Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 2—Limitation of time for minor offences—

“No proceedings shall be brought against any person in relation to a relevant offence, where—

(a) the condition set out in subsection 3 of section 1 is satisfied,

(b) the offence is subject to summary conviction only, or is one in the commission of which no serious, permanent or lasting psychological or physical injury has been caused, and

(c) a period of six months has passed from the time the offence was committed or discovered.”

This new clause would dispose of minor allegations of misconduct by imposing a time limit similar to that which exists in relation to summary only matters in Magistrates’ Courts.

New clause 3—Access to justice for service personnel—

“Within 12 months of this Act coming into force, the Secretary of State shall commission an independent evaluation comparing—

(a) access to justice for members and former members of the regular and reserve forces and of British overseas territory forces to whom section 369(2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (persons subject to service law) applies, in relation to legal proceedings in connection with operations of the armed forces outside the British Islands, with

(b) access to justice for asylum seekers and prisoners seeking to bring an action against the Crown.”

New clause 4—Ability to conduct a fair trial—

“The principle referred to in section 1(1) is that a relevant prosecutor making a decision to which that section applies may determine that proceedings should be brought against the person for the offence, or, as the case may be, that the proceedings against the person for the offence should be continued, only if the prosecutor has reasonable grounds for believing that the fair trial of the person has not been materially prejudiced by the time elapsed since the alleged conduct took place.”

This new clause is intended to replace Clause 2 of the Bill. It replaces the presumption against prosecution with a requirement on a prosecutor deciding whether to bring or continue a prosecution to consider whether the passage of time has materially prejudiced the prospective defendant’s chance of a fair trial.

New clause 5—Restrictions on time limits: actions brought against the Crown by service personnel—

“Nothing in this Part applies to any action brought against the Crown by a person who is a member or former member of the regular or reserve forces, or of a British overseas territory force to whom section 369(2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (persons subject to service law) applies.”

This new clause amends Part 2 of the Bill so that it explicitly excludes actions brought against the Crown by serving or former service personnel from the limitations on courts’ discretion that the Part imposes in respect of actions relating to overseas operations.

New clause 6—Duty of care to service personnel—

“(1) The Secretary of State shall establish a duty of care standard in relation to legal, pastoral and mental health support provided to service personnel involved in investigations or litigation arising from overseas operations, as defined in subsection (6) of section 1.

(2) The Secretary of State shall lay a copy of this standard before Parliament within six months of the date on which this Act receives Royal Assent.

(3) The Secretary of State shall thereafter in each calendar year—

(a) prepare a duty of care report; and

(b) lay a copy of the report before Parliament.

(4) The duty of care report is a report about the continuous process of review and improvement to meet the duty of care standard established in subsection (1), in particular in relation to incidents arising from overseas operations of—

(a) litigation and investigations brought against service personnel for allegations of criminal misconduct and wrongdoing;

(b) civil litigation brought by service personnel against the Ministry of Defence for negligence and personal injury;

(c) judicial reviews and inquiries into allegations of misconduct by service personnel;

(d) in such other fields as the Secretary of State may determine.

(5) In preparing a duty of care report the Secretary of State must have regard to, and publish relevant data in relation to (in respect of overseas operations)—

(a) the adequacy of legal, welfare and mental health support services provided to service personnel who are accused of crimes;

(b) complaints made by service personnel and, or their legal representation when in the process of bringing or attempting to bring civil claims against the Ministry of Defence for negligence and personal injury;

(c) complaints made by service personnel and, or their legal representation when in the process of investigation or litigation for an accusation of misconduct;

(d) meeting national care standards and safeguarding to families of service personnel, where relevant.

(6) In section (1) “service personnel” means—

(a) members of the regular forces and the reserve forces;

(b) members of British Overseas Territory forces who are subject to service law;

(c) former members of any of Her Majesty‘s forces who are ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom; and

(d) where relevant, family members of any person meeting the definition within (a), (b) or (c).

(7) In subsection (1) “Duty of Care” means both the legal and moral obligation of the Ministry of Defence to ensure the well-being of service personnel.

(8) None of the provisions contained within this clause shall be used to alter the principle of Combat Immunity.”

This new clause will require the Ministry of Defence to identify a new duty of care to create a new standard for policy, services and training in relation to legal, pastoral and mental health support provided to service personnel involved in investigations or litigations arising from overseas operations, and to report annually on their application of this standard.

New clause 7—Duty of care to service personnel—

“(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person has been acquitted of an offence relating to conduct on overseas operations; or

(b) a determination has been made that an investigation into an offence relating to such conduct should cease under section (Judicial oversight of investigations).

(2) No further investigation into the alleged conduct shall be commenced unless—

(a) compelling new evidence has become available; and

(b) an allocated judge advocate determines that the totality of the evidence against the accused is sufficiently strong.”

This new clause would require a judge advocate of the armed services to determine if new evidence is sufficient to grant reinvestigation of armed forces personnel for alleged offences in which they have been acquitted or the original investigation was ceased.

Amendment 11, page 1, line 4, leave out clause 1.

Part 1 of the Bill introduces restrictions on prosecution for certain offences, including a presumption against prosecution. This amendment is one of a series that would remove Part 1 from the Bill.

Amendment 18, in clause 1, page 2, line 2, leave out “5” and insert “10”.

This amendment is one of two providing that the presumption against prosecution should apply after 10 years (instead of 5 years).

Amendment 19, in clause 1, page 2, line 4, leave out “5” and insert “10”.

This amendment is one of two providing that the presumption against prosecution should apply after 10 years (instead of 5 years).

Amendment 64, page 2, line 12, leave out clause 2.

This amendment, which would remove Clause 2 from the Bill, should be read together with NC4, which replaces the presumption against prosecution with a requirement on a prosecutor to consider whether the passage of time has materially prejudiced the prospective defendant’s chance of a fair trial.

Amendment 13, page 2, line 18, leave out clause 3.

Part 1 of the Bill introduces restrictions on prosecution for certain offences, including a presumption against prosecution. This amendment is one of a series that would remove Part 1 from the Bill.

Amendment 24, in clause 3, page 2, line 20, leave out

“(so far as they tend to reduce the person’s culpability or otherwise tend against prosecution)”.

This amendment would ensure that, in giving particular weight to the matters in subsection (2), a prosecutor may consider whether any matter tends to reduce or increase culpability, tending against or in favour of prosecution respectively.

Amendment 21, in clause 3, page 2, leave out lines 23 to 29.

This amendment is one of two that together would delete the requirement for a prosecutor to give “particular weight” in a prosecution decision after 5 years to the adverse effect on a person of the conditions the person was exposed to during deployment.

Amendment 25, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

“(ba) the thoroughness, promptness and efficacy of any ongoing investigation into the alleged conduct or any relevant previous investigation, and the reasons for any delays in such investigations;”.

This amendment would ensure that the adequacy of any investigative process to date is given particular weight by a relevant prosecutor.

Amendment 26, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

“(bb) the public interest in maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the Armed Forces;”.

This amendment would ensure that a relevant prosecutor gives particular weight to maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the Armed Forces.

Amendment 27, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

“(bc) the nature of the alleged conduct, in particular whether it engaged the obligations of the United Kingdom under Articles 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights;”.

This amendment would ensure that particular weight is given by a prosecutor where the alleged conduct engages the UK’s obligations under Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, Article 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced labour) or Article 5 (prohibition of arbitrary detention) ECHR.

Amendment 28, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

“(bd) whether the person had command responsibility for the alleged conduct, and to what extent;”.

This amendment would ensure that particular weight is given by a relevant prosecutor where the person had command responsibility for the alleged conduct.

Amendment 38, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, after subsection (2)(b), insert—

“(c) the quality and duration of relevant investigations.”

This amendment would require prosecutors to give weight to the quality and duration of relevant investigations when deciding whether to bring or continue proceedings against a person relating to alleged conduct during overseas operations.

Amendment 22, in clause 3, page 2, leave out lines 34 to 43.

This amendment is one of two that together would delete the requirement for a prosecutor to give “particular weight” in a prosecution decision after 5 years to the adverse effect on a person of the conditions the person was exposed to during deployment.

Amendment 14, page 3, line 1, leave out clause 4.

Part 1 of the Bill introduces restrictions on prosecution for certain offences, including a presumption against prosecution. This amendment is one of a series that would remove Part 1 from the Bill.

Amendment 15, page 3, line 15, leave out clause 5.

Part 1 of the Bill introduces restrictions on prosecution for certain offences, including a presumption against prosecution. This amendment is one of a series that would remove Part 1 from the Bill.

Amendment 31, in clause 5, page 3, line 29, at end insert—

“(c) where the offence is punishable with a criminal penalty by the law of Scotland, except with the consent of the Lord Advocate.”

Amendment 39, in clause 5, page 3, line 29, at end insert—

“(3A) Where the consent of the Attorney General is sought under subsection (2) or (3) above, the Attorney General must prepare a report containing his reasons for granting or withholding consent, as the case may be, with reference to sections 1 to 3 of this Act, and must lay a copy of this report before Parliament.”

This amendment requires the Attorney General to lay out their evidence and assessment as to why they granted or refused consent to prosecute.

Amendment 16, page 3, line 40, leave out clause 6.

Part 1 of the Bill introduces restrictions on prosecution for certain offences, including a presumption against prosecution. This amendment is one of a series that would remove Part 1 from the Bill.

Amendment 20, in clause 6, page 4, line 13, at end insert—

“(2A) An offence is not a “relevant offence” if it amounts to—

(a) torture, within the meaning of section 134 Criminal Justice Act 1988; or

(b) genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime as defined in section 50 of the International Criminal Court Act 2001.”

This amendment provides that the presumption against prosecution does not apply to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or torture.

Amendment 32, in clause 6, page 4, line 13, at end insert—

“(3A) A service offence is not a “relevant offence” if it is an offence whose prosecution is required under the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations.”

This amendment would exclude the prosecution of serious international crimes (such as torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain war crimes) from the limitations otherwise imposed by the Bill.

Amendment 17, page 4, line 27, leave out clause 7.

Part 1 of the Bill introduces restrictions on prosecution for certain offences, including a presumption against prosecution. This amendment is one of a series that would remove Part 1 from the Bill.

Amendment 33, page 6, line 4, leave out clause 8.

Amendment 34, page 6, line 15, leave out clause 9.

Amendment 35, page 6, line 26, leave out clause 10.

Amendment 23, page 6, line 38, leave out clause 11.

This clause would introduce a hard deadline for human rights claims and also includes detailed provision around the impact of proceedings on the mental health of Armed Forces witnesses. This amendment deletes this clause from the bill.

Amendment 60, in clause 11, page 7, line 23, at end insert—

“(c) the importance of the proceedings in securing the rights of the claimant.”

This amendment adds a further consideration to which UK courts must have particular regard when determining whether to disapply the standard HRA limitation period of one year so as to ensure that the claimant’s interest in having their claim proceed is not subordinated.

Amendment 46, in clause 11, page 7, line 30, leave out from “before” to the end of line 34 and insert

“the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date of knowledge.”

This amendment is one of a series that change the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing claims under the HRA arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 41, in clause 11, page 7, line 34, at end insert—

“(4A) The court may disapply the rule in subsection (1) (b) where it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”

This amendment introduces a discretion for UK courts to allow a Human Rights Act claim arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.

Amendment 29, in clause 11, page 7, line 36, leave out

“first ought to have known”.

Amendment 47, in clause 11, page 7, line 40, at end insert—

“(c) of the manifestation of the harm resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim; and

(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim under the Human Rights Act 1998 against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”

This amendment is one of a series that change the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing claims under the HRA arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 40, page 8, line 14, leave out clause 12.

Clause 12 would require the Secretary of State to consider making a derogation under Article 15(1) ECHR in respect of any significant overseas operations. This amendment would remove this requirement.

Amendment 37, in clause 12, page 8, line 20, at end, insert—

“(1A) No order may be made by the Secretary of State under section 14 following consideration under this section unless a draft of the order has been laid before, and approved by, each House of Parliament.”

This amendment would require significant derogations regarding overseas operations proposed by the Government from the European Convention on Human Rights to be approved by Parliament before being made.

Amendment 66, page 11, line 1, leave out schedule 1.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 16.

Amendment 1, in schedule 1, page 12, line 6, at end insert—

“(13A) An offence under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (torture).”

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 2, in schedule 1, page 12, line 40, leave out “or” and insert—

“(b) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(f),

(c) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(i)

(d) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(k), or”.

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 3, in schedule 1, page 12, line 42, leave out “or” and insert—

“(ii) article 8.2(a)(ii) (which relates to international conflict),

(iii) article 8.2(b)(xxi) (which relates to international conflict), or”.

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 4, in schedule 1, page 13, line 2, at end insert “, or

(iv) article 8.2(c)(i) (which relates to armed conflicts not of an international character) insofar as it relates to the offences of cruel treatment and torture,

(v) article 8.2(c)(ii) (which relates to armed conflicts not of an international character).”

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 5, in schedule 1, page 13, line 14, leave out “or” and insert—

“(b) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(f),

(c) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(i),

(d) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(k), or”.

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 6, in schedule 1, page 13, line 16, leave out “or” and insert—

“(ii) article 8.2(a)(ii) ((which relates to international conflict),

(iii) article 8.2(b)(xxi) (which relates to international conflict), or”.

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 7, in schedule 1, page 13, line 18, at end insert—

“(iii) article 8.2(c)(i) (which relates to armed conflicts not of an international character) insofar as it relates to the offences of cruel treatment and torture,

(iv) article 8.2(c)(ii) (which relates to armed conflicts not of an international character).”

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 8, in schedule 1, page 14, line 8, leave out “or” and insert—

“(b) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(f),

(c) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(i),

(d) a crime against humanity within article 7.1(k), or”.

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 9, in schedule 1, page 14, line 10, leave out “or” and insert—

“(iii) article 8.2(a)(ii) ((which relates to international conflict),

(iv) article 8.2(b)(xxi) (which relates to international conflict), or”.

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 10, in schedule 1, page 14, line 12, at end insert—

“(iii) article 8.2(c)(i) (which relates to armed conflicts not of an international character) insofar as it relates to the offences of cruel treatment and torture, or

(iv) article 8.2(c)(ii) (which relates to armed conflicts not of an international character).”

This amendment is one of a series designed to ensure that the Bill’s “triple lock” provisions to block prosecutions would not apply to torture and related offences under UK law. This suite of amendments would ensure that the existing offences of torture – contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act and in other parts of UK law incorporating longstanding laws of war – would not be included within the Bill’s “triple lock” against prosecutions of UK soldiers.

Amendment 67, page 15, line 33, leave out schedule 2.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 33.

Amendment 48, in schedule 2, page 16, line 5, leave out

“the section 11 relevant date”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 30, in schedule 2, page 16, line 5, at end insert

“save for exceptional cases where the overriding interest of justice should be served.”

Amendment 42, in schedule 2, page 16, line 5, at end insert—

“(1ZAi) The court may disapply the rule in subsection (1ZA) where it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”

This amendment introduces a discretion for the courts of England and Wales to allow a civil claim for personal injury arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.

Amendment 49, in schedule 2, page 16, line 30, leave out

“the section 11 relevant date (ignoring, for this purpose, the reference to section 11 (5) in paragraph (a) of the definition of that term)”

and insert “the date of knowledge.”

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 50, in schedule 2, page 16, line 35, leave out

“the section 12 relevant date”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 43, schedule 2, page 16, line 36, at end insert—

“(2Bi) The court may disapply the rules in subsections (2A) and (2B) where it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”

This amendment introduces a discretion for the courts of England and Wales to allow a civil claim for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.

Amendment 61, in schedule 2, page 17, line 5, at end insert—

“(c) the court must also have particular regard to the importance of the proceedings in securing the rights of the claimant.”

This amendment adds a further consideration to which the courts of England and Wales must have particular regard when determining whether to disapply the standard limitation period of three years so as to ensure that the claimant’s interest in having their civil claim proceed is not illegitimately subordinated.

Amendment 51, in schedule 2, page 17, leave out from beginning of line 35 to end of line 5 on page 18, and insert—

“‘the date of knowledge’ means the date on which the person bringing the proceedings first knew, or first ought to have known—

(a) of the act complained of;

(b) that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence or the Secretary of State for Defence;

(c) of the manifestation of the injury resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim, and

(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 68, page 20, line 1, leave out schedule 3.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34.

Amendment 62, in schedule 3, page 20, line 32, at end insert—

“(c) the importance of the proceedings in securing the rights of the claimant.”

This amendment adds a further consideration to which the courts of Scotland must have particular regard when determining whether to disapply the standard limitation period of three years so as to ensure that the claimant’s interest in having their civil claim proceed is not subordinated.

Amendment 52, in schedule 3, page 20, line 41, leave out

“the section 17 relevant date”

and insert

“the date of knowledge (see subsection (13))”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 53, in schedule 3, page 21, line 4, leave out

“the section 18 relevant date”

and insert

“the date of knowledge (see subsection (13))”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 54, in schedule 3, page 21, line 9, leave out

“the section 17 relevant date”

and insert

“the date of knowledge (see subsection (13))”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 44, in schedule 3, page 21, line 9, at end insert—

“(7A) The court may disapply the rules in subsections (5) to (7) where it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”

This amendment introduces a discretion for the courts of Scotland to allow a civil claim for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.

Amendment 55, in schedule 3, page 22, leave out lines 12 to 17 and insert—

“‘the date of knowledge’ means the date on which the person bringing the proceedings first knew, or first ought to have known—

(a) of the act complained of;

(b) that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence or the Secretary of State for Defence;

(c) of the manifestation of the injury resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim, and

(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 69, page 23, line 38, leave out schedule 4.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 35.

Amendment 56, in schedule 4, page 24, line 5, leave out

“the Article 7 relevant date”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 45, in schedule 4, page 24, line 5, at end insert—

“(1Ai) The court may disapply the rule in paragraph (1A) where it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”

This amendment introduces a discretion for the courts of Northern Ireland to allow a civil claim for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.

Amendment 57, in schedule 4, page 24, line 29, leave out

“the Article 7 relevant date (ignoring, for this purpose, the reference to Article 7(5) in paragraph (a) of the definition of that term)”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury out of overseas operations.

Amendment 58, in schedule 4, page 24, line 34, leave out

“the Article 9 relevant date”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 63, in schedule 4, page 25, line 5, at end insert—

“(c) the court must also have particular regard to the importance of the proceedings in securing the rights of the claimant.”

This amendment adds a further consideration to which the courts of Northern Ireland must have particular regard when determining whether to disapply the standard limitation period of three years so as to ensure that the claimant’s interest in having their civil claim proceed is not subordinated.

Amendment 59, in schedule 4, page 25, leave out lines 25 to 43 and insert—

“‘the date of knowledge’ means the date on which the person bringing the proceedings first knew, or first ought to have known—

(a) of the act complained of;

(b) that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence or the Secretary of State for Defence;

(c) of the manifestation of the injury resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim, and

(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

[Mr Jones]

For the sake of time, I will not speak to every single amendment.

[Dan Jarvis (Barnsley Central) (Lab)]

Go on!

[Mr Jones]

My hon. Friend says, “Please do,” but I am sure that other Members want to contribute to this debate.

Since speaking on Second Reading and in Committee, it has been my aim, and that of the Labour Front-Bench team, to try to improve the Bill. In my nearly 19 years in this House, I have been someone who is proud of our armed forces, considers myself a friend to them and wants to help them in any way I can. I stand up for them, and I speak passionately, I think, in defending not just them but the case for defence.

It has therefore been disappointing that the Government have not really engaged to amend the Bill. Yesterday, my right hon. Friend the Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey) said to the Defence Secretary that he wished to work with the Government to try to improve the Bill today, and he got a single-word reply: “No.” We then had the reply from the Minister for Defence People and Veterans in response to a question on the Bill when he said that he would be

“happy to work with anybody to improve this Bill, but we must operate in the real world.”—[Official Report, 2 November 2020; Vol. 683, c. 13.]

The only problem with that is that it is the real world according to the Minister, and that world obviously has a different colour sky from the one that we all live in. The idea that, somehow, as long as he is saying it, it has to be true, even when his evidence is counter to that put forward by various witnesses in Committee, is telling. What was sad in Committee was that all the Minister did was read out his civil service brief to us in response to the various amendments. He was reluctant to accept any interventions, even from rottweilers such as my hon. Friends the Members for Blaydon (Liz Twist) and for South Shields (Mrs Lewell-Buck). When it comes to the Government Members on the Committee, I must congratulate the Whips Office on selecting so well, because those Members must have taken a collective vow of silence, which would have been admired by any silent ecclesiastical order. We had no contribution whatever from them, so it has been very difficult trying to engage with the Government on this Bill. The line is, clearly, that this is the answer, irrespective of what has been raised in Committee. We had some very good witnesses before us in Committee, but the Government are just not interested in changing the Bill, because the world and this Bill are perfect, according to the Minister and the Government.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

I concur with much of what my right hon. Friend is saying. He has always been a champion of the armed forces, both in his time in Government and, indeed, during the course of this Bill. Does he share my surprise that even the Government witnesses were saying things that disagreed with the Government’s account of this Bill? Professor Richard Ekins said that the Bill certainly does not stop investigations. He said:

“In fact, if one were to make a criticism of the Bill, one might say that it places no obstacle on continuing investigations”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 35, Q63.]

Does he not find it surprising that even Government witnesses did not agree with the Government?

[Mr Jones]

Indeed. Time and again, supposed Government witnesses went against the Government. My hon. Friend raises a good point with the example that he has just provided.

The other thing that came out, which relates to my new clause, was about investigations. Investigations, or the problems that lead to these issues around investigations, were the thread that ran throughout the evidence. In spite of that, what we had at the weekend—this was a really dangerous move on the part of the Ministry of Defence—was tweets promoting this Bill from the MOD and saying that it would stop investigations. It will do nothing of the sort. As a former Defence Minister myself, using the MOD’s website and tweets to politicise things would not have been allowed in my day. What was put out is just not going to happen. Let us look at the evidence that we heard in Committee from a number of witnesses. The first one I will mention, again a Government witness, is Hilary Meredith, solicitor. She was very good and concentrated on the issue around investigations. She said:

“It is the procedure and investigation in the UK that need to be reviewed and overhauled, and not necessarily a time limit placed on…prosecutions.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 16, Q24.]

[Ian Paisley (North Antrim) (DUP)]

The right hon. Gentleman has a long track record of supporting the armed services here. Is he concerned by the expression of doubt that has been put by members of the Royal British Legion? They have put in writing to all Members of Parliament the fact that they believe that part 2 of this Bill should be improved and that the time limit really gravely concerns them.

[Mr Jones]

I am, and I will come onto part 2 in a minute. The hon. Gentleman has hit on an issue relating to the Government’s approach to this Bill. The Minister is saying that it is standing up for members of the armed forces. It is doing nothing of the sort. In part 2, it is actually taking away rights.

[The Minister for Defence People and Veterans (Johnny Mercer)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Jones]

I will let the Minister intervene, even though he is very reluctant to give way to me. I asked him if I could intervene on numerous occasions in Committee, but he would not tear himself away from the civil service briefing in front of him.

[Johnny Mercer]

I just wish to intervene briefly. It is a litany of accusations and they are complete rubbish. Where have I ever said that I wanted to stop investigations in this Bill? That is what I would like the right hon. Gentleman to indicate to me.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. That is a perfectly reasonable question, but, although it is not exactly unparliamentary language, perhaps the Minister, speaking as he does with dignity from the Front Bench, might use a different phrase than “complete rubbish”—just something a little bit different.

[Mr Jones]

It is better than he did in Committee when he called me a hypocrite, Madam Deputy Speaker, but if he listens to what I am saying, he will know that I am not saying that. I know that his attention span is not very good, and he does not tend to listen. What he tends to do is just stick to what he has in front of him and his view of the world, rather than hearing what people are saying. The issue is—[Interruption.] Well, he can say “brilliant” and chunter as much as he likes, but this is the issue—the delays that are taking place because of the investigations.

I have referred to Judge Blackett, and the Minister was there when the evidence was taken. Judge Blackett is a just-retired senior judge of the service justice system, and he said:

“The Bill is effectively looking at the wrong end of the telescope. It is looking at the prosecution end, and you have got to remember that you do not prosecute until you investigate—and you have got to investigate. This will not stop people being investigated and it will not stop people being re-investigated and investigated again. Lots of investigations do not go anywhere, but the people who are investigated do not see that.”—[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 120.]

That came up when we took evidence from Major Campbell. I will put it on record again that his case was a disgrace, because it took 17 years, but this Bill will do nothing to speed up such cases or to ensure that reinvestigations do not occur. That is the key problem. The problem is not the prosecutions, because their number is very small.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Ind)]

I have put in three written questions about this Bill, and yesterday I had answers to them. Two of the answers were helpful, but one, on the point that the right hon. Gentleman is making, was not. I was trying to establish how many investigations had not resulted in prosecutions, and I could not seem to get an answer, yet that is central to the whole problem. The core of the problem is not the small number who get prosecuted but the large number who get investigated.

[Mr Jones]

The right hon. Gentleman is correct. That came out in evidence that we took throughout the Committee. The issue is not the number of prosecutions but the number of investigations and how we can speed up the length of time they take.

The problem is that the Ministry seems to have a deaf ear when it comes to recognising that we need to address the issue around investigations, which is what new clause 1 would do. It would ensure that we had judicial oversight of the investigations. We can see what we have at the moment from the example of Major Campbell’s case, which went on and on. New clause 1 states that after a certain period of time, the evidence should be put before a judge to see whether there was a case to answer. Clearly, if the evidence did not meet the test and the case was going nowhere, it would get thrown out there and then. Alternatively, it could be decided that the case needed further investigation, but at least that would ensure that, after six months, there was some judicial oversight of the investigation. That would be a way of ensuring that these investigations did not go on for a long time.

[Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Slough) (Lab)]

My right hon. Friend has always been a strong supporter of the armed forces. Does he agree that, while drafting the Bill, the Government, who claim to be champions of our armed forces, continued to ignore the impartial advice of the Royal British Legion, which has stated again and again that it breaches the armed forces covenant?

[Mr Jones]

But it really does not matter, because if my hon. Friend wants to see the attitude of the Minister to the Royal British Legion, he has only to read the evidence that came before the Committee.

New clause 2 would provide a way of ensuring that minor offences were dealt with speedily. As Judge Blackett said, this could be done in a magistrates court, where, after a period of time had passed, the cases could be looked at judicially and ticked off and dismissed on the basis that the there was no evidence to go forward. That would deal with a lot of the smaller issues. People ask why that is important, but if we look at the Iraq Historic Allegations Team—IHAT—and Northmoor, some of those cases involved assault and other things that in normal circumstances could be dealt with very quickly in a magistrates court. At least if we had a judge looking at them, he or she could make a decision as to whether or not those cases had any merit. It is amazing that the Government fail to recognise that the problem is not prosecutions but actually the investigatory process.

Then, halfway through the Bill Committee, the MOD announced it was coming forward with a review of investigations, to feed into next year’s Armed Forces Act, when the obvious place to have put that would have been in this Bill. The reason for doing that was given away by the Minister in the evidence session: this Bill has nothing to do with making sure of these matters. There is no reason why what I am suggesting and other issues around investigations could not be put in the Bill now and improve it, yet for reasons of tidiness the MOD wants to do it next year.

I have some sympathy with the MOD on that, because perhaps the best way to do this is in those five-yearly reviews of the Armed Forces Acts—and I think I have been on the Committee for every single one for the past nearly 20 years as either a Minister or Back Bencher. But the reason this Bill is before us has nothing to do with that; the Minister let the cat out of the bag in Committee when he said he had to get this through now, because one of his general election pledges was to do it within 100 days. I am sorry, but that is not a good way of bringing in legislation—just trying to press it forward irrespective of whether or not it is flawed.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I have a lot of sympathy with what the right hon. Gentleman is saying, but may I drag him away from his politics for a second? Would it not be very simple to incorporate the recommendation in a 1960s magistrates Act of a judge advocate general, as that would deal with exactly what he is talking about?

[Mr Jones]

It would. That and judicial oversight would improve the Bill tremendously. It would then actually do what it is supposed to do, which is stop reinvestigation and stop the worry that these individuals have, but it does not do that; that is the big hole in the Bill.

It is not as though the Minister has not had a chance to look at this. I have raised it with him—I tabled amendments in Committee, which he pushed aside, and we are going to go ahead with what we have now, which will be a flawed Bill. Once it has passed, it will lead to a situation whereby a lot of people think that as a result they have protections when, frankly, it will do nothing of the sort, because it will not stop investigations and reinvestigations. One of the worst things we can do in politics is promise people things and give them the impression that we have done something when actually we have not, because once the penny drops and they see it is not actually the case, they rightly feel very bitter.

As the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) has just said, there is time to put this in the Bill. If Ministers are not going to do it in this place, they should do it in the other place, because it will improve the situation.

There is another dishonesty with this process. From, again, using the MOD website, which I do not think is appropriate for political reasons, we see there is a promise about Northern Ireland. The Minister is on record as saying that similar legislation will be brought in to cover historical cases in Northern Ireland. Well, I am sorry, but it will not do so if it is like this Bill; if it is like this Bill then, frankly, it will do nothing at all on investigations. If it is a mirror image of this Bill, all those people who think that somehow they are going to get protection will find that they do not, and that is just not fair.

[Ian Paisley]

I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will agree that the officers who served under Operation Banner have been completely jettisoned and abandoned. That is the bottom line, and that is the crying shame of this—and I do not trust anyone in the Northern Ireland Office to bring forward a Bill that will help those ex-servicemen in the years to come.

[Mr Jones]

The hon. Gentleman makes a clear point: do I feel it right that, frankly, people in their 70s or 80s and even younger are worried about this happening? No, I think that is appalling, frankly, because there is an evidence test: is it in the public interest for those individuals to be now dragged before the courts? No, it is not. Here we have another promise that will not be delivered. I must say he is right in terms of the Northern Ireland Office. I have looked at the matter in detail—I have met all parties in Northern Ireland, including Sinn Féin, along with the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis)—and I think that finding a mechanism is going to be virtually impossible.

[Ian Paisley]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his comments. The fact is this will end up in Northern Ireland Operation Banner officers being a trade-off between what the NIO finds politically helpful to buy off bartering with the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin.

[Mr Jones]

I defer to the hon. Gentleman’s knowledge of Northern Ireland politics, but I will say that this will not be solved by the promise that has been made. That again is not the issue.

I turn to new clause 3. It relates to the point that was raised on part 2 and is covered by an amendment tabled by Members on the Labour Front Bench. The issue is the stripping away of rights from veterans. I find it absolutely astonishing that, in this week of remembrance, we have a Government who have introduced a Bill that will actually take rights away from veterans. The longstop of six years will mean that veterans—and families—will not have access to section 33 of the Limitation Act, which allows people to bring cases out of time.

In Committee there was a lot of discussion about how many people would be affected. The Royal British Legion was very clear in its opposition to part 2 because, as Charles Byrne said in response to the Minister:

“I think it is protecting the MOD, rather than the service personnel”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 86, Q163.]

He said that the Royal British Legion thought it did breach the armed forces covenant. I agree, because the covenant states:

“Those who serve in the Armed Forces, whether Regular or Reserve, those who have served in the past, and their families, should face no disadvantage compared to other citizens in the provision of public…services”

and so on. I agree with that, but this strips away their rights under section 33, which means that if somebody brings forward a case after the six-year longstop, they cannot have recourse to section 33 of the Limitation Act, because the Bill will take those rights away. Those rights are open to every single Member in the House today, and to prisoners and asylum seekers—anybody who wants to bring a case.

The Minister said that 94% of cases were brought within the time limits anyway. That is irrelevant to me, because 6% clearly are not, and it is those 6% that will then possibly use the Limitation Act.

May I put this on record, as I did in Committee? Bringing forward a section 33 case is by no means easy. It pertains to a very small number of individuals who could not bring their case within the time limit because their circumstances were unique; and they have to go before a court and argue out the reasons. I have done it myself when I worked for a trade union on injury or disease cases that were out of time—although you would not take on such a case in the first instance if you thought you would not get anywhere. However, there are those important cases that you can take, and which do make a difference.

The case that was mentioned time and again in Committee was the Snatch Land Rover decision in 2016. The families took forward the case under the Human Rights Act, which I will come on to in a minute, on the basis that their loved ones had been killed and injured in Iraq because of negligence on behalf of the MOD.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. Just for clarification, in the silent exchange that the right hon. Gentleman and I have just had, I was trying to indicate to him that it would be helpful to the House if he concluded his remarks quite soon. I know it seems that he has not been speaking for very long, but it has been 22 minutes. I appreciate that he has taken a lot of interventions and this is important. I am requiring not that he finishes now but that he takes into consideration that there are many points of view on this Bill and that there are many people who wish to speak and, although we have a long time, we do not have long enough for everyone to take more than 20 minutes. He has some serious points to make, and I trust he will make them as quickly as possible.

[Mr Jones]

On one occasion, I spoke in Committee for an hour and 10 minutes.

[Miss Sarah Dines (Derbyshire Dales) (Con)]

Could the right hon. Gentleman take a moment to reflect on what he said in his opening remarks, when he said there was near silence from Conservative Members in Committee? I was there, and I did not hear silence, but his contributions probably put us to sleep. With respect, could he think about it again for one moment?

On our side, we had valuable contributions from Members of Parliament who have served this great country of ours, like my hon. Friends the Members for Wrexham (Sarah Atherton) and for Wolverhampton South West (Stuart Anderson). They know what they are talking about. Would the right hon. Gentleman care to think again about saying they were silent?

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. Let us get this straight. Interventions will also be brief this afternoon. We want interventions because there is a serious debate to be had. As I look around the Chamber, I see experienced parliamentarians and others who understand that this is a very important Bill, and much of it is very sensitive, so let us try to behave with sensitivity and consideration for others.

[Mr Jones]

I made a mistake this morning, because I was going to count the number of interventions. There were no speeches from Conservative Members in Committee, although I think there were six interventions.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. I do not care how many interventions there were in Committee. This debate is not about Committee; it is about the important matters before us, and that is what we will stick to.

[Mr Jones]

Sorry, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I was being polite in replying to the hon. Member for Derbyshire Dales (Miss Dines).

The families took the case against the MOD on the basis that they did not know about the Snatch Land Rovers until the Chilcot inquiry reported. That was way past any time limit.

[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

Surely the right hon. Gentleman realises that the proposed six-year time limit applies from the point of knowledge or the point of diagnosis, so it is not clear what point he is trying to get across.

[Mr Jones]

He who waits it all comes to. I was going to answer that point in a minute.

The MOD argued two things in that case. First, it argued that the case was out of time, and the families won the limitation hearing to take the case forward. The hon. Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti) has just said it would be within the six-year limit. No, it would not. Let us suppose they had taken the case not in 2016 but six years later. They would not be able to take a limitation hearing at all. The Minister does not quite understand that problem.

The case I raised in Committee was of an aircraft engineer who developed a very serious nerve condition from paint. The only reason he was able to take forward his case was because the technology had changed and research had shown that the paint actually damages people’s nervous system.

The Minister said in Committee that, somehow, he is on record in The Sun as guaranteeing that no one will lose out, but he cannot because that will not happen: as I said to him in Committee, using the Robin Day analogy, we are all here-today, gone-tomorrow politicians. Frankly, what will happen is that MOD lawyers will use this to stop people making claims.

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle (Brighton, Kemptown) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Jones]

If I must.

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle]

My right hon. Friend does not have to if he does not want to.

Will the passing of the Bill mean that civilians working for the MOD down the road will end up having, in effect, more rights than Army service personnel who have served in operations overseas? Does that not bring us back to the fundamental issue of the breaking of the armed forces covenant, on which the Government really must think again?

[Mr Jones]

It does. The Bill’s provisions will also mean that prisoners will have more right to sue the MOJ, for example, than armed forces personnel. The Minister said in Committee, “That’s terrible because you’re comparing armed service personnel with veterans”; no, I am not. I am saying that if the Bill goes through, prisoners will have more rights than armed forces personnel. That cannot be right. The Minister mentioned the 6%; I am sorry, but if even one veteran loses their rights under this Bill, I am not prepared to support that.

My next point is about the Human Rights Act. I support the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) and the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), because it is about how this looks in terms of our international reputation. There is derogation in the Bill; I accept that there cannot be derogation for torture, but it can and will be used to stop claims by MOD personnel against the MOD itself. The Snatch Land Rover case was brought under the Human Rights Act. Some people have the idea that the Human Rights Act is there to protect nasty foreigners and people we do not like; no, it is not. It is there to protect us all, including armed forces personnel. I am sure that that derogation will be used again by the MOD to deny the rights of individuals to take cases.

People should look at the Smith judgment on that case. What were the Government arguing? They were arguing that combat immunity, which is covered and was reinforced by the Supreme Court judgment, applied in that case because it happened in Iraq. No, that was not the case; the case was actually about the design and the decision to procure those Land Rovers and put them into theatre. The derogation will clearly be used in such a way.

I wish to make one final point, about our standing in the world. I am a supporter of the service justice system—it works well and we should be proud of it—but the problem with the Bill is this: do I want to see British servicemen and women tried in the International Criminal Court? No, I do not. I want them to be tried by their peers in a court in this country. As the Judge Advocate General, Judge Blackett, said in Committee, under this Bill there is a danger that if we have a presumption against prosecution and the issue around torture, we will get a situation whereby individuals will be tried not here but elsewhere. That would be terrible, not just for those individuals but for this country’s international reputation.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

I had been hoping to manage this afternoon’s proceedings without a time limit, but I do not think that is going to work; therefore, I am now obliged, in order to try to get a fair and equitable debate, to start with a time limit of eight minutes, but that will be significantly reduced later in the debate. If hon. Members who have eight minutes choose in an honourable way to speak for less than eight minutes, that would be remarkable.

--- Later in debate ---

We can absolutely see the possibility that a Russian hand will use the Human Rights Act, which is currently being deployed in various other ways, to stop our forces from deploying by arguing that kit is inappropriate and that operations are therefore too dangerous for soldiers to be deployed. It may be true that the operation is too dangerous or that the risk is not appropriate, but it is the job of this House, of Ministers, of generals and officers to decide. It is not the job of lawyers.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I like the hon. Member, but he is talking complete nonsense. If he has read the Smith case, which went before the Supreme Court, he will know that combat immunity is completely covered under the Human Rights Act. It did not change that one iota, so what he suggests just will not happen. That case reiterated the point about combat immunity under the Human Rights Act.

[Tom Tugendhat]

I am sorry, but the right hon. Member is completely wrong. If he reads “The Fog of Law” written by—oh—me in 2013, a paper for Policy Exchange written alongside actual lawyers, rather than me, such as Richard Ekins, with a foreword written by Lord Moses of the Supreme Court, he will see exactly what I am talking about. If he reads “Clearing the Fog of Law”, which explains the situation, he will see clearly why this is a problem. This is absolutely an issue.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Joy Morrissey]

It was indeed an honour to serve on the Committee, because I myself, although not serving in the military, had two brothers who were veterans, and I saw the way that war and conflict tore their lives and our family apart.

I have spoken to many veterans who have said that they were at the point of wanting to kill themselves—some attempted it—for the fear of being prosecuted through these kinds of claims. The Bill protects the men and women who have risked their lives and fought to keep us safe and free. It allows our brave servicemen and women to go overseas to fight and represent us, and then come back and safely carry on their lives. That is what the Bill was intended to do, and I believe that that is what it will do.

I appreciate the plethora of amendments presented by the right hon. Member for North Durham. I am grateful for his studious nature in making sure that we have covered every aspect of these clauses. As my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) mentioned, the investigative system is out of control. The Bill goes some way towards mitigating that, and we could perhaps have gone even further. The issue of derogation, which was raised at the start, was not further discussed, but we could have done so with a greater level of debate.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Joy Morrissey]

Not at the moment.

The issue of derogation before an overseas conflict or an overseas mission is started might go a long way in any claims made retrospectively after the mission and whatever conflict we have engaged in is completed.

Those are small things that we could have looked at in further detail, but I appreciate and support the Bill. I am grateful to all those who have contributed, and I hope that we will be able to do what we promised in our manifesto commitment, which is to take care of veterans.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

Well, we will go through some of that evidence, shall we? We will go through some of the comments made by senior military, legal and political opinion that make it quite clear that what I have said is correct. I accept, of course, that there are differences of opinion within those fields, but it is the case, I am afraid to say to the hon. Gentleman and to the Minister chuntering at me from the sidelines, that senior military, legal and political opinion believes that the Bill is farcical in several respects. I will go through them in turn.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

We cannot get more distinguished than the Judge Advocate General, Judge Blackett, who was firmly of that opinion. The Minister did not perhaps listen, but the judge made his position about the Bill very clear.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. The Minister has just accused my right hon. Friend the Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey) of being disingenuous. Is that actually parliamentary?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I am sure the Minister meant “unintentionally disingenuous”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

No, I am not giving way—I have suffered enough. The House has suffered enough at the hands of the hon. Gentleman. I have listened to all the points about the amendments, but I did not ,write them. I wrote the Bill and the Bill as it stands deals with the problem that we are trying to fix, and hon. Members fully know that. Imagine my surprise—the Al-Sweady inquiry has been picked out by Opposition Members, but they would not believe who was the Minister at the time of the Al-Sweady inquiry: the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones). If Members are really going to contribute honestly with a debate that they know the answers to, it has to be done with the sort of standards, values and ethos that we expect our people to adhere to.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

Actually, it was the Minister of State who was dealing with the Al-Sweady inquiry. As I told the Minister in Committee, it was not the Labour party that set up the IHAT committee or Northmoor—it was his Government—so he should not start lecturing people when Members on the Government Benches at the time were calling for investigations.

[Johnny Mercer]

I appreciate the intervention, but the fact is that when the Al-Sweady inquiry took place, the right hon. Gentleman was a Minister in the Department. The claimants in the Al-Sweady case were supported by Leigh Day. Leigh Day gave £18,000 to the Labour party. This stuff is quite transparent ,and it is all on the record.

Look, at some point, hon. Members have to make a decision as to whether they are just going to speak very warm words, feel very strongly and think that our armed forces are the best of us, or actually do something that will change their lives, improve their lives, protect them from this new pernicious nature of lawfare and vote with the Government to get things done. I commend the Bill to the House.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

My right hon. Friend the Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey) and others have tried to improve this Bill. The Minister is just not listening. He throws cheap shots. I am sorry, but I stand up for members of our armed forces and veterans. I do not need to get paid £85,000 a year, as he did as a Back Bencher, to support veterans. I do it for nothing because I believe in them, so do not give us lectures about people who take money to support veterans for their own pockets, rather than just supporting our veterans.

The problem is that the Bill has gone through Committee and today’s debate and it is not going to be amended. The Minister is not listening at all. He said that actions are what matter. Yes, they do, because what we are going to have is a Bill passed here tonight that does not address the main issue, which is investigations, because the Minister will just not accept it. Part 2 means that veterans and members of the armed forces will have fewer rights than anybody in this House—fewer rights than prisoners—and he cannot say, in the lead-up to Remembrance Sunday, that taking fundamental rights away from members of our armed forces is right. But that is exactly what he is—

[Johnny Mercer]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Jones]

No, I am not going to take an intervention. I am sorry; the Minister, both in Committee and tonight, is one thing if one thing only—consistent. He sits there, chunters from a sedentary position, never takes interventions, reads his civil service brief and will just not listen to anyone because he thinks he is right. I am sorry; he is wrong on this.

I will not press my new clauses and amendments to a vote, but I will end with this point. The Bill is flawed. It could have been improved in Committee and it could be improved here tonight. It will not be, because the Minister stubbornly refuses to accept it. He will then use the parliamentary majority in this House to ram it through. This Bill will do nothing to protect veterans. They will still be investigated. They will still be prosecuted, possibly before the International Criminal Court, and their basic rights, which we should all have under section 33 of the Limitation Act, will be taken away from them. That is shameful.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Wallace]

No, I will not. It is a bit rich for them to come here today and condemn the legislation. On the other hand, it is we who have commissioned—

[Mr Jones]

rose—

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Gentleman has had plenty to say on the Bill; I will not give way. We do not have time to conclude these exchanges. On the other hand—[Interruption.] They can shout me down, but I will just continue to use up Third Reading time, and I will then listen to other speeches. I will not give way; I have made it clear to the hon. Gentleman.

[Mr Jones]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. The Minister has now added mind-reading to his many skills. The Minister, who is actually a good friend of mine, has just made an accusation against me and has not given me the right to reply to it. It was his Government, in 2010, who set up IHAT and Northmoor, not the Labour Government.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I do not want the point of order to become a subject of debate, but obviously—[Interruption.] Thank you; I can cope. Obviously, the Secretary of State has referred to the right hon. Gentleman, and he may feel it appropriate to give way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Kevan Jones]

May I too thank the Bill Committee Clerks, who worked very hard? I congratulate the Minister for Defence People and Veterans on his excellent reading of his briefs in Committee and today.

This is sad, because the Bill is fatally flawed. It will take rights away from veterans, which cannot be right, and it will lead to our international reputation being at stake. It does not solve the problem, which is investigations. That could have been put right in the Bill, but unfortunately, the Minister is not prepared to listen. He says that he is prepared to work with people; the exact opposite has been the truth throughout the passage of the Bill.

As for the Secretary of State trying to blame all this on a wicked Labour Government, it was a Labour Government who met the armed forces pay review every year and ensured that defence expenditure kept pace with inflation. It was his Government who, in coalition, put IHAT and Northmoor in place in 2010. When these cases were going on when I was a Minister, it was Conservative Members who were asking why we were not investigating them more. There is selective memory on the Government Benches. We had an opportunity to get a good Bill that would address the issues and improve the situation for veterans, and that has been missed because of the arrogance of the Minister who has led it through the House.

Covid-19 Update

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Monday 2nd November 2020 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

We are rolling out testing of all NHS staff as fast as we possibly can, and we are all too aware of the risk of nosocomial infection of the kind that we saw last time. One of the things that we are doing this time is greatly expanding the use of novel mass testing devices such as the LAMP technology, with which I am sure my right hon. Friend is familiar, in NHS settings. As I told the House earlier, we want to get to a world in which we are testing these particularly vulnerable institutions—hospitals, care homes, schools and universities—with regular mass lateral flow testing of the kind that I have described.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Participation in sport is vital for our nation’s physical and mental health. The Prime Minister triumphantly announced at his press conference on Saturday night that the premier league would continue, but his announcement today means that local amateur football will not be able to continue. Golf clubs and gyms will be closed despite their valiant efforts to ensure that they are covid safe. Will the Prime Minister publish the scientific data behind this set of decisions?

[The Prime Minister]

I am happy to provide all the scientific data on which these decisions have been made, but I think that the House will appreciate that for any particular human activity, one can always find an arguable exemption from these measures—or from many of them. The difficulty is that to be consistent and have a package that works, we need a thoroughgoing series of measures of the kind that we have described. I bitterly regret that we have to curtail for 28 days football clubs and sporting activities in the way that we are—I bitterly, bitterly regret it—but I believe that that is necessary to get the R down.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill (Ninth sitting)

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 9th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 22nd October 2020 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 93, in schedule 2, page 16, line 5, at end insert

“save for exceptional cases where the overriding interest of justice should be served.”.

Amendment 70, in schedule 2, page 16, line 36, at end insert—

“(2C) Subsections (2A) and (2B) shall not apply where it appears to the court this would be equitable having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”.

This amendment introduces a discretion for the courts of England and Wales to allow a civil claim for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.

