiden speech of my noble friend Lord Harper, who I had the pleasure of working with at the Department for Transport and who I know will make a considerable contribution to the debates in your Lordships’ House. My noble friend has previous ministerial experience in the area of immigration, and I look forward to his contribution later.

I begin by welcoming the fact that, after years of opposing measures to improve border security and clamp down on illegal migration, the Labour Party has finally realised the importance of greater control over our borders. There are some positive noises coming from the Government’s actions. Clause 41 grants the Secretary of State the ability to detain a person while they are pending a deportation decision. Clause 48 reinterprets the United Kingdom’s construction of Article 33 of the refugee convention to include conviction of an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in the list of offences that constitute particularly serious crimes for which refugees may be removed. This is, of course, right: no person who enters this country and commits a crime, regardless of their method of entry or their status, should be permitted to remain.

Unfortunately, that is where our agreement with the Bill ends. Although, as I have said, the Government have begun to move in the right direction, the Bill does too little, too slowly. It does nothing to deter illegal crossings, it does nothing to expedite the removal of illegal migrants, and it does nothing to reduce the scale of illegal immigration.

On that last point, I am very pleased to see the latest figures from the Office for National Statistics, which show that net migration to the UK for 2024 was 431,000—half the level of the previous year. This is all thanks to the efforts of the previous Conservative Government, as the ONS has acknowledged. Last year, my right honourable friend James Cleverly strengthened the Immigration Rules, raising the minimum income for those on skilled worker visas and family visas, and imposing a limit on the number of foreign students able to bring their dependants. It is clear that Conservative policies have delivered.

Let us look at what this Government have promised and what they have delivered. The 2024 Labour Party manifesto promised to

“turn the page and restore order to the asylum system so that it operates swiftly, firmly, and fairly; and the rules are properly enforced”.

Yet the Government have presided over the highest asylum figures recorded in a single quarter, with 31,276 people claiming asylum between September and December 2024. The number of people being given a grant of protection has increased to 17,477 in quarter 4 of 2024, up from 7,185 in quarter 2 of 2024. They have reversed the progress made by the previous Government in reducing asylum claims.

Not only this but the Government pledged to close all asylum hotels. After the previous Government reduced the number of asylum seekers housed in hotels to 29,585 by 30 June 2024, since the election those numbers have jumped to 38,079 on 31 December 2024, representing a rise of 22.3%. This begs the question: when will they end the use of asylum hotels, as they promised in their manifesto?

We heard time and again during the election, and indeed ever since, that the Government will “smash the gangs”, but it is now evident that this slogan was mere hyperbole. Can the Minister tell me how many gangs have been smashed by the policies of this Government? I look forward to receiving those figures, perhaps in his closing speech.

The Minister was keen to highlight the new role of the Border Security Commander and their counterterrorism-style powers. However, Clause 1(1) states that:

“The Secretary of State must designate a civil servant as the Border Security Commander”.


Clauses 3, 4 and 5 state the functions of the commander, the duty to prepare annual reports and the duties of co-operation, and that is it. What the Government have presented us with is simply a redesignated civil servant without the powers to command anything. That extends across the whole Bill.

The Government have talked up this legislation as comprising tough new measures to tackle the people-smuggling gangs, yet they are repealing two pieces of legislation which would have had that exact effect. Clauses 37 and 38 repeal the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 and the Illegal Migration Act 2023. The safety of Rwanda Act, ably taken through your Lordships’ House by my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom, would have—had it not been scrapped the day the first flight was due to take off—provided a suitable deterrent to those considering taking the journey across the channel.

The Minister has pointed to the Government’s focus on the people-smuggling gangs which facilitate channel crossings. We agree that those gangs must be pursued, for theirs is a repulsive trade, but it is not enough to simply tackle supply; we must also tackle demand. While there are large numbers of people who are undeterred from paying the traffickers, the trade will continue.

