Procurement Bill [Lords]

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 13th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Alex Burghart]

I thank my right hon. Friend for the constructive conversations that we have had in getting ready for today’s debate. He is slightly pre-empting some remarks that I will come to later. I hope that he saw the announcement that the Government made the other day. It is in the nature of the work that we are doing that, first, we wish to remove devices and components that pose a security risk to sensitive sites—I will say more about the timescale for that later. Secondly, we intend through the use of the unit and the provisions in the Bill to prevent similar devices and components from entering our sites in future. It is a two-part process: first, get rid of what is already there and, secondly, prevent other such services from coming in in future.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

The Minister has mentioned sensitive sites. I do not quite understand what that phrase means—I am hoping that we will get a proper explanation in due course—but what I would observe is that, as far as I can see, every single Government site is by nature and definition sensitive. The Department for Work and Pensions is very sensitive because any disruption of its payments would render the UK in a terrible state. Is it not the case that all Departments of central Government are by nature sensitive sites and, therefore, should take upon themselves the reality that they must all rid themselves of these things?

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[Florence Eshalomi]

The hon. Member is absolutely right: those SMEs will work with local councils in a local area, and they know the local area. In some cases the contracts that are outsourced are not value for money. This is about ensuring that, in public contracts, public money is spent in the right way. If we are to lower the risks faced by SMEs seeking to enter the supply chain, it is vital that the measures in the Bill have an impact.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

One of the biggest problems during the pandemic, which came out of China and became a global pandemic, was the question of everybody scraping around trying to find PPE, most of which was manufactured in China. Is it therefore part of the hon. Lady’s argument that we should have strategic manufacturing of PPE—either here or certainly in democracies that we can trust—to which we get earlier access, or will we just leave it to be produced somewhere else?

[Florence Eshalomi]

I agree with some of the amendments the right hon. Member has tabled on the issue of China and national security. Throughout the Committee stage, we argued consistently for removing risks from countries with a high national security risk, but we have concerns about the approach of naming specific countries in the Bill. It is important that we work with the whole House to get the right framework. I urge the Minister to consider our amendment 17, which is a careful mechanism for assessing the impact of the new rules that he is championing.

Throughout the passage of the Bill, national security has been an issues of extreme interest to the House. On Second Reading, we heard a tour de force from the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns), on national security. In Committee, I raised multiple concerns with the Minister about the place of national security as a discretionary exclusion ground and its role in the debarment system. I am pleased that the Minister was listening to all those points, and we welcome amendment 57 and similar Government amendments, which we believe will address many of the concerns raised in Committee. I welcome the amendments originally tabled by the hon. Member for Rutland and Melton, which will establish a list of high-risk suppliers as part of the Bill. Our amendment 15 would exclude suppliers identified as a security threat from public contracts. Although that offers some benefits over alternative proposals, there is a balance, so we are not minded to press amendment 15 to a Division.

Procurement practices affect not only our services, but the many workers who rely on procurement-related roles for their jobs and livelihoods. Public money, and the jobs that will create, should not be given to those who treat their workers unfairly. Our amendment 18 would give contracting authorities the power to exclude suppliers that have significantly and repeatedly breached the rights of their staff. It would affect only those who have not taken self-cleansing measures to correct their conduct and the causes of breaches. The amendment would ensure that authorities have the right to turn away the worst offenders on workers’ rights, and would ensure that publicly funded jobs are protected jobs.

It can only be right that those seeking public contracts in the UK are transparent about where they pay their tax. The public would not expect their hard-earned money to go to those seeking not to pay into the system themselves, but a study from the Fair Tax Foundation found that, between 2014 and 2019, one in six public contracts were won by companies with links to tax havens. Our new clause 10 would mean that multinational companies bidding for large public contracts need to provide information about their tax arrangements in the UK. That would be open to the public and create greater transparency on how public money is spent. Amendment 16 would create a discretionary exclusion ground for suppliers that have violated UK sanctions or export controls, ensuring that authorities have the power to exclude from the procurement system those who continue to profit off businesses in places such as Russia. New clause 11 would require authorities to undertake a public interest test whenever deciding to outsource public services, to ensure that it truly offers value for money. Finally, new clause 14 would allow public authorities to choose not to buy goods or services from countries on the basis of their human rights records. That would give authorities the power to set clear policies, not to hand public funds to those committing atrocities around the world.

I pay tribute to members of the Committee for their engagement on this very long Bill. We have definitely shone a light on it, and had many discussions about paperclips. In particular, I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Birkenhead (Mick Whitley) and for Brighton, Kemptown (Lloyd Russell-Moyle), who embellished the Committee with a wealth of examples of procurement practices from their constituencies. I hope the Minister will listen to us on why additional amendments are important to strengthen the Procurement Bill in the interests of all taxpayers across the country, and I look forward to hearing from other Members.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I rise to speak to the amendment in my name and those of 26 others in the House of all parties.

The real issue here is the existence of a specific law in China that makes pretty much all companies in China, but particularly those involved in technology, a public risk in procurement to the United Kingdom. Article 7 of the People’s Republic of China national intelligence law 2017 states:

“Any organisation and citizen shall, in accordance with the law, support, provide assistance, and cooperate in national intelligence work, and guard the secrecy of any national intelligence work that they are aware of.”

In other words, under the Chinese national intelligence law, they must completely comply with all demands and requests for information in the business they are in, and deny they have done that to any other country or authority that asks. We have had Chinese companies coming to the House and lying to Select Committees about what they are doing, all saying that they have no obligations under the national intelligence law. They do have obligations under that law and they will lie for their country as a result.

We need to start by understanding the problems, and I thank my hon. and right hon. Friends on the Front Bench for having listened to the arguments and changed the terms, first by referencing the national intelligence law, which is very important, because many Departments will play fast and loose unless what they must do is made very clear. We have been encouraging the Government, who came out with views on Hikvision, Dahua and other companies supplying surveillance equipment to the UK, knowing that they are a surveillance risk not because they are cameras in a particular fashion but because what they glean is available completely to the Chinese authorities under the national security laws.

We have heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) about the small devices—a growing threat that I have not referenced but which also gets caught by the national intelligence law. China is leading in this technology, which is one way in which it can keep track of its own people, but they are now using it more broadly. I had a suspicion and heard that the cars that my hon. Friend was referencing were Downing Street cars. There is a very good chance that the Prime Minister and others may have been tracked by the Chinese Government without our knowledge.

We must therefore remember that first and foremost China poses a significant threat to us, our interests and the way we live our lives. Until we all agree and come to those terms, we simply cannot move on; that is the key. Government Departments and the Government have dragged their feet over this because we do not want to upset the Chinese—but it takes a lot to upset the Chinese because they carry on as before. The amendment is intended to get the Government to accept that we should reference the national intelligence law because that defines all Chinese business and companies and therefore they are a threat.

There are other Chinese companies that are a problem that will not be named, and surveillance cameras are part of this. I must confess that when my brother-in-law went around an area of a farm looking at the surveillance cameras, he spotted that they were Hikvision cameras—they are not listed in the contract because the contract provider is a UK organisation, but we discovered that they are everywhere.

Once I heard the news that the Government clearly wanted Departments to get rid of those cameras, I made a set of freedom of information requests to all Departments about whether they had cameras, where they were, whether they were on their buildings, and what plans they had to get rid of them, having spotted that a lot of Departments still had them, including the Ministry of Defence. All Departments—bar I think the Wales Office, which came clean and said it did not have any or was getting rid of them—claimed that, under section 24 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, they did not have to answer because it was a security risk. The security risk is having the cameras, not answering the damned question! Excuse my language, Mr Deputy Speaker. It is all about where the cameras are and what they are doing, and that is the point of the amendment.