Amendment 71, in schedule 3, page 21, line 9, at end insert—

“(7A) The court may disapply the rules in subsections (5) to (7) where it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”.

This amendment introduces a discretion for the courts of Scotland to allow a civil claim for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.

Amendment 72, in schedule 4, page 24, line 5, at end insert

“except where it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”.

This amendment introduces a discretion for the courts of Northern Ireland to allow a civil claim for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.

Amendment 68, in clause 11, page 7, line 34, at end insert—

“(4A) The court may disapply the rule in subsection (4) where it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”.

This amendment introduces a discretion for UK courts to allow a HRA claim arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

May I welcome you to the Chair, Mr Mundell? It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again. I will talk about schedule 2 in general, but I will first refer to amendment 93, which stands in my name and which would amend the end of schedule 2 to say

“save for exceptional cases where the overriding interest of justice should be served.”

I will come back to schedule 2 in a minute.

We are again getting to the issue of justice for servicemen and women and veterans, in terms of the conditions they are bound by. I will come on to the Limitation Act 1980 in a minute, of which section 33 disregards the limits on the right of veterans and servicemen and women to make claims. We heard in the evidence sessions and during consideration of the Bill from my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South and others about particular issues affected by this hard stop of six years. We talked about mental health and psychological conditions, but there are also physical conditions. Mental health is a complex area. The Minister tries to hide behind the date of knowledge, and mental illness is difficult to pin down. I would certainly say that the whole gamut of mental illness should be treated as exceptional cases.

Did the Labour party, when we were in Government, get it wrong on the armed forces compensation scheme? Yes, we did, even though it was a landmark scheme, in the sense that it brought in lump sum compensation for the very first time. I remember people at the time complaining about the levels of lump sum payments. We had a big debate about that in around 2008. However, it brought in lump sum payments for the very first time for those injured in service of their country. Going back to the Falklands war, for example, no such thing existed, so it was quite a landmark.

However, we clearly had not seen the challenge around mental illness. When I was a Minister, I asked Lord Boyce to undertake a review into the effects of service on mental health, so that we could potentially bring into the scope of that scheme people suffering from an array of mental illnesses. That was the right thing to do, and it was an attempt to future-proof the legislation.

[Chris Evans (Islwyn) (Lab/Co-op)]

I draw my right hon. Friend’s attention to the Armed Forces Act 2006, particularly the part where the Labour Government pardoned those who had been shot at dawn during world war one. For shell shock to emerge and be accepted took some 60 to 70 years. The Bill was an example of a Government saying that they had got something wrong and were willing to backdate it to ensure that justice was meted out to the families so that they would not think that their grandparents or ancestors were cowards, as they were deemed at the time. If we can do that in that situation, we can surely do it in this as well, as we learn more about the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder and of alcohol and drug abuse as well.

[Mr Jones]

I do not disagree with my hon. Friend, but the problem I always have with veterans’ mental health is the fixation on PTSD. I am not for one minute downgrading PTSD and the numbers of people that suffer from it, but it is one of a range of mental illnesses that might arise later in life. My hon. Friend referred to alcohol abuse, which is sometimes a form of self-medication. Is it automatically recognisable that a mental illness that might come in later life is a result of service? No, it is not. I agree with the Minister here. Most people leave service and have a perfectly good career that is life-enhancing for many servicemen and women. They end up in a variety of careers and have a good quality of life. Obviously, the failures end up as Members of Parliament, but that is neither here nor there. I have always said that military service overall is a good and positive thing for people’s life chances because it gives opportunities to people.

However, some individuals can be affected. Is it easy to determine what caused someone’s mental health problem? No, I do not think it is. That was recognised in the armed forces compensation scheme. I want to add exceptional circumstances because, by taking section 33 out, we stop recourse to civil law and the ability to claim against the MOD. As Mr Byrne from the Royal British Legion said, this is not about protecting servicemen and women and veterans; it is about protecting the MOD. I have heard the Minister’s arguments about the date of knowledge and this, that and the other, but, as I have said before, if we leave it to the solicitors or lawyers in the MOD, they will use this to strike out these cases, and that cannot be right.

We then come on to physical conditions. I mentioned the other day the issue of cold weather injuries, which can develop later. There are also musculoskeletal conditions that develop not at the time but as the body gets older. If the body has been through large amounts of stress earlier on, whether it is physical or mental, the condition can start later on. That leads to a situation where a lot of individuals will not necessarily think straight away, “It was due to my service”. That is why I have always strongly argued—we did it in 2010, but the coalition scrapped it—for the importance of having a flag on people’s medical records as they leave the service so that in future doctors can see that people had served and then link the two together. We provided for that in 2010, but an election was called and the coalition seemed to forget about it, but I thought it was important not only in terms of physical injuries but, very importantly, for mental health issues. If a physician, a doctor or a consultant can see that someone has served, that is a red flag and they can ask whether that has had an impact on that individual.

The six-year longstop will stop those individuals taking cases to court. I accept that legally it might be difficult to insert the words “exceptional cases”, because we then get into the issue of what is an exceptional case. To be honest, the easiest way of solving it is to retain section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, because then at least a judge will be able to determine what an exceptional case is. I accept that there are problems with the amendment as it is written, but it goes to the core of the issue of ensuring that, while as few cases as possible are brought out of time, people have the ability to do that.

I am not sure I would leave it to the MOD to make the decision, because I think the kneejerk reaction would be to use the Limitation Act to strike the cases out. I accept that the amendment is not expertly written, but I am not so proud as to prevent somebody from stealing the idea and drawing it up so that, at least in exceptional circumstances, members of the armed forces would be able to take their cases forward for consideration to determine whether they should go beyond the six-year longstop, which limits them at the moment.

We also heard about issues relating to the Human Rights Act 1998. I asked the Minister to write to me to explain how a time limit or a longstop can be put on human rights cases. I do not know whether he has been able to do that yet—I accept that I only asked the other day—but it would be interesting to know that before Report. There is the one-year time limit, but they are covered by section 33 of the Limitations Act. Hilary Meredith said that she found it difficult to understand how it would be possible to have a limitation on the Human Rights Act because it is part of a convention. The Minister responded the other day that it had been cleared and that it was human rights law-compliant. It would be interesting to know what the legal advice is on that, and whether there are any other cases—although there is already a time limit of one year—in which the Limitation Act is not applied to individuals.

As we heard from the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers in the evidence session, that issue was crucial in the Snatch Land Rover case. A widow took a case against the MOD—it was not a civil case, but a Human Rights Act case, because a decision had been taken in relation to the right to life. Again, that was about not putting the Human Rights Act on the battlefield but trying to ensure that a decision was taken about Snatch Land Rover’s procurement and deployment. It was not about getting the Human Rights Act into the battlespace. I suggest that people read the Smith judgment, because the Supreme Court is very clear about combat immunity and about human rights not applying. People sometimes argue that this Bill is somehow about trying to stop human rights intervening with our right to defend ourselves, but they should read the Supreme Court judgment, because it is very clear that it does not apply there, but it does apply to that important case.

There were two issues in that case. The first was whether it was out of time. Quite clearly it was, because the incident took place in 2006 but the case was not brought until after Chilcot, which was 2015, so it was way out of time. The reason it was taken forward was that, in the first instance, although the MOD argued that it was out of time—I have no complaints that it did that—it was successfully argued that it was not. There were special circumstances that meant that it could not be brought within the time period, and it was allowed to go forward. I understand that the case was settled before it went to court, and the individual widow got a substantial payment. As I said the other day, it also focused, in policy terms, Ministry of Defence thinking about the decisions on the Snatch Land Rover. It gave closure to the widow and some compensation, though no amount of money can ever compensate for somebody’s loss, but it also made MOD policymakers say, “Wait a minute. In future, we’re going to have to actually think about this.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

The Minister says he has seen no evidence, but he quotes the figure of 94% being brought in time. What is the number of cases that have been brought under the Limitation Act against the MOD? He says the limit gives certainty; well, it does give certainty to people—certainty that after those six years, they will not be able to take any claims at all.

[Johnny Mercer]

Many cases have been raised, I agree, such as Snatch Land Rover and the Royal Marines individual who has been mentioned a number of times. However, as I have outlined a number of times, none of those would be affected by this Bill, because the period starts from the point of knowledge. We have had this conversation before. I encourage people who feel that they could be disadvantaged to come forward, to speak to the Department or speak to me, but I have to operate in reality, not saying things that are not true. I include any non-service person who believes that they have a meritorious claim against the MOD, because fundamentally, we are not trying to stop legitimate claims.

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

Of course. Part of this Bill is a huge education campaign to get people to understand what their rights are. While we have drawn the line at six years, we have a duty to make sure all the people who are in our employment and who served with us understand what the rules are and where the boundaries are, and at the same time are protected from the vexatious sort of claims we have seen over the years. I genuinely believe it is a fair line to be drawn, and I reiterate that lots of cases have been raised, but when we have looked into them, none would have been precluded under the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

The Minister is not answering my hon. Friend’s question. I accept that there are good reasons for time limits; I have no problems with time limits on civil litigation and other things. I asked him earlier about the number of cases that have fallen outside the limitation period that the MOD has defended. I do not for one minute question the Minister’s commitment, but remember that he and I will not be here when this comes into force. I tell him now that the MOD will use this as a way to stop claims.

[Johnny Mercer]

I accept the right hon. Gentleman’s point that there is a risk of any legislation being interpreted in different ways by different Administrations over a period of time. That is the reality of life in this place, but I cannot accept the repeated regurgitation of cases. We have looked into individual cases. When these cases are raised, I write them down and go back to the Department to look into them. They are not affected by this legislation. Members can sigh and so on, but I cannot do anything other than operate within what is actually going on, rather than deal with stuff that is not true.

Members will remember that in one of the evidence sessions for the Bill, the representative of the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, Mr Al-Nahhas, told us that he frequently rejects clients who want to bring claims that are out of time. Although I would urge everyone to bring meritorious claims as soon as they can, I know that sometimes the courts allow claims to proceed after the primary limitation period has expired. The Bill will not stop that happening. The courts will still be able to extend the primary limitation period for up to six years, but we are stopping claims—often unmeritorious—being brought many years down the track.

The amendments would effectively give the courts the same discretion that they currently have to extend the primary limitation periods indefinitely, but they are contrary to the intent behind the Bill and would reduce the certainty that we want to give to service personnel and veterans. Before I recommend that the amendments be withdrawn, I would love to give way to the right hon. Gentleman again.

[Mr Jones]

The Minister has raised something that is very complex for the courts. He said that the period will be six years from the date of knowledge, and the courts will be able to give discretion within the six-year period. Is he not expecting—some people will—to take this to court, in terms of saying that it is unjust if a case falls outside the six years? This will end up with a lot more confusion than just keeping what is there at the moment: section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980.

[Johnny Mercer]

I completely disagree; it is the current situation that we has produced the chaos we are trying to bring order to with the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

It has not.

[Johnny Mercer]

The right hon. Gentleman can say it has not, but people such as Bob Campbell, to whom he has alluded a number of times, would strongly disagree. We are trying to bring certainty for our veterans and service personnel going forward. That has been a strong Government commitment from the start of this Government, and I support it. I therefore recommend that the amendments be withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

No, but may I just say one thing to the Minister? He talks about Major Bob Campbell. The legislation was not an issue in that case; it was the investigation that was the issue.

[The Chair]

Thank you, Mr Jones. You have saved me from saying that it was not a debate on the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Morgan]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Mundell. I rise to speak to amendment 89, which stands in my name. During the proceedings so far, there has been much discussion in recognition of the role that mental health plays in the cases to which the Bill applies. Although the Opposition recognise the importance of the Bill in cases where the court is given discretion to disapply the time limits of three years, the court must also have particular regard for the likely impact of the action on the mental health of any witness or potential witness who is a member of Her Majesty’s armed forces. There is still more to be done here. There is an imbalance in the consideration of civil claims in the Bill. I will say it once again: where the Opposition see that the Bill can be improved, we will highlight it.

We have tabled the amendment to ensure that both witnesses’ and claimants’ interests have been secured. The Bill asks the courts to have

“particular regard to the likely impact of the action on the mental health of any witness or potential witness who is a member of Her Majesty’s forces”,

but we can do better. It is important to ensure that there is equality under the law and that the interests of the claimant are also considered. The intent of the amendments is to balance the considerations UK courts must have particular regard for in determining whether to disapply the standard Human Rights Act limitation period so as to ensure that the claimant’s interest in having their claim proceed is not illegitimately subordinated.

Over the last few days, we have received written evidence highlighting this very issue, including the submission from Rights and Security International, a charity which works to promote just and accountable security policy; it has over 25 years’ experience working in the field of human rights and national security policy in the UK. In its evidence submission, it said that it is concerned about the creation of a one-sided discretion to disapply the standard limitation period within the six-year mark.

“First, the proposed considerations have a discriminatory impact against the claimants. This is because they are illegitimately weighted in favour of the MOD operating solely to the detriment of claimants. They are overly focused on factors tending to preclude claims with no reference to the interests of the claimant in having his or her rights vindicated. This has the effect of creating a hierarchy of values and subordinating the claimant’s interest in bringing the claim”.

Secondly, RSI says that there is a requirement that the court give particular regard to the likely impact of the action on the mental health of the witness or potential witness who is a member of Her Majesty’s forces. They argue this is an inappropriate and disproportionate test because it is heavily weighted in favour of precluding claims from proceeding. This is because giving evidence is almost always stressful to any witness be they members of Her Majesty’s forces or not. It continues:

“It is disproportionate because there are many alternative ways to support vulnerable witnesses that do not have the effect of preventing access to justice for potential victims of human rights abuses, wrongful death or personal injury. Were the Government really serious about protecting members of Her Majesty’s Forces, ensuring the provision of such support services would be the focus of reforms to the law, rather than provisions which have the effect of protecting first and foremost the MOD.

Third, it is questioned whether it is really necessary that the court gives particular regard to the likely impact of the operational context on the ability of individuals to remember relevant events or actions fully or accurately. This is because it has been determined that effective legislation can still take place way after the event occurred. For example, the Malmo litigation proceeded over 50 years after the incident. The courts were still able to identify systematic rights abuses and systematic flaws on the part of the Bill relevant to the British colonial administration. This is evidence of the fallacy of the allegation that effective investigations can never take place well after the fact due to a loss of evidence or decreasing reliability of evidence over time”.

That is a lengthy quote, but I think it makes some very important points, which I will take in turn. Once again, we have heard that the Bill is not designed to protect our service personnel but to protect the Ministry of Defence. The legislation is heavily weighted against the ability of service personnel to proceed with civil claims. These are not my words or Labour’s; they are from a highly respected organisation that has covered the issues raised here for many years and is highly experienced in this area.

In light of this, will the Minister recognise the mistake that is being made here for the sake of our service personnel? Why is he so intent on rushing through the House a Bill that will disadvantage our troops? There is another theme here, which we have covered before—something that we have called into question before in other areas of the Bill: fairness and balance.

In its current form, this part of the Bill would create a serious imbalance of fairness within the equality of the law. If the Minister will not address these issues for the sake of our armed forces personnel, will he not do it for the sake of equality under the law, for which our country is so well respected and renowned?

We received further written evidence highlighting this problem of an unbalanced weighting. The Centre for Military Justice is a charity established to advise current and former members of the armed forces, or their bereaved families, who have suffered serious bullying, sexual harassment, sexual violence, racism, or other abuse or neglect. In its evidence, the charity outlined the need for the Bill to take into account the mental health of claimants, not just their witnesses. Specifically, the CMJ said that

“there are often very good reasons why some claims or parts of them need to be issued 6 years after date of knowledge or diagnosis; or where some of the damage would have been caused outside of the 6 year limitation period and some within it. If you are suffering from PTSD you may become aware that there is something seriously wrong within the limitation period, but it may be very hard for you to get help then or even for some time after.

Imagine if you are a veteran with undiagnosed PTSD—you are drinking heavily, or having a lot of personal problems (because of what you have been through)—you may know there is something wrong—you may even go to your GP—so that might be said to be your date of knowledge for limitation purposes—but you may not be able to take the next step of getting properly diagnosed and/or be able to get legal advice. Those are the kinds of cases that need to have the option of applying to the court to extend time and it makes no sense to add a hard ‘long stop’. If there are good reasons to extend time, the claimant should be allowed to try and persuade the court and the court should be allowed to apply the existing criteria.

Last year, The Times reported the case of Mark Bradshaw, 44, who suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) since he was involved in a friendly fire attack in 2010 while serving with the Royal Artillery. Despite the immediate onset of nightmares and hypervigilance, the veteran was not given a formal diagnosis until 2016. By then he was drinking heavily, had suicidal thoughts and had left the service and become alienated from his family. He was eventually awarded a settlement, but not without a fight, and he fears that the proposed legislation could discriminate against those who do not develop PTSD, or receive a diagnosis, until many years later. He called the plan to impose a time limit on claims ‘horrendous’. The Times reported him saying, ‘I got pushed to the GP. How many people sick with mental health won’t go to the GP?’”

That tragic case, which we have already heard about in Committee, shows that we need a proper and fair weighting of both witnesses and claimants. I hope this will make clear to the Minister the changes required in the Bill. In the light of the fact that his legislation is heavily weighted against the ability of service personnel to proceed with civil claims, will the Minister, for the sake of our service personnel, recognise the mistake that is being made here? Why is he so intent on rushing through this House a Bill that disadvantages our troops? If he will not change his mind for the sake of our armed forces personnel, will he not do so for the sake of the equality under law for which our country is so respected and renowned?

[Mr Jones]

Do I understand that we are also debating schedule stand part?

[The Chair]

Yes.

[Mr Jones]

Thank you—I will ask some questions about the schedules as outlined.

Schedule 3 references Scotland, and schedule 4 is about Northern Ireland. Mr Mundell, your great nation has always had a separate legal system, which in many ways is far superior to the one we have in England, given some of the common sense it contains. I would be interested to know from the Minister what representations were received from the Scottish Law Officers regarding the application of the Bill. It references overseas operations, but is clearly going to affect many servicemen and women, and Scotland is a good recruiting ground for those servicemen and women.

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

Does the right hon. Member understand—I am sure he does—that he is fundamentally wrong to say that the Bill would not have had an impact in the Major Campbell case, which he keeps referring to? He talks about the investigations taking so long. Those investigations are driven by bringing civil or criminal claims. Bringing in the longstop would mean that the worst Major Campbell could have had was going through to 2009; he has repeatedly said that. Those are the facts of the matter, and it is important to bear that in mind going forward. The Campbell case is a very emotional case; however, we have to stick with the facts, and the facts are that this measure would have limited the experiences to 2009, as he has said, and as we have laid out on a number of occasions.

[Mr Jones]

I am sorry; I totally disagree with the Minister. He is wrong. It was not the claims that drove that case. As Hilary Meredith said in her evidence to the Committee, part of the problem was that the MOD started to pay out large amounts of compensation to individuals. I think I explained the reason why that was done at the time; it was partly to follow a little bit what the Americans were doing, and it was partly a cultural thing in Iraq—for example, if there was a car accident, a certain amount of money was paid and that was that. It even got to where we might call it brutal. I remember sitting once in Basra with a claims officer, dealing with claims. They were everything from a car accident, “My goat’s been shot” and “You’ve run over my dog” right up to, “You’ve ruined my crop landing a helicopter, or flying something into it.” They were paid out, and it even got to a point, which we might find quite cold, that somebody’s death was covered by making a payment—blood money, I think, is how the Americans referred to it. That might seem harsh and callous, but we did the same things, just with a legal process. That led to others.

The Minister and I totally agree about people like Phil Shiner. There is no defence there. However, in Campbell’s case, if an accusation had been made to the MOD, not from a civil case but because someone came forward to say, “This happened,” it was not, then, the claim that kicked it off—it was the accusation. I accept that Shiner, in some cases, was trying to put forward things that were false, or encouraging people—I think there were even cases where he paid people—but the Bill would not stop that case coming forward, because when an accusation is made to the MOD, it will have to investigate it.

That is the problem for the Minister. He has focused in, with something of a gut reaction, against people such as Phil Shiner, and I sympathise with him—I have lots of sympathy with him on that. I have no time for those things, but the MOD created part of the problem itself, in the compensation culture that it engendered. Then it made it worse—I know the Minister was trying to be party political the other day, but I am not going to be, shudder the thought—by setting up the IHAT investigation in 2010, under a Conservative Government. That just fuelled things.

I still plead with the Minister to do now in the Bill what Campbell’s case needed, though I accept his officials will say, “Minister, we must wait until next year’s armed forces Bill.” No, put it in now. If he includes issues to do with controls over investigations, he will have my 100% support, because that is what will drive down cases such as the Campbell one. It was completely unacceptable that that happened. Yes, political decisions were made about Iraq and Afghanistan about paying compensation. A Conservative Government set up IHAT, and, as happens with a lot of these things, it became like a licking lollipop, in terms of the way they keep growing. However, if the suggestions of the Judge Advocate General, Judge Blackett, about looking at investigations were put in the Bill, that would stop the Major Campbell cases. Just introducing a limitation period will not stop cases. They will still be investigated.

Let us be honest, it is a proud testament to the professionalism of our armed forces that, in the horrendous situations that they have been involved in over the past few years, in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have had small numbers of disciplinary cases. That is testament not only to their courage but to the system of discipline in our armed forces. We have a set of regulations, laws and training that ensure that people know what they are doing, and that they follow. As to the cases that have been brought, such as Marine A, that was not started by an ambulance-chasing lawyer. It happened because someone took a video of Marine A shooting a wounded Taliban fighter, which was clearly contrary to all his training. The Bill would not stop that. In that and other relevant cases—I am racking my brain to think of them—the investigations were complete within two years. That was quite quick, so I think it can work. It is about case management.

There is another point to be made about that. When the service man or woman gets to court, do they get a fair hearing? In that case, he did. My question is why on earth the legal representatives did not argue—quite rightly—at the first hearing that he had suffered mental trauma and other things. He was found guilty by a military court—not a civil court—of murder on the first count. But when it went to appeal, it was reduced to manslaughter, which was quite right, taking into account the circumstances in which the incident occurred, as well as credible evidence from mental health professionals about his mental state at that time. That does not excuse what he did, but it puts context around it.

That is why, as I said before, I am a supporter of the military justice system, because cases are dealt with by people who understand that system. Putting a time limit on cases will disadvantage members of the armed forces by taking them out of section 33 of the Limitation Act, and for what? For something that will not reduce the number of cases.

There is another point we could deal with very easily. I ask the Minister again, how many limitation cases have there been from civilians or anybody else? I suggest there would be very few, but that is not the point. The point is that servicemen and women have a right to go outside of that time if there are exceptional circumstances. Having taken limitation cases—not personally—I know that they are done only in exceptional circumstances, because the threshold is so high. That is why when the Minister said the personal injury lawyers said they sometimes advise clients not to take these cases on limitation, he is quite right. I have done that myself, because I know there is not a cat in hell’s chance of the court ever saying that the reasons are justifiable in terms of the Limitation Act.

The Limitation Act is there for a good reason. It is not—I think this is what the Minister has in mind—a green light for everybody to come out of the woodwork after a huge period of time and say, “Yes, I want to put my case.” It is not like that; it is very difficult. I support that, because there must be time limits for cases, for the reason the Minister gave—I agree with what my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South said—which is that we have to try, if possible, to get cases done as speedily as we can. That is fair for the victim and fair for the accused. But this Bill will not do that.

The other thing that is said is that the Bill will stop investigations. It will not stop investigations at all, and they could go on a long time. As I said in a previous sitting, that must be horrible. We cannot imagine being accused of some of the horrendous crimes that Major Campbell was accused of and having that hanging over us for a long time. That is not fair to that individual.

[Johnny Mercer]

It has never been the Government’s stated position to stop investigations. I think the right hon. Member knows that. We cannot run a Department and refuse to investigate allegations that people bring forward.

[Mr Jones]

No, I am not suggesting for one minute that it is. I am suggesting to the Minister—this is what Judge Blackett came forward with—that we need a way of managing those investigations, to ensure that they are speedily done and that there is judicial oversight of the process, not oversight from the MOD or the chain of command, which could lead to accusations. I came forward with three suggestions of how to do that. Get rid of all the minor cases in the system. That is just good case management, and it also helps the individual who has been accused. If the judge thinks there is no evidence, they should throw the case out. That can be done in magistrates courts; why can we not do it in this system? That is a huge missing bit of the Bill.

To reiterate, I am not for one minute accusing the Minister or the MOD of turning a blind eye to serious allegations. If an allegation is made, it has to be investigated.

The issue is the way it is investigated and the time it takes to investigate it. The idea is that the time limit process will somehow reduce the number of claims. I do not think it will, because people will bring a claim within six years, it will have to be investigated, and someone will have to ensure that it is case-managed through the system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

I have listened at length and for many hours to a lot of the points that have been made, and I fear we are beginning to reach a point where we are repeating ourselves to a large degree.

[Mr Jones]

There is more to come this afternoon.

[Johnny Mercer]

Fantastic, fantastic. With any such legislation, I understand that there will be people with fears or concerns, and there will be an element of risk. I cannot honestly stand here and say that the Bill disadvantages troops or service personnel. I accept that there is a difference of opinion here, but I would not even think about introducing legislation that disadvantaged them.

Looked at in the round—and as I have said many times—this is a good, fair and proportionate Bill. I will defend it. I have already outlined that Government are creating new factors to ensure that the courts are directed to consider the uniquely challenging context of overseas military operations when deciding whether to extend the primary limitation periods for personal injury and death payments, and Human Rights Act claims. Amendments 88 to 91 are therefore unnecessary. They introduce a further factor to which the UK courts must have particular regard when determining whether to allow claims beyond the primary limitation periods of one year for Human Rights Act claims and three years for personal injury and death claims. Their stated intention is to ensure that the claimant’s interest in having their civil claim proceed is not subordinated to the additional factors being introduced by this Bill, but the courts already take into account the interests of the claimant in having their claim proceed when determining whether it is equitable to allow a case to proceed beyond the primary time limit.

For personal injury and death claims in England and Wales, section 33(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1980 states that the courts should have regard to any prejudice that might be caused to the claimant if the case is not allowed to proceed beyond three years. Prejudice would include the impact on the claimant’s ability to secure their rights through legal proceedings. For personal injury and death claims in Northern Ireland, article 50(1)(a) of the Limitation (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 has the same provisions. For personal injury and death claims in Scotland, section 19A(1) of the Prescription and Limitation Act Scotland 1973 sets out the equitable tests in more general terms, but that still includes considering the interests of the claimant in securing their rights through legal proceedings.

For Human Rights Act claims, section 7(5)(b) sets out that the court may allow claims to be brought beyond the primary 12-month period if it considers it equitable to do so, having regard to all the circumstances, which would include considering the interests of the claimant in vindicating their human rights through legal proceedings. The factors introduced in clause 11 do not replace the tests set out in section 7(5)(b) of the Human Rights Act; they just outline considerations that reflect the unique context of overseas military operations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Evans]

I beg to move amendment 57, in clause 12, page 8, line 20, at end insert—

“(1A) No order may be made by the Secretary of State under section 14 following consideration under this section unless a draft of the order has been laid before, and approved by, each House of Parliament.”.

This amendment would require significant derogations regarding overseas operations proposed by the Government from the European Convention on Human Rights to be approved by Parliament before being made.

Good afternoon, Mr Mundell. It is a pleasure to once again serve under your chairmanship as we head into the final straight of this Bill Committee. I rise to speak in support of amendment 57. I have concerns about multiple aspects of the Bill. This amendment is crucial to improving the Bill and safeguarding our reputation at home and abroad, and it can easily be implemented.

The amendment is simple. It asks that the Government seek approval from both Houses of Parliament before the Secretary of State for Defence approves any derogations from the European convention on human rights. I spoke in the last sitting about parliamentary scrutiny of the role that the Bill gives to the Attorney General, and I must once again raise the absolute importance of scrutiny. I remind the Government that the UK is not a presidential system—given what we see from the United States at the moment, amen to that. The Government draw their power from this House. This House must be consulted on matters as serious as derogating from our key international obligations. The Government are in danger of destroying our reputation as a country that upholds and defends international law. They should at the very least let Parliament act as a check on the worst urges that may come out this legislation.

The Bill would use article 15 of the European convention on human rights, the derogation clause. A guide from the Council of Europe says of article 15:

“It affords to Contracting States, in exceptional circumstances, the possibility of derogating, in a limited and supervised manner, from their obligations to secure certain rights and freedoms under the Convention.”

The words that stick out to me are “exceptional” and “limited”. If these cases are exceptional, there should be no problem with the Defence Minister seeking parliamentary approval on the very rare occasions when they deem derogation necessary.

[Mr Jones]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, although the Human Rights Act is often portrayed as being used by unscrupulous foreigners to attack us, it is very important for our servicemen and women if they are bringing claims against the MOD for injuries that they have suffered?

[Chris Evans]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. Human rights are a political football that is being kicked around by everybody. If hon. Members want to see the importance of the Human Rights Act, they would do well to look at the debate that I introduced last week about the Uyghur Muslims in China, and at what they are going through. We have had human rights problems with China. On the issue that my right hon. Friend raises, of course human rights are vital when claims are brought against the Ministry of Defence, and that should be considered. We should not attack anybody’s right to defend their human rights in court, and we should not view human rights as something bad. They are fundamental rights that we all have as humans.

Parliament can then decide whether a derogation is limited. If we are going to derogate from international obligations, consent must come from Parliament. The Equality and Human Rights Commission said in written evidence:

“At the very least, we recommend support for amendment 57, which would require significant derogations regarding overseas operations proposed by the Government from the ECHR to be approved by Parliament before being made.”

As it points out, the amendment is the very least that we should be doing to ensure that the UK upholds its very proud record of human rights across the world. To set a legal norm for derogation from the European convention on human rights would seriously damage Britain’s international standing. It would send a signal that these international conventions and treaties are not taken seriously by our nation, and would have the knock-on effect of harming the integrity of our troops.

In its briefing on the Bill, Redress said:

“the Bill risks undermining the UK’s influence on human rights in the global context”.

Derogating from the international conventions on human rights will clearly diminish our integrity on these matters. The Government should be keen to mitigate that in any possible way. The Opposition believe that this amendment is a good start if the option to derogate must be written into the Bill at all.

Martha Spurrier, the director of Liberty, said in one of the evidence sessions:

“The concern, of course, is when you take a wider view and look at this Bill as a whole, which very much signals the desire to water down the human rights arrangements”.––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 76, Q149.]

Surely the Government want to do everything in their power to counter those views and assure the global community that this country still regards human rights as of the utmost importance.

I echo the words of my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), who said on Second Reading:

“At a time when we are witnessing an erosion of human rights…it is more important than ever before that we uphold our values and standards and not undermine them.”—[Official Report, 23 September 2020; Vol. 680, c. 1109.]

In a similar vein, the Equalities and Human Rights Commission warned:

“At a time when the UK Government’s adherence to international law”

and the relationship with Northern Ireland

“is under increased scrutiny, it is imperative that the UK is seen to show the highest regard for the international legal order.”

To write in a system of derogating from European conventions regarding human rights would severely undermine us. This clause, unamended, will determine our international reputation, and therefore the reputation of the brave men and women who serve in our forces.

Amnesty has said that, as it stands, the Bill

“will do irreparable damage to the reputation of the armed forces of this country, undermine basic principles of access to justice and send a bad message internationally.”

The former director of service prosecutions, Bruce Houlder, has called the Bill an “international embarrassment”. David Greene, the vice-president of the Law Society, has added to the voices warning of our loss of international standing, saying that while

“Our armed forces are rightly known across the world for their courage and discipline”,

the provisions allowing for a derogation from human rights conventions and breaking international law

“would undermine this well-deserved reputation”.

Multiple people and organisations say that the Bill will damage our international standing. After all, how can we call on other countries to respect international treaties on human rights, or to honour international obligations, when we are setting a precedent in our legislation for derogating from them? How are service people supposed to carry out missions overseas with the integrity that the British forces have if they know that they might not always be held to international standards by their own Government?

If the Government insist on writing derogations from the European convention on human rights into the Bill, the legislation must be scrutinised at the highest level. It is that important. The Government cannot simply ignore international conventions without getting approval for doing so from both Houses, and ensuring that derogations are considered case by case and are deemed exceptional actions. That would signal to other countries that we still valued international conventions on human rights.

[Mr Jones]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the problem with the European convention on human rights is that people are confused about how it relates to the European Union? Clearly, there is a dog-whistle approach to anything with the word “Europe” in it. The convention has nothing at all to do with the European Union. It is actually something of which we should be proud. Winston Churchill and others pioneered it at the end of the second world war.

[Chris Evans]

Yes, my right hon. Friend is absolutely right. He gets to the nub of the issues that we are facing nationally. In the press, and even in some quarters of the House, it seems that putting the word “European” on anything makes it something to do with the European Union, and then we open up a can of worms about Brexit. As he says, the European convention on human rights has a proud history, involving such luminaries as Sir Winston Churchill, who was responsible for setting it up.

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that we have to be careful about confusion. When the word “Europe” or “European” is slapped on something, people think it is all about Brussels and its rules on bendy bananas, or whatever else people want to throw at us. This is a really important point. Whatever side of the argument people are on—whether they supported Brexit or wanted to remain in the EU—they should realise that the European convention on human rights has nothing to do with the EU. This is fundamentally about human rights.

[Mr Jones]

Does my hon. Friend congratulate the Members of this House who sit on the Council of Europe? Its role is to ensure that the European convention on human rights is a beacon of freedom and rights throughout the world, but in parts of Europe today—Ukraine being one, and Russia another—the human rights that we take for granted are not practised.

[Chris Evans]

I echo my right hon. Friend’s comments about the work of the Council for Europe; I know how important it is. If we want to talk about human rights more widely, look at what happened in Nigeria yesterday, and what has happened in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. We are the guardians of the rule of law. This whole country is formed on the rule of law, but we have always had an international and Atlanticist outlook whereby we defend human rights to the hilt. There is a fundamental belief, which I think is shared across the House, that if one person loses their human rights, we all do. That is something we should be guided by.

No member state of the Council of Europe has previously derogated from the European convention on human rights in the manner proposed in the Bill. That is how unusual its provisions are. What we are asked to agree to today would make us an anomaly right across the continent of Europe and beyond. It is therefore clear that intense scrutiny of derogations would be highly sensible.

[Mr Jones]

I agree. On combat in overseas operations, the Supreme Court was very clear in the Smith case that combat immunity was not in any way prevented by the Human Rights Act 1998. In that case, the MOD was trying to extend the Human Rights Act to cover planning decisions that were taken in Whitehall about Snatch Land Rovers.

[Chris Evans]

It comes back to the point that my right hon. Friend has so eloquently made over the last few sittings. I tell the Minister this: I have enjoyed my right hon. Friend’s contributions, though they may have been difficult.

[Chris Evans]

Sometimes I am not sure.

I was not au fait with the case of the Snatch Land Rovers before I came here. The point my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham has been making is that one day, in the near future—a nearer future for some than for others—we will not be here, and others will come in, but the legislation will stay. We have to get it right. He knows as well as anyone else, given his experience, that the Ministry of Defence will hide behind its lawyers. In this case, they would have used the Human Rights Act. That is why it is important that we have scrutiny at the highest level. It is important that the provisions are not left open for lawyers to use at will. I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend.

To me, it is clear that intense scrutiny is highly sensible. It ought to be required when the UK decides to derogate from conventions; otherwise, we will be setting a dangerous precedent. This country has a unique role in global history. We have set the standard for so many countries to follow.

[Mr Jones]

The provisions may also pose a practical problem for deployment with other forces. Everyone agrees that in the future, many of our deployments will be with other nations, and if we have a derogation, and our situation is different from theirs, that could create problems in building alliances, or UK armed forces deploying with our allies.

[Chris Evans]

I absolutely agree. We do not know who will lead our combined forces in the future. If we have a piece of legislation that allows us to derogate from the European convention on human rights, that puts us at a disadvantage. This year we celebrated the anniversary of VE and VJ Day. Of course, during the famous D-day landings, we were led by an American, General Eisenhower. We might be putting our forces at risk if we are allowed to derogate from the European convention on human rights.

Given the UK’s standing and influence, there is a risk that if this provision remains in the Bill as it is, and is acted on without parliamentary scrutiny or consent, it would set a dangerous precedent to other countries in future conflicts. Having carte blanche to derogate from international conventions is not a precedent that the UK should set. As I said, other countries look to us for the standards that we have set in the past. We should be setting the highest standards in the future.

Other organisations have also raised their concerns about the Bill and giving the Government the ability to ignore international law. Justice stated:

“the Bill would damage the standing of the armed forces by acting contrary to established legal norms—both domestic and international…The Bill risks both contravening the UK’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights…and other international legal instruments, many of which the UK helped to create.”

Our country has a proud history of upholding international conventions on human rights across the globe, but the Bill threatens to undo our international standing as the rightful champion of human rights. Amendment 57 will make it clear that our country still sees international obligations and human rights conventions as vital. It states that the Government will not derogate from human rights conventions without real and significant cause. It shows a commitment to transparency and parliamentary scrutiny.

[Mr Jones]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[The Chair]

The hon. Member for Islwyn has concluded his remarks.

[Chris Evans]

No, I have not; I have three hours of this. I give way.

[Mr Jones]

My hon. Friend is just getting into his flow. Does he agree that the problem with the Bill is that it does not define the circumstances in which a derogation will take place? We have a Conservative Government today, but if there is no definition of the reasons for allowing a derogation, a future Government could use the provision to do anything.

[Chris Evans]

I agree with my right hon. Friend. We have to be careful; we are in the here and now, but we have to attempt to future-proof the legislation we pass. That is true of anybody. It will be difficult, but if, God forbid, there was an extreme Government in future, they could do whatever they liked, using this anomaly in the Bill, and would be acting within the confines of the law. That is why it is extremely important to remember that the legislation will remain long after each and every one of us has gone.

[Mr Jones]

That is not in the realms of fantasy. In Europe, we need only look at the way Hungary is going under the leadership of Mr Orbán, who seems to disregard a lot of what we would take to be human rights legislation. This argument is not based on a figment of the imagination, or fantasy.

[Chris Evans]

This is on our doorstep. Look at the annexation in Ukraine. Hungary is running over human rights like a tank. If we leave these anomalies in the legislation and do not tighten it up, people can do whatever they like in future. It is extremely important that we have certainty; that is the most important element of law. Judicial precedent and statutory interpretation are important, too, but we need certainty, and that is unfortunately not in the Bill. It would be lovely if the Government supported the amendment—it would be the first Opposition amendment that they agree to in the Committee—because it would ensure certainty.

If we cannot give certainty, because we do not know when we will use the provision, we can at least ensure parliamentary scrutiny of derogations. As Justice and other human rights groups have publicly stated, the Bill signals that the Government are willing to break international conventions. It signals a worrying disregard of the European convention on human rights and the Geneva convention. That cannot be allowed to pass unchecked. That is extremely important. Particularly as we leave the European Union, we should be aiming to highlight our commitment to international conventions such as those on human rights. Any derogation from the European convention on human rights must be checked by Parliament, decided on democratically, and subject to the highest level of scrutiny, as any derogation should be.

[Mr Jones]

My hon. Friend refers to the Geneva convention; there are very good reasons for such conventions. They are not just the right thing to follow, in terms of human rights; they afford protections to our servicemen and women. In the past, we have rightly criticised—and, going back to the Nuremberg trials, taken cases against—individuals who ignored the Geneva convention.

[Chris Evans]

Absolutely. Our troops must be defended, and they must have the right protection in law.

I point out, Mr Derogation—please forgive me, Mr Mundell; that was my first mistake in a number of sittings. I point out, Mr Mundell, that derogation from treaties is extremely rare. To derogate frequently from a treaty would be to undermine it. [Interruption.] I see that I am shaping up to be the most unpopular Member present, because I keep speaking and eating into lunchtime, so I will come back later this afternoon.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Leo Docherty.)

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill (Tenth sitting)

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 10th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 22nd October 2020 Public Bill Committees

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Welcome back to the Chair, Mr Stringer.

My hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn spoke this morning about the duty to consider derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights. Clause 12 states:

“After section 14 of the Human Rights Act 1998 insert—

‘14A Duty to consider derogation regarding overseas operations”.

It then details ‘overseas operations’. I have a problem with that for many of the same reasons outlined by my hon. Friend. What do we derogate from, and for what reasons? The Human Rights Act 1998 gets a bad name in the sense that people start foaming at the mouth and think that it has something to do with Brussels and Brexit, but it is nothing of the sort. That is important to remember in view of the rights that it gives us and the signatories to it. The Act covers all 47 states that have signed the European Convention on Human Rights. As my hon. Friend said, this country has a proud history of acting as a champion of human rights under the convention, and was instrumental in the convention’s creation in 1950. It was championed by Winston Churchill, mainly as a result of the issues arising from the second world war. It is also important to note that the people who wrote it were members of the United Kingdom Government, and lawyers as well. That convention contains a fundamental part of British DNA—in fact it goes back to Magna Carta and the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act. We build up laws in this country over time, but the horrors of the second world war prompted us to enshrine basic rights for everyone. As I have said before, the Human Rights Act has been portrayed—as it has in terms of the Bill—as the means for nasty foreigners to be able to sue the Ministry of Defence. But the opposite is true: it is fundamental for members of our armed forces. I have already mentioned how it was used in the Smith case in connection with Snatch Land Rovers.

The Bill, as drafted, asks for derogations from the human rights convention. Such derogations are allowable, but subject to limitations, and an applicant must be clear about what they want. When people start chomping at the bit and foaming at mouth when we talk about the Human Rights Act and the human rights convention, I always say, “Just look at it and see what it does. Can you really disagree with it?” Unfortunately, some people do disagree with it, but article 2, which is the most quoted, relates to the right to life.

[Chris Evans (Islwyn) (Lab/Co-op)]

Would my right hon. Friend accept—

[Chris Evans]

In the past, the European Court of Human Rights has been judged as the most effective international human rights court in the world.

[Mr Jones]

It is, because it sets a standard that I do not think many British people could disagree with. Article 2 enshrines the right to life; I do not think that most people would disagree with that. Article 3 relates to freedom from torture, again I am not sure that anyone would disagree with that. People may say that that is self-evidently accepted these days, but not that long ago in Iraq, one of our closest allies, the United States, did commit acts of torture. I did not see any evidence that UK servicemen and women were involved in that when I was part of the rendition report produced by the Intelligence and Security Committee, but there were occasions when UK servicemen and women, and our intelligence agents, were present. Perhaps we all take it for granted that we should be against torture, but there were such cases in Iraq in living memory.

Article 4 relates to freedom from slavery. Again, a few years ago we may have thought about slavery in terms of historical cases and the transportation of slaves from Africa to America and the West Indies. But today, in all our constituencies, slavery is, sadly, alive and kicking, even in my constituency of North Durham, where we had a case of modern slavery about 12 months ago. It exists in modern society.

Article 7 relates to the right to a fair trial, and that comes to the heart of the Bill.

[The Minister for Defence People and Veterans (Johnny Mercer)]

The right hon. Gentleman has talked about articles 2, 3 and 4, and is about to discuss article 7. Is he aware that we cannot derogate from those articles, and nor would we seek to?

[Mr Jones]

If the Minister is patient, I am coming on to that.

[Johnny Mercer]

Sorry—I get excited.

[Mr Jones]

I know. If he is patient, I have a full description of what we cannot derogate from. If he sits back and just enjoys it, he might learn something as well.

We have already discussed how the Bill is removing veterans and armed forces personnel from section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, and I believe that that does not allow people access to a fair trial. But we would all agree that the right to a fair trial is a basic right. Article 8— Minister, do not worry, I am not going to read out the entire list of articles in the Human Rights Act, but I want to concentrate on those that may come within of the Bill’s remit and may be subject to derogation—relates to respect for family and private life. No one should disagree with article 9—freedom of thought, belief and religion. A normal society should have no problems with such a freedom.

The Minister intervened to point out that any derogations are subject to limitation. That leads on to the important question about why such a derogation is included in clause 12. It has always been accepted that the rights given to us under the Human Rights Act should be considered in law according to their hierarchy in the convention. In terms of the Bill and warfare, people have focused on the idea that somehow that Act and the convention on human rights stop a country like ours, or members of the armed forces, using lethal force.

To come to the issue that the Minister just raised, I should say that, yes, there are some absolutes that cannot be derogated from. For example, article 15(2) of the convention states:

“No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.”

That was upheld by the Supreme Court in the Smith case. It held steady—Hilary Meredith mentioned this point—in saying that lawful conduct cannot be questioned in terms of the use of the other ones, which the Minister referred to; this comes on to the rights that are absolute and cannot be impaired in any way. There is article 2, about the protection of the right to life, apart from the qualification that I have just given. Article 3 is about the prohibition of torture—something that the Bill could not derogate from.

I should say to the Minister that I disagree with some of my colleagues who said on Second Reading that the Bill gave carte blanche for torture. I simply said that, no, it does not, as would be clear if they read the Bill. Alas, these days many people hold forth in the Chamber without ever having read the relevant Bill—a bit of a disadvantage, I always think, if someone wants to make a useful contribution.

Article 4 is about the prohibition of slavery and forced labour. We cannot derogate from those issues. Article 7 is about punishment without law. One right that some might think we should be able to derogate from is in article 12—the right to marriage. We could not derogate from any of those rights. My issues with the Bill are not about the headlines that some have grabbed in saying that it gives carte blanche for torture. It does not, because of the limitations on derogations.

I then ask myself why the derogation that we are discussing is needed. All my hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn was trying to do—and I asked about this earlier—is establish what we can define about what derogations are actually needed, and why. Is this a way of trying to protect the MOD from civilian claims, as I was saying earlier?

[Chris Evans]

Article 15 of the European convention on human rights allows derogation in times of war. The last time this country asked for a derogation was in the wake of 9/11 and the rise of al-Qaeda; there was another time in the ’70s during the troubles in Northern Ireland. Does my right hon. Friend agree that derogation is so important? Even when it was granted in the wake of 9/11, this country had still had to argue the reasons for derogation.

[Mr Jones]

My hon. Friend obviously must be reading my mind; I was about to come to the Northern Ireland case, which is important in respect of the limitations of derogation and the controls around it. The other thing about when a state wants to derogate from the European convention on human rights is that it first has to inform the secretary-general of the Council of Europe, who should be given an explanation about why. Can the Minister tell us in what circumstances he sees this Bill being used, in terms of the derogation from human rights, particularly when it does not limit lawful combat actions in a conflict situation? The Bill also needs to give the reasons and measures, and how they will operate, and set out why it will not be withholding those rights. It comes back into the tier, as I said, where there are some that cannot be touched and others that can.

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[Chris Evans]

I think my right hon. Friend is referring to the case of Lawless v. Ireland, where the European Court of Human Rights said that for it to be a state of emergency the entire population needs to be under threat for it to be possible to derogate from the convention on human rights. That underlines how significant it is to even ask for a derogation from the European Court of Human Rights.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

My hon. Friend is right on the second point, but that was not the first case I referred to. In the first case, legislation that the UK had put forward was challenged as a breach of the convention’s obligations. It is Brogan and others v. the United Kingdom. In that case, the judge ruled that the UK would only be able to apply for a derogation if it declared a state of emergency, pursuant to article 15.1 in the derogation clause of the convention. Under the Human Rights Act, there are good reasons why we are able to derogate, but, justifiably, they have to be damn good reasons. Those derogations were found to be unlawful, which allowed the respondents to claim compensation for unlawful imprisonment.