The Rwanda scheme was the deterrent that would have hit that demand for small boat crossings. This built on the work of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, and I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth for steering through that legislation, which created an obligation for the Home Secretary to remove any person who arrives illegally and prevented illegal entrants claiming asylum.

The previous Conservative Government struck a returns deal with Albania, which meant that the number of illegal arrivals of Albanian nationals fell from 12,658 in 2022 to just 924 in 2023. That is a 93% reduction in Albanian nationals illegally crossing the channel.

If the Government are serious about reducing illegal migration, why remove the deterrents that the Conservative Government legislated for? We can see the effects of the Government’s policies already; noble Lords will have seen the figures over the weekend. On 31 May, 1,194 migrants crossed the channel in small boats—the highest figure for a single day this year. This brings the total number of migrants who have crossed in small boats so far this year to 14,811; that is a 42% increase on the same point last year.

This Bill not only undoes much of that work but fails to provide suitable alternatives. The offence of endangering another during a sea crossing, as created by Clause 18, is unlikely to have any real impact because it can be committed only if a person has already committed an offence under subsections (A1), (B1), (D1) or (E1) of Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971—offences that were inserted into that Act by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, which my noble friend the Opposition Chief Whip took through this House. Moreover, Section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971 already makes it an offence to assist or facilitate unlawful entry into the United Kingdom—an offence that is punishable by life sentence thanks to the changes made by my noble friend in the Nationality and Borders Act.

Furthermore, the powers contained in Clauses 20, 21 and 23, authorising officers to search, seize and access electronic devices, already exist in Section 15 of and Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act, which the Government are repealing. Would it not make more sense to keep the existing powers, rather than repealing them and replacing them with something that is virtually identical? Of course, they would not have to include these “new” powers if they were not in the same Bill repealing Section 15 of and Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act.

It is apparent that this Bill presents a missed opportunity. Even after this legislation becomes law, activist lawyers will still be able to use the Human Rights Act to bring vexatious claims against the Government to prevent the legitimate removal of those who have abused our immigration system, entered the country illegally and committed criminal offences. The Government should follow our policy of disapplying the Human Rights Act in relation to immigration law, thereby ensuring the timely removal of those with no right to be here. The Government have indicated that they are willing to shift in this direction. The immigration White Paper states that the interpretation of Article 8 of the convention must be reconsidered; even the Attorney-General has indicated that he is open to reinterpreting the convention as well.

This Bill also presents the Government with the opportunity to tighten the conditions for visas and indefinite leave to remain. The Immigration and Visas Bill, presented by my right honourable friend the shadow Home Secretary, would ensure that indefinite leave to remain can be granted only if the applicant’s salary does not fall below £38,700 and if they do not apply for any form of state benefits. Being granted the ability to remain in the UK indefinitely is a privilege, not a right. As such, we believe that those wishing to obtain that privilege should have made a net contribution to our country. Raising the threshold for receiving earned settlement would ensure precisely that. Given the Government’s new-found vim and vigour for more stringent controls of legal migration, I am sure that they will be amenable to such policies.

Let us not forget that reducing the level of net migration to the UK is overwhelmingly backed by the British people. Polling by More in Common has found that 65% of the public believe that immigration should be reduced. I should add that that stretches to supporters of all political parties, given that 57% of Liberal Democrat voters and 49% of Labour voters support cutting immigration. Further, 62% of the public, including 61% of Liberal Democrats and 50% of Labour voters, agree that it is too easy for people to live here illegally. We would all do well to remember that this is the voice of the British public, and it is precisely what they are demanding of their parliamentarians.

This Bill does not deliver what the British people desire or deserve. Where are the powers to prevent vexatious legal challenges being used to thwart legitimate removals? Where are the powers to ensure the deportation of all foreign criminals? Where is the deterrent? Where are the measures to bring down the level of net migration? The answer, of course, is that they are simply not there. These are glaring omissions that could and should be fixed by your Lordships as the Bill progresses. We on these Benches will be seeking to strengthen this Bill to deliver on the British people’s priorities; I hope that the Government will want to follow suit.

