Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill (Eighth sitting)

Chris Evans Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 20th October 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to have you in the Chair, Mr Mundell. I trust that everyone has had a nice lunch. I hope the Minister has not had too much raw red meat and that he has been able to have a lie-down after his exertions this morning. He will certainly not be eating haggis for his dinner or lunch, or at any time soon, after his comments about Scotland this morning. I shall let him enlighten you later on those points, Mr Mundell.

We were talking about the rights of veterans. My hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn raised the issue of asbestos and how asbestosis is one of a number of diseases that limits the serviceman or woman from bringing claims within the six-year period. As I said this morning, the Minister and I agree on one thing: we understand the limitation and the date of knowledge. The bit where we have a problem is where the Bill takes out veterans, apart from anyone else, from section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980. We heard evidence last week from the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers. I accept that there are certain people in the room who perhaps do not like lawyers—criminal, civil or whatever. The association told us that the Bill strips service personnel and veterans of certain rights in relation to civil claims. I will come back to this later, but we were told that if the Bill is enacted, prisoners will have more rights than veterans or servicemen and women.

On the claims brought before the Ministry of Defence, clearly this Bill has its origins in what its promotors argue is a tsunami of unfounded civil claims that then led to criminal investigations, which then took many years. We have demonstrated in Committee that the actual number of prosecutions have been very small, but in terms of civilian claims there is also a very important set of claims that we should protect: the claims that allow servicemen and women and veterans to bring claims against the Ministry of Defence. That is done in two ways: via a civil claim or under the Human Rights Act. As I said this morning, some people in this place suddenly start frothing at the mouth as soon as the Human Rights Act is mentioned, but as I have said, it protects us all by giving us basic human rights.

The problem with part 2 of the Bill is that it will not only stop the straightforward civil claims, where people ask for compensation for injuries and other things; it would limit claims under the Human Rights Act. Such claims are important. I referred this morning to the Smith case involving Snatch Land Rovers, which was around the right to life and human rights. Hilary Meredith, who I thought had very good, detailed knowledge in the claims area, said in her evidence:

“There is a difficulty putting a time limit on the Human Rights Act—I do not even know whether we can do that constitutionally, because it is a European convention.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 18, Q30.]

I said that I would not question the Minister’s motives for what he is trying to achieve, but again, we are the seeing the huge implications that this Bill could have. We have already discussed criminal cases and possible trials before the International Criminal Court, but it would be interesting to know how the longstop—which is stopping the rights we all have under the Human Rights Act for veterans and armed force personnel—will be put into practice legally if, as Hilary Meredith said in her evidence, the UK has certain rights that are not just governed by what we agree as a country, but are part of an international convention on human rights. How does that square with part 2 of the Bill? That needs some explanation, because I do not want veterans and armed services personnel not to be covered by the Limitation Act 1980 or the rights that we all get from the Human Rights Act.

[Chris Evans (Islwyn) (Lab/Co-op)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the nub of the problem that he is driving at is that clause 8 and schedule 2 take away the court’s discretion under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 to disapply the time limit if

“it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed”?

That is being taken away from our service personnel, and it is the same under the Human Rights Act. Is not the nub of the problem with clause 8 that it is removing the court’s discretion to allow these actions to go ahead?

[Mr Jones]

It is. Again, this is about the rights of veterans and armed services personnel, which I thought this Bill was trying to protect. If we are taking away rights that everyone else has access to, that is a retrograde step. We need an explanation of why that is being done and why it is necessary, because I certainly do not think it is proportional. Again, that is one of the things this debate has thrown up, in that the Bill is about protecting the MOD from litigation, whether by armed forces personnel or veterans, and that cannot be right.

Coming back to investigations, Hilary Meredith raised another important thing that does not apply:

“That is a really interesting point, actually. I had not thought of a time limit on investigations. Certainly under the Human Rights Act, there is a right to have a speedy trial, and that did not happen in these cases.”—[Official Report, Overseas Operations Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c.19, Q31.]