I hope that Ministers will take this matter forward and tell Departments to stop obfuscating. If they are asked a direct question they should tell the honest truth and explain that under the new rules under the Bill they will be getting rid of those cameras, which is absolutely critical.

[Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)]

The right hon. Gentleman makes an excellent point on national security, particularly the risk posed by this equipment. I credit him and others across the House who have worked to encourage the Government to move on this matter. As well as the national security issue, does he share my concern that companies such as Hikvision are involved in human rights abuses in China, for example with the Uyghur Muslims?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I did not send the hon. Lady a copy of my speech but I am glad she has jumped into this because I want to move on to that point now.

Finishing on the point I have been making, however, it is good that the Government are moving on this, but I do not think they have moved enough because I am very worried about the word “sensitive”, which the Minister is talking about. I will come back to that, but this move will begin to bring us into line with the United States, who moved on this under their Hikvision Act, which banned it back in 2019. It is worth reminding colleagues, too, that the European Union is also ahead of us on this now, because the President has said that they must do some “de-risking” on the issue of threats from China. So we are coming back into line on doing that and the west is waking up to this threat.

It is not just about all the threats that are clear under the obligations and the data China collects—it data-harvests, by the way. When the Government said that they were banning TikTok from Government telephones, I made the observation that that is not enough because people might still have TikTok on their own phones. Having run a Department for six years, I know that Ministers’ telephones sit on their desks next to their Government telephones, and therefore the Chinese will be data-harvesting on the back of that. One of my Government colleagues said that he wants to get in touch with the younger people; fat chance they are going to listen to a word they are saying. The truth is he should get rid of TikTok like the rest and be real about it. We must now make it clear that Government telephones and the telephones of Ministers should no longer have TikTok.

[Damian Green]

I am glad that my right hon. Friend has moved this amendment, which as he knows I strongly support. To return to my point about timescale, security cameras are normally replaced every five to seven years. Does he think we have five to seven years in which we can leave these cameras in place in public sector buildings, or would he like their removal to be accelerated?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

The Cabinet Office must now decide the pace of this change. I hear that it is talking about six months and will come forward with a clear and explicit decision. In line with what my right hon. Friend has just said, it ought to explain the timescales for how Departments are going to take them away and how quickly, and an endpoint. That is critical, because otherwise, as I saw with the FOIs, Government Departments will do whatever they can not to do this because they are frightened and they say it will cost them extra. What really costs us is if they fail to do it.

[John McDonnell (Hayes and Harlington) (Lab)]

On telecoms, not TikTok in this instance. According to reports last week, the UK telecoms arm of CK Hutchison, 3 mobile, is merging with Vodafone. Vodafone is extensively involved in Government contracts and evidence by Unite the union published this week is basically saying that CK directors supported the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong. In fact, the chair of the company, Victor Li Tzar-kuoi, is adviser to the Hong Kong Chief Executive. The right hon. Gentleman knows that John Lee, the Chief Executive, has been involved in the suppression of protests and in the arrest of trade union colleagues of mine, members of Unite. Does he share my concern that people linked to this company now are going to have access to Government contracts in the UK?

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

That is not the subject of the amendment but I will touch on it briefly. I have already spoken to the unions on this and I am very much in line with their position. The Government need to look very carefully at what has taken place, particularly because it reduces competition in the market. The links to the authoritarianism of the Chinese is one of the big worries, so I suggest that the Government have a serious look at that.

Returning to the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman), these cameras are also being used in internal suppression in China. We know about the suppression of the Uyghurs; that is a genocide that is taking place. Even though the Government will not say it is genocide, everybody else believes it is: Parliament here has said it; the Americans have now said it; and so, too, have many other countries. I do not know why we cannot say this is genocide, but that is a question for another debate. The fact is that many of these instruments are being used as part of that suppression in the camps as well as to watch carefully so that suppression can take place. Right now, forced labour, forced sterilisation and re-education in camps are all taking place in China.

The hon. Member for Vauxhall (Florence Eshalomi) referred from the Dispatch Box to the Opposition’s amendments. It is worth reminding her that China poses a risk in just about every single area with its human rights abuses and abuses of workers’ rights, yet so many of our companies want to ignore that.

While I welcome much of what the Government have done, I do not plan to move new clause 1 today, but only because I want more from the Government. I think they understand that.

I come back to the “sensitive” point. The truth is that, by definition, all Government Departments must be sensitive. As I said, I spent six years in charge of the DWP, and what I know is that there is arguably no more sensitive Department, because stopping payments for one or two days from the DWP would wreak havoc across the United Kingdom. People would not be able to get money to pay their rent, to buy their food or to live—all those things of vital importance. So a foreign power might be able to use information to target a Department such as the DWP that is not on the list because it may not appear as sensitive as the Ministry of Defence, GCHQ or—God bless us—the Foreign Office, when in reality, it is much more sensitive.

When we try to use a word like “sensitive” to give ourselves a little bit of a break, the problem becomes: who defines sensitive, and how often we will redefine it? I recommend that the Government describe all Departments as sensitive or else get rid of the word. That would put the onus on the Departments to come to the Cabinet Office to say, “We need an exemption for a period” or, “We can’t do this as fast.” The current wording means that they will not have to do that if they are outwith the term “sensitive.”

The reality is that we have had a number of Dispatch Box commitments from a load of Government Ministers about interpreting these things, but they never come to fruition. We were promised guidance in the other place on slavery during the passage of the Nationality and Borders Bill, but that was never put in. We really want the Government to commit at the Dispatch Box to changing what they are doing with “sensitive” when the Bill goes to the other place. “Sensitive” is too weak a position. It lets Departments off the hook and will put all the onus on the Cabinet Office. That must be reversed to ensure that this removal gets done.

[Kirsty Blackman]

I really appreciate the right hon. Member giving way again. Would he consider asking the Government for removal from all sites and, when they produce their timeline, to have them say, “These are our priority sites, which will be done first, but there will be removal from all sites off the back of that”? That would cover removal from all sites but allow the Government to prioritise if they cannot do things overnight.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I agree that that would be the common-sense way of doing it; I think we are all on the same page on this one.

The thing about our new clause is that, without the word “sensitive”, the position is simple. The new clause uses the same language as the Cabinet Office’s announcement in November, which recommended the removal of Chinese CCTV from sensitive sites. Now, that was the wording. Okay. But when we ask, “What has happened? How many Departments have felt under pressure to do that?”, we start to discover that they are not doing it because it is too difficult, and they want the requirement to go away. My answer is: do not use the word “sensitive” in that respect. It is about national security law, and Government Departments must either be completely defined as “sensitive”—if we want to use that word—or be bound to rid themselves of all companies obligated under the national security law. If they are unable to do that, they must make their case so that we can question that publicly and comment about what is going on.

I conclude on this simple point. The new clause is there to try to make it clear that we face a most significant and dangerous threat from the Chinese Communist party in control of China today. It is everywhere. It is using slave labour to produce polysilicon to collect solar rays. We all beat our chests proudly and proclaim that we are heading towards net zero, but on whose backs is that? It is people working in slave labour conditions to produce these things, people under surveillance, and people taken away on genocides. A Government already doing this internally are now referring it out to us. We must make it clear beyond peradventure that Government Departments must now rid themselves of equipment and never place contracts with other companies on equipment that comes under the rule of the national security law. I am looking for commitments from the Government today that, by the time the Bill gets to the other place, that will finally be resolved. If so, they will have my approval and that of many others in the Chamber.