Investigatory Powers (Codes of Practice, Review of Notices and Technical Advisory Board) Regulations 2025

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Monday 12th May 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Deben (Con)]

I wonder whether the Minister would be kind enough in his reply to give us some idea of the ongoing arrangements for the updating of this kind of material. He has shown that the constant need for this is because of the speedy change of the world outside. Who is responsible for it? How are they able to keep up to date and how regularly do we think we are likely to have statutory instruments updating the material that we have? We are dealing with an ever-changing scene which is changing ever more quickly. I would like to understand the government structure that enables us to make satisfactory changes rapidly enough to see that we are fully in control.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these regulations. These regulations implement key provisions of the Investigatory Powers Act 2024, which was passed by the previous Conservative Government. These regulations introduce three codes of practice and revise five existing ones.

The new codes provide a framework for two regimes introduced by the 2024 Act— the treatment of bulk personal datasets where there is a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy, and the authorisation of access to third-party datasets. A third new code consolidates guidance on the notices regime, including the operation of notification notices and what constitutes a relevant change—a key test for when telecoms operators must inform the Secretary of State of technical updates.

The revised codes also enhance oversight and safeguards by clarifying the conditions for lawful access to data, strengthening protection for journalistic material and requiring notification of serious data breaches where it is in the public interest. These regulations also make important structural updates to the technical advisory board, expanding its membership and adjusting its quorum rules to ensure it can operate effectively when dealing with complex or concurrent reviews.

We welcome these provisions and, with that in mind, I raise several broader points. First, on legislative responsiveness, these regulations reflect the speed at which both threats and the technologies behind them are evolving. The 2024 Act rightly introduced flexible tools for handling internet connection records and bulk data. But agile legislation should not rely solely on periodic amendments. Can the Minister confirm whether the Government plan to conduct regular reviews of the framework and whether a structured timetable has been established to ensure that the legislation continues to meet operational needs?

Secondly, on stakeholder engagement, the Government’s consultation included contributions from technology companies, civil liberties organisations and public bodies. Although this engagement is welcome, several respondents raised concerns, particularly regarding the practical implications of notification notices and the definition of “relevant change”. Given that, can the Minister outline how the Government intend to maintain an open and ongoing dialogue with stakeholders as these codes are implemented?

Finally, on oversight and accountability, the powers under discussion are significant. Their legitimacy depends on effective safeguards; this is especially true for third-party bulk datasets, where individuals may not reasonably expect their data to be protected. Can the Minister confirm that the revised codes provide the Investigatory Powers Commissioner with the necessary clarity and authority to ensure that these powers are exercised lawfully and proportionately?

The 2024 Act was designed to safeguard national security in a rapidly evolving digital world. However, the use of investigatory powers must always be lawful, properly overseen and proportionate in its impact. Although these reforms offer practical steps to modernise the existing framework, we must ensure that these powers are used responsibly, reviewed regularly and held accountable, balancing security with our democratic values.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for those two contributions. First, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, mentioned again how the Government will keep these matters under review. He will know that, basically, the 2016 Act was passed on the basis of cross-party support. The 2024 Act was a review of whether the 2016 Act needed to be amended further, while the regulations before the Grand Committee today are the outcome of some of the changes to that 2024 Act.

The Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Act made a series of targeted changes to ensure that the regime was fit for purpose but, self-evidently, the Home Office will keep under examination the new technology and the need to make any further amendments. I cannot give the noble Lord an assurance as to when and how that will be done, but he can rest assured that if amendments to the 2016 Act, which was amended in 2024, are required, they will be brought to the House as a matter of some urgency.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, also mentioned public consultation; I very much welcome his welcome for of these regulations today. The responses that the Government received included various suggestions for amendments to the draft codes of practice and the regulations. We have made changes as a result; these are quite wide but include changes to the Technology Advisory Panel’s membership requirement. I know that he mentioned telecommunication companies in particular. Again, we are satisfied that there was sufficient input from them during the passage of the 2024 Act and that the points they raised were taken into consideration when preparing the codes. Obviously, again, we need to examine the wide space between telecommunications companies’ powers and responsibilities, including their responsibility to protect the individual and the consumer. I think that we have got the balance right here.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked about oversight. Strong safeguards are in place to ensure that investigatory powers are used in a necessary and proportionate way. There is independent oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the right of redress via the Investigatory Powers Tribunal for anybody who believes they have been the victim of unlawful action by a public authority using covert investigative techniques. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner independently oversees the use of investigatory powers and will ensure that they are used in accordance with the law and in the public interest. Several other powers—I hope this also reassures the noble Lord—are subject to the double lock, where warrants must be signed by the Secretary of State and an independent judicial commissioner. These powers are deployed only in connection with the most serious of crimes or national security.

