(10 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I recognise the strength of feeling with which my noble friend Lord Tyler moved his amendment; indeed, it is one to which he has spoken in the past, and one which he, I and—at some stage—my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire have discussed. We debated this issue last week when the Government tabled, and the House accepted, amendments which raised the third-party registration thresholds to £20,000 for England and £10,000 for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
An amendment providing for a new “third” registration threshold of £9,750 was also tabled and accepted. If that was not made clear, I apologise. The point has been picked up by the Electoral Commission. Perhaps I may give some clarity. This third threshold has been introduced to provide alignment with the constituency limits. It ensures that a third party, whether or not it is already registered with the Electoral Commission, will have committed an offence if it spends more than £9,750 in a constituency. In other words, if a third party is already registered, it will be subject to the constituency limit, exceeding which will be an offence. If it is not registered and exceeds the constituency registration threshold, it will also have committed an offence.
I hope noble Lords will recognise that this third registration threshold has not been introduced with the same purpose in mind as that which applies to the other registration thresholds. It has not been introduced to bring third parties into the regulatory regime. Instead, its principal purpose is to ensure that the offence of exceeding the constituency limit operates as intended. For this reason, the Government do not believe that there is a need for a registration threshold lower than the constituency limit.
I hear what my noble friend says about the need for clarity, and I hope that these words have brought greater clarity. I can also tell your Lordships that the Electoral Commission will make very clear in its guidance the operation of the various registration thresholds so that campaigners are left in no doubt about their responsibilities. I hope that the fears which my noble friend expressed on Report, that it would not be possible to keep account of what a third party was spending in a constituency, are resolved by this.
Moreover, the Government have spent a significant amount of time listening to the concerns of campaigners. Perhaps I should address my noble friend’s suggestion of a £5,000 limit. He said that £9,750 is a significant amount. We took seriously the representations made by campaigners, organisations, the commission chaired by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, and other Members of your Lordships’ House. One of the largest criticisms the Bill received, which was made abundantly clear to us, related to the registration thresholds. They were originally set at £5,000 and £2,000 in the Bill but the Government tabled an amendment last week to raise these to £20,000 and £10,000. This major concession was made with the intention of reassuring campaigners that the Bill would not seek to promote the principle of transparency by imposing onerous and unnecessary burdens on third parties. It was a direct response to the debates in and outside this House and I thank again all those who contributed to them. The increased thresholds mean that small campaigners need not worry that they will be unduly burdened by the Bill’s reporting requirements. The thresholds have been set at a level such that those campaigners who spend only small amounts of money will effectively be excluded from the regime.
I totally accept that this is a judgment call. I hear what my noble friend says about spending up to £9,750 but I also think it was my noble friend himself who made the point in our first Committee sitting that greater transparency goes hand in hand with a greater administrative burden and regulation. We have sought to try to strike the right balance. With regard to constituency spending, we believed that the lower threshold of £5,000 could risk capturing exactly those small local campaigners who have been so clear regarding their concerns about the impact that the Bill would have on them. It was not our intention to do so, and we certainly do not want to unpick some of the important work—
The noble Lord, Lord Tyler, made clear in his contribution that the Electoral Commission was concerned about the lack of clarity. The noble and learned Lord is not answering that point. Is the commission simply to be ignored?
Perhaps I may add to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. The amendment of my noble friend Lord Tyler very much simplifies the administration. It sets a clear limit—rather clearer than the percentages in the original Bill. Given that, given the real problem about bureaucracy and fights with transparency in the Bill, and given that all of us appreciate the major changes made already, would the Minister not consider the advantages of both clarity and transparency in accepting this amendment?
My Lords, I remind the House that I am a member of the Electoral Commission. This new clause gives the Government the power to deal with any consequences of the Bill that turn out to be radically different from those intended. Such consequences may indeed include the workload and the efficacy of the Electoral Commission, which has been greatly commented on today and in previous debates. The noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, talked about headaches and nightmares for the Electoral Commission. I hope it is not quite as bad as that but I appreciate her point. My noble friend Lord Cormack called, in the right spirit, for sensible and simple advice from the Electoral Commission. Given the hideous complexity of the Bill, that is more than ever necessary in this case.
I wish to draw the Minister’s attention to a point about the consequences for the workload and efficacy of the Electoral Commission. Clause 38 alters the legal language in which the remit of the Electoral Commission is incorporated. The Government have done this without any prior consultation with the Electoral Commission. This non-consultation, while fairly common in this Bill, is unusual generally in legislation and is doubly so when one considers that the Electoral Commission is not a government body but one that reports to Parliament through the Speaker of the House of Commons. It is deliberately independent of government yet the Government have altered the wording of its remit without any prior consultation with the Electoral Commission or with Parliament.
The Lords Constitution Committee noted that the regulatory duties of the Electoral Commission had been extended and advised that:
“The House may wish to consider the implications”
of that. The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in the other place actually said that the clause should be withdrawn, pending consultation with the Electoral Commission. Of course, that has not happened.
It is fair to say that the Government’s motives in doing this were well intended but, as has often been said, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The Government’s contention is that the change in emphasis of the Electoral Commission’s remit provides reassurance to non-party campaigners and the Electoral Commission itself that its role and responsibilities are important and necessary and that it has the appropriate statutory backing.
That is commendable but, on closer scrutiny of the Bill, it is not helpful. The main thing Clause 38 does is to change “general function” to “duties” and change taking “appropriate steps” to taking “all reasonable steps”. The problem with this is that it reduces the flexibility of the Electoral Commission to deal with spurious or politically motivated allegations that are clearly unfounded. The lawyers in the House will appreciate the difference between “appropriate” and “all reasonable” steps. The problem is compounded by the fact that, as a result of the Bill, many more campaigners are likely to be regulated, as has been acknowledged by the Government and other speakers. Any allegations may peak at the climax of the election and thus lead to confusion and loss of confidence in the new regime.
As has been acknowledged, many provisions are untested. On the one hand, the Government are giving the Electoral Commission more to do; on the other, they are making it harder to deal with simple and unsubstantiated cases quickly and cost-effectively. I am sorry to raise this point so late in the deliberations on this Bill, but I think that the Electoral Commission has shown admirable self-restraint in wanting the House to concentrate on the content of the Bill rather than on the problems that it may have in enforcing it and regulating subsequently. It is important to raise that point before the Bill is finalised here. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister would ensure that the Government talked to the Electoral Commission about this problem, which may occur over the next few months, and if necessary take corrective action by means of the powers which they are taking under this new clause.
Finally, perhaps I may say as a new Member of your Lordships’ House that the debates on this Bill have brilliantly illustrated this House’s role as a scrutineer of legislation. The Bill has been much improved as a result of the House’s efforts, and pride of place in that respect must go to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, and his supporters on the Commission on Civil Society. They have, in common parlance, played a blinder.
Occasionally, their supporters outside the House have gone over the top. A certain co-ordinated “holier than thou” attitude has sometimes been apparent. I have lost count of the number of campaigners who have told me in identical words, “This is a deeply unpopular Bill the need for which has yet to be substantiated”. Letter after letter contained that particular clause; they could have been a little more differentiated in the way in which they approached this issue. Those campaigners have also attempted to portray themselves as defenders of democracy. Actually, in my view, it is the Government who are in this case the defender of democracy. As my noble friends Lady Williams and Lord Tyler have said in a Guardian article, this Bill has a noble intent, which is to defend the democratic process from distortion by excessive interference by outside interest groups. Quite rightly, the Government want to make the electoral process as level a playing field as possible. The noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, whose great expertise in this area we acknowledge, made that point forcefully in the previous debate. The Government have also shown a creditable willingness to be flexible, having originally consulted too little and drawn the Bill too tightly. I commend my noble friends for that.
The end result, I believe—and I believe that it is the view also of the Electoral Commission—is a Bill which is workable. If it proves that the unintended consequences can be dealt with by a review process, that should happen and I commend my noble friends on making provision for it. I therefore commend them on the way in which they have handled the Bill in its totality.
My Lords, is there a connection between the substantial powers inherent in the new clause proposed in government Amendment 24 and the fact that the Bill is to be returned to the Commons with there being inadequate time for substantial consideration of potential Commons amendments?
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 119, I shall speak also to Amendment 119A. We had a long debate on this subject in Committee and I do not intend to rehearse all the arguments that I used on that occasion. In Committee, it was quite clear that support for the amendment was overwhelming. Apart from the two Front-Benchers, and the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein, no one spoke against the amendment. Everyone supported the amendment as it was phrased on that occasion. Perhaps I should clarify at the beginning of my contribution what my amendment would do. It would incentivise a system of donations by individuals by allowing taxpayers to reclaim the basic rate of tax on their donations to political parties. It would limit the relief to the standard rate and operate in the same way as gift aid to charities or covenanting to your local church.
This issue has had much support over the years from all political parties and all the organisations associated with political debate. The Committee on Standards in Public Life, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Neill of Bladen, recommended essentially this amendment in 1998, some 15 years ago. The Electoral Commission’s report of 2004 on the funding of political parties recommended a similar change in the law, with a £200 cap. In 2006 the Constitutional Affairs Committee in the House of Commons made a similar recommendation in line with my amendment. The Conservative Party’s Tyrie report of 2006, entitled Clean Politics, also made reference to an amendment of this nature. In 2004 the Liberal Democrats called for a scheme of tax relief of a similar nature, and indeed in 2009 moved a very similar amendment to this during the proceedings on the Political Parties and Elections Act. When the Labour Government established the Hayden Phillips inquiry in 2007, they recommended a tax relief match funding scheme that bore a close resemblance to the scheme that I am proposing, but on that occasion with a £500 cap on contributions.
