Health: Flu Vaccine Research

Earl Howe Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Knight of Collingtree]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they propose to fund research into more effective flu vaccines, in the light of the recent report in The Lancet.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, research on the development of new flu vaccines is being actively carried out by academic departments in universities, biotechnology companies and vaccine manufacturers. There are number of improved vaccines in the final stages of development and licensed products may become available over the next few years. The department does not fund the development of new vaccines, but does support some work on basic research and research to inform policy in this area.

[Baroness Knight of Collingtree]

My Lords, did the Lancet report not warn that the currently used vaccine is effective for only six out of 10 of the persons receiving it, and that the virus can actually change to outwit that vaccine? Has my noble friend studied a more recent report from the chief virologist at Barts and the Royal Hospital about a new vaccine which not only gives lifelong protection in only one jab but also overrides the virus changes? Would it not be a real boon for patients if this were looked at more carefully, and perhaps brought in? It would save a lot of money for the NHS.

[Earl Howe]

My noble friend is extremely well informed. I have not seen the report that she mentioned. The only licensed vaccines currently supplied to the UK are inactivated trivalent influenza vaccines, but it is expected that within the next few years others will become available, including a live attenuated trivalent intranasal vaccine next year. In the future, an adjuvanted vaccine and a quadrivalent vaccine may also become available. The JCVI—the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation—has looked at some of these new vaccines and believes that they present exciting prospects for greater efficacy.

[Lord Patel]

Does the Minister agree that it is currently the task of the Health Protection Agency to track these infections globally and to do research to make sure that we are prepared if there is a pandemic of a different flu virus? Does he therefore agree that any proposals that lead to the Health Protection Agency—which is recognised worldwide for research and expertise —not being allowed to carry out research as it currently does are flawed?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, we are very clear that the Health Protection Agency performs a major public service and we have no intention of disrupting the work that it does, least of all by interfering with its research. As the noble Lord knows, the proposals are to shift the Health Protection Agency into the new, larger government agency, Public Health England. The World Health Organisation is actually the body that monitors the strains of flu worldwide and issues twice-yearly warnings to countries about the strains that are emerging so that countries can prepare for their forthcoming winter flu season.

[Baroness Wall of New Barnet]

My Lords, does the noble Earl agree with me that—despite the view of the noble Baroness, Lady Knight, about the Lancet report, which I have read—there is still an important need for people who work in the health service to have the current vaccine? It is not taken up by everybody, despite many trusts trying to ensure that everybody does take it up. Is there a stronger message that could go out from the Government that it is really important to do this? Forcing people is perhaps too much, but certainly it is a real issue.

[Earl Howe]

The noble Baroness is quite right. The Chief Medical Officer wrote to the NHS on 25 May, citing four studies that provide strong evidence of the benefit of influenza vaccination for front-line healthcare workers. These studies show clearly that healthcare workers can transmit influenza to patients, that vaccination of healthcare workers can prevent that transmission and that vaccination of healthcare workers can lead to better health outcomes in the vulnerable patients with whom they very often deal.

[Baroness Jolly]

My Lords, can my noble friend confirm that there is a problem with supplying the H1N1 vaccine? If that is the case, how is it proposed to target it more effectively and what steps will be taken to make sure that vulnerable people are targeted first?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, there were supply problems last winter, but my advice is that there are none this winter. Indeed, the quantity of vaccine that has been ordered for this winter’s anticipated flu outbreak is considerably larger than was the case last year. The Government also have a reserve stock of vaccine to be deployed in the event of local shortages.

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, the recently published Department of Health report on winter preparedness says that by the end of the 2010 flu vaccine season, only about 50 per cent of those under 65 years old in the clinical risk groups had been vaccinated. The Chief Medical Officer states that we need to,

“ reach or exceed 75% uptake”,

of this group and for pregnant women. Unlike Scotland and Northern Ireland, I understand that this year there will be no advertising campaign in England to raise awareness of the importance of flu jabs. Will the Minister rethink this policy to ensure that this target is achieved?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the difficulty with advertising is that there is no evidence either way as to whether an advertising campaign has an impact on vaccine uptake, although there is no doubt that it has an impact on vaccine awareness. Without a marketing campaign last year, it was notable that the flu vaccine uptake was very similar to that achieved in previous years. We believe that the best way to access those who are at risk is through GPs. We know that from surveys that ask patients what has prompted them to get vaccination.

[Lord MacKenzie of Culkein]

My Lords, has the Minister seen reports in the nursing press that student nurses are being denied the influenza vaccine, despite advice to the contrary from the Chief Medical Officer? Can he comment on that and see whether something can be done about it?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, although student nurses are not technically employees, as the noble Lord will know, they will be working for a particular NHS trust, with that trust’s patients, and it is therefore the trust’s responsibility to consider the safety of the student nurse and indeed the patients that they care for. If student nurses are going to be carrying out front-line work, particularly with vulnerable patients, then the trust should follow the advice we have issued on healthcare workers generally.

NHS: Waiting Times

Earl Howe Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government how many patients currently waiting more than 18 weeks for treatment will benefit from the recent directive on waiting times; and what are the most common conditions from which they suffer.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)]

My Lords, we have introduced a strong performance measure in 2012-13 for patients still waiting to start treatment more than 18 weeks after referral. This, and the requirement to treat patients in order of clinical priority, will ensure that the NHS focuses on minimising waiting times for all patients. At the end of September 2011, 242,540 patients were waiting longer than 18 weeks to start treatment. The largest numbers of patients were waiting in trauma and orthopaedics specialties.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, does not this U-turn underline the folly of abandoning targets in the first place? Will the Minister say how, under the provisions of the Health and Social Care Bill, the Secretary of State will be able to intervene in similar circumstances should they arise in future?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, this is not a U-turn. The Government have always been clear that the standards laid down in the NHS constitution should be adhered to. As the noble Lord will know, that includes the expectation that patients should not wait for longer than 18 weeks. It is also a condition built into the NHS standard contract. We have been absolutely consistent all the way along. Those things will continue to have to be measured after the Government’s modernisation proposals are put in place.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

What percentage of patients in hospital are currently awaiting discharge because of delays in establishing a suitable care and follow-up package for them at home, thereby preventing the admission of others for investigation and treatment?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, in the first quarter of the current financial year, 0.4 per cent of occupied bed days were taken by patients who were delayed while waiting for a care package. That picture has deteriorated over the past year but that deterioration masks some variations. Some hospitals have improved dramatically and others have started reporting for the first time. It is not possible to compare this year’s figures with the previous year, although these are very important figures which we do monitor.

[Lord Naseby]

My Lords—

[Lord Naseby]

My Lords, is it not strange that the figures show that certain hospitals consistently get nowhere near meeting the 18-week target? What action are the Government going to take to help those hospitals ensure that they perform like the average?

[Earl Howe]

Yes, my Lords, my noble friend is right. Five hospitals account for a very significant proportion of the number of patients waiting for longer than 18 weeks. We are working with those hospitals to look at ways in which that performance can be improved. We know that it can be because many hospitals are more than achieving the desired standard.