Forensic Science Regulator Draft Code of Practice 2025

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Monday 12th May 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Humphreys (LD)]

My Lords, it seems as though the Taffia are taking over.

I begin by saying what a pleasure it is to see the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, in the chair of this Committee. This is the first time I have seen her in her new role, and I congratulate her and wish her well. I know she will bring the same high level of professionalism to this role that she does to every other role she holds.

I welcome very briefly these updated provisions, which offer much-needed clarity and a more streamlined approach to compliance in incident scene examination. A consistent corporate framework is a sensible step forward in reinforcing accountability across the sector. In a field that plays such a critical role in the justice system, clear standards and effective oversight are essential. However, I would be grateful if the Minister could provide further details on two points.

First, how many small and micro businesses are currently involved in commercial forensic work? Have they all been made aware of the need to comply with the updated code? How will their compliance be monitored to ensure that standards are met across the board? Secondly, the code mentions that it will be reviewed at regular intervals. Can the Minister clarify what that means in practical terms? Certainty around the timing and process of review would help build confidence in the regulatory framework. It is essential that we ensure that all providers, large and small, are held to the same high standards to maintain the integrity of forensic evidence and the public’s trust in our justice system. This statutory instrument has the support of these Benches.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, like the Minister, I too am a fan of forensic science. I well remember the introduction of DNA evidence during my police service in the mid-1980s, and of course some very challenging crimes have been solved by scientists using forensic science.

I thank the Minister for introducing this statutory instrument. This measure brings forward version 2 of the statutory code of practice, as required under the Forensic Science Regulator Act 2021, legislation introduced by the previous Conservative Administration. These provisions marked a significant step forward, placing the regulator on a statutory footing for the first time and mandating the creation and upkeep of a code to govern forensic science activities across England and Wales.

Version 1 of the code, which came into force in October 2023, was the first statutory code of its kind anywhere in the world. It represented an important milestone in improving the quality and consistency of forensic science. Version 2, which we are considering today, introduces a series of technical and procedural amendments aimed at improving clarity, efficiency and regulatory consistency. Many of these changes respond directly to issues raised during the early implementation of the original code, such as simplifying the accreditation process and refining standards around scene examination and other forensic practices.

We welcome the introduction of a transitional period, extending to October 2025, to support providers, particularly small businesses, in adjusting to the updated requirements. We note that changes were made following a broad consultation process, which received strong support from across the forensic science community. We support efforts to strengthen forensic standards, particularly where they serve to uphold the integrity of the criminal justice system. None the less, we believe that it is right to raise several points for consideration.

First, on the question of regulatory burden, have the Government undertaken a full and transparent assessment of whether these revised provisions meaningfully reduce unnecessary bureaucracy, especially for smaller providers? Will a formal post-implementation review be carried out to ensure that the intended efficiencies are being realised without compromising quality?

Secondly, we would welcome clarity on how the regulator intends to remain responsive to future developments. Forensic science is a rapidly evolving field and it is essential that the regulatory framework remains adaptable. Can the Minister confirm whether there is a rolling review process for ensuring that the code is kept up to date in a timely manner, rather than relying solely on periodic revisions?

Finally, on stakeholder engagement, while it is encouraging that the initial consultation involved a wide range of voices, can the Minister explain how the Government intend to maintain ongoing dialogue with front-line practitioners as the code is implemented in practice?