Over recent weeks I have not found a single Member of this House, apart from those supporting the hierarchies of the political parties, who is opposed to my amendment. Everyone I speak to cannot understand how it is that sane politicians in sane political parties can possibly oppose what is deemed to be a perfectly reasonable and sensible amendment. They all ask, “What is the problem?”. I intend to set out briefly what the four principal objections are and how they are being answered.
First, I am told that there is a need to continue negotiations. Indeed, a colleague sent me a note on my BlackBerry today to say that that was one of the reasons why my colleagues were being advised to vote against my amendment. The fact is that no negotiations are going on. They terminated earlier this year and anyone who suggests that they are continuing is actually fibbing and not telling the truth. There are no negotiations. They fizzled out and there are people in this Chamber today who were party to those negotiations and know exactly what the position is. Indeed, I understand that Mr Clegg has stated in the other place that the negotiations have finished and, obviously, will not be reopened until some time in the future, perhaps under a separate Government. My view is simple: negotiations on these matters will not work and the only way in which we will get change is by introducing incremental improvements—a little bit here, a small change there—and over a period of time we will see a new regime established for political donations in the UK.
Secondly, I was told that a party might gain out of the proposals that I am making and indeed might abuse its position by unilaterally increasing the contribution threshold in future. I took that problem on board. In the amendment before the House today there is a change to ensure that the only way in which the contribution threshold can be changed in future is by way of primary legislation and not by regulation. A new Bill would have to be introduced in primary legislative form to change the thresholds in the Bill. In my view there is another argument in favour of the amendment. It is right to allow a scheme to percolate throughout the system to see how it beds in and whether it works. My view is that it will work and that at some stage in the future there will be a need to review the thresholds as set out in my amendment.
Thirdly, there is the cost of the scheme. When the Hayden Phillips report was published in 2007, there was a reference to a £500 cap on contributions. That cap is 25 times greater than the cap that I have set for the first year in my amendment and five times greater than my third-year figure of £96 per calendar year. My view is simple—and it is the view of others—that my proposal would cost but a few million pounds, perhaps £2 million or £3 million per year. We need to balance the problems of introducing that against all the malevolent publicity that surrounds political institutions today. Is it worth £2 million or £3 million to begin the process of avoiding all the adverse publicity that surrounds donations?
However, the fourth objection to my amendment—the one I found most ludicrous—is the view that it would be impossible to sell the principle of support for political parties through tax relief at a time of austerity. That objection surfaced during the course of discussions. It is always a time of austerity. There is never a right time to spend money, but we are talking only about a very small amount of money. However, again in a spirit of generosity, I have amended my amendment for proceedings in the House today to ensure that it would not trigger until the financial year that follows the next general election so as to avoid the very debate that people might be concerned about. I have made two concessions on my amendment, almost neutering it, but it would still stand on the statute book as a scheme to be introduced in the first year, 2016-17, at £16; in 2017-18 at £32 and in 2018-19 at £96—the threshold under which tax relief could be secured on a donation.
Today I can be even more flexible. If the Government, even after all these concessions, feel that they cannot give way, I understand that it would be possible for them to introduce an amendment to delay commencement of my proposed scheme pending an order to be brought in by the Secretary of State under the next Government. In other words, an amendment to Clause 41 could be introduced at Third Reading to allow for an order to be introduced to delay the date of commencement of the scheme.
I cannot understand, in the light of all the concessions that I have made on my amendment and the way in which I have bent over backwards to make it possible for the Government to deal with all the problems and objections that have been raised, how the Front Benches of both parties find it objectionable to introduce an amendment which I know is supported in reality in free debate by an overwhelming majority of this House as well. I say that having talked to colleagues across Parliament who simply cannot understand why the Government refuse to go down this route.
At the end of the day, the very credibility of this institution is at stake. We have had far too many scandals over the years; political scandals relating to money and politics. All I am doing in moving my amendment today is setting in train a course of events towards bringing in the embryo of a provision of change that might one day lead to a cleaner donation regime for British political parties. I am confident that, if the measure is presented in that form, as against all the scandals that we currently have in this area of political activity, the general public will support me. I hope that noble Lords will support me in the Division Lobbies later this evening. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment because it is a very modest and necessary step to take towards taxpayer funding of political parties. None of us should be pleased, content or comfortable with the fact that political parties in this country are financed by the trade unions and, to a very large extent on all sides of the House, by extremely rich men who are seen to exert influence. I am not saying that they do exert more influence than anybody else who runs industries or anything, but they are seen to exert influence over policy. This does us no good at all and we should grasp this nettle and do something about it.
I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, has arranged that these measures would come into place after the general election. I would like to see a lot more done after the general election. I would like to see matched funding up to a certain limit, but now is not the time to talk about that. The fact remains that we are already paying opposition parties millions of pounds a year. We are paying the Opposition in your Lordships’ House Cranborne money of hundreds of thousands of pounds. I challenge anybody in this House to say that anybody has mentioned on a doorstep either Short money or Cranborne money. They do not know that it is happening. In terms of public expenditure, they are insignificant sums of money.
We should be grasping this nettle early on in a Parliament. I hope that whoever wins the election will do so at the beginning of the next Parliament and get the entire funding of our political parties in this country into a sleaze-free zone, where it should always have been. If we go on as we are, we will have endless problems. We will always be accused of having an unhealthy influence on the political system. This does nothing for politics in this country. I therefore support the amendment with enthusiasm.
I will finish in one second. As one of our colleagues pointed out, this does not confuse political parties with charities but elevates the role of the political party in our national life, and it would be right to have some form of tax concession for those who nail their colours to a mast, be it blue, red or yellow.
I have fought long and hard about the point the noble Lord has just made. The difficulty is this: I know that among those who will vote against my amendment in the Lobby tonight there will be many who support it.
Of course—I was going to say “my noble friend”, but he is my friend—the noble Lord may well be right. However, I remember the famous words of Jack Straw, when a lot of people in the other place voted for an all-elected second Chamber on the advice of the Labour leader of the campaign for an appointed second Chamber, although he then acknowledged that he had made a tactical mistake. Jack Straw kept saying, “A vote is a vote, and that’s all that counts”. That is what will be said tonight. The noble Lord should reflect very seriously on that.
We also have to consider whether the Bill is the right one in which to insert such an amendment.
My Lords, perhaps I may reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, that she is not the sole spectre at the feast. Indeed, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, indicated when he moved the amendment, he does not expect the Front Benches to fall into line with him. We had this debate four weeks ago. Admittedly, there are differences in this amendment—but, frankly, in the intervening four weeks the Government’s position has not changed.
That is not to say that raising these issues is not without merit. As my noble friend Lord Cormack said, it may serve to stir up the leaderships of all three parties. I endorse what was said by my noble friends Lord Tyler, Lord Cormack and Lord Hodgson, and by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, about politics being a noble calling. We in your Lordships’ House like to think that we make a contribution. We may disagree with each other—sometimes quite strongly—but we recognise, across the House, that we have good motives for coming into politics. Although we operate, vote and make speeches by different lights, we nevertheless have the common good of the nation at heart.
However, the proposal we are dealing with this evening is not necessarily the one and only way to restore the nobility of the political calling. The rules on party financing have been the cause of much discussion. The noble Baroness, Lady Corston, gave us a very good historic perspective when she mentioned the Houghton committee. This has gone on for some time. Most notably, this Government led talks on the subject between the three main political parties during 2012 and 2013. In 2010, each of the three parties had a manifesto commitment of one kind or another to some reform of party financing.
It is a complex issue. I noted the four points that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, said had been given as excuses. I checked the speech I made in Committee, and we advanced none of the four then. In particular, I made it very clear that talks were no longer continuing, and I quoted from the Written Ministerial Statement issued by the Deputy Prime Minister on 4 July 2013 when he announced that the talks had not produced results—I think they met seven times—and that it was clear that the reforms would not now go forward in this Parliament.
The noble Lord’s point was that some people were arguing that talks were still going on. I did not seek to do that, but it is a legitimate expectation that all parties will seek to find a way forward on this complex issue in the next Parliament. I was not party to these talks but I am told that they were close. The Government want party funding reform but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, said, it should come as part of a package and by consensus. Some have asked for donations to be treated in the same way as charitable giving, and I can understand the relevance of that comparison from a tax point of view. However, I am not sure that the public necessarily see donations to charities—many of which we have been discussing in the course of our debates on the Bill—in the same light as giving support to political parties through the tax system.
I suspect that many noble Lords support state funding of political parties. As has already been mentioned, we have Short money, Cranborne money and the money that goes to the Royal Mail. However, this would be a significant step. Short funding is probably not mentioned on doorsteps. However, although I was probably still a student when it first came in, I remember that it was a major step which attracted quite a lot of discussion. It would be naive to think that a step as significant as the Exchequer funding political parties in this way through the tax system would not be devoid of any comment, which is why I think all parties have sought to go forward together by way of consensus.