[Lord Warner]

My Lords—

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[Lord Warner]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. Blessed is the sinner who repents. However, will the Minister tell us whether in the light of this repentance, he will, following my noble friend Lord Beecham’s Question, look sympathetically at amendments to the Health and Social Care Bill which will give patients the kind of safeguards that targets did under the previous Government?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, we believe that the safeguards are already in place, but the figure I cited in my original Answer is very similar to the figure we have seen over the past two and a half years. Little progress has been made over that time. We do not think that that is satisfactory, so we are broadening the operational standard to ensure that more patients are treated in a timely way. I am sure all noble Lords would wish to see that.

[Baroness Jolly]

My Lords, approaching 250,000 patients have been waiting for more than 18 weeks and I expect that they would like to know why, as would the House. Can the Minister give us any indication, apart from the five hospitals mentioned earlier, of whether there is a regional pattern to this—while we still have regions—or of whether it is the result of financial pressures, clinical management issues or maybe a combination of all three?

[Earl Howe]

It does seem to be a combination of all three, although it is clear that in certain areas there is a shortage of the necessary specialist consultants. Sir Bruce Keogh, the NHS medical director, is addressing this urgently with the British Orthopaedic Association in particular. That is expected to result in a solutions paper being put to the NHS Operations Executive in the new year.

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, this weekend the Royal College of Nursing reported that around 50,000 nursing posts are either in jeopardy or lost completely due to the ill conceived implementation of the economies being driven through the NHS. Does the noble Earl accept this figure and what effect does he think that figure might have on waiting times and waiting lists? Is it not time for the Government to accept that cuts to front-line staff are going to have an effect on patient care?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, in that press release, which I think was from the Royal College of Nursing, there was a blurring of the distinction between the number of nursing posts which have been lost and the number which might, if certain things happen in the future, be lost. We recognise that in some cases local organisations will have to make difficult choices about staffing changes in the coming years. In making any changes, we have been clear that we expect them to ensure that the quality and safety of care is maintained or improved. That may involve changing the skill mix of the workforce in a particular hospital but, if that happens, it has to be safety and quality assured so that there is no adverse effect on patients.

Health and Social Care Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd November 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)]

My Lords, I hope that I can demonstrate to the Committee that the portrayal of what the Government intend through these provisions is a false one. We wish to create a transparent and accountable system in which every organisation understands its duties and responsibilities. Clause 20 sets out further provisions for the NHS Commissioning Board. It requires the Secretary of State to publish a mandate to the board setting out objectives and requirements as well as the board’s resource limits. The mandate is one of the key levers that Ministers will have in order to set a national health policy and influence the way in which taxpayers' money is spent on delivering NHS services. It lies at the heart of the Secretary of State’s continuing accountability for the health service.

In a moment, I shall cover the provisions concerning transparency prior to the publication of the mandate, but once the mandate has been published, the Bill requires the board to publish its business plan, setting out how it will deliver it. The Bill also requires it to report on what it has previously achieved in its annual report laid before Parliament. The Secretary of State must then publish an assessment of the board's performance. Taken together, that will provide what we believe is an unprecedented degree of transparency about what the NHS is asked to achieve and what is delivered.

The noble Lord, Lord Warner, suggested that, having issued the mandate, the Secretary of State would detach himself from the health service from that point on. That has never been our vision and it will not happen. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, in regard to his example of waiting times, that he will know that the board and all the commissioners will have to have regard to the NHS constitution, and within the NHS constitution is a standard which says that patients can expect to wait no longer than 18 weeks. That duty is in the Bill and we do not intend to change it. It is also open to the Secretary of State to stipulate conditions to be included in the NHS standard contract. Again, the noble Lord will know that within the NHS standard contract there is a stipulation about waiting times.

The Bill requires the Secretary of State to keep the board's performance against the mandate under review throughout the year, over and above his general duty to review the performance of all national bodies. I refer the noble Lord, Lord Owen, to Clause 49 of the Bill which sets out that duty.

Amendments 96 and 153A, tabled respectively by the noble Lords, Lord Warner and Lord Hunt, would limit the number of objectives in the mandate and remove the ability to amend it in-year following an election. I do not yet know how many objectives the mandate will contain. That will emerge from the process of engagement and public consultation that we will undertake, but I am confident that, given that the NHS Commissioning Board will receive around £80 billion of funding, there will be many more than 10. Setting an arbitrary limit, as the amendment seeks to do, would undermine Ministers’ legitimate ability to set strategic policy for the NHS.

As a result, although I support the broad intention of the noble Lords, I think a better way of achieving the desired outcome is not to put crude limits on Ministers’ powers, but to ensure that they are used proportionately. That is what the autonomy duty in Clause 4 does. I hope that helps to explain to the noble Lords why we think that duty is so important.

The noble Lord asked whether the mandate would contain desirable as well as obligatory objectives for the Commissioning Board. That is not our intention. The Bill will require the board to seek to achieve all the objectives in the mandate and the board will then be legally required to comply with all the requirements set out in the mandate.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked me about the period—

[Lord Warner]

I would like to pursue the last point the Minister made. Is he saying that, after a lot of consultation, the Secretary of State may say, “I have 35 objectives for you, laid out in the mandate, and I claim that the justification for that is the consultation process that we have had. You, the national Commissioning Board, better get on with it, and we will look at what you have done at the end of 12 months to see whether you have delivered those 35 objectives”? Can the Minister give us some idea what failure would look like? Would it mean failure on 10 objectives, or five, or 15? Where does the point come when the chairman and the chief executive get fired because they have not delivered the objectives in the mandate?

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord is taking us into a hypothetical realm. I understand why he is asking those questions, and I think the answer would depend on the degree and scale of the failure. I have just said that the Bill requires the board to seek to achieve all the objectives in the mandate. It would be up to the Secretary of State to judge whether it had used its best endeavours to do that. The performance of the board will be a matter of public record; it will be up to Parliament to take a view on that, as well.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I am most grateful to the Minister for giving way. Could, or would, the mandate include any way to prioritise between the potentially 35 different tasks that are being imposed on the board?

[Earl Howe]

It could do. However, that is to be determined. I would welcome the views of the noble Lord on that, if he has particular examples in mind.

This brings us to the question the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked about the period which the mandate will cover. It will be a multi-year document, updated annually, which is intended to provide a stable policy context for the board. There may be circumstances which call for the mandate to be updated in-year, including after a general election, to ensure that an incoming Government could start to implement their manifesto commitments for the NHS in-year. Any revisions to the mandate will be open and transparent. If the mandate is revised, it must be published and laid before Parliament with an explanation of the changes.

I will now comment on Amendments 98 and 100, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, and Amendment 100A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. These rightly highlight the importance of transparency and parliamentary scrutiny of the mandate. I completely sign up to transparency as a principle. In the first place, there will be a public consultation. Alongside that, we will engage with stakeholders, including the board, to ensure that we set ambitious but achievable objectives. It is essential that the Government hold the board to account for objectives that are achievable. It is not in anybody’s interests to set the board up to fail. At the same time, where there is scope for improvement in the health service within the resources available, the mandate should and will ask the board to drive such improvements.