In conclusion, this revised code of practice represents a constructive step forward in refining and strengthening the regulatory regime for forensic science. While we support the direction of travel, we will continue to monitor implementation closely and encourage the Government to remain responsive to ongoing feedback from across the sector.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Humphreys, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for their contributions. As a relative newcomer to the House, I had not realised that the noble Baroness, Lady Wilcox, had not chaired the Grand Committee before. I wish her well. I note also that all of us speaking in the Committee today have been Welsh by election—if not in my case by birth.

Counter Terrorism Policing: Arrests

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Wednesday 7th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the police, security services and other agencies across the country who have worked and continue to work around the clock to keep our country safe. Ken McCallum, the director-general of MI5, revealed last year that the British security services had foiled 43 late- stage terror plots since March 2017. Every one of these attacks threatened lives and sought to attack our very way of life. The work that our police and security services do every day should not be taken for granted, and I know the whole House will join me in recognising this work and paying thanks to those men and women who protect us.

On the events of 3 May, the scale of this operation is simply quite staggering. Eight men in total have been arrested by the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command, five on suspicion of preparation of a terrorist act in several locations across the country. I appreciate that this is a sensitive and ongoing matter and that the Minister is limited in what he can say. However, it is clear from what the Minister in the other place said yesterday that there are grounds to believe that this was a threat made at a state level by Iran.

The threat posed to British lives by Iran is considerable. Last year, Ken McCallum confirmed that the intelligence services and the police had identified 20 credible Iranian plots to kill or kidnap people in the UK since 2022. What we have seen in the last few weeks is not an isolated incident but another attempt to undermine our values, our way of life and the safety of our people. Given the scale of the risk posed by Iran and Iranian-backed organisations, I ask the Minister what advice the Government have received from the police and the intelligence agencies about proscribing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. What is the Government’s assessment of the impact of proscription in terms of how it will improve their capacity to combat the threat posed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps? Furthermore, can the Minister update the House on the discussions that the UK Government are having with their counterparts in Iran to hold them to account for the threats that that organisation poses to our democratic society and security? We have an ambassador and diplomats in Tehran. Can he confirm that urgent discussions are being undertaken with Iranian authorities on this matter? It is important that the Government take appropriate steps to strengthen their resolve against those who wish to harm us and our communities, and we on these Benches would welcome any steps made in that direction.

The news of these arrests will naturally make people worried. There will be communities around the country that feel particularly at risk, given the nature of the arrests made. Without speculating on any specific target, which I know the Minister is unable to do, can he none the less provide assurances to communities around the country that safeguards are in place to make sure that they are kept safe?

I am aware that the Minister making the Statement in the other place said the Government would not be providing a running commentary on the progress of the investigation, but can the Minister perhaps commit to keeping the House updated on any further developments?

This is a serious issue of national security, and people are feeling under threat in a very tangible sense. An assurance from the Government that they will keep us informed about how they are working to mitigate the threat we face and to implement safeguards for the future would be most welcome and would, I know, be much appreciated by the communities most likely to be targeted by the Iranian actors.

I reiterate my thanks for the work of our security services and the police, who have likely saved several lives through their work on this case alone. While I appreciate that this is an ongoing, sensitive matter, I hope the Minister will address the few questions that I have asked. I know that any assurances he can give to communities at risk will be most welcome.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I too take this opportunity to thank the security services and police for what they do. The weekend’s arrests are an important reminder of how hard they work behind the scenes to keep us all safe. The scale of the threat posed by the Iranian regime is great, and there is clear evidence of Tehran’s willingness to disregard the rule of law to silence critics and fuel extremism.