That demonstrates that these provisions are there for good reasons, but we should not use them loosely. I have not yet heard anything about why they are included in this Bill. Clearly, all the issues around warfare and people using lethal force on the battlefield are covered by the convention. That has been upheld by the Supreme Court.

[Chris Evans]

When a Government ask for derogation under article 15, the key words are “exceptional circumstances.” If, and only if, it is granted it is then limited and the Government have to justify that. That is the crux of the problem with the Bill and why we have introduced the amendment. The Bill seems to be going against the spirit of that article. Does my right hon. Friend agree?

[Mr Jones]

I do. I do not know why it is in the Bill, without an explanation about why one would want to use it. As my hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn said, there are perfectly good reasons why there are derogations in the Human Rights Act, for example in times of emergency. But for this area? I just do not see it, because as I say, lawful combat is covered. Torture and other things are proscribed anyway, so nobody can get derogations for those. For what other purpose would it be in the Bill? That is what I find very difficult to understand, and that is why I have a problem with some of this Bill.

The situation we are in is possibly due to the fact that the Human Rights Act 1998 has been portrayed by a lot of people as this horrible piece of socialist, human rights-hugging legislation brought in by a nasty Labour Government. It was not: all it did was incorporate the European convention on human rights into UK law. Previously, if claimants wanted to raise a case under the ECHR, they had to take that case to Strasbourg. Because of the Human Rights Act, those cases were able to be looked at in UK courts and decided by UK judges, which I think was a lot better than the previous scenario. It made it easier, but that is possibly why the focus and attention has been on human rights cases, or the uses of them.

The other thing about human rights cases, which gets into the mythology around those cases, is that the Human Rights Act is often quoted by lawyers and given as a reason why a case should go forward. It is often just struck out, because those lawyers are sometimes just flying a kite and seeing if they get anywhere, but it is quite a robust piece of legislation. It also gives us a lot of protections: it protects individual citizens, but more importantly, it protects individual servicemen and servicewomen when they are bringing cases against the MOD. That is the problem we have had with some of the optics around this, rather than what the facts themselves are. I have had these discussions with constituents, and when I tell them that the Human Rights Act has nothing to do with the EU and that it was actually Winston Churchill’s invention, they look at me agog.

The point is that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn said this morning, these are the standards that we apply when we are arguing the moral case, both in foreign policy and in anything else. These are the things we want people to follow, and if we are just loosely throwing derogations into this Bill, we are going to be quite rightly accused of not holding ourselves to the same high standards, or somehow trying to wriggle out of our basic commitments under the Human Rights Act, which is very difficult for me. As I say, I do not understand why this is in the Bill.

The other issue, which I have raised before and was also raised by Hilary Meredith, is the time limits under the Human Rights Act. There is a one-year limit on Human Rights Act cases, but what we are saying is that there should be a longstop, because they are covered by the Limitation Act 1980. We are arguing for a separation of that, in terms of the six-year longstop, and I think Hilary Meredith said in her evidence to us that it would be interesting to know how that fits with the EHCR and its incorporations. I am quite happy for the Minister to write to me on this topic, but he did say that the Bill complies with the Human Rights Act, and I would like to see the explanation from the lawyers about the implementation of the time limits, because I am not sure whether that is something we would have to run by the secretary-general of the Council of Europe. What we are saying, in effect, is that we are limiting someone’s access to human rights. That is the use of human rights legislation, so I think that is the important point.

The other issue is, as the Minister said, the growth in the areas for these cases. I admit that, in some of the Phil Shiner cases, the Human Rights Act was just flying a kite, basically. Those cases should have been knocked down very quickly, and it should have been said that they were nothing to do with the Human Rights Act.

The Defence Committee did a very good report—I think the Minister was on the Committee at the time—called “Who guards the guardians? MoD support for former and serving personnel”. It is worth reading—I have read it, and it is a good report. The main issue in it is investigations, which we have been talking about throughout this Committee. It is very critical of the £60 million spent on IHAT, for example. There was no mention of it being anything to do with the Human Rights Act. It outlines in detail the chaos when IHAT was set up in 2010 by—I reiterate yet again—the coalition Government.

I would like to know what the justification is for having this measure in the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn said this morning, it potentially has huge implications for us.

[Johnny Mercer]

Clause 11 introduces new factors that the court must consider when deciding whether to allow human rights claims relating to overseas military operations to be brought in the normal time—[Hon. Members: “We are on clause 12!] I am sorry; I got carried away. Hon. Members are right—it is clause 12.

The measures in this Bill about derogation are not intended to change the existing and very robust processes that the Government and Parliament follow if and when a decision to derogate has been made. The requirement to consider derogation merely ensures that all future Governments are compelled to consider derogating from the ECHR for the purpose of the specific military operation. It is worth saying that the only change that we are bringing about in this Bill is the requirement to consider, rather than leaving it as an option. It is not actually a derogation; it is a requirement to consider a derogation and prove that it has been considered, not a derogation itself. That will ensure that operational effectiveness can be maintained by, for example, enabling detention where appropriate for imperative reasons of security. It is worth noting that the vast majority of the challenge that we face around lawfare has come from issues relating to detention.

Appropriate parliamentary oversight over derogation is already built into the Human Rights Act 1998. For the benefit of the Committee, I will spell out the existing obligations on the Government once they have made the decisions to derogate from any aspect of the European convention on human rights. The Human Rights Act requires that the Secretary of State must make an order designating any derogation by the UK from an article of the ECHR or a protocol thereof. The Secretary of State must also make an order amending schedule 3 of the Human Rights Act to reflect the designation order or any amendment to, replacement of or withdrawal of the designation order. A designation order ceases to have effect if a resolution approving the order is not passed by each House of Parliament 40 days after it is made, or five years from the date of the designation order, unless extended by order under section 16(2) of the Human Rights Act, or if it is withdrawn, or if it is amended or replaced.

[Johnny Mercer]

The practical difference is that instead of it being optional to consider derogation from the ECHR, it becomes mandatory for Governments to demonstrate why they have derogated from the ECHR. It is much like in the prosecution setting, where we talk about factors to consider. Previously, people have said, “Well, they consider those anyway.” All we are doing is making it mandatory to prove that they have been considered, in order to demonstrate that the correct process has been gone through.

[Mr Jones]

My hon. Friend the Member for South Shields is right. This will have no effect whatsoever. I suspect it has just been put in the Bill for a bit of window-dressing—to suggest that the Government are feeding red meat to those who want to be against the entire Human Rights Act. The Minister is feeding the bogeyman around the Human Rights Act.

[Johnny Mercer]

Of course it is not.

In addition to the requirements laid out in the Human Rights Act 1998, the Government must communicate a decision to derogate to the secretary-general of the Council of Europe, including details of measures taken and the reasons for taking those measures, and inform the secretary-general when derogations have ceased. Those existing measures provide for an appropriate level of parliamentary debate of a decision to derogate. Requiring a parliamentary debate on decisions to derogate ahead of time could undermine operational effectiveness.

[Mr Jones]

Why?

[Johnny Mercer]

The Government may have to make decisions quickly, meaning there simply will not be time for a debate.

[Mr Jones]

Why?

[The Chair]

Order.

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[Johnny Mercer]

Requiring a debate before an order is made may also result in discussion of operations that rely on an element of surprise. That would defeat the purpose of derogation in relation to overseas military operations, which should enhance operational effectiveness. I therefore strongly recommend that the amendment is withdrawn.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Johnny Mercer]

Next time.

[Chris Evans]

I am not going to go on forever and I will withdraw the amendment.

[Mr Jones]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving way. It is interesting that the Minister has read his speech into the record like he used to, and his Whip told him to sit down. Can my hon. Friend think of an example that was so urgent for operational reasons that it would have to be rushed through on this basis? The Minister clearly did not want to give one.

[Johnny Mercer]

I can—

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[Chris Evans]

Does anyone else want to intervene now? I feel like a post box at the moment. With the amount of whys coming over my left shoulder, it was just like my four-year-old son asking me why all the time—I do not mean to offend my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham.

I hope this matter is revisited on Report. I believe the derogation is very important and, as my right hon. Friend mentioned, article 15 is so important. It is usually in states of emergency that derogation is asked for. That means it needs to be scrutinised in both Houses. I will withdraw the amendment at this stage, but I hope that we will revisit the issue on Report, when the Bill comes back to the Floor of the House. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Power to make consequential provision

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

We are moving in the direction of a lot of things in this House being done by regulation. Here again:

“The Secretary of State or the Lord Chancellor may by regulations make provision that is consequential on any provision made by this Act.”

We have just had a discussion about the Human Rights Act, and I am less than convinced. The other issue—because, again, this is a contentious area—is the statutory instruments that will be used, and how the provisions will be amended. Once the Bill is passed, it will, I think, lead to a lot of problems, so I would just like to understand a bit more about how the powers will be used.

[Johnny Mercer]

I have little to add to what I previously said. The point of these provisions is simply to formalise our position and make sure that where we should have derogated previously to prevent the abuses that we have seen, and we have not, we simply bring forward legislation to make it mandatory to consider that derogation and prove the workings thereof.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Commencement and application

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

Again, I want clarification about clause 15, because there is hype around the Bill somehow righting all past wrongs, and giving rights. Northern Ireland, which we spoke about this morning, is not covered by the Bill, but there is also the question of cases that are currently going on, or those that have been. I just want the Minister to give a response to the fact that the Bill will not apply to past cases relating to Iraq and Afghanistan, and there will not be any fast resolution. I want to get clear parameters from the Minister for which cases will fall within the Bill’s scope, because I think—there has been press comment on this—things have been a bit confused, perhaps intentionally and perhaps unintentionally.

[Johnny Mercer]

I am more than happy to answer that. If the Bill receives Royal Assent, it will apply immediately. It will not apply to any cases where an external, independent decision from the prosecutor on whether to prosecute is awaited, but it will apply from Royal Assent, and there is therefore an element of retrospection to it in that if further things come from Afghanistan, Iraq or wherever it may be, the Bill will apply and provide that certainty. We have been clear all along on the Northern Ireland issue. I have been clear that we will not leave Northern Ireland veterans behind. It was an important concession to achieve—that veterans who served in Northern Ireland will receive equal treatment to those who are covered by the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

indicated dissent.

[Johnny Mercer]

The right hon. Gentleman can say no, but that is the reality of the position. The Northern Ireland Secretary has spoken before about how he intends to bring forward legislation before Christmas to do that, but it is an issue for the Northern Ireland Office, and I think the right hon. Gentleman knows that.

[Mr Jones]

I do, and having dealt with the Northern Ireland Secretary, I wish him luck, because he is going to come up against huge problems with that. Is the Minister saying that whatever happens in Northern Ireland will be a mirror image of the Bill?

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This shows a serious gap in pastoral care and support as well as additional legal support for current and former personnel, and it must be filled. Can the Minister really support a Bill that breaches the armed forces covenant with regard to the unfair treatment of our troops in terms of legal support? Does the Minister believe this behaviour to be acceptable—for troops to be actively discouraged by the Government from seeking justice in the brazen manner outlined by Major Campbell? Is this treatment that he would accept if he was in the same position? If so, why?

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I rise to speak to new clause 9, which is in my name. My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South made an important point. We ask our servicemen and women to do dangerous, remarkable things on our behalf. Is there a straight read-across to an equivalent civilian job? No, I do not think there is, if we are talking about combat and some of the other things that we are asking people to do. We are asking two things: that they will ultimately have to take human life or give their own life in defence of this country and their comrades. That is a unique set of circumstances that many of us will never experience.

It is important, therefore, that we get it right and support our servicemen and women on two sides: where, because of their actions, they are accused of wrongdoing, or where, in the service of their country things are done to them through no fault of their own. They may contract a disease as a result of work conditions or the way a piece of equipment is designed. The problem with some of the Bill is that we are quite rightly focusing on the unique set of circumstances in foreign combat. There is also a whole swathe of areas where people are not in immediate danger but are capable of being injured while serving their country. That applies to a chef on a ship right through to somebody who is working in a maintenance depot.

If these service personnel were in civilian life, they would be allowed to join a trade union and to get independent legal redress. I think it was mentioned in the evidence session that the Dutch armed forces have a staff association or trade union. Although they do not have recognised trade unions in the United States, they have very strong regiment associations. The US Marine Corps has a very strong representative for its members and, having met the individual, very strong lobbying power on Capitol hill.

[Chris Evans]

When I was a young parliamentary researcher, a rather young hon. Member for North Durham raised this issue in a Westminster Hall debate in, I think, 2006—it might have been 2007. At the time, he was on the Back Benches and was yet to be appointed Minister for Veterans. What was stopping some form of staff association emerging? He argued for such an association in the Westminster Hall debate, but what sorts of obstacles did he encounter from military brass when he was in the Ministry of Defence?

[Mr Jones]

I am not in favour of a trade union for the armed forces—let me make that very clear—but there needs to be some type of representative body for members of our armed forces. The reasons argued against it were the same reasons that were argued when we brought in the service complaints commissioner and the ombudsman —that somehow it would affect the chain of command. Has the world stopped since we have had the ombudsman and the service complaints commissioner? No, it has not. It is not perfect, but the world has not stopped. I used to describe it as a pressure cooker: it allows another avenue for disputes or complaints to be dealt with in a timely way.

Reading the ombudsman’s annual report, I think she is making great progress, but there is a long way to go. A lot of the complaints that come forward are nothing to do with combat; they are to do with the way in which the Army handles its personnel issues—issues that, to be honest, would in some cases be very similar to what we would find in private industry.

I turn to the issue of representation. If we are going to have fairness, there has to be a level playing field. It surely must be right that there should be some way for members of the armed forces to have legal redress. I am not talking about minor disciplinary cases and things like that; I am talking about some of the serious cases that have been outlined. If you cannot sleep tonight, Mr Stringer, it is worth reading the Defence Committee’s 2016 report on this issue—I referred to it earlier—called “Who guards the guardians? MoD support for former and serving personnel.” The Minister was on the Committee at the time. The report was mainly about the issues around the IHAT inquiry. It did not only find, as we have already heard, the catastrophic delays that were happening, but it raised the issue of who represented the members of the armed forces who were being accused. As my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South says, not only were they not represented, but they were actually encouraged in some ways not to take representation. I think even Major Campbell said in his evidence to us that he was more or less told, “Go away—it’ll be okay, everything will be all right.”, but it dragged on and on.

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[Chris Evans]

Sorry. Maybe next time; that is the third mistake I have made today. As my right hon. and hon. Friends said, the crux of the Bill is not just about the law but the investigation. I believe from what the Minister has said that he has some sympathy for that as well.

The problem that we have with mental health, of course, is that we do not know what somebody’s background is when they join. Yes, they do psychometric testing and follow tests for reading and writing, and so on, but we do not know what was in their background. What was their family history? Might they have experienced personal distress or trauma in their childhood? That leads on to the problem that military investigations are often preceded by internal disciplinary acts.

What actually happens is that someone is faced with two pieces of law, especially if they have had a mental health problem. They have civilian law on the one hand and military law on the other, making things extremely complicated.

For example, investigations in military contexts are often more complex and involve additional investigative personnel, many of whom do not deal with investigations as their primary task. Therefore, we have all these multi- layered rules and regulations that are not in civil law.

[Mr Jones]

I agree with that. The Armed Forces Act 2006 tried to simplify the legal system, but the issue, again, is time delays. If we look at the ombudsman’s report each year, some of the simplest disciplinary issues should have been dealt with. That is not about investigations; it is about resources.

[Chris Evans]

As I said, the military are not employing full-time investigators. Many of the people who are investigating are doing other jobs as well.

It can get even more complicated. In cases of suspected disciplinary misconduct, the initial investigation is usually done by the immediate disciplining senior officer. That can then move on to the military supervisor, which makes it even more complicated again. In cases of suspected criminal acts, military police and probably legal advisers are called in as well. So we have large numbers of people who are not speaking to each other and who are getting confused about the rules, regulations and what is covered by what law. It is increasingly confusing.

Consider someone who already has problems with alcohol or drugs. I have some sympathy with what my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham said earlier. When veterans are going through the criminal justice system—I am sure the Minister knows this—they often rely on the defence of post-traumatic stress disorder, but if we look at the facts, there is little research into how much it affects criminal behaviour. I am aware that 4% to 5% of the prison population—

[Mr Jones]

It is 3%.

[Chris Evans]

It was in 2016. The figure I have is 4% to 5%. If my right hon. Friend wants to correct me, I would be happy to take an intervention.

[Mr Jones]

Before 2010—I instigated the review—they had no figures at all about the numbers. The important thing is that the number is small. Most of the people who go through military life get a positive benefit out of it.

[Chris Evans]

That is the point I was getting to. Based on the Ministry of Justice figures that I have—the Minister may want to correct me—2,500 former members of the armed forces are in prison, largely because of sexual or violent crimes. However—again, my right hon. Friend might want to correct me, because I might be using out of date figures—0.1% were discharged from the armed forces, usually for mental health reasons. Are those figures that he recognises?

[Mr Jones]

The problem my hon. Friend underlines is the same problem I think the Minister will confirm we have today. Some people claim that 25% of the prison population is veterans, which is nonsense. The real problem—again, it was a problem when I was a Minister, and I am sure it still is today—is early service leavers. A lot of these people are early service leavers.

[Chris Evans]

Whatever the figures are, these people are still vulnerable to social exclusion and homelessness. I well remember a harrowing case from when I was growing up of a boy who joined the forces. He came straight out of care, and he did not do very well in the forces—he did not get above private. He had severe mental health problems. He came out and he could not operate outside of a stringent regime. He went to pieces and ended up in prison for committing a violent crime. It was very harrowing because I knew the family.

[Mr Jones]

Just because someone joins the armed forces, it does not mean that their mental health history is scrubbed at the recruitment door. My hon. Friend is right. A lot of things are put down to military service that are pre-military service. It is sometimes wrong to blame the service for some of those issues.

[Chris Evans]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. The person who was recruited in this case was clearly unsuitable for the forces. He did not take advantage of the fantastic opportunities that there are in the forces. He clearly had some sort of problem, and he needed to live in that regime where he was told what to do day in, day out. Once that left his life, his life went completely off the track. He said that he missed not just being told what to do but the camaraderie of his unit. Once that was gone, he felt friendless and alone.

However, the problem we have is that there is a dearth of academic research, and that is why we need a report. We do not know the unique factors that have an impact when it comes to military investigations, including the psychological wellbeing and the mental health of service personnel. I know that the Minister is a champion of this in the Government, and I am glad of that fact—I know that he will work on this issue for as long as he is a Minister—but that is the problem we have, and it is why we need a report. There are large numbers of factors that help personnel deal with the complexity of disciplinary and criminal proceedings and the potential of those two processes, but we do not know their effects.

Returning to the example from many years ago that I mentioned, there is also the point about camaraderie. When someone is under investigation, whether disciplinary or criminal, that has an effect on the morale of their unit, which in turn has a wider effect on their mental health. At the end of the day, many people who find themselves under investigation will say one thing: “I was simply following orders. Why am I the one being investigated?” Also, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham alludes to, there are far more laws, regulations and rules in a military investigation. Some military laws have different objectives from criminal and civil laws: in contrast to the criminal law, military discipline has educational objectives, positive as well as negative.

I am not an expert on military law, but I would say that it is confusing. Take the example of a military guard guarding a checkpoint in Helmand 15 years ago, protecting the security of a region’s population. An approaching vehicle opens fire on them—imagine it is you, Mr Stringer. In this role, you as the guard are the victim: you have been fired on. However, you return fire, and you kill the alleged insurgents in the vehicle. That could mean you are investigated simply for following orders and returning fire. That is the crux of the problem: on one hand, somebody is the victim of a crime; on the other hand, they are the perpetrator of a crime, simply because they have followed orders. That is the type of thing I hope we can clear up in future.

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[Mr Jones]

The hon. Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke makes a very good point, because these things are covered by the rules of engagement and the training that takes place. However, they are incredibly easy to look at and make a determination about while sat in a nice, comfy armchair away from the place where they occurred. These cases involve split-second decisions, and mistakes do happen. The important thing, surely, is that the investigation that comes afterwards should be done as rapidly as possible so that it takes the onus and pressure off the potentially accused individual.

[Chris Evans]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right: the investigation should be effective and efficient. As I said while building up the background to this issue, if we could cut the multi-layered process that people have to go through down into one simplified investigation, that issue would be resolved pretty quickly.

[Mr Jones]

Would that not be achieved by including in this Bill the suggestions that I made in my new clauses—suggestions that are completely missing from the Bill—about making sure there is some judicial oversight of those investigations after a certain period of time? The individual my hon. Friend refers to would at least be able to have his or her case looked at judicially after a certain period of time, and if the investigation was going nowhere it could be dismissed.

[Chris Evans]

That is eminently sensible, and I hope that at some stage the Government will accept that and perhaps put it in the Bill. That is up to the Government, but I think that that is absolutely right. The problem is that these investigations seem to go on for ever and ever. For ex-service personnel or veterans, if there is no end in sight, that will affect their mental health. That is surely one resolution that could be written into the Bill.

I want to talk about learning disability. Obviously, if someone has a physical disability, they are disbarred from joining the armed forces, but we have to address the issue of mental disability. Someone can go through life without being diagnosed as dyslexic or autistic, or as having attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. There are many cases of people in their 40s and 50s being diagnosed with those conditions, which we do not know about. When someone is under investigation, how do we know that they do not have those types of disabilities? Usually, if someone is arrested under civilian law, they have a responsible person with them—a designated person. People do not have access to that in the military.

[Mr Jones]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. When I was a Minister, the average reading age of some of the infantry when they were recruited was 11 years of age. All credit to the Army and the Darlington College at Catterick for doing a great job of getting people’s reading ages up,. The problem that was spotted, which had never been spotted before, was dyslexia. Individuals had gone through the education system without being diagnosed until they were in their late 20s.

[Chris Evans]

There is still a huge stigma in relation to illiteracy, as my right hon. Friend knows. A lot of issues in the prison population concern people with undiagnosed learning difficulties. There are higher than normal levels of illiteracy that we need to address. However, someone who has come through the basic tests to join the forces might be on the autistic spectrum but still able to function, and they need the help of a designated person as well.

I have written down something about a split decision. I do not know whether Members remember the case of Alexander Blackman, a Royal Marine who had his conviction for murder quashed on the grounds of diminished responsibility in 2016 after he had fatally wounded a Taliban prisoner. Blackman’s lawyers argued that he had an adjustment disorder at the time of the killing, because of months on the frontline in terrible conditions, and we can see how that would affect his mental health.

The whole issue of investigations comes down to one thing: training. Written evidence from David Lloyd Roberts and Dr Charlotte Harford stated:

“Regular and effective training for the armed forces on compliance with the law of armed conflict can reduce the risk of situations arising in which allegations of war crimes are levelled at British service personnel serving overseas. There is no need for military personnel to be given a comprehensive legal education. However, if knowledge of and consistent respect for the following ten principles, at least, can be instilled in all members of the armed forces, they should have little reason to fear prosecution…Torture is prohibited in all circumstances…Summary executions are prohibited…Those hors de combat may not be attacked…Only military objectives may be deliberately attacked…Civilians may not be deliberately attacked unless they are taking a direct part in hostilities…Buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law may not be deliberately attacked…Combatant adversaries may not be treacherously killed or wounded…The wounded and sick must be collected and cared for…Prisoners of war should be evacuated from the combat zone as soon as possible…The dead may not be despoiled or mutilated …Effective training on the law of armed conflict is likely to take the form not of the testing of theoretical knowledge, but of presenting members of the armed forces on a regular basis with hypothetical (but realistic) scenarios in which to practise thinking how military operations in a particular context might be conducted effectively in compliance with the above principles.”

I think that is eminently sensible, but if we are producing a report to Parliament, we can start building on the gaps in knowledge about mental health and its effect on service personnel. I look forward to the Minister responding on the basis of his knowledge. I am sure he will give us an interesting insight.

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[Johnny Mercer]

Sorry. New clauses 3 and 4 would require the Defence Secretary to commission and publish an independent evaluation of access to legal advice and legal aid for service personnel and veterans in relation to the legal proceedings covered by the Bill. The MOD has a long-standing policy that, where a service person or veteran faces criminal allegations in relation to incidents arising from his or her duty, they may receive full public funding for legal support, as well as pastoral support for as long as they are serving. That was not the case when I first came here, and Bob Campbell indicated to us his experiences. The situation changed when I was running the inquiry into the Iraq Historic Allegations Team. Clearly, my views on that are well known, and they have not changed just because I have become a Minister.

[Mr Jones]

Is the Minister saying that, in the future and now, that will include families’ legal costs?

[Johnny Mercer]

Yes. There is full pastoral support and full legal support, paid for by the MOD, for everybody swept up in these investigations. My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. It was not like that until about two years ago, so that is a very fair point to raise.

We do that because we should look after our armed forces, both on the battlefield, where they face the traditional risks of death or injury, and in the courts, where they face the risk of a conviction and a prison sentence. We therefore aim to provide legal aid case management and funding for those who are, or were at the time of an alleged incident, subject to service law.

Because of the risks our service personnel and veterans face, our legal support offer is now very thorough. For the benefit of the Committee, I will set out some if its provisions. The legal aid provided by the armed forces legal aid scheme provides publicly funded financial assistance in respect of some or all of the costs of legal representation for defendants and appellants who appeal against findings and/or a punishment following summary hearings at unit level. That includes applications for extensions of the appeal period by the summary appeal court, for leave to appeal out of time, or to have a case referred to the Director of Service Prosecutions for a decision on whether the charges will result in a prosecution. That includes offences under schedule 2 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, which are referred directly to the Director of Service Prosecutions by the service police, as well as matters referred to the Director of Service Prosecutions by the commanding officer. It also includes those who are to be tried in a court martial or the service civilian court; those who wish to appeal in the court martial against the finding and/or sentence after trial; and those who are entitled to be tried in a criminal court outside the UK.

The legal aid scheme applies equally to all members of the armed forces, including the reserve forces when they are subject to service law, as well as to civilians who are, or were at the time of an alleged incident, subject to service discipline.

[Mr Jones]

The Minister calls it a legal aid system, but does it mirror that system? Unfortunately, over the last few years the cutbacks in the legal aid system have made it difficult for many people who we—including myself, the Minister and you, Mr Stringer—would not think of as having access to a lot of resources, and they are finding that they have no recourse at all. Does it mirror the national legal aid system, or is it a bespoke system without the financial constraints?

[Johnny Mercer]

It is a bespoke system for military personnel. It is now used extensively by veterans in particular, who previously have not been supported. For example, Government legal services were provided in the al-Sweady inquiry. The challenges came when these investigations got to the case of, for example, Major Bob Campbell. They were not being funded at the time, but they are now. It is based on the same principles as the civilian criminal legal aid scheme. They are the same principles but it is bespoke for the military. It makes necessary adjustments to take into account the specific circumstances and needs of defendants and appellants in the service justice system. As a result, I am confident that we are already ensuring that service personnel veterans are now properly supported when they are affected by criminal legal proceedings.

[Mr Jones]

An issue I have always felt very passionate about is the representation of families at coroners’ inquiries. Does it also cover that? Many service men and women, and many families, felt daunted that they were up against legal representation, when they were there on their own in many cases.

[Johnny Mercer]

I am happy to write to the right hon. Gentleman on that subject. As I understand it, a coroner’s court is different. There is support for service personnel or for bereaved families in those cases. These are often not criminal proceedings so the requirement for legal aid is not there, but they are supported and I am happy to outline that in a letter.

I am now confident that service personnel and veterans are properly supported when they are affected by criminal legal proceedings. The armed forces legal aid scheme does not provide legal aid funding for civil proceedings, but we are content that the funding available for service personnel and veterans through the legal aid regimes in different parts of the UK is now sufficient. If a service person or veteran brings a claim against the MOD, we obviously cannot fund that claim as there would be a conflict of interest. We have heard from a number of law firms, as well as the Royal British Legion, that may be prepared to support those cases if they see merit in them. If veterans or service personnel need to access the legal aid scheme, they would be doing so on the same terms as a civilian would. However, in the first instance—before considering whether to bring a claim—I would encourage any service person or veteran to consider the armed forces compensation scheme, which the right hon. Member for Durham North mentioned. It provides compensation irrespective of fault across the full range of circumstances in which illness, injury or death may arise as a result of service, and it avoids the need for claimants to go to court.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Does any Member wish to move any other new clauses formally?

[Mr Jones]

New clause 9 is a probing amendment. The important point is that I think the Minister has missed the point again—the comparison is that prisoners are going to have more rights than veterans.

Bill to be reported, without amendment.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill (Seventh sitting)

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 20th October 2020 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 3, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

‘(bb) the public interest in maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the Armed Forces;’.

This amendment would ensure that a relevant prosecutor gives particular weight to maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the Armed Forces.

Amendment 4, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

‘(bc) the nature of the alleged conduct, in particular whether it engaged the obligations of the United Kingdom under Articles 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights;’.

This amendment would ensure that particular weight is given by a prosecutor where the alleged conduct engages the UK’s obligations under Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, Article 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced labour) or Article 5 (prohibition of arbitrary detention) ECHR.

Amendment 5, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

‘(bd) whether the person had command responsibility for the alleged conduct, and to what extent;’.

This amendment would ensure that particular weight is given by a relevant prosecutor where the person had command responsibility for the alleged conduct.

Amendment 13, in clause 6, page 4, line 13, at end insert—

‘(3A) A service offence is not a “relevant offence” if it is an offence whose prosecution is required under the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations.’.

This amendment would exclude the prosecution of serious international crimes (such as torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain war crimes) from the limitations otherwise imposed by the Bill.

Amendment 58, in schedule 1, page 12, line 6, at end insert—

‘13A An offence under section 1 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).

13B An offence under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (torture).’.

This amendment adds to Schedule 1 specific reference to existing domestic offences in relation to torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, in a similar way to the treatment of sexual offences.

Amendment 6, in schedule 1, page 12, line 38, leave out paragraph 17 and insert—

‘17 An offence under Part 5 (Offences under domestic law) of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 as it relates to the law of England and Wales.’.

This amendment would mean that all offences listed in Part 1 of the International Criminal Courts Act 2001 as they related to the law of England and Wales would be excluded offences, without restriction.

Amendment 59, in schedule 1, page 12, line 39, at end insert—

‘(za) an act of genocide under article 6, or’.

This amendment would ensure that acts of genocide are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 60, in schedule 1, page 12, line 40, leave out

‘a crime against humanity within article 7.1(g)’

and insert

‘a crime against humanity within article 7.1(a)-(k)’.

This amendment would ensure that crimes against humanity are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 61, in schedule 1,page 12, line 41, leave out from beginning to end of line 2 on page 13 and insert—

‘(b) a war crime within article 8.2(a) (which relates to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).’.

This amendment would ensure that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 7, in schedule 1, page 13, line 12, leave out paragraph 20 and insert–

‘20 An offence under Part 5 (Offences under domestic law) of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 as it relates to the law of Northern Ireland.’.

This amendment would mean that all offences listed in Part 1 of the International Criminal Courts Act 2001 as they related to the law of Northern Ireland would be excluded offences, without restriction.

Amendment 62, in schedule 1, page 13, line 13, at end insert—

‘(za) an act of genocide under article 6, or’.

This amendment would ensure that acts of genocide are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 63, in schedule 1, page 13, line 14, leave out

‘a crime against humanity within article 7.1(g)’

and insert

‘a crime against humanity within article 7.1(a)-(k)’.

This amendment would ensure that crimes against humanity are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 64, page 13 [Schedule 1], leave out lines 15 to 18 and insert—

‘(b) a war crime within article 8.2(a) (which relates to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).’.

This amendment would ensure that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 8, in schedule 1, page 13, line 28, leave out paragraph 23.

This amendment is consequential on amendments 6 and 7.

Amendment 9, in schedule 1, page 14, line 5, leave out paragraphs 27 to 30 and insert—

‘27 An offence under Part 1 (Offences) of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001.’.

This amendment would mean that all offences listed in Part 1 of the International Criminal Courts Act (Scotland) 2001 would be excluded offences, without restriction.

Amendment 65, in schedule 1, page 14, line 7, at end insert—

‘(za) an act of genocide under article 6, or’.

This amendment would ensure that acts of genocide are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 66, in schedule 1, page 14, line 8, leave out

‘a crime against humanity within article 7.1(g)’

and insert

‘a crime against humanity within article 7.1(a)-(k)’.

This amendment would ensure that crimes against humanity are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 67, in schedule 1, page 14, leave out lines 9 to 12 and insert—

‘(b) a war crime within article 8.2(a) (which relates to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).’.

This amendment would ensure that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 12, in clause 15, page 9, line 21, at end insert—

‘subject to subsection (2A).

(2A) Before making regulations under subsection (2), the Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament the report of an independent review confirming that the Act is in full compliance with the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations with respect to the prosecution of war crimes and other crimes committed during overseas operations.

(2B) This Act shall cease to have effect at the end of the period of five years beginning with the day on which it is brought into force, unless the Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor has, not fewer than four years after this Act has come into force, laid before Parliament the report of a further independent review confirming that the Act remains in full compliance with the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations with respect to the prosecution of war crimes and other crimes committed during overseas operations.’.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I have nothing further to add, Mr Stringer, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Section 3: supplementary

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

This clause goes to what we heard in the evidence session is the missing part of the Bill: investigation and what warrants particular types of investigation. We heard from numerous witnesses, including Judge Blackett and General Nick Parker, that what is missing from the Bill is any scope of investigation. I have tabled new clauses to limit and have control over investigations, because, as Judge Blackett said, the problem with the Bill is that it looks at the process from

“the wrong end of the telescope.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 120, Q246.]

It looks at the prosecution end, rather than the investigation end.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Evans (Islwyn) (Lab/Co-op)]

As my right hon. Friend was speaking, I thought of an anomaly. The Bill now strikes out claims on the Ministry of Defence after six years. However, if new evidence comes to light and there is a criminal conviction for the same offence, there could be a situation in which a criminal court imposes compensation when the MOD has already struck the claims out. How does my right hon. Friend see clause 4 squaring that circle?

[Mr Jones]

It does not, and that comes to one of the other problems with the Bill: it combines both criminal and civil. As I think Ms Meredith said, that is the problem, in terms of what we are trying to achieve. If we keep the longstop for six years on civil claims, a situation would arise whereby they would not go forward, although potentially they could even after six years under clause 4.

The other thing put forward by the Bill’s supporters is that it will somehow stop investigation of our servicemen and women for cases that they do not think have substance. However, it does nothing of the sort. I learned a long time ago in politics that the worst thing we can do is promise things and then not deliver after raising people’s hopes. The problem with the entire Bill, especially on investigations, is that people will think that we could never get another case like Major Campbell’s. I am sorry, but we can. A lot of the veterans believe what is being said—that the Bill will stop investigations—but it will not. It will not stop investigations within the six-year period. It will not even do so afterwards, because, as we have already heard, cases will go to the International Criminal Court and others.

Clause 4(1) states:

“For the purposes of section 3(2)(b), where there has been at least one relevant previous investigation in relation to the alleged conduct, evidence—

(a) is not “new” if it has been taken into account in the relevant previous investigation (or in any of them);

(b) otherwise, is “new”.”

Again, we get to dancing on the head of a pin about what is new evidence. There have been some complex cases, certainly from Iraq. If a witness comes forward many years later with a piece of evidence saying that they were there, who makes the determination on what is new evidence? That will make the investigation more difficult, because what will be deemed as new evidence? Who makes that judgment call?

We are not dealing with house burglars, are we? We are dealing with very complex cases in other countries, where there are cultural and language difficulties. Sometimes, six years might have passed. The passage of time can not only affect the securing of evidence; it would also affect judgments about people’s memory, which has always been the case with civil cases in this country, let alone in a war zone.

I understand what clause 4 is trying to do, but, like a lot of things in the Bill, it leaves a lot of loose ends. As I said, it will lead to a lot of disappointment on the part of veterans who think that somehow reinvestigation will not happen. Likewise, victims will perhaps feel that new evidence or evidence that they have put forward is not being taken seriously.

[The Minister for Defence People and Veterans (Johnny Mercer)]

Thank you, Mr Stringer, for chairing the Committee so well.

Again, there were a lot of inaccuracies in what the right hon. Member for North Durham said. The Department can never be in a position whereby, if allegations were made, it could not investigate them. That is not a lawful position, so the idea that we can legislate to stop investigations is entirely false. We have heard Bob Campbell give evidence in this Committee: his case, in the worst-case scenario, would have ended in 2009.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Johnny Mercer]

I will in a minute, because both I and Bob Campbell have really got into the weeds of this legislation. I am interested in how the right hon. Gentleman has a different view and thinks that it would not have helped Bob Campbell in any way. I would love him to explain how he arrives at that position.

[Mr Jones]

Major Campbell is in a very different situation. He has lost all faith in the system and actually wants cases to go direct to the International Criminal Court, which I do not agree with. But I did suggest, if the Minister was listening on the new clauses that I tabled for the last sitting—new clauses 6 and 7—that we need a system of both case management and judicial oversight. That would actually speed up the process and ensure that justice was being done. This is not about stopping investigation; it is about timely investigation.

[The Chair]

Order. Before I call the Minister, it now seems timely to remind people that interventions should be short and to the point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

That is very simply because there is no way, at the moment, that I have been presented with anything that is legal, within the art of the possible or within the strategic aims of the Bill that would actually improve it. It is as simple as that.

[Mr Jones]

rose—

[Johnny Mercer]

Yes, I would love to give way.

[Mr Jones]

But that is not the case, is it? One issue that has come out, both in evidence and in amendments that I have tabled, is about investigations, and that is not covered in the Bill. I accept that the amendments that I tabled may not have been perfect, but if the Minister had at least given an indication that the issue would be looked at, that would have been a movement forward. But he has completely deaf ears on this.

[Johnny Mercer]

Again, that is completely untrue, because I have repeatedly spoken, years before anybody else in this House, about the standard of investigations—investigations that were going on under the right hon. Gentleman’s watch when he was an Armed Forces Minister. Those investigations, I said—this has been quoted to me time and again—had not been up to standard, but that is not part of this legislation; it is part of an armed forces Bill that is coming forward next year. I have been absolutely ruthless in terms of dealing with the Department on its standard of investigations, which I reiterate were under the right hon. Gentleman’s watch.

[Mr Jones]

rose—

[Johnny Mercer]

I will not give way again. I cannot take in people saying, “We would like to see these pieces in the legislation,” when the whole point of this legislation is dealing with the abuses that we have seen over the years; it is not about investigations. People saw an announcement last week that we are having a judge-led review of how the Department does that. We will get the investigations right, but this Bill is very clearly about overseas operations and the situations in which we found ourselves, which actually resulted from when the right hon. Gentleman was a Minister in the Department.

[Mr Jones]

I was not actually in government. It was under the coalition Government, so the Minister should get his facts right.

[Johnny Mercer]

No, it was not.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

I want to clarify something. It is easy to blame the previous Labour Government, but I think I was right to say that IHAT started in November 2010 under the coalition Government and not the previous Labour Government.

[Johnny Mercer]

That inquiry started in 2010, but the al-Sweady inquiry and others started before then. I am not blaming any Government. I am just pointing out the hypocrisy of the right hon. Gentleman’s intervention. Anyway, I beg to move that clause 4 stand part of the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

On a point of order, Mr Stringer. Is it in order to accuse a Member of hypocrisy?

[The Chair]

I was just coming to that. Minister, will you withdraw the accusation of hypocrisy?

--- Later in debate ---

[Carol Monaghan]

I will speak to all three of the amendments in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for West Dunbartonshire. Amendments 10, 11 and 22 address the issue of the independence of the decision to grant or withhold consent to prosecution. The Attorney General is, by the nature of the position, a political appointment. Therefore, tying in the prosecution of potentially serious incidents to a politically motivated individual is at least unethical and at worst dangerous.

If we are the healthy democracy that we boast of being, there has to be independent oversight of these investigations. To maintain justice and continue to uphold the rule of law, those decisions cannot be made by the Attorney General. That role should be carried out in England by the Director of Public Prosecutions and in Scotland by the Lord Advocate.

In effect, with these amendments, we are asking the Minister to decide whether the actions of the MOD itself require further investigation. To give an example, that would be like asking the Health Secretary to decide whether a patient had grounds to seek redress for cases of medical negligence. Are the Government really in the business of marking their own homework?

Of course, we all understand why the Government have chosen to press ahead with this Bill. I think we all, regardless of the robust debate that has taken place, have sympathy with the purpose of this Bill, but the manner in which it is progressing is concerning a lot of us. Many parts of this Bill would not address the issues faced by our service personnel. However, having the Attorney General preside over decisions to prosecute will potentially leave a shadow of doubt hanging over some service personnel. Is that really what we want?

I watched the previous exchange; for anybody watching Parliament just now, it was rather unedifying, to say the least. At the start of this process, the Minister said he wanted—[Interruption.] Even as I am saying that, and trying to say it in a generous spirit, the Minister mumbles to himself and makes comments. I was a teacher by profession, and I can tell hon. Members that I would be taking the Minister to task if he behaved like that in my class. He could at least have the decency to listen while a point is being made.

At the start of this process, the Minister said he wanted to listen and that he was happy to take on good ideas. I have yet to see any evidence of that. I am at a loss as to how we actually improve this Bill. Is the Minister so confident in the absolute perfection of this Bill that not only will he not accept any amendments from the Opposition, but he has not tabled any amendments from his own colleagues? I have never seen this in a Bill before. It is unheard of.

Going back to my amendments, there must be independence in the decision-making process. That would give clarity and increase public confidence in the process that is undertaken. Surely, if this Bill is so good, the Minister has nothing to fear from a politically unbiased head considering the evidence and making decisions on whether to prosecute.

[Mr Jones]

I thank the hon. Member for Glasgow North West for the amendment. I am not sure that I totally agree with it, although I agree with the spirt of it. The hon. Lady is trying to ensure judicial oversight of these decisions. Her recommended route is the Crown Prosecution Service, and she is right, in that that is at least a judicial process that is separate from the Attorney General, who is a political figure.

Coming back to my remarks about clause 4, the reason the CPS was set up in the first place is because it was the police who investigated and then also took the decision to prosecute, so the CPS was brought in, quite rightly. Has it improved the system? Yes, it has. Do we always agree with what the CPS comes up with? No, we do not, and I doubt whether we always would in every legal case. However, as the hon. Lady said, that does not mean that the process is weak in any way. It means that it is legally robust.

The hon. Lady is suggesting the CPS, but my concern relates to the service justice system. I would rather the Advocate General decided, although I say that in the same spirit as the amendment. The other concern, which a number of witnesses raised, is about the role of the Attorney General as a political appointee. I think Judge Blackett mentioned that in its recent judicial reforms Kenya has made its Attorney General politically independent for that exact reason: so that the position is seen as being above politics.

That is important, because in the case Marine A, which has been raised before, there was a lot of publicity at the time in the newspapers and campaigning about why that person was being prosecuted, often without knowing what had occurred or having seen the video or other evidence that was put forward. If the Attorney General had been the final arbiter of whether to prosecute in that case, they would have come under huge political pressure not to prosecute, and that would not be right.

The other side to this is our standing in the world. If we are to have a system where we properly investigate alleged crimes and have a fair process to decide who to prosecute, then ultimately, although there are other issues in the Bill that raise problems, if it is down to a political appointee whether someone is prosecuted, the International Criminal Court and others would take a dim of that, in the sense that it would be a political decision, not a judicial decision.

It is interesting to look at it from the angle of someone who has been through the process. When Major Campbell gave evidence to the Committee, the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West asked him:

“Thank you, Major Campbell. It is an absolute disgrace…Will you confirm whether you welcome the Bill or whether you are against it?”

Major Campbell went on to say:

“I fully welcome the Bill, both in its intent and in its content. Again, in my amateur legal opinion, there may be a legitimate argument to be had over whether the Attorney General is the correct address in terms of being the final arbiter of further prosecutions, due to the advice he gives to the armed forces on the legality of a conflict.”

He then went on to be quite disparaging, because of his frustration, which I think we all understand:

“My other slight concern is that previous Attorneys General have done us no favours...Lord Goldsmith had a lot on his shoulders…When I appealed to Jeremy Wright, and when he gave evidence to the Defence Sub-Committee…he took the view that this was an entirely fair process”.––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 24, Q54.]

He was concerned about the role of the Attorney General.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

Does my hon. Friend agree that this Government and the previous one have been reluctant to allow Parliament to see that advice and have had to be brought kicking and screaming to produce it for our scrutiny of the decisions?

[Chris Evans]

The decision not to present the rationale, what advice was taken and how the Government arrived at their decision have eroded trust in politics and have been a problem for as long as I have been in the House. We have an opportunity with the Bill to start to rebuild trust in the decisions that the Government make. I hope that that Government will take that on board.

The Attorney General should be required to publish a report on the findings to reassure Parliament and the public that a decision has not been a political one. Many of the issues we have had in the past few years—the north-south divide and Brexit and remain—would have been avoided if the advice had been published and made transparent and fair. When we are making decisions, especially about our service personnel—some of the bravest people in this country—we must ensure that the public interest is at the heart of decision making. Dominic Grieve believes that the fact that the courts can review a decision by the Attorney General may create more litigation rather than reduce it and simplify the process. There is already a backlog of court cases, and we do not want to add to it.

[Chris Evans]

The hon. Gentleman has a lot of experience in this area. If I was Chair of the Backbench Business Committee, he would just have talked himself into a debate on the Floor of the House. If he will forgive me, I shall stick to the amendment, because as I said earlier, we should have at least a 90-minute debate in Westminster Hall on that point.

The concerns expressed by Dominic Grieve have been echoed by His Honour Judge Jeffrey Blackett, who stated that

“the decision of the Attorney General to prosecute or not prosecute certain cases is likely to lead to judicial reviews and, as Mr Grieve stated, more litigation.”

In the Bill’s evidence sessions we heard from the most recent Advocate General of the Armed Forces. He expressed deep concern that this decision should be taken away from the Director of Public Prosecutions:

“My concern about the Attorney General’s consent is that it undermines the Director Service Prosecutions. If I were he, I would be most upset that I could not make a decision in these circumstances.” ––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 125, Q267.]

It is quite clear that by taking this responsibility away from the Director Service Prosecutions the Government intend to assert a certain level of political control over these decisions. I hope that when the Minister responds he will give us a full explanation.

This is a risky decision from the Government. If they do not comply with the Geneva convention in making such decisions, that could add to the reputation, which they appear to be determined to establish around the world, that the UK no longer respects international law.

[Mr Jones]

Does my hon. Friend agree that by inserting, as the Bill does, a politician into that prosecutorial process, questions will be raised about our obligations under international treaties where there should be independent judicial oversight, not political decisions?

[Chris Evans]

That goes back to my earlier point. As my right hon. Friend says, inserting a politician would mean only more cases where the courts are asked to review the decision of the Attorney General, which would have the knock-on effect of clogging up the courts when we do not need that. It could be nipped in the bud simply by producing a report.

Disregard for international law is not only wrong but sends the wrong message to the British public and the rest of the world. Some have argued that it will even put our service personnel in more danger. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, QC, an ex-Defence Secretary, warned that the Bill will put soldiers at greater risk if Britain is seen to ignore international law. In a letter to Downing Street, he wrote:

“It would increase the danger to British soldiers if Britain is perceived as reluctant to act in accordance with long established international law.”

Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Mercer, who was a senior military adviser, said that the Bill

“undermines international humanitarian law while shielding the government”.