[Apsana Begum (Poplar and Limehouse) (Lab)]

I rise to speak in favour of a number of new clauses and amendments to improve transparency and accountability regarding public procurement and providing value for money for the taxpayer, including those tabled by Labour Front-Bench Members. The House will be aware that trade unions and others have long raised concerns that existing procurement policy pushes public authorities to privatise and marketise public services, including through private finance initiative contracts, which allow private consortiums to make high profits out of public assets—often far above the true value of the asset.

A particularly controversial element of procurement policy has been the use of private finance initiative regimes in NHS contracts. The evidence is clear that many of them have left NHS trusts heavily in debt owing to the need to repay private companies for capital assets, with high repayments meaning that some NHS trusts pay 12 times the initial sum borrowed, giving some investors profits of 40% to 70% in annual returns. Indeed, the poor performance of many of the private outsourcing and consulting companies brought in at significant cost to the taxpayer to provide parts of the covid-19 response stood in stark contrast to the consistently proven effectiveness of our publicly run NHS, for example, but that did not stop more and more contracts being awarded to those seeking to make money off the back of our country’s worst health crisis. Amendment 2, which would prevent VIP lanes by ensuring that any contract awarded under emergency provisions or direct awards should include transparency declarations, is therefore critical.

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[Bob Seely]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum), and I think that some of the things she said will be echoed on the Government Benches.

I want to speak, in the time I have, to new clauses 1, 13 and 16, and I will try to theme them. Before I do so, I want to thank the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart), for his excellent work on the Bill. People moan about Parliament, but we have a Government bringing forward this legislation and Back-Bench MPs from across the House trying to shape it for the betterment of the nation. There is a lot of good in the Bill and I thank the Minister for listening, as he has clearly and obviously done.

I want to talk about the strategic, political and human rights ramifications of supply chain dependency. I thank the Government for their excellent work and the fact that they are moving on this. We will have a national procurement centre, which will look at high-risk firms not only from China but potentially elsewhere. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns) on their really good work on this.

However, my criticism is that while the Bill is a start, the new clauses that I am speaking to would allow us to go further, and I want to explain why that is. We urgently need to understand the UK’s economic dependence on systemic threats or competitors—namely China, but not only China—and the political, economic and ethical ramifications and risks of that dependency. Not to do so is to betray our national interests. I am concerned at the lack of urgency on this issue, which has become significantly more pressing in the last five years. I thank the Government for focusing more on it, but more needs to be done. I think we are at the starting gate. The reality is that we have high levels of dependency and they are increasing, not decreasing.

Here are some facts. First, as an act of state policy, China is aiming to become less dependent on others, while encouraging others to be more dependent on it. It is decoupling from us, but making sure that we are coupled to it. The Made in China 2025 plan had the goal of raising the domestic content of China’s core components and materials to 70% by 2025. In 2020, it set a goal to become largely self-sufficient in technology by 2035. At the same time, the belt and road initiative means that China is now the largest lender to developing countries and is effectively encouraging debt dependency, which we have talked about in the past. President Xi, at the seventh session of the Chinese Communist party’s finance and economy committee, said that China must develop “killer technologies” to strengthen the

“global supply chain’s dependence on China”.

So this is not a case of, “Gosh, is this happening?” It is stated policy. We do not need to debate whether it is happening; we are being told by the leader of the Chinese state and the Chinese Communist party that it is.

China is already the largest importer to the UK and many other countries. We import more than 50% of our supplies from China in 229 categories of goods. Some 57 of those categories are in sectors critical to the UK’s national security. I therefore agree entirely with what my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green was saying only a few minutes ago. It is difficult to say what is strategic and what is not. In the US, it might be agricultural production. Here it might be the details of 20 million people on the DWP’s databanks. The 57 categories of goods cover communications, energy, healthcare, transport, critical manufacturing, emergency services, agriculture, Government facilities and information technology.

I do not care that we are 85% dependent on China for plastic Christmas trees—although, I do worry about the environmental impact—but I do care that we are 96% dependent on China for phenylacetic acid, which is a basic building block for many drugs; 83% dependent for TV receivers and decoders; and 68% dependent for laptops. China controls near 90% of rare earth processing, which we are now beginning to worry about. And the point about solar panels was well made.

I asked the Foreign Secretary yesterday about having an annual statement on dependency, not just on China but on states in general. He said that one was not needed. With great respect to the Foreign Secretary, I profoundly disagree. We argued during the passage of the National Security and Investment Act 2021 that we need an annual statement of dependency. New clause 13 is about establishing an understanding of the nature of our extreme dependency. I did a report with the Henry Jackson Society a couple of years ago. We found that although we are the least dependent of all the Five Eyes nations, we still have a critical dependency on China in 230 areas of our industry, manufacturing, information technology and so on.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Just to add to my hon. Friend’s list, as we move to electric vehicles we are about to make ourselves even more dependent. Even battery factories in China are turning themselves into car factories selling to the UK.

[Bob Seely]

I agree completely and I thank my right hon. Friend for that point. I would not even like that dependency on our allies. Would I like that level of dependency on the United States? No. On Australia? No. But to have that level of dependency on a Communist dictatorship that is investing massively in AI and big data to spy on their own people and increasingly on us as never before, to threaten peace in the Pacific, and to have a stated aim of dominating while freeing itself from dependency on the west, is really an extraordinarily dangerous position for us to find ourselves in.

We know that Chinese Communist party companies such as Huawei actively seek to gain a monopoly position by systematically destroying economic rivals. That is not fair trade; it is trade as a weapon for a Communist party dictatorship. It did it with Huawei, undercutting and deliberately destroying rivals on price through cheap subsidies. It is now doing the same with cellular modules, seeking to dominate and take control of the market. It does that through IP theft, economic espionage, subsidy, access to super-cheap finance, shared technology and other forms of state support.

Companies such as Quectel and Fibocom—the manufacturers of cellular modules—will, like Huawei, claim to be private. They are not. Nothing is private, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green said, in a Communist state. It was profoundly depressing for me, a couple of years ago, to hear two former senior Conservative Ministers, who should know better, say that Huawei was a private company. That is a rather more serious way of accidentally misleading the House than whether somebody ate cake or not, but that is another matter.

What are the dangers? We know that the Chinese leadership see themselves as being in competition with the west. Why? Because they tell us. A 2013 “Document No. 9” concludes that western constitutional democracy and universal values were a fundamental threat to the PRC. Of course our values are a threat to dictatorships. Our values are always a threat to communists. Earlier this year, a work report delivered to the National People’s Congress set out the belief that

“external attempts to supress and contain China are escalating”,

and the term “self-reliance” appeared multiple times. Again, the idea is to create dependency on China for us, while at the same time freeing China from dependency.

What is the worst-case scenario? Frankly, it has happened in Russia, so we should at least be alive to the idea that the worst-case scenario may be happening in the Pacific.

President Xi has told his army to be ready to re-take Taiwan by 2027. As I said, let us please stop pretending that dictators do not mean what they say, because they have a depressing habit of meaning what they say. I wish they did not; I wish they would overpromise and underdeliver, but they tend to do what they promise.

Either the UK is militarily involved or it is not. Either way, an assault on Taiwan, either by slow strangulation—a sort of Berlin scenario—or direct invasion, would profoundly alter the state of the world. We would have to put on the mother of all sanctions. The minute we do that, we will risk not only a global economic meltdown, but an economic meltdown probably worse than covid. It will strain to breaking point our relationship with the United States, the European Union and Australia—and not just our relationship but the interdependent relationships.

