Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Baroness Smith of Basildon Excerpts

Monday 19th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

I wonder if we might be told when we can expect to see this memorandum of understanding.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, we have tabled Amendment 22, which replicates the one tabled in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and is very similar to one tabled by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours.

This amendment requires a memorandum of understanding that will further define the remit of the ISC and other elements of its functioning. We consider that this should be approved by Parliament. Throughout the debate we have been arguing for greater ties between the ISC and Parliament in order to underline its accountability to Parliament rather than the Executive. This is an important example of how we can assist in effecting such change.

If the ISC is ultimately accountable to Parliament, it seems right that Parliament should approve the MoU that governs the ISC’s relationship with the Government over and above that which is set out in the Bill. I am sure that we will replicate this debate next week in the Crime and Courts Bill about the framework document for the National Crime Agency. If something is outside the remit of what is in the legislation, it is very helpful to have sight of that and Parliament should have the opportunity to debate and approve it.

The Government have argued against the establishment of the ISC as a full Select Committee of Parliament. One of the arguments is that it is necessary to circumscribe in statute the rules under which the committee may operate. It seems justified and very reasonable that the MoU should be subject to greater scrutiny and formalisation by coming before the House and having formal parliamentary scrutiny and approval before it can be acted upon.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach)]

My Lords, legislation is often a process of distillation and this evening the House has distilled itself down to this particularly rich mixture.

The Government intend to use the memorandum of understanding to make a substantial contribution to central government’s intelligence and security activities. It will be subject to ISC oversight. It is our intention that the activities should include certain activities within the Ministry of Defence, the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office and the central government intelligence machinery in the Cabinet Office, including the Joint Intelligence Organisation. The scope of the memorandum, therefore, is wider than the three core agencies.

As my noble friend Lord Henley said in response to an amendment from the Opposition on this same subject in Committee, it is right that the memorandum of understanding should spell out the precise remit of the ISC in relation to bodies other than the agencies, because the memorandum of understanding can make provision at a level of detail which is not appropriate in primary legislation. This is particularly important because parts of government departments engaged in intelligence and security activities may be engaged in other activities which would not properly fall within the remit of the ISC.

The House will know that things change over time—departments reorganise. Functions done in one department one year may be done in another the following year. The intelligence world is no different from any other part of government. A memorandum of understanding is flexible. It can be changed much more easily than primary legislation. It will enable the intention of the Government to be realised now and in the future.

The effect of the amendment spoken to by my noble friend Lady Hamwee would be that, instead of the ISC’s widened remit beyond the three agencies being defined precisely in a memorandum of understanding, it would be defined in primary legislation, which is not in the interests of a good definition of the ISC’s role and is less flexible as I have said.

The Government’s intention is that the memorandum of understanding will enable the ISC to oversee certain activities; for example, within the Ministry of Defence as I have described. A memorandum of understanding is the best place to make provision at this level of detail.

The effect of Amendment 22, as proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, would be that a memorandum of understanding agreed between the Prime Minister and the ISC for the purposes of Clause 2 would need to be approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament before it could take effect. The memorandum of understanding is an important document. It will define the activities of government in relation to intelligence or security matters, other than the activities of the agencies, which the ISC may oversee. It will also specify additional principles and provisions, other than the criteria specified in the Bill, with which the ISC’s consideration of operational matters must be consistent. It will also specify the arrangements by which the agencies and other government departments make information available to the ISC.

The Bill also provides that the memorandum of understanding may include other provisions about the ISC or its functions. It must be agreed between the Prime Minister and the ISC and can be altered or replaced at any time by agreement. It is therefore different from a parliamentary document.

While the ISC is dissolved on Dissolution of Parliament, the memorandum of understanding will continue in place during a succession of government until a new memorandum of understanding is agreed with the Prime Minister.

As is usual with a memorandum of understanding, there is no parliamentary approval procedure. While the memorandum of understanding will be an unclassified document which is published and laid before Parliament, its precise terms are very likely to be shaped by matters which are sensitive in terms of national security and cannot therefore be made public. However, there is no restriction on the document laid before Parliament being debated in Parliament, and, indeed, one might expect on occasions for it to be so debated. Of course, the terms of the memorandum of understanding must be agreed with the ISC itself: a committee composed of parliamentarians that, as a result of the changes that we have been talking about, will be a committee of Parliament appointed by and accountable to Parliament. Requiring these parliamentarians to seek the approval of their parliamentary colleagues would be quite a restriction on the independence of that body.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, this amendment is in my name and that of the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian. I shall couple with it Amendment 23. I am grateful to the Opposition, who have given their support to these amendments. They relate to circumstances in which the ISC may consider operational matters. At the moment, these are defined in Clause 2(3), which states:

“The ISC may … consider any particular operational matter but only so far as the ISC and the Prime Minister are satisfied that

(a) the matter—

(i) is not part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation, and

(ii) is of significant national interest, and

(b) the consideration of the matter is consistent with any principles set out in, or other provision made by, a memorandum of understanding”.