While the Government may be able to shield themselves from blame, soldiers may find themselves in the International Criminal Court, whose jurisdiction will be triggered if the Government chooses to avoid prosecuting. In fact, Judge Blackett raised that concern with the Committee. He said that

“the Attorney General has to consent to prosecuting any International Criminal Court Act 2001 offence—that is, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Under section 1A(3) of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, he has to consent to prosecuting any grave breaches of that Act, and under section 61 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, he has to consent if a prosecution is to be brought outside of time limits.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 125, Q267.]

If the Attorney General must consent in those circumstances, what is the need for a political appointee to be involved in the decision making? Why not allow the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Advocate General in Scotland to make the decision?

That leads to concerns that the Government intend to break international law and politicise prosecutions. If that is the Government’s plan, it must be scrutinised by the House so that we can understand the reasoning. Ultimately, the public deserve to know why the Government would deem it fit to break international law and damage the reputation of our troops serving abroad.

Another voice we were grateful to hear from in our evidence sessions was that of General Sir Nick Parker. He added a further concern about the damage to Britain’s reputation if we are not seen as a country that respects international law, which will not only damage the reputation of and endanger our troops serving abroad but have more complex results. He said:

“If there is some doubt about this—”

the willingness of the UK to break international law and the Geneva convention—

“and we are viewed in the international community as being prepared to operate outside norms, there is an implication for the people who will have to command in the international community.”— [Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 99, Q203.]

He expressed concern about not knowing whether that would affect the willingness of other countries to work with the UK armed forces. If other countries are less willing to work with our forces, that creates additional problems for our troops. He later said

“I believe that we need to be consistent with our coalition partners. All I would add is that you cannot predict who your coalition partner will be, because we do not know whom we will be fighting with in the future.” [Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 100, Q206.]

Today’s friend is quickly tomorrow’s enemy. Therefore, there must be that certain consistency provided by international norms.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Evans]

I am glad the Minister nods in assent.

The present Attorney General has been accused of advising on legal matters from a political standpoint. The Scottish National party’s Attorney General spokesman, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald), has accused our Attorney General of putting her political loyalties ahead of her loyalty to the rule of law when it should be the other way round. If the role of the Attorney General is seen as a political one, involving them in this Bill politicises—

[Mr Jones]

Does my hon. Friend agree that if we have the Attorney General involved in this, matters will end up in the courts? Again, it raises a false flag to servicemen and women that somehow this will stop prosecutions. If something is overturned by the Supreme Court or whatever, the prosecution will still go ahead, so the longstop is not achieved.

[Chris Evans]

It is not. I would like the Minister to answer this conundrum that I came up with when I was listening to my right hon. Friend’s very good speech earlier. The trouble that I see with the Attorney General being involved is that if we have a civil case that is ruled out after six years, according to the Bill, and we have new evidence that emerges from the previous case—this is an important point—the Attorney General then decides to prosecute. That person is then found guilty of a crime and damages are given out. We have a situation where we have a criminal court giving compensation for a case that has already been struck out. That is an anomaly in the Bill that I hope the Minister will address because it is a concern. Given the mixed opinions on the role of the Attorney General, and the general cloudiness of what their role and priorities ought to be, the requirement to produce reports on their decisions to prosecute or not seems entirely sensible.

[Mr Jones]

Would it not also be the case that we would not know how the Attorney General made a decision in terms of legal thresholds and suchlike? There will be a political decision, and there is no guidance in the Bill on what the important factors would be for an Attorney General to make his or her decisions.

[Chris Evans]

From a legal perspective, it is really important that when an Attorney General gives their advice, they do that through the process of legal precedent, statutory interpretation or whatever we want to call it. It is extremely important that when the Attorney General arrives at Parliament with their advice, they have a very strong legal argument. They have consulted academics or leading lawyers, presumably in the area of human rights, and they have crossed all the t’s and dotted all the i’s, and when they come before Parliament, they are confident in their decision. That is why it is extremely important that a report is presented, because at least they can cross-reference how they arrived at the decision. It also gives confidence in the decision. If the case does end up in court, they are standing in a stronger legal position than they would be if they had not released that advice.

As there is a long-standing worry about the balance between law and politics in the role of the Attorney General, it surely makes sense that the Attorney General, if they are to be involved in this Bill at all, is required to publicise the decision. That would ensure that prosecutions covered by the Bill continued to be legal matters or could be at least scrutinised by other bodies to regulate them. It would ensure that party politics was not placed above the law.

It is a judicial process that the Government are concerned with. It should not be politicised or manipulated by party politics in any way, shape or form. If the Government feel the need to grant the power of decision over prosecution to the Attorney General rather than an independent legal body such as the Director of Public Prosecutions, the process must be entirely transparent, so that all those involved can clearly see the thinking behind the decisions. There is no reason why that information cannot be shared. It should and must be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

[Johnny Mercer]

I thank the hon. Member for Islwyn for his very thoughtful contribution. I will address some of those points.

First, let me come to the points raised by the SNP. I will not call it “hypocritical”, because that would be out of order, but the irony of being lectured about behaviour in debates by the hon. Member for Glasgow North West, who has repeatedly screamed at me at the Dispatch Box, is not lost on me in any way. I have no ribs left from laughing at the SNP’s position on defence matters. The idea that it is possible to have a constructive debate from such a false position is ridiculous, but I will address some of those points in my comments.

Dominic Grieve and Nicholas Mercer are people who have contributed. I do not know whether Members expected those who had overseen the disaster of things such as IHAT, who had overseen those processes, to come in and say, “This was a good idea.” I never expected that. Nicholas Mercer was not some senior legal adviser; he was a brigade LEGAD, and there were many brigades in Iraq. His evidence, a number of times, has been called into question. Dominic Grieve was a Member of this House. I have huge respect for him. But he, as Attorney General, oversaw some of these horrendous experiences that some of our people went through. Of course they are not going to be supportive of changing that scenario, because they did not do that when they were in charge. I respect that that was their decision, but we have come in on a very clear promise to end the unfair nature of this process.

I understand that it is combative; I understand that it is contested, but it is about time that someone came here with the voice of those who actually go through the process and was at the head of this debate, rather than those who are managing it and ultimately, in my view, have no real idea what it is like to walk in the shoes of those who serve on operations or who are dragged through these investigations.

When it comes to the Attorney General’s consent—

[Mr Jones]

I accept what the Minister is saying, but let us be honest: it was not just Dominic Grieve as Attorney General; the Government oversaw the IHAT system. As for the point the Minister makes, I do not for one minute question his intent in trying to do the right thing, and I support him in that. The only problem I have is that, in proposing what he does, he has a deaf ear to things that could actually improve the situation and get the Bill right so that it does what he is trying to achieve.

[Johnny Mercer]

It is not a deaf ear if I disagree. I am allowed to disagree.

[Mr Jones]

But you’re wrong.

[Johnny Mercer]

That is a matter for debate, and that is the whole point of why we are here.

Clause 5 requires the consent of the Attorney General for England and Wales or the Attorney General for Northern Ireland before a case of an alleged offence committed by a serviceperson more than five years prior on an overseas operation can proceed to prosecution. We introduced the consent function because we believe it is important for service personnel and veterans to be confident that their case will be considered at the highest levels of our justice system. In relation to amendment 22, the consent function does not need to extend to Scotland, as all prosecution decisions in Scotland are already taken in the public interest by, or on behalf of, the Lord Advocate.

Requiring the consent of the Attorney General for a prosecution is not unusual. The Attorney General already has to give consent to prosecute war crimes, as has been said, and for veterans to be prosecuted more than six months after they left service. Who introduced that legislation? The Labour party, in 2001. The Attorney General already has numerous other consent functions, but that does not mean that the Government have any role to play in decisions on consent; it is simply a safety check on fairness.

On amendments 10 and 11, in deciding whether to grant consent to prosecutions, the Attorney General acts quasi-judicially and independently of Government, applying the well-established prosecution principles of evidential sufficiency and public interest. This means that the Government will play no role in the decision taken by the Attorney General or Attorney General of Northern Ireland on consent—no role. Amendment 24 seeks to require the Attorney General to report to Parliament with the reasons for granting or withholding consent. There is no statutory requirement anywhere else for the AG report on individual casework decisions, and we do not believe that it would be appropriate to introduce such a requirement in the Bill. I therefore ask that the amendments be withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the schedule be the First schedule to the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

Paragraph 46 of the explanatory notes states:

“Schedule 1 details the sexual offences excluded from the scope of the requirements of clauses 2, 3 and 5”.

We have touched already on the fact that sexual offences are not included in the Bill. I have not yet had a good explanation of why that category is the only one identified in the Bill. I think we all agree, and there is no dispute, that sexual offences play no part whatever of the conduct of our armed forces.  If they are committed, they should be investigated and prosecuted and the perpetrator taken before court. The problem is how to separate sexual offences from other criminal activity. There are situations in which the sexual offence is committed along with other crimes, such as torture, that are not on the face of this Bill. Why exclude sexual offences?

The argument could be, as has been said, that this should never be part of the conduct of forces personnel—I agree, but that should not mean it is singled out. The problem I have with this is that when cases come forward, if there is a sexual offence as part of the accusations then this will be prosecuted, but something else of equal severity might not be prosecuted despite being part of the same event.

The obvious way around this is to leave it in and add other items as well, but I have yet to understand why sexual offences have been singled out, and I think we need an explanation because it draws attention to the fact that other things are not also mentioned. If there were clear-cut, one-off sexual offences then it is understandable, but I can imagine situations that may include other offences. If you look at some of the accusations, not necessarily against UK service personnel, but others such as those involved in peacekeeping operations, sexual offence was part of other crimes that were committed against individuals. It says in the schedule that we will exclude the sexual offence but the rest, frankly, is not part of it. I do not think it is as simple as to divide the two as clearly as this. I would like an explanation as to why and how sexual offences would be separated from other offences.

[Johnny Mercer]

It is a fair argument from the right hon. Member for North Durham; there is a difference of opinion on this issue. We are very clear as to why sexual offences are on there—schedule 1lists the offences that are not relevant for the purposes of clause 6. The only offences contained in schedule 1 are sexual offences. This means that in cases involving alleged sexual offences on overseas operations more than five years ago, a prosecutor does not need to apply the statutory presumption and the matter is to be given particular weight when considering whether to prosecute.

Further, the prosecutor does not need the consent of the Attorney General for a case to get a prosecution; they will simply follow the usual procedures for determining whether or not to prosecute. For clarity, it should be noted that conflict-related sexual violence is classified as a war crime and is recognised as torture, a crime against humanity and genocide in international criminal law. These offences are referenced in paragraph 13 of part 1 and are listed in parts 2 and 3 of schedule 1.

Part 1 of schedule 1 lists sexual offences as criminal conduct offences under armed forces legislation, the Armed Forces Act 2006, and the corresponding offences under the law of England and Wales, including repeals provision. Part 2 of schedule 1 lists the sexual offences contained in the International Criminal Court Act 2001, under the law of England and Wales and the law of Northern Ireland. Part 3 of schedule 1 lists the sexual offences contained in the International Criminal Court Act 2001 under the law of Scotland. Part 4 of schedule 1 contains the provisions extending jurisdiction in respect of certain sexual offences. I reiterate to the Committee the reason for the exclusion of sexual offences.

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

The reality is that the word “torture” and allegations of torture have been used as a vehicle to generate thousands of claims against our service personnel. There have been arguments around why we have not packed investigations and so on into the Bill, but the Bill is trying to deal with very specific problems, which are the ones we have faced over the last 15 or 20 years relating to claims of this nature. In the discharge of your military duties, you can expect to be accused of assault, unlawful killing, murder and torture when using violence. There is no scenario in which our people will be asked to operate in which they can legitimately commit sexual offences. This country has a strong commitment against the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, and that is why it is in the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

I agree that it should play no part whatever, and it does not in terms of the ethos of our armed forces. Will the Minister answer the point that there will not, in many cases, be a situation in which sexual violence takes place by itself? What happens if it involves violence and other things? How can the other issues be looked at if it is taken out? He is saying that the only reason for it is because torture is seen as a reason for a lot of the claims coming forward. Is that the only justification?

[Johnny Mercer]

Putting sexual offences in the Bill in no way denigrates our commitments against torture. We have to deal with the world as we find it, not as we would like it to be. When allegations of torture are mass-generated, as they have been, to produce these claims we have a duty to act to protect our service men and women from that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

I want to speak to clause 8 and my new clause 9. Does the Minister want to do the right thing by our armed forces personnel? I think he does. I have never questioned his determination to do that. Again, the problem with the Bill is its unintended consequences.

Part 2 is a key part of the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South said, it cannot be right that we will pass legislation that will mean that our servicemen, women and veterans have fewer rights than prisoners. The Limitation Act 1980 is there for a good reason. In the Minister’s comments in The Sun newspaper on Sunday, he said he will give a guarantee that servicemen and women will not lose out in part 2. I would be interested to know how he will do that, given the six-year longstop.

I do not doubt the Minister’s commitment to what he said in that newspaper article, but—to use the old Robin Day quote from his famous interview with John Nott—the Minister, like us all, is a “here today, gone tomorrow” politician. It is important to ensure this legislation is future-proofed. Irrespective of what the Minister says in his article, which is well intentioned, he cannot give that guarantee. Again, I do not question his motives for saying what he did.

The Minister has a higher trust in the MOD than I do when it comes to protecting servicemen and women. The Limitation Act, section 33, is very clear: it sets out the exceptional circumstances. In our evidence, we heard that although they are exceptional circumstances, they are not uncommon.

The Committee heard evidence of one example; I will give another, which, having spoken to a friend of mine who deals with personal injury, I think falls within the scope of this, too—of the Snatch Land Rovers in Iraq. The families of the individuals killed in the Snatch Land Rovers were not aware of the failings—not failings of the chain of command, but of the procurement—until the Iraq inquiry took place. They then sought legal redress against the MOD, because they thought a decision had been taken that had put their loved-ones in jeopardy. It was many years later, so it was outside of time, but they were able to use section 33 of the Limitation Act to bring a case, which, according to the evidence we heard, they then settled.

My other concern with the MOD—again, referred to in the evidence sessions—is that it employs clever lawyers. It will use the provision as a way of stopping any case that comes forward, as a first hurdle for the claimant to get over. That means that there will be no right of appeal for those individuals. If the Bill had been in force during the case of the Snatch Land Rovers, those families would have had no redress at all. At the end of the day, the measures protect only the MOD; they do not protect our servicemen and women, as the Minister would like. Again, we come back to the Bill’s problem of conflating civil and criminal cases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Evans]

As my right hon. Friend has been speaking, I have been thinking in particular of the people serving in the Royal Navy who were affected by asbestos. In the 1950s and 1960s, asbestos was this magic formula—used everywhere from schools to garden sheds. Then, years later, it was found to cause tumours in the lungs. That caused serious problems to our servicepeople, but the evidence did not emerge for 30 years. People may be using chemicals now that we do not understand. How would the MOD be held responsible, and families be properly compensated?

[Mr Jones]

I will come back to asbestos. The aircraftman could not walk because the paint had attacked his nervous system, and his case was able to be taken forward only because of scientific evidence about exposure to that paint. However, if the Bill goes through, such an individual would not be able to make a case because it would be way out of the six-year limit. A lawyer friend of mine took that case to court and argued successfully before a judge that the individual was only able to bring the case then because of the scientific evidence, and that allowed them to take the case forward.

[Johnny Mercer]

A series of examples have been given where the Bill would not prevent action from being taken. On the Snatch Land Rover incident, the inquiry findings is the point of knowledge from which people had six years to make a claim. On the paint issue, when a connection is made with service and evidence can be produced, that is the point of knowledge from which there are six years. I do not know whether the point of knowledge piece is clearly understood, but when evidence comes together that clearly shows what has happened, that is when the six years begin. The Bill would not prevent such cases.

[Mr Jones]

I have heard the Minister say that before. I accept what he is saying, but he is wrong. I will come to asbestos, because in a previous life I used to press asbestos cases, but I will first address the Minister’s point and why he is wrong. I would agree with him about the date of knowledge if it were he and I dealing with the Bill. However, the dealings will be with MOD lawyers and not with the Minister or with me. If it said in the Bill that the date of knowledge were that date, that would be fine, but it does not. The Minister is putting an awful lot of trust in MOD lawyers. I would not do that, because they will argue straight away in such a case that it is time barred because of the legislation. They use that now, for example in the paint case I just mentioned. I hear what the Minister says and he might be technically right, but we heard in evidence that the MOD lawyers are experienced and will use that in their armoury as a way of stopping claims going forward.

[Carol Monaghan]

This is exposing an ambiguity right here, right now. Up until this point, the Minister has talked about the point of knowledge of the injury or the disablement. Now, he is talking about the point of knowledge of the issue with the equipment. What are we talking about and where in the Bill is that differentiated? If there is no clarity, we will have a situation with lawyers because of that ambiguity.

[Mr Jones]

Yes, and the lawyers will use it to protect the MOD. Like I say, if the Minister and I had to judge, we both would say “Yes, give the benefit of the doubt to the veteran.” I certainly would. However, neither he nor I will be there. It will be down to some Minister in the future and some lawyer to do that.

Coming on to asbestos, let me give an example. The issue in the early test cases on asbestos that I dealt with was about the date of knowledge. As my hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn just said, the issue with asbestos and asbestos-related diseases is that they can lie dormant for 20 or 30 years. It is an indiscriminate issue. I have met men who worked with asbestos and have what they call asbestos scars—asbestos in their skin—with no symptoms whatsoever and no health effects at all. I have also dealt with cases where a doctor and a nurse, who were just walking through a tunnel where an asbestos pipe was broken and were being covered in asbestos every day, developed mesothelioma, which we all know is a death sentence within 18 months to two years.

The MOD used to have a get-out because of Crown immunity; it could not be sued. As such, we are bringing back time-barred Crown immunity and saying to people that they cannot take cases against the MOD. Would cases around asbestos be time barred? I do not know. Again, why change it? I accept what the Minister is saying—we do not want frivolous and vexatious cases—but if they are time barred, there is a perfectly legitimate system in place at the moment called the Limitation Act, which allows people to take a case forward, if they wish to or their legal representatives feel there is a case.

[Chris Evans]

My right hon. Friend has, like me, worked with many constituents on this issue. Plural plaques may or may not develop into full-on asbestosis, but if someone develops the plaques within six years and then goes on to develop—God forbid—the worst kind of asbestosis, how does he see the MOD addressing that anomaly with the Bill?

[Mr Jones]

That is the point. I do not want to go off piste and explain the issues around pleural plaques, but I am a little bit of a sceptic on this. Although pleural plaques are lung scarring, I have not yet been convinced of any evidence that every case turns into something asbestos-related. It can be an indicator but it does not always go on to that.

Again, the MOD used to have Crown immunity, which used to mean that a case could not be brought against the MOD; that is what we are doing. Certainly in cases involving submariners who worked in submarines—as my hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn said, they threw asbestos around like confetti, as it was the great wonder material at the time—they would be time barred under the Bill. Again, coming back to what the Minister said, were it he and I then yes, I would agree, but lawyers will use that.

I do not understand why part 2 is there. Why would the Government want to put veterans and servicemen and women at a disadvantage? The Limitation Act is there for a perfectly good reason; it acts as a sieve because the person involved has to go before a judge and argue an exceptional reason as to why that case has not been brought within that period of time. From my experience in dealing with limitation cases for industrial diseases, for example, they are hard to prove, so it does act as a sieve.

If the Government are wanting to ensure that we are not getting huge amounts of unwarranted claims, the Limitation Act, as it stands at the moment, acts as that protection because the bar is high. In the cases where it does apply—with Snatch Land Rovers for example, the paint case I mentioned, or other cases, including those on hearing loss—it is very important, and I cannot support anything which means that our servicemen and women will be at a disadvantage.

In the evidence we took, Hilary Meredith said:

“I think that part 2, on the time limit, should be taken out and scrapped completely. It is the time limit for the procedure. It went on too long”.––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 19.]

She then referred back to investigations, which we come back to all the time. The other issue that she and a few other witnesses raised was the Human Rights Act 1998. I know that a lot of people start frothing at the mouth and gnashing their teeth whenever we mention the Human Rights Act, because it always applies to those that do not deserve justice—the ne’er do wells, asylum seekers and everyone else—but it is actually there to protect us all.

There are cases where servicemen and women will bring cases against the MOD under the Human Rights Act. One of the arguments—and I think the reason why, in this Bill, the Human Rights Act is a bit of a bogeyman—is that somehow the Act will impinge on the ability of servicemen and women to do their work. I do not accept that because, looking at the Smith case, the Human Rights Act was not an impediment; it clearly separated out combat immunity—that is, that lethal force must be used on occasions. Putting a time limit on the ability for servicemen and women to bring a case under the Human Rights Act would be a disadvantage to them.

Hilary Meredith says in her evidence that:

“There is a difficulty putting a time limit on the Human Rights Act…For civil claims against the Ministry when people are injured or killed in service overseas, I do not think a longstop should be applied. There are tremendous difficulties in placing people in a worse position than civilians. In latent disease cases—diseases that do not come to light until much further down the line, such as asbestosis, PTSD, hearing loss—it is not just about the diagnosis. Many people are diagnosed at death.”—[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 06 October 2020; c. 18, Q30.]

Again, that is something that I dealt with when I dealt with asbestos cases. The only time that a lot of people knew about them was when there was a death certificate. On more than one occasion, I stopped funerals to ensure that we had done the proper post-mortems.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 20th October 2020 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 9 and 10 stand part

New clause 2—Restrictions on time limits: actions brought against the Crown by service personnel—

“Nothing in this Part applies to any action brought against the Crown by a person who is a member or former member of the regular or reserve forces, or of a British overseas territory force to whom section 369(2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (persons subject to service law) applies.”

This new clause amends Part 2 of the Bill so that it explicitly excludes actions brought against the Crown by serving or former service personnel from the limitations on courts’ discretion that the Part imposes in respect of actions relating to overseas operations.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair, Mr Mundell. I trust that everyone has had a nice lunch. I hope the Minister has not had too much raw red meat and that he has been able to have a lie-down after his exertions this morning. He will certainly not be eating haggis for his dinner or lunch, or at any time soon, after his comments about Scotland this morning. I shall let him enlighten you later on those points, Mr Mundell.

We were talking about the rights of veterans. My hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn raised the issue of asbestos and how asbestosis is one of a number of diseases that limits the serviceman or woman from bringing claims within the six-year period. As I said this morning, the Minister and I agree on one thing: we understand the limitation and the date of knowledge. The bit where we have a problem is where the Bill takes out veterans, apart from anyone else, from section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980. We heard evidence last week from the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers. I accept that there are certain people in the room who perhaps do not like lawyers—criminal, civil or whatever. The association told us that the Bill strips service personnel and veterans of certain rights in relation to civil claims. I will come back to this later, but we were told that if the Bill is enacted, prisoners will have more rights than veterans or servicemen and women.

On the claims brought before the Ministry of Defence, clearly this Bill has its origins in what its promotors argue is a tsunami of unfounded civil claims that then led to criminal investigations, which then took many years. We have demonstrated in Committee that the actual number of prosecutions have been very small, but in terms of civilian claims there is also a very important set of claims that we should protect: the claims that allow servicemen and women and veterans to bring claims against the Ministry of Defence. That is done in two ways: via a civil claim or under the Human Rights Act. As I said this morning, some people in this place suddenly start frothing at the mouth as soon as the Human Rights Act is mentioned, but as I have said, it protects us all by giving us basic human rights.

The problem with part 2 of the Bill is that it will not only stop the straightforward civil claims, where people ask for compensation for injuries and other things; it would limit claims under the Human Rights Act. Such claims are important. I referred this morning to the Smith case involving Snatch Land Rovers, which was around the right to life and human rights. Hilary Meredith, who I thought had very good, detailed knowledge in the claims area, said in her evidence:

“There is a difficulty putting a time limit on the Human Rights Act—I do not even know whether we can do that constitutionally, because it is a European convention.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 18, Q30.]

I said that I would not question the Minister’s motives for what he is trying to achieve, but again, we are the seeing the huge implications that this Bill could have. We have already discussed criminal cases and possible trials before the International Criminal Court, but it would be interesting to know how the longstop—which is stopping the rights we all have under the Human Rights Act for veterans and armed force personnel—will be put into practice legally if, as Hilary Meredith said in her evidence, the UK has certain rights that are not just governed by what we agree as a country, but are part of an international convention on human rights. How does that square with part 2 of the Bill? That needs some explanation, because I do not want veterans and armed services personnel not to be covered by the Limitation Act 1980 or the rights that we all get from the Human Rights Act.

[Chris Evans (Islwyn) (Lab/Co-op)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the nub of the problem that he is driving at is that clause 8 and schedule 2 take away the court’s discretion under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the time limit if

“it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed”?

That is being taken away from our service personnel, and it is the same under the Human Rights Act. Is not the nub of the problem with clause 8 that it is removing the court’s discretion to allow these actions to go ahead?

[Mr Jones]

It is. Again, this is about the rights of veterans and armed services personnel, which I thought this Bill was trying to protect. If we are taking away rights that everyone else has access to, that is a retrograde step. We need an explanation of why that is being done and why it is necessary, because I certainly do not think it is proportional. Again, that is one of the things this debate has thrown up, in that the Bill is about protecting the MOD from litigation, whether by armed forces personnel or veterans, and that cannot be right.

Coming back to investigations, Hilary Meredith raised another important thing that does not apply:

“That is a really interesting point, actually. I had not thought of a time limit on investigations. Certainly under the Human Rights Act, there is a right to have a speedy trial, and that did not happen in these cases.”—[Official Report, Overseas Operations Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c.19, Q31.]

This issue therefore cuts into investigations, another central point that we have been considering in this Bill.

When the Minister replies, I would be interested to know whether that has been cleared. I am not sure whether things still work this way, but when I was a Minister, the usual process for bringing forward a Bill involved sending a write-round to all Departments to get their agreement before it was sanctioned to come before the House. I do not know whether that still applies, because I know that, for a lot of things that this Government do now, they do not accept the usual common-sense conventions, which are there for very good reasons—to stop this type of thing—but how will the MOD be separate from the Human Rights Act?

[Chris Evans]

My right hon. Friend was a member of the Defence Committee, which wrote to the Secretary of State in July 2020 saying that

“the Bill may not be an effective way of achieving”

the aim of protecting personnel and veterans against

“vexatious and unnecessary investigations and prosecutions”.

My right hon. Friend was a member of that Committee. Does he agree with its finding that the Bill would have been better served by scrutiny from an ad hoc Select Committee before it came before Parliament?

[Mr Jones]

I am a big defender of pre-legislative scrutiny. I think I said a couple of sittings ago that our current system of pre-legislative scrutiny as part of the Bill Committee process is important. However, an important Bill such as this should have been road-tested a little more than just what we are able to do here, in terms of not only scrutiny, but the process that we are going through today.

I come back to the point that I do not understand why the Bill is now before us—well, I do understand, because the Minister gave it away the other day; it is an election commitment to bring it within 100 days of taking office—rather than what would have been a better place for it, the armed forces quadrennial review next year, which could have covered those issues. Now we are going to have a strange process: we will have this Bill and then the Armed Forces Bill next year, which we are now told will cover investigations, because the Secretary of State has now set up a commission to look at that. The best thing would have been to do those two things together, but that would not have met the political commitment that was put forward.

I do not think it is too late to make some changes to the Bill to improve it on investigations. Deleting part 2 would certainly be an important part of that, because part 2 changes the status of veterans and armed forces personnel. I genuinely believe what the Minister said in a Sunday newspaper over the weekend: that he does not want this in any way to affect our armed forces personnel. As I said, if it were left to both of us, we would guarantee that this type of limitation would not apply to individuals, but eventually none of us will be here and it will be the law that takes it forward. That is the weakness.

I do not understand why the Government want to reduce the role of veterans, and certainly not this Minister, who has prided himself on trying to be a champion for veterans. It is not just me saying this, or some lawyers or anyone else; we only have to look at the transcripts of the evidence put before us by the Royal British Legion. On 8 October, we took evidence from Charles Byrne from the Royal British Legion and General Sir John McColl from Cobseo. My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South asked whether this was a breach of the covenant. The covenant should be about not only protecting the rights of veterans and armed forces personnel, but, where it can, enhancing them. Charles Byrne from the RBL spoke in response to the Minister, when the Minister said:

“No, because what we are looking to do is to protect, and to ensure that our servicemen are not disadvantaged.”

Mr Byrne replied:

“I think it is protecting the MOD, rather than the service personnel—that is the debate that we have had.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 86, Q163.]

I think it is clear, as we have heard from other witnesses as well, that this goes against the armed forces covenant. I fully support the covenant, and not just in ensuring that the armed forces have no disadvantage and are treated the same. I take a very clear view on this. If people have served their country, they should be given certainly the same rights as everyone else, and in some cases better ones to recognise that service. That is important.

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[Mrs Emma Lewell-Buck (South Shields) (Lab)]

On that point about the exchange between the Minister and the Committee, and the evidence sessions, is my right hon. Friend aware that the figure of 94% was based on an extrapolation of a sample of cases, and not on all post-six-year cases?

[Mr Jones]

It was, and that is where the disagreement about the figures comes from, and not for the first time in this Bill. Early on, we asked for the number of litigation cases, which was the reason why the Bill was introduced. We got various arguments, and one figure was 900 and another 1,000. If we want to act in the best interests of veterans, we need to know the extent of the problem, so my hon. Friend makes a good point. Again, even if we accept the figure of 94%, then 6% of people will not be able to take claims against the Ministry of Defence—including, as was argued by the personal injury lawyers, in those like the Snatch Land Rover cases and the ones that I outlined this morning. That cannot be right. I do not understand what the Government think is to be gained from taking away the rights of veterans and service personnel.

We are dealing with small numbers here, but this is important. If I was in prison—perhaps some on the Committee wish I was—and I made a claim against the Ministry of Justice, there would be certain time limits. But there are always cases under the Limitation Act that fall outside those limits. Prisoners have the right to take those cases out of time and stand before a judge, or have legal representation, to argue that they need their case considered out of time. They can do that because of section 33.

Asylum seekers can do the same. A claimant against the Ministry of Justice, whether on housing or anything else, can argue successfully to a judge that they had not brought the claim because of various circumstances, such as a refugee’s trauma from being in a war zone, and that they need a chance to bring their case, although there is no guarantee that their case will be accepted. That is the case with veterans, too. The representative from the personal injury lawyers said that the numbers of such cases are small, but when the application does work and a judge says that the time limit does not apply, it is very important. Snatch Land Rover is a great example of a case against the MOD.

Would that be a case against the armed forces? No, it would be against the MOD. No disrespect to the MOD lawyers—they are just doing their job—but if this provision is introduced, they will use that six-year backstop as a way of arguing that a case cannot go forward. The individual will have no rights whatever to go before a judge and argue that their case, for certain reasons, should be made an exception. The MOD is protected, rather than the veteran or serviceman or woman. That cannot be right.

We are brought back to the point of what is missing throughout the Bill. I accept what the Minister says: that he is passionate about these issues, and if it were down to him—if it were down to me and some others in this room, too, to be honest—veterans and servicemen and women would get first dibs every time, and quite rightly. But it will not be down to us; it will be down to officials in the Ministry of Defence.

Having worked with them, I have huge respect for officials in the Ministry of Defence, but they are in civil service mode. If they can protect the organisation, they will. That is not to be discredited. I remember dealing with lawyers in the MOD when I was there over the nuclear tests veterans cases, where, frankly, we were going to spend millions of pounds on a case that should have been settled. I successfully argued for a settlement proposal to be put forward; unfortunately, it was rejected by the other side. Again, the natural reaction was to defend the indefensible. I said, “Wait a minute—how much do you want to spend in lawyers’ fees to do this?” That is what will happen here. It will be an easy get-out for the MOD, because it will have the protection of a backstop of six years in law. The individual will no longer have the right.

Judicial oversight is a problem throughout the entire Bill. Having employed lawyers in a previous life and dealt with them over many years, am I a great fan? I am a fan of some of them, because some are very good. Some are also very bad, as the hon. Member for Darlington will attest. The point is that they do their best on behalf of their client. They are not making things up; they are using the laws that we pass in this place to advance the case that someone has presented before them. We should not be putting obstacles in their way, in terms of servicemen and women and veterans.

This is really a probing amendment. Someone asked, “Is it a bit of fun?” No, it is actually a serious point. When the average person on the famous Clapham omnibus realises that we are taking rights away from veterans and that prisoners and asylum seekers will have more rights than veterans, they will rightly be appalled.

Even if the Minister cannot accept the amendments today, I urge him to reflect on part 2 to see whether we can remove it from the Bill. We should at least ensure that the disadvantage to servicemen and women and veterans is not enshrined in law. If that happens, it will be a travesty. It would actually be a disappointment to the Minister, because he is trying to protect victims—instead, he will have done something that makes their lot in life worse. As a number of people said in the evidence sessions, servicemen and women and veterans have too few rights as it is. Taking away more of them cannot be right.

[Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)]

First, I thank the right hon. Member for North Durham. I agree with everything he has said. Of course, I raised part 2 of the Bill on Second Reading—I have major issues with it. One of the SNP’s amendments, which unfortunately was not selected, was about removing time limits completely. Perhaps a better idea would be to remove part 2 of the Bill.

Having sat through Second Reading, four sessions of oral evidence and this morning’s session, I still cannot see how a six-year limit on claims benefits veterans. I know the Minister has tried to explain the measure by saying it will allow them to make claims more easily, but the reasons why veterans are not claiming are very complex. Frankly, I have serious doubts about the time limit, as does the organisation that has arguably done more for veterans than any other: the Royal British Legion, which stated its concerns about part 2 of the Bill. It has said that, as currently drafted, part 2 introduces a time limit for civil claims from veterans, serving personnel and their families where one does not currently exist, and it risks a breach of the armed forces covenant, as there will continue to be no limit for civilians in relation to their employer.

During the evidence sessions, the Minister said it is a disadvantage to have to go and serve and put one’s life at risk. We understand that—none of us is disputing that—but we are talking about whenever we are comparing like for like, claim for claim. Does the Bill put veterans at a disadvantage? It absolutely does. The Royal British Legion has said that part 2 of the Bill should be improved to ensure that no member of the armed forces community is left subject to a time limit when pursuing a civil claim against the Ministry of Defence as an employer, and to avoid a breach of the armed forces covenant.

Personal injury awards can be substantial, so we understand why the MOD wants to minimise the opportunity for such claims, but if harm has been done to individuals that is due to negligence, why are we making it more difficult for them to seek recompense?

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Let us look at the reasons why a veteran might not bring forward a claim within the six years. Hearing loss, for example, has been mentioned a number of times. It might be difficult to ascertain exactly which incident caused the hearing loss in the first place, but even if we do know when the hearing loss injury occurred, this is a progressive situation. My own grandad lost his hearing and he was thoroughly embarrassed. He did not like to speak about it; he pretended that he could hear. He did not want to seek help and when he did, he did not want the family to know. There are reasons, including embarrassment, that might prevent an individual from looking for recompense for such things.

[Mr Jones]

I agree with the hon. Member on hearing loss cases, having dealt with such cases in shipbuilding. The person will agree that they have lost their hearing; it is about whether the hearing loss can be pinned back to where it was lost.

[Carol Monaghan]

We have also heard examples of veterans who have served in multiple conflicts or operations where they have been exposed to loud noises, explosions and all sorts—which one caused the hearing loss? Could it otherwise have been caused at a firing range in the UK? That is a real difficulty, and it causes problems.

[Mr Jones]

If overseas operations will be excluded after six years while for cases in this country a case could be made under the Limitation Act 1980, does the hon. Member not think that will also complicate hearing loss cases, if it must be determined where the hearing loss took place? It will be difficult to disaggregate these points.

[Carol Monaghan]

In such situations, we know that the person who will benefit is not the veteran. That is the problem with part 2 of the Bill and the six-year limit. There must be protections in place to ensure that veterans who have served and suffered personal injury can seek justice for those injuries.

There are other examples, such as the nuclear test veterans. It was good to hear about the work done by the right hon. Member for North Durham on that. I have had interactions with those veterans, including a constituent of my own who, sadly, died. Many have waited decades and decades for compensation and have had nothing—not even any medals to recognise the service they undertook. There are still ongoing issues, and again the MOD has denied that the cancers that those veterans have suffered are related to their service, despite a number of them having similar cancers and there being no links other than the Christmas Island testing.

I could also mention Lariam, an anti-malarial drug that can cause real issues for individuals’ mental health, but not always instantly—it can happen on a much later date. My own husband was given Lariam and suffered as a result. Thankfully, he has not had any long-term issues, but many individuals’ mental health is affected many, many years beyond that.

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I know how important the armed forces covenant is to the Minister and, indeed, to other people in this room. Most of us have worked with local authorities and other employers and organisations locally to ensure that the armed forces covenant actually means something. If the Royal British Legion, whose reason for existence is to support the armed forces and former armed forces personnel, is raising concerns about the impact of part 2 on those veterans, we really need to take note of that.

[Mr Jones]

The hon. Member for Glasgow North West, who speaks on behalf of the SNP, raised the issue of nuclear test veterans. In 2009, when they brought their case against the MOD, it was a limitations case, because the injuries happened in the 1950s. They won it because new evidence came forward and Mr Justice Foskett argued that the limitation case could go forward. Is it not clear that if that happened now, that case would not even have been heard?

[Liz Twist]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely correct. That is why it is important that this part of the Bill be either substantially amended to protect the rights of veterans, or perhaps taken away altogether.

The Royal British Legion, talking about disadvantage under the Covenant, says:

“The Armed Forces Covenant states: ‘those who serve in the armed forces, whether regular or reserve, those who have served in the past, and their families should face no disadvantage compared to other citizens in the provision of public and commercial services…in accessing services, former members of the Armed Forces should expect the same level of support as any other citizen in society’”.

We all need to take very seriously the concerns raised by the Royal British Legion about claims and the breach of the armed forces covenant. I have no doubt that it is not the Minister’s intention to disadvantage people, but the Bill as drafted will do so. I ask him to look at this very seriously, and to consider amendments to the Bill.

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[Johnny Mercer]

I will get to my point. There were 552 employer liability claims from what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today’s Daily Mirror had sounded familiar to a couple of the speeches: it mentioned “21,000 claims”. It is total nonsense. That is the total number of claims that people have made against the MOD in the period from 2004 to 2017. They are claims in a civilian workplace environment, where there are civil liabilities claims, claims regarding exercises and so on in the UK, and breach of contract claims. In the Bill, we are talking specifically about overseas operations. Whoever is providing these figures is demonstrating a pretty basic misunderstanding of what is going on—or it is a deliberate attempt to mislead, but I am sure it is not. The two things are not comparable in any way.

[Mr Jones]

To me, that does not matter. Why should armed forces personnel be treated differently when something happens in this country, as opposed to overseas? It might not be in combat; it might be on a training mission, or something like that. As I said, if one veteran is disadvantaged, that is one veteran too many.

[Johnny Mercer]

It does matter. Facts do matter in this debate; figures do, too.

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[Johnny Mercer]

I disagree, and this is why. Operational service overseas is fundamentally different from life in the UK, and from what we ask our people to do. The hon. Lady is absolutely right: we have a duty in this country to protect those overseas, whether it is against improvised explosive devices, bombs, electronic warfare, or indeed legal systems used to bring warfare by another means. That is what this Bill is trying to do.

I understand the assertion that if someone from the Royal British Legion was deployed on an operation, the six-year limit comes down. Viewed on its own, that is something that will happen to serviceperson, but not a civilian. Disadvantage is a comparable term. Disadvantage to who? The Government argue—this I am clear on—that these people are seriously disadvantaged by having no legal protection against these thousands of claims that we have seen come in over the last 15 or 20 years. What the Royal British Legion would like us to do is to put that to one side—[Interruption.] No, it is, because I have engaged with it extensively. It would like us to apply that to one side of the argument, which, again, is not legal. Under European human rights law, people are being disadvantaged and discriminated against based on the claimant, which is not legal. This cannot be brought in on one side.

[Mr Jones]

The Minister is taking rights away from servicemen and women. He talked about overseas operations, but let us say, for example, someone is in British Army Training Unit Suffield in northern Canada on a training exercise. If that is classed as an overseas operation, or a peacekeeping operation—

[Johnny Mercer]

It is not.

[Mr Jones]

A peacekeeping operation?

[Johnny Mercer]

No.

[Mr Jones]

Right. Nevertheless, there have been times—the Snatch Land Rover cases, for example—where there was quite a good reason why the case should have been argued out. Why is the Minister so determined to take that right away from people?

[Johnny Mercer]

Because what the right hon. Gentleman says—I have a lot of respect for him—is simply not true. BATUS is not an operational environment. It is not a peacekeeping mission. It is a training unit mission. As I said this morning, and speaking from a point of knowledge, when it came out in the inquiry about the Snatch Land Rover cases, that is when the six-year thing started. That would not have been affected by this legislation.

We could keep raising these points, but I am not going to change my view, because it is based on the truth. I cannot suddenly say, “Yes, BATUS is a war-fighting operation, so this stuff applies.” I cannot say, “These people would be affected in the Snatch Land Rover case,” because that is simply not the case.

[Mr Jones]

rose—

[Johnny Mercer]

I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman in a minute. He talks about taking rights away from our service personnel. They have a right to be protected on the battlefield in all these areas. One area where they have a right to be protected is the use of lawfare to progress, and change the outcome of, a conflict through other means.

There were lots of wild sentiments thrown around—“lawyers don’t make things up,” and all the rest of it. Again, that does not collide with reality. Phil Shiner has been struck off. The reality—the world as we find it—is what this Bill is designed to deal with.

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[Johnny Mercer]

Absolutely; it is right to take note of it, and I have engaged with it extensively on this issue, but the legion does not own the covenant—nobody does. It belongs to the nation. The covenant was designed to ensure that when a service person and a civilian are in a comparable situation, the service person is at no disadvantage. It was never designed to ensure no disadvantage whatsoever. We send our people away from their families for six or seven months of a year—that is a disadvantage. We send them away to undertake dangerous work—that is a disadvantage.

The covenant was meant to mean that when two people are in the same situation, the service person is not disadvantaged, and that is why the Bill says that it applies to a civilian in these environments in exactly the same way. I heard the right hon. Member for North Durham say again this morning that civilians were not covered by this Bill. Well, they are. It is in the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

The Minister said these rights protect people, but the covenant is not about taking rights away from people. I know we fixate on the date of knowledge, but when he is no longer a Minister and none of us are here anymore, the Ministry of Defence lawyers will not use this provision to say that a case is time-barred. There is nothing in this Bill that says that. That is the problem he has. I do not for one minute think that he is suggesting otherwise, and he is perhaps well intentioned, but he is just wrong on this, and is trusting the MOD too much.

[Johnny Mercer]

I accept the right hon. Gentleman’s point. He will not find many Ministers who will say that half is the Department’s problem in terms of how it has investigated and so on. I have a healthy interrogation of any advice I am given. I accept his point that there is a danger of abuse, but we have written into the Bill that point of knowledge. I am not fixated on it; it is just there in black and white.

[Mr Jones]

rose—

[Johnny Mercer]

I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman. I want to finish what I am saying—I do not want to repeat myself and bore everybody—and then I will take more interventions.

Clause 8, in conjunction with schedule 2, introduces new factors that the courts must consider when deciding whether to allow certain claims relating to overseas military operations to be brought after the normal time limit, and sets the maximum time limit for such claims at six years. The Government intend to ensure that claims for compensation for personal injuries or deaths arising from overseas military operations are assessed fairly and achieve a fair outcome for victims, for the service personnel and veterans called upon to give evidence, and for the taxpayer.

Section 2 of the Limitation Act 1980 sets an absolute time limit of six years for compensation in claims relating to most types of tort. Although sections 11 and 12 set a three-year limit for claims for personal injury or death, the three-year limit is not absolute. Section 33 of the Act gives the court discretion to allow claims to be brought beyond the time limit if it considers it fair to do so. Section 33 identifies six factors to which the court must have a particular regard when assessing fairness. In broad terms, those relate to the steps taken by the claimant to bring the claim, the reasons for delay and the effect of delay on the quality of the evidence. Those factors do not adequately recognise or reflect the uniquely challenging context of overseas military operations. The Government are concerned that unless the court is directed to consider relevant factors, it might wrongly conclude that it is fair to allow older claims to proceed. The clause, in conjunction with schedule 2, introduces three new factors that the Government consider properly reflect the operational context to which the court must have particular regard.

[Mr Jones]

Is it not for a lawyer, when they are arguing a limitations case, to make the case for special circumstances? They can do that now in law. If the measure goes through unamended—I accept that this is not the Minister’s intention—the MOD will use it as a way of blocking cases. We only have to look at the nuclear test veterans case of 2009 and Judge Foskett’s summing up. The MOD’s argument in the limitations hearing was that the case was out of time, but it was successfully argued that new evidence had come forward. That was possible because it was before a court of law. This measure stops that.

[Johnny Mercer]

I will address that point in my final remarks on the clause. The factors that have to be considered are the extent to which assessment of the claim will depend on the memories of service personnel and veterans, the impact of the operational context on their ability to recall the specific incident, and the impact of doing so on their mental health. The new factors reflect the reality of overseas military operations—the fact that opportunities to make detailed records at the time might be limited; that increased reliance might have to be placed on the memories of the personnel involved; and that as some of them might be suffering from mental health illnesses owing to their service, there is a human cost in doing so. The human cost obviously goes beyond that of the service person and will be felt just as much by their families and friends. Families of the military community are a core aspect of the armed forces covenant and must not be overlooked when we consider the measures in the Bill.

Clause 8, in conjunction with schedule 2, also introduces an absolute limit of six years for claims for personal injury or death arising from overseas military operations. This change brings the absolute time limit for personal injury or death claims in line with other claims for other torts that might occur on operations, such as false imprisonment. It also gives service personnel and veterans certainty that they will not be called upon indefinitely to recall often traumatic incidents that they have understandably sought to put behind them.

Finally, this clause, in conjunction with schedule 2, amends the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984, so that claimants cannot benefit from more generous time limits under foreign law. This change is needed for consistency and will ensure that no claim is brought after six years. I must emphasise that the Government are not seeking to stop meritorious claims or to avoid judicial scrutiny, nor are we seeking to put the armed forces or the Government generally in a more favourable position compared with their position as regards other defendants.

The changes that this clause and schedule 2 introduce go only as far as is necessary to ensure a fair outcome. They do not affect the way in which the time period is calculated or those provisions that suspend time in appropriate circumstances. They are also consistent with court rulings that claimants do not need to be provided with an indefinite opportunity to obtain a remedy. The courts have recognised that limitation periods have an important role to play in ensuring legal certainty and finality and in preventing injustice. The changes that this clause, in conjunction with schedule 2, introduces are a reasonable and proportionate solution to the problem of historical claims.

I will not repeat the same arguments for clauses 9 and 10, which amend the legislation in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but I will just add that the Limitation Act 1980 only covers claims brought in England and Wales. It is therefore necessary to extend similar provisions across the whole of the UK to prevent forum shopping. It would be deeply unsatisfactory if changes that the Government are introducing to achieve a fairer outcome in relation to claims brought in England and Wales could be circumvented by a claimant’s bringing their claim in Scotland or Northern Ireland instead.

Turning our attention to new clause 2, none of the measures in part 2 of the Bill will prevent service personnel, veterans or their families from bringing claims against the MOD in connection with overseas operations within a reasonable timeframe, as historically most have done anyway. The purpose of the limitation longstops is to stop historical and often vexatious claims being brought against the military on overseas operations, which put our service personnel at the mercy of being called to provide evidence long after the alleged events in question, with all the harm and anxiety that might cause them.