Ministers have a legitimate right to be ambitious on behalf of citizens and taxpayers, but we know that getting the balance right and setting objectives that are affordable and ambitious will not be straightforward. Much of the answer lies in transparency. There will be open public consultation on the Government’s objectives for the NHS. I can assure noble Lords that the process of developing the mandate will be open and consultative, including a formal 12-week public consultation. We intend to publish a consultation response as well as a summary of the responses we receive.

I point out that the Bill places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult the board and HealthWatch England before specifying the objectives and requirements in the mandate. We should be clear about how that changes the current arrangements. At present, decisions about the Secretary of State’s priorities for the NHS can be decided without reference to, or consultation with, anyone, as we saw under previous Governments. Top-down targets can be set without consultation. The priorities for the NHS are issued around this time every year through an operating framework without any need for consultation. Under the Bill, for the first time parliamentarians and the public will have the opportunity to consider and challenge the Government's objectives for the NHS every year. No previous Government have ever allowed this. It will highlight and reinforce, year by year, Ministers’ overarching responsibility for a comprehensive National Health Service free at the point of need.

The consultation will provide a period in which Parliament will be able to scrutinise the Government's proposals—as will the Health Select Committee if it chooses. It is appropriate that this consultation should take place before the mandate is published. We must provide clarity of purpose for the NHS. A period of additional parliamentary scrutiny after the mandate is published, which is what the amendment proposes, would be disproportionate and very disruptive. It would reduce the time the NHS has for planning and would create uncertainty in the service.

There will of course be formal parliamentary control over any legal requirements set for the NHS through the standing rules and any other regulations. The Bill not only gives Parliament an unprecedented role in setting out the roles and responsibilities in the NHS but increases parliamentary scrutiny by requiring detailed parameters and requirements to be set in regulations rather than in ministerial directions that have no scrutiny at all. I hope that noble Lords will give the Government credit for that package of proposals.

In addition, we have accepted the recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that the requirements in the mandate should have the force of legislation and should be in an instrument subject to the negative procedure.

[Lord Owen]

It sounds very reasonable, but effectively the pre-consultation period will involve the board, HealthWatch England and such other persons as the Secretary of State allows. Parliament will not always be fobbed off with the answer that the Minister is still considering the issue. That is perfectly reasonable; we all know that a normal consultation period is required by all ministries, and certainly the Department of Health has observed this over many decades. It is when the Minister makes up his mind that Parliament will know what the policy is—and if it is in legislation it will be at that stage that there will be an intervention from Parliament with the right to challenge it. Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable to ask Parliament to come in after the consultation period because then it will know what the Secretary of State is proposing.

[Earl Howe]

Of course, Parliament is the sovereign body and can do whatever it chooses. Nothing will prevent it commenting on the mandate once it has been published. No doubt the Health Select Committee will wish to do this. My point is that to expect the process to feed into a regurgitation or reformulation of the mandate would be unfair on the NHS. The opportunity for Parliament to have its say should surely be during the normal consultation period. Parliament will be able to see the extent to which the Secretary of State has responded to whatever comments it has made.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

I take up the point that any debate in Parliament should be after consultation has taken place so that Parliament will know what the Secretary of State has decided. The Minister said that this would be debated by a sovereign Parliament. However, he will know that translating that into real time for debates in which noble Lords can question Ministers is problematic. The beauty of the Planning Act 2008 was that it laid down a requirement that was then turned into procedure. Perhaps the Minister will reflect on this. As he rightly said, this mandate is a very important indication to the health service of the Secretary of State’s wishes. If the department gave some further thought to this matter, it might come to the conclusion that it would be right to allow parliamentarians to have a go at the mandate—to question Ministers—before it is finally signed off.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I was just about to comment on the recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that the requirements in the mandate should have the force of legislation, in an instrument subject to the negative procedure. The board will have to comply with the requirements in order to support delivery of the objectives in the mandate that it must seek to achieve. Parliament will therefore be able to scrutinise the requirements after the mandate is published. We will bring forward a government amendment at Report stage to achieve that recommendation of your Lordships’ committee.

That is not the same as opening up the actual objectives in the mandate—that is to say, the direction and the strategy that the Government of the day want to set for the NHS—and rightly so. If that were to happen, it would lead to unwelcome delay and uncertainty for the health service. The Delegated Powers Committee, which has great expertise in this area, did not suggest that any further parliamentary scrutiny of the mandate was necessary. I can reassure the Committee that if Parliament were to make a recommendation concerning the mandate after it is laid before Parliament, the Secretary of State would undoubtedly have to respond, just as Ministers do now as a matter of course.

[Lord Warner]

I have been cogitating what the Minister has been saying, in his normal, plausible way, about the consultation with everybody before the mandate is agreed by the Secretary of State. The trouble that I have with that, worthy though it is, is that it does not really deal with the point in my Amendment 98, and in some ways it makes the situation worse. My amendment is all about how the national Commissioning Board answers back and tells Parliament if it thinks that the final mandate is undeliverable. That is the purpose. If you have extensive public consultation, the point that my noble friend Lord Harris made earlier comes into play. I am sorry to have got a bit fixated about the figure of 35, but you end up with 35 propositions in the mandate, and the money available to the Secretary of State at that point is still the same as when he went out to public consultation. We run an even greater risk of having a very overloaded mandate, with lots of items in it which come out of the public consultation. The money has not changed. The board is expected to deliver a larger number of things with the same amount of money. That is why my Amendment 98 becomes even more important if the Minister is going down the path that he says that the Government are going down.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

As I said, there will be full public consultation on the mandate. It would of course be possible for the Health Select Committee or indeed other parliamentarians to scrutinise and challenge the mandate at that point. If changes to the mandate were made in-year as a result of that process—that is not inconceivable—then a revised mandate would be published. It would be laid before Parliament with an explanation. After the mandate comes into force in April 2013, Parliament will have all the usual opportunities to ask questions about the performance of the board against the mandate. The board in addition will include in its annual report an assessment of performance against the mandate, and that will be published and laid before Parliament.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked me how we will know what the board said when it is consulted about the mandate. As I am sure he knows, the Government have a code of practice on consultation that we would follow. That code sets out the expectation for the Government to respond to the consultation and in doing so to provide a summary of the views expressed to each question as well as of what decisions have been taken in the light of them.

The noble Lord, Lord Patel, asked a question that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, also asked me about what would happen if the board disagrees with the mandate. The mandate sets out the objectives that the Secretary of State considers the board should seek to achieve. Those objectives will be developed in close co-operation with the board. It will not be a detached process. Indeed, the Bill requires the Secretary of State to consult the board before setting the mandate. Nevertheless, decisions about the content of the mandate will ultimately rest with the Secretary of State, and I contend that that is entirely appropriate. It is the Secretary of State taking responsibility on behalf of the Government for what he is requiring the board to achieve.