This issue therefore cuts into investigations, another central point that we have been considering in this Bill.

When the Minister replies, I would be interested to know whether that has been cleared. I am not sure whether things still work this way, but when I was a Minister, the usual process for bringing forward a Bill involved sending a write-round to all Departments to get their agreement before it was sanctioned to come before the House. I do not know whether that still applies, because I know that, for a lot of things that this Government do now, they do not accept the usual common-sense conventions, which are there for very good reasons—to stop this type of thing—but how will the MOD be separate from the Human Rights Act?

[Chris Evans]

My right hon. Friend was a member of the Defence Committee, which wrote to the Secretary of State in July 2020 saying that

“the Bill may not be an effective way of achieving”

the aim of protecting personnel and veterans against

“vexatious and unnecessary investigations and prosecutions”.

My right hon. Friend was a member of that Committee. Does he agree with its finding that the Bill would have been better served by scrutiny from an ad hoc Select Committee before it came before Parliament?

[Mr Jones]

I am a big defender of pre-legislative scrutiny. I think I said a couple of sittings ago that our current system of pre-legislative scrutiny as part of the Bill Committee process is important. However, an important Bill such as this should have been road-tested a little more than just what we are able to do here, in terms of not only scrutiny, but the process that we are going through today.

I come back to the point that I do not understand why the Bill is now before us—well, I do understand, because the Minister gave it away the other day; it is an election commitment to bring it within 100 days of taking office—rather than what would have been a better place for it, the armed forces quadrennial review next year, which could have covered those issues. Now we are going to have a strange process: we will have this Bill and then the Armed Forces Bill next year, which we are now told will cover investigations, because the Secretary of State has now set up a commission to look at that. The best thing would have been to do those two things together, but that would not have met the political commitment that was put forward.

I do not think it is too late to make some changes to the Bill to improve it on investigations. Deleting part 2 would certainly be an important part of that, because part 2 changes the status of veterans and armed forces personnel. I genuinely believe what the Minister said in a Sunday newspaper over the weekend: that he does not want this in any way to affect our armed forces personnel. As I said, if it were left to both of us, we would guarantee that this type of limitation would not apply to individuals, but eventually none of us will be here and it will be the law that takes it forward. That is the weakness.

I do not understand why the Government want to reduce the role of veterans, and certainly not this Minister, who has prided himself on trying to be a champion for veterans. It is not just me saying this, or some lawyers or anyone else; we only have to look at the transcripts of the evidence put before us by the Royal British Legion. On 8 October, we took evidence from Charles Byrne from the Royal British Legion and General Sir John McColl from Cobseo. My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth South asked whether this was a breach of the covenant. The covenant should be about not only protecting the rights of veterans and armed forces personnel, but, where it can, enhancing them. Charles Byrne from the RBL spoke in response to the Minister, when the Minister said:

“No, because what we are looking to do is to protect, and to ensure that our servicemen are not disadvantaged.”

Mr Byrne replied:

“I think it is protecting the MOD, rather than the service personnel—that is the debate that we have had.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 8 October 2020; c. 86, Q163.]

I think it is clear, as we have heard from other witnesses as well, that this goes against the armed forces covenant. I fully support the covenant, and not just in ensuring that the armed forces have no disadvantage and are treated the same. I take a very clear view on this. If people have served their country, they should be given certainly the same rights as everyone else, and in some cases better ones to recognise that service. That is important.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Morgan]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Chris Evans]

I beg to move amendment 76, in schedule 2, page 16, line 5, leave out

“the section 11 relevant date”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 77, in schedule 2, page 16, line 30, leave out

“the section 11 relevant date (ignoring, for this purpose, the reference to section 11 (5) in paragraph (a) of the definition of that term)”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 78, in schedule 2, page 16, line 35, leave out

“the section 12 relevant date”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 79, in schedule 2, page 17, leave out from the beginning of line 35 to end of line 5 on page 18, and insert—