To ensure fairness between claimants, we have not excluded service personnel from those provisions. They will apply equally to service personnel and veterans as they will to any other person bringing a claim against the MOD in connection with overseas operations. I am confident that these measures do not break the armed forces covenant. The new factors and limitation longstops only apply to claims in connection with overseas operations and will apply to all claimants in the same way. The court’s discretion to extend the three-year time limit for death or personal injury claims and the one-year time limit for human rights claims remains unchanged in respect of any other claims, that is, those not connected to overseas operations brought against the MOD.

Additionally, our evidence suggests that 94% of those claims from service personnel are already brought within six years. We would expect that figure to rise in future, as we ensure that the armed forces community is made aware of the new measures and the relevant dates for bringing claims, including what is meant by the date of knowledge. That should encourage personnel to bring claims within six years, or earlier if possible, as after the primary time limit of three years for personal injury and death and one year for human rights claims expires, claimants must rely on persuading the courts to exercise their discretion to extend the time limit.

In summary, clauses 8 to 10, as they stand, do not breach the armed forces covenant and do not disadvantage service personnel or veterans. Let me make this clear point: on operations and in the area of modern warfare, we cannot lift human rights legislation and apply it to the battlefield. I accept that some people want to do that and think that is the right thing to do, but I respectfully disagree. The idea that people can go to court and argue for an extension produces exactly the position we find ourselves in now, where individuals such as Phil Shiner, who the right hon. Member for North Durham mentioned, have sought extensions under those situations, in order to bring thousands and thousands of claims against the MOD.

We are stuck in a position where we have to do something. In that scenario, I cannot apply something to one side, as I have indicated already, although the Legion would like me to. Similarly, we cannot take away all time limits, because that would defeat the entire purpose of the Bill, which is to provide some certainty for veterans. I accept what some hon. Members have said about people’s ability to sue within that timeframe if they are serving overseas. If they were in the UK on exercise or in Canada, it would be different, but that is because the unique nature of operations is different.

We have a duty to protect those people, as I said, both physically, from what is on the battlefield, and in the court of law. We have seen some horrendous experiences over the years. We can say, “It’s all too difficult”, and that we need to walk away—the reason why, for 40 years, no Government have done this is that it is really difficult—but we are in a position where we have to make choices: either we choose to leave the situation as it is now, letting it continue with no time limit, or we bring forward legislation to give certainty to our veterans.

[Mr Jones]

I am sorry—I do not agree with that. There is a way to improve the Bill, as with the issue of investigations raised earlier. We have talked about the Human Rights Act 1998, but if the Minister reads the judgment in the Smith case, he will see that the Supreme Court was clear about the Act’s limitations. Will the Minister explain the proposal to have a one-year time limit on human rights cases? Will he explain how he will limit appeal if section 33 does not apply to human rights cases, which it will not if the Bill goes through? How does that fit with our obligations under the convention?

[Johnny Mercer]

Our obligations under the European convention on human rights are not changed in any way. We have to design an investigative framework that is resilient and robust in the face of challenge under the convention. I have to disagree with the right hon. Gentleman—clearly, there is a difference of opinion here. That is allowed, that is what this place is all about, but the reality is that those on the Government Benches have a different view, which is that we cannot let the situation that has persisted for the past 40 years continue ad infinitum. We have to bring in fair and proportionate legislation to go beyond saying nice things about our people, or, “Isn’t it terrible that these people get dragged through the courts?”, while being prepared to do absolutely nothing about it. I am afraid that those days have come to an end. We have to legislate to protect our people. I will give way once more, and then I will finish.

[Mr Jones]

There is nothing fair about taking rights away from veterans. On the Human Rights Act, the one-year limit to bring a claim is clearly still there, but at present someone could bring a late claim under section 33 if at the time they thought it was not there. The Minister said that we would be abiding by the convention. Will he point to where in the convention—on our side, in the Human Rights Act—it says that time limits and out-of-time claims are applicable? I cannot see that.

[Johnny Mercer]

As the right hon. Gentleman will remember from his time in government, all legislation has to be signed off as ECHR compliant. The Department has done that, recognising our responsibilities under the legislation and meeting its requirements. He talks about rights, but people such as Bob Campbell have a right to be protected from experiences such as his over the past 17 years, and the soldiers who went through al-Sweady have a right to be protected as well. This is not all in one direction—it is not a one-way street—and we are clear that those people have a right to be protected in the jobs that we asked them to do. That is what the clause is all about, so I ask that it stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2

International Criminal Court Act 2001

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[Stephen Morgan]

I thank my hon. Friend for the intervention. She hits the nail on the head: we want to work constructively with the Government to get the Bill right. Sadly, we are not seeing that engagement, and that concerns us. Are Ministers not concerned that the very Bill they claim is devised to help our armed forces is said to be doing the very opposite by an organisation as distinguished as the Royal British Legion?

We heard from other important witnesses. The Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, a not-for-profit organisation representing injured serving and ex-service personnel, said:

“This Bill leaves our veterans with less rights than prisoners.”

I will repeat that because it is so important:

“This Bill leaves our veterans with less rights than prisoners.”

That is a damning verdict delivered by lawyers who devote their lives to representing our troops. Our armed forces serve the nation with distinction. They deserve more than to have their rights stripped away.

I say to the Minister: do not dismiss the warnings of the legion and APIL; work with us to address them.

Let us take a closer look at what part 2 means. The Limitation Act 1980 results in the armed forces community and civilians being treated equally in seeking a claim for personal injury. A three-year cut-off point is in place. The courts retain the right to grant an extension to forces personnel. Section 33 provides the court with discretion to override the current three-year limit, but this Bill deliberately snatches courts’ ability to show discretion if the case relates to an overseas armed forces action. It makes a deliberate change to the Limitation Act. That makes no sense. There are already structures in place to ensure that only appropriate claims are brought. Courts routinely manage out-of-time proceedings and frequently throw out cases where delay is unjustified. The detailed criteria set out in the Limitation Act 1980 already address cases that do not have reasonable grounds or are unjustified. Why is the Minister actively removing an aspect of the Limitation Act that offers courts the right to grant an extension in cases relating to armed forces personnel?

[Mr Jones]

As I said earlier in an intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon, the nuclear test veterans case is a good example. There was a limitations hearing in which the MOD argued that the case was out of time because the incident took place so long ago. In that case, Judge Foskett argued that new evidence meant the date of knowledge was current and he allowed it to be admitted. I accept that the numbers are not huge, but it is the exceptional cases that are important.

[Stephen Morgan]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his remarks. I hope the Minister addresses the points that he makes so eloquently later on, in his summing up.

The Bill removes the ability of our armed forces personnel to bring forward a civil claim at all after six years, even where it would have passed judicial scrutiny. Under the Government’s proposed changes, civilians will retain the right to pursue a civil claim against their employer. Armed forces personnel will not, which clearly breaches the armed forces covenant. Non-discretionary time limits undermine justice and arbitrarily prevent legitimate claims from proceeding. We must hear the Minister’s business case for setting that time limit.

We have established that part 2 of the Bill is flawed. It introduces a six-year time limit for any claimant or bereaved family in bringing civil claims against the Ministry of Defence. That means that if someone suffers personal injury or even death owing to employer negligence and in connection with overseas operations, they can take no action after a six-year time limit. That is deeply concerning because a great many conditions might not come to light until after the time limit: for example, post-traumatic stress disorder.

Last year, The Times reported the case of Mark Bradshaw, aged 44, who had suffered from PTSD since being involved in a friendly-fire attack in 2010 while serving in the Royal Artillery. Despite the immediate onset of the condition, the veteran, who lives in Newcastle, was not given a diagnosis until 2016. By then he was drinking heavily and had suicidal thoughts. He had left the service and become alienated from his family. He was awarded £230,000 in a settlement, but feared that the proposed legislation could discriminate against those who do not develop PTSD or receive a diagnosis until many years later. He called the plan to impose a time limit on claims “horrendous”.

I have another example.

[Mr Jones]

Another issue concerns human rights cases. The impression being given is that they are always brought by people against the MOD and include litigants and people in foreign countries and so on, but Human Rights Act cases are also brought against the MOD by armed forces personnel. When Hilary Meredith gave evidence, she said:

“There is a difficulty putting a time limit on the Human Rights Act—I do not even know whether we can do that constitutionally”.––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 18, Q30.]

The Minister seemed to brush aside the fact that section 33 will be ignored in terms of time limits. Does he also think that that constrains the rights of veterans and service personnel from bringing cases against the MOD, which they can, under the Human Rights Act?

[Stephen Morgan]

We could spend all afternoon on different cases. That is why the amendment is so important. I have another example. It is about how legislation would have denied justice to a former royal marine with noise-induced hearing loss, according to the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers. The former marine received nearly half a million pounds for a noise-induced hearing claim on the grounds that his hearing loss and tinnitus was caused by a negligent exposure to noise. During his career the marine served in Northern Ireland, the Gulf and Afghanistan, and he was exposed to noise from thousands of rounds of ammunition, thunderflash stun grenades, helicopters and other aircraft and explosive devices. His claim related to his entire service.

When he left the Royal Marines in 2012 because of problems with his hearing, he was unaware that he was able to make a claim for compensation. He eventually spoke to a solicitor in late 2014, seven years after he was first aware that he had problems with his hearing. The MOD admitted liability and made no argument about his case being brought out of time. The time limit in this Bill, however, would have eliminated all aspects of the claim relating to the Marine’s extensive service overseas.

[Stephen Morgan]

The claim could have been made only in relation to negligent exposure in the UK. It might not have been possible to isolate the extent and the effect of negligent exposure in the UK, making it very difficult to claim any redress at all. Why are some medical conditions worthy of justice, and not others? Many other medical conditions are likely to fall outside the cut-off point, and there are conditions such as long-term deterioration of joints resulting from carrying heavy equipment.

[Mr Jones]

Does my hon. Friend agree that what the Minister is saying cannot be the case? He cannot give any guarantee that such cases will not be resisted by the MOD. He cannot direct the MOD, because he will not be there when he leaves the MOD, and no one else can do it either. It is about protecting future cases. In the two cases referred to, the Bill would allow the MOD to legitimately turn those cases down because they were out of time. Those two individuals would have no recourse to law in order to enforce their rights.

[Stephen Morgan]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely correct. We are saying it time and again, but the Bill protects the MOD; it does not protect our troops. I hope the Minister will take that point on board.

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Will the Minister clarify whether Ministers are not concerned that the very Bill they claim was devised to help our troops is said to be doing the opposite by such a distinguished organisation as the Royal British Legion? Why is he actively removing the aspect of the Limitation Act 1980 that offers courts the power to grant extensions in cases relating to armed forces personnel? Why are some medical conditions worthy of justice and not others? Is he satisfied that the Bill in its current form will exclude troops suffering from conditions such as PTSD from receiving justice? Why has the MOD scrapped the proposed better compensation scheme that would have seen payments closer to those offered in court settlements? Finally, why are the Government willing to introduce a six-year time limit to stop troops but not civilians?

[Mr Jones]

I rise to support my hon. Friend and to speak to my amendments 92 and 93, which I understand fall in this group of amendments—

[The Chair]

Order. They do not. They are in the next group.

[Mr Jones]

They do not—I am reading it wrongly as one big group, but they are two separate groups.

My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South made a point about the backstop. I am sorry, I just cannot accept that backstop. The Minister seems to be misunderstanding the issue to do with the date of knowledge. The date of knowledge is clearly not only as laid out in the law of cases against the MOD, but as in civil law as well. As I said this morning, I used to deal all the time with the date of knowledge in asbestos cases. Some of those test cases were to do with ensuring that individuals—sometimes many years after they had left the industry in which they had contracted their disease—were able to take action. They were able to do so because of the Limitation Act.

The other thing that we need to knock on the head is the idea that bringing a section 33 case is easy. It is not easy; it is very difficult, and the threshold to meet is very high—rightly. As the Minister said, time limits rightly have to be fair in two ways: first, to give individuals enough time to ensure that they can bring a case; and, secondly, because evidence gets lost, whether in a civilian case or, more so, in such a case as we are addressing now. There is therefore a good reason for time limits, but there is also a good reason to have circumstances and exceptions in which those time limits should not apply.

My hon. Friend mentioned two cases, which the Minister said would be covered—but I am sorry, they would not. If they fell outside the six years, under the Bill as drafted those individuals would not be able to argue before a judge why limitations should not apply in their cases, and their case would just be dismissed. The Minister seems to have a lot of faith that the MOD’s lawyers of the future—and now—would not use that measure to reduce and stop such claims. They would not be doing their job if they did not use it to stop those claims.

The important thing is that such an individual would then have no rights whatever—unlike you, me or anyone else: even a prisoner—to bring a case under section 33 of the Limitation Act. I understand what the Minister says about his trust and belief in the MOD now and in the future. I do not disparage what the MOD is doing. There was a reference in the evidence session that the Department employs good lawyers and that will be their job, and they will use this provision. As such, what the Minister said will not be the case.

My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South raises the issue around the 94%, or whatever the figure is. I do not care, to be honest, because as I said earlier one case is a case too many. Like my hon. Friend, I want to ensure that armed forces personnel and veterans are treated on the same basis as everyone else in this country. If that does not happen, the armed forces covenant will protect their rights but the Bill will take their rights away. That cannot be right.

There is also the point, which I had hoped the Minister would answer, about the Human Rights Act. He said the one-year time period is still in there, which is fine, but as Hilary Meredith said, how do you then disapply the Limitation Act to the Human Rights Act? As she said, it is very difficult to see how you would do that in practice because we are part of an international convention.

The only response the Minister gave—he might want to write to me if he does not have it with him; I accept that on occasions he does not have all the facts to hand—is that it has been cleared as being Human Rights Act-compliant. Are we suggesting that for this group of veterans there will be a new thing—a time limit for out-of-time human rights cases? If that is so, it is very interesting. How has that been squared in terms of the convention we have signed? Again—and likewise—everybody else will be able to use the Limitation Act to take a case forward outside that time.

The Minister said he is listening, but he is not. He has a fixated view of what goes forward in the Bill and that is what he is going to put forward. We have made attempts. I have said that I accept that amendments written by mere amateurs such as myself and others are not necessarily legally correct. However, what often happens on these occasions is that a Minister will say, “Yes, we agree. There is a point there. We will take it away, look at it and try to frame it in terms of how it fits into the Bill and the legal parameters.” That way, when we get to Report and Third Reading, they can be introduced, usually as Government amendments. However, that has not happened. We have had, “This is how it is going to be and that’s it.”

The situation is rather sad because there are things that can be done even at this stage—I am discussing one of them—that could improve the Bill. I accept that the Minister has already committed to look at investigations in the Armed Forces Bill next year, but he should stick the provisions in the damn Bill now. He could do it. The fact that the civil service might not want to do it—well, tough. He should just say, “You are going to do it” and put it in. Putting those investigation measures into the Bill will improve it immensely and do more than where the Minister has come from so far in the Bill. As Judge Blackett said, he has been

“looking at the wrong end of the telescope”—[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 120, Q246.]

The Minister is concentrating on prosecutions, but that ain’t the problem: the problem is investigations and how the MOD operates. I will not support a Bill that is going to take away rights from our servicemen and women. That would be an absolute tragedy. I know that is not the Minister’s intention, but unfortunately the Bill, as it is written, is going to do exactly that.

[The Chair]

To confirm, we are debating amendments 30 to 54, with amendment 29. If no other Members wish to speak to any of those amendments, I call the Minister.

[Johnny Mercer]

I wanted to address a couple of points about the limitation period. In the Stubbings ruling that we looked at, limitation periods are okay under ECHR regulation as long as there is compatibility with article 6, the right to a fair trial. That is the test that has been undertaken in this exercise and that is the advice that the Government have received. The right hon. Member for North Durham may well disagree with that, and is well entitled to.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Johnny Mercer]

Not at the moment. I have literally just stood up. I will get through a couple of points, if I may.

As to the idea that I have not engaged in the process, and that it is just “head down, drive on”, I should like to know whether there has been a Bill that has gone through this place in the past five years when the Minister has been more ready to say a number of times that he was willing to work cross-party to improve the Bill; but I have to deal—[Interruption.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

As for the idea that we must withdraw part 2, the whole point of the Bill is to bring in time limits to provide certainty for veterans, so if colleagues take it away, what is the point of the Bill? Why are we here in the first place, if we will just continue as we currently are?

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Johnny Mercer]

Not at the moment.

The six-year longstop for personal injury and death claims is an important part of the Bill. The measure will help to provide greater certainty for service personnel and veterans by requiring civil claims arising from overseas operations to be brought promptly. Effectively, service personnel will not have to worry about having to give evidence on what would have been very distressing events many years in the future.

The public consultation launched in 2019 sought views on the length of time for such a longstop, and asked whether 10 years was appropriate. Many respondents supported a period of less than 10 years, so we decided to reduce the time limit for the longstop. Six years was chosen because it aligns with the limitation period for some other tort claims. That decision was further informed by the case of Stubbings v. the UK, in a judgment that has been repeatedly confirmed. The European Court of Human Rights upheld an absolute six-year limitation period. The Court noted the need in civil litigation for limitation periods because they ensure legal certainty and finality and the avoidance of stale claims, and prevent injustice where adjudication upon the events in the distant past involves unreliable and incomplete evidence due to the passage of time.

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The vast majority—around 94%—of relevant claims from service personnel and veterans already fall within the six-year time limit. We anticipate that claimants who in the past have brought claims after six years may in future bring their claims within six years, and we will ensure that the armed forces community is made aware of the new measures. I have given notice of that commitment before. Changing the longstop from six years to ten years will only increase the uncertainty that service personnel and veterans face from the threat of being called on repeatedly to give evidence relating to historical events. The statistics that I have outlined show that most service personnel and veterans bring their claims within six years. The amendments, therefore, would only increase the uncertainty, without giving any significant benefit.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Johnny Mercer]

Is there going to be a new point? I have given way a lot and we seem to be repeating the same points.

[Mr Jones]

The Minister is going backwards and forwards just reading out what he has in front of him—[Interruption.] I am sorry, but he is. He is not answering any questions at all. Can I ask the Minister this? He says the reason for the longstop, which disadvantages veterans, is to stop all these vexatious claims. In terms of the Shiner case, for example, how many of those cases were actually time-limited cases and argued in terms of this limitation? If that is the case and there were thousands of them—I would be very surprised if there were—I would imagine in most cases the Limitation Act would weed out most of those that were vexatious. To actually introduce this to solve that part of the problem is going to have a massive impact on servicemen and women who wish to bring claims against the MOD.

[Johnny Mercer]

Of Phil Shiner’s claims through Public Interest Lawyers, 62% were brought more than six years after the date of the incident. The Bill imposes a six-year limit, meaning that 62% of those claims would have been out of time. This legislation is designed to redress the balance. We are operating in a very difficult area, I accept that. Doing nothing has been the easy option that this House has pursued for 40 years and it is an approach I disagree with.

[Mr Jones]

rose—

[Johnny Mercer]

I am not going to give way again, there will be plenty of opportunity for the right hon. Gentleman to speak further. I recommend that the amendment be withdrawn.

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[Mr Jones]

Had the Bill been in place in 2009, that would have been it for those veterans—there would have been no case at all. The 2009 case, which I know well, was a limitation case, and they brought it before Justice Foskett because they argued that new evidence—medical evidence from New Zealand—had emerged about what my hon. Friend is referring to. If this Bill had been in place then, they would not have even been able to go to court to argue why their case should have had consideration, because of the time that had elapsed since the 1950s, when the exposure took place.

[Chris Evans]

I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend for his service during that time. I know that as a Minister he dealt with the case with sympathy and respect. My direct predecessor, Lord Touhig, also dealt with the case when he was a Minister. I know that everybody who served during that period was wrestling with it, but my right hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that it would not have been possible to bring the case.

If radioactive particles are ingested, the harm might occur at a slow but steady rate for many years, with minor ailments leading to a dramatic diagnosis, and eventually to death. There was no way for the veterans to know that their minor ailments were linked to the nuclear tests that they were involved in. As the Minister knows, however, it often prevented them from gaining the compensation they deserved.

How can we ask young men and women to serve and not guarantee their rights in the same way as civilians are guaranteed theirs? Should the Bill progress, I worry for the next generation of service personnel who are affected by the equivalent of nuclear tests. We do not yet know what might happen in the future that could cause problems further down the line. That is just one example of why someone might need to extend the six-year limitation as currently set out.

I must raise concerns from specialist members of the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, a not-for-profit firm that specialises in military claims. It has voiced concerns that injured personnel can be misinformed of their right to make a legal claim. They might not even know that they have a right to a claim. According to a report by the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, it is unfortunately not unusual for service personnel to be misinformed about their right to bring a civil claim.

[Mr Jones]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it would also limit families? In some cases—especially those involving asbestos, but also some involving cancers—the claim is generated only after the person passes away. Even though somebody might have known earlier that they had cancer, it is only once they pass away that the family might think that it was related to service. I know of some cases that were the result of submarine service. The Bill would actually stop families getting any redress in such cases.

[Chris Evans]

I agree. I will come to an example that my right hon. Friend probably knows as well, but I first will say something about service families. When servicepeople are away, their families are left with the worry, the childcare and other needs. When a serviceman suffers from cancer, it is the family who have to watch their loved one wither away. It is vital that they have a chance to make a claim.

It is interesting that my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham intervened in my speech. When we talk about personal injury, those of us who come from mining communities will remember the example of the miners’ compensation scheme and how miners were left behind. I am not comparing miners to veterans, but it is a similar principle.

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[Chris Evans]

I thank the Minister for that.

[Mr Jones]

I am not sure that that is the case, because those veterans brought quite a successful case. The Minister just said that it was not an operation, but it was: Operation Grapple, I think. If it was called an operation—the MOD loves giving deployments various—

[Johnny Mercer]

It doesn’t work like that.

[The Chair]

Order. This is not a conversation.

[Mr Jones]

It was Operation Grapple. If the Minister wants to intervene on my hon. Friend, I am sure he will act as the post box again. However, those veterans brought a successful case, although the Minister says that that is not true, just to clarify.

[Chris Evans]

I give way to the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West.

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[Chris Evans]

I was about to say—as we spoke about earlier when I moved the amendment about the Attorney General—that we could have a huge debate about this. I have made a plea to the Minister about the nuclear test veterans. I know he is a good man and that his heart is in the right place when it comes to veterans, and I hope he will recommend to the HD committee that they receive some recognition for their service.

I will move on to the meat of the Bill and the amendment, otherwise we could be here all day. Simon Ellis, a senior partner at the law firm Hugh James, argues from experience that the point of knowledge of the injury, especially in cases of post-traumatic stress disorder or deafness, as the hon. Member for Glasgow North West said, is difficult to define. For illnesses such as PTSD, the sufferer may take a long time to understand what they are suffering from—similar to what the hon. Lady mentioned about her father—long after healthcare professionals or friends or family have this knowledge. Therefore, although there is knowledge of the injury, the victims themselves do not fully know or are not willing to admit that they are suffering. It can then take even longer for them to accept that they have post-traumatic stress disorder, to link that to an overseas operation or a series of operations and to realise that they therefore have a right to a civil claim. The point of knowledge, therefore, can be marked only as the point at which the serviceperson has a full understanding of their condition and their right to a civil claim.

I listened with interest to the hon. Member for Glasgow North West when she talked about what her father was going through. As I understand it, he knew he was deaf and those around him knew he was deaf, but it took him a long time to admit to it. Where is the point of knowledge in that? I do not know. I would be interested to learn, maybe afterwards, when he did finally admit that he had a problem.

Even in simpler cases, when the service person is aware of an injury at the point of the event, it would be grossly unfair for the longstop to start on the date of that event, if they had no knowledge that they could even bring a claim if they wished. Will the Minister therefore concede that clause 11 is not comprehensive enough to deal with the intricacies of a process that includes an event occurring, the sufferer fully understanding and accepting the injury, and their knowing that it is something that fulfils the criteria for a civil claim––that the option of a claim is open to them? If the Government insist on placing a time limit on service personnel or their families for bringing a civil claim, surely the clock must start from the point at which the claimant was both fully aware of the content of the claim––be that negligence, injury or death––and aware that they had the right to file a claim.

If that is not taken into account, it becomes even more clear that the Bill is intended to protect not service personnel but the Ministry of Defence. If these clauses relating to the rights of civil claims become law, those injured through negligence during overseas operations will no longer have the benefit of the full discretion of the court to allow a claim to proceed after the limitation period has expired. They will have fewer rights than other employees while the Ministry of Defence will be sheltered behind the longstop.

An employee who frequently works on military claims for Simpson Millar Solicitors said that, from her experience, she expects that Ministry of Defence lawyers

“could use this new Bill to support arguments that personal injury claims are out of time.”

Therefore, it is a bare minimum that the time limit starts ticking only once the claimant has full knowledge of their right to file a civil claim. This strikes back hard in respect of what my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham said. Once the Bill is passed, it will be handed over to MOD lawyers. Now, none of us will be here for ever and we will have our successors. It will be the lawyers who interpret the Bill. It is therefore vital that we get this right. There is no justification for the MOD having special protection in terms of limitations on civil claims. It is vital that service personnel can bring claims to court in accordance with civil law, without fear or favour. It is vital that they are entitled to the same rights and civil considerations as the rest of the population when it comes to employment disputes.

There is a concern that the Bill could put troops at a disadvantage compared with their civilian counterparts. In our first sitting, Mr Young said:

“Imposing an absolute time limit places armed forces personnel claimants themselves at a disadvantage compared with civil claimants in ordinary life, where the court has discretion. Of course, the Minister has made it perfectly clear, absolutely correctly, that the time limit for this particular part of the Bill only starts to run at the point of knowledge. That is completely understood. That point of knowledge, diagnosis or whatever, could be many years later. Nevertheless, I would have a worry about an absolute longstop as proposed.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 9, Q6.]

If as Mr Young says, it is the case that the Minister considers the time limit as beginning from the point of knowledge, let us say so in the Bill. This is too important a matter to be imprecise in our words. We need clarity and we need definition. Let us be clear what the amendment means for our armed forces. Let us be clear that service personnel will not be disadvantaged if a link between actions and events overseas and a particular injury or negligent action comes to light only years later. We have seen time and time again, from asbestos to our test veterans, that these things unfortunately do happen. People get injured and hurt. Let us not use this Bill to protect the Ministry of Defence and disadvantage our service personnel. They deserve our support and, more than anything, our protection.

[Mr Jones]

I thank my hon. Friend for moving amendment 76. He makes a good point: whatever legislation we put in must be future-proofed. There are claims that it will do x, y and z, but we have all seen legislation that goes through Parliament with the best of intentions, but, as things change, still sits on the statute book and disadvantages individuals. Is it ever possible to future-proof legislation completely? No, it is not, but it is certainly possible to ensure that we do not put things in a Bill at the start that discriminate against veterans and armed forces personnel. That should be the starting point for this.

In this group of amendments, I will speak to my amendment 92, which relates to clause 11, page 7, line 36, leave out,

“or first ought to have known”.

It gets to the point that my hon. Friend has just referred to about date of knowledge and the issues surrounding it. Is it straightforward to know when a condition happens? No, it is not, as he eloquently explained, and I will explain some examples in a minute.

Many conditions that arise from service are complex; they first require diagnosis, and that sometimes takes time. If someone has a condition and knows they are suffering from something, that is their date of knowledge, but it might take several years to diagnose exactly what it is. Also, as we heard in the evidence session and has come out again today, it may take time for members of the armed forces to recognise that they might have a claim against the Ministry of Defence anyway. I hear what the Minister said about how we should publicise that, and I welcome the idea that we should make it known to people that they can make claims for injuries or conditions, whether through publicity or just ensuring that people know it, both when they are in service and when they leave. That must be recognised.

The conditions fall into two areas. If we look at industry—I know the Minister will say that is different from the military, and it is in many ways, but in other ways, on key issues such as hearing loss, there are some clear links—over many years litigation has led to improvements in standards and training, and I would argue that that should also be a lever in terms of the MOD.

I remember, when I was in the Ministry of Defence, dealing with the question of hearing loss. To be honest, I accept that in combat operations people are going to be exposed to loud noise. They are, and I do not think we can get away from that fact. But when I think back to the MOD in those days, we were paying out huge claims—quite rightly—for people’s hearing loss caused by training and other things, and it struck me that we were not getting to the root cause. As I said this morning, litigation can be seen, not as ambulance-chasing from the claimant’s point of view, but as a way of informing the MOD that it should change things, and can change things.

[Carol Monaghan]

Another example, of course, is the Snatch Land Rovers, which we have heard talk of many times. It was only because a claim was brought against the MOD that safer alternatives were put in place.

[Mr Jones]

Yes, it concentrated the minds of people. I will refer to that case in a minute. The important thing is that the Bill shifts the burden of knowledge to the combatant in terms of self-diagnosis. That is completely unfair. A lot of these cases are complex, and it is unclear whether a service man or woman in a war zone could remain resilient with their fellows if they had to keep sight of a self-diagnosis, saying exactly when something actually happened, certainly for mental health cases. I am not one to want to encourage people to sue the MOD or any public body for the sake of it, but if they have been done wrong then they should have the right to do that. I am uncomfortable about the six-year rule protecting the MOD.

I accept what the Minister said. He has introduced the rule because he is looking through the wrong end of the telescope; he is looking at ways of stopping cases like Phil Shiners’. There are other ways of doing that which would not mean introducing a six-year longstop to prevent veterans and service personnel taking cases. It concerns me that the attitude is there. MOD lawyers will use the longstop. They will definitely use it. They are not going to be thinking, “This is a tool in the armoury that we are not going to use to stop claims.” They will use it. Can you blame them? No you cannot, to be honest, but it disadvantages veterans and leads to a grievance.

Issues have already been raised about mental health and PTSD, but other conditions are, again, quite unique in terms of how they are dealt with. Non-freeze injuries are soft tissue injuries that involve nerve damage, and they result from an individual being exposed to long periods of wet and cold weather. That has been a particular issue for Commonwealth service personnel. The MOD have tried to do certain things to mitigate it, but it was only because claims were starting to be initiated that the issue was highlighted. Has that knowledge been around for a long time? Yes it has. If you go back to the first world war, trench foot was that type of injury. It has affected many Commonwealth members who loyally joined our services to serve the UK. Even after an injury is diagnosed, it might not be realised during a career. In terms of delaying a claim, the effects of the cold injury might be there and the initial advice is to keep things warm, which might alleviate the issue. If two or three years down the line the service man or woman is discharged from service because of that—I understand it is a debilitating condition—that individual might not know they had a claim.

[Liz Twist]

We heard evidence from the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers about the fact that too many former service personnel do not understand that they can bring a claim against the MOD. Would this address the issue?

[Mr Jones]

Yes it would. That, and doing away with the six-year backstop. My hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon makes a good point. The individual might not know that they were suffering from the condition, in terms that a judge would be able to look at to say they should have known about it and they should have brought a claim. I think the evidence outlined by my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon is right: there was a reluctance to bring claims, which meant they ended up out of time. Major injury sufferers should know the date of diagnosis, but not necessarily the full impact of the condition on their service—it might not be a showstopper in their career, but in the long term it might affect their career and their ability to find post-career employment.

Another example is non-freezing cold injuries: this is not a surprise to the MOD because it knows about them. There are things that can and should be done, without putting the onus on the individual to self-diagnose the date of knowledge.

The other issue, raised by the hon. Member for Glasgow North West this morning—I mean earlier this afternoon: I am enjoying myself so much I have lost track of time— is hearing loss, the date of which is notoriously difficult to determine. In my previous incarnation, in a case of someone working with loud machinery in a factory all their lives, it is easy to pinpoint what has caused the loss of hearing. The problem for service personnel is that their careers are very varied, and although hopefully the MOD has training in phases 1 and 2 about protecting young ears especially, what is the crucial issue that leads to hearing loss, or hearing impairment? In military life, there will be exposure to loud noises: it nearly as much a fact of life as us having to listen to loud noises every day in the Chamber of the House of Commons.

[Carol Monaghan]

Just as a point of clarification, not all service personnel are exposed to loud noises: they talk about the silent service.

[Mr Jones]

Yes, but that can lead to other problems, such mental health issues. I think I referred to the 1902 situation when submarines were first invented, and there were issues with pressure that had an effect on people’s bodies, which led to further issues. I accept that it does not affect everyone.

Under the Bill, how can people disaggregate when their hearing loss took place? If a certain proportion of someone’s life was spent in overseas operations, are we saying that that part of the hearing claim cannot go forward as it is exempt, as it is beyond the six years? That is where it gets very complicated, which is why I think the clear system that we have at the moment, in which if people make a claim after the time limit, they have the possibility of taking the claim under section 33 and are able to argue their case. I reiterate the point that that is not an easy process.

When I asked the Minister how many of Phil Shiner’s cases were time-limited—could have been struck out due to the time limits—and how many he actually argued in court—the Minister did not say. It would be interesting to know—

[Johnny Mercer]

I said clearly it was 62.7%.

[Mr Jones]

Is the Minister saying that that 62.7% were all cases that went before a judge under the Limitation Act 1980 and were deemed to have enough evidence and special circumstance to take them forward? If he is, I find that remarkable, because in my experience of the Limitation Act, trying to get cases under it is very difficult. That is what was said by the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers—they are unique cases and specialists are needed. I would be surprised if the figure was as high as that, so that of the 4,000 cases, more than half were out of time and went before a judge. If so, why did the MOD not just strike the cases out straight away, so that they were out of time? It would be interesting to know if they all went before a judge, because that suggests that the judge clearly thought that there was enough evidence to progress them. Perhaps the Minister will write to me about that—I am happy to accept that he cannot have all such figures to hand.

I am interested to know the number of those so-called vexatious claims because, I tell the Committee now, in my experience, someone who takes a vexatious case to a limitations hearing will not get very far, because of the high bar. People have to argue not only the reasons why a case should be brought out of time, but the case itself and its possibilities of success later in the litigation. For 60-odd per cent., there must have been a very soft judge allowing cases through under the Limitation Act. But I will wait to hear clarification from the Minister.

Something we have not mentioned is sight loss. I accept that in some cases people wake up and have lost their sight overnight, because of blood clots and so on, but more commonly sight is lost incrementally over time. That can sometimes take up to 10 years. If so, the veteran or serviceman or woman might have thought, “Well, I’m losing my sight”, but did not get a diagnosis, or have thought only after 10 years that they might be able to take a case, because the sight loss was related to service. They might not have thought it was but, if it was, 10 years later the Bill would not allow them to take a case. At present, they can get the diagnosis, the medical evidence, the reasons and the arguments for a limitations hearing on why they need to take a case out of time. That will not be the case if the Bill goes through.

Another example is respiratory issues, some of which may lie dormant for a long time and be the result of a whole host of conditions. I remember that in Iraq and, in particular, in Afghanistan, we had a lot of respiratory problems to do with bacteria, because the air was full of pathogens and other things. People might not have had a hacking cough but, a year or so later when they got home, they started to have such symptoms. Again, they might not have related that to their service straightaway, or with certainty, but it was later shown that, because of the use of animal manure, especially in some rural areas of Afghanistan and Iraq, people breathed in pathogens when the dust got into the air. That got into people’s lungs but did not affect their health until many years later—again it was a direct result of service, because they were there to serve their country.

The other issue, which we have touched on a little bit, is how this affects families. I raised the issue earlier of various cancers and other diseases from which people die. People think, “Why has this cancer appeared?” or “Why has this individual suddenly died?” Usually, the causes can only be identified at death. The individual will not have the date of knowledge, but the family will.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Evans]

Removing the ability for the courts to extend the six-year period would leave our veterans, ex-service personnel and their families at a disadvantage compared to those who bring normal civil claims against their employers. That is the problem we are facing in the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

It is a right. Okay—it will not be straightforward, because in my experience of asbestos cases, even with a clear diagnosis and an autopsy report, getting someone to admit liability is very difficult. The first thing that insurance companies used to do, which is exactly what the MOD will do, is require date of knowledge and say that it is time barred. If the claimant gets over that hurdle through a limitations hearing, the company usually settles. In this case, the MOD will reach for this straightaway, to say that it is not covered because it was contracted on an overseas operation and, therefore, it cannot go any further. That would give no rights at all to that family or the servicemen and women to take that case forward.

[Chris Evans]

I want to give an example and ask my right hon. Friend about his experience. He knows as well as I do that both our constituencies have large numbers of ex-miners who have had compensation for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and vibration white finger. If these rules were applied to them, would they have got the compensation?

[Mr Jones]

No, because some of those cases, especially with vibration white finger, were taken on limitation hearings, because those things happened a long time ago. That is the fundamental right. To protect the veterans or servicemen and women, they need the right to go to the law, if they wish to—not everyone does and I respect people who do not.

The best example—it is a tragic example—which came up in the evidence session was the Snatch Land Rovers. The events in which people were killed and injured took place in Iraq. Although it was an issue in the MOD when I was there, in terms of the suitability of the vehicles, the real focus on it never came until July 2016 and the Chilcot report. The case that was mentioned in the evidence session was in 2005. A serviceman was killed in a Snatch Land Rover, but his widow did not really know the significance of the vehicle until the Chilcot report in July 2016. At that time, she thought that there had been a failing on behalf of the MOD in its duty care and in the provision of that equipment, so she brought a claim for the loss of her husband, not under civil law but under the Human Rights Act on the basis that her husband had a right to life.

That case was clearly time-limited, because the event took place in 2005 but the case was not brought until after the Chilcot inquiry in 2016. Obviously, a limitation hearing was held and it was successfully argued that the case should go forward, and it was settled, along with—I understand—other cases.

If the Bill goes through unamended, that case would not have been able to go forward, because—I mean, if it was left to me and the Minister, we would both agree that the date of knowledge should have been 2016, and therefore it could go ahead. However, I am not sure that the MOD lawyers would be as generous to veterans as the Minister and I would be. That is the problem when the Minister argues that the date of knowledge somehow protects veterans: it does not. The date of knowledge should not be used as argument to throw such cases out straightaway.

What will that take? If the Bill goes through as planned—especially on the human rights side, there will be a court case and an argument will be made. Let us say that a case similar to the one that I just mentioned was active today in the courts. What will happen is that someone will challenge that. So we will get litigation as a result of that process on whether the Bill is compatible with the Human Rights Act. I accept that the Minister will write to me on these issues, but we will get more litigation than we would if we instead said, “Let us have a judge look at the limitations on whether a case should be brought”, and if the case is deemed to be special circumstances, it should go to trial.

We must recognise that the MOD acts no differently to the insurance companies that I used to deal with when I took personal injury cases and industrial injury cases against employers, and I am sure that the hon. Member for Darlington knows this as well. It is horse trading. If there is a limitations hearing, what someone will do is to try and get it settled—nine times out of 10, an offer will be made. It is only the ones who really want to be stubborn who take the matter all the way through to trial. Very few of those cases go to trial, because people look at the evidence, to see whether it is worth going further in court, and the case is settled.

However, that process will be closed down for the individual if this tight six-year time stop goes ahead. The cases will not get to the second stage after the limitation hearing, which is about negotiating with the other side to say, “Well, come on. Can we make an offer?” It is a difficult judgment call. It is a bit like a game show—take the prize or play on—and I am sure the hon. Member for Darlington has had many sleepless nights about what is being offered. In most cases, there is an agreement and the individual making the claim is content with what is offered. Some will want their day in court, but that is not always a good idea.

What the Minister said about nuclear test veterans was interesting. I accept the point about operations—the MOD loves to give things “operation” names—but in that case, which is one I know well, and I know the medical evidence, having read it as a Minister, the Government argued in 2009 that it was time-limited. In terms of overseas operations, it was overseas.

[Mrs Lewell-Buck]

The Minister said that nuclear veterans would not be classed as having been on overseas operations under the Bill, yet as I read clause 1(6), which defines what “overseas operations” are, my understanding is that nuclear veterans would be included.

[Mr Jones]

The Minister says not. It will be interesting to see whether we can have definite clarification. That case was taken against the MOD in the mid-2000s for events that took place in the 1950s and 1960s, so it was clearly time-expired by anyone’s standards.

I am not arguing that we should not have time limits, which are there for very good reasons, but there need to be exceptions to allow for people who fall outside them. In that case in 2009, the MOD refused the case based on time limits, but it went before Judge Foskett who ruled that it should go forward because of new evidence from a study in New Zealand—I am racking my brains for what the study was, as I read the huge scientific document at the time. Subsequently, it failed, which shows that getting past the Limitation Act does not mean that a case is somehow a dead-cert. The facts of the case must still be argued in court and can be resisted, as they were in this case. However, people were given a right.

If that work had been classed as an overseas operation under the Bill, those people would not have had any right to get their day before a judge to argue the case. That could apply to other similar group litigation—there is such litigation from more than one person or a number of individuals—or to individuals. We have been dancing on the head of a pin about the numbers, with the Minister saying that 94% of cases are brought within time. That is fine, and I have no problem with that, but that leaves 6% that are not. If that affects one person, as I said, that is one person too many. With that brief contribution, I commend the amendment to the Committee.

[Johnny Mercer]

The amendments propose changing technical parts of the Bill, so I hope hon. Members will bear with me as I try to address them in turn. These amendments are aimed at making changes to the point from which the clock starts running for both personal injury and death claims, as well as Human Rights Act claims relating to overseas operations. The amendments mean that for these types of claims the longstop clock would run from the claimant’s date of knowledge only and will not also run from the date of the relevant incident or act.

Taking amendments 76 to 87 first, in relation to the personal injury longstops contained in schedules 2, 3 and 4, there are several problems with this effect. The longstop is already able to run from the claimant’s date of knowledge under the existing law. This Bill does not change that position. We consider that the definition of the date of knowledge in section 14 of the Limitation Act 1980, and its Scottish and Northern Irish counterparts, is satisfactory and works well in practice. There is no reason why the date of knowledge for overseas operations claims should be defined differently. It is therefore not necessary to replace this definition with a new one.

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Moving on, amendments 73 to 75 and amendment 92 propose changes to the Human Rights Act longstop. Amendment 73 would increase the time period, which runs from the date of knowledge, from 12 months to six years, and means that the longstop will run from the date of knowledge only and not also from the date of the act. The date of knowledge provision in this Bill is new for Human Rights Act claims relating to overseas operations, the primary time limit for which currently runs only from the date of the act.

[Mr Jones]

On a point of order, Mr Mundell. Can the Minister slow down? I am finding it difficult to understand all that he has to say.

[The Chair]

That is not a point of order, but I am sure that the Minister will accommodate it.

[Johnny Mercer]

I am more than happy to slow down. The date of knowledge provision in this Bill is new for Human Rights Act claims relating to overseas operations, the primary time limit for which currently runs only from the date of the act. We introduced the date of knowledge to mitigate the risk of any unfairness that might be experienced by claimants as a result of the new absolute longstop.

We chose 12 months for the relevant time period because this aligns with the primary limitation period in the Human Rights Act, which requires claimants to bring their claims within one year of the relevant act. We therefore consider 12 months to be a reasonable period for claimants to gather the necessary evidence to bring their claim.

Amendments 74 and 75 aim to change the definition for the new date of knowledge set out in clause 11. We consider that the definition in clause 11 is comprehensive and fair to both claimants and the MOD. It does not replicate section 14 of the Limitation Act 1980, for example, because parts of that definition do not make sense in the context of Human Rights Act claims. Similarly, amendment 75 proposes new parts for the date of knowledge definition that do not work in the context of Human Rights Act claims.

Lastly, amendment 92 removes an important part of the date of knowledge definition, which adds an objective element to the test. This ensures that claims cannot be brought indefinitely if a victim has failed to take reasonable steps to gain the relevant knowledge.

These amendments are simply not necessary. The existing definitions of the date of knowledge are comprehensive and fair, and there is no good reason why the longstops cannot run from both the date of the incident or the act, as well as the date of knowledge. These amendments will unnecessarily complicate the Bill and cause confusion.

I will address two of the points raised by the hon. Member for Islwyn about education for those who are in the armed forces. Running alongside and in tandem with this Bill, if it becomes law, will be a significant education effort through a series of annual tests that we will give to our service personnel. I am more than happy to write to the hon. Gentleman about that.

I understand the points made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, but they are not within the scope of the Bill. The nuclear test veterans and the other pre-1987 cases that he talked about are not covered by the Bill. A lot of today’s debate has been outside the context of the Bill. I do not know what the point is of continuing to bring up cases that are unaffected by the legislation that we are discussing. I have huge sympathy for nuclear test veterans and for others. Indeed, I lobby hard for the recognition that I think we all want to see for those people, but none of that is covered by this legislation. That is worth remembering.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Johnny Mercer]

No, not at this stage. I therefore recommend that these amendments are withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

As a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I would like to clarify what my hon. Friend just said. The report did not say that UK personnel were involved in the torture of individuals, but it was clear that they were present and that there were cases where rendition was conducted on behalf of the United States. However, I do not think there was any evidence that people were directly involved in torture.

[Stephen Morgan]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his clarification. I am quoting from the charity, but I thank him for putting that on the record.

Reprieve’s written evidence continues:

“In the period between these acts of mistreatment occurring and their exposure by the ISC, survivors of these abuses would have been barred from redress by this bill.

UK courts already have powers to strike out civil claims that disclose ‘no reasonable grounds’, including those which are vexatious or ‘obviously ill-founded’. The Court’s discretion to extend the limitation period for civil claims under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 is already subject to a full and rigorous assessment of all the circumstances of the case, including the reasons tending against extending time such as the impact of delay on the quality of the evidence available. Moreover, claims under the Human Rights Act 1998 must be brought within a year unless good reason can be shown as to why the claim was not brought sooner—a far tighter limitation period than almost all other areas of law.

Far from protecting soldiers’ interests, the bill, designed to benefit the Ministry of Defence, will fundamentally harm UK soldiers…The bill will have a very significant impact on the ability of UK soldiers and former soldiers to bring claims of this kind…As former Attorney General Dominic Grieve has highlighted, this raises the real prospect that the beneficiary of this bill ‘is not so much the personnel of the armed forces but the government, which is thereby protected from facing what may be wholly deserving late claims.’ Reprieve recommends that the Overseas Operations Bill be amended to ensure that survivors of abuses, as well as UK soldiers, do not face absolute time bars to bringing claims for serious human rights abuses, such as torture. ”

The evidence—not just from Reprieve, but from the Government’s former Attorney General— makes it clear that this legislation will not ensure the proper rights that are our service personnel deserve. Indeed, it is true to say that the path to justice would become more difficult and protect the MOD, not our service personnel. Does the Minister really intend to pass a Bill that would actively build barriers to the route to justice for the victims of torture and servicepeople with other injuries? Is that what our armed forces deserve?

Those are not the only examples of where potential injustices of this nature could occur. Take the case of Mark Bradshaw, which was reported in The Times last year and which we heard about earlier today. He was awarded £230,000 as a settlement, but he fears that the proposed legislation could discriminate against people who do not develop PTSD or receive a diagnosis until many years later. He called the plan to impose a time limit on claims “horrendous”.

We also heard earlier about the claim from the marine who left service due to hearing loss. The MOD admitted liability and made no argument about his case being brought out of time. However, the time limit in the Bill would have eliminated all the aspects of the claim relating to the marine’s extensive service overseas. The claim could have been made only in relation to negligent exposure in the UK. It might not have been possible to isolate the extent and effect of negligent exposure in the UK, making it very difficult to claim any redress at all.

Is the Minister willing to turn his back on those troops? Why are some medical conditions worthy of justice, and not others? I urge the Minister to work with us. Put party politics to one side and build a consensus around the Bill that is worthy of our troops, who set out to achieve what they need to achieve. Does the Minister really intend to pass a Bill that would actively build barriers to the route to justice for victims of torture and servicepeople with other injuries? Is that what our armed forces deserve? Finally, is he satisfied that the Bill in its current form will prevent troops who are suffering from conditions such as PTSD, or even torture, from receiving justice?