UK-based Iranians have been the main targets, with mounting proof of Iran seeking to control its citizens abroad through intimidation, harassment and violence. That culminated in last year’s stabbing of a journalist working for the TV station Iran International, attacked outside his London home; and Iranian journalists, including those working for the BBC Persian service, facing daily threats of violence. Meanwhile, Iranian intelligence continues to target Jewish and Israeli individuals abroad, spreading fear and disinformation. I too would like to know if the Minister can confirm that extra security measures are in place to provide vulnerable communities and individuals with protection and reassurance amid these direct and unacceptable attacks on both media and religious freedoms.

In opposition, the Government were clear that they supported the proscribing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation. Canada took that step in June and the United States did so in 2019, but in Britain we have yet to make that call, preferring to keep communication channels open. Does the Minister agree that this weekend’s events indicate that the policy is not working, and that now is the time for the Government to act and to proscribe the IRGC as a terrorist organisation? Not only would that allow tighter control of the UK’s borders; it would enable the police proactively to charge those who materially or financially support the IRGC and enable assets linked to the organisation to be frozen.

The Liberal Democrats have previously welcomed sanctions against those with links to the Iranian regime, and we will support proposals to sanction the Iranian-backed Foxtrot criminal network when they come before the House next week. However, we hope the Government can go further to establish whether those with links to the Iranian regime have assets here in the UK. As such, we would like to see an audit carried out so we can find out where those assets are, including those put in the name of family members, so we can freeze them accordingly.

Thanks to the work of the police and security services, we appear to have been lucky this time, but we must now heed the warning and do more to ensure that the Iranian regime’s reach cannot continue to spread. Given the threat, does the Minister agree that now is not the time to cut the overseas budget, which had previously been used to support vital resilience programmes countering Iran’s malign influence?

It is already clear that the foundations of the previous world order are shifting fast, with America increasingly taking a step back, so can the Minister reassure the House that the Government are taking steps to fill the void by working with their international partners to combat Iran and address the wider situation in the Middle East?

Police: Stop and Search

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 6th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right that intelligence-led policing is critical to making the best use of stop and search. That includes methods where individuals who have information can pass it in confidence to the police. The suggestions the noble Lord has made are important ones. It will also be helpful that we will have over this Parliament an extra 13,000 neighbourhood police officers, with neighbourhood police officers allocated to each community area. It will build confidence and trust to report those matters.

The noble Lord mentioned technology. It is no secret that the Government have been looking at the question of facial recognition and other technologies along those lines, which can spot and analyse the use and carrying of knives. That is something we are working on, although I cannot give him definitive answers today.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, as has been said many times, stop and search is a vital part of the police toolbox to tackle crime. The 2023 review by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, highlighted several areas of concern in how these powers were used. In my years of policing, I always maintained that it is vital that all officers are properly trained in how to use these powers and that they know their limitations within the law. Could the Minister update the House on how the Government are working with the College of Policing to deliver the updated national policing curriculum to ensure that guidance for stop and search is properly understood and implemented on the ground?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right; it is important there is training in the use of stop and search by police officers and that it is updated. It is important that the outcomes of stop and searches are monitored for both the impacts, which the noble Lord mentioned earlier, and to see whether racial disparities are taking place. Those should be fed back to both the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs’ Council. This is why the National Police Chiefs’ Council is issuing and regularly updating information on the race action plan, both monitoring it and examining its impact.

Knife Crime

Lord Davies of Gower Excerpts

Tuesday 6th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Education and contact in schools is probably one of the key issues that need to be challenged to give young people the skills and confidence to play a role with their friends in a way that is not in a gang—where they are not drawn into criminal activity and have the confidence to resist those temptations when they are put in front of them. The right reverend Prelate’s point is vital, and it lies with the Department for Education in England and with the devolved Administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It is key to driving up individuals’ confidence to tackle knife crime at source.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

Last year, there were around 50,500 recorded offences involving a sharp instrument. Knife crime, of course, terrifies communities and can have lethal consequences, and it is very worrying that the numbers are heading in the wrong direction. The Government reported in February that 17% of knife crime offences related to children, and over 99% of these were for possession alone. One of the great issues around this is the glorification of carrying knives among some young people, so what might the Minister have to say about tackling this glorification?