I am not saying that will happen—although, I think we are heading in that direction—or that we should stop trading with China; I am saying that it makes a great deal of common sense, frankly, to know what our levels of dependency are. That is why I would love the Minister to commit to at least developing an understanding of what our trade dependency is.

There is another reason to be concerned about supply chains: what is happening in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region, which other Members have rightly mentioned. A 2022 UN report found serious human rights violations in the region. They seem to be about the most significant human rights abuses currently happening in the world, whether we use the “G” word or not—genocide. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps alone produces 8% of the world’s cotton. China overall produces 20% of the world’s supply of cotton. Effectively, this is a new slave trade in cotton, as shocking as that sounds. It is not happening 200 hundred years, in the 19th century, in the southern United States; it is happening now, in the early 21st century, in Chinese-controlled central Asia.

There are many other things coming out of the Xinjiang province that tell the story of using forced labour, as both Opposition and Government Members have eloquently spoken about. There is forensic technology available, which we could be using in this country, that can pinpoint the region of origin for items tainted by modern slavery, such as cotton. When it comes to new clause 60, on eradicating slavery and human trafficking in supply chains, I ask the Government to set an example by saying that we will, at the very least, commit—a good Government word—to bringing in that forensic technology within a period of time. That would enable us to understand whether western companies are using slave cotton—an incredibly horrible phrase to use in this age—in their manufactured goods.

Finally, we have spoken about Chinese surveillance technology, and I speak again in support of new clause 1. We have got to get this stuff out of the country for a start. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green says, with all the dual-use capabilities and new styles of conflict, not just in conventional military but in data domination, it is really difficult nowadays to say where security starts and finishes.

In summation, we need to understand, as a critical matter of national importance, our supply chain dependency on any country, but specifically China. I implore the Government to use the Bill, even at this late stage, to bring in a statement of dependency so that we can begin to understand and to take measures to work out not how to stop trading with China, but how to trade more safely. That way, if we need to take sanctions in future, and for the health of our relationship with that superpower, we can begin to work out how to diversify our supply chains in future and, at the same time, do something about the horrors happening in Xinjiang.

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We should remember that the House voted unanimously to recognise the Chinese genocide against Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Although it may not have been a binding vote and the Government have yet to come round to the thinking of the vast majority of Members, it was nevertheless a vote in the House, reflecting the clear evidence provided by Sir Geoffrey Nice in the Uyghur trials about 18 months ago. There is compelling, detailed, startling but convincing evidence of what was going on then, and of what is still going on under the noses of the world. Having been trialled in places such as Tibet for decades before, these practices are being increasingly extended towards Hong Kong, where, as we see daily on our television screens, the rule of law is being increasingly snuffed out,.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. May I return him to the procurement point about what is national security and what is not? He will know, as I do, that if we go to Hong Kong we can see that HSBC, for instance, is already, in a way, in league with the authorities. The changes it is imposing include freezing the pension funds of people who are over here under British National (Overseas) passports and, at times, freezing their bank accounts. It says that it has to obey the Chinese Government. Is that not what we are saying? There is no particular definition. They are all operating, once these companies are in China, under the rule.

[Tim Loughton]

My right hon. Friend is, of course, right. He and I and others in this place who have been sanctioned in China and beyond have drawn attention to how effectively respectable global British companies are becoming complicit in the suffocation of the democratic principles, freedoms, liberties and rule of law that we all take for granted, and they need to answer for it. Are they on the side of the rule of law, of international freedoms and liberties in all the areas we have described, or have they thrown in their lot for a mess of pottage—or whatever we want to call it—with the Chinese Communist Government, notwithstanding their complete abrogation of any pretence to democratic accountability and freedoms for the individuals who not only happen to live within its borders but against whom they are increasingly able to extend their tentacles globally, not least in this country?

Hikvision and Dalua are both subject to China’s National Intelligence Law, which stipulates that

“any organisation or citizen shall support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work according to law”.

The law also permits authorities to detain or criminally punish those who “obstruct” intelligence activities. The presence of vendors who are subject to extrajudicial directions from a foreign Government which conflict with UK law may risk failure by the carrier to adequately protect networks from unauthorised access or interference.

In the UK, Uyghur people face a sustained campaign of transnational repression in the form of threats, harassment, cyberattacks, and online and in-person surveillance. LBC and the Financial Times have recently reported instances of Uyghur people seeking refuge in the UK being offered thousands of pounds a month and blackmailed by Chinese security officers to spy on Uyghur advocates. In that context, the Government must take seriously the threat posed by the presence of this equipment to British national security and the safety of exiled and dissident populations seeking refuge in the United Kingdom. Without urgent action, the UK risks facilitating a system of surveillance designed to extend Chinese domestic policy across borders.

The evidence, which is presented by reputable sources such as IVPM, Axios, The Intercept, The Guardian and the BBC, is deeply troubling. These and other reports paint a harrowing picture of the situation in Xinjiang and provide substantial evidence of Hikvision’s involvement. IVPM’s investigation reveals that Hikvision, a leading provider of surveillance technology, has actively contributed to the surveillance state in Xinjiang, where more than a million Uyghurs are estimated to be held in what we now know to be internment camps. Hikvision’s technology is reportedly used to monitor and control the Uyghur population, facilitating its repression. Worse, it is credibly accused of constructing the surveillance state in Xinjiang in close partnership with the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, a report corroborated by The Guardian, which published leaked documents outlining Hikvision’s close collaboration with Chinese authorities in developing and implementing surveillance technologies in Xinjiang. The evidence suggests a concerted effort by Hikvision to profit from this oppression.

Axios, in its comprehensive reporting, explains that Hikvision’s surveillance cameras are integrated with sophisticated artificial intelligence systems to track, profile and identify individuals in Xinjiang. Let me be clear: this technology is trained to recognise Uyghur-looking faces with a view to profiling them, flagging them when they are doing things of which the Chinese Government do not approve, and then facilitating their persecution through mass surveillance and control with the aim of suppressing their cultural, religious, and political freedoms.

The scale and sophistication of Hikvision’s surveillance technology exacerbate the already dire human rights situation in the region. The Intercept’s exposé provides damning evidence that Hikvision’s technology has been directly used in the internment camps, enabling the Chinese Government to monitor and suppress the Uyghur population. One source revealed that Hikvision’s cameras were installed throughout the camps, capturing every move and expression of the detainees. This raises alarming questions about the company’s complicity in the perpetration of human rights abuses that our own Government have described as

“torture…on an industrial scale”.

The evidence leaves no room for doubt. Hikvision’s involvement in the surveillance and control of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang is deeply troubling, and, even without the security concerns so ably highlighted by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green, would warrant the company’s removal from our supply chains, consistent with our modern-day slavery commitments. We cannot turn a blind eye to the suffering of millions of innocent people, and help those who persecute them fill their pockets with public money.