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Leo Docherty.)

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill (Sixth sitting)

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 14th October 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I hope everyone had an enjoyable lunch. When we left off, I was still talking about investigations and what came through in the evidence we took. Mr Stringer, you and I are old enough to remember when Public Bill Committees did not hold evidence sessions. The process is far better now, because it informs the debate and our progress. Certainly, our witnesses gave valuable evidence, and from a variety of different positions. The one thing that did come through, however, was the lack of any reference in the Bill to investigation.

This morning I referred to Nick Parker’s comment that

“part 1 of the Bill focuses entirely on the process of prosecution, whereas for me the big issue here is the process of investigation”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 94, Q188.]—

and of reinvestigation. Major Campbell gave some very good evidence—I think everyone had sympathy—about how he had spent 17 years under investigation and reinvestigation.

Last Thursday we had the Judge Advocate General before us. I was amazed that he had not even been consulted on the Bill before it was introduced. I would have thought that he, as the leading judge in the service justice system, would be a good starting point to run things by. He said in evidence:

“My concern relates to investigations, not prosecutions; but there are a number of issues”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 115, Q231.]—

that need addressing. He also accused the Government of

“looking at the wrong end of the telescope”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 116, Q246.],

which is a good analogy for how they have approached the subject. We have been blindsided by the disgraceful case of Phil Shiner, which concentrated on the number of vexatious claims. I will put on the record again that I thoroughly condemn that individual, but I think that the process that we had did deal with him, in terms of regulation.

I will now turn to the two amendments that stand in my name, amendment 2 and new clause 6. We did not get a chance to talk about amendment 2, which is also about investigations. It seeks to insert into clause 3:

“the thoroughness, promptness and efficacy of any ongoing investigation into the alleged conduct or any relevant previous investigation, and the reasons for any delays in such investigations”.

The purpose of that is to ensure that we get timely investigation. I will move on shortly to new clause 6, which talks about judicial oversight, because that is important, but we do not want to get into a situation in which the service military police or other people simply say, “Well, we’re not going to investigate because it’s too difficult.” We need oversight, but amendment 2 puts the focus on looking at the investigation, not only to ensure an adequate investigational process, but to give particular weight to the prosecution. In considering a case, therefore, a prosecutor should be able to consider the efficiency of the process and previous investigations that have taken place.

As a statement of principle, I would like the Bill to consider more effectively the way in which the investigation function in the military justice system can be amended. I am sorry that the Government do not seem to accept that that should be part of the Bill. I think I referred to it this morning. At least I know why the civil servants are not accepting that. The obvious thing to have done with the Bill would have been to have put it with the armed forces Bill that will be coming through next year. If there is one thing that I know from my experience of civil servants, it is that they like tidiness, and this process is not tidy. That would have been a better way of doing it.

[Liz Twist (Blaydon) (Lab)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that witness after witness in the evidence sessions pointed to the centrality of good-quality investigation in removing the problem of vexatious and pluralistic claims?

[Mr Jones]

Yes, and in a moment or two I will cover the important point that my hon. Friend raises. It is about efficiency in dealing with claims through an early process, so that when the evidence is not going to go anywhere, a claim can be dropped. As the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire said this morning, that is good for the efficiency of the system as well as for the individual. As Lieutenant Colonel Parker said, it is not just the prosecution case, but the mental torture that people go through when waiting for that. It would help servicemen and women going through that process to have an early resolution.

We did not get to discuss new clauses 6 and 7, so I will speak to them now. I understand, Mr Stringer, that they will be voted on at the end of this process. Is that correct?

[The Chair]

We are debating clause 1 stand part and we will vote on clause 1 stand part at the end of the debate.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

One of the important things about the process is that we have judicial oversight of whatever happens. That is important for making the system robust and fair, both for those complaining and for those accused, as well as in relation to our international obligations. We have been a beacon of light in ensuring that we have an independent judiciary in this country, and it is important that we have oversight of that. Judge Blackett suggested things that could do that, and that could also make the system more efficient.

New clause 6 proposes to bring in judicial oversight of investigations. It would allow the judge advocate, once an investigation has come to its preliminary conclusions, to look at the evidence in the allegation as soon as possible, but no later than 6 months, and the judge, not the Ministry of Defence or the chain of command, would then make an assessment. It is important that the assessment is made by the judge advocate, who is part of the judiciary. The judge advocate would have

“the power to determine—

(a) that no serious, permanent or lasting psychological or physical injury has been caused; and order that the investigation should cease”.

If, at that stage, an indication was taken that the case was going nowhere, that would knock out all the vexatious cases, which is what we are trying to get at here. It would allow the individual who has been accused to move on. It would have the strength of having a judge make that decision. The clause moved this morning takes away more minor offences, allowing us to get down to the serious cases that need to be investigated and prosecuted.

[Chris Evans (Islwyn) (Lab/Co-op)]

My right hon. Friend is rightly seen as an expert on defence matters, having been in this House for a number of years. I wonder whether we could have the benefit of his experience. In his experience, both as a Minister and as a member of the Bill Committee, is he open to the suggestion that a number of these investigations are taking so long because of failures within the Ministry of Defence, and that that is why we have arrived where we are?

[Mr Jones]

Yes. That is the problem. How do we get at it? Is it about a lack of resource? I think it is. Going back to Iraq and Afghanistan, as I said this morning, there was huge pressure from all sides, including the Conservative Opposition at the time, that these things had to be seen to be investigated to the nth degree. There was a culture, which led to a resistance to say in some cases, “There is no evidence to stand those.” If that was done politically, I understand why people have issues with that.

However, if there were a judicial process, which new clause 6 provides for, overseen by a judge, that would give confidence to the public and the international community, in relation to our obligations, that this was being done not for political reasons but because a judge had determined independently what the facts are. It would certainly help.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)]

In response to a question the right hon. Gentleman raised last week, Judge Blackett said, in relation to the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980, that

“a great raft of those allegations in IHAT and Northmoor would have gone with that.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 122, Q254.]

Is that not the right hon. Gentleman’s point? Much of what the Bill seeks to do could easily have been dealt with through existing legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

Well it could, but I am a defender of the service justice system, because I think it is unique. There are those who want to abolish the service justice system, who ask, “Why aren’t these tried in the civil courts?” I am against that, and I always have been, because of the unique nature of the circumstances and the way the system works. It is an independent judiciary, not part of the MOD, so it has respect. Courts martial understand not only the special nature of service, but the circumstances that people are in.

My fear is that this Bill will strengthen those who want to sweep away what they see as giving special privilege to the armed forces. I do not see it that way at all. It gives those men and women who go before it the chance to be judged by an informed judiciary, which deals with certain cases. That is the important point. Again, it comes back to judicial oversight.

New clause 6 states, in subsection (3)(b), that a judge can determine

“that the evidence is of a tenuous character because of weakness or vagueness or because of inconsistencies with other evidence, and that it is not in the interests of justice to continue an investigation”.

The judge would look at the evidence and make a judgment about the validity of the original claim, as well as what the investigation has thrown up. If the judge were subsequently to decide that the case should go no further, that is defendable, because it would be the judge’s decision.

Subsection (3)(c) presents the other side, where the judge may decide

“that there is merit in the complaint; and make directions as to the timetable and extent of further investigation.”

Clearly, if the judge looks at the evidence after six months and says, “Actually, there is a case here, and further leads from the investigation need to be taken forward,” it is important that that is allowed to happen. That is not stopping prosecutions or interfering in any way with the investigative process; it is reviewing the evidence and whether it will go forward. It would also give directions to set a timescale for that investigation to be completed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

Again, the hon. Member asked Judge Blackett question last week in relation to Marine A. Judge Blackett responded that

“a number of the issues here were raised by Marine A subsequently through the Criminal Cases Review Commission and back to the Court of Appeal, and they were never raised at first instance. Had he”—

Marine A—

“raised them at first instance—had all the psychiatric evidence that came out eventually appeared at the start—he probably would have been charged with manslaughter rather than murder”, ––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 124, Q262.]

which is what he was charged with. It was actually on the second appeal that it was overturned and the prosecution was for manslaughter. Does the right hon. Member agree that the process is at fault and that, to improve that, the Government need to make substantial changes and investments in the process, rather than with the Bill?

[Mr Jones]

It is the process. I am glad that the hon. Member has mentioned the case of Marine A, because the way it was dealt with worries me. People might not be familiar with it. It was an individual who was on operations in Afghanistan and shot, on camera, a wounded Taliban fighter. That case did not come about through an ambulance-chasing lawyer; it came about because somebody filmed the shooting and was so horrified by it that they handed in the video. That was not an ambulance-chasing lawyer saying, “This man’s killed somebody in cold blood.” That case is important.

The process being adopted concerns me for two reasons. My first concern, on the point we raised last week, is about the support that servicemen and women are getting while they are going through the process. Clearly, in that case, the individual did something that goes against everything that members of the armed forces are trained to do. But when we look at the overall envelope of what he had been up to—the psychological trauma and the other things he had been through—we could explain it not as murder, but as manslaughter. Again, if that case had gone through this type of system, it would have led to those issues around the individual’s mental health, which do not excuse his actions but obviously had an impact on what happened, and to the first issue being seen as manslaughter, which would have been a fairer way of dealing with it.

My second concern about the Bill is that if that happened more than five years after that case, the presumption would have been not to prosecute. There would then have been a political decision, because the Attorney General would be deciding on prosecution. That individual could then end up before the International Criminal Court, because we would deem that we had not prosecuted.

There was a media maelstrom around the case. As with many such cases that we have all dealt with, it got a nice headline in the Daily Mail or The Sun, but there were obviously more details to it. If we have a similar case in future on which there is to be a political decision, it will be a strong politician or Attorney General who will turn around and say, “Yes, I want to prosecute this person.” There would then be the danger of the International Criminal Court picking up the case. Whereas in the process that I am proposing in new clause 6, the judge would review all the evidence, including, in that case, whether he should have been charged with murder in the first place when it went to court or to appeal—and no, he should not have been.

As many Committee members have said, and certainly, having spoken to members of the armed forces and veterans, they do not want to be above the law; they want to be treated fairly. That is what we are here to ensure. I have spoken to the individuals involved in the Marine A case, who explained the reasons why it happened, which I understand. It did not fulfil the high standards that are expected of the armed forces. In that case, it is about being fair to members of our armed forces, and ensuring that we are doing the right thing. Again, the combination of new clause 8, which we debated this morning, and new clause 6 would start to reduce that pile of potential litigants, even if they came from vexatious lawyers or elsewhere.

The other issue, which I can never get my head around, is the idea that the same case can be reinvestigated, as in the Campbell case. That is just ridiculous. There must come a time when we have to say, “Well, it has been looked at in detail. There has been evidence.” There might be a delay to trawl for witnesses and other evidence, but in effect what that says is, “Basically, we will do a fishing exercise until we get the answers that we want.” That cannot be right.

My new clause 7 addresses some of the limitations around investigations. I think we on this Committee all want thorough investigations, and so do members of the armed forces; what they do not want is endless reinvestigations that go on for, in the Campbell case, 17 years. New clause 7 would put limitations on reinvestigation. The section applies where

“(a) a person has been acquitted of an offence relating to conduct on overseas operations,”

so it would apply to those individuals.

I know this is not within the scope of this Bill, and I am sure you would pull me up, Mr Stringer, if I mentioned other areas, but that is the problem with the title of the Bill: some of the things in here should apply to members of the armed forces if the offence was committed on the UK mainland, but they do not. That is why I come back to the point that it would be better to do these things in the Armed Forces Bill next year and to take a holistic approach. Obviously, there are political reasons why this Bill is being rushed forward, to meet a manifesto 100-day commitment. However, I think some of these things should apply in the UK, but they will not with this Bill, and no doubt they will have to be picked up in the Armed Forces Bill.

The section also applies where

“(b) a determination has been made that an investigation into an offence relating to such conduct should cease under section (Judicial oversight of investigations).

(2) No further investigation into the alleged conduct shall be commenced unless—

(a) compelling new evidence has become available”.

Again, this is about trying to stop that reinvestigation, but having judicial oversight. The judge advocate determines

“the totality of the evidence against the accused”,

and sees whether it is strong enough such that

“there is a real possibility that it would support a conviction.”

Let us go to the Campbell case: if that case came forward again, the judge would have to look at the evidence and see whether the material circumstances had changed since the last time the offence was looked at. The strength of doing it this way, rather than as proposed in this Bill, is that it is not about limitations of time and the presumption against prosecution; a judge will look at the evidence and there will be a process. That would avoid the reinvestigation of such complaints.

If there is compelling new evidence, I think we would all agree—not just in the military justice system, but in a civil case—that we would want it to be looked at again. That links to the time limits on investigations, which for the individual concerned would not then stretch out for an indeterminate length of time.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

Regarding proposed new subsection (a) on new evidence, in evidence to the Committee last Thursday, in response to the hon. Member for Wrexham, the judge advocate gave as an example the six Royal Military Police who were sadly killed at Majar al-Kabir in 2003. Would this not allow us parity of esteem in the international judicial system? If new evidence came out in Iraq, we would demand that the Iraqi Government prosecute the individuals responsible for the murder of those six Royal Military Police.

[Mr Jones]

Yes, I remember that case—it was awful, if you read the background to it. The Bill is basically saying, “We are going to do something different from what we expect of other people.” I am sorry, but that is just not acceptable. We have a high standard in this country of judicial law and the rule of law and, as I said earlier, we should be a beacon. We should say, “This is something we are proud of.” Anything that changes that would be detrimental, and not only to the armed forces, for the reasons that have been raised. It is just logic that, if new evidence comes forward in a case, it must be looked at; just to say that the reason it cannot be looked at is that it has gone past a certain time period is wrong. If we dismiss new evidence without looking at it and having any judicial oversight of it, that would be a mistake.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Defence People and Veterans (Johnny Mercer)]

Let’s not be personal, Kevan.

[Mr Jones]

I am not being personal, but a Minister usually does more than read what is in front of him; he takes notes and engages. My proposals should be looked at seriously, because they would improve the Bill. The Minister says he wants to work with everybody, but he seems to have deaf ears when people make suggestions that would not harm but improve the Bill. It is not just me saying that, as someone who is passionate about protecting the armed forces; that is the evidence we have taken through this process. As I said earlier, that is the good thing about the process.

What would be the argument against accepting the new clauses? The only one I can see is that the Government want to deal with this next year in the Armed Forces Bill. Fair enough, but put them in now. They can be done now. We will not end up with any additional costs of process—in fact, that will save money. I know we do not have a money resolution with this Bill, so we cannot propose things that cost money, but I doubt whether those proposals will. As the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire said this morning, it is about making things efficient, and there are two wins here: one win with the process being slicker and quicker; and another win with the accused individual being dealt with fairly and robustly.

Turning to other parts of the clause, this morning we asked why five years, rather than 10, 15, 20 or whatever. I asked the Minister to justify that and I also asked about the numbers for who said what. He said they were in the impact assessment, but I could not find them when I looked at it at lunchtime in the Library, or where they are referred to. I would like the Minister to do what I thought he would do when he responded to my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South, which is to say, “Well, five years has been put forward for X reasons and 10 years was seen as too long”—or something like that—“and these were the people who argued for each.”

On balance, I agree, that some such things are at the end of the day political decisions, but we did not get that sort of response. I would still like an explanation for the decision of five years. I do not think that is in the impact assessment, on which, likewise—I have raised this with the Minister on the Floor of the House—there is confusion on the number of claims and the potential of those claims. The figures vary from 900 to 1,000, but there is no breakdown at all of whether those claims are from civilians or from members of the armed forces making claims against the MOD.

The other thing that concerns me is the presumption not to prosecute. I know of no other system where the presumption is written into a Bill to state, before anything is done, that someone will not be prosecuted. Again, my fear about that is that it will be seen as interfering with process. I am sure some people in Committee are old enough to remember the time before the Crown Prosecution Service, many years ago—this is the reason why we had that in this country—when police investigated and did the prosecution as well. Anyone who wants to know the reasons why that system failed—for example, in the Horizon case to which I referred earlier—should read last week’s excellent report of the Justice Committee, which criticised the arrangement whereby someone was both investigator and prosecutor.

The presumption in this Bill is worse than that, because we are saying, “We will presume that we are not going to prosecute.” I know that Ministers have said, “This does not mean that cases will not be prosecuted”, and I accept that, but the decision on whether a case should be prosecuted should be down to an independent judicial process; it should not be in the hands of the Attorney General, a Minister or anyone else to decide whether a case goes forward.

[Chris Evans]

My right hon. Friend has touched on this before. The issue is not prosecutions but the actual investigations. The question to ask is, how do we square proper and prompt investigations, where there is justice at the end, with this limitation on prosecution? Do the Government have this the wrong way around?

[Mr Jones]

I agree with Judge Blackett and General Nick Parker. What the Government have done is looked at the prosecution end of it, rather than at the investigation end of it. As I have said, Blackett referred to it as looking through the wrong end of a telescope. We all know what happened when we were kids—we looked through telescopes, which were quite good for seeing things that were far away. It is as though somehow we would not pick up on the detail of what can be seen. With the Bill, however, we can see the detail.

As I have just outlined, what is needed is proper investigation. No one is suggesting shortcuts in investigations. We need a proper system that has judicial oversight, which will ensure that it is fair on all sides, and that it is efficient. The next bit of it is prosecution, which has to be independent of Government. I have never seen it written into a Bill that, before there is an investigation, there is a presumption in law that there will be no prosecution. How would we do that? What is the purpose of investigating a case and going through details if, from the outset, there is a presumption that it will not be prosecuted? That is very difficult. It would be like you, Mr Stringer, burgling somebody’s house—I am not suggesting for one minute that you would do that. The authorities would then say, “We are going to investigate you, but the presumption”—not the decision, because I accept that you could still get prosecuted—“is that you are innocent and that you haven’t done it.” That is just nonsense and will not stand up. It will end up with judicial reviews, so we will not be free from the ambulance-chasing lawyers or the legal aid system, because if they can see that there is a buck to be made in that way, they will do it.

Likewise, on international comparisons, it comes down to the point that the Judge Advocate General made in his excellent letter to the Defence Secretary, to which I referred last week in evidence: he was not consulted on the Bill. When these cases go to the International Criminal Court for investigation, it will say, “Wait a minute. At the outset you had a presumption that you were not going to prosecute in these cases.” If we had a situation in which a case went forward, there would be a presumption against prosecution and there would be an investigation. If the Attorney General were to decide that the case did not go to prosecution, the International Criminal Court would have a field day. It would say, “Well, wait a minute. You’ve had a presumption against prosecution. You’ve had political interference, with the Attorney General making the final decision about whether a prosecution should take place.” I do not think that is compatible with our treaty obligations to the ICC.

I know that reference is often made to the Human Rights Act 1998 and that there is a tendency—not with you, Mr Stringer, because I know you are an expert on European matters—to think that somehow it is something to do with the European Union. It has nothing at all to do with the EU. It has a proud history, and we should be proud to have helped develop the idea of human rights after the second world war in order to ensure that we have the highest standards. My fear is that we will end up with servicemen and women before the International Criminal Court. I am sorry, but I do not want to see that. What I want to see is their being dealt with in our judicial legal system, which will end up with their getting better justice. It will be very difficult to explain to the public why servicemen and women end up in the International Criminal Court. If that happens, the next step is that we withdraw from the International Criminal Court and everything else. If we do that, it will affect our reputation in the world as a country that wants to uphold the rule of law and to tell China and other nations, “Look, these are the basic standards that you should adhere to.” It will be a godsend to them.

There are serious issues to do with clause 1, which I do not think the Minister has addressed. If we end up with fairness and justice for our servicemen and women but we do not have an efficient system, that needs to be changed. I repeat to the Minister that the Bill can be changed on Report in this place, and I am happy to work on the investigation issues with him. If new clauses to that effect were not perfectly written according to the Ministry of Defence, I would be quite happy to work on getting a form of words that we could all accept. I am a mild-mannered individual, as many people know, and I would quite happily let the Government table them and claim the credit. I am not looking for plaudits. What I want above everything is a good Bill, and the Bill as it stands is not a good one.

[Chris Evans]

I thank my right hon. Friend for a rather long, in-depth speech. I am sure that I will repeat some of the points that he raised, but I want to focus particularly on the measures that apply to events that occurred more than five years ago. The starting point for covering that time period is the date that the alleged conduct occurred. When an alleged offence continued over more than one day, the starting point for the five-year time period would be the last day on which the alleged conduct occurred. I believe that that needs a bit more probing and explanation.

As we know, the Defence Committee report “Protecting veterans by a Statute of Limitations” was supported on the presumption against prosecution for allegations that were more than 10 years old. I was extremely concerned that the proposals would not cover soldiers who had served in Northern Ireland through the troubles. It is said that the Ministry of Defence should ensure that sufficient resources are made available for educating the armed forces more regularly about their legal obligations.

Far be it from me to be personal, but when the Minister replies, I would like him to give further explanation of why he moved from the 10-year period agreed by the Defence Committee to the five-year period. The real issue here, as my hon. Friend said—sorry, my right hon. Friend; he is a member of the Privy Council and I should acknowledge that—is not so much the prosecution but the investigation. All soldiers who make the great commitment to serve our country in the armed forces need a prompt, fair, efficient and effective investigation before we reach prosecution.

I would like to cite the example of how alleged crimes in Iraq were investigated and how we have arrived at the current position. As many of us know, UK military operations in Iraq lasted from the start of the invasion on 20 March 2003 to the withdrawal of the last remaining British forces on 22 May 2011—an eight-year period. Alleged crimes by UK forces in Iraq have formed the subject of two public inquiries initiated by the Ministry of Defence between 2008 and 2009 to examine the death in custody of an Iraqi civilian, Baha Mousa, in September 2003, and allegations of unlawful killings in a street arising from the so-called battle of Danny Boy in May 2004.

In March 2010, the MOD established the Iraq Historic Allegations Team, to ensure that credible claims were properly investigated. The IHAT received a total of around 3,400 allegations of unlawful killings and ill treatment between 2010 and 2017—a period of seven years. However, in February 2017, the Defence Committee published its IHAT inquiry report, which notably criticised the team for alleged inefficiency and lack of professionalism. It called on the MOD to close it down and to provide financial and other support to UK servicemen under investigation. On the same day as the release of the inquiry’s report, the Defence Secretary announced the closure of the IHAT, ahead of the original schedule, citing IHAT’s own forecasts that the team’s caseload was expected to reduce to about 20 investigations by the summer of 2017. The IHAT was permanently shut down on 30 June.

The MOD said that military operations in Iraq have resulted in nearly 1,000 compensation claims for unlawful detention, personal injury and death, and about 1,400 judicial review claims, seeking investigations and compensation for alleged human rights violations. An investigation by the BBC “Panorama” programme and The Sunday Times found that the UK Government and the armed forces might have covered up the killing of civilians by British troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. The MOD has strongly rejected the allegations of cover-ups. I bring that up because it was a MOD investigation into a conflict that lasted eight years, and then seven years into that investigation it was shut down because of what it was doing.

The real problem we have is that the Bill does not stop the cycle of investigations. Restrictions apply solely to prosecutions. If we were to ask most people who have been investigated time and again, they would say it is the investigation that has caused the problems. Unless we resolve that, the Bill does not ensure that allegations are properly investigated and resolved—this is the point, Mr Stringer—within a reasonable period. As I have said, service personnel would benefit from a focus on prompt and thorough investigations, rather than simply a limitation on prosecutions. That is why the amendments are so important. The investigations have to be judge led.

I agree that we have to resolve concerns about uncertainty and the delay for soldiers and litigants. On the other side, there are the victims. Some claims may have to go over five years for sound reasons. Injury may become problematic only after five years of post-traumatic stress disorder. Luckily, we live in a world where we have a better understanding of mental health and we are far more sympathetic to problems. In another life—14 years ago—I worked for Lord Touhig, who was involved when he was a Defence Minister with the shot-at-dawns. I am very proud that the last Labour Government granted them a pardon. I hope we never see a return to the bad old days when people were shot for alleged cowardice, when really they were suffering from terrible mental health problems.

That is what we have to guide ourselves with in this Bill. We face a mental health crisis. I was encouraged earlier when I moved the motion about UAVs, as the Minister accepted there was an issue of post-traumatic stress disorder and the need for more research. I know he has worked very hard in that area and I look forward to some of the outcomes of the work he is doing. I pay tribute to him for his work on that.

We have to accept that many of these claims will take longer. In some of these cases, it may take a long time for evidence to be gathered and to come to light, especially when we are dealing with complicated areas of law or complicated parts of operations in theatre. The Minister should look again at the five-year rule and make it 10 years, but it is more important that, alongside that, we look at how the investigations are conducted.

We should consider any time limit on prosecutions to be an intolerable barrier to justice. It is notable that the proposed five-year period halves the time period for prosecutions from the proposal of 10 years consulted on by the Ministry of Defence last year. A five-year limit makes it likely that the relevant overseas operation will still be in progress—I used the example of Iraq and Afghanistan at the beginning of my speech. That means investigations may have to be limited to while we are active in hostilities. That, again, is a barrier to justice.

The Judge Advocate General of the armed forces, Jeff Blackett, warned the Defence Secretary that this provision

“would encourage an accused person to frustrate the progress of investigation past the five-year point to engage a high bar for prosecution”.

When the Minister responds, I hope that he can lay out some guidelines on how we can stop anybody frustrating justice in that way.

[Mr Jones]

Is not an obvious way of doing that to adopt the new clause I spoke to, which would give judicial oversight?

[Chris Evans]

I alluded earlier to our good friend Lord Touhig, who advised me to always be careful of taking interventions, because they can ruin the end of your speech. I feel that that has happened here.

It is important to remember that the overwhelming majority of repeat investigations or delayed prosecutions in recent years have, as my right hon. Friend said, been the direct result of failures by the MOD itself. It is an issue within the MOD that needs to be resolved—whether it is a cultural issue or a rules-based issue, it needs to be resolved. I agree with what the Minister is trying to do because there are too many veterans, ex-servicemen and women, who are living in fear of repeat investigations. If they are living in fear of that, we must ask why these investigations are repeated over and over again, causing not only stress to their mental health but putting intolerable strain on their families.

Rather than measures that tackle the real reason behind the investigations that delay prosecutions, the Bill proposes unprecedented legal protections that will create a legal regime that mandates impunity for serious offences and, above all, inequality in law for the victims of abuse in our forces. Severely restricting the application of criminal law for certain categories of people accused of having committed offences including international crimes would violate the principle of equal application of the law, which is what our legal system is based on.

A multitude of sources suggest that crimes were committed on a large scale in Afghanistan and Iraq. That happened at least partly due to systemic issues—for instance, in 2013, in R. v. the Secretary of State for Defence, the UK High Court held that

“there might have been systemic abuses and that such abuses may have been attributable to a lack of appropriate training.”

If the problem is appropriate training, it is not a legislative solution that we need but a systemic solution from within the Ministry of Defence. In its 2018 report, the Ministry of Defence working group on systemic issues said that it considered:

“there was sufficient evidence to conclude that assaults in detention had occurred, and may have been systemic.”

International law imposes certain obligations on the UK, including the obligation not to put in place a legal framework that severely restricts or makes impossible the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes under international law committed in armed conflict, irrespective of where those crimes were committed. The proposed legislation severely limits the possibility of opening a full investigation in respect of Iraq or Afghanistan. Any measure that significantly limits the possibility of prosecuting international crimes, whether referred to as a statute of limitations or a statute of presumption against prosecution, risks undermining the UK’s hard-won role as a champion of the international rule of law and hence its ability to advance its agenda.

[Mr Jones]

The hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West made the point, in respect of the lack of training, that the real pressure is not on the chain of command but on the men and women in the frontline. Does my hon. Friend agree that, unfortunately, it is they who find themselves in these cases rather than those higher up in the chain of command who have equal responsibility for some of the actions?

[Chris Evans]

I agree; it is often ordinary squaddies or ratings who find themselves in these circumstances simply because they were following orders. If we are talking about training, we do live in a different world, a modern world. I have already spoken about our shot-at-dawn campaign, which my right hon. Friend is involved in. We have to realise that our modern armed forces are constantly evolving in a changing world, and our training should reflect that, whether it is for an ordinary rating or top brass in the armed forces. It is important that we focus on training. The Government have the numbers and they will pass the Bill, but the way to change the culture of ongoing prosecutions is to start with the training of our troops, whether in command or on the front line.

To return to the point I was making, the code for Crown prosecutors already has ample criteria to provide guidance on whether prosecution should take place. This includes an evidential stage, followed by a public interest stage. The evidential stage concerns an independent prosecutor’s assessment of whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction. The public interest stage guidance involves considerations such as the seriousness of the alleged offence, the level of capability of the offender, the circumstances of and the harm caused to the victim, the suspect’s age and maturity at the time of the offence, the impact of the offending on the community, whether prosecution is a proportionate response and whether sources of information require protecting.

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

Clause 1(3) applies where,

“the alleged conduct took place (outside the British Islands)”,

at a time when the person was “subject to service law” under the Armed Forces Act 2006, and “deployed on overseas operations.” There is no further limit on the remaining provisions of the proposed new clause, which means they must therefore apply to all investigations on overseas operations committed by service personnel. For context, there were in the region of 3,000 service police investigations in Iraq and 1,000 in Afghanistan. The majority of those will have been committed by persons subject to service law. It is not considered feasible for such numbers of investigations to be brought in front of a judge, and to do so would undoubtedly add further delays to the process.

Proposed new subsection (2) states:

“The police force investigating the conduct must place their preliminary findings before an allocated judge advocate as soon as possible, but no later than 6 months after the alleged offence was brought to their attention.”

The service police are independent. That independence is enshrined in law in section 115A of the Armed Forces Act 2006. It is common practice for them to consult prosecutors in the course of an investigation and for that discourse to shape an investigation, but this is discourse, not direction. Any obligation on the service police to police their investigation before a person who has control over the final determination of that matter seriously compromises the independence and is therefore contrary to section 115A.

New clause 6 states that the allocated judge advocate may order an investigation to cease should it be determined,

“that no serious, permanent or lasting psychological or physical injury has been caused”—

presumably by the alleged conduct. Again, it would be hard to determine whether that was the case without investigation, a matter complicated by being on overseas operations. Proposed new subsection (3)(b) gives the judge advocate the power to order that an investigation should cease if it is determined,

“that the evidence is of a tenuous character because of weakness or vagueness or because of inconsistencies with other evidence, and that it is not in the interests of justice to continue an investigation”.

That proposed new paragraph is equally problematic; only in the most clear-cut cases can the police produce evidence entirely without some area of weakness or vagueness. Difficult operational investigations are particularly prone to those problems, but the relationship with the prosecutor will allow them to be explored and the progression of the investigation adapted accordingly. Furthermore, inconsistency with other evidence is a factor in all investigations and is what the trial process is created to explore. For a judge advocate to be placed into such a process, rather than relying on the relationship between police and prosecutor, risks adding delay to the investigation, and for a judge to order the cessation of an investigation risks cutting it short where evidence has not yet been gathered due to the complex nature of operational inquiries.

Finally, proposed new subsection (3)(c) seeks to give the judge advocate the power to direct the timetable and extent of further investigation if it is determined that there is merit in the complaint. However, the clause does not specify whether the judge advocate would have continued oversight, or some ability to enforce the timetable and direction. Again, that would place an additional burden on police who, in an operational theatre, responding to operational events, would now have an added layer of bureaucracy placed on them by someone who is not deployed and cannot possibly understand the unique pressures experienced by the deployed police officer. That would remove the discretion that all police officers must have to carry out prompt, independent and effective investigations, and hamper their decision making. That is not the same as the police relationship with the prosecutor, and here I return to my point about discourse versus direction. Discourse allows the police to retain the discretion so vital to acting in response to events; direction fetters their decision making.

The proposed clause is based on the false premise that police carry out unmeritorious or vexatious investigations. It would undermine the relationship between the police and prosecutors and fetter the police in the conduct of investigations in difficult circumstances. It would place an additional and unnecessary cog in a system that does not need it.

New clause 7 fails to take account of the processes involved in investigations. It fails to make clear the difference between an investigation and a reinvestigation and it fails to understand the processes involved in gathering evidence. The proposed clause applies where a person has been acquitted of an offence relating to conduct on overseas operations. It is assumed that this envisages a situation in which a person is acquitted at court martial, but it should be noted that it could also apply to a matter that is heard at a summary hearing in front of a commanding officer, following on from an investigation that did not involve the police. It also applies where a determination has been made by a judge advocate that an investigation into an offence should cease, which, as I have already stated, risks prematurely cutting short an investigation whose progress is impacted by its being an operational investigation.

The new clause proposes that there be no further investigation into the alleged conduct unless compelling new evidence becomes available and an allocated judge advocate determines that the totality of the evidence against the accused is sufficiently strong that there is a real possibility that it would support a conviction. I will take this step by step.

An investigation is a hard thing to define in law. It starts when inquiries begin, and its purpose is to determine whether what little information there is to start with is credible, and to gather more evidence in support of that. The process of finding out whether evidence is compelling is called an “investigation”. It is hard to see how, people having been told to cease an investigation, no further investigation—whether new or a continuation of the earlier investigation—can be commenced unless some form of compelling new evidence becomes available. The only way the police can determine whether the new evidence is compelling is by carrying out the investigation that they are not allowed to carry out. This becomes a circular issue.

Additionally, no further investigation into the alleged conduct may be carried out unless the allocated judge advocate determines that the totality of the evidence against an accused, which presumably has had to come from some sort of investigation that the police are not allowed to conduct, is sufficiently strong that there is a real possibility that it would support a conviction.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Johnny Mercer]

Not at this stage.

Where a person has been acquitted and new evidence comes to light, it would be necessary for there to be a further investigation before a prosecutor could determine whether a new prosecution could and should be brought. That is not a decision for the police; it is a decision for the prosecutor. To prevent the investigation would prevent a prosecutor from having the information that they need to make that determination.

Unfortunately, new clause 7 is not clear enough to allow a real debate on what it is seeking to achieve. The only way the police can determine whether new information is “compelling” or “sufficiently strong” to “support a conviction” is to carry out an investigation. A thorough investigation is important. As I said earlier, it can serve to exculpate, which is a good thing for the reputation of our armed forces, as well as to incriminate. The Bill should not, and does not, seek to fetter the police from carrying out investigations. It seeks to ensure that prosecutors are in a position to make prosecutorial decisions based on information that can be gleaned only through thorough investigations.

With the discourse between prosecutor and investigator, a balance must be struck between further investigation and the realistic prospect of conviction, and this includes the measures in the Bill that the prosecutor must take account of.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Johnny Mercer]

Not at this stage.

However, this does not need further clauses that seek to fetter that discourse. It needs the lightest touch, which is achieved through the balanced and established relationship between police and prosecutor.

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

I assume that the hon. Gentleman is talking about Judge Blackett, who is the Judge Advocate General. He made some keen points. I have met Judge Blackett and we have tried to incorporate his work in the Bill, where appropriate. The idea that new evidence is presented and we do not prosecute is simply not the case. With reference to the six individuals killed at Majar al-Kabir in 2003, if new evidence is presented in that case, we would expect the Iraqis to prosecute. If new evidence emerges in cases against servicemen and women, they can still be prosecuted beyond these timelines. The legislation is simply bringing integrity and rigour to the process.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Johnny Mercer]

No, I am going to make some progress.

Under the Bill, the first condition establishes that the measures will only apply to members of the armed forces, both regulars and reserves, and to members of British overseas territory forces operating as part of UK forces when deployed on operations outside the British Islands, as defined in clause 7. Although we do deploy other Crown servants and contractors on overseas operations, those individuals are not deployed on front-line military operations and are not ordinarily exposed to the same risks and dangers as service personnel. It is not therefore appropriate to extend the protection provided by the measures in part 1 for our service personnel and veterans to other Crown servants or contractors.

The first condition in the legislation also requires that the alleged conduct occurred while the person was deployed on an overseas operation during which personnel came under attack or faced the threat of attack or violent resistance. Operations conducted outside the UK are vastly different from those conducted inside the UK. Within the UK, the military only ever operate in support of the civil authorities. With the exception of Operation Banner, which was an absolutely unique circumstance, UK operations rarely, if ever, require our personnel to operate in the same sort of hostile, high-threat environments they face on overseas operations. Excluding Northern Ireland, there are no outstanding historical allegations relating to operations in the UK.

Be assured that we have not forgotten our Northern Ireland veterans. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will be bringing forward separate legislation to address the legacy of the past in a manner that focuses on reconciliation, delivers for victims and ends the cycle of re-investigations into the troubles in Northern Ireland, which has failed victims and veterans alike. That will deliver on our commitment to Northern Ireland veterans.

The second condition for the measures to apply is that the alleged offence must have occurred over five years ago, with the start date being the date of the offence. Where an alleged offence occurred over a period of days, the start date will be the last day of that period. It is vital that investigations into historical allegations are brought to resolution without undue delay. To provide greater assurance to our brave servicemen and women, we consider five years to be the most appropriate start point for the presumption.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 1—Ability to conduct a fair trial—

“The principle referred to in section 1(1) is that a relevant prosecutor making a decision to which that section applies may determine that proceedings should be brought against the person for the offence, or, as the case may be, that the proceedings against the person for the offence should be continued, only if the prosecutor has reasonable grounds for believing that the fair trial of the person has not been materially prejudiced by the time elapsed since the alleged conduct took place.”

This new clause replaces the presumption against prosecution with a requirement on a prosecutor deciding whether to bring or continue a prosecution to consider whether the passage of time has materially prejudiced the prospective defendant’s chance of a fair trial.

Both clause 2 and new clause 1 can be debated. We will not vote on new clause 1 until the end of the Bill when the new clauses are considered. At the end of this debate, I will collect voices for a vote on clause 2. The Minister has moved clause 2 formally. If there is any debate, he can respond. The new clauses will be moved formally when we get to them, but they can be debated now.

[Mr Jones]

Clause 2 is quite an important part of the Bill. I am sorry that the Minister did not allow me to ask him about his investigation point, because it has an impact on this clause. He said that there is no similar system of judicial oversight for investigations, but I have to say that there is. For example, the police will often refer cases to the Crown Prosecution Service prior to the conclusion of an investigation for advice on whether more information is needed to meet the threshold for a prosecution. That is one of the points that I was going to make if he had allowed me to intervene. Whatever his civil servants have written to him, I suggest that they look at that comparison and what that would have done.

It is interesting that the Minister said that he met the Judge Advocate General and tried to incorporate things. I would like to know what in the Bill was changed after his meeting with Judge Blackett. I cannot see anything, but if the Minister wants to give us that, either now or later, that would be fine.

The presumption in clause 2 is for it to be exceptional for a prosecutor to determine that proceedings should be brought in relation to an offence committed by members of the armed forces when deployed on operations abroad. On that presumption against prosecution, I think we will have real problems, as we have referred to already, with regard to our international standing. I ask for your guidance, Mr Stringer: am I allowed to speak to new clause 1, even though it is not being moved?

[The Chair]

New clause 1 is before us for debate. The Shadow Minister may or may not wish to press it when we get to the new clauses, but it is before us for debate now.

[Mr Jones]

New clause 1 states:

“The principle referred to in section 1(1) is that a relevant prosecutor makes a decision to which that section applies may determine that proceedings should be brought against the person for the offence or, as the case may be, that the proceedings against the person for the offence should be continued, only if the prosecutor has reasonable grounds for believing that the fair trial of the person has not been materially prejudiced by the time elapsed since the alleged conduct took place.”

We have already discussed this, but if a material time difference were to prevent someone from getting a fair trial, I do not think that anyone would deem it fair to prosecute them for a crime. That has been an issue in civil law. For instance, certain historical sexual abuse cases have been very difficult to determine. There is a balance between the case for the prosecution to, quite rightly, get justice for the victim, and for the accused to receive a fair trial given the lapse in time. The new clause makes a fair suggestion.

In the case of Major Campbell, the circumstances were very difficult. The differences between service justice and civilian life include the unique circumstances in which individuals operate and, as I have said, the fact that they serve overseas, where evidence and witnesses must be gathered. We must ensure that the accused gets a fair trial. I want this Bill to make the process fairer and more just for accused individuals in those unique circumstances. I keep coming back to that point: the circumstances are unique and very different.

I support new clause 1. I accept that it might not be expertly drafted, but if the Minister is sympathetic towards it, I urge him to at least ask a civil servant to redraft it so that it can be brought back as a Government amendment, or to suggest another way in which the proposal can be brought into effect. Judging by his attitude, I doubt he will do that for any of the proposed amendments.

[Johnny Mercer]

He’s a fan, isn’t he?

[Mr Jones]

I am not bad, actually. I am just trying to be helpful and to improve the Bill, but the Minister seems determined to push it through unamended. He might not like it, but this is the purpose of Parliament: it is about scrutinising legislation. I have tabled amendments that I do not necessarily agree with, but I have done so because we need to demonstrate to the public that all opinions have been aired in Committee. That is an important part of our democracy. Even with a Government majority of 80, a Minister cannot simply determine that their proposals go through on the nod. Likewise, just because something comes out of his lips, that does not necessarily make it right. Perhaps I can give the Minister some advice: he might be in a stronger position if he was prepared to stand up and argue, in a friendly way, some of the points made in the Bill. All he seems to be doing, however, is reading out a pre-prepared civil service brief. This is the first time I have seen that done in a Bill Committee.

On the presumption against prosecution, we have got things the wrong way around. As Judge Blackett said, by looking at prosecutions we are looking through the wrong end of the telescope. I think there are ways in which we can ensure that people do not have to face lengthy reinvestigations or an inordinately long wait before being taken trial, and, if they meet the threshold for prosecution, that they are not disadvantaged by the passage of time. It is worth exploring those issues. My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South asks, through the new clause, a reasonable question about time limits. If this is not the way to do it, what is?

[Stephen Morgan (Portsmouth South) (Lab)]

I rise to support new clause 1. I have said many times throughout this process that the Opposition will work constructively with the Government to get the Bill right, to protect armed forces personnel and their families. We believe that the intent of the Bill is well placed, but it has been poorly executed to achieve what Members on both sides of the House want—an end to vexatious claims that are misplaced, that are drawn out for years longer than they should be, and that place our troops and their families under incredible amounts of stress and pressure that they simply should not have to expect.

Our world-class personnel and their families deserve so much better. That is why it is so important that we get the Bill right. However, the presumption against prosecution does not resolve the issue that we all recognise. It does not afford our armed forces personnel the protection that they deserve. That is why, where the Opposition see an opportunity to improve the Bill, we will seek to highlight it. It is why we have tabled new clause 1, which we believe is fair. Crucially, it tackles the key issues of bringing to an end many of the vexatious claims against our armed services personnel—we want to make that commonplace—and of ensuring that decisions to prosecute are brought to a swifter conclusion. For that to happen, clause 2 in part 1 of the Bill must be removed and replaced by a new clause that replaces the presumption against prosecution with a requirement for a prosecutor who is deciding whether to bring or to continue a prosecution to consider whether the passage of time has materially prejudiced the prospective defendant’s chance of a fair trial.

The principle of a fair trial and consideration of the length of time that has passed during an investigation of our armed forces personnel is important for two reasons. First, it focuses on fairness. It ensures that our world-renowned legal system’s reputation remains intact. It does not undermine our international reputation and avoids the potential repercussions of our armed forces personnel being dragged to The Hague for violating international law. Secondly, it tackles the issue of lengthy investigations, which, sadly, some of our armed forces personnel have experienced and still are experiencing. More specifically, it requires the prosecutor to consider whether the passage of time in such investigations has materially prejudiced the chance of a fair trial for our armed forces service personnel and veterans.

It is not just the Opposition who have identified the flaws in clause 2 and where it could be improved. The International Committee of the Red Cross has raised these concerns, submitting them in written evidence. For context, and for those who are not aware, the ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organisation whose mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and others in situations of violence and to provide them with assistance. The ICRC is also the origin of the Geneva conventions, an international agreement of which our country is a proud original signatory.

In its evidence, the ICRC acknowledges that there are occasions on which discretion has developed to address cases in which prosecutions are not taken forward. At international level, article 53 of the International Criminal Court statute sets out a procedure to follow if,

“upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution because…A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime”.

The written evidence goes on to say, however, that the ICC Office of the Prosecutor said that

“only in exceptional circumstances will the Prosecutor of the ICC conclude that an investigation or a prosecution may not serve the interests of justice”.

Finally, under the heading, “The presumption in favour of investigation or prosecution”, the OTP notes:

“Many developments in the last ten or fifteen years point to a consistent trend imposing a duty on States to prosecute crimes of international concern committed within their jurisdiction”.

The written evidence gives rise to a number of considerations. Clause 2 states that there should be exceptional circumstances for a prosecutor to determine whether proceedings should be taken against armed forces personnel. However, as outlined in the ICRC submission, does the prosecution in the interests of justice, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age and infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, sound like an exception to the rule of when proceedings should be brought forward? Indeed, it seems more likely to be exceptional for such a case to not be progressed and brought forward. The OTP compounds that point by stating that

“only in exceptional circumstances will the Prosecutor of the ICC conclude that an investigation or a prosecution may not serve the interests of justice.”

Under the Bill as drafted, it will not be exceptional to not prosecute such cases. Indeed, it risks undermining our international reputation and legal obligations, and, as a consequence, risks our armed forces personnel being tried at the International Criminal Court instead of in British courts. That gives rise to the question: why are the Government so intent on taking this risk, undermining our reputation and legal obligations, and leaving our armed forces personnel exposed? Why have the Government included a clause that risks undermining a historic, momentous international convention in which our country played a key role and of which it is an original signatory? That is something that our country and armed forces are proud of, and it is a reason for the high regard in which we are held across the world. Why risk breaching it, particularly when this clause could put our armed forces personnel at greater risk of vexatious claims? The Bill would not protect them, as it intends to do.

Furthermore, according to the evidence submitted by ICRC, the OTP also notes that many developments

“in the last ten or fifteen years point to a consistent trend imposing a duty on States to prosecute crimes of international concern committed within their jurisdiction”.

Why would we wish to deviate from our colleagues and international security partners on such an important issue? What is the Government’s reasoning for this?

That is not the only evidence received by the Committee that underlines the issue of clause 2. During last week’s evidence sessions, we heard from Judge Blackett, the former Judge Advocate General, the most senior military judge in the country, who said:

“I have three concerns about the Bill. One is the presumption against prosecution”.—[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 116-17, Q234.]

He went on to say:

“I do not think that there should be a presumption against prosecution”.––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 121, Q248.]

Quite simply, if the most senior military judge in the country has clearly outlined that there should not be a presumption against prosecution in the Bill, what more do the Government need to understand that clause 2 should be removed? What advice and evidence have the Government taken to support their approach? Was the Judge Advocate General consulted? If not, why not? In summary, I hope the Government will listen to the points raised, remove clause 2, uphold our international reputation and obligations, and work with us to protect our troops and get this Bill right.

Finally, I ask the Minister to clarify what advice and evidence have the Government taken to support clause 2? Why do the Government wish to deviate from our colleagues and international security partners on such an important issue? What is the Government’s reasoning for this? Why have they included a clause that risks undermining a historic and momentous international convention in which our country played a key role and of which it is a key signatory? Why are the Government so intent on risking undermining our reputation and legal obligations and leaving our armed forces personnel exposed? I hope the Committee will get some answers from the Minister.

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[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way?