I hope that I have shown that the level of transparency and of public accountability over the mandate will be very great indeed. I do not share noble Lords’ apprehensions that somehow Parliament will have no opportunity to comment on the mandate. Quite the reverse is the case. We will ensure that it does, and it is right that it does. This is an entirely new situation for the NHS. I hope that that is welcome to noble Lords and that I have said enough to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Warner, to withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Jay of Paddington]

I wonder whether the Minister can help me with a point he made in response to the noble Lord, Lord Owen. He was raising some important points of principle about the Secretary of State’s role and the way in which it, as it were, percolates through so many of the provisions in the Bill, and the Minister referred to Clause 49 as being something that should ease those concerns. I realise that we are not discussing Clause 49 at the moment, but the Minister and the Committee will remember that the Select Committee on the Constitution was concerned that Clause 49 was not an adequate answer to some of these points of principle that were raised by, among others, the noble Lord, Lord Owen. Can the Minister help me this afternoon on that?

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[Earl Howe]

The noble Baroness knows that I have undertaken to engage in discussions outside this Chamber about Clauses 1 and 4 and their relationship with Clauses 10 and 20, and that is what I intend to do. There is a broader question here. My point to the noble Lord, Lord Owen, and the noble Lord, Lord Warner, who suggested in his opening speech that somehow the Secretary of State would detach himself and say, “Not me, guv” about anything that happened in the health service, is that they are mistaken because Clause 49 requires the Secretary of State to keep health service functions under review—in other words, not just the functions, but the effectiveness of the exercise by the bodies of those functions in relation to the health service. That is a very powerful duty. It is not a signal that the Secretary of State can just detach himself from what is going on in the health service. If he is holding the board to account, it involves him doing what Clause 49 requires, and I do not think that anything in the Bill negates that.

[Lord Owen]

The procedure in another place is deliberately very limited in terms of getting to a legislative change. This mandate has many of the qualities of legislation. It lasts for a year. It is going be a fixed statement. Is the Minister really telling us that the Secretary of State will not be saying that, because the mandate has been given, this is a question for the commission or the board—one which he would normally accept on the Floor of the House? Past experience is that he will pass that responsibility on the Floor of the House to, in this case, the commission. This is what concerns many people: there will be a change in procedure in how questions are answered in the House of Commons. The Minister has still not answered the question. This amendment allows a substantive change in the mandate that would stay for a year to be instituted by Parliament after it knows what is in the Minister’s mind, and he appears to be rejecting that. Is he rejecting that?

[Earl Howe]

I am surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Owen, thinks that the health service should be run in that way; that is, Parliament in effect mandating requirements to the health service whenever it chooses. I do not think that is a helpful idea. I think it is helpful for the Secretary of State, as now, to take responsibility for the health service but in the future to take direct responsibility for what lies in the mandate. Should events during a given year raise questions about the performance of the board, the Secretary of State would be answerable to Parliament for whatever the event was, and he would indeed have to take the necessary advice from the board. What he would not be saying is, “This is not my concern, guv”. He is answerable to Parliament in the ways that I have indicated. There is obviously a need for the board to take responsibility for the day-to-day management of the health service. However, we are seeking to achieve a balance between the Secretary of State taking responsibility in Parliament for what is in the mandate and the outcomes that he has set for the health service.

This is a shift of responsibility, it is not an abdication of responsibility—that is the distinction. Power is a zero sum game. If you shift power from the Secretary of State down to the health service, you cannot at the same time expect the Secretary of State to retain the same degree of power. We are transferring power in two directions; from the Secretary of State downwards, and from the Secretary of State upwards to Parliament. That is the picture that I hope noble Lords will keep in their minds.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl, but there are some extra points here. What we have seen from the Secretary of State recently is no desire to desist from day-to-day involvement in the National Health Service. We have seen a number of interventions—which, as the noble Earl knows, I welcome; I believe that is the duty of the Secretary of State. I am still completely mystified as to how the Secretary of State will do this in the future. I can see that you have the NHS constitution; I can see that in the objectives set in the mandate the Secretary of State will say to the NHS Commissioning Board, “You will do the right thing on waiting times”. However, what happens if, because of resource constraints, clinical commissioning groups put in artificial devices to extend waiting while still meeting the 18-week targets? They will be okay under the constitution, but that action is found to be unacceptable in PCTs now. Where does the intervention come? The Secretary of State will be required by Parliament to intervene. There will be no getting away from that.

The second point is about accountability upwards. I say again to the noble Earl that I do not know why he will not take this point away. We have the Planning Act 2008; we have had a highly successful process of examining national policy statements, which must be of the same degree of importance as the mandate. It has been clearly set out how Parliament will scrutinise those: it allows in your Lordships’ House a process in Grand Committee and then in your Lordships’ Chamber if a Motion is moved. However, at the end of the day the Secretary of State can ignore what Parliament says because it is the Secretary of State’s responsibility to set the national policy statement as he would the mandate. If the Government are claiming that this is an appreciable shift of power, I am puzzled as to why on earth Parliament is not allowed more involvement in scrutinising the mandate.

[Earl Howe]

Because it would get Parliament into the territory of micromanaging the health service, if it so chose. That is not the territory we would want to be in, any more than we wish the Secretary of State to micromanage the health service. That is the problem. The Secretary of State has to take responsibility for the objectives set for the health service. I think there is a general acceptance among those in the health service and indeed the public at large that the health service has to be judged on a different set of measures than it has been in the past—namely, on its outcomes and the cost effectiveness with which it approaches the use of the budget given to it.

We believe that undue political influence is undesirable. Parliament is capable of exercising that kind of interference every bit as much as a Secretary of State. We are saying, however, that Parliament has every right to scrutinise the Secretary of State’s proposals, to feed into those proposals, to be listened to and to be responded to. However, in our contention, it is undesirable for us to go beyond that because in the end, the health service has to know where it stands. If this is an endless process of Parliament second guessing the mandate and coming forward all the time with suggested changes, we will not have a workable system.

[Lord Warner]

My Lords, we have had a very interesting debate on Amendment 96. I cannot say that I have been convinced by the noble Earl’s argument that he will not have a large amount of clutter in this mandate as a result of this public consultation. The poor old NHS will have to make the best of it. I suspect that at some stage we will come back to this issue of placing some limit on the objectives and requirements. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 96.

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[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for moving the amendment. I should like to start with the question about the scale of the financial challenge. As my noble friend suggested, the amount of money that has got to be taken out of the NHS through efficiency in the next four years is considerable. The indications are that while in the current financial year there will be some parts of the NHS that really struggle, by and large the service is going to get through. However, years two, three and four are going to be much more fundamental challenges. The need for the NHS to use its assets as effectively as possible, to get on with reconfiguration of services, and for all groups involved in the NHS to buy into that kind of change, is going to be essential. The more comparative information that can be provided the better, which is where I hope the Minister will be responsive to my noble friend.

The noble Lord Lord, Lord Owen, mentioned procurement. I should wear a hat as president of the Health Care Supply Association, and say that he is right to identify procurement as a potential area of much greater efficiency in the future. However, the Minister will know that two recent reports from the Public Accounts Committee have raised concerns about procurement and really are inviting the Minister in particular and the department specifically to take on a much greater leadership role in ensuring—it is rather like the Green report suggested—that the NHS makes the most of its potential buying power. I ask the Minister how, in the devolved structure that the Government are enunciating, we can ensure that on issues such as the use of our assets and procurement we still act as one national service making the most of our buying power? Unless we do that, there are going to be continuous PAC reports looking at the problem of national direction.