--- Later in debate ---

The Chancellor’s answer to that is growth—it is the right answer. The biggest part of the answer is probably addressing how we generate growth in the economy. His answer is, rightly, that we do it through productivity gains, which are essential. He highlights the productivity challenges in the public sector, which are relevant to this debate. He pointed out a terrible figure with which I was not familiar: the output of the public sector since the pandemic has fallen by 6%. So while the private sector has recovered its productivity, the public sector has not. That is a chronic problem. His answer is that we need to be “much, much more efficient” in the public sector.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I am fascinated by the speech my hon. Friend is making, because he is right in one sense about this. We did a report at the Centre for Social Justice about four or five years ago where we looked at productivity. So often we make international comparisons, but the whole figure for productivity contains that which a country wants to put into it. For example, France does not put health or education into its productivity measures. Health and education have shocking productivity outcomes in terms of cost, which means that France is able to declare itself as having a higher level of productivity. London and the south-east have the highest productivity in Europe, but the real story is that the rest of the UK does not meet the average for the whole of the Europe, which tells us what our problem really is.

[Danny Kruger]

My right hon. Friend makes important points, and I recognise the difficulty of comparing our productivity figures with those of other countries. The comparison I am making is with our own recent history, but he is absolutely right in what he says. Indeed, the point about what is measured matters enormously. In our debates, we often make the mistake of thinking that the only things that matter are those that can be easily quantified. That is a great challenge we face, particularly in the social sector.

The Government are rightly committed to improving the efficiency and productivity of the public services—I absolutely support them on that—but we face another great challenge that does not get enough of a mention: the need to reduce demand on the system as a whole. We are spending so much not just because we are inefficient, but because the demand on the system is so high. I do not need to run through all the details of the enormous budgets we spend on social breakdowns and the consequences of social problems that we should have averted, in criminal justice, in the health budget, in what is called “social protection”. Some £150 billion is categorised under “social protection” in the public finances—not pensions, but paying for people who have tough lives. We should be seeking to reduce the cost of those budgets, because each one of those costs represents, in a sense, people in trouble. Both for financial and social reasons, we should be trying to reduce that expenditure.

How do we do that? We need social reform. I am not going to bore the House with long thoughts on that, but we need public sector reform, as has been mentioned a bit today, and that includes procurement reform. I acknowledge what Labour is suggesting in some of its amendments and in some of the speeches we have heard: an objection to the whole model of outsourcing. I recognise the objections to some of the failures of public service management—new public management—over the past generation, and some of the challenges of outsourcing and of competition in the public sector or for public services. However, I do not think insourcing everything is the answer. Reverting to a pre-1990 model of everything being delivered by the central state, as one of the amendments and Unison are championing, is not the right model. We need a better model of outsourcing that relies much more on civil society and, in particular, on the local, community-based services in which the UK is so rich and which do such a great job. We need to be able to measure their value properly and commission their services effectively. That is what this Bill aims to do.

I declare an interest, in that I set up and ran for many years projects working in prisons and with youth services. I have personal acquaintance with the challenge of EU procurement, not only social fund commissioning, but central and local government contracts. None of this is easy and I am familiar with all of that. I am familiar with the frustrations of getting on the frameworks; expressing interest; bidding through tenders; and being treated as bid candy on a long contract. I am also familiar with going through a pointless competition process where there is only one obvious provider—the one that helped to design the service—which still has to jump through loads of competitive hoops only for some other random provider to come in and swipe the contract; I speak bitterly from experience. The challenges that small social enterprises face are significant.

The difference between procurement and commissioning is not often acknowledged. We often have procurement departments doing work that is too complicated for them on their own. We need to have proper commissioning where people who are paying for a service work collaboratively with providers, stakeholders, service users and other parts of the system. Everybody needs to bring their assets, resources, skills and experience to co-design the service that is needed locally. The Bill brings us much closer to that model. I greatly welcome the measures that have been included, especially around the simplification of tendering. The single portal is an important development and it is good for transparency as well. The Tell Us Once registration is essential, as is the help that will be given to SMEs and social enterprises, including the active reduction in the barriers to tendering, lower reporting requirements and so on.

Most of all there is the shift from the most economically advantageous regime to the most advantageous regime. That small excision of the word “economically” is an important recognition of the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) was just making about the need to go beyond a purely commercial estimation of the value of social projects. I would go further. In 2020, I wrote a report for the Government who were trying to maximise and sustain the enormous contributions that communities were making during the first lockdown. I suggested that we recognise and declare that the whole of Government commissioning—the whole of public service spending—is to deliver social value for the public. Essentially, that is what we all believe and it should be stated much more explicitly in my view. I just bring the House’s attention back to the Conservative Government’s Social Value Act 2012, which gets those principles right.

I recognise that we need to take enormous steps forward. I honour what the Government have been doing around national security. I also honour the steps that have been taken to ensure greater opportunities for SMEs and social enterprises, and I commend the Bill to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Burghart]

It is a pleasure to wrap up a very interesting Report stage on this landmark piece of post-Brexit legislation that will allow our country to rewrite its procurement rules for the first time in decades.

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman), who had interesting reflections on the Bill. One could be forgiven for being able to listen to her remarks and not understand that the SNP has absented Scotland from the legislation. That is a great shame, and I believe that deep down she recognises the potential of the legislation. As the years go by, and small and medium-sized enterprises, and other businesses and contracting authorities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland benefit from the new regime, we will take pleasure in reminding businesses and contracting authorities in Scotland that it was the SNP that chose to keep Scotland out of it.

I touched on new clause 1, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), in my opening remarks. I am grateful for his saying that he will not push the new clause to a vote today. In return, I am pleased to reaffirm what I said earlier: we are happy to talk to him and other colleagues who are concerned about the definition of “sensitive”, to ensure that it captures the issues about which he is concerned. We do not consider “sensitive” to attach itself just to sites of military significance or intelligence centres controlled by the agencies. It goes further, and we will take his points away regarding ministerial movements.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

May I be clear? On the question I was asking, and have been asking, the Government have moved, particularly in reference to the national security laws of China, but my key point is that the Government should consider that all Departments fall into that category. There should not be any “B” definition. It would be far better if everybody were incorporated into that definition by the time the Bill got to the other place. Supplication would then have to be made for a variation or change, which the Cabinet Office will make a decision about. Start with the power; then let them come and ask for it to be changed. That is the way to do it.

[Alex Burghart]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his comments. He will have heard me say earlier that we understand his views that “sensitive” could incorporate a broader range of assets, where information gleaned on the movement of officials and politicians could be detrimental to our national security.

I reaffirm our commitment to make a statement in the House within six months of Royal Assent, setting out the timeline for the removal from sensitive sites of surveillance equipment supplied by companies subject to the national intelligence law of China. I state again my gratitude to my right hon. Friend for his important work in this area and for the constructive dialogue that we have had with colleagues on the matter.

Amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for St Helens South and Whiston (Ms Rimmer), introduces a new ground for the exclusion of suppliers involved in forced organ harvesting. The amendment replicates an amendment made to the Bill in the other House, and subsequently removed by Committee of this House. I reassure her that the Government are not turning a blind eye to the extraordinarily important subject that she raises and highlights consistently.

We are in full agreement that complicity in the abuses associated with the overseas organ trade must not be tolerated. The Government have taken action to address that issue on a number of fronts. The Health and Care Act 2022 prohibits commercial organ tourism. I know the hon. Lady was involved in discussions leading to those provisions being included in the Act. The Government continue to monitor and review evidence relating to reports of forced organ harvesting in China, and maintain a dialogue with leading NGOs and international partners on that very important issue. I reassure her that forced organ harvesting is already covered by the exclusion grounds for professional misconduct. These grounds cover serious breaches of all ethical and professional standards—whether mandatory or not—that apply to different industries and sectors. The mandatory grounds in relation to corporate manslaughter and human trafficking are also relevant in this context. We have sought to limit the grounds—particularly those which, like this one, require an assessment of factual circumstances by the contracting authority—to those where there is a major and particular risk to public procurement. We are not aware of any evidence that a supplier to the UK public sector has been involved in forced organ harvesting, but I want to reassure the hon. Lady that the Bill will be able to deal with this horrendous practice appropriately.