[Johnny Mercer]

I would absolutely love to.

[Mr Jones]

The Minister has referred to who he consulted when drawing the Bill. Can he expand on their comments, and is it possible to produce them as evidence for the Committee?

[Johnny Mercer]

We have already published a response to our consultation, which was widely available for everybody to see. We have also published a response that contains a lot of the conversations around this. As I have indicated, we have engaged with a number of different parties and have arrived at the decision that this was a fair and proportionate line to tread in order to achieve the effects that we are trying to achieve.

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[Johnny Mercer]

I will not give way at the moment, because I have addressed that point a number of times.

Clause 2, which the new clause would replace, sets out the principle of the presumption against prosecution, but it is to be exceptional for a prosecutor to determine that proceedings should be brought for an alleged offence that occurred in operations more than five years ago, as set out in clause 1. We have not sought to define “exceptional”, as we do not think it necessary or possible to provide an exhaustive definition. We intend, however, that the effect of clause 2 will be that when a prosecutor considers whether criminal proceedings should be brought or continued in relevant cases, there will be a presumption against prosecution, and that the threshold for rebutting that presumption will be high.

We also expect that the concept of “exceptional” will develop over time as cases are considered by prosecutors. I reinforce the point in clause 1(2): the presumption against prosecution does not impact on the prosecutor’s assessment as to whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution. It focuses instead on setting a high threshold for a prosecutor to determine that it is in the public interest to bring or to continue criminal proceedings in respect of offences committed by service personnel on operations more than five years ago.

Although the presumption will not directly impact on investigations, allegations of wrongdoing must, and will, continue to be investigated. We accept that, over time, this is likely to have an indirect impact. As prosecutors become familiar with the presumption, they should be able to advise investigators earlier in the process on whether the higher threshold of the new statutory requirement would be met in a particular case.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Johnny Mercer]

Not at the moment. Although that should therefore help to reduce the likelihood of investigations being reopened without new and compelling evidence, it does not create an absolute bar to investigations or prosecutions, as a statute of limitations or an amnesty would. Rather, the presumption is rebuttal, with the prosecutor retaining the discretion to prosecute where they determine that it would be appropriate to do so. That may include cases in which there is evidence that a serious offence has been committed.

In contrast, an amnesty or a statute of limitations for service personnel would be a breach of our international legal obligations and would pose significant challenges and risks. That includes the risk that, in the absence of a domestic system for the prosecution of international criminal offences, the International Criminal Court would assert its jurisdiction and bring prosecutions against members of the UK armed forces. The presumption against prosecution, however, is consistent with our international legal obligations, as it would not affect the UK’s willingness or ability to investigate or prosecute alleged offences committed by our service personnel.

Finally, the statutory presumption and the measures in clauses 3 and 5 will apply only to proceedings that start after the Bill has become law. Although alleged criminal offences relating to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan occurred more than five years ago, meaning that the presumption could be applied in any relevant prosecutorial decisions, it is likely that any remaining investigations of those allegations will be complete before the Bill becomes law. If any new credible allegations relating to Iraq and Afghanistan should arise, however, they will obviously be subject to investigation and, where appropriate, consideration by a prosecutor. Any decision to prosecute such a case after the Bill has become law must, in accordance with the presumption, be exceptional.

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[The Chair]

Order.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Matters to be given particular weight

[Mr Jones]

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 3, page 2, line 20, leave out

“(so far as they tend to reduce the person’s culpability or otherwise tend against prosecution)”.

This amendment would ensure that, in giving particular weight to the matters in subsection (2), a prosecutor may consider whether any matter tends to reduce or increase culpability, tending against or in favour of prosecution respectively.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 3, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

“(bb) the public interest in maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the Armed Forces;”

This amendment would ensure that a relevant prosecutor gives particular weight to maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the Armed Forces.

Amendment 4, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

“(bc) the nature of the alleged conduct, in particular whether it engaged the obligations of the United Kingdom under Articles 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights;”

This amendment would ensure that particular weight is given by a prosecutor where the alleged conduct engages the UK’s obligations under Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, Article 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced labour) or Article 5 (prohibition of arbitrary detention) ECHR.

Amendment 5, in clause 3, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

“(bd) whether the person had command responsibility for the alleged conduct, and to what extent;”

This amendment would ensure that particular weight is given by a relevant prosecutor where the person had command responsibility for the alleged conduct.

Amendment 13, in clause 6, page 4, line 13, at end insert—

“(3A) A service offence is not a ‘relevant offence’ if it is an offence whose prosecution is required under the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations.”

This amendment would exclude the prosecution of serious international crimes (such as torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain war crimes) from the limitations otherwise imposed by the Bill.

Amendment 58, in schedule 1, page 12, line 6, at end insert—

“13A An offence under section 1 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 (grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).

13B An offence under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (torture).”

This amendment adds to Schedule 1 specific reference to existing domestic offences in relation to torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, in a similar way to the treatment of sexual offences.

Amendment 6, in schedule 1, page 12, line 38, leave out paragraph 17 and insert—

“17 An offence under Part 5 (Offences under domestic law) of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 as it relates to the law of England and Wales.”

This amendment would mean that all offences listed in Part 1 of the International Criminal Courts Act 2001 as they related to the law of England and Wales would be excluded offences, without restriction.

Amendment 59, in schedule 1, page 12, line 39, at end insert—

“(za) an act of genocide under article 6, or”

This amendment would ensure that acts of genocide are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 60, in schedule 1, page 12, line 40, leave out

“a crime against humanity within article 7.1(g)”

and insert

“a crime against humanity within article 7.1(a)-(k)”.

This amendment would ensure that crimes against humanity are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 61, in schedule 1, page 12, line 41, leave out from beginning to end of line 2 on page 13 and insert—

“(b) a war crime within article 8.2(a) (which relates to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).”

This amendment would ensure that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 7, in schedule 1, page 13, line 12, leave out paragraph 20 and insert—

“20 An offence under Part 5 (Offences under domestic law) of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 as it relates to the law of Northern Ireland.”

This amendment would mean that all offences listed in Part 1 of the International Criminal Courts Act 2001 as they related to the law of Northern Ireland would be excluded offences, without restriction.

Amendment 62, in schedule 1, page 13, line 13, at end insert—

“(za) an act of genocide under article 6, or”

This amendment would ensure that acts of genocide are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 63, in schedule 1, page 13, line 14, leave out

“a crime against humanity within article 7.1(g)”

and insert

“a crime against humanity within article 7.1(a)-(k)”.

This amendment would ensure that crimes against humanity are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 64, in schedule 1, page 13, leave out lines 15 to 18 and insert—

“(b) a war crime within article 8.2(a) (which relates to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).”

This amendment would ensure that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 8, in schedule 1, page 13, line 28, leave out paragraph 23.

This amendment is consequential on amendments 6 and 7.

Amendment 9, in schedule 1, page 14, line 5, leave out paragraphs 27 to 30 and insert—

“27 An offence under Part 1 (Offences) of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001.”

This amendment would mean that all offences listed in Part 1 of the International Criminal Courts Act (Scotland) 2001 would be excluded offences, without restriction.

Amendment 65, in schedule 1, page 14, line 7, at end insert—

“(za) an act of genocide under article 6, or”

This amendment would ensure that acts of genocide are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 66, in schedule 1, page 14, line 8, leave out

“a crime against humanity within article 7.1(g)”

and insert

“a crime against humanity within article 7.1(a)-(k)”.

This amendment would ensure that crimes against humanity are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 67, in schedule 1, page 14, leave out lines 9 to 12 and insert—

“(b) a war crime within article 8.2(a) (which relates to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions).”

This amendment would ensure that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are also excluded from the Bill, alongside sexual offences.

Amendment 12, in schedule 1, clause 15, page 9, line 21, at end insert

“subject to subsection (2A).

(2A) Before making regulations under subsection (2), the Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament the report of an independent review confirming that the Act is in full compliance with the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations with respect to the prosecution of war crimes and other crimes committed during overseas operations.

(2B) This Act shall cease to have effect at the end of the period of five years beginning with the day on which it is brought into force, unless the Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor has, not fewer than four years after this Act has come into force, laid before Parliament the report of a further independent review confirming that the Act remains in full compliance with the United Kingdom’s international treaty obligations with respect to the prosecution of war crimes and other crimes committed during overseas operations.”

[Mr Jones]

The amendments we are debating relate to clause 3. I will first refer to amendment 3, which stands in my name. At the outset, I make clear that these are probing amendments; I am not going to push them to a vote, but they mean that the issues are at least going to get some scrutiny by the Committee, although based on the answers we have had so far, I am not sure we are going to get much response.

Particularly during the last bit on prosecutions, it would have been interesting to know whether, for example, the Crown Prosecution Service had agreed to clause 2 and what its thoughts on it were, because even though the Minister said it was consulted, I very much doubt it would agree with clause 2.

There is a difference between being consulted and agreeing with what comes out of the sausage machine at the end of the consultation. We want the public to have confidence not only in the Bill, but in the process. The Minister is right: the Government can consult who they like, but at the end of the day, they have to make decisions. What if those decisions fly in the face of what the Minister referred to as “campaign groups”? I do not consider the International Criminal Court and others “campaign groups”. These are obligations under international treaty, and, like my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South, I am concerned about our international reputation.

Amendment 3, which would amend page 2, line 33 of the Bill, relates to the public interest test in maintaining trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the armed forces. I have no problem with the accountability of the armed forces, because as I say, I am a supporter of the service justice system. I have no problem with the oversight we have in Parliament and the way that system operates. However, there was a time when many families had direct connections to the armed forces: going back to the second world war or national service, people knew people in the armed forces, so they understood the culture. That is becoming increasingly distant. We no longer have national service, so we do not have a culture where most citizens go through that system. It is therefore important that we work extra hard to maintain public confidence in the principle of accountability of the armed forces.

Again, I am a supporter of our armed forces, and have been for the 19 years I have been in this House. I am not uncritical if they get things wrong, and I am pleased that I played my part, for example, in the activities of the Select Committee on Defence back in 2005, which led to the creation of the office of the Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces, now the Service Complaints Ombudsman. We are asking people to do unique things, and we do need to protect them, but this probing amendment is to see whether we can get the weight of public trust when it comes to prosecutions—in other words, if we are going to take forward a prosecution, that is taken into account.

I know for certain that our service prosecution system is fair, and it is one that I support. It is also one that includes the test of whether a prosecution is in the public interest, which is in civil law as well. That is controversial in civil law because there are cases in which you and I, Mr Stringer, and the average person on the famous Clapham omnibus, might think someone should be prosecuted. There is the evidential test and then there is the question of whether prosecution would be in the public interest, and sometimes it is difficult to explain that to the public.

I see no purpose whatsoever in prosecuting an 80-year-old veteran in Northern Ireland. I accept that the legislation does not cover Northern Ireland, but the Government have made huge promises about what they are going to do to replicate the Bill to cover Northern Ireland—having dealt with Northern Ireland as a Minister, I would say, “Best of luck with that, mate.” There are ways of translating the Bill to do that, but this goes to the heart of it, because the issue in Northern Ireland is public trust on both sides of the community divide.

This probing amendment is trying to see whether the prosecution can take some account of the perception of our armed forces in the public eye. As I said earlier, many people do not understand the service justice system. Indeed, some people campaign against it, saying that members of the armed forces should not have a separate judicial system. I am sorry, but I disagree, because we ask unique things of them. I think that what we have at the moment strikes the right balance, having judicial oversight while also ensuring that the unique circumstances in which they serve are considered.

The public interest test—whether it is in the public interest to sue somebody—is already there. The question is whether we can have a system in which some weight is given to how it will look and how the armed forces would be perceived. I am not quite sure how that would be done in practice. The prosecutors and members of the armed forces who I have met have this in their DNA, because they are all conscious of the importance of maintaining public trust. We are a democracy and it is important that public trust is maintained in all aspects of Government and the armed forces. I think that the current Government are trying the public’s patience in relation to that trust element, but I will not go down that route now.

Am I proud of our armed forces? Yes, I am. It is important to say that. My constituency is a recruiting ground for many young servicemen and women, and the armed forces give them opportunities that they would never get in civilian life. We often concentrate on the negative aspects of service life, but I have always advocated that service life is not only positive for those young people but good for the nation, because those life experiences and skills are transferable once those individuals return to civilian life. We should be proud of that and celebrate it more than we do.

I am not sure how amendment 3 would reflect that, but it is worth putting it to the Committee, so that Members understand that public trust in our armed forces is going to be important. My fear is that the Bill will do a lot to undermine that trust. As I told the Committee last week, I am also concerned that the Bill will give weight to those people who want to do away with the service justice system, which I certainly do not want to see.

Amendment 4, which stands in my name, is about the alleged conduct, with particular reference to our obligations under articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the European convention on human rights. I know that, for some Conservative Members, any mention of Europe has a Pavlov’s dog effect—it sets them off. However, it is important to remember that the European convention on human rights is nothing to do with the EU or those nasty foreigners who, in the eyes of certain people, have been persecuting us from Brussels. It was set up after the second world war so that there would be a basic, decent standard.

I am proud that this country was part of that convention. I am also proud that we have been seen as a force for good around the world, because we have argued for basic human rights—rights that we take for granted in this country, but that many people do not. We have seen recently in Ukraine and Belarus what happens when those rights are not maintained. Under amendment 4, the prosecution would give weight to whether the alleged conduct would engage the UK’s obligations under article 2, on the right to life, or under the articles prohibiting torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, slavery and forced labour, and arbitrary detention.

There is something that I find strange about the Bill. The Government specified certain categories of crimes that will not be covered by it—murder and sexual offences—and I totally agree about that. What I have difficulty with, however, despite the assertion of compliance with the Human Rights Act, is the issue of torture. I do not think that anyone in the Committee Room would condone torture. It was a given after the second world war that torture was something that we would not engage in, that was not acceptable, and that would lead to the condemnation of any nation that participated in it. Credit is due to the Foreign Office, under all Governments, including the present one, because it does a lot to raise the issue when torture is instigated against countries’ citizens, and to push back and argue against it. I do not know why the issue is not specified in the Bill. It might help to reassure people who do not understand the justice system. People ask why it is needed, so I shall explain.

I did not think that we would get to a point where nations from which we would expect better would engage in torture. As a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I saw a lot of intelligence during the investigation of rendition. It is a fact that the United States, under the Bush Administration, engaged in state torture, which is not acceptable. Did that put members of our security services and some of our armed forces personnel in a difficult position? Yes, I think it did.

As to being open to prosecution, although I have seen no evidence that members of the British armed forces or security services took part in any type of torture, there is credible evidence to show that they were present when it was taking place. That is not acceptable, either. It would be helpful if the Bill took into account and gave the weight in prosecutions to the European convention on human rights, and explicitly included reference to torture and inhumane treatment, to ensure that people can take comfort in the Bill. Let me dispel the myth that members of our armed forces or our Government would want to be involved in torture—they would not. To ensure we can have that protection, it should be in the Bill.

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[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

The right hon. Gentleman gets to a point that many of us find disconcerting, especially when reflecting on the second part of the Bill. The chain of command needs to take responsibility for its decision making. I know this is only a probing amendment, but the Government need to consider the fact that the chain of command has responsibility within the decision-making process.

[Mr Jones]

That is important. It is about taking responsibility of the chain of command. I remember when we first introduced the Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces, there was a huge fear, as there was when we introduced the armed forces ombudsman, that they would interfere with the chain of command. I do not want for one minute to do that, and neither should a prosecutor, but the actions and freedoms that someone has is a relevant factor that needs to be taken into consideration. As we discussed this morning, these people are in very difficult situations—I am sure that neither you, Mr Stringer, nor I could imagine what it would be like, although I am sure that the Minister can—and that needs to be taken into account.

Having made those comments, I shall leave it there.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Morgan]

I rise to speak in support of the amendments to clause 3. When I became a Member of Parliament, in the nation regarded as the birthplace of modern parliamentary democracy, I never once thought that I would have to argue the case for retaining Great Britain’s commitments against war crimes. This country was built upon principles of fairness, equality and justice. We have stood against torture and other war crimes, with a proud tradition of taking direct action when we see violations against human rights being committed. From world war two and the Nuremberg trials to Bosnia and The Hague, this country has a reputation for standing against torture and crimes against humanity. It is part of our identity and is part of what makes us British, which is why it is so concerning that this Bill in its current form, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham said earlier, puts all of that at risk.

Schedule 1 to the Bill sets out what constitutes excluded offences for the purposes of presumption against prosecution. Torture is not included and neither are other war crimes listed in article 7 of the Rome statute, apart from sexual crimes. That is morally wrong. It breaks our commitments to international law, it risks dragging our troops in front of the International Criminal Court, and it is entirely avoidable with some common-sense amendments to the Bill.

Let us consider that first point. I know that everyone in this room would agree that it is morally wrong in any situation to commit an act of torture—it is the most serious of crimes and has no moral justification in any circumstances. When we look at schedule 1, we see that the offences excluded from legal protection are sexual offences. Labour agrees that these offences should be utterly condemned and are inexcusable, and that they should be excluded from any presumption against prosecution. However, schedule 1 fails to exclude terrible crimes such as torture and genocide. The Government have provided no good explanation or justification whatever for excluding only sexual offences from the scope of protection under the Bill, particularly as no service personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan have been accused of genocide, yet it is not excluded as an offence in the Bill. As a former Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, put it:

“This could create the bizarre outcome that an allegation of torture or murder would not be prosecuted when a sexual offence arising out of the same incident could be.”

As the Minister wrote the Bill, can he take us through sub-paragraphs (a) to (k) of article 7(1) of the Rome statute and explain why each provision is legally needed? What is the legal necessity of including each of those provisions?

That brings me to Labour’s second ground for objection to the Bill’s exclusion of torture and other war crimes. Britain has always had an unwavering commitment to the law of armed conflict. The Geneva conventions are known in most households in Britain, and the Bill tramples on our commitments to them. We have heard from judges and generals, witnesses who have trained our armed forces and provided them with independent legal advice, and ex-service personnel. We have received written evidence from the International Committee of the Red Cross. All those individuals and organisations have said two things in common. First, they are clear in their duty to uphold the law of armed conflict and instruct others to do so. Secondly, they are clear that the Bill risks eroding our commitment to those laws and have expressed grave warnings on the consequences. First, it would irreparably damage the moral credibility and authority of the UK to call out human rights abuses worldwide. Secondly, it would undermine the hard-won reputation of UK forces as responsible and reliable actors. Thirdly, it risks reprisals against British troops, particularly service personnel who may be captured and detained on operations.

I am reminded of the evidence last week of the Judge Advocate General, who said:

“You will remember that six Royal Military Police were killed…in 2003. If those responsible were identified today, would we accept that there would be a presumption against their prosecution? Would we expect the factors in clause 3(2)(a) to be taken into account? Would we be content that a member of the Iraqi Government’s consent would be needed to prosecute? Would we accept a decision by that person not to prosecute? In my view, there would be outrage in this country if that occurred. In all areas of law, you have to be even-handed.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 128, Q278.]

It is hard to disagree with those words. To demand justice from others when our men and women on the frontline need it, Britain must be at the forefront of defending that system, underpinned by international laws and the principle of equality under the law.

Labour is deeply concerned that the Bill sets the UK on a collision course with the International Criminal Court and that the Bill risks our troops being dragged to The Hague. Last week, we heard from a witness who represents and is the voice for thousands of veterans, who said that

“there is without a doubt greater fear of a non-British legal action coming against people than of anything British.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 110, Q219.]

Going back on our commitments to the Geneva conventions risks our forces personnel being dragged in front of the International Criminal Court, only confirming the worst fears among veterans discussed by Lieutenant Colonel Parker. Why would the Minister not prefer to have trials for British troops in British courts rather than The Hague?

The Bill as it stands is flawed. It is fundamentally at odds with British values by failing to offer an absolute rejection of torture. It tramples on our commitments to international doctrines that we helped to write, and it fails our troops by risking action by the international courts.

There is a way out. Protecting troops from vexatious claims does not need to be at odds with our commitments to international humanitarian law. There does not need to be a trade-off between safeguarding our armed forces and standing against torture. That is why we have tabled these amendments, which will address those imbalances.

First, the amendments would ensure that, under schedule 1, the forms of crime listed in the Rome statute, such as torture, genocide and crimes against humanity, were—alongside sexual offences—excluded from the presumption against prosecution. Further amendments would ensure that any breach of the Geneva conventions and other international laws also fell outside the scope of that. Labour’s amendments, by bringing the Bill in line with international law and doubling down on our commitments against torture, would protect our troops from international courts and protect our nation’s reputation.

The Minister said at the witness stage, “Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.”

[Mr Jones]

What my hon. Friend proposes in no way changes the Bill in effect; it strengthens the Bill. Does he agree that it is a simple thing which might assuage a lot of the critics of the Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

We ask a huge amount of our service personnel. We send them to undertake high-threat and high-risk operations in defence of our country and its people. They do their duty in the clear knowledge that they may be injured, maimed or even killed.

This Government believe, therefore, that it is absolutely right and reasonable to require that in return we ensure that, in addition to the existing public interest test, a prosecutor has to give particular weight to the unique circumstances of overseas operations and the adverse impacts that those may have on a serviceperson’s capacity to make sound judgments and on their mental health at the time of an alleged offence when coming to a decision on whether to prosecute. That is not intended to excuse bad behaviour by service personnel, but to ensure that prosecutors give full recognition to the significant difference in the circumstances surrounding an alleged offence committed on operations overseas as compared, for example, to situations where the alleged criminal conduct occurs in a domestic civilian setting.

The prosecutor must consider the presumption against prosecution under clause 2 to determine whether a case meets the exceptional threshold. The prosecutor, as required by clause 3, must also give particular weight to matters that may, in effect, tip the balance in favour of not prosecuting. Clause 3 is therefore integral to supporting the high threshold set in clause 2 for a prosecutor to make a decision to prosecute.

There was a lot of discussion last week about the concerns over the impact on our personnel of repeated scrutiny and the mental burden placed on them by the threat of criminal prosecution occurring long after the events in question, particularly where there is no compelling new evidence to be considered. Clause 3 requires that prosecutors must also consider where there has been a previous investigation in relation to the alleged criminal conduct and no compelling new evidence has arisen. The public interest is in cases coming to a timely and final resolution.

In the responses to our public consultation, many service personnel expressed a lack of trust in prosecutors and others in the justice system. They were particularly concerned about whether prosecutors are able to understand the operational context in which the offence occurred and to adequately reflect this in determining the public interest. We fully accept that prosecutors may already take such matters into account. However, making that a statutory requirement provides greater certainty for service personnel that the unique context of overseas operations will be given particular and appropriate weight in the prosecutor’s deliberation.

By seeking to remove the benefit of the matters in clause 3 that tend towards reducing the culpability of a serviceperson and tend against prosecution, the amendments are designed to ensure that the prosecutor can also consider whether such matters increase the culpability of an individual and support a prosecution. The amendments undermine our reassurance to our service personnel that the operational context of an alleged offence will be taken into account, and in their favour, by the prosecutor. It would be a slap in the face for our armed forces personnel to suggest that the context of an overseas operation will be considered as a factor in support of their prosecution.

[Mr Jones]

At present, the service justice system understands the context and the public interest test is already there—whether it is in the public interest to prosecute. The service justice system is designed to take into account special circumstances, so what is the need for clause 3?

[Johnny Mercer]

The need is very clear. The fact is that the service justice system as it stands has facilitated an industrial level of claims against our people that has absolutely destroyed their lives.

[Mr Jones]

No, it has not.

[Johnny Mercer]

The right hon. Gentleman can sit there and say no, this did not happen and that did not happen. The rest of us live in the factual world, where these things actually did happen. They destroyed some of our finest people, which is why we are introducing this legislation. I have heard a lot from the right hon. Gentleman, and the vast majority is not correct. I respect him immensely, but it is not correct. I will therefore push on at this stage.

Amendments 3 to 5 seek to add additional factors to clause 3. In the light of amendment 1, I can assume only that the intention is somehow to bring in factors that would be seen by the prosecutor to increase a serviceperson’s culpability and make a prosecution more likely. I have already set out my arguments as to why amendment 1 should be withdrawn. Furthermore, I do not believe that amendments 3 to 5 are appropriate or needed.

Amendment 3 is designed to

“ensure that a relevant prosecutor gives particular weight to maintaining public trust in the criminal justice system and upholding the principle of accountability of the Armed Forces.”

The independent prosecutor’s responsibility is to follow the principle set out in the code for crown prosecutors. That includes the principle that they will work

“to maintain public trust and to provide an efficient criminal justice system.”

The Bill does not place service personnel above the law or make them somehow less accountable. Allegations of offences must and will continue to be investigated. Where appropriate, a prosecutor can still make a decision to prosecute. On that basis, I do not believe that amendment 3 is warranted.

Amendment 4 is designed to

“ensure that particular weight is given by a prosecutor where the alleged conduct engages the UK’s obligations”

under articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the European convention on human rights. The prosecutor already has to apply the principles of the ECHR, in accordance with the Human Rights Act 1998, at each stage of the case, so amendment 4’s additional requirement would be totally unnecessary.

Amendment 5 is designed to

“ensure that particular weight is given by a relevant prosecutor where the person had command responsibility for the alleged conduct.”

I can assume only that the amendment is meant to address the concerns raised last week about the chain of command being held accountable as well as individuals, but it misses the point. A decision taken by a serviceperson to use force during an overseas operation is an individual decision for which they, and not their commanding officer, may then be held personally accountable if their decision is deemed to have been in breach of criminal law. The circumstances of an incident would determine whether the involvement of a commander in the activities of their subordinates also merited a criminal prosecution. Separately, it should be noted that under the Armed Forces Act 2006, commanding officers may be investigated and prosecuted, including at court martial, for non-criminal conduct offences in relation to serious allegations of wrongdoing by personnel under their command. Non-criminal conduct offences are not covered by the Overseas Operations Bill.

On the proposed amendments to schedule 1, the Government are committed to providing reassurance to service personnel and veterans in relation to the threat of prosecution for alleged offences on overseas operations more than five years ago. The measures in part 1 of the Bill are key to delivering that reassurance. The fact that we have only excluded sexual offences in schedule 1 does not mean that we will not continue to take other offences, such as war crimes and torture, extremely seriously.

The presumption against prosecution will allow the prosecutor to continue to take decisions to prosecute these offences, and the severity of the crime and the circumstances in which it was allegedly committed will always be factors in their considerations. On a case-by-case basis, a prosecutor can determine that a case against an individual in relation to war crimes, torture or genocide is “exceptional”, and that a prosecution is therefore appropriate, subject to the approval of the Attorney General or the Advocate General in Northern Ireland. The decision to exclude only sexual offences reflects the Government’s strong stated belief that the use of sexual violence or sexual exploitation during overseas operations is never acceptable in any circumstances.

We have not excluded other offences, including torture, because in the course of their duties on overseas operations, we expect our service personnel to undertake activities that are intrinsically violent in nature. These activities can expose service personnel to the possibility that their actions may result in allegations of torture war crimes. By contrast, although allegations of sexual offences can still arise, the activities that we expect our service personnel to undertake on operations cannot possibly include those of a sexual nature.

We do not therefore believe it is appropriate to afford personnel the additional protection of the presumption in relation to allegations of sexual offences after five years. I am aware that many people have misinterpreted this decision, and have suggested that it somehow undermines the UK’s continuing commitment to upholding international humanitarian and human rights law, including the UN convention against torture. That is completely untrue. The UK does not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone the use of torture for any purpose, and we remain committed to maintaining our leading role in the promotion and protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill (Fifth sitting)

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 14th October 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Chris Evans (Islwyn) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 1, page 2, line 1, at end insert—

“(ba) operating weapon-bearing UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) or RPAS (Remotely Piloted Aerial Systems) from the British Islands in support of overseas operations.”

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer.

The Bill is important to our service personnel, and it is crucial that we get it right. Last week, one of our witnesses, Mr Sutcliff, said to us:

“please scrutinise the Bill as carefully as you can…and…look after your service and ex-service personnel in the best way you can.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 10, Q9.]

It is important to keep those things in mind as we proceed. I hope that the Government will consider our amendments even-handedly. They have been tabled in good faith, in the hope that we can make the Bill the best it can be for the brave men and women who serve in our armed forces.

Amendment 23 calls for unmanned aerial vehicles or remotely piloted aerial systems operated from the British isles in support of overseas operations to be included in the Bill. The Minister has said that he is happy to look again at all aspects of the Bill and that he wants to build a collegiate approach in the House to get the Bill through. I would argue that this clause is a good place to start. The amendment would a simple and effective way to help the Bill to achieve its stated aims. If the Government are serious about making this Bill comprehensive, I see no reason for UAVs not to be included. As drafted, the Bill is not clear enough about its scope or what it includes.

In recent times, we have seen a dramatic rise in the use of UAVs. The failure to include them in the Bill gives me concern that it is not looking enough to the future of warfare. The Government have made their plans clear, saying that they will rely increasingly on unmanned aerial vehicles, meaning that those will account for an important part of the integrated review. Across the world, armed forces have invested millions in the development of UAVs for military operations. The United States has increasingly relied on drones to carry out its military operations overseas, and the rest of the world is quickly following.

In 2016, at the cost of £816 million, the drone acquisition programme was approved by the Ministry of Defence. Earlier this year, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence said that the estimated cost had risen by an additional £325 million. The UK Government are funnelling ever-increasing sums into the funding of UAVs for military purposes. Since 2007, about 3,700 Royal Air Force drone missions have killed 1,000 terrorists in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that UAVs are an integral part of the new battlespace and that, while some people argue that they are outside any rules of engagement, they are in fact governed by the same rules as govern conventional weapons and that the people using them are aware of the legal restraints?

[Chris Evans]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. A long-standing member of the Defence Committee, he has developed a reputation as an expert in the field of defence. He is right that the impact of technology will only increase in changing our world beyond all recognition. It is important to realise that, in future, whether drones are operated from the British islands or America, they will be as much a part of warfare as boots on the ground. Unmanned combat is likely to become an increasingly common form of warfare. The Ministry of Defence has said it aims for a third of the Royal Air Force to be remotely piloted by 2030, and funding for unmanned aerial vehicles for military purposes continues to grow. Given their rising use, the exclusion from the Bill of UAVs and remotely piloted aircraft systems is a glaring oversight if the legislation is to serve its purpose in the future.

The Ministry of Defence is also considering the most appropriate systems for air combat, especially when Typhoon leaves service in 2030. Options for air combat forces include unmanned combat aerial vehicles with both offensive and defensive capabilities. That would see a mix of manned and unmanned craft in the air force, working alongside each other. Surely those piloting UAVs from the UK should be given the same consideration under the Bill as those they work alongside.

[Mr Jones]

The hon. Friend refers to unmanned aerial vehicles, but is it not the case that in future we will also have unmanned sea vehicles and, increasingly, autonomous tank-type vehicles on the battlespace?

[Chris Evans]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. People will still have to operate those vehicles in future, and they will also be open to the horrors of war and what happens on the battlefield. We should keep that in mind as we develop this argument.

Until recently, the drones used by the UK armed forces were remotely piloted aerial systems. The proposed unmanned combat aerial vehicles differ from the previous drones as they are designed to fight for air supremacy. That widens the scope of drone and other unmanned warfare, as my right hon. Friend just said, increasing the number of service personnel working on an overseas mission but not physically based overseas. General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith recently said that he foresees the Army of the future as an integration of “boots and bots” and that in future combat those on the ground will be supported by “swarms of drones”. We look forward to hearing more about those plans when the integrated review is finally published.

The Ministry of Defence also continues to fund research into the future of drones. The Government are funding jointly with the French a study into the feasibility of an unmanned combat aircraft as a possible replacement for Typhoon from 2030. The Government have said they have no plans to develop fully autonomous weapons; that means that service personnel will continue to operate UAVs for the foreseeable future. What is clear from all that is that drones are here to stay. Therefore, those who operate those missions should be included in the Bill. It is important to note that drone operators face a worryingly high chance of developing post-traumatic stress disorder. In fact, in 2015, Reaper squadron boss Wing Commander Damian Killeen told the BBC that staff operating drone aircraft in Iraq and Syria may be at greater risk of mental trauma.

While drone operators may be based in the UK, they are completing overseas missions. There is a popular image that operating a drone is like playing a video game, but those who serve say that that is simply not the case. One US drone operator is quoted as saying:

“You are 18 inches away from 32-inch, high-definition combat, where you are in contact [by headset with] the guys on the ground... You are there. You are there. You fly with them, you support them and a person you are tasked with supporting gets engaged, hurt, possibly killed, it’s a deeply, deeply emotional event. It’s not detached. It’s not a video game. And it’s certainly not 8,000 miles away.”

For some, drone operation can be more traumatising than flying a conventional aircraft. As Commander Killeen says:

“You’ve got that resolution where you know exactly what it is that’s on the other end of your crosshairs.”

Research by the US air force also suggests that those in the kill chain see more graphic violence than their special forces counterpart on the ground. On surveillance missions, they are more likely to see destroyed homes and villages, as well as witnessing dead bodies and human remains. One UAV pilot told the Daily Mirror:

“The days are long and hard and can be mentally exhausting. And although UAV pilots are detached from the real battle, it can still be traumatic, especially if you are conducting after-action surveillance.

When you are piloting a UAV for hours, you feel part of the battle, even though you are thousands of miles away.”

The risk of post-traumatic stress disorder is also increased by the fact that, unlike personnel on the ground, who perhaps do a four-month tour, UAV operators often work year round, meaning less chance for a break and time to recover. Justin Bronk, a research fellow for airpower at the London-based Royal United Services Institute, said that fast jet crews were used to deploy on short tours abroad, but that drone operators switched daily between potentially lethal operations and family life, which could be

“extremely draining and psychologically taxing”.

The psychological stress of drone warfare is visible in difficulties that the UK faces in recruitment and retention of those qualified to fly armed drones. During an appearance before the Public Accounts Committee in January, the Ministry of Defence permanent secretary said that for the Royal Air Force, the training and retraining of drone crews has “historically proven challenging”.

The effect that taking part in such machines has on UAV pilots mentally, despite their being physically further away from the action, merits their inclusion in the Bill. Only last week, in our evidence session, Clive Baldwin of Human Rights Watch said:

“The idea of having one rule for overseas operations and one for domestic operations will be increasingly artificial”.––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 67, Q135.]

Drone operators may not be physically overseas, but they are very much taking part in overseas operations. With unmanned warfare looking like it will be more common in future conflicts, I would argue that failing to include those operations in the Bill may cause the Ministry of Defence service personnel issues down the line. The Government have said that they want the Bill to protect service personnel from repeated investigations and vexatious claims. Do those service personnel who operate UAVs not also deserve to be protected?

Given the increasing use of UAVs and RPAS, I would be deeply concerned were they not included in the Bill. If the Bill is to do as the Minister purports, surely, if we are to protect our service personnel, we want to include and protect those personnel who operate our drones.

[Mr Jones]

I thank my hon. Friend for introducing this amendment, which I assume is a probing one in order to have the debate. But, Mr Stringer, it was remiss of me not to say what a pleasure it is serve under your chairmanship, especially now we are both serial rebels on our Benches, after votes that took place this week on covid.

I do not like the word “drone”. It gives the sinister idea that somehow these things are indiscriminate weapons and there is no human in the chain. Unmanned aerial vehicle is a more appropriate term. I accept that, in the future, we may get to a system where unmanned aerial vehicles or subsea systems are completely autonomous, but at the moment, we are talking about the human in the chain.

It is a common myth, mainly argued by those who are against the use of UAVs, that somehow there are no rules that govern how they are used. Nothing could be further from the truth. When I was a Minister in the Ministry of Defence, I met the individuals who pilot—that is the word we use—these unmanned systems in both Iraq and Afghanistan. They are in the same decision-making process and legal framework as if someone was dropping a ordnance from a Typhoon or any type of manned aircraft.

There is a chain of command, including a legal framework around their decisions. Before each individual airstrike takes place, there is a legal justification. That might come as a surprise to some people who want to portray the view that people are sat in Nevada or Waddington or Florida pressing buttons, attacking targets. Nothing could be further from the truth. There is a legal framework for each operation and that is supported by the legal service. It surprises some people that each strike has a legal sign-off, with lawyers who agree what can and cannot be done, including, as I know from my time in office, a chain that sometimes includes Ministers who have to agree to those sign-offs. There are many examples where Ministers have had sign-off.

Is what we are talking about pretty? No, it is not—but anyone who knows the battle space or any type of combat knows that it is not a pretty thing. Killing people is not something that anyone wants to do, but unmanned aerial vehicles have given a capability to us and our allies which has been of tremendous help, not only in saving UK and allies’ servicemen and women’s lives, but in saving civilian lives.

The chain of command is a legal framework. Do things go wrong? Yes, clearly they do, and not just in this theatre. Sometimes in a very complex battle scenario, no matter how well you plan for it, you cannot foresee every eventuality. What irritates me is that people sometimes look back at those situations with some sort of crystal ball and say, “Well, if I was there, I would have done X, Y and Z.”

[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

On a point of information, and paying tribute to the right hon. Gentleman’s experience in the field, if a Minister signs off an operation and it goes wrong, does that mean that the Minister is legally culpable for the decision, or is it the operator operating the UAV or is it the people on the ground calling in the mission?

[Mr Jones]

I will come to that in a minute; it is an important point on the legal protection that is there for the people involved.

Things do go wrong. It is fine for people to look back and say, “Look, if that happened, I would have done this differently,” but that is just not how warfare takes place. Sometimes, there are critical decisions that have to be taken at short notice to protect civilians or protect our armed forces’ lives. At the end of the day, they are down to individual judgments, not only by the commanders who authorise things, but by the people we are asking to protect us as members of our armed forces.

--- Later in debate ---

[Martin Docherty-Hughes (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)]

When the hon. Member for Islwyn was introducing the amendment, he noted that it was not meant to take on board issues in relation to fully autonomous systems. Nevertheless, it should be recognised that fully autonomous systems will be with us sooner rather than later and that, in those systems, there is a human decision-making process that must be safeguarded. Artificial intelligence is artificial, requiring human instigation to create the algorithm to make the decision-making process, and we must keep that in mind as we recognise the need for and validity of securing protections.

[Mr Jones]

I agree. Again, some people writing or talking about this area are saying that somehow the human being has nothing to do with it. The hon. Gentleman is correct in that even if we get to having a futuristic system with fully autonomous vehicles and in-flight combat between various systems, swarms of drones and things like that, a decision will still need to be taken on how that system is used. That is an area where not just in the UK but internationally we will need to look at rules of engagement and the definition of an autonomous vehicle. There is increasingly a move towards autonomous vehicles. Look at the Team Tempest programme from BAE Systems and its partners and how that is going: there can be a pilot, but the design will not need a pilot, and that ain’t that far away—it is coming up fast.

It comes back to the decision-making process. The hon. Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke mentioned the chain of command issue. That goes to the heart of the Bill because of the importance of having the audit trail for who took which decisions. It is difficult for anyone in the chain of command to take a decision, from the person executing the mission on the ground right up to a Minister signing something off. That is not an easy process. Can things go wrong all the way through? Yes. However, I would argue that as long as a decision is underpinned by our legal processes right the way through to authorisation by a Minister to ensure that it is legally watertight, we should be okay. Mistakes will happen. What a lot of the public find strange is that in cells that deal with targeting, there are MOD or RAF lawyers sat there, saying, “I am sorry, you cannot do that.” It shocks people.

Unmanned aerial vehicles have got to the point where there is a bit of folklore when people make a decision. It is therefore important to ensure there is that legal framework. However, as I said, things will go wrong, and my hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn is trying in the amendment to consider what happens when things do go wrong. Is somebody sat in RAF Waddington classed as being on overseas operations? That is a grey area that perhaps has not appeared yet in all these claims, but I think it will.

The evidence we have taken in the last few weeks has highlighted how, in many ways, this is an easier area to look at in terms of investigations because there is—there should be—that chain of decision making. However, it does get complicated when we are working with allies. I am confident that we have some of the most robust rules in terms of targeting and rules of engagement, but—how can I put this diplomatically?—I do not think it is the same for some of our allies, especially one of our closest allies. Could we argue that some of the examples I have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq were proportionate in the way they were conducted? I do not think they were. That has led to the idea that somehow we are the same.

Let us suppose we get to the situation where we have a legal challenge to somebody who has been sat in Waddington, has legitimately followed the legal advice and something goes wrong. What happens? Are they classed as being on overseas operations? We should give them protection because they are not just following orders, but following the legal guidance that has been supplied to them as to why they are carrying out the mission. That is an area we need to look at.

It links to a broader point about what we deem to be overseas operations. Eminent lawyers will want to argue around the head of a pin about this, if we do not look at it. The other side is other operations. Increasingly we, as a nation, are not going into conflicts on our own, but with other nations. That leads to a situation where, on occasion, UK forces are not under the command of UK personnel, but those of other nations. I do not think people realise that.

Some nations have different interpretations of what is proportionate. How are they included, especially within—that misnomer—peacekeeping? Peacekeeping can be dangerous. I have visited parts of the world where peacekeeping is taking place that were far from peaceful, and were stressful for the individuals involved. Is that classed as an overseas operation?

When I was walking in this morning—I often think when I am walking—I was thinking that this gets to the definition of what an overseas operation is. If somebody were based at NATO headquarters in Brussels, would that be classed as an overseas operation? I am not suggesting they would be involved in a mission such as an airstrike or combat in Brussels, although perhaps they might be on a rowdy Friday or Saturday night in the Grand Place. Is that classed as an overseas operation for that individual? Those individuals are lone officers, but members of our armed forces are serving in ones and twos around the world, mentoring forces, doing a great job in defence diplomacy and ensuring that the high standards we have in this country are passed on to other nations.

My hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn talked about the UAV operators themselves. I have read a few studies about their mental health and the jury is out on evidence of increased PTSD and other things. It is a strange environment for individuals, as my hon. Friend said, because they are separated from the battle space, but they see and do some graphic and dangerous things. Having seen some of those videos, what happens is not pretty. The jury is still out on the issue of mental health effects and that is an area where we need more research, not just in this country but internationally. That links to part 2. If those individuals developed mental illness later, given the time limits set out in the Bill, would they be excluded or not? That is another area that we need to look at when we come to part 2.

Can we ever future-proof legislation? No. Politicians all think that we can see into the future as if with hindsight, but unfortunately we all know that most of our legislation is reactive to events. We can try to make it as future-proof as possible, however, and amendment 23, which I presume is a probing amendment, is really a way of asking whether the MOD and the people who have drawn up the Bill have thought about the area. Whether we like it or not, it will increasingly become a challenge not just for how we train people, but for how individuals are legally protected. Even if it cannot be incorporated into the Bill, I would certainly like the Ministry of Defence to look not only at the training, but at what the legal status of those individuals will be. The amendment is welcome in allowing us to explore some of those areas; I hope that it will give MOD policy makers some food for thought on where we take this in the future.

[The Minister for Defence People and Veterans (Johnny Mercer)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer.

The principle is that part 1 should cover personnel in circumstances in which they may

“come under attack or face the threat of attack or violent resistance”

in the course of an overseas operation, as detailed in clause 1(6). When developing our policy, we considered whether we should extend the coverage of part 1 to include UK-based drone operators when the systems that they are operating are involved in operations outside the British islands. However, we determined that although the UK-based drone pilots would be considered part of an overseas operation, they could not be said to be at risk of personal attack or violence, or face the threat of attack or violence, as would be the case for an individual deployed in the theatre of operations. We therefore determined that as the personal threat circumstances would not arise in a UK-based role, the personnel in those roles would not warrant the additional protection provided by the measures in part 1. I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Mr Jones]

I see the logic of how the Bill is structured, and I accept that somebody sitting in Waddington is not going to be attacked by an enemy, but if the purpose of the Bill is to give them legal protection for their actions, they are not immune from being attacked in a legal process for something that they do on overseas operations.

[Johnny Mercer]

Some really important points have been made, particularly about mental health provision and the protection of those who operate these systems, but the Bill is clearly there to provide the additional protections that particularly apply to those who face the threat of violence and attack at the time, so I disagree on this point. I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Morgan]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that remark. We also learned last week from the witnesses that, while veterans may welcome the intent of the Government to take forward action, when they looked at the detail of the Bill, they were not so satisfied with its contents.

[Mr Jones]

The hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West raised the issue of evidence, but the most moving statement last week was from Major Bob Campbell, who went through hell for 17 years. Even he admitted the problem in his case was the reinvestigation investigation.

[Stephen Morgan]

I thank my right hon. Friend for that remark. It is very clear that the Bill in its current form will not help that case if that is repeated ever again.

The Government have let us down on the Bill. It is becoming ever clearer in Committee not only that it fails to fix the problems that it intends to fix, but that the Government have failed in the due diligence for our armed forces personnel and their families that they deserve. The Government should be developing legislation by properly conducting consultation, analysis and identifying the best way to deal with the issues at hand.

Sadly, it seems that the Government are inclined to make policy on the hoof. It is exactly this failure to identify the root causes of the issues that our armed forces personnel face that has been continually highlighted in Committee. As Professor Richard Ekins, head of the judicial power project at the Policy Exchange, highlighted in evidence last week:

“It certainly does not stop investigations. In fact, if one were to make a criticism of the Bill, one might say that it places no obstacle on continuing investigations, which might be thought to be one of the main mischiefs motivating of the Bill”.—[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Military Personnel and Veterans) Bill, 6 October 2020; c. 35, Q60.]

We also heard from Major Bob Campbell about the unimaginable stresses he faced in a 17-year investigation that eventually did not lead to prosecution. I know the entire Committee will join me in thanking him for his service and offering our condolences for the terrible process he has been put through. Once again, we heard that the Bill does not deal with the key problem of addressing investigations. The specific case of Major Bob Campbell would not be covered by the Bill.

Last week, Dr Jonathan Morgan also stated that Major Bob Campbell’s case would not have been addressed by these proposals. He was prosecuted in 2006 in connection with an alleged offence in 2003, which would have been within the five-year period for bringing a prosecution. It is only in 2020, after 17 years, that he has finally been cleared. Several hon. Members made the point on Second Reading that perhaps the real vice is not so much late prosecutions but the continued investigations by the Ministry of Defence, without necessarily leading to a criminal prosecution at all.

If I have understood the facts of Major Campbell’s case, it rather shows that a five-year soft cut-off for prosecutions will not solve that kind of problem at all. Are the Government really prepared to abandon decorated armed services personnel like Major Bob Campbell? Is that really what the Government have set out to achieve?

In summary, I hope that the Government will listen to the points raised here—including the extensive evidence that we have heard that the five-year limit is at best arbitrary—refocus the Bill on dealing with investigations, not just prosecutions, and work with us to protect our troops and get this Bill right.

I ask the Minister, what evidence or advice have the Government received to change the deadline to five years? Why not six or seven? I ask the Minister to provide evidence on why that specific timeframe was selected. Are the Government really prepared to abandon decorated armed services personnel like Major Bob Campbell? Is that really what the Government have set out to achieve? Why does the Bill not deal with the issues in investigations that the Minister has identified? What is the Government’s reasoning for ignoring the Judge Advocate General in this Bill, raising serious concerns about the problems he raised about the five-year limit on prosecutions?

[Mr Jones]

Are we dealing with the group together, including my new clause 8?

[The Chair]

We are dealing with new clause 8 and amendments 26, 27 and 28.

[Mr Jones]

Thank you for that clarification, Mr Stringer.