Finally, I endorse the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams. What about clinical commissioning groups? The Bill is silent on how CCGs are to be accountable. One way would be the publication of comparative performance of how they use their resources—the more comparative performance, the better. I should also like to ask the Minister about primary medical services. As we know, this has always been a difficult area. We have had various efforts through the GP contract to have much more of a performance culture. I cannot say that has been uniformly successful. However, in these days of stringency, I do not think we can get away with that any longer. It would be good to hear how we can extend the whole concept of efficiency performance measurement into an area of the health service, such as GPs themselves, where I am sure there is much more efficiency to be gained.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, this has been a useful debate. I should probably say straight away to the noble Lord, Lord Warner, that I am not convinced by the amendment. That is not because I do not believe that the issues that he has raised are important—I certainly do. Good governance is absolutely dependent on having good data and on the financial control that that data enable the board of directors to exercise. It is very much about ensuring throughout the health service that the QIPP agenda is pursued effectively. The QIPP agenda is all about ensuring the more efficient and effective use of money. This could not be a more salient topic at the moment.

However, Amendment 102, which the noble Lord has proposed, would in my view introduce a new layer of bureaucracy. I hope to show that it is not required. My main reason for saying that is that accounting and disclosure requirements for the Department of Health and all NHS bodies are ultimately set by the Treasury. These are already based on independent advice.

I am conscious that that is rather a condensed answer, so, if I may, I should like to go into a little detail as to how this will work. Paragraph 15 of the new Schedule A1 to the NHS Act, inserted by Schedule 1 to the Bill, enables the Secretary of State, with the agreement of the Treasury, to specify the form and content of the board’s accounts and the methods and principles to be applied in their preparation. The Bill places an obligation on the board to produce annual accounts, as well as in-year accounts covering shorter periods if necessary.

In addition, the Bill provides powers for the Secretary of State to require such other information as is considered necessary for the purpose of exercising his functions in relation to the health service. This is what one might term management information—data required by those controlling funding or setting policy alongside the financial returns in order to provide an accurate picture of issues such as staffing levels.

For clinical commissioning groups, it is the NHS Commissioning Board that sets the accounting and reporting requirements. It will do so in a way that is consistent with requirements set by the Secretary of State, and approved by the Treasury for the purposes of consolidation.

My noble friend Lady Williams expressed the fear that CCGs may not be well equipped to handle that kind of reporting. The board will set the accounting and reporting requirements for CCGs, as I indicated. Paragraph 16 of Schedule 1A to the NHS Act 2006, inserted by Schedule 2 to the Bill, allows the board, with the approval of the Secretary of State, to give directions to CCGs as to the methods and principles of accounting which they must use and the form and content of their accounts. That will provide a means whereby much greater control can be had over the form, content and consistency of those accounts.

These provisions are mirrored in relation to NHS foundation trusts, with Monitor or the Secretary of State specifying the form and content of the trusts' accounts, again with Treasury agreement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

Practices will be accountable for the money that they receive to commission services, as will CCGs. But it is another matter to say that independent private individuals should lay open what are effectively their tax returns to the general public. That is the sensitivity there.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

This is not about GPs’ private incomes and tax returns. This is about the finances of the business, which is their practice partnership, and within that the way in which that money is being spent on business, just as other business accounts have to be open and filed.

[Earl Howe]

I understand the noble Baroness’s point. Clearly, we want to see maximum accountability for public money. Does the noble Lord wish to intervene?

[Lord Warner]

I do not particularly want to intervene about GPs. I can understand to some extent what the noble Earl is saying about them. I am more concerned that the noble Earl has given us a lot of information about powers in the Bill for people to do things. I recognise only too well official defence in depth of the current status quo. I have had many a brief along those lines in my time, so I can see that.

What I am really interested in is how the Government are going to use those powers that they have taken in this Bill to deliver the kind of ideas that are actually in my amendment. I want to know what work is going on to produce the kind of comparative data that this amendment seeks to deliver to an unsuspecting world, from this variety of providers; not least because it is not just about accounting standards in financial terms, it is about the relationship of that expenditure to what is being delivered. That is why I have deliberately used the term “management accounts”, not just financial accounts. The public, and many of us, want to see the NHS showing how it has spent the money and what it has produced for that, and to see that on a standardised basis. I remain very sceptical whether the QUIP accounts deliver that. That is the issue that the NHS has to face up to. Unless we tackle that and can use the powers that the noble Earl has referred to in the Bill—and I am happy to come back on Report with a new amendment that relates to those powers—to deliver the comparative management account data, I do not think we are progressing matters very far from where we are now. I would very much welcome a more detailed discussion on this issue with the noble Earl, and with any other noble Lords, before the next part of this Bill, so that we can get to the bottom of this and help the Government use the powers that they are taking in a more constructive way.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I would be delighted to have that conversation. I did not in the least mean to suggest that the ideas the noble Lord has put forward are in any way irrelevant. Indeed, quite the opposite, I am aware that there is a lot of work going on at the moment in the very areas that he has highlighted. I would be happy to write to him about that, if that would help as a precursor to a meeting.

I will just cover a couple of the questions that have been asked. The noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, asked to what extent the Office for Budget Responsibility would be involved. The OBR has a very specific role in terms of producing economic information. We would not see a role for the OBR itself in analysing the impact of NHS spending, but this is an area that is always under close scrutiny across the Government, in the Department of Health and beyond. I am leaving the possibility slightly open, if I may.

The noble Lord, Lord Walton, asked whether Sir David Nicholson would have sufficient financial expertise alongside him on the board. Sir David Nicholson has said in Developing the NHS Commissioning Board, published earlier this year, that the board will have a finance director as part of its leadership team. That is all I can tell him at the moment. However, it is clear that the board will have a major task in ensuring that sufficient financial control is maintained over the health service as a whole. If it fails to do so—as the noble Lord, Lord Warner, rightly reminded us—we are all in trouble.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked how we can achieve comparable performance measurement of CCGs. The board will be required to publish an assessment of CCG performance annually, including their financial functions. It must also publish a summary report of the performance of all CCGs.

The amendment is well intended; I have no difficulty with that. However, in practice, as framed, it would be onerous and cut across established government responsibilities. I know the noble Lord, Lord Warner, thinks I am just defending the status quo, but I am trying to say that I am not sure his formula would add much value, particularly as the underlying purpose of the amendment is already achieved under existing arrangements. For those reasons, I hope he will feel comfortable—for the time being—in withdrawing it.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s response on clinical commissioning groups, but I come back to the question of GPs. Along with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, I do not think I was seeking to look at their business arrangements, but I am seeking to find out how their performance as primary medical providers is going to be measured in the future. When the Secretary of State announced his reforms, shortly after coming into government, he emphasised that he wanted to put responsibility for budgets alongside responsibility for expenditure, on the basis that GPs, either through referral or through prescribing, were responsible for most expenditure in the NHS. I assume the intention was, essentially, to encourage GPs to be much more effective in what they did in primary medicine, as it would impact on their budgetary situation; but, given that, how do we get to a situation where we can start to measure the performance of GPs? I do not pretend that it is easy—as I said earlier, I think our own experience with the GP contract shows some of the challenges. However, I would have thought that for the future, some comparative information about GP performance, in addition to the prescribing information that is now available, would help. For instance, one issue would be how good they are at demand management. How good are they at preventing their patients from inappropriately going to hospital? I would have thought this was a rich gold seam.