““the date of knowledge” means the date on which the person bringing the proceedings first knew, or first ought to have known—

(a) of the act complained of;

(b) that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence or the Secretary of State for Defence;

(c) of the manifestation of the injury resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim, and

(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in England and Wales so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 80, in schedule 3, page 20, line 41, leave out

“the section 17 relevant date”

and insert

“the date of knowledge (see subsection (13))”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 81, in schedule 3, page 21, line 4, leave out

“the section 18 relevant date”

and insert

“the date of knowledge (see subsection (13))”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 82, in schedule 3, page 21, line 9, leave out

“the section 17 relevant date”

and insert

“the date of knowledge (see subsection (13))”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 83, in schedule 3, page 22, leave out lines 12 to 17 and insert—

““the date of knowledge” means the date on which the person bringing the proceedings first knew, or first ought to have known—

(a) of the act complained of;

(b) that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence or the Secretary of State for Defence;

(c) of the manifestation of the injury resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim, and

(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Scotland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 84, in schedule 4, page 24, line 5, leave out

“the Article 7 relevant date”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 85, in schedule 4, page 24, line 29, leave out

“the Article 7 relevant date (ignoring, for this purpose, the reference to Article 7(5) in paragraph (a) of the definition of that term)”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury out of overseas operations.

Amendment 86, in schedule 4, page 24, line 34, leave out

“the Article 9 relevant date”

and insert “the date of knowledge”.

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 87, in schedule 4, page 25, leave out lines 25 to 43 and insert—

““the date of knowledge” means the date on which the person bringing the proceedings first knew, or first ought to have known—

(a) of the act complained of;

(b) that it was an act of the Ministry of Defence or the Secretary of State for Defence;

(c) of the manifestation of the injury resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim, and

(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run in Northern Ireland so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury and wrongful death arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 73, in clause 11, page 7, line 30, leave out from “before” to the end of line 34, and insert

“the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date of knowledge.”

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing claims under the HRA arising out of overseas operations.

Amendment 92, in clause 11, page 7, line 36, leave out

“or first ought to have known”.

Amendment 74, in clause 11, page 7, line 37, leave out “both”.

Amendment 75, in clause 11, page 7, line 40, at end insert—

“(c) of the manifestation of the harm resulting from that act which is the subject of the claim; and

(d) that they were eligible to bring a claim under the Human Rights Act 1998 against the Ministry of Defence or Secretary of State for Defence in the courts of the United Kingdom.”

This amendment is one of a series that changes the relevant date from which the six-year longstop starts to run so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing claims under the HRA arising out of overseas operations.

[Chris Evans]

The amendments allow the Bill to account for all legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing civil claims for personal injury arising out of overseas operations. The Minister recently said in The Daily Telegraph:

“Our analysis suggests 94 per cent of claims from service personnel and veterans are already brought within six years.”

He has repeated that today. He goes on:

“Critically, for conditions like PTSD, this limit will start from the date of knowledge or diagnosis.”

If that provision can be applied for certain conditions, which of course I agree with, let us take this opportunity to apply it fairly to all service personnel. That would allow those 6% who do not make claims within six years, according to the Minister’s own figures, to be given a chance to explain why. If the court’s criteria were met, they could then claim any compensation they are entitled to. On Sunday, I happened to chance upon the article that the Minister wrote for The Sun on Sunday, where he said that he would make it his personal mission to carry the can for those who fall outside the six-year rule. It would be helpful, given those comments, if he expanded on what he meant by that.

The court will still take the passage of time into account, just as it would normally, but to block claims being brought after six years does not take into account the true complexities of civil claims linked to overseas operations. Courts should retain their discretion and should consider the large periods of time that can pass before knowledge comes to light of the true extent of an injury, acts of negligence, or the right to other civil claims. The point of knowledge of a claim may be many years after the event or series of events. This may be because claimants did not know that they had a right to claim, or because they did not link their circumstances to overseas operations for some years.