As my noble friend Lord Cormack said, I do not believe that this is the appropriate Bill for dealing with this issue, but it is the Government’s hope that further discussions will take place in the next Parliament. My noble friend Lord Hamilton said that he wanted more done after the next election. I would echo that. Anyone from all party leaderships who reads our debates and follows this will realise that there is an appetite among Members of all parties that this matter should not be allowed just to gather dust in the next Parliament. But I do not believe that it is appropriate to act in the context of this Bill or at this time and without a bigger package that commands a consensus among all the parties. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. If he seeks to push it to a vote, as he has indicated, the Government will not support his amendment.
My Lords, I shall push my amendment to the vote. I thank all those who contributed in a most passionate way to the issues that we have raised in this debate. In the 1997 to 2001 Parliament, we were told that the matter would be resolved during the next Parliament and it was not. In that Parliament we were told that it would be dealt with in the next Parliament. Hayden Phillips came in the next Parliament and it was not resolved. We were told that it would be resolved in this Parliament. Again, there have been talks but it has not been resolved. We will go through Parliament after Parliament after Parliament ducking this issue. That is why it is important that we take a decision now. Some of us are becoming exasperated by the ducking and weaving.
For me, one of the great joys of coming to the House of Lords from the Commons is that I have always regarded ours as the House of free thinkers. In the Commons, you are held in a rigid, party, heavily whipped atmosphere where there is very little room for the kind of flexibility that we can exhibit as Members of this place. Because of the rigidity of debate in the other place, I believe that party reform ultimately will come through this House and not from the House of Commons. That is why tonight I am going to push my amendment to a vote. As I have said, I believe that this is the House which at the end of the day will make the reforms. I do not know, but it might well be that I will be defeated this evening—although I suspect some people will be surprised by the names of those who move into our Lobby.
As has been said, it is never the right Bill, the right time or the right moment to spend money, but this is the right time to take a decision. I should like to test the opinion of the House.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak briefly, simply because my Amendment 136 is grouped with the other two in this grouping. My amendment is slightly different from the others, and signals what we will need to do if some of the amendments we are discussing this afternoon are not accepted. My amendment seeks to change the title of the Bill. As it stands, it is Transparency of Lobbying, but the Bill does not enhance transparency and it is not actually about lobbying. It is about lobbyists; it is about status, not about activity. There is a mismatch between the Short Title and the Long Title. The Long Title makes clear what the Bill is about: it is about the registration of lobbyists; it is not about transparency of lobbying. As I say, this is really to signal later debates, but unless the Bill is changed quite substantially, we will have to amend the title to bring it into line with what the Bill actually contains.
My Lords, I want to speak for less than a minute; I spoke at some length on this matter in Committee. The Bill is deceiving the public. The public expect the matter of the registration of lobbyists to be dealt with in this legislation. However, Parliament is now considering a Bill which excludes the vast majority of people in the industry. I object and I hope that the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, is accepted by the House.
My Lords, I also support Amendments 1 and 11. I hope that I will not also have to support the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, as we hope that we will have made the changes that will make supporting it unnecessary. Amendment 1 also stands in the name of my noble friend Lady Royall and myself. It is already clear that establishing a register only of consultant firms would add nothing to the existing voluntary register. It would omit hundreds of employers—the in-house, public bodies, charities and, perhaps most importantly, trade associations—as well as more than 1,000 individuals who work in this industry.
We have heard the Government boast about being part of the Open Government Partnership, and Ministers say that the public should be able to see who is lobbying Ministers. However, as we know, the Bill will not do that. It will only tell us the companies for which, for example, Bell Pottinger has had direct contact with a Minister over the past quarter. It will not name the individual lobbyists concerned, nor will it identify the company on whose behalf that meeting took place. So if a lobbying company met a Minister, for example, on behalf of a defence company, we still would not know that. In the hypothetical Bell Pottinger case, it has, according to Marketing Week, some 900 clients; so we would only know that Bell Pottinger was meeting somebody on behalf of one of those 900 clients but not which one it was. If the Minister, instead of meeting a consultant, met the actual defence company itself, or its trade association, that would not appear on the register at all, because the lobbyists would be direct employees.
This is very different from the United States where, we understand, Mr Cameron’s election guru, Jim Messina, has just taken up a job with the American Gaming Association, which is about to lobby on online gambling. That will all be declared, but in the UK, there will be no record of such lobbying by organisations such as the Association of British Bookmakers, despite the public interest in knowing who is lobbying the Government, in this case, on gambling.
According to today’s Daily Mail, the Chancellor took the boss of one of the world’s biggest makers of betting machines on his trip to Beijing. That is something that the company would not have to declare because it would be doing that lobbying direct. It is interesting that the Rank Organisation discloses far more than the Bill actually asks. It has decided to set out the spending that it makes in its government and regulatory affairs work—for example, £115,000 to Luther Pendragon, Ernst & Young and FTI and another £88,000 in membership fees to three trade organisations: the Bingo Association, National Casino, and the Remote Gambling Association. However, none of those would be required under the Bill. So, congratulations to Rank but not to the Government.
Similarly, we would know nothing about meetings between the big six energy companies and HMT or DECC officials because they use their direct staff for that. Or consider the anti-electronic-cigarette lobby, largely funded, I understand, by the pharmaceutical industry, which produces nicotine replacement therapy and ideally would like e-cigarettes off the market. Johnson & Johnson, GSK and Novartis have teams dedicated to that lobbying work, and none of that would be known under the current provisions.
I am afraid that the Bill is rather a damp squib and, unless we amend it, it will exclude virtually all business lobbying, whether done by the companies themselves or by their trade bodies. Worse, even where one of the big agencies such as Weber Shandwick or Bell Pottinger register, we will still not have a list of their staff so that if one of their lobbyists met a Minister, we would be no more the wiser about who that lobbyists’ clients actually were.
In the debate on Part 2, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, who is not currently in her place, warned us of the danger to our democracy of American-style lobbyists, and indeed her autobiography, which I recommend, draws on her wide experience of that side of the Atlantic. She talks of the powers of lobbyists there and the extraordinary influence of organisations such as the American Association of Retired Persons, the National Rifle Association and the American Israel Political Action Committee. As she and your Lordships’ House must know, though, none of those or their UK equivalents would have to be registered under the Bill—nor the British Insurance Brokers’ Association; the Building Society Association; Philip Morris; FOREST; the nuclear industry; One Hub or None, which is in favour of Heathrow’s expansion; the CBI; the TUC; or the drinks industry, despite 130-odd meetings with civil servants to resist minimum unit pricing.
What is the point of the Bill, particularly this clause, if it does nothing to shed light on what goes on behind closed doors in Whitehall? For the sake of democracy and good governance, we need to see who is lobbying whom and about what. The register should cover the act of lobbying—the status, I think the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, said—not the type of lobbyist, otherwise this is open to abuse. If an issue becomes very sensitive, you can simply have the lobbyists who have been working for an agency become directly in-house and put on the payroll of a particular company at that time, and then none of their activity will have to be registered. Or a small lobbyist could simply work part-time for 10 clients and be paid directly by them, and then we would know nothing about them.
A list of lobbying firms is not enough. That is not what was foreseen in the coalition agreement, it is not what the lobbyists themselves want and it is not what Unlock Democracy or Spinwatch want. The charities and trade unions have told us that they are very content for their public affairs professionals to be registered and to disclose their lobbying meetings. We strongly support Amendment 1 regarding the production of a proper, comprehensive and statutory register of all professions lobbying the Government. Democracy demands nothing less.
My Lords, it is fair enough to say that, but it is not what the House is being asked to vote on today. It is being asked to vote on something which is devoid of any definition.
If the professionals have designed a system which includes them, why can that not be in the consequential amendments? Why do the Government not come back at Third Reading to include those provisions?
Because, my Lords, there have as I understand it been many attempts made to pin down and define what is meant by “professional lobbyists”, none of which has met with approval or the kind of certainty we want in previous debates. Perhaps we can answer two of the points of the noble and learned Lord and the noble Baroness. Simply to introduce ambiguity to a prohibition provision that is accompanied by serious criminal sanctions is unacceptable. That lack of clarity leaves the amendment fatally flawed.
As the Government have made clear throughout the passage of the Bill, our proposals for a register are designed to address the specific problem that we have identified. One of the things that gave rise to complaints in the media was that when consultant lobbyists were lobbying, people did not know who their clients were. That is the issue which the Bill addresses. It is not always clear whose interests are represented by consultant lobbyists when they meet Ministers and Permanent Secretaries. The context is that this Government have for the first time made it clear to the public exactly who Ministers and Permanent Secretaries are meeting. The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee’s report on the Government’s initial proposals for a statutory register of lobbyists made clear that identifying the problem that the register is intended to address is critical if successful regulation is to be achieved.
While we acknowledge that there are those who consider the focus of the proposed register too narrow—I am aware that these criticisms have been made—we have yet to see a clear articulation of the problem that would be addressed by expanding the scope to all so-called professional lobbyists. The point has been made about in-house lobbyists. It is quite clear whose interests are represented by an in-house professional lobbyist: it is the person who employs him or her. If you are an in-house lobbyist for the Scotch Whisky Association—I am not sure if that association has in-house lobbyists, but let us assume that it does—it does not take a genius to work out that if you are lobbying a Minister or Permanent Secretary, those are the interests that you would be representing. If you are an in-house lobbyist for one of the utilities and you meet a Minister or Permanent Secretary, it does not take a huge leap of the imagination to guess that you are representing the interests of the organisation which employs you. I cannot honestly see what is added by creating a list of people and their employers. If I have missed the point, I am more than happy to have it explained.