Security of Government Devices

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Thursday 16th March 2023 Commons Chamber

[Oliver Dowden]

I thank the hon. Lady for her questions. First, on how we ensure adherence, this instruction is going to Government Departments from the Cabinet Office, so we would expect that adherence to happen. We are one Government, and the Cabinet Office is responsible for co-ordination. Were there any evidence of non-compliance, I would take that up directly with the Ministers responsible for each of those Departments. I would expect them to take it seriously, as they have done in relation to previous guidance.

The hon. Lady raises an important point about the security of Members of Parliament. I discussed that with Mr Speaker prior to making this announcement, and there is already a high level of engagement between the Government and the parliamentary authorities, including through my right hon. Friend the Security Minister. Clearly, Parliament is independent of Government, but we are very willing to provide all necessary information to help parliamentarians make appropriate decisions.

On human rights abuses in China, that is something the Government have never been shy of calling out or engaging with the Chinese Government on, and we will continue to do so.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I say to my right hon. Friend—not to be churlish—so far, so good. Most of our allies have already done this, but I simply make the point to him that he cannot stop there. The reality is that, even though Government phones will have this taken out of them—this TikTok leak element—the key thing is that private telephones remain on Ministers’ desks and are used for communications. I honestly do not believe, whatever the complaints are, that in reality those private phones will never be used for Government business. They will be, they are, and there is no way of stopping that to some degree. Can he not now say that any Government Minister or senior official who has TikTok on their private phone should remove it, because that gets rid of the risk?

I have an amendment down concerning Hikvision cameras. I have never known it so difficult to drag any information out of Government as the sites at which they are using these cameras. They should now be removed from every single site that is a Government base, and the reality is that they are dragging their feet. Could he turn to that as well?

[Oliver Dowden]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his questions. I will take the second point first. I am happy to meet him and provide further information about the sites where Hikvision is used. I should say that this point applies to surveillance technology from Chinese companies; it is not just about Hikvision.

The broader point my right hon. Friend makes is a legitimate one, and it is a balance that the Government have to try to get right. It is the case that many social media apps use huge amounts of data harvesting, and it is also the case that sophisticated foreign hostile state actors are perfectly capable of using many mechanisms to obtain bulk data aside from direct ownership. On balance, we believe that this is the correct approach.

Ministers of course need to exercise heightened caution in respect of the rules. It may be that communications devices are used for routine administration and so on, but substantive Government business should be conducted on Government devices. In addition, bespoke security advice is provided to Ministers, and they are expected to adhere to it.

Northern Ireland Protocol

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Monday 27th February 2023 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill is passing separately to these arrangements, but these arrangements provide for the appropriate sovereignty in Northern Ireland for the Stormont Assembly to have that say. It is more than a say; it is an ability for the Assembly to block new EU goods laws as they come down the pipe if Assembly Members are not happy with them. As the hon. Lady will see in the Command Paper, we have also committed to a range of other things to ensure that we protect against trade and regulatory divergence, including dialogue with businesses in Northern Ireland and also with the European Union. As she studies the detail, hopefully she will be reassured that we have protected properly against that.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

May I associate myself with my right hon. Friend’s comments on Betty Boothroyd, who was my first Speaker when I arrived here—she will be greatly missed—and also his comments on the brutal attack on DCI Caldwell?

I commend my right hon. Friend and his team for their diligence and hard work in pursuing this matter regardless of the obstacles that lie in their way, including the reluctance of the EU to admit anything about the problems that have been taking place. For me, having served in Northern Ireland and lost friends who never came back from Northern Ireland, the restoration of the Good Friday agreement is, at the end of the day, the No.1 item. However, when I was looking through the details, I noticed that the Stormont brake is not quite as defined as it might be. I wonder whether my right hon. Friend could clear this up. One phrase says that it can be used only if there is

“significant impact specific to everyday life”.

Who makes that decision as to what is significant? Secondly, can the EU demand countermeasures if the brake is deployed?

[The Prime Minister]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his comments and pay tribute to his service. I know that this is a topic that he rightly cares about.

I am happy to clarify. It is for us to make the determination whether the threshold has been met. It is right that there is a threshold. The ability to block new law is a serious mechanism and it should not be used for trivial reasons. It should be used for those new laws that have a significant and lasting impact on the everyday lives of people in Northern Ireland. That is the right trigger, and it is one that we are in control of deciding. It is equally appropriate that if we do that, the EU will have the right to take appropriate countermeasures. That is there in black and white. Obviously, those have to be proportionate. I do not think that anyone could disagree with that. This is a very powerful mechanism, and I am pleased that we were able to reach resolution on it, because, as I have said, it ensures that we have restored sovereignty to the people of Northern Ireland.

Tributes to Her Late Majesty The Queen

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Friday 9th September 2022 Commons Chamber

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

So much has already been said and I do not intend to repeat it much, but I do want to say that it is a sad day for all of us. It is tragic news, bringing to an end a remarkable career spanning 70 years, endless Prime Ministers and endless Leaders of the Opposition, too.

For those 70 years, Her Majesty carried out her duties with charm, humility—not often mentioned, but real humility—and also endless humour. She was quite remarkable in a way. She learned that from someone whom we have not mentioned today, her father, who in his own way was someone who never expected to be the monarch and who suffered a very significant problem, a speech impediment, yet showed her that it was possible to rise above the challenge and to deliver one’s service to one’s country at an incredible time. There is no question but that she learned that service and duty at the knees of her father as he overcame his own difficulties and put his country and their service first. That is something that is quite often forgotten.

A couple of things come to mind. So often, we have taken Her Majesty for granted. We expect her to be there. In the same way, whenever anything good or bad happens in our country, the crowds gather at Buckingham Palace. Whether she was there or not, they gathered; it was almost as though they could touch the railings and draw from them some sort of succour, support or mystical help. There they were again, last night, in pouring rain outside Buckingham Palace.

In all of that, we often forgot that she was also a human being with her own family issues and problems. I remember particularly that period when two of her sons faced marriage break-ups that were widely reported in the newspapers and the media, with everybody speculating in public about all that was going on. I wonder how many in this House could ever have borne something like that—such a tragedy for their mother—in such a public domain. Then, to top it all, Windsor Castle burned down, a place she loved deeply and felt responsible for. In a way, nobody seemed to take her into consideration until, approaching a speech—with a cold, interestingly—she said that that year had been her annus horribilis. I think that the public stopped. We all paused and realised that we had forgotten that we actually owed her as much duty and service as she had shown us without complaint. I thought that that was a remarkable moment, when the country came back from where it was to recognise that duty and service.

The other moment was when Diana, Princess of Wales, tragically died in that terrible car accident. Again, everybody gathered outside Buckingham Palace and demanded that the Queen should come. It got more and more shrill, with the newspapers banging on about how she had to come back. But there she was in Balmoral, trying to do what almost any grandmother would want to do—to put her arms around her grandchildren, comfort them and protect them from what she knew was going to descend upon them. Finally, when she came down, I came to the realisation that, actually, it was not that the British public were angry that she was not there; it was that they needed her there to be able to show their own emotion, because she was the focus for all of that. When she came, everybody cheered and applauded—she was there, and they could now grieve properly, because she was the focus for that grief.