The Bill is meant to protect our armed service personnel, but leaving this part unamended only protects the Ministry of Defence. I want to bring to the Committee’s attention a particular case, or group of cases I should say, that causes me great concern in the event of the amendment not being made. It is the case of the nuclear test veterans.

This case is particularly close to my heart, and I raised it with the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) when she was the Prime Minister. When I first became the Member of Parliament for Islwyn, we used to hold a parade through Risca to honour those veterans. In my second year as an MP, because of the number who had passed away, it was decided that their standard would stay in the local church in Risca until it turned to dust.

What was so sad about this case was that those veterans were fighting for justice for so long. Many of them endured horrific medical conditions, and the families left behind only had their memories of those who were incapacitated by their nuclear service during those times in Easter Island. What was really hard to bear was, first, that they did not have compensation; secondly, though—if I step out of the Bill and say this to the Minister, who is the Minister for Veterans—these people have suffered enough. As he will know, I have made appeals to other Ministers to ensure that these veterans have a medal and some recognition. I want to use this opportunity to ask the Minister to take that up with the Honours and Decorations Committee, and to ensure that they do get some recognition, especially as we approach a very different Remembrance Sunday this year. I have digressed. Thank you, Mr Mundell, for allowing me to indulge in that.

For the vast majority of nuclear test veterans, their injuries did not manifest for decades. The nature of radiation injury means that it invisibly alters cellular DNA.

[Mr Jones]

Had the Bill been in place in 2009, that would have been it for those veterans—there would have been no case at all. The 2009 case, which I know well, was a limitation case, and they brought it before Justice Foskett because they argued that new evidence—medical evidence from New Zealand—had emerged about what my hon. Friend is referring to. If this Bill had been in place then, they would not have even been able to go to court to argue why their case should have had consideration, because of the time that had elapsed since the 1950s, when the exposure took place.

[Chris Evans]

I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend for his service during that time. I know that as a Minister he dealt with the case with sympathy and respect. My direct predecessor, Lord Touhig, also dealt with the case when he was a Minister. I know that everybody who served during that period was wrestling with it, but my right hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that it would not have been possible to bring the case.

If radioactive particles are ingested, the harm might occur at a slow but steady rate for many years, with minor ailments leading to a dramatic diagnosis, and eventually to death. There was no way for the veterans to know that their minor ailments were linked to the nuclear tests that they were involved in. As the Minister knows, however, it often prevented them from gaining the compensation they deserved.

How can we ask young men and women to serve and not guarantee their rights in the same way as civilians are guaranteed theirs? Should the Bill progress, I worry for the next generation of service personnel who are affected by the equivalent of nuclear tests. We do not yet know what might happen in the future that could cause problems further down the line. That is just one example of why someone might need to extend the six-year limitation as currently set out.

I must raise concerns from specialist members of the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, a not-for-profit firm that specialises in military claims. It has voiced concerns that injured personnel can be misinformed of their right to make a legal claim. They might not even know that they have a right to a claim. According to a report by the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, it is unfortunately not unusual for service personnel to be misinformed about their right to bring a civil claim.

[Mr Jones]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it would also limit families? In some cases—especially those involving asbestos, but also some involving cancers—the claim is generated only after the person passes away. Even though somebody might have known earlier that they had cancer, it is only once they pass away that the family might think that it was related to service. I know of some cases that were the result of submarine service. The Bill would actually stop families getting any redress in such cases.

[Chris Evans]

I agree. I will come to an example that my right hon. Friend probably knows as well, but I first will say something about service families. When servicepeople are away, their families are left with the worry, the childcare and other needs. When a serviceman suffers from cancer, it is the family who have to watch their loved one wither away. It is vital that they have a chance to make a claim.

It is interesting that my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham intervened in my speech. When we talk about personal injury, those of us who come from mining communities will remember the example of the miners’ compensation scheme and how miners were left behind. I am not comparing miners to veterans, but it is a similar principle.