I am very grateful to my noble friend and I recognise his long-standing interest in this, not just in terms of the Bill. I hope that I will directly address the points he has raised in responding to points made by my noble friend Lord Norton.
My noble friend’s amendment would revise the title of the Bill so that it referred to the registration of consultant lobbyists rather than the transparency of lobbying. His amendment appears intended to suggest that the provisions outlined in Part 1 of the Bill will not enhance the transparency of lobbying. He will not be surprised to learn that I respectfully disagree. This Government have done more than any before to enhance the transparency of government and decision-making, and these provisions will extend that transparency. We are the first Government to proactively and regularly publish details about Ministers’ and Permanent Secretaries’ meetings with external organisations, and we do so alongside a huge amount of open data regarding departmental spending and procurement. We are recognised as international leaders in open government and we continue to introduce initiatives to further extend transparency in government and the public sector.
We listened carefully to the concerns expressed during the Committee stage debate. In response to the question raised by my noble friend Lord Tyler, I am pleased that I can today commit to noble Lords that we will make further improvements to the accessibility of government transparency information. We will ensure greater co-ordination of the publication of data sets so that all returns within a quarter can be found on one page. I hear the criticism that he makes, and we ought to get better at the speediness with which we make this information available, but we will improve the access to and presentation of those data, including by improving the consistency of presentation and titling. We will also ensure greater consistency in the content of departmental reporting, particularly on including the subject of meetings. Finally, we will ensure that the gov.uk transparency pages contain a link to the statutory register of lobbyists so that the data can be easily cross-referenced.
The practical implications of those improvements are that: rather than having to visit a number of different sites or pages, all information will be accessed via one easily located page of gov.uk; the consistency of those data will be improved so that the transparency reports can be more easily located via search functions; and the subject of the meetings will be set out more helpfully—for example, rather than describing them as “introductory” or “catch-up” meetings, the detail of the meeting discussion will be outlined. Therefore, if, for example, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change was meeting someone, the subject would include not just energy policy but things such as fracking.
I hope that these practical proposals to which the Government are committing themselves will improve the transparency of decision-making further than we have already achieved, and that the Part 1 provisions will complement and enhance them. I dare say that they will do more to improve transparency than just having a long list of employees of a consultant firm. Obviously, if an employee—the noble Baroness mentioned Bell Pottinger, so for the sake of consistency let us say that this was an employee of that firm—had a meeting, the record would list not just “Joe Bloggs” but “Joe Bloggs of Bell Pottinger” and the subject of the discussion. As a result of the Bill, the list of Bell Pottinger’s clients would also be made available. I therefore believe that what we propose today does far more to improve transparency than simply making available a list of employees, and it reflects suggestions made by a number of colleagues who have made representations.
Although this does not relate directly to the actual register or to the Government’s scheme, I can also indicate that in our response to debates in Committee and to concerns that have been raised by Members of your Lordships’ House—I do not believe that this has been raised on any of the amendments now before us—we are committing ourselves to subjecting the appointment of the registrar to the scrutiny of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the other place. By doing so, we are reiterating our commitment to the independence of the registrar.
If I put a scenario to the Minister, perhaps he will be able to give me the answer. If an in-house lobbyist from, let us say, IGas, the shale gas production company, were to meet a junior Minister or a civil servant in the department, by what means would a member of the public or a journalist know about that?
My Lords, as a former Permanent Secretary, I rise still bathing in the warmth of the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Williams. Would that some of the current Permanent Secretaries were here to hear them; I think that they might have been moved to tears.
I shall speak only briefly in support of the amendments proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, and the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. It is one thing for Parliament to show that it does not fully understand, or understand very much, the lobbying process; it is a rather more serious thing for Parliament to show that it does not understand how Whitehall and the decision-making process work. That process works increasingly through special advisers and senior civil servants, not through Ministers and Permanent Secretaries. For this not to be recognised in the Bill is very odd and shows serious flaws.
My Lords, I spoke in Committee on this matter, so I shall be brief today. My concern is that special advisers often have more influence on ministerial decision-taking than do Members of Parliament, because they have daily access.
I want to tell a story of an incident that I experienced in 1999 on a train coming from my former constituency of Workington to London. To my side in the carriage was the Member of Parliament for Blackpool and opposite were two young men who were on their way to London, and we struck up a conversation. They told us that they were going to London to lobby in the department on the need to introduce new gambling legislation. As Labour MPs, we had absolutely no idea that discussions were going on in the department about gambling and gambling legislation. That was in 1999—some 14 years ago. Those two young men were going to meet the special adviser in the department concerned. I was very interested and asked them how they had made contact. They explained that they had done so at a political level, locally to start with, and had then been referred to the special adviser. There was no need as far as they were concerned to see Ministers.
In that particular case, the embryo of the debate had started with access from the industry directly to political advisers in the department. The discussion would then permeate within the department between, as has just been said, civil servants and the special advisers, to the exclusion of Parliament and individual Members of Parliament. I find that deeply troubling. One of the reasons why I want special advisers to be included in the Bill is that I want that process to become more transparent, so that individual Members of Parliament can at least see what is happening within a department, what influences are being brought to bear and the dangers that might arise. If those special advisers then organise meetings between various groups and Ministers without Members of Parliament being aware of the scale of the lobbying going on—I know that I am making a very subtle point—it is at that point that Members of Parliament need to know that such relationships are being forged. That is why I strongly support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and I hope that we have the opportunity to vote on it.
My Lords, this is the first time I have got involved in this Bill.
The current structure is indeed rather peculiar: lobbyists or lobbyist consultants are to register themselves and report those whom they represent, but we will find out whom they lobby only by an indirect process of interrogating a list of external meetings of all kinds that Ministers and Permanent Secretaries have attended. The case for this amendment is that lobbying takes place with a much wider group of people, which in a typical department would be about five or six individuals. I was a Permanent Secretary for 11 years in three departments and I do not think I ever had a conversation with a lobbyist as defined in this Bill. The lobbying always took place with officials who were working on the policy or were experts on the subject or were working on a Bill team.
Should we extend the requirement to civil servants? Well, there are 412,000 of them, so we have to define whom we mean. The people working on a policy would probably include the senior Civil Service, which is probably about 3,000 people. The logic of this Bill is that we extend the requirement to assemble and publish a list of external meetings—of course, these are not only meetings with lobbyists—to a very much wider group. In my view, there would be a lot of dead-weight cost in this: most of those contacts are part of the regular and desirable interchange between government and industry. In the White Paper that launched this whole process, it was stated:
“The Government does not wish to create an obstacle to necessary interaction with policy makers”.
If that is the price—that we extend this to all of the senior Civil Service, who then have to report all external meetings involving not just these people but everyone—in my view that is a price too high.
On the other hand, I am taken by the arguments about special advisers. There are now 98 of them; there were 38 in 1997 at the exit of John Major’s Government; there were about 74 by 2010; the number dipped for about three months but now there are 98. If I really had to distinguish between the amendments in this group, I would vote against Amendment 2 but for Amendment 3.
I think I understand the point that the noble and learned Lord is making about the requirement to register if you are making communications with these people. It may be that that would bring more names on to the register—I simply do not know—but to enhance transparency, the complement to such an extension would be the introduction of meeting reporting obligations on these public officials. Otherwise you have a list of names of consultant lobbyists and their clients but there is nothing there to which you can then relate them. It becomes fully meaningful only if you have that complementary extension of the scheme. On the amendment, I sought to make the point that that would be a huge burden and one that would not be consistent with efficiency in government; nor indeed would it be proportionate to improving transparency.
The Minister has not responded to the very narrow point that was made by my noble friend Lady Royall of Blaisdon. She asked a very simple question: why should a Minister, in his or her registration, not register the activity of that Minister’s individual political adviser? That political adviser is working on behalf of that Minister. No doubt the noble Lord, as a Minister, has political advisers of his own. In the event that they meet lobbyists from outside, they are meeting them on his behalf. Why should not he, in his registration, refer to those meetings?
My Lords, until I became Deputy Leader of your Lordships’ House I did not have a special adviser. I now have one but I am not sure that she has met anyone, although she has said that if she could get a diary secretary it might be a bonus. We take the view, as I indicated earlier, that it is the Ministers who are making the decisions. On that basis, we believe that it is communications with Ministers—and not just meetings, as the noble and learned Lord said—that are pertinent. We believe that these proposals are appropriate and proportionate. I therefore urge the noble and learned Lord—
My Lords, in moving the amendment standing in the name of my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire, I will also speak to Amendments 15, 16 and 22. As the Government have made clear throughout the debates on this part of the Bill, the statutory register of consultant lobbyists is designed to address a specific problem—that it is not always clear whose interests are represented by consultant lobbyists. Our objective is to ensure increased transparency without disrupting in any way the fluency of the dialogue between government decision-makers and those who will be affected by policy and legislative decisions.
It is not, nor has it been, the Government’s intention to attempt to regulate comprehensively all those who communicate with government, and the register will not, therefore, be associated with a statutory code of conduct. Instead, the Government are committed to ensuring that the statutory register complements the existing self-regulatory regime by which the industry promotes the ethical behaviour that is essential to the integrity and reputation of the lobbying industry.