[Earl Howe]

I could not agree more with the noble Lord. We want to get closer to the question of what represents value for money in primary care. There are perhaps two principal ingredients of that equation. The first is the money we put into primary care, which we will know through the resource allocation formula, with which the noble Lord is familiar; the second is through highlighting the results achieved through primary care. Primary care clinicians will be accountable as never before by reference to the outcomes that they achieve for their patients. The other ingredient, overarching all that, is transparency. The more measures of performance that we can devise and place into the public domain the better in my view, and in the next few weeks, we will be announcing measures that I hope will be welcome in that regard. However, we are starting from a low base—not much information is currently published. We want to change that, and ensure not only that clinical commissioning groups and the NHS board are aware of all this but that patients and the public are aware of how well or badly a practice is performing. All these things such as prescribing rates and referral rates are key measures of performance, which we have to get closer to. If we can ensure that practices themselves are more able to compare their own performance with those of their peers, that too will be an advance. I am sure that this is a rich seam, as the noble Lord put it, and we very much hope to advance on that front over the coming months.

[Baroness Young of Old Scone]

Can I just press the noble Earl on that point? We have a situation at the moment that I think is not in patients’ interests. If you want to find out about the quality of diabetes care by provider, hospital or trust in this country, you can find out about it perfectly well; if you want to find out about the quality of diabetes care commissioned by a PCT, you can find out about it perfectly well. The quality of care being delivered to people with diabetes by general practitioners is available and can be seen by general practitioners—who can compare their performance with each other—but it is not available for people with diabetes. Quite frankly, I think that is outrageous and I would urge the Minister to do something about that now.

[Earl Howe]

The noble Baroness, with her passion for this important area of care, makes an extremely important point. I will take that point away and see what more I can tell her about the work that is going on in that area.

[Lord Warner]

My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate. It was never my intention to assume that the way in which this amendment was framed was the last word on the subject. It is helpful to know that there are provisions in the Bill that can be used or adapted for the purposes that I was seeking to produce. I still remain concerned that we need to use the powers that the Government are taking in a very speedy and effective way to link finance with performance data on a standardised basis. We need to get on with that. It needs to be in place by the time the SHAs disappear. The SHAs have been holding some of this stuff together. Once they go, we will need better systems than we have now to monitor performance and money. As the noble Baroness, Lady Young, has said, we need that matter to be in the public arena as well; it is not just for the closed world of the NHS. I hope that we can have some useful dialogue on this before Report to see whether we can secure amendments to the existing arrangements that will improve things.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the subject of the tariff may, to an outsider, seem rather dry but I will begin by saying to the noble Lord, Lord Warner, that I agree with him that it is fundamental to having an effective and efficient health service and better care for patients. Indeed, as noble Lords have articulated so well, this group of amendments takes us to the heart of one of our running themes in Committee; namely, the integration of NHS services, both within the NHS and more widely with social care services. I agree that this is a subject of profound importance. The NHS Future Forum highlighted this while also identifying that some people had real concerns that competition in the provision of NHS services could act against the development of integrated provision.

First, what do we mean by integration? A number of noble Lords have asked that question. The duties to promote integration would cover both integration between service types—for example, between health and social care—and integration between different types of health services. Whatever the combination and however they are integrated, the practical effect should be that services are co-ordinated around the needs of the individual. This duty would apply right the way through the system. It would certainly apply to the board when exercising its functions, not just its commissioning functions.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, who made a very important point about vulnerable people in particular. For example, CCGs could comply with their duty of integration by choosing to commission services jointly with local authorities. We have always envisaged that happening. The joining-up of services could, as I say, be between different organisations or between workers within an organisation or even with advice that is given to patients about self-care and the treatment that is delivered by providing organisations. What matters is that the service is based around those patients, not the other way round.

It might be helpful if I said something about the Government’s approach to competition in the NHS. We are clear that in some circumstances competition is a force for good. Competition can create incentives for providers to innovate and improve effectiveness, as well as enabling greater choice for patients. My noble friend Lady Williams made that point very well. However, there is no single model of competition that will be right in all circumstances. Indeed, in some circumstances, competition will not be appropriate at all. Who should decide questions of this kind? Our view is that it should be for commissioners to decide whether—and if so, how—to use competition to further patients’ interests. In doing so, commissioners must act transparently and would need to consider the type of service and the needs and preferences of patients who would receive it, and be able to demonstrate the rationale for their decisions.

The noble Lord, Lord Warner, made a helpful intervention on this issue. The NHS Future Forum report stated:

“We have also heard many people saying that competition and integration are opposing forces. We believe this is a false dichotomy. Integrated care is vital, and competition can and should be used by commissioners as a powerful tool to drive this for patients”.

The Government agree. That is why the Bill set out duties for both the board and CCGs on promoting integration when commissioning services. The board, CCGs and health and well-being boards, as well as the regulators, Monitor and the CQC, will have duties to encourage integration and work across health and social care.

These changes should make it easier to deliver higher quality service pathways of patient-centred care. To help support commissioners, health and well-being boards will provide a forum to bring together people from across the health and social care sectors. Furthermore, the Bill gives the boards a specific duty to encourage health and care commissioners to work together to advance the health and well-being of the people in their areas. I might just mention that we have also asked the NHS Future Forum to consider in more detail how we can ensure that our reforms lead to better integrated services, and its conclusions on that topic will be with us shortly.

It is perfectly possible to have responsive, joined-up services working in patients’ interests and competing for their choice. For example, commissioners could decide to run a tender for a whole pathway of integrated services to be delivered by a single provider. This could encourage providers to bring forward innovative, integrated care solutions that deliver greater patient benefits and greater efficiency. Only a few weeks ago, I visited in Oldham an example of exactly that: musculoskeletal services delivered in the community, specialists from a variety of disciplines situated in one building and accessible to patients directly, and with short lines of communication. It is very popular with the clinicians and patients involved, and is achieving great results.

Of course, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, pointed out, the extent to which particular services will benefit from both integration and choice will vary. Diabetes networks provide high-quality services with a high degree of integration but limited choice for patients between providers. I am sorry not to have a contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Young, on this point, but I am sure she would agree. Certain mental health services may be another example of this. For other services, more choice may deliver better outcomes. This is why the provision in the Bill enables services specified in a particular way in the national tariff to be unbundled and paid for separately. That should happen, however, only where this is demonstrably in patients’ best interests. The comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, in support of her Amendment 203A were very helpful in that context.

Monitor would have duties to support commissioners by enabling integration through the exercise of its functions. This reflects the fact that, as I have indicated, the driver for integration within the reformed healthcare system must come from clinical commissioners rather than from the regulator. Having said that, we are clear that, consistent with its duty to enable integration, Monitor will have an important role here. For example, the Commissioning Board would specify services for the purpose of tariff-setting, which may include bundling services together or specifying care pathways. Monitor’s role would be to devise methodologies for pricing those services.