[Johnny Mercer]

The hon. Gentleman, for whom I have a lot of respect, has now spoken for about 10 minutes on nuclear test veterans. I trust that he is aware that nuclear test veterans are not covered by the Bill. It was not an overseas operation, and they are not covered by the Bill. The legislation that we are debating does not affect them in any way.

[Chris Evans]

I am glad the Minister has confirmed that.

[Carol Monaghan]

I am looking for clarity. Why would the overseas nuclear test veterans not be considered to have been on an overseas operation?

[Chris Evans]

I should ask the Minister to reply to that—I am just the post box here.

[Johnny Mercer]

Nuclear tests were not classified as operations. There is a lot of conversation about what Operation Banner was in Northern Ireland, but nuclear test veterans are not classified as having been on an operation. They are not subject to the Bill.

[Chris Evans]

Service personnel might have knowledge of the event or series of events that the claim relates to, but many are under the impression that they cannot bring a claim while they are serving, or that their only route to redress is through the armed forces compensation scheme. This means that the date of knowledge should encompass not only the date of knowledge of the injury or the subject of the claim but the date of the knowledge that they had a right to claim—the date when they knew they had a case. That can be many years later and must therefore be taken into account if the Government insist on introducing a time limit.

The 2009 High Court case of 1,000 veterans of nuclear testing was fought and eventually lost on precisely this issue. The MOD argued that some veterans knew they were ill when they joined the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association in the 1980s, when it began campaigning. That was not the case. They knew they were ill at the time, but they wondered only if there was a link. The true point of knowledge can only come when a doctor confirms a possible link, which for many does not happen until years later. To me, that is the point of understanding.

[Carol Monaghan]

The problem with the nuclear test veterans—it could apply to other examples—is that there is actually a clear date of incident, many decades before. Although their point of knowledge of harm might have been much later, there was a clear date of incident, which the MOD could use to its advantage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Evans]

That raises the actual point. When someone is ill, they know something is wrong, but they do not know what caused it; a doctor or medical researcher has not confirmed a link.

[Johnny Mercer]

I think it will be helpful if I make it clear that service personnel cannot bring claims for service pre 1987. Nuclear test veterans have access to the war pension instead, which has no time limit, so issues around nuclear test veterans and the Bill are not comparable.

[Chris Evans]

I thank the Minister for that.

[Mr Jones]

I am not sure that that is the case, because those veterans brought quite a successful case. The Minister just said that it was not an operation, but it was: Operation Grapple, I think. If it was called an operation—the MOD loves giving deployments various—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

It was Operation Grapple. If the Minister wants to intervene on my hon. Friend, I am sure he will act as the post box again. However, those veterans brought a successful case, although the Minister says that that is not true, just to clarify.

[Chris Evans]

I give way to the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West.

[Stuart Anderson (Wolverhampton South West) (Con)]

Every training exercise in the UK or overseas is given an operational name, even though it is not an operation overseas, as per the Bill.

[The Chair]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that.

[Chris Evans]

I was about to say—as we spoke about earlier when I moved the amendment about the Attorney General—that we could have a huge debate about this. I have made a plea to the Minister about the nuclear test veterans. I know he is a good man and that his heart is in the right place when it comes to veterans, and I hope he will recommend to the HD committee that they receive some recognition for their service.

I will move on to the meat of the Bill and the amendment, otherwise we could be here all day. Simon Ellis, a senior partner at the law firm Hugh James, argues from experience that the point of knowledge of the injury, especially in cases of post-traumatic stress disorder or deafness, as the hon. Member for Glasgow North West said, is difficult to define. For illnesses such as PTSD, the sufferer may take a long time to understand what they are suffering from—similar to what the hon. Lady mentioned about her father—long after healthcare professionals or friends or family have this knowledge. Therefore, although there is knowledge of the injury, the victims themselves do not fully know or are not willing to admit that they are suffering. It can then take even longer for them to accept that they have post-traumatic stress disorder, to link that to an overseas operation or a series of operations and to realise that they therefore have a right to a civil claim. The point of knowledge, therefore, can be marked only as the point at which the serviceperson has a full understanding of their condition and their right to a civil claim.