We have been very grateful to those Members of your Lordships’ House for their thoughtful suggestions as to how this might best be achieved. After careful consideration of the debates both in this House and in the other place, and discussion with the industry and transparency groups, we have concluded that the most effective option is to provide for a statutory link between the statutory register and the industry-hosted voluntary codes of conduct. As such, Amendments 12, 15 and 16 will require consultant lobbyists to state in their register entries whether or not they subscribe to a publicly available code of conduct in relation to their lobbying activity and, if so, where a copy of the code can be accessed. Such a provision will enhance both the transparency and the scrutiny of registered lobbyists, and the Government hope that the measure will therefore be welcomed.
Additionally, the Government have tabled an amendment to clarify that the registrar can both revise and replace the guidance that he or she has published. I appreciate that this group also includes amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, and I will perhaps respond to these after she has moved them.
What are the circumstances in which a lobbying firm would not wish to sign up to the code of conduct?
I am not sure that this should be addressed to me as opposed to the lobbying firms, since it is sincerely hoped that they would sign up to a code of conduct. What we seek through these amendments is for them to indicate that they have signed up to a code of conduct and for there also to be a link as to where that code of conduct can be found.
Amendment 13 (to Amendment 12)
My Lords, in Committee I moved an amendment to deal with the linkage between the registration process and existing codes of conduct in the lobbying industry. I warmly welcome the movement that the Government have now undertaken. If I recall rightly, we were given encouraging noises on that particular point in Committee. Therefore I very much support Amendments 12, 15 and 16. I shall listen with interest to what my noble and learned friend has to say about the stiffening of that resolve—if I may put it like that—incorporated in Amendments 13 and 14.
Amendment 23 is, almost by definition, premature. I want to see how this works. I do not want to put more responsibilities on the statutory register than it can easily undertake at the outset. The noble Baroness was quite right to talk about the future. In this particular case, we legislate for the future when it arrives, rather than put more responsibilities on the registrar at this stage. I will listen with interest to what my noble and learned friend has to say about Amendments 13 and 14, to see if there seems to be a practical way in which these could be incorporated and therefore give an even stronger statutory link between the register and the existing codes.
My Lords, as I understand the present arrangement—and I am only going by memory from what was said in Committee—the Public Relations Consultants Association already has a code of conduct. If it is correct that the professional organisations may over the longer term actually wind up—and in the period between Committee and Report we were led to believe that this is the case—then I presume that no code of conduct will necessarily apply. That is unless the Government introduce a model code on the basis that my noble friend on the Front Bench has just argued for. I asked the Minister in what circumstances an organisation that registered would not wish to introduce a code of conduct. I presume that during the consultation to which the Minister referred when he moved his amendment, they made clear what those circumstances would be. I wonder if we can be told what Ministers were told. There must be some explanation for why they resist. If there is an explanation—perhaps it is in the written brief or something—maybe we could see it prior to Third Reading. I simply cannot understand what they are objecting to, and we need to know during the course of the debate what it is.
Perhaps I can answer the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. In the debate about the first amendment today, I referred to how the PRCA requires people who sign up to the voluntary register to sign up to the code of conduct, which has strong enforcement of regulations or provisions. My point earlier was that if that disappears and there is to be a statutory register in place, it would be appropriate that we have something which is at least as good, not something that detracts from the current position.
My Lords, I appreciate the welcome given to the government amendments by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and my noble friend Lord Tyler. As I indicated, we listened carefully to the debate in Committee. We have responded by tabling these amendments, which will require consultant lobbyists to state in their register entries whether they subscribe to a publicly available code of conduct in relation to their lobbying activity and, if so, where a copy of the code can be accessed.
The Opposition’s amendments, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, would require that lobbyists declare on their register entry which publicly available code of conduct they subscribe to, implicitly requiring such a subscription in order to register. The Government are not persuaded that the amendment is appropriate. Moreover, there is no provision that would require compliance with such codes or provide for enforcement.
The objective of the Part 1 provisions is to enhance transparency and scrutiny. We are not seeking to regulate behaviour. The noble Baroness mentioned the exchanges she had in Committee with my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire about lobbyists who breach the Bribery Act. Of course, breaches of the Bribery Act are punishable by unlimited fines and up to 10 years’ imprisonment, or both. The Government do not consider it appropriate for a Bill to contain separate sanctions in addition to those already included in the Bribery Act, which are clearly very substantial indeed. It is quite proper that the Bribery Act includes serious and proportionate sanctions but it would not be appropriate for the transparency Bill to duplicate those sanctions. The Government considered the option of including a penalty whereby a person could be removed from the register but concluded that imposing a limitless prohibition on someone conducting their profession was too extreme a penalty.
Requiring lobbyists to declare whether they subscribe to a code will expose those who do not abide by the ethical principles that are so essential to the integrity of the industry. It is not the Government’s intention, however, to introduce a high-regulation regime whereby the registrar is responsible for monitoring and enforcing subscription to, and compliance with, codes of conduct. The Opposition also suggest that the registrar should be responsible for publishing a code of conduct. As my noble friend indicated, that is premature. The Government’s amendments are intended to complement the existing self-regulatory regime, not to replace or undermine it.
To pick up the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, we do not anticipate that lobbying associations such as the PRCA, CIPR and APPC will withdraw their codes. Indeed, the industry has welcomed the link between its codes and the proposed register, which it recognises will enhance the existing self-regulatory regime. That was the feedback we got during the consultation. I heard the noble Lord’s inquiry but I am not aware that any explanation or example was given of circumstances in which a firm would not register. Rather, the industry anticipates that it will continue with its codes and that the proposed register—and the government amendment—will enhance the existing self-regulatory regime.
Would Ministers be happy to meet a lobbying company that did not subscribe to the ethical standards that have been set down, either by the association or any code that the Government might wish to introduce at some stage in the future? Indeed, are there circumstances in which Ministers would refuse to meet them?
My Lords, I do not think the noble Lord can reasonably expect a blanket application. There may be reasons—I do not know what they might be—that are not malign as to why a particular group has not signed up. We already know that a majority of lobbying firms sign up to and adhere to the respective codes of conduct, but we believe that making it a statutory requirement would lead to unnecessary pressure and that what we are proposing has struck the right balance.
I have a lot of sympathy for the point the noble Lord is making but it would not be appropriate to make a sweeping general obligation on all future Ministers when you cannot foresee particular circumstances that would occur at any time or place. I believe we have struck the right balance. I urge the House to support the Government’s amendments and I urge the noble Baroness not to press the amendment in her name.
My Lords, about five or six years ago, I sat on a pre-legislative scrutiny committee dealing with the bribery and corruption Bill. During consideration of the draft Bill, there was a realisation within the committee that the Government were going into the issue from completely the wrong position. That was the view right across the committee. I always remember the civil servants sitting at the back of the committee wriggling in their seats as they saw their case being destroyed along with all the work that they had done in the production of the Bill. I tell that story because I believe that that is precisely what would have happened here if this Bill had gone into pre-legislative scrutiny. If it had done so, a very different approach would have been taken and I think that there would have been agreement on the way forward across the House. We would not have been going down this particular route; we would have taken the route set out by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, in moving this amendment. His is the right approach. The approach that the Government are taking is the wrong approach. His solution is cheaper; it is more efficient; it provides for a greater level of transparency; and it is what the public have expected of Ministers in the introduction of legislation. In the end, we will probably end up where the noble Lord is starting when we find, particularly in the light of the previous amendment, that there are problems in the way in which the system is operating. I know at this late stage that we will not see a change in the minds of Ministers, but I am really sorry that they missed a cue given by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, when he moved his amendment in Committee and gave the Government the opportunity of at least changing their approach.
(11 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 177. Amendment 176 is an attempt to reduce some of the controversy over the funding of political parties. It would incentivise a system of donations by individuals by allowing taxpayers to reclaim the basic rate of tax on their donations to political parties. It would limit the relief to the standard rate. It would operate in the same way as gift aid to charities or covenanting to your local church.
The objective is to help to build a more participatory democracy where a far larger section of the population can sign up to more active forms of political engagement. It would widen the donor base, as Obama managed during the course of his campaign for the presidency in the United States of America. It would be far healthier for democracy than a system where a few large donors and organisations stand accused of exercising undue influence over the democratic process. We all know that while that may be the case on occasion, more often than not it is not the case, but the public simply do not believe us. I argue that an arrangement that widens that donor base and reduces the reliance on large donors is to be welcomed.
I have support for my amendment right across the parties and there is wide support in both the Commons and in this House. I know that there are many who would have been here today if the debate was not taking place at this time of day shortly before the Christmas Recess.
Why has it not happened before? Why has my simple proposal not been considered and implemented in law? To examine the reason for that we have to go in the history of what has been a very difficult debate. Over the past century there were repeated scandals involving political donations. By 2000 the debate had become sufficiently heated to provoke the Government into introducing legislation in the form of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, which has been referred to repeatedly during proceedings on this Bill. However, that Act dealt with only part of the problem. Deficiencies in the legislation surfaced around the 2005 general election when a series of arguments broke out over the use of loans—or what were described as loans—as a means of funding political campaigns. As a result, the parties were driven into all-party discussions on reforms which, predictably, broke down. That breakdown and the inevitable stalemate that followed led to the 2007 review undertaken by Sir Hayden Phillips. It was hoped that this review would lead us out of the impasse but its report indicated only the nature of the problem and did not provide a solution. However, the review paved the way for further talks between the three main political parties, under Sir Hayden Phillips himself. Again, the inevitable happened as the talks broke down in October 2007. In May 2010, after aborted discussions and a general election, a reference to the problem surfaced in the coalition agreement:
“We will also pursue a detailed agreement on limiting donations and reforming party funding”.