With new clauses 8, 6 and 7 we come to the issue of investigation. We will discuss new clauses 6 and 7 later. The new clauses put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South get to the heart of the issue, which has come out in the evidence we have taken over the past few weeks. This Bill puts the cart before the horse. It deals with prosecutions rather than the real issue, which is investigations.

I find that odd. Who was consulted on drafting this Bill? We heard evidence last week that Judge Blackett was not consulted on this Bill, so who drafted it? Anyone looking at the Iraq Historic Allegations Team or the testimony given last week by Major Bob Campbell can see that the issue is investigation. It would interesting to hear the reasons why the limit has gone from 10 years, as recommended in the consultation, down to five.

Personally, I do not agree with the time limit, for the reasons that my hon. Friend has just outlined. It will give no protection to those veterans of the most recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, whom this Bill seems to be focused on, nor will it give protection to veterans in the future, because investigation will still take place from that five-year period. Are they traumatic? I think they must be.

I agree with my hon. Friend, and I pay huge tribute to Major Bob Campbell for his evidence last week, because it must have been very difficult for him. Consider the idea that any of us would have something hanging over us for 17 years. If it was a minor offence, it would be bad enough, but he was accused of horrendous crimes for 17 years, and investigated time and again for the same thing. I cannot imagine how that felt for him as an individual.

What is proposed will not stop investigations. It is clear to me that if we have limitations as outlined in the Bill, we will get cases that go to the International Criminal Court. Its investigations will take into account the lack of action, because there is a five-year limit. We will come later to the presumption of prosecution, which is another huge problem. Do I actually want our servicemen and women to end up in the International Criminal Court? No, I do not. I think it is proud testimony not only to the professionals in our armed forces, but to our legal system and what we have had so far, that we have avoided that because of our robust legal system and the oversight of our military justice system.

The problem with the Bill—the Minister gave this away in his ill-advised winding up on Second Reading—is that it implies that people are either in favour of our brave armed forces or in favour of ambulance-chasing lawyers. As I said on Second Reading, my record of supporting defence and the armed forces speaks for itself. My attacks on ambulance-chasing solicitors, through my work on the miners’ compensation scheme and the formation of the sister regulation body—taking it away from the law side—also speak for themselves. What we need over the Bill is a legal framework that is there not just because it is nice to have, but because society needs a framework that protects individuals—not just individual civilians, but members of our armed forces. As one witness said last week about the unique situation for members of the armed forces, they have few enough rights, and recourse to the law is important. In terms of our standing in the world, we are rightly proud that we have been a beacon of being able to portray good practice both in law and in other areas.

New clause 8 is about how we try to stop the cycle of investigation. As I say, I am just surprised that when the Bill was being drafted, no one thought, “Let’s look at what the problem is.” It is around investigation and the time it takes. Various arguments have been about why investigations have taken so long. Is it a lack of resources? It possibly is in some cases. Has it been the issue around Iraq and Afghanistan? Are we now in a different political climate? Yes, we are. When I was a Minister in the Ministry of Defence, when we were in Iraq and Afghanistan, the will to ensure that accusations were investigated came from all sides. It was not just from the liberal wing of Liberty and others; it was from Conservative Members as well. Mistakes were made.

Not having the issue of investigation in the Bill—

[The Chair]

Order. I have been listening carefully to the right hon. Member. The amendments are very tightly drawn. New clause 8 is about the limitation on time for minor offences. I do not want to restrict the debate, but I do want to focus on what the amendments are, rather than wandering all the way through the Bill. If the right hon. Member focused on the new clause and the three amendments that were are debating, that would be helpful.

[Mr Jones]

I accept your ruling, Mr Stringer. New clause 8 is around investigation.

[The Chair]

For minor offences.

[Mr Jones]

Yes. I will come back to the new clauses later.

Some serious accusations were made in the IHAT and Northmoor investigations. They took so long because some were very complicated, but some were very minor. The more we can speed up the system for the accused and the quicker it is dealt with, the better. It will be better for armed service personnel, and better for confidence in our system. New clause 8 tries to get a system that deals with minor cases and does not lead to endless investigations into things that really should be dealt with in the first instance.

New clause 8 argues that minor offences should be dealt with through a summary process, which Judge Blackett referred to last week and through which the magistrates court system already deals with cases. One thing that is missing in the entire Bill, which would give us confidence in it, is judicial oversight of the reasons why things are done. That is important. New clause 8 would empower prosecutors to place a six-month time limit on summary matters.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

In reality, the right hon. Gentleman wants to remove bureaucracy because justice delayed is justice denied, whether someone is the accuser or the accused. His new clause seeks clarity for minor offences.

[Mr Jones]

It is clarity for the individuals, so that they can be dealt with swiftly. If Judge Blackett had been consulted on this Bill, that might have been included.

I will not try your patience, Mr Stringer, because I might need it when I come to new clauses 6 and 7 on the broader issues around investigation, which I notice the MOD is now moving on and possibly recognising that it has missed a trick in the Bill. The new clause would give the court powers. We are not talking about serious offences or common assault. We did a similar thing in the Armed Forces Act 2006. We gave commanding officers the powers to deal with minor offences, because the old system was taking an inordinate amount of time to deal with them. We are basically setting up a de minimis case. As the hon. Gentleman just said, it would deal with the bureaucracy and make sure that we concentrate on the most serious offences.

People might say, “How does this get into ambulance-chasing solicitors?” With IHAT and Northmoor, some of the cases put forward were to do with such things as slaps and assaults, which would actually meet this criteria. Why did it take years to investigate whether somebody was slapped if it was on a Saturday night in a pub and classed as a common assault? Why did it take years to investigate or in some cases re-investigate? We could argue that it happened in Iraq or Afghanistan or somewhere else and it might be more difficult to gather evidence and witnesses, but it should not be beyond the wit of the legal system to look at the evidence initially and say, “To be honest, the threshold for this would not be very high.” Why were they brought? We know: in some cases, clearly, Phil Shiner was trying to get some compensation out of an alleged fault, but the pressure was put on those individuals who were accused of things that were minor and would have been dealt with normally. The new clause frees up the criminal justice system and the investigators to concentrate on the things that we want to concentrate on, which are the more serious cases.

Would that protect our armed forces? Yes, I think it would, because we would have a sense of fairness for them—they would be getting speedy justice, they would not go through reinvestigation and they would not have to wait an inordinate length of time for things dealt with as a matter of course in a magistrates court. It is a way to give protection to servicemen and women, while also—as the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire said—making the system more effective.

The important thing, however, is the judicial oversight—this is not just deciding to stop prosecution; the evidence is looked at, the de minimis test is applied and only then would that be ended. That would be a huge improvement. The Minister said he was looking for improvement of the Bill and, to me, this is an obvious way to do it.

[Johnny Mercer]

Amendments 25 to 28 seek to change the time at which the presumption comes into effect from five to 10 years. The proposal in the public consultation that we ran last year was for a 10-year timeframe for the statutory presumption. It was not fixed policy, because we were seeking the public’s views.

In the consultation, we asked the following questions: whether 10 years was appropriate as a qualifying time, and whether the measure should apply regardless of how long ago the relevant events occurred. As we set out in our published response to the consultation, there was support for a 10-year timeframe, but equally there was support for presumption to apply without a timeframe at all. We also considered the written responses, which clearly indicated the concerns that a 10-year timeframe was too long—memories can fade, evidence tends to deteriorate and the context of events changes. There were also concerns that 10 years was too long to have the threat of prosecution hanging over a serviceperson’s head.

Respondents suggested time periods of less than 10 years, with the most popular timeframe being five years. As the issue that we seek to address relates to historical alleged offences, we did not feel able to apply the presumption without a timeframe. However, given the strength of the views expressed, we felt that a timeframe of less than 10 years would be more appropriate, and five years was the most popular alternative.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister say what the numbers were for the responses to the consultation? What was the basic divide between those who wanted 10 years and those who wanted none or five years?

[Johnny Mercer]

I am more than happy to write to the right hon. Gentleman with the exact responses. They are in the House of Commons Library, in the impact assessment. The numbers were clear, and I have just outlined the general findings—[Interruption.] I will not give way again. Some people want 10 years and some five years—

[Mr Jones]

It is not in your notes.

[The Chair]

Order. Continue, Minister.

[Johnny Mercer]

Thank you, Mr Stringer.

New clause 8 seeks to limit to six months the period between an offence being committed or discovered and any proceedings being brought, where a number of conditions can be satisfied. First, the offence must be a relevant offence, committed on overseas operations by a serviceperson. Importantly, the bar to proceedings only applies if the offence being prosecuted is subject to summary conviction only, or is one where no serious, permanent or lasting psychological or physical injury has been caused.

During an investigation, it is not always clear what the charge will be, but this is made harder for investigations on overseas operations where the injured person is a local national. It will not always be possible to get information regarding the incident, or on the permanence or lasting nature of an injury, in the timeframe demanded by the amendment.

Investigations on overseas operations inevitably rely to some degree on actions by others in theatre. Delays in such investigations are a fact of the operational environment and placing a time limit on investigations runs the risk that others may be able to affect the outcome of a service police investigation. The service police cannot have any barriers placed in the way that fetter their investigative decision making. A time limit in these circumstances would do just that.

Even the most minor offences take on a greater significance in an operational environment. A minor offence is not necessarily a simple matter that could be dealt with quickly by a commanding officer. Placing a barrier in the way of investigations for minor offences does not take account of the disproportionate effect of poor discipline directed towards local nationals in an operational setting.

The amendment is modelled on the provisions that exist in relation to summary-only matters in the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. That is where the problem lies. That Act codifies the procedures applicable in the magistrates courts of England and Wales. It is not legislation written to accommodate the extraordinary demands made of a system operating in an operational context.

[Mr Jones]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Johnny Mercer]

I will not give way.

Delays are inevitable and applying civilian standards to an operational context is inappropriate. If this is something that might be considered for the service justice system, it would seem more appropriate for an armed forces Bill, but with an exemption to account—

[Mr Jones]

On a point of order, Mr Stringer. This is a very strange Committee. Basically, the Minister is reading his civil service brief into the record, rather than actually answering the points. It is going to be very difficult to scrutinise the Bill properly if he will not take interventions, even though I accept he might be at a disadvantage if it is not in his briefing notes.

[The Chair]

The right hon. Gentleman knows that is not a point of order. The Minister is entitled to give way as he chooses.

[Johnny Mercer]

If this measure is something that might be considered for the service justice system, it would be more appropriate for an armed forces Bill, but with an exemption to account for the complexity of overseas operations. This Bill is not the correct legislative vehicle for the measure. I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Mr Jones]

I just find this remarkable, Mr Stringer. We have a Minister who has come in here to read his civil service brief into the record. He is not taking account of anything that is being said, by myself or by other hon. Members. When he wants to be questioned on it, he will not take interventions. It is a strange way of doing this. He possibly thinks that doing a Committee is just about reading the civil service brief the night before and then reading it into the record. I am sorry, but that is not how we do scrutiny in this House.

With regard to the Minister’s comment that this measure would be more appropriate in an armed forces Bill, that may well be the case, but he has an opportunity to put it in here. He can sit there and smile but, frankly, he is doing himself no favours. He has said that he wants co-operation on the Bill, but he is doing nothing. He is going to try to plough through with what he has got, irrespective of whether it damages our armed forces personnel. That makes me very angry.

The Minister said that the Magistrates’ Court Act provisions would not cross over to this Bill. We could draw up a protocol around that, which would fit in the Bill. If the Bill is supposed to be the all-singing, all-dancing, huge protection that we are going to give to our servicemen and servicewomen, then that should have been in the Bill.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that the ranks, as opposed to the chain of command, would be best served by an acceptance of the new clause, because it gives clarity and allows them to move forward on those cases, within the elements that he has discussed?

[Mr Jones]

It does. There is an argument, which some members of the Committee are trying to make, that it is the ranks versus the seniors, but this is designed to protect the ranks.

The Minister says that it would be more appropriate to have this in an armed forces Bill. If that is the case, why was this Bill not held over until next year, when we could incorporate all of this into an armed forces Bill? Having sat on nearly every single armed forces Bill over the past 20 years, I know that there are things in this Bill that would be able to fit into an armed forces Bill. We know that the reason it is in this Bill is because it was a political stunt—it is more about politics than about what it is supposed to do.

New clause 8 should be incorporated in this Bill, because it would get to the root cause, which we discussed last week and which people have continually commented on: namely, that the Bill does not look at investigations. If the Minister got off his phone and listened, he might be able to get to a situation where, after reflecting on this, the Government may well look at how they can codify this and put it into the Bill, because it would then be stronger. As has been said, we want to protect, and that is what we are supposed to be doing with the Bill.

[The Chair]

Does the right hon. Gentleman wish to press the amendment to a vote?

[Mr Jones]

Yes, I do.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

I thought so.

[Mr Jones]

Mr Stringer, are you going to move the other clauses? Are you taking them as a group?

[The Chair]

What is being debated is amendment 14 to clause 1. We are also debating amendments 2 and 56, and new clauses 6 and 7. If hon. Members wish to vote at the end, we will vote on amendment 14. However, it is in order to discuss the other amendments and new clauses.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

The opportunity to debate the other amendments in this group has gone; that went when that debate finished. We can now, if hon. Members wish, vote on amendment 26, and then we will come to clause stand part. If I can help the hon. Lady, if I think—as I almost certainly will think—that the debate on clause 1 has not been exhausted, we can have a general debate on clause 1. However, the opportunity to debate amendment 26 went when we moved to the vote on the previous amendment. I will now ask whether you want to vote on amendment 26.

[Mr Jones]

Further to that point of order, Mr Stringer. I did ask whether you were taking these as a group and when I could move my amendment.

[The Chair]

I read out at the beginning that they were being debated together. I made that clear.

[Mr Jones]

May I ask for clarification on new clauses 6 and 7? In terms of the general debate on clause 1, reference could obviously be made to them in that.

[The Chair]

I will think about that while we are debating. I know that the right hon. Gentleman is not new to the House, but many members of this Committee are. If they listened carefully, I did read through all the areas we were debating at the start of this. I read out the amendments we were debating and what was before the Committee.

[Mr Jones]

To be fair, Mr Stringer, I also asked to move those new clauses. I am sorry, with respect, Chair, but you did not clarify that.

[The Chair]

It was clarified at the beginning. I cannot go back to that. That has been debated, although Members did not speak to it. If hon. Members wish to have a clause stand part debate, we can have that. You are absolutely right that we will vote later on new clauses, but the opportunity to debate them was then, when I read out the list.

[The Chair]

I accept that there is a misunderstanding, but the statements were read out clearly from the Chair about what we were debating at the start. The opportunity to debate them was not taken. I cannot think of any way to debate them now. However, I will take the Clerk’s advice later and see whether there is a way.

[Mr Jones]

rose—

[The Chair]

I will take no further points of order on the matter at this time. Clearly, people have not taken the opportunity to debate the matter. That is unfortunate. I will take the Clerk’s advice to see whether there is any way of doing that, but I cannot think of any way at the present time, because we have passed it. We have now moved on to amendment 26. Does Stephen Morgan wish to move amendment 26 formally?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

It is clear, but I asked the Chair, when he was taking that group of amendments, whether I could move my new clause. I will not go over that. It was strange to me, because I have been here long enough to know that when amendments and new clauses are grouped, they can actually be moved. I did ask the Chair, but I was not allowed to do that.

[The Chair]

If the right hon. Member will take his seat, I had already told the Committee what was being debated. There was clearly a misunderstanding. We are going to resolve that issue, and then we can have the clause stand part debate. For clarity, amendment 26 has been moved formally. Does the Front-Bench spokesperson wish to put it to a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

Not at this stage, Mr Stringer.

[Mr Jones]

I say again what a pleasure it is to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer.

On clause 1, we heard last week that one problem the Bill does not address relates to investigations. If that had been included, the Bill would be more effective in stopping the unfair distress of individuals. We heard from Major Campbell, who was quite graphic about his 17 years of investigations. The clause is clear about trying to clear up the system and we have heard about the system being made more efficient, which would not only ensure that armed forces personnel get a fair hearing but speed up the processes where they face distress.

It is not surprising that investigations are not being considered. Let us look at General Nick Parker’s evidence last week. I know him well—he has had a distinguished career—and I certainly know his son, who was injured in Afghanistan. Those of us on the Opposition Benches might say, “It’s yet another general rather than a squaddie,” but I have a huge amount of respect for him. He not only has the Army running through his veins but stands up for the armed forces and the men and women who served under him, having their best interests at heart. He would be supportive of any legislation or anything done to try to improve their lot. Having had a few heated arguments with him over the years—he is no shrinking violet—I know that if he thought the Bill was perfect or would improve things, he would say that. What he says about investigations is therefore important. He said:

“On the effectiveness side, it appears as if part 1 of the Bill focuses entirely on the process of prosecution, whereas for me the big issue here is the process of investigation and, critically in that process, ensuring that the chain of command is deeply connected with what goes on from the very outset. I do not think there is any serviceman or woman who would not accept that bad behaviour on the frontline must be treated quickly and efficiently. Nobody would want anything in the process that somehow allows people who have behaved badly on the frontline to get away with it. But all of us would believe that the process has to be quick, efficient and effective to remove the suspicion of a malicious allegation as quickly as possible. I cannot see how this Bill does that.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 94, Q188.]

The Minister referred to next year’s armed forces Bill as being appropriate for that, but I am aghast. If this Bill is supposed to be the Rolls-Royce legislation to protect our servicemen and women, why on earth does it not include investigation?

I note that, ironically, since we took evidence, a written ministerial statement was made yesterday in which the Defence Secretary announced that investigations will be looked at. He said:

“The Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill currently before this House will provide reassurance to service personnel that we have taken steps to help protect them from the threat of repeated investigations and potential prosecution in connection with historical operations…However, we are also clear that there should be timely consideration of serious and credible allegations and, where appropriate, a swift and effective investigation followed by prosecution, if warranted. In the rare cases of real wrongdoing, the culprits should be swiftly and appropriately dealt with. In doing so, this will provide greater certainty to all parties that the justice system processes will deliver an appropriate outcome without undue delay.”—[Official Report, 13 October 2020; Vol. 682, c. 9WS.]

Even the Defence Secretary recognises that one of the issues is the length of investigations. Could I disagree with any of what he said? No. As I said in speaking to new clause 8, the issue is effectiveness in making sure not only that the service is protected from malicious allegations, but that individuals are. We must always think about that, because at the end of the day the individual is important.

The Defence Secretary’s statement goes on to say:

“I am therefore commissioning a review so that we can be sure that, for those complex and serious allegations of wrongdoing against UK forces which occur overseas on operations, we have the most up to date and future-proof framework, skills and processes in place and can make improvements where necessary. The review will be judge-led and forward looking and, whilst drawing on insights from the handling of allegations from recent operations, will not seek to reconsider past investigative or prosecutorial decisions or reopen historical cases. It will consider processes in the service police and Service Prosecuting Authority as well as considering the extent to which such investigations are hampered by potential barriers in the armed forces, for example, cultural issues or operational processes.”—[Official Report, 13 October 2020; Vol. 682, c. 9WS.]

[Mrs Lewell-Buck]

Is my right hon. Friend a little concerned about the Secretary of State’s comments, as I am? If indeed those comments are true and that is the intention, why has the Minister not tabled amendments today to address that issue?

[Mr Jones]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. We were told, although I do not believe it, that the Government wanted to improve the Bill and would consider amendments. I accept that Opposition amendments are not always properly drafted to fit into a Bill, but it is quite common for the Government to say that they will look at an amendment and change it, but put the spirit of it into a Bill. There is an opportunity to do that now, but unfortunately we have a Minister who clearly just wants to say, “No, we will get the Bill through as drafted, and that’s it,” which is contrary to his statements about trying to work together with people. There is an opportunity to do that now and I do not understand why we cannot do it, as my hon. Friend says.

The Defence Secretary’s statement goes on to say:

“A key part of the review will be its recommendations for any necessary improvements. It will seek to build upon and not reopen the recommendations of the service justice system review”.—[Official Report, 13 October 2020; Vol. 682, c. 9WS.]

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

On the justice system review and its relationship to the Bill, in answer to a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North West last week about Major Campbell’s 17 years of dreadful investigation, General Sir Nick Parker said:

“That will not happen if you have a credible system that investigates and you address some of the cultural issues in the chain of command by making it genuinely accountable for what is happening.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 98, Q201.]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the Bill does absolutely none of that?

[Mr Jones]

It does not. If somebody like Nick Parker is saying that, we need to take it seriously. As for how the Bill has been born, I would love to know who is claiming paternity for it, because a lot of people seem to have been excluded—certainly the Judge Advocate General has. I would have thought he was the obvious person, as a senior military person in the justice system, to be brought in at an early stage to look at some of the things we shall talk about later—not only the issues of international law, but how the system could be improved.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miss Sarah Dines (Derbyshire Dales) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. The scope of the Bill clearly does not encompass a wide-scale investigation of the present investigation process. Will the right hon. Gentleman explore a little more and explain what he did in his tenure as a Defence Minister to look into the matter?

[Mr Jones]

I will say this to the hon. Lady: if she wants a long rundown of the positive things that the Labour Government did for the armed forces I can start with the Armed Forces (Pensions and Compensation) Act 2004.

[Miss Dines]

But on investigations?

[Mr Jones]

It is related, because it is related to people who were serving on operations. For the first time ever it brought forward a modern system of lump sum payments, which were never there before, for Falkland veterans or anything else. I actually extended that in 2007 to cover issues to do with mental health provision. Our record was that each year but one of that Labour Government we accepted the finding of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body, as opposed to the Conservative Government’s cutting pay. We maintained our armed forces spending at a level above inflation. The 2010 Conservative Government cut the defence budget by 16%.

We also had the armed forces welfare pathway, which I started in—

[The Chair]

Order. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman knows that he is moving way outside the scope of clause 1 and the amendments and new clauses. I ask him to come back to the clause stand part debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

I am sorry, Mr Stringer. I was going down memory lane to happier times. Just to finish that point, the welfare pathway, which the Government who came to power in 2010 rightly changed and renamed the covenant, was something that I introduced in 2010.

The hon. Member for Derbyshire Dales raised the issue of investigations and what we did. She is the new Member for that beautiful part of the world, and I have huge respect for her predecessor. I spent many a time at Kinder Scout and Hope as a boy walking round that area, so I know her area very well. But I think that she has to recognise the issue in terms of Iraq and Afghanistan. Yes, huge and terrible accusations were made about what was going on. There was pressure not only from what could be called the outriders on the left but from her own party to the effect that some of these accusations should have been investigated. If there was a failure, it was around investigation.

I do not want to try your patience, Mr Stringer, but we also did the Armed Forces Act 2006, which meshed the three service disciplinary systems into one. That was a huge issue, but it actually improved service discipline and investigations. This is an opportunity to get this Bill right. Let me say to the hon. Lady that I just want to get the Bill right. I think that if we had an approach from the Minister whereby he would take on board some of this, we could do these things, both here and in the other place, but there is a tendency, which I do not like, to think that somehow we in this place scrutinise legislation, and the Government know that they are going to change things but they change things in the House of Lords, giving the public the impression that somehow the House of Lords is this all-singing, all-seeing, body when actually those things should be done here. I am already talking, as I am sure others are, to Members of the House of Lords, including, I have to say to the Minister, some of his noble Friends who I think also have concerns about the Bill.

There is an opportunity here to do that with investigations. The issue with the amendments that we were talking about is really this. We had the debate about investigation of de minimis things, but what I think everyone wants is that investigations can be done quickly—not be done quickly and dismissed, because we have to get the balance right in terms of people making serious allegations that are investigated properly. Let us remember that we are talking here about allegations from civilians against members of the armed forces, but remember also that there are often cases between servicemen and women, who are making accusations against themselves—against individuals. There has to be a sense of fairness, and it cannot be right that it goes on for a very long time, so it does need judicial oversight. If someone is accused of something, that should be investigated properly and quickly, but that should also be done in a legal process that cannot be challenged—well, I am sure that everything can be challenged if someone pays a lawyer enough, but we must ensure that we have a situation whereby it is as judicially robust as possible.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

In response to a question asked by the hon. Member for Blaydon last week, General Sir Nick Parker stated:

“Nobody would want anything in the process that somehow allows people who have behaved badly on the frontline to get away with it. But all of us would believe that the process has to be quick, efficient and effective to remove the suspicion of a malicious allegation as quickly as possible. I cannot see how this Bill does that.”–[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 94, Q188.]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that legitimacy and effectiveness are not an element of this Bill and that we need to see structural change before we can go forward?

[Mr Jones]

I agree. The impression that I think some people try to give of the armed forces is that the armed forces, which have a job to go and do, want to be above the law. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Covid-19 Update

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Monday 12th October 2020 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

Yes. I thank my hon. Friend, and everybody in Devon, and the local authorities, for their efforts to keep the virus down. This is a giant collective effort, and alas, even in the south-west we are seeing the virus going up, although by nothing like as much as in other parts of the country. It is going up across the whole country, and we must work together to get it down.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

The Prime Minister says that he is listening and working with local authorities, but that simply is not true. Since the beginning of the crisis, local authorities and directors of public health have argued for a locally based test and trace system. When will he admit that his national approach and national system has failed? Will he hand over to local authorities and directors of public health the responsibility and resources to ensure an effective local test and trace system? That is the only way we will get on top of this crisis.

[The Prime Minister]

I think I have answered that point about four times already. We need a combination of both national and local.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill (Fourth sitting)

Lord Beamish Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 8th October 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Johnny Mercer]

Q Of course, and that that is why we have built in there that it is the point of knowledge, rather than when the incident took place. Therefore, if you had PTSD 24 years later, your six-year clock would start from that 24-year point.

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: Understood. It is great to hear that clarification.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

No, it would not.

[Johnny Mercer]

Yes, it would. You have no idea what you are talking about.

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: You can understand the problem that the military community have. It is hard enough for someone like me, as a master’s graduate, to understand it, but also trying to get this understood by a large body of quite unqualified people who fought bravely is difficult enough.

The only other qualification that I would add is to do not with the question that you have directly asked but with a broader question, which you may want to touch on later. It is very difficult to separate, in the view of the veteran, operations from one theatre and operations from another theatre. Obviously, you probably know straight away that I am referring to Northern Ireland. I understand, and we understand, that it is not part of this Bill, but I think there has to be a measure by the Government to say—and I think they have—that other measures will be taken ahead to deal with that. That is something that I know is a concern, and it is something that is of prime concern.

Broadly—I have to say this broadly because, again, we have to remember that we do not get people scrutinising the Bill itself; they hear the broad terms of it—it is welcomed by the community and there is no major feedback of negativity other than the points we have registered about claims, which you have clarified very helpfully.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Anderson]

That is brilliant. Those are all my questions. Thank you very much.

[Mr Jones]

Q Hi, Chris. In terms of the cases you have dealt with, we have already heard from other witnesses that the real issue is the length of time these investigations take. We took evidence on Tuesday from Major Campbell—frankly, the way that individual has been treated is disgraceful. This Bill does not cover investigations, and I wonder whether you think there should be some way in which investigations could be speeded up, or a way to prevent people from being reinvestigated for the same thing on several occasions, which certainly happened in Major Campbell’s case.

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: That is a very fair point, and it is an excellent question, because the time has been a big factor. I am not aware of any way in which military law should be seen to be rushed along or pushed along. However, I think this comes back to the duty of care. I know there is provision in the Bill for certain time restrictions, so if there were a time restriction on an investigation, unless there was a good reason to extend it, that might be something that would allow a positive factor of, “Yes, there is some definite evidence brewing here.” That could be positive.

We are talking about several years in which people are on hold. That was certainly the case for people involved in the Danny Boy incident in al-Amarah, with the public inquiry and the many cases to do with that particular incident, which was a real travesty. That affected some people for eight or nine years, so that was quite a long wait, and of course some of those people were already in distress because of the very tough fighting in that incident.

[Mr Jones]

Q I agree with you on that, but the Bill does not stop potential prosecutions by the International Criminal Court. The problem with this legislation as it is drafted is that it includes a presumption not to prosecute even before investigation, which seems very odd. The Minister is looking bemused, but it is actually in the Bill. Are you not concerned that if we are not seen to investigate these things to a certain level, we could end up with individuals being placed before the International Criminal Court? That is certainly something I would not want to see.

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: That is a good question, because it is something I have heard from chats on veteran social media and other discussions. You must remember that our face-to-face contact with our people has been limited from the summer onwards, but in a lot of the discussions that happen on this, sometimes weekly, there is without a doubt greater fear of a non-British legal action coming against people than of anything British. Even though soldiers, sailors and airmen might grumble about the prosecutions, I think they would all, to a man and woman, admit that British justice would be the preferable place to go to every time. There have been many times when people have been investigated but then there has been no case to answer and justice has been seen to be done—there has been no prosecution, and certainly no conviction, in the majority of cases—so I would agree with you.

Again, we must remember that I, let alone the body of the kirk, if you like—the association members—would not understand the nuances of what might cause an International Criminal Court action. If there seemed to be a risk of that, it would need to be closed on behalf of the veterans, who would see that as a far greater risk to themselves than facing British justice. I think that is a fair question to ask.

[Mr Jones]

Q Can I turn to the issues around investigations? You talk about the duty of care and the chain of command—I know it well, and how it works sometimes and does not work at other times. Do you think there should be an obligation on the Ministry of Defence to provide legal assistance to individuals who are being investigated or are accused of crimes?

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: When I was involved in a public inquiry—it was the Baha Mousa public inquiry—there were five separate teams of lawyers and barristers, of which two were consulting me as a person giving evidence, not in any accusatory sense, but for contextual evidence. I was amazed by how much effort and money was going into that. The accepted norm is that a lot of people are left to their own devices and are not able to access the same level or scale of funded assistance when they are accused by military investigations such as IHAT and others.

[Mr Jones]

Q I raise that because if you were in civilian life and were accused of something in line with your employment, you could go, for example, to a trade union, which would provide you with legal assistance. We have not got that for individual soldiers. I am just thinking about trying to level the playing field, in the sense that members of the armed forces should at least have some recourse to legal assistance. As you say, the other side could perhaps spend a fortune on very expensive barristers and others. Leaving it to associations such as you and others to provide legal support that is a bit hit and miss, isn’t it? I know that some associations do.

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: It is, and I understand that. As an association, we have our own private funds and we raise funds. We have had need to use them, and we have a regimental advocate or lawyer who helps us, often on a gratis arrangement. But that is a poor reflection on the way it should be.

I agree with you. If this can add any context, after my 17 years of service and a lot of frontline tours, often the biggest point of failure that caused the most damage was when there was a point of failure in the chain of command. If a commanding officer or a senior officer—a major or a brigadier perhaps—was the person causing the problem, they are also in the discipline chain, so the whole thing grinds to a halt and becomes an impasse. That is a very difficult situation.

The second-order question is: why do we not have a Police Federation equivalent or a trade union? I have seen a number of failures—not a large number, but it has happened—in the chain of command by officers behaving improperly, and that says to me that the only way you can stop that sort of thing affecting the people beneath them is by having, if not a trade union or federation, then an independent place to go. Personally, I think we have that with the independent Service Complaints Ombudsman, which is available as a pressure release valve. The good work that has been done to bring that in, although that small body is not widely known at the moment, has removed some of the risk.

[Mr Jones]

Q That is one of the things I argued very strongly for when we did the Deepcut inquiry—it came out of that in the early 2000s. The problem with the ombudsman is that he or she can only look backwards. What I am trying to get to is that people need legal support and so on in these cases when they are going through it. I will come on to the ombudsman in a minute, because you raised another issue with it earlier.

I am trying to think whether there is a mechanism we could get for those accused. I accept the point that you make about the chain of command, but I am trying to understand whether there is anything we can do to even up the playing field, in terms of ensuring that people are not left on their own? Most people do not have access to independent funds, and most people have perhaps never been involved with the law before, so when they are it is obviously quite a daunting experience. If we could come up with some system that actually allowed recourse to legal support, would that be something that you would support?

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: Yes, I would, but I would qualify that support. As a veteran leader, I constantly tell our people that they must not consider themselves to be a special case when there are also blue light services and other people who are equally well deserving and who also sometimes face legal complaints.

[Mr Jones]

Q But they are slightly different, in the sense that they have recourse to, for example, in the ambulance service, a trade union, or the Police Federation.

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: Correct. I understand why you ask that question. It is something, certainly for the veteran part of it, that I have proposed. I am in discussion with our excellent friend the Minister about innovative ideas such as having an inspector for veterans, like the inspector for prisons. Beyond that, there could possibly be someone who would be an independent body. Wherever that independent body sits, it cannot sit in the MOD. That is the problem—it must not sit there; it should sit outside.

[Mr Jones]

Can I—

[The Chair]

May I turn to Sarah Atherton. If there is time, I will come back to you.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

Can I just ask one question about the ombudsman?

[Sarah Atherton (Wrexham) (Con)]

I don’t mind, Mr Stringer.

[The Chair]

Okay. Just one. There might be time for further questions, because only Sarah is indicating that she would like to ask one at the moment.

[Mr Jones]

Q The ombudsman can look backwards. We heard Major Campbell the other day; even though he had been completely exonerated, there was no ability to investigate why he was treated the way he was. Do you think it would help those individuals who have gone through very poor service—in his case, it was 17 years of hell, by the sound of it—to have recourse to the ombudsman to have that investigated, to at least get some answers as to why things were actually happening?

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: I would say a strong yes, because in all the incidents I have seen where it has gone wrong, if the individual concerned knew that there was some way that an independent person would be able to investigate them, they may have been less likely to think that they could get away with it; it is often individuals acting fully in the knowledge of what they are doing because they can get away with it. Personally, based on my experience, I would say yes to that.

[Sarah Atherton]

Q Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment, the Tigers, was caught up in the battle of Danny Boy. As an association representative, can you give the Committee a sense of what the soldiers and families went through during those vexatious claims? There have been high-profile cases of Brian Wood and Scott Hoolin, whom I assume you know all about. Can you give us a sense of what they went through during these vexatious investigations?

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: I will, and if it helps you, I would prefer to answer that in the broadest terms, rather than focusing on individual cases, to avoid causing them any further distress. Obviously, a lot of the things we talk about are very confidential, and a lot of them are very tearful.

With that incident and the aftermath, once it started to break out that there was going to be some sort of investigations, and the manner of those investigations, there was certainly a feeling of horror and almost terror that swept through people, because they realised, “When will this stop?” It was a particularly brutal engagement, and it was cited, as the Committee probably knows, as being along the lines of second world war bayonet fighting-type engagement—incredible bravery but also incredible stress. One of the individuals I know—a large, strong, tough individual—was in tears in my arms, explaining that he had enough to deal with coping with having had to kill several people, and now he would have to deal with the fact that he might be court martialled for it. He just could not understand it.

We have to remember, again, that the individuals concerned are not people who are able to sit and pick through legal documents, nor understand them. Whether we ask the most vulnerable or tough people in our society to go forward and do these extremely tough and brave point-of-the-spear jobs, such as combat roles, we must remember that we have a duty of care to protect them from anything—intellectual or otherwise—that might affect them later in their distress.

In answer to your question about the families, that whole inquiry, and certainly that incident, were the largest single point of family distress that I have witnessed in my entire military service or veteran chairmanship of five years. That amount of distress was not only for those who were being prosecuted, but for their spouses, partners, mothers, fathers, others, and children in some cases—those who knew that the veteran had been involved not only in that incident but in others—because there was immediate presumption that there would soon be a knock on the door or a letter popping through the door for some sort of summons, so the stress levels, the distress and the impact snowballed to quite a large level. It was very hard to put a lid on that stress because that is what happened: letters did start to arrive and people did get knocks on the door, so it became a very distressing time.

[The Chair]

I cut you off Kevan. Do you have another question?

[Mr Jones]

Q I have, but I just want to pick up on that point. The Bill would not stop the agony that you have just talked about, because in the five or six-year period, you would still be investigated. Is the root of this not that if accusations are made, they should be investigated and dealt with speedily and efficiently and, frankly, thrown out? That is what is missing from the Bill. A time-limit can be put on it, but six years is a long time for a family to go through that, as you have described. We cannot put ourselves in those people’s shoes; for anybody accused of something that they have not done, it must be awful.

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: I agree with you, but I propose that in the whole of defence—let alone the MOD, lawyers, investigators, military police investigators —everyone went through a learning process. That was an unprecedented time. Now, everything—the procedures, the understanding, the channels of complaint, the channels of the chain of command acting to look after people, the care for families—has improved, so we must be careful not to look at those past incidents when we were going through extreme learning pains with the existing legislation, but think about how we might cope not only with new legislation, but with the great leaps forward and lessons that have been learned about investigative timescale and accuracy, and the ability and the need for statements to be taken after patrols and suchlike.

Those things sound very easy. Sometimes they are difficult out in the dust and the heat, with the extreme exhaustion that goes on out there. We are in a much better place; I genuinely offer that from a very lucky perspective, because I can speak without any official man here, but I get the chance to speak to everyone who is in officialdom, as well as the soldiers from my regiment and their families.

[Mr Jones]

Q Can I now turn to part 2 of the Bill? I accept that you and others have perhaps not read the Bill line by line, but part 2 would put a six-year limit on section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, which means that veterans will not be able to bring claims outside that time limit. As one witness explained the other day, that would mean that prisoners would have more rights than members of the armed forces. That cannot be right, can it?

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: No, but it would not be the first time. We are in a gradual process as a country, and we must not be too hard on ourselves. We are closing gaps and are doing the best we can, but nothing will be done in a week or two. Everyone is pretty realistic—you will not get a bunch of people who are more realistic than military veterans about how long things take. There might be some concerns about the six-year rule, but I am sure people would welcome being part of that discussion. I can certainly help that process by getting my people to be part of that discussion, survey or whatever it might be, to get the feeling about whether this would be something that could sit happily with them. This process alone—my being here—is part of that. The six-year part, and the potential that other parts of society could be better off, is still countered by the fact that I have never met a military person who feels that we should be outside the law and that we should not obey the agreed principles.

[Mr Jones]

Q But what this is doing is putting veterans at disadvantage by comparison with what I or you can do as a civilian, in terms of taking a case outside the Limitation Act 1980. It does not sit comfortably with me that veterans should not have the same rights as everybody else. It is possibly one of those things that we get in legislation sometimes—an unintended consequence. Personally, I think it should be taken out of the Bill, because it will limit the ability of veterans to bring civil claims outside those time limits. Knowing the MOD lawyers as I do, they will use it as an excuse for why claims should be discontinued.

Lieutenant Colonel Parker: Understood, and I partially agree with you. Again, I would say that most people would be surprised, as would I, that no mechanism could be thought of to allow someone after the six years, if they felt that there was a strong enough case and it was sound in British justice, to bring a claim via appeal, the High Court or whatever it might be, to a judge, and that would be allowed to be waived. I am not a legal expert, but I would have thought that would be the situation if there was a particularly compelling case. I cannot think of any.

[Mr Jones]

It is there already in section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980. The Bill is carving veterans out of it, which I certainly do not agree with at all.

[The Chair]

If there are no more questions, may I thank you, Colonel Parker, for your valuable evidence this afternoon? I am sure the Committee will find it useful and informative when we come to discuss the Bill on a line-by-line basis.

Examination of Witness

Judge Jeff Blackett gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Carol Monaghan]

Yes.

Judge Blackett: The previous witness talked about the inability of service personnel to sue, because of the six years. It is rather like going back to section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. That is not really my area of law, so perhaps I am not the right witness to deal with it. I said to the Secretary of State that I thought it was injudicious, but there are better minds than mine who can apply that.

One bizarre thing is that, if this Bill becomes law, there is a six-year time limit but the Attorney General may give consent to a prosecution. Then, clearly, one of the things that the criminal court would be doing is awarding compensation, if there was a conviction. There would still be issues in relation to personal injury claims, which would come through the criminal court rather than the civil court, if it got to prosecution. However, I do not think I am the right person to answer those questions.

[Mr Jones]

Q In your letter to the Secretary of State you said:

“The bill as drafted is not the answer.”

You have been very clear on that today. You have made four suggestions there. I can see a problem with the legal aid one, but the other three relate to procedure for criminal trials in the service justice system. Could they be incorporated into the Bill?

Judge Blackett: Yes. If you need legislation, you can use any legislative vehicle, can you not? Certainly, I would have thought that applying the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 one, which is applying a six-month time limit to summary-only matters, would be extended. It would need more wording because I believe that should be extended to what should be called de minimis. De minimis claims probably need to be taken before the judge who is overseeing it so he can say, “This is de minimis.” Then, a great raft of those allegations in IHAT and Northmoor would have gone with that.

[Mr Jones]

Q That would clear out a lot of frivolous and vexatious cases, the difference being that it would not be about a presumption not to prosecute. An independent legal body—a judge or a magistrate—would make that decision. That is the important thing there. It is not the chain of command or the MOD making that decision, or the Attorney General. It is independent legal—

Judge Blackett: Yes.

[Mr Jones]

Q On raising the bar, how would that work in effect?

Judge Blackett: The way I described it when we had our meeting with the Minister was relating to the Criminal Cases Review Commission. They can look at what is a miscarriage of justice and put it back to the Court of Appeal, but they have a very high bar. It was extracting that sort of test and applying it on the other side in relation to investigations. Having said that, there have been only two reinvestigations following acquittals in my time, and both of those determined that there was no further evidence and therefore it did not come back to court. However, the individual accused, who had been acquitted, had to go through all the problems that we heard the last witness talk about.

[Mr Jones]

Q I am aware of the criminal case review because I have just been involved with the Post Office Horizon cases that are going before that. It is a high test to get them there, but it does give that. I will come on to one of your third points in a minute, but the issue that has come out throughout all the evidence that we have taken so far is around investigation and—I think this came through from the last witness—the trauma, not only for individuals but for families, because things are taking too long, although the two cases you mentioned were done quite quickly. In terms of judicial oversight, can you explain how that would work?

Judge Blackett: In my view, you have an allocated judge—probably a judge advocate—who the investigators can come to and say, “This is what we have. We have one person saying ‘He raped me 10 years ago.’ We have no other evidence. We have interviewed her and we think”—she is lying, she is telling the truth, or whatever. The judge can then take a view, rather than the current system at IHAT. It became rather like a fishing expedition, where an allegation came in and they spent ages fishing for more evidence around the allegation. It needs, I think, judicial oversight to say, “Stop fishing, you have had enough time. This clearly will not get anywhere near a conviction and therefore stop the investigation now.”

[Mr Jones]

Q Would the judge have the ability, if he or she were not satisfied with the evidence put forward, to say, “You should investigate it further”?

Judge Blackett: Absolutely, yes.

[Mr Jones]

Q So it would not be an automatic cut-off.

Judge Blackett: No, no. It is basically judicial supervision. It comes back to what I was saying about better case management in the court martial, which is the system we introduced not that long ago, where early on in the investigation, before the investigation is complete, the case is put before a judge. It may be that at that stage the defendant says, “I plead guilty and therefore let’s stop the investigation.” That is one way of dealing with these matters. It stops the time taken on an investigation.

[Mr Jones]

Q On the issue around the International Criminal Court, in that case, you could argue to them that it would be judicially independent oversight, and that is the important point.

Judge Blackett: Absolutely.

[Mr Jones]

Q Can I turn to clause 3? I think it is a very strange one. It refers to “exceptional demands”, but I think your letter to the Secretary of State outlines that the service justice system already takes that into account. That is certainly why I am a big supporter of it, in the sense that it recognises the nature of military service, which of course civil courts cannot take into account. Can you talk us through your concerns about clause 3?

Judge Blackett: Clause 3 is engaged after five years. It seems bizarre to me that in deciding whether to prosecute, you have a post-five-year test, but not a pre-five-year test. All these matters are taken into account anyway when the service prosecutor decides whether it is in the service and public interest to prosecute. As you know, there has to be evidential sufficiency and public interest. This is effectively designing or describing what the service interest test or public interest test should be. Now, prosecutions may take place, even though a serviceman were suffering from battle fatigue, diminished responsibility—all of those things. There is still a proper prosecution and the offence or the sentence will reflect all those matters, but not the actual prosecution. This therefore seems to me unnecessary, because the service prosecuting authority exists separate from the Crown Prosecution Service because it applies the service interest test. That was my concern.

[Mr Jones]

Q In your letter, you give the example of Marine A. Could you talk the Committee through how that worked in practice in that case?

Judge Blackett: Interestingly, a number of the issues here were raised by Marine A subsequently through the Criminal Cases Review Commission and back to the Court of Appeal, and they were never raised at first instance. Had he raised them at first instance—had all the psychiatric evidence that came out eventually appeared at the start—he probably would have been charged with manslaughter rather than murder, for example. So that can assist the prosecutor in the way he moves forward.

[Mr Jones]

Q In that case, he was charged with murder and convicted of murder and then, on appeal, that new evidence came in and it was reduced to manslaughter. Is that correct?

Judge Blackett: That is correct—on the second appeal.

[Mr Jones]

Q Do you have concerns—I certainly do—that there is a danger that the way in which the Bill is constructed could give credence to some of those who are advocating the abolition of the service justice system? I am not one of those who want to do away with the service justice system, because I think it is a system that protects its unique nature.

Judge Blackett: I think if the Bill becomes law as it stands, then clearly there is a concern. We have seen it from all the responses to you, from Liberty and others such as Liberty, who are very concerned. Their perception is that you are protecting people from wrongdoing. I am sure their view will be that if you are protecting people from wrongdoing, you are not capable of being independent and therefore we should take all this away from you.

[Mr Jones]

Q You have already mentioned the presumption to prosecute. I have said this before and I will say it again, but in my opinion, the Bill fails the Ronseal test: it does not do what it says on the tin. I find the presumption not to prosecute remarkable—the idea that you can investigate someone, but start the process with a presumption that you are not going to prosecute them. The argument made is that this will mean that people will not face courts later on. However, is it not true that this will open up an entire system of judicial reviews, not only of decisions to not prosecute, but where the Attorney General decides to?

Judge Blackett: Sorry, I am not quite sure what the question is.

[Mr Jones]

Q Well, in terms of the way judicial review is done, if you have a presumption at the start to not prosecute and somebody then says, “We are not going to prosecute you even when we have done the investigation,” could that not lead to other court action coming in through judicial review?

Judge Blackett: I do not read the Bill as you have suggested—that you do not investigate because there is a presumption against prosecution.

[Mr Jones]

Q No, you do investigate, but you have the presumption at the back of your mind that you are not going to prosecute at the end of it.

Judge Blackett: You investigate on the basis that if there is sufficient evidence, it will go to the prosecuting authority and he will say either yes or no, or it will go to the Attorney General. As I said earlier, if the Director Service Prosecutions decides not to prosecute, there is a victim right of review, so there is a further process—that is, if it does not go to the International Criminal Court—and if it gets to the Attorney General, there is the option of judicial review of his decision. Yes, there is a lot of potential litigation around the Bill.

[The Chair]

I call Liz Twist.

Judge Blackett: Can I add a rider to what I have just said? The Attorney General has to consent in a number of offences. As far as the court martial is concerned, the Attorney General has to consent to prosecuting any International Criminal Court Act 2001 offence—that is, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Under section 1A(3) of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, he has to consent to prosecuting any grave breaches of that Act, and under section 61 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, he has to consent if a prosecution is to be brought outside of time limits. That is in relation to service personnel who have left and are no longer subject to that jurisdiction. A consent function is there in any event, and funnily enough, given that ICC Act offences and Geneva Conventions Act offences are covered by the Attorney General, a lot of this will have to go to the Attorney General anyway, without the Overseas Operations Bill.

My concern about the Attorney General’s consent is that it undermines the Director Service Prosecutions. If I were he, I would be most upset that I could not make a decision in these circumstances.