I listened with interest to the hon. Member for Glasgow North West when she talked about what her father was going through. As I understand it, he knew he was deaf and those around him knew he was deaf, but it took him a long time to admit to it. Where is the point of knowledge in that? I do not know. I would be interested to learn, maybe afterwards, when he did finally admit that he had a problem.

Even in simpler cases, when the service person is aware of an injury at the point of the event, it would be grossly unfair for the longstop to start on the date of that event, if they had no knowledge that they could even bring a claim if they wished. Will the Minister therefore concede that clause 11 is not comprehensive enough to deal with the intricacies of a process that includes an event occurring, the sufferer fully understanding and accepting the injury, and their knowing that it is something that fulfils the criteria for a civil claim––that the option of a claim is open to them? If the Government insist on placing a time limit on service personnel or their families for bringing a civil claim, surely the clock must start from the point at which the claimant was both fully aware of the content of the claim––be that negligence, injury or death––and aware that they had the right to file a claim.

If that is not taken into account, it becomes even more clear that the Bill is intended to protect not service personnel but the Ministry of Defence. If these clauses relating to the rights of civil claims become law, those injured through negligence during overseas operations will no longer have the benefit of the full discretion of the court to allow a claim to proceed after the limitation period has expired. They will have fewer rights than other employees while the Ministry of Defence will be sheltered behind the longstop.

An employee who frequently works on military claims for Simpson Millar Solicitors said that, from her experience, she expects that Ministry of Defence lawyers

“could use this new Bill to support arguments that personal injury claims are out of time.”

Therefore, it is a bare minimum that the time limit starts ticking only once the claimant has full knowledge of their right to file a civil claim. This strikes back hard in respect of what my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham said. Once the Bill is passed, it will be handed over to MOD lawyers. Now, none of us will be here for ever and we will have our successors. It will be the lawyers who interpret the Bill. It is therefore vital that we get this right. There is no justification for the MOD having special protection in terms of limitations on civil claims. It is vital that service personnel can bring claims to court in accordance with civil law, without fear or favour. It is vital that they are entitled to the same rights and civil considerations as the rest of the population when it comes to employment disputes.

There is a concern that the Bill could put troops at a disadvantage compared with their civilian counterparts. In our first sitting, Mr Young said:

“Imposing an absolute time limit places armed forces personnel claimants themselves at a disadvantage compared with civil claimants in ordinary life, where the court has discretion. Of course, the Minister has made it perfectly clear, absolutely correctly, that the time limit for this particular part of the Bill only starts to run at the point of knowledge. That is completely understood. That point of knowledge, diagnosis or whatever, could be many years later. Nevertheless, I would have a worry about an absolute longstop as proposed.”––[Official Report, Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Public Bill Committee, 6 October 2020; c. 9, Q6.]

If as Mr Young says, it is the case that the Minister considers the time limit as beginning from the point of knowledge, let us say so in the Bill. This is too important a matter to be imprecise in our words. We need clarity and we need definition. Let us be clear what the amendment means for our armed forces. Let us be clear that service personnel will not be disadvantaged if a link between actions and events overseas and a particular injury or negligent action comes to light only years later. We have seen time and time again, from asbestos to our test veterans, that these things unfortunately do happen. People get injured and hurt. Let us not use this Bill to protect the Ministry of Defence and disadvantage our service personnel. They deserve our support and, more than anything, our protection.