The coalition agreement was followed in July 2010 by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which re-energised the debate with its 2011 report. The report was accompanied by caveats in the appendices from both Labour and Conservative party representatives. We were back on the old merry-go-round with caps on contributions, trade union donations and the usual differences and suspicions—what appeared to be irresolvable problems. Two months later the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee called for heads to be banged together and a solution found to this intractable problem, which is so damaging the political class. The committee, despairingly, called for a resolution of the problem to help avoid further party funding scandals. Not that that plea had much of an effect. Within two months we had a further scandal, with the Cruddas affair: an allegation that led to a libel action against the Sunday Times, which Peter Cruddas, incidentally, won. Once again, Parliament had been submerged in sleaze allegations and more damage was done to its credibility.
Following the Cruddas affair, in the same month, Francis Maude, a Minister in the other place, announced a new series of talks. In his statement establishing the talks he said:
“We could also look at how to boost small donations and broaden the support base”,
for the parties. I could not agree more. That is the basis for this amendment. I understand that there were seven meetings in 2012 and 2013. Once again the predictable and the inevitable happened. The talks collapsed. They have been described to me as, “collapsed talks” that “fizzled out”. On 4 July this year, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Clegg, announced that there was no agreement between the parties and it was, in his words,
“clear that reforms cannot go forward in this Parliament”.
Where does that leave us? It leaves us with a totally discredited donor regime in place. Personally, I am fed up to the back teeth with all this ducking and weaving. All we are doing is bringing the entire political establishment, particularly Parliament, into disrepute, while increasing the disconnect between Parliament and the people. The rot has got to stop.
My amendment is the embryo of a scheme. It provides a framework on which a tax-relieved donor regime can be built. Discussions about what constitutes a political party or levels of tax-relieved donations, although defined in my proposal, can be the subject of negotiation and more precisely defined at a later stage. Today, I am simply moving a probing amendment, and I look forward to the considered response of Ministers.
My Lords, I apologise for not having spoken at Second Reading, when I was not present, and I declare my interests in charities that are in the register of interests.
It is natural for us, as people who are involved in politics, to think that it would be a good idea to subsidise politics in a way that other activities are not subsidised, and for us to be keenly aware of the difficulties we all have as members of political parties in raising money for our political causes. However, our problems in doing that are the same as those that other people have. We should therefore think very deeply about appropriating for ourselves a privilege that is not given to other people. Although this is a modest proposal, and does not go as far as other proposals for state financing of political parties, it would be naive of us to think that if we asked the electorate to treat political parties as if they were charities, they would not in return begin to expect political parties to behave as if they were charities and ask us to do all sorts of things that justify our claim that subsidising our activities is something of public worth. Therefore, although I respect the intention behind this amendment, and I understand why we all feel that our work is incredibly important and therefore should be exempt from the normal taxation that other people’s important work is subject to, we should be careful before appropriating to ourselves that privilege.
Does the noble Lord know by how much the state already funds political parties now? Does he know what the figure is?
I know it is already many millions of pounds, and I am very nervous and worried about that. That money leads to the state beginning to suggest to political parties how they should spend that money, in a very restricted way. In the end, to avoid the problems that the noble Lord talked about in his speech, we would have to impose all sorts of restrictions on political parties’ funding. Otherwise, political parties would be able to raise that money on top of the other money that has been given to them.
If it were a charitable activity, the party would be a charity. It is not a charitable activity; it is a political activity. There is a distinction between a charitable activity and a political activity. I am sure that the noble Lord is motivated in his politics by a charitable instinct, but that is very different from a political party being a charity. There are rules that govern what is a charity—rules that we have determined should exist. If we wished political parties to be charities, my point is precisely that the electorate would begin to expect us to impose on political parties the same sort of restrictions that we place on charities.
In the light of these interventions, might the noble Lord not wish to revise his article on these matters in the Times this morning?
It is hardly to my surprise that I discover that in a group of people who are involved in politics, everybody thinks that political activity is very special and ought to be granted privileges not granted to other activities. It should not come as a surprise to any of us that we are all very keen on it and understand its importance. My question is whether we think that because we have an interest in politics and believe it to be a noble and important activity, we have a right to expect the electorate to grant us that privilege—an exemption from our other duties as taxpayers. I would argue that we do not.
To illustrate the point, I was making a distinction between a monthly contribution and an annual contribution.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for explaining that.
It will not come as any surprise that the Government do not feel able to support the amendment. There have been discussions among the three main parties, which have been guided by the principle of consensus. There has been not total consensus but substantial consensus in your Lordships’ House this evening—a consensus that was not found in the discussions that have taken place. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, said that there had been seven such discussions. In a Written Ministerial Statement on 4 July, my right honourable friend the Deputy Prime Minister indicated that the talks had not produced results and that it was,
“clear that reforms cannot go forward in this Parliament”.—[Official Report, Commons; 4/7/13; col. 62WS.]
From what has been said, it has been a source of considerable disappointment that agreement could not be reached. I do not necessarily think that the Bill is the best place in which to start to do these things without that wider consensus as to what other things might be needed. However, it is important that we have had this debate, which has shown that there can be consensus across the parties.
I therefore say to my noble friend Lord Cormack that, while I am sympathetic, I regret that I cannot be encouraging. I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I do not know whether to describe that as a disappointing reply. I hope that behind the scenes wise heads get together and further consider these matters.
All that I have tried to do in the amendment is break a logjam. These talks go on and on, collapse, start again and collapse. That is the history of this debate and we are getting nowhere. Meanwhile, our Parliament is submerged in a reputation of sleaze nationally, and some of us really resent it. Whether it is due to Hanningfield, Mackenzie and all these people, it is all part of the same reputation that is developing and surrounding Westminster. We cannot go on forever talking and nothing happening.
I say to the political parties that this is the beginning and is a way through. It would mean that we would have to re-engage in discussions about how to go forward. I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Deben, Lord Tyler, Lord Marland, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, Lord Finkelstein, and Lord Cormack, and my noble friend for their comments. The fact is that more people spoke on this amendment than on most amendments to this Bill, because people really are conscious of this matter and they know that there is a problem of credibility outside in the country.
I beg leave to withdraw my amendment, but I hope that at some stage in the future heads are banged together to sort this problem out.
(11 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I start by echoing what many of your Lordships have said, by thanking my noble friend Lord Forsyth for securing this debate and introducing it—and, indeed, for the animated and spirited way in which he made his case. He covered, in a very short time, most of the salient points that were made in the debate. I acknowledge that he was not alone in asking for a much longer debate; indeed, I think most other contributors to the debate said the same. I have noted that request, and will ensure that it is conveyed back to the business managers. Even I am constrained in replying to all the points that have been made in this debate, and would perhaps like longer to do so. That is an important point.
Numerous noble Lords have asked for a Joint Committee. Clearly, that is a matter that could be established only with agreement across both Houses. As ever, I shall ensure that the usual channels consider the request. It is also important to put it on record that committees and their members in both Houses are already undertaking much work on the implications of independence in a whole range of different areas; they are making the case for the union and exposing the gaps in the case for independence. I pay tribute to the work done by a number of Select Committees, both in your Lordships’ House and in the other place.
The Minister says that this will be a matter for the usual channels, but could not Ministers in this House approach the Leader of the House of Commons and ask him whether it is possible to take such an initiative forward?
I thought that the Leader of the House of Commons was part of the usual channels. This would have to be done with the collaboration of both Houses, but I am saying that we will reflect on the matter. I cannot go further in making any commitment today, other than what I have already said.
My noble friend chose a debate specifically on the date, because I think he had to put his application into a ballot before the White Paper had been published. It may be worth reflecting on the fact that the date may be about the only thing in the White Paper that had not previously been in the public domain—and even that was leaked about two days before publication. We had already been told that the date would be in March 2016, so I suspect the only new information was the specific date of 24 March, which I think is the anniversary of the death of Queen Elizabeth I, and therefore of the union of the Crowns. Indeed, as my noble friend the Duke of Montrose reminded us when he talked about the Earl of Seafield and the end of the auld sang, it is also the date on which the previous Scottish Parliament last sat. However, I rather suspect that that was an ex post facto justification that some people gave for that date, rather than stating the reason that, as my noble friend pointed out, it will be the start of the 2016 Scottish election campaign.
I take the point that even if Scotland were—heaven forbid—to vote yes, actually naming your cut-off point does not seem the best way to go about negotiations. One of the things that has been evident from this debate, if not necessarily from the White Paper, is that a considerable amount of negotiation will have to take place. That point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes.
Sometimes we have heard people in the Scottish Government compare this White Paper to the 1997 White Paper produced by the Labour Government, which paved the way to the referendum on devolution. However, there is a world of difference between a White Paper produced by a Government, which reflected a constitutional convention that had met in public over many years and had achieved a consensus, and a White Paper that is the product of a single party behind closed doors, and is dependent not just on the Government of the rest of the United Kingdom, but on other member states of the European Union, members of NATO and numerous other countries. It is important to make the point that this White Paper has no guarantee of delivery. It is, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said, strong on assertion but perhaps not so strong on argument.