Of course, we all have anecdotes. When I ceased being leader of the Conservative party—it happens quite a lot, so I think the Queen was pretty used to it—she kindly asked me to take leave of her officially. I thought that was pretty kind—nobody else wanted me to, so it was decent of her to do that. When I came to the palace, and I was ushered into her small personal sitting room, I was struck by two or three things. One was the two-bar electric fire, which had around it a very strange piece of cardboard in the shape of flames and coloured with yellow and red crayons—I suspect by some somebody in the palace. It surrounded the fire, and I thought that was peculiarly dangerous; notwithstanding that, I am sure it had a purpose. The other thing was the Tupperware radio sitting next to her. I had not seen one since my parents smashed their last one. She very sweetly asked me how I was, being clearly sympathetic about what had happened. I just shrugged and said, “Well, Ma’am, nobody died and I’m still here,” whereupon she roared with laughter. The funny thing was that she then paused and looked at me, not sure whether I had actually made a joke. I laughed too, and then she laughed again—whether at me or with me, I could not figure out. That was something to relish.

The other anecdote I want to share with the House is slightly different. I was in a Privy Council meeting, and for some reason we were offered drinks at the end. It did not happen very often, so I took full advantage and ordered a whisky. The Queen came round to talk to us, and when she came to me, I, like everybody else, was as nervous as anything, but I stumbled through. Then I said, “I’ve just been reading some stuff about one of Churchill’s speeches”—I had suddenly recalled something he had said in 1941. President Roosevelt had sent a note over with the person he had just defeated in his third election, and Churchill said that, in it, he had written in his own hand a verse from Longfellow. Now, remember that in 1941 we did not know whether we would survive. Churchill had read the verse out, and I started to speak it. As I did, she started speaking it as well. I just want to share it with the House:

“sail on, O Ship of State!

Sail on, O Union, strong and great!

Humanity with all its fears,

With all the hopes of future years,

Is hanging breathless on thy fate!”

She said it perfectly. She then smiled slightly, and I detected a little dampness in her eye. Then she moved on. It suddenly struck me that that was exactly her. She was the ship of state. We looked to her for everything good, and in difficult times. She loved the Union with a passion, and she loved Scotland, I think, probably most of all. That is who she was—she was that ship of state, and somehow too often we took her for granted, but she never complained, and she always gave us service.

Now, for that union of hearts, if the House will indulge me, I want to quote WH Auden with a few changes:

“Stop all the clocks, cut off the telephone,

Prevent the dog from barking with a juicy bone,

Silence the pianos and with muffled drums

Bring out the coffin, let the mourners come.”

She was our North, our South, our East and West,

Our working week and our Sunday rest,

Our noon, our midnight, our talk, our song.

We thought that love would last forever: we were wrong.

May God bless her and keep her, and hold her in our hands, and may we bless the royal family. God save the King.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

Ukraine

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Thursday 24th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to raise that appalling possibility, and it is vital that we reaffirm, again, that under article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty, we stand four-square behind every one of our NATO allies and will come to their defence.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

With Ukrainian men and women dying to fight against the Russians for their freedom today, those who are calling for negotiation at this point can only please that rambling wreck of a neo-Nazi sitting in the Kremlin, and they should be shunned.

Today the ambassador from Ukraine asked desperately whether NATO would look at a no-fly zone. I know it is a difficult choice, but could my right hon. Friend step to the Dispatch Box and make it clear that in this particular case, he rules nothing out?

Ukraine

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd February 2022 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

The hon. Member is completely right. The biggest threat is apathy and indifference. That is why what my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) said was so important. This is about not just Ukraine but democracy and the security of many other European countries—indeed, countries around the world. That is what is at stake here today.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I commend my right hon. Friend and his colleagues for their stalwart action so far. The fact is, Mr Lavrov said today that Ukraine does not have a right to sovereignty, so the scale of the ambition is surely clear to anyone who doubted it. I commend what he has done so far but, if we are going to hit them with sanctions, we need to hit them hard and hit them now. They need to feel the pain of the first part of this decision. Secondly, what is the ultimatum to them now? If they move further, are we going to take further action? We are facing the growth of the axis of totalitarian states. China will watch this and look at Taiwan. How we behave now and what we do as an alliance will dictate what happens in the far east.

[The Prime Minister]

We are hitting them hard now and we will hit them harder in the future. With every day that goes by on which Russia violates the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine, we will continue to punish Russia. In the end, I do not believe that President Putin has thought this through and I do think that he will fail.

Ukraine

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Tuesday 25th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

We are actually in lockstep with the United States, and, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, we have kept at least 30 of our diplomats in Kyiv, including Melinda Simmons, our outstanding ambassador. The UK presence continues to be very strong there, but those are sensible precautionary steps.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary on forming a very robust leadership with NATO and our European allies, and with the United States. Does my right hon. Friend agree, however, that right now we are facing an even wider threat? It is Ukraine today, but the powers of dictatorship have watched as we did nothing about Georgia, Crimea and South Ossetia, and they have been encouraged. Even now China is looking at Taiwan, watching to see what our reaction will be. Does my right hon. Friend not agree that we have to get our allies to recognise that we must never put ourselves in the position, when it comes to energy, of being dependent on these terrible regimes for our future? We need to get security into our energy now.

[The Prime Minister]

My right hon. Friend is completely right in what he says about the need for us to guarantee the independence of our energy—that is why it is so vital that we are building our wind power and other renewables so fast—but he is also right in his analysis of what is happening. What Putin basically wants is to go back to the Yalta system of spheres of influence. It is not just Ukraine that he has his eye on. Therefore, this moment now matters for the whole geometry and security architecture of Europe, and we must stand firm.

Oral Answers to Questions

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Wednesday 8th December 2021 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

We are absolutely committed to delivering 4,000 zero-emission buses and we are also committed to supporting UK bus manufacturing.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

The Prime Minister has already been asked about the winter Olympics, but having listened to his answer, I have to say that, sadly, it was not strong enough. I support the request that the UK Government now act against the dictatorial brutal Chinese regime that is persecuting everybody from Christians to Tibetans and terrorising the Uyghurs. Will they follow the suit of the Americans, the Australians and even the Lithuanians and please—I beg of him—give a lead to human rights and make a diplomatic boycott of the winter Olympic games?

[The Prime Minister]

It is clear from what I said earlier on that the Government have no hesitation in raising these issues with China, as I did with President Xi the last time I talked to him. There will be effectively a diplomatic boycott of the winter Olympics in Beijing. No Ministers are expected to attend, and no officials, but what I can tell the House is that I do not think that sporting boycotts are sensible, and that remains the policy of the Government.

Tributes to Sir David Amess

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

Monday 18th October 2021 Commons Chamber

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I am going to be, or at least intend to be, brief; after all, pretty much everything about David has been said, but that does not mean I cannot repeat it.

I knew David for 29 years. When I first came into this place in 1992, he was outstandingly and unfailingly kind, conscientious and generous, even to new Members who had arrived here eight years after him. I remember that very clearly. Later on, when I got to know him better, I recalled that a constituent of mine had referred to David, when he represented Basildon, as somebody who would go to the opening of an envelope. I put this to him, saying, “You are accused of going to the opening of an envelope,” and he said, “I damned well hope so, because I wrote it to them so I could go there in the first place.”

When the Conservatives won Basildon Council—for the first time, I think—David was there. It was not enough for him just to be with the councillors when they went in; he formed a conga that took the whole of the newly elected council through the council buildings and into the chamber. His sense of humour was always there, preceded by that megawatt smile that he could turn on. For most of us in this Chamber, it is hard work sometimes being able to smile enough, but for David it was hard work not to smile, and he would smile even in some of the most difficult circumstances.