The problem is that that is too restrictive, but I want to make clear at the outset that the ISC does not aspire to consider current operational matters unless the Government have some particular reason for asking it to.

The reason why the wording is too restrictive is that at present there are three tests that have to be passed by an operational matter for the ISC to continue to consider it. The first is that it,

“is not part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation”.

The second is that it,

“is of significant national interest”.

The third test is that,

“the consideration of the matter is consistent with any principles set out in, or other provision made by, a memorandum of understanding”.

However, the preface to that is that the ISC and the Prime Minister must be satisfied that those conditions are met. That would curtail the present operations of the ISC considerably.

I shall cite one example. When the SIS operation in Libya went so badly wrong and it got into the newspapers, the first thing that happened, quite rightly, was that the chief of SIS wrote a letter to the committee to explain what had gone wrong. If the words of this provision were taken literally, he could have done that only if he had first cleared his lines with the Prime Minister. I could repeat lots of examples of matters where something appears in the press and the heads of the intelligence agencies then report to the ISC. However, the provision says that before any operational matter can be considered, the Prime Minister has to be satisfied that the three tests are passed. My first amendment would omit the words,

“the ISC and the Prime Minister are satisfied that”,

so that the provision would read, “The ISC may consider any particular operational matter but only so far as” the three tests were passed. In other words, it would remove the hurdle of satisfying the Prime Minister, which certainly does not apply at the moment. To have to satisfy the Prime Minister in each case would add a new and cumbersome bureaucratic procedure, which I doubt very much that the Prime Minister would welcome, let alone the ISC.

Doing that alone, however, is not sufficient, and that is where Amendment 23 comes in. That amendment says that the three tests would have to be passed before the ISC could consider an operational matter, and one of those tests would be that it was not part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation.

As I said, the ISC has no aspiration to consider an ongoing operation, unless the Government ask it to. It normally looks at operations retrospectively, but there are circumstances in which it suits the Government to ask the ISC to look at an ongoing operation, so Amendment 23, which my noble friend and I have tabled, states:

“The ISC may, notwithstanding subsection (3), consider any particular operational matter if the relevant Minister of the Crown agrees to consideration of the matter or it is consistent with the memorandum of understanding”.

An example of where this was necessary was cited by the noble Lord, Lord King. When he was chairman of the committee, it was asked by the Home Secretary of the day to consider the Mitrokhin case. That was a circumstance in which it suited the Government to ask the ISC to consider that operational matter. It would be very quixotic if the ISC had to say to the Government, “Sorry, you may have asked us to look at this matter because it would help you, but I am afraid we’re not allowed to because there is an absolute ban on it in the Bill”.

The purpose of these two amendments is to give more flexibility to the Government about the circumstances in which the ISC may look at an operational matter. It is not the ISC’s wish, in normal circumstances, unless the Government want it to, to look at matters retrospectively. The purpose of this amendment is to increase the flexibility which has been removed by the current drafting of the Bill. I beg to move.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

As noble Lords will see from the Marshalled List, we have added our names to Amendments 18 and 23, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, noted, and we have also tabled Amendment 24 in this group.

The noble Lord, Lord Butler, has proved a worthy proponent of his Amendment 18, which would return the procedure for determining whether a matter should be considered by the committee back to the status quo by removing the requirement for the committee to seek the approval of the Prime Minister before making any such decision. It seems absolutely clear that the committee is bound in statute to abide by the remit set out in Clause 2 and it should not have to seek the approval of the Prime Minister to determine that it had done so. I agree with the members of the ISC and the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, who have argued that not only is this overly bureaucratic but it is a step backwards from the current position where the committee itself determines, on the basis of given criteria, whether a matter falls within its remit.

Amendment 23, to which we added our name, and Amendment 19, which was tabled by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, address the same point, but in a slightly different way. The Bill reflects the status quo by incorporating operational matters, which the committee has been de facto undertaking for some time, into the formal remit of the ISC. However, it seems overly prescriptive for the Bill expressly to prohibit the committee from reviewing ongoing operational matters. All Members of your Lordships’ House fully accept that there are security issues to do with reviewing operations that are current and may risk compromising individuals involved. However, there may be rare cases where an operation carries on for a long time and, despite the risk being minimal, it is still considered current by the standards of the Bill. It seems much more reasonable to make a general stipulation against the review of ongoing operations but to allow the committee to review such matters in special circumstances if it has the express consent of the relevant Minister.