My noble friend the Duke of Montrose asked about the fact that it is sometimes said by some Scottish National Party people that there would be two new countries, and the rest of the United Kingdom would have to negotiate lots of other treaties. However, the first Scotland analysis paper, which the Government produced in February, examined the constitutional position. We did so on the basis of advice from Professor James Crawford of Cambridge University and Professor Boyle of Edinburgh University—two outstanding experts in the field. Their analysis—one which represents the view of the United Kingdom Government—is that the rest of the United Kingdom would be a continuing state, with all the rights and responsibilities such as permanent membership of the Security Council of the United Nations and membership of the European Union on the terms that have been negotiated, and Scotland would be a new state.
It sometimes seems rather odd to me that a party that aspires to independence finds it awkward to admit that it wants to be a new state. I thought that was the whole purpose. Scotland would be a new state, and it would have to enter into a whole series of different negotiations, including seeking membership of NATO and the European Union. If I may pick up another point, it was certainly rather a novel approach—perhaps this is one of the other things in the White Paper that we had not quite anticipated—to refer to Article 48 of the TFEU. The view of the United Kingdom Government—again, this was set out in the first paper of the Scotland analysis series—is that Article 49 would represent the appropriate way forward. We can have a debate as to whether Scotland would have to come out to go back in, or whether there would be a possibility, following a yes vote, of negotiations taking place during that period. However, the important point, which was reflected in the speeches by my noble friend Lord Forsyth and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, is that there would have to be negotiations—and we cannot predict with any certainty what would be in those negotiations. The only thing that is certain is the uncertainty.
Arguments have been made about Schengen, about membership of the euro and about the rebate. Approaching this from the perspective of Croatia or Bulgaria, we would be talking about giving a rebate to a country that the First Minister has said would be the eighth wealthiest in the world. I also think that there is a misunderstanding on the part of the Scottish Government as to the nature of the rebate. They have said, “As the budget has been set for the European Union for 2014-20, we will decide between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom how the rebate is split up”. I know that there are people in this House who are much more knowledgeable about this matter than me but my understanding is that it is not a constant, annual lump sum that can be divvied up or shared; it is a function of the United Kingdom’s respective shares in the EU economy and receipts. Any change in the size of the United Kingdom, for example as a result of independence, would automatically be reflected in the rebate calculation. Therefore, there would not be a Scottish share of the UK rebate to be handed over. There seems to be a fundamental misunderstanding on the part of the Scottish Government in their White Paper as to what they are talking about.
As regards currency, my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer has said that it is highly unlikely that there would be a currency union. That was reflected by other former Chancellors, including Alistair Darling, and the former Chancellor and Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. I think it also has been said by the Shadow Chancellor. Therefore, while we get an answer to whether Scotland could take part in the Eurovision Song Contest, we do not get an answer as to what the currency position would be if a monetary union was not agreed with the rest of the United Kingdom. Because questions such as that are ducked, the Scottish people will not be given, as a result of this White Paper or from the Scottish Government, the proper information with which they can make up their minds—our minds—when voting on 18 September next year.
My noble friend Lord Selkirk talked about defence and the primary importance of the security of the realm. We believe that the whole of Scotland and the United Kingdom benefits from a full range of UK defence capabilities and activities. Scotland has greater security and influence with the United Kingdom’s geopolitical influence, which few states of similar size to Scotland can match. In addition, there is the important defence industry in Scotland. On the idea of joint procurement, as far as I am aware, since the Second World War, no complex naval vessels have been built outside the United Kingdom. If the rest of the United Kingdom should start building these vessels outside the UK, that could not automatically go to Scotland. There would have to be open competition, even in these circumstances. My noble friend is absolutely right to stress the defence implications of independence, but there are defence benefits from Scotland being part of the United Kingdom.
The 2015 election was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Crickhowell and the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy. In answer to my noble friend Lord Crickhowell, last Thursday, I had a question from my noble friend Lord Forsyth on what would happen after the vote on independence in September 2014 and whether Scottish MPs would have to leave at that point. I think that that is when I said that they would not need to do so. Obviously, it would be a matter for Parliament to address what would happen in 2016, although I cannot honestly see how people could represent constituencies or a country that no longer belongs to the rest of the United Kingdom. I do not see how that could happen, or how Parliament would deal with that or with the intervening period between the elections in 2015 and 2016. Should that ever happen, I think it would be a matter for both Houses.
I certainly picked up the point made by my noble friend about the idea that we should somehow postpone the United Kingdom general election. Given that the Fixed-term Parliaments Act was on the statute book before the date of the referendum was announced, the Scottish Government had full notice of it. I find it somewhat preposterous that for some reason people in the rest of the United Kingdom should be denied their democratic opportunity to select their Members of Parliament to facilitate a negotiation.
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have tabled Amendments 16, 17, 20 and 21 in this group, of which the substantive amendment is Amendment 21. Taken together, these four amendments would ensure that although the Secretary of State may, through a memorandum of understanding, alter the provisions concerning the ISC, a memorandum of understanding could not limit the functions of the ISC.
I hope that the Minister can give me an assurance that Clause 2 does not intend that the ISC’s functions could be limited in this way and that the Government are not seeking the opportunity to restrict its functions. If that is not wholly clear, perhaps the Government can look at it, but the Minister may well be able to persuade me that it is wholly clear. In any event, I am sure that he understands the short but important point that I am making. I beg to move.
I wonder if we might be told when we can expect to see this memorandum of understanding.
My Lords, we have tabled Amendment 22, which replicates the one tabled in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and is very similar to one tabled by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours.
This amendment requires a memorandum of understanding that will further define the remit of the ISC and other elements of its functioning. We consider that this should be approved by Parliament. Throughout the debate we have been arguing for greater ties between the ISC and Parliament in order to underline its accountability to Parliament rather than the Executive. This is an important example of how we can assist in effecting such change.
If the ISC is ultimately accountable to Parliament, it seems right that Parliament should approve the MoU that governs the ISC’s relationship with the Government over and above that which is set out in the Bill. I am sure that we will replicate this debate next week in the Crime and Courts Bill about the framework document for the National Crime Agency. If something is outside the remit of what is in the legislation, it is very helpful to have sight of that and Parliament should have the opportunity to debate and approve it.
The Government have argued against the establishment of the ISC as a full Select Committee of Parliament. One of the arguments is that it is necessary to circumscribe in statute the rules under which the committee may operate. It seems justified and very reasonable that the MoU should be subject to greater scrutiny and formalisation by coming before the House and having formal parliamentary scrutiny and approval before it can be acted upon.
First, on this preliminary document, which will not be the final document, will there be anything more in front of the Commons when they consider this in Committee than what is provided to us before Third Reading? Secondly, why should not preliminary drafting work, which I presume is going on now, be made available to the House—or certainly to the Commons—at an earlier stage?
I think I can reassure the noble Lord that I am doing my best to make sure that this House is informed before Third Reading of the nature of the document and the context in which it is being presented. I hope that the same document would indeed be available to the House of Commons. Until the Bill is enacted, the document cannot of course be laid before the House other than in a framework format. I hope that I have reassured the noble Lord that he and his colleagues in another place will have the information on which to see how this aspect of the Bill—the memorandum of understanding—is designed to bring flexibility into the procedures of the ISC.
Indeed, we wish to ensure that the memorandum of understanding is not used to restrict in any way the ISC’s remit or its functions as set out in the Bill. As we explained in our memorandum to the Delegated Powers Committee—another memorandum—the purpose of this clause is to enable provisions to be included in the memorandum of understanding to ensure that the ISC’s oversight of operational matters does not: interfere with the statutory accountability of the intelligence services to their Ministers; overlap with the roles of other independent oversight bodies, such as the Intelligence Services Commissioner; or lessen the effectiveness of the intelligence services and other intelligence and security bodies, or place any undue resource burden upon them. We believe that a clear understanding between the Government and the ISC as to how the ISC can most effectively oversee operational matters without compromising these imperatives is best achieved in a flexible instrument agreed between them. These amendments would, I fear, seem to preclude that. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness will see fit to withdraw the amendment.
When I originally read this wording in the Bill prior to the Committee stage, alarm bells immediately rang. When I saw the reference to ongoing operations, I tabled the original amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, in his contribution, really set out the case very much in the way that I would wish to argue it and I do not wish to repeat what he said.
However, he referred to one operation, which perhaps illustrates where the problem might arise. I refer to the issue of what happened in Libya. I did not know the detail of what happened there but I presume, from what the noble Lord said, that it was reported to a committee. I should have thought that that is a typical example of something which fell under the description of these matters given by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, in Committee when she referred to operations being—if I recall correctly—finite and coded. Am I right in saying finite and coded?
I should have thought that that operation in Libya was a typical example of something that was finite and coded but which, as we know, was referred to the committee prior to the operation being completed. One wonders whether that operation would have fallen foul of what is in the Bill as it stands. I have no doubt that the Minister has in his brief, in very large red letters, “resist at all costs”—perhaps more than many of the other amendments that we have considered today. I would imagine that the services are particularly worried about this area. However, I would say to them that they must go away and reconsider this issue.
This is classic House of Commons debating material. I should have thought that the House of Commons will latch on to this wording and really drive it in Committee very hard. The Government should get a better line in dealing with these matters than we have heard hitherto.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Campbell-Savours, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for introducing these amendments, three of which concern the ISC’s ability to oversee operational matters and the fourth concerns the relationship between the ISC and Select Committees. It is worth reminding ourselves that one of the purposes of the Bill is to extend the ISC’s statutory remit. It makes clear its ability to oversee the operational work of the security and intelligence agencies and of other parts of the Government’s intelligence machinery.