[Mr Jones]

I thank my hon. Friend for moving amendment 76. He makes a good point: whatever legislation we put in must be future-proofed. There are claims that it will do x, y and z, but we have all seen legislation that goes through Parliament with the best of intentions, but, as things change, still sits on the statute book and disadvantages individuals. Is it ever possible to future-proof legislation completely? No, it is not, but it is certainly possible to ensure that we do not put things in a Bill at the start that discriminate against veterans and armed forces personnel. That should be the starting point for this.

In this group of amendments, I will speak to my amendment 92, which relates to clause 11, page 7, line 36, leave out,

“or first ought to have known”.

It gets to the point that my hon. Friend has just referred to about date of knowledge and the issues surrounding it. Is it straightforward to know when a condition happens? No, it is not, as he eloquently explained, and I will explain some examples in a minute.

Many conditions that arise from service are complex; they first require diagnosis, and that sometimes takes time. If someone has a condition and knows they are suffering from something, that is their date of knowledge, but it might take several years to diagnose exactly what it is. Also, as we heard in the evidence session and has come out again today, it may take time for members of the armed forces to recognise that they might have a claim against the Ministry of Defence anyway. I hear what the Minister said about how we should publicise that, and I welcome the idea that we should make it known to people that they can make claims for injuries or conditions, whether through publicity or just ensuring that people know it, both when they are in service and when they leave. That must be recognised.

The conditions fall into two areas. If we look at industry—I know the Minister will say that is different from the military, and it is in many ways, but in other ways, on key issues such as hearing loss, there are some clear links—over many years litigation has led to improvements in standards and training, and I would argue that that should also be a lever in terms of the MOD.

I remember, when I was in the Ministry of Defence, dealing with the question of hearing loss. To be honest, I accept that in combat operations people are going to be exposed to loud noise. They are, and I do not think we can get away from that fact. But when I think back to the MOD in those days, we were paying out huge claims—quite rightly—for people’s hearing loss caused by training and other things, and it struck me that we were not getting to the root cause. As I said this morning, litigation can be seen, not as ambulance-chasing from the claimant’s point of view, but as a way of informing the MOD that it should change things, and can change things.

--- Later in debate ---

Earlier, I gave the example of asbestos—I could think of other examples—which people were exposed to when working in shipyards. Portsmouth was a big area for that, both for civilian personnel and the sailors. It is only when an autopsy takes place that it is discovered that the person who died had a cancer-related condition related to asbestos. That exposure may have been many years before. There is no date of knowledge, because the individual did not know that they actually had it. Under this longstop of six years, if that condition was contracted on an overseas operation, the family would not be able to take the case forward. That would disadvantage not only servicemen and women, but their families.

[Chris Evans]

Removing the ability for the courts to extend the six-year period would leave our veterans, ex-service personnel and their families at a disadvantage compared to those who bring normal civil claims against their employers. That is the problem we are facing in the Bill.

[Mr Jones]

It is a right. Okay—it will not be straightforward, because in my experience of asbestos cases, even with a clear diagnosis and an autopsy report, getting someone to admit liability is very difficult. The first thing that insurance companies used to do, which is exactly what the MOD will do, is require date of knowledge and say that it is time barred. If the claimant gets over that hurdle through a limitations hearing, the company usually settles. In this case, the MOD will reach for this straightaway, to say that it is not covered because it was contracted on an overseas operation and, therefore, it cannot go any further. That would give no rights at all to that family or the servicemen and women to take that case forward.

[Chris Evans]

I want to give an example and ask my right hon. Friend about his experience. He knows as well as I do that both our constituencies have large numbers of ex-miners who have had compensation for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and vibration white finger. If these rules were applied to them, would they have got the compensation?

[Mr Jones]

No, because some of those cases, especially with vibration white finger, were taken on limitation hearings, because those things happened a long time ago. That is the fundamental right. To protect the veterans or servicemen and women, they need the right to go to the law, if they wish to—not everyone does and I respect people who do not.