I would not want to go further than that and make it a statutory requirement that the tariff could specify services by reference to clinical pathways, as some amendments in this group imply. That would be overly prescriptive and unnecessary. While tariffs for whole pathways of care may be appropriate in some circumstances—and I have mentioned an example or two of this—that may not always be so. For example, it might be appropriate to give patients choice about which provider provided a particular element of their care along a pathway. If the tariff enabled only a single payment for a whole pathway of care, it could deny patients that choice. Hence, we need to retain flexibility within the tariff and remain focused on outcomes.

My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones spoke with great authority about specialised services. Sir David Nicholson, as chief executive designate of the Commissioning Board, published Developing the NHS Commissioning Board in July, which set out proposals for how the board will operate and how it will be organised. It is envisaged that the initial sub-national structure will reflect the arrangements that have been made for PCTs and SHA clusters. It is envisaged that the field force, as he describes it, will be responsible for commissioning specialised services, providing the flexibility for this to be organised at different levels according to what is most appropriate for that condition. My noble friend was absolutely right to draw attention to the need for integrated pathways of care in specialised services. We believe that we are setting up the structures to deliver just that.

The noble Lord, Lord Warner, helpfully indicated that the tariff should be based on four main principles: integrated care rather than episodes of care; best practice, not average costs; a full range of services; and particularly the need to avoid costs that did not need to be built in and windfall gains. Those factors form the basis for the new tariff structure provided for by the Bill. Provisions will allow currencies based on integrated services and pathways of care by specifying bundles.

Monitor will set the costs based on a fair level of pay for providers. The board will be required to work towards the standardisation of currencies, which will enable the extension of the tariff to a wider range of services. What the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said about tariffs reflecting clinical complexity was absolutely right. We tabled amendments in another place to prevent providers from benefiting from cherry-picking services, including providing for a fair level of pay and a requirement for transparency in patient eligibility and selection criteria.

My noble friend Lady Tyler spoke compellingly about addressing inequalities. The Bill does not lose sight of that. The board’s duty under new Section 13M, to be inserted into the NHS Act under Clause 20, and that of clinical commissioning groups under new Section 14Y to promote integration—

[Baroness Thornton]

I am thinking about Monitor, what it is doing and its role as an economic regulator. Why is it the best body to decide on the price, cost and value of things?

[Earl Howe]

It needs to be a body that is separate from the NHS Commissioning Board. Determining what represents an appropriate price in the system is a very specialised discipline. We think that it will be helpful to have a sector-specific regulator doing that work. I would be happy to write to the noble Baroness setting out our rationale on this, but I make no pretence that this is a complex job. We do not think that it can be done very readily at the local level, although it would not be impossible. We think that local commissioners will need to be supported in this task.

[Baroness Thornton]

Perhaps when the Minister writes to me, he could explain why it is better that economists and regulators dictate those decisions rather than clinicians.

[Earl Howe]

Yes, I will. To address the point that I began just now, the board’s duty to promote integration specifically requires it to exercise its functions to ensure that services are provided in an integrated way where it considers that this would reduce inequality in outcomes. Those words are very important. That is mirrored by Monitor’s duty to enable integration.

I completely understand the intentions behind the amendments in this group. We have had a very helpful debate. We believe that the duties in the Bill, coupled with the wider levers in the system to promote integration, address the points that have been made. In the light of what I have said, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment, although I am sure that this is a theme to which we shall return.

[Lord Warner]

My Lords, this has been a very helpful debate. I do not wish to keep noble Lords from their supper. I just want to log with the noble Lord the thought that, ultimately, if we look at history, changing the tariff has been a long, arduous job. I ask him to think some more about whether we should give a little more of a push to the work of the board in setting currencies than we have so far. Monitor cannot get on with pricing until those currencies are settled. That is the potential blockage in the system. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Health and Social Care Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Cumberlege]

Those words are so warm to my heart, I cannot tell the noble Lord how much. One of the things that really concerns me is delay. I am worried that if we get this outside group it will delay matters, because some of this is very urgent at the moment. What is the relationship between this and the independent review panel—I am not sure what it is called—which deals with hospitals at the moment?

[Earl Howe]

It is the Independent Reconfiguration Panel.

[Baroness Cumberlege]

I am indebted to my noble friend for that. Does the Independent Reconfiguration Panel play a part in this? Is it something different? Do we have to go through that as well, in which case it will take even longer?

[Lord Warner]

Something equivalent to the Independent Reconfiguration Panel was used earlier in the system. It was put in to bat with the local area by Monitor when it saw trouble coming down the railway track in the form of failure. I envisage that a standing group of people would be approved to work in this area, which Monitor would be able to assemble very quickly. My amendment proposes that a timescale is set for this panel to work with local people and to come back with a solution to the problem, but I think that more people than are currently approved for the reconfiguration panel will be needed because of the points made by my noble friend. In many parts of the country we are likely to have to intervene quite quickly because we have spent a lot of time over the past 10 or 20 years putting off decisions about some of these places. A lot of these places will come to Ministers, the national Commissioning Board and Monitor over the next few years, so we will need quite a few different panels.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, this group of amendments usefully focuses us on reconfiguration and the sustainability of NHS services. The sustainability of services will be centre stage for commissioners and providers alike. I should like to set out some key features of the Government’s reforms, which I hope will reassure noble Lords that the system we have put in place will deliver sustainable NHS services. The first key feature is that local clinical commissioners will be responsible for securing continued access to healthcare that meets the needs of local communities in consultation with health and well-being boards. Any proposals for service change will be locally led by clinicians in consultation with patients and the wider community.

The second key feature is that the continuity of services regime requires Monitor to support commissioners to secure continued access to NHS services. Monitor will do this by undertaking an ongoing assessment of risk and intervening to support recovery and to prevent failure where possible. Therefore, the onus is on commissioners and providers to address any problems with the sustainability of NHS services. Only as a last resort where commissioners and providers have failed will Monitor step in to appoint an administrator to take control of the provider in order to secure continued access to NHS services.

The noble Lord, Lord Warner, suggested that there would be nothing between a locally led process leading to an agreed reconfiguration and Monitor triggering the failure regime. That really is not so. It may be helpful to the Committee if I explain. There are various levers available to Monitor before failure is even thought of. First, regulatory interventions are available to Monitor through the licence in order to protect patients’ access to essential services where Monitor considers that a foundation trust is at risk of becoming clinically or financially unsustainable. I agree that there should be a way for the system to respond when, as the noble Lord put it, trouble is seen to be coming down the railway track.