Opposition Amendment 24 is a repeat of that tabled by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours in Committee. It would require the ISC to consider a request by a Select Committee to review a certain matter related to the ISC’s remit as well as any request to provide the Select Committee with information. It should be clarified that under no circumstances would the amendment require the ISC to act on any such request from a Select Committee, for instance, to disclose sensitive information or that simply would prove to be unmanageable for the committee’s workload. It would be a request. However, fostering greater communication and collaboration of Select Committees in Parliament could be only a positive development for the ISC.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, this may be the last amendment that we consider this evening. I can move it very briefly indeed because I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, for putting his name to it and therefore take it that we are pushing at an open door. This amendment would remove the words “a draft of” in relation to the report submitted to the Prime Minister. The committee does not and never has submitted a draft of the report; it submits its report. The Prime Minister can then ask for certain redactions to be made before it is published. However, it is by no means provisional. I take it from the fact that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, has put his name to this amendment that the Government will accept the removal of the words “a draft of”.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, since we are considering the last group of the evening, I confess to being envious of the noble Lord, Lord Butler. I have been in your Lordships’ House a relatively short time in comparison with him, but I have never had an amendment signed by both the Official Opposition and the Government. I congratulate him on that achievement.

There is not very much that I can say on this amendment that will not be said even better by others. However, I will say something regarding our Amendment 27. This is a revised version of an amendment which I tabled in Committee. This amendment would amend the grounds on which the Prime Minister may exclude matters from the annual reports. These are currently broadly defined in the Bill as that which the Prime Minister considers,

“would be prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of the Security Service”.

It goes on in that vein. We have argued that the primary reason for the Prime Minister to request the redaction of material contained within the annual report should be on the basis of national security, or that it risks a disclosure of sensitive information as defined in the Bill. Again, we have reservations that the reason given in Clause 3(4) is a bit of a catch-all provision which allows the Prime Minister to prohibit the publication of material perhaps considered too critical and which may damage the reputation of government agencies.

Of course, we acknowledge that there may be circumstances in which the Government will need to prevent the publication of material. That may not be only on the basis of national security or the sensitivity of information. It could also be where the information might threaten the UK’s economic interests. However, it would be better to make such additional criteria transparent and accountable, in order to prevent any misrepresentation of the role of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Amendment 27 allows the Prime Minister to prohibit publication on grounds in addition to national security and the sensitivity of information, along the lines defined in the Bill, but also requires that the scope of the information must be set out in the MoU with the Intelligence and Security Committee. It is a moderate and reasonable amendment and I hope that the Minister will give it his consideration.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, moved his amendment. It received support from around the House and I am pleased to say that the Government are in a position to accept it. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and my noble friend Lord Lothian made the important point that the committee should be independent. I agree wholeheartedly. It will submit its report, not a draft of its report, to the Prime Minister, who may insist on redactions to the document but may not insist on any other changes. Again, I agree with this, so we are happy to accept the amendment.

Amendment 27 would have the effect of changing the grounds on which the Prime Minister might exclude any matter from a report to Parliament. It would add to the grounds for exclusion already described so that material might be excluded if it were of such a nature that it would be prejudicial to the continued discharge of the functions of the security service, the Secret Intelligence Service, the Government Communications Headquarters or any person carrying out activities that fall within Section 2(2); if it were sensitive information as defined in paragraph 4 of Schedule 1; or if it were information that, in the interests of national security, should not be disclosed. For convenience, I will refer to the three possible grounds for excluding material as the prejudice to functions ground, the sensitive information ground and the national security ground. The amendment would also require that matters considered to fall under the prejudice to functions ground—currently the only ground for excluding information from the Bill—should be set out in a memorandum of understanding.

The ISC must be able to report candidly to the Prime Minister on sensitive matters. Inevitably, it will not always be possible to publish the full content of its reports because of the nature of the material contained in them. I do not think that there is any dissent in the House from that position. It follows that there must be an ability to redact information before ISC reports are published or laid before Parliament. In Committee, and amendment was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith—to which she referred—which would have made the criteria for excluding material from the published report just the grounds of sensitive information and national security. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who is not in this place, explained that it was a probing amendment to try to find out why it was necessary to use the definition that was in the Bill rather than that in the amendment, which presented grounds similar to those in Schedule 1 for withholding information from the ISC. In the case of withholding material from the ISC, both grounds had to be fulfilled, whereas for these purposes material could be excluded from a report if either ground were fulfilled.

The sensitivity of information and national security grounds add nothing in substance. Material that falls within those grounds will necessarily also fall within the prejudice to functions grounds—unless in the case of sensitive information that is so historical or so widely known publicly that it is no longer sensitive, in which case there would be no real justification for excluding it from an ISC report to Parliament anyway.