With this formalisation, we certainly expect that the ISC will provide such an oversight on a more regular basis. The provisions of the Bill allow the ISC to consider,
“any particular operational matter but”—
as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, quite properly indicated by quoting from the Bill—
“only so far as the ISC and the Prime Minister are satisfied that … the matter … is not part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation, and … is of significant national interest”.
The starting point is that the ISC’s oversight in this area ought to be retrospective and, so as not to cut across the role of Ministers, should not involve, for instance, prior knowledge of approval of agency activity. It is important that when there is an ongoing operation, or indeed a future operation, the responsibility for national security lies with Ministers. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, made it clear that the ISC is not seeking to intervene in that and accepts that the primary and principal responsibility lies with Ministers.
The ISC’s consideration of an operational matter must also,
“be consistent with any principles set out in, or other provision made by, a memorandum of understanding”.
The first amendment would have the effect of leaving it solely to the judgment of the ISC to decide when the criteria for considering a particular operational matter are met. It is our intention that the memorandum of understanding will set out the factors that should be taken into account in assessing whether a particular operation is still ongoing or is of significant national interest. None the less, while fully accepting that the committee does not have ambition or aspiration to extend beyond what is said, I am sure that even reasonable people could come to a different view about whether those particular criteria are met or not in a particular instance.
I hope that noble Lords will agree that the judgment as to whether an operational matter meets the criteria is one that should properly be for both the ISC and the Government and not just for one or the other. It is important that the judgment is got right; I do not think that anyone is suggesting in any way whatever that there will be any deliberate attempt to intrude in circumstances where it has not previously been anticipated that the ISC should, but the last thing that anyone wants is for a different judgment to be struck that could lead to impeding the operational effectiveness of the intelligence agencies.
The noble Lord, Lord Butler, indicated what was perhaps at the crux of his concern. He mentioned the case of Libya. I understand that there may be a concern that the requirement that both the ISC and the Prime Minister should be satisfied that the criteria are met will slow down responses to more routine requests from the ISC for information about operational matters. The noble Lord used the word “cumbersome”. I assure your Lordships’ House that that is not the Government’s intention, nor do we believe that it will be the effect of the clause. However, I further assure your Lordships that we are looking very closely at this and it may well be that a memorandum of understanding to be agreed by the Government and the ISC is the right vehicle for agreeing a process that will allow the information that the noble Lord indicated to be provided to the committee, and in an appropriately prompt manner. Alternatively, it may be that there are other approaches that might make the position clearer, and I suspect that as this Bill progresses through Parliament we may return to it. But I indicate that it is a matter to which we will give further consideration. It may be that the memorandum of understanding is a better way to address it—and I hope that, on that basis, the noble Baroness will not press that amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, said that he would wish to remove one of the key restrictions on the ISC’s new power to oversee agency operations—namely, the requirement that its oversight of operations should be retrospective. There is nothing in red in my briefing, but there is an indication that the amendment should be resisted. We have worked with the current committee to develop the new arrangements, and it is the committee’s view, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, made clear in his speech to his amendment, that the committee agrees with the Government that it should not oversee ongoing operations.
There are clear lines of ministerial responsibility for authorising agency operations, and we believe that they could be undermined by the ISC having prior, even contemporaneous, knowledge of particular operations. Secondly, once a particular operation has commenced, it may well be that things move very quickly, and it is essential that the agencies can focus fully on the task on hand. It is better to bring the committee in and have retrospective oversight of a particular operation. Indeed, some operations will be so sensitive, with perhaps highly sensitive sources in play, that the details are kept within a very small, need-to-know circle, even within the agencies. The committee fully understands this; it is part and parcel of the work that it does, and which it recognises that the agencies do on our behalf. Once an operation has concluded, the ISC will then be well placed to carry out its work, which will no doubt include making strategic and policy recommendations, and giving views on any lessons learnt. The noble Lord’s concern expressed in Committee, which he has reflected this evening, on how operations might be defined, particularly if there is a long-running set of activities, was whether that could be defined by the Government as a single operation. I certainly understand where the noble Lord is coming from, but that is not an appropriate or proper interpretation of the clause. The nature of operations varies, and this is one of the reasons why we have provided in the Bill detailed consideration as to how the ISC’s operational oversight remit should operate and should be set out in a memorandum of understanding, which the Government will agree with the ISC.
Would it not be better simply to remove the whole section on ongoing operations and deal with the whole thing in the memorandum of understanding?
No, my Lords. One of our purposes is to ensure that this is put on a statutory basis. That has not been the case hitherto and this is a step forward. I can reassure the noble Lord that it is not the Government’s intention that a long-running operation be outside the scope of the ISC’s oversight for its entire duration. As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, explained in Committee, a long-running operation could, for instance, be broken down into discrete phases of operational activity, parts of which could be judged to be no longer ongoing and, on that basis, could be subject to the oversight of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I very much hope that on that basis the noble Lord will see fit not to press his amendment.
The third amendment in the group, Amendment 23, would allow the ISC to oversee an operational matter that does not meet the criteria in Clause 2(3) if the relevant Minister of the Crown agrees to the consideration of the matter. It is difficult to see the circumstances in which the provisions of that amendment would need to be used, although I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Butler, said. His concern was that there may be a circumstance whereby both the Government and the committee agreed that it was proper that there should be an investigation, but that it would be statutorily barred from that. The concern is that that amendment is aimed at allowing both to agree on what the ISC could consider. I am sympathetic to the kind of situation that the noble Lord described. The Government are not convinced that there is a need for this amendment, but we appreciate the intention behind it, which is to introduce a degree of flexibility that might prove useful in the future. It is certainly a matter that we would want to keep under review as work continues on drafting the memorandum. We would be willing to look at that again because, as the noble Lord indicated, it would relate to an issue on which there was agreement between the Government and the committee. It is just a question of how we can get that right without opening up to some unintended consequences.
Finally, I turn to the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which raises some important points relating to the relationship between the ISC and Select Committees. The first part of that amendment would mean that Select Committees could ask the ISC to consider any request to review any particular issue related to national security. The second part would mean that a Select Committee could request that the ISC transfer information to it that the Select Committee,
“has stated it needs to carry out its function”.
The third part states:
“The terms of any consideration … are to be set out in a memorandum of understanding between the ISC and the Select Committee in question”.
Again, I recognise and appreciate the intentions underlying that amendment—an intention expressed by the noble Baroness to create a stronger link between the ISC and other committees. It certainly would be our intention that the new ISC should be closer to Parliament than its predecessor and that it should be a strong and effective committee. Equally, an important feature is that the ISC operates within a framework that enables its members safely to be party to highly sensitive material and that it can scrutinise matters that are secret and of which the rest of Parliament and the public, for good reason, do not have sight. Of course, at the moment it is open to Select Committees to write to the ISC requesting it to review a particular matter. There is nothing in the new arrangements that will stop that. I am sure that any such requests will be treated seriously by the committee.
However, I have a number of concerns about the idea of creating a formal statutory mechanism for making and considering the requests. First, I am concerned that the ISC could become overwhelmed with requests to report on particular matters. If it acceded to all requests, the programme of work could be overtaken with matters that are of interest to other committees, which would take the focus away from the core work of the ISC. Secondly, there is the question of what the ISC would be able to say in response, given the highly sensitive nature of the agency’s work. Members of the ISC are of course bound by the obligations of the Official Secrets Act. Thirdly, if the ISC regularly refuses to action requests from Select Committees, an inevitable tension could arise between the ISC and those committees. I fear that that might undermine the perceived effectiveness of the new ISC and its closeness to Parliament.
On the requesting of information to help Select Committees with their work, it will be clear that there will be real limitations on what the ISC could provide, given that much of the material that is provided to the ISC is, by necessity, extremely sensitive.
Have civil servants and the Minister considered the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, when he intervened in Committee on these matters? If they have not, why do they not meet him prior to Third Reading so that he can discuss with them his concerns arising from his experience as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights?
I recall having read, in the past 24 hours, a particular phrase from the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, to which the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, refers. I could take the Joint Committee on Human Rights in isolation but numerous other Select Committees could start making requests and the point I am trying to make is that if the ISC started to receive requests—indeed, it is possible at the moment and no doubt the committee considers them—but on a statutory basis, the concern would be that if the committee decided to respond positively to those requests, that would detract from its core function and purpose. Equally, the point I was making was that if it regularly refused action, that could lead to tension and detract from what we are trying to achieve by way of a greater closeness between the new committee and Parliament.
There is also the point that I was making about the information. By its very nature, some of that information will be extremely sensitive and will be classified as secret or top secret, according to the government system of protective markings, but the ISC, in its accommodation, staffing and procedures is set up to handle sensitive information. The ISC secretariat is vetted and its accommodation is secure. However, other committees are not set up to deal with such information, nor are they, we believe, in a proper position to assess the damage that disclosure could cause. If the ISC refuses to provide information, again, that could lead to tensions between committees.
The new ISC will need to consider how it works with Select Committees and with Parliament more broadly, but I am concerned that the provision suggested in this amendment might serve to skew or disrupt the ISC’s work programme and its reputation could be damaged by refusals to take forward work or pass on information. It is important that the ISC can direct its own work programme as far as possible and focus its efforts on issues that it, with its unique perspective, thinks are most important. I appreciate the intention behind the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, but I hope that they will reflect on the concerns that have been expressed and feel able to withdraw it.