After I ceased being Leader of the Opposition—I have to say, with respect, to the right hon. and learned Gentleman the current Leader of the Opposition that no matter how much he is enjoying it now, it really is not what it is cracked up to be—[Laughter.] I have to tell him that. [Interruption.] That is what I thought, too. I had to go and speak at an event for David, and he patted me on the shoulder and said, “Are you going all right?” I said, “Yes, fine,” and he got up and introduced me by saying, “I’m so pleased to have Iain Duncan Smith here; he has just slid down the greasy pole”—and then he carried on. [Laughter.] He did tell me directly afterwards that he had retired finally from a long time in government and thought that he would have more influence elsewhere; actually he spent a very short time in government, but that did not bother him in the slightest.

On a more serious note, I want to say that David has shown us the way—the way of co-operation. Most Members in this place know that we get things done by co-operating across the Floor. Little is talked about that, Mr Speaker, as you know, but it is the embodiment of who we are in this place. We cannot get stuff done by ourselves, so we form alliances. Whether it is on modern-day slavery or, in my case, gambling harms, we go on, we form alliances and we eventually move things and get them done. David was the architect of that. There was not an alliance that he could not form; even if there was not an issue on which he could form it, he would form it. [Laughter.]

My point is that this is who we are. We are often, as Jo Cox said, more united by the things we believe in than necessarily divided. The fact is that we are in this place because we argue with each other about our ideas. The important feature of this place is that we may disagree with arguments, but we do not disrespect the motives of those who hold them.

This is a lesson to us that we need to be careful here what we legitimise in what we say about our colleagues. They are not evil people. Nobody in this Chamber is an evil individual. They have strong beliefs. I was struck when the media had finished talking about David and then said, “And he was a man with very strongly held beliefs,” as though that was an aside that they wanted to bury. We come here because we have strong beliefs, and we should be proud of that. We argue with each other because we are the point where people can see us debate these things, have power of emotion and be angry about them—this place is a cockpit of that—so that they do not have to do it outside, violently, elsewhere. I believe the point that David was making was that we need publicly to show each other the respect that those ideas are greatly held. We respect each other, but we do not dislike or hate each other. That is not for us, and it is not for that that he lost his life.

I have been told that today, a document came through the door of my constituency office. The front page was all about David, and on it was written, “Like you. You bastard.” In fact, I did think he might have done it, because it was spelled “Barsted”. Even in that threat, I think there is a sense of irony.

In conclusion, let me say that for David’s family, this is a tragedy, which this deranged, hateful and violent individual has brought to them, unwarranted and without cause. David taught us something very important that they can remember. He believed not in the power of position, but in the power of purpose. Mr Speaker,

“They told me, Heraclitus, they told me you were dead,

They brought me bitter news to hear and bitter tears to shed.

I wept as I remember’d how often you and I

Had tired the sun with talking and sent him down the sky.

And now that thou art lying, my dear old Carian guest,

A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,

Still are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake”—

that is the important thing, Mr Speaker: he will be with us forever.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

Elections Bill

Iain Duncan Smith Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th September 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baker]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I am clear that in speaking in support of the Bill I am standing overwhelmingly for my ethnic minority voters in Wycombe. I am absolutely clear about that in my mind. I am clear that they are the most strident supporters I have on this matter in my constituency.

I will not repeat the matters that I raised on 19 December, because that took several times longer than the time I have remaining, so I will point out five areas where the Bill could go further. The first is that many people are incorrectly listed on the electoral roll, entitling them to vote. Many of the issues are already illegal, but there is a strong argument that if the electoral roll was much more tightly governed, the opportunity for criminality, and particularly the misuse of postal votes, would be reduced.

There needs to be a national check for uniqueness, but without a national database. I am grateful to the Electoral Commission for meeting me; I have shown it a technique that could be used with a kind of digital fingerprint to guarantee uniqueness. We need to ensure that people only vote once in the UK. I have seen a WhatsApp message where somebody said, “I have voted in Birmingham; I am now coming to Wycombe to vote against Baker.” I do not mind people voting against me if they are so convicted, as it were, but I do mind them voting twice.

The second point is that people register to vote at an address where they do not reside. I could take Members to a small Edwardian three-bedroom house in Wycombe where 12 electors are registered to vote. We absolutely know that they do not reside there. It is very important that people register to vote only where they reside. It is also important that people do not end up abusing the postal vote system by applying for a postal vote on someone’s behalf and then casting it without their knowledge. We also can give examples of where that can be done, although I do not have time now.

Thirdly, there are instances where foreign nationals here legally in the UK—very welcome they are, too—and with a national insurance number are not entitled to vote. We have examples of some people of Turkish nationality and some EU nationals. In some cases, people just do not know that they are not entitled to vote in a national election. We need to ensure that we tell them. I could give anecdotes of people who find they have inadvertently voted and wished they had not, because they had no intention of breaking the law, so we need to educate them.

Fourthly, I realise and accept that at this stage the Minister almost certainly cannot do anything about the national uniqueness of the electoral roll—I put that on the record so that we can come back to it—but this is an area where I think he could go further. When someone wishes to make an objection to someone’s name being on the roll at a particular address, the name of the objector must be disclosed. That is a reasonable principle of justice to ensure that the accused knows the name of their accuser. The point for me is about when their name is disclosed. It seems that just as an accused person is revealed when they are charged—not when they are arrested—so it could be the case that a person challenging the electoral roll is named publicly only at the moment when someone is charged so that that person knows who their accuser is for the purposes of the criminal justice system and the accuser does not end up exposed to intimidation for challenging registrations on the electoral roll. I make that case because such challenges need to be made and there is a problem with people either not making them or making them and subsequently feeling they were or could have been intimidated.

Finally, the Minister needs to do much more to educate voters about what the law is. For example, I am sorry to say that we cannot assume that just because a postal vote is completed by an elector in their own home, it has been completed freely. I know of one lady from an ethnic minority community who asked to cancel her postal vote because it had been taken from her and given to a candidate. I personally reported that candidate to the police. That is just one example concerning the treatment of women, which is not equal everywhere. In particular, I fear that women are not being given the opportunity to cast their vote freely. However they choose to vote, they should have their choice. In so far as it is up to me, I am not having this country go back to the pre-suffragette era in which women’s votes were abused. That requires us to be realistic and understand that some women cast their votes at home under duress.

I welcome the Bill and am grateful to the Minister, who will have my full support. Let us not listen to some of the nonsense we have heard today.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. I apologise to colleagues for this brief intervention, but I have heard that the all-party parliamentary China group has invited the ambassador of China on to the estate next week. As one of many in this place who has been sanctioned by the Chinese Government, I find that reprehensible, because Mr Speaker himself condemned the sanctioning of Members of Parliament here in very strict terms.

I have notified the chair of the all-party group, my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham), as well as the vice-chair, the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), who I see in his place. I wonder if you would give your view, Mr Deputy Speaker, about whether such a visit should happen. The representative of the Government who have sanctioned us, trolled us, broken some of our email accounts and taken our characters around the world is coming to Parliament next week, and I think that is unfathomable.

[Mr Carmichael]

Further to that point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. As vice-chair of the all-party parliamentary China group—in fairness, one of 22 vice-chairs—may I say to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) through you that I very much share his concerns? It is obviously necessary for us to engage in every way possible, but when the engagement is of the nature he described, that goes beyond normal engagement, and that should be a matter of concern across this Chamber.