The best example—it is a tragic example—which came up in the evidence session was the Snatch Land Rovers. The events in which people were killed and injured took place in Iraq. Although it was an issue in the MOD when I was there, in terms of the suitability of the vehicles, the real focus on it never came until July 2016 and the Chilcot report. The case that was mentioned in the evidence session was in 2005. A serviceman was killed in a Snatch Land Rover, but his widow did not really know the significance of the vehicle until the Chilcot report in July 2016. At that time, she thought that there had been a failing on behalf of the MOD in its duty care and in the provision of that equipment, so she brought a claim for the loss of her husband, not under civil law but under the Human Rights Act on the basis that her husband had a right to life.

That case was clearly time-limited, because the event took place in 2005 but the case was not brought until after the Chilcot inquiry in 2016. Obviously, a limitation hearing was held and it was successfully argued that the case should go forward, and it was settled, along with—I understand—other cases.

If the Bill goes through unamended, that case would not have been able to go forward, because—I mean, if it was left to me and the Minister, we would both agree that the date of knowledge should have been 2016, and therefore it could go ahead. However, I am not sure that the MOD lawyers would be as generous to veterans as the Minister and I would be. That is the problem when the Minister argues that the date of knowledge somehow protects veterans: it does not. The date of knowledge should not be used as argument to throw such cases out straightaway.

What will that take? If the Bill goes through as planned—especially on the human rights side, there will be a court case and an argument will be made. Let us say that a case similar to the one that I just mentioned was active today in the courts. What will happen is that someone will challenge that. So we will get litigation as a result of that process on whether the Bill is compatible with the Human Rights Act. I accept that the Minister will write to me on these issues, but we will get more litigation than we would if we instead said, “Let us have a judge look at the limitations on whether a case should be brought”, and if the case is deemed to be special circumstances, it should go to trial.

We must recognise that the MOD acts no differently to the insurance companies that I used to deal with when I took personal injury cases and industrial injury cases against employers, and I am sure that the hon. Member for Darlington knows this as well. It is horse trading. If there is a limitations hearing, what someone will do is to try and get it settled—nine times out of 10, an offer will be made. It is only the ones who really want to be stubborn who take the matter all the way through to trial. Very few of those cases go to trial, because people look at the evidence, to see whether it is worth going further in court, and the case is settled.

However, that process will be closed down for the individual if this tight six-year time stop goes ahead. The cases will not get to the second stage after the limitation hearing, which is about negotiating with the other side to say, “Well, come on. Can we make an offer?” It is a difficult judgment call. It is a bit like a game show—take the prize or play on—and I am sure the hon. Member for Darlington has had many sleepless nights about what is being offered. In most cases, there is an agreement and the individual making the claim is content with what is offered. Some will want their day in court, but that is not always a good idea.

What the Minister said about nuclear test veterans was interesting. I accept the point about operations—the MOD loves to give things “operation” names—but in that case, which is one I know well, and I know the medical evidence, having read it as a Minister, the Government argued in 2009 that it was time-limited. In terms of overseas operations, it was overseas.

--- Later in debate ---

[Johnny Mercer]

No, not at this stage. I therefore recommend that these amendments are withdrawn.

[Chris Evans]

I just want to raise a point of clarification with the Minister. The nuclear test veterans were brought up because that was an example of a case that took numbers of years to emerge. I thought it was the best example of how people can be affected by an operation where it takes years for the case to develop.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stephen Morgan]

I beg to move amendment 69, in schedule 2, page 16, line 5, at end insert––

“except where it appears to the court that it would be equitable to do so having regard to the reasons for the delay, in particular whether the delay resulted from—

(a) the nature of the injuries;

(b) logistical difficulties in securing the services required to bring a claim, so long as the claimant was making all reasonable attempts to secure such services, or

(c) any other reasons outside the control of the person bringing the claim.”

This amendment introduces a discretion for the courts of England and Wales to allow a civil claim for personal injury arising out of overseas operations to proceed in prescribed circumstances so as to account for legitimate and explicable delays commonly experienced by persons bringing such claims.