Where it is appropriate, Monitor would be able to direct a provider to appoint turnaround specialists that would provide additional capacity and expertise to support a provider’s management in turning an organisation around. Monitor would also be able to appoint a pre-failure planning team to work with commissioners to develop plans for securing continued access to services in the unlikely event that turnaround was unsuccessful. That process may identify reasons why service reconfiguration would be needed to secure sustainability, but it would remain a commissioner-led process. I hope that I have made it clear that it is appropriate for local clinical commissioners and not Monitor to lead this process with support from the NHS Commissioning Board. The board will be able to support clinical commissioning groups by providing support and advising on the possible effects of larger changes, and Monitor will support commissioners in protecting patients’ access to essential services through the licensing regime.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, suggested that the board should play a leadership role. The Bill allows for that to happen in a number of ways, using commissioning guidance to set expectations on how CCGs should deal with reconfigurations that span CCG boundaries. It would also provide access to advice in the form of senates to help them develop their proposals. Ultimately, where a local authority challenges a proposal, the board will be able to direct the CCGs on their plans, so there is an interest in making sure that those plans are robust to start with.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl for giving way. I understand that, but is not the problem as my noble friend said? If you look back over the past 20 to 30 years, the NHS has found reconfiguration decisions very difficult indeed. The new system potentially has weaker bodies, in the form of the clinical commissioning groups, covering smaller areas, such that taking a bold decision on matters such as closing an accident and emergency department would be very difficult. In one way or another, what is being suggested is some kind of external mechanism that essentially forces the local health economy, both commissioners and providers, to come to terms with the latest knowledge in relation to safety and quality. They would actually have to face up to the challenge.

This happens in a way with the various inspections of the colleges and the deaneries, and we know of a number of hospitals where the viability suddenly goes because of an inspection and they are not approved for training. This has a devastating domino effect on the rest of their services. But surely the time has come for a much more proactive external review of each local health economy area. It would be of assistance to those who wish to move and modernise services because they would be able to turn to the mechanism, whatever it is, and say, “We have to change”. If the Government are simply relying in this legislation on local forces, my fear is that that simply will not happen quickly enough.

[Earl Howe]

I understand the noble Lord’s point; it is one that we have thought carefully about, as he might imagine we would. The trigger for local service reconfiguration is often a joint decision by commissioners and providers that the current configuration of services does not offer the highest quality care or that it does not meet current and modern clinical practice. It is usually a dialogue between commissioners and providers which identifies services as being, in some way, not optimal for patients, and that a reconfiguration is the most appropriate way to improve and modernise services, rather than smaller scale operational change.

We are proposing that commissioners should engage and consult on these changes in the normal way, working closely with providers and engaging with patients, the public and local authorities in developing their proposals. However, I agree that there are clear roles for the board, and for Monitor, in ensuring that this process is given a fair wind. They have an interest in ensuring that services are of high quality and sustainable and they will wish to add value to the process.

We talk as if all reconfigurations were long and drawn out—we all know of some that are like that—but the successful reconfigurations tend to be those that have involved more, rather than fewer, local stakeholders. That is why we are strengthening the powers provided by the Bill, so that reconfigurations can take place in a genuine spirit of local engagement and partnership.

[Lord Beecham]

What does the Minister mean by local consultation and local considerations? One can envisage a situation when hospitals serve just a particular locality. However, in many areas, there are trusts and hospitals serving a much wider community—a sub-regional or perhaps even a regional community—and who then is to lead the process? Who then is to take the decision? There could be several commissioning groups involved, looking at the facilities in question, rather than just the one or two in a particular town or county.

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. In that kind of situation the process would inevitably become more complex. I do not know whether the noble Lord noted the comments of Dr Jennifer Dixon of the Nuffield Trust when she gave evidence to the Commons committee, but she said:

“If you look at some of the more successful attempts at reconfiguration, more involvement of local groups was necessary in order to get change. Some of the unsuccessful ones have been those where they have communicated less and involved fewer people”.

So paradoxically, she said, having more local organisations involved,

“could have the opposite effect”.

I think that that was a very perceptive comment. We think that the Bill should strengthen and encourage these relationships, either within a local area, or within a larger one, where services are commissioned over a larger area, as very often they will be, and you will get a broader dialogue taking place. The main object for all of us is to ensure that the mechanisms for this kind of partnership-working and local engagement are in place.

I take the point of the noble Lord, Lord Warner, about the length of time that some reconfigurations have taken in the past. We are very conscious of that. Under our plans, local authority scrutiny functions will be required to publish a timescale for when they will make a decision on whether to refer proposals for substantial service reconfiguration. We intend to change the existing regulations so that, where scrutiny functions are delegated to joint committees of two or more councils, councils could not step in and exercise those functions. This should prevent proposals which have taken time to develop and agree through a joint overview and scrutiny committee from falling apart at the end of the process by one local authority choosing to refer.

I understand the noble Lord’s concerns and will of course reflect on his proposal. However, I think that we are creating what could be an effective framework that would allow commissioners and providers to work together to reconfigure services where that is needed to protect patients’ interests. To support that, the Bill sets out a commissioner-led framework. We think that it is right for patients that it should be framed in that way. With the prospect of continuing dialogue on this subject, which I think will rear its head on more than one occasion as we go through these Committee proceedings, I hope that the noble Lord will feel content for now to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Warner]

My Lords, this has been a useful piece of—if I may put it this way—foreplay on this subject before we get down to real business. I want to say a couple of things to the Minister as he goes into reflective mode.

We tried turnaround teams with individual trusts in 2005-06 in the aftermath of financial failure. The trouble was that they tried to solve the problems of a particular hospital within that hospital and not within the health economy. I listened carefully to a lot of what the Minister said. Many long-standing problem trusts cannot solve their problems. You can keep coshing them into insensibility, but they cannot solve them on their own. They need to be solved within a much wider context. I would pray in aid north London, which in my judgment has something like three district general hospitals too many for the income that is likely to be available. Those hospitals cannot be saved on their own. There is a massive reconfiguration exercise to be done in a wider health economy. I give turnaround teams three out of 10; we need something better than that.

I wish the Minister and the Government well in trying to tackle this subject. It may be that all Governments have to go through the difficult process of learning by disaster, which is what may happen here. We are dealing with a deep cultural problem in the NHS. It believes that, somewhere along the line, a cheque will come through the post to bail it out at the local level. Unless that culture is changed dramatically, I do not believe that the Minister’s well intentioned approach is likely to deliver the change that we need.

I, too, shall reflect, but I think that we shall come back to this matter and look for something which may not be as draconian as my noble friend would be satisfied with but which moves in the same direction if we are to see the changes that the NHS needs made in the timescale that is needed. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Health: Early Diagnosis

Earl Howe Excerpts

Monday 21st November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what provision there will be for national early diagnosis campaigns for serious diseases following the enactment of the Health and Social Care Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)]

My Lords, both Public Health England and the NHS Commissioning Board, subject to the passage of the Bill, will have a clear interest in ensuring that early diagnosis supports improved outcomes in line with the NHS outcomes framework, the public health outcomes framework and the Secretary of State’s mandate. The Government, as set out in Healthy Lives, Healthy People: Update and Way Forward, continue to reflect on where commissioning responsibility for early diagnosis campaigns should rest.

[Lord Sharkey]

The Minister will know that there have been recent and very welcome significant advances in the early diagnosis of bowel and oesophagal cancers, but not in lung cancer, which is the most common cause of cancer deaths in men and women. Cancer Research UK points out that early diagnosis would make a significant difference to the current 5 per cent 10-year survival rate. Given that, can the Minister tell the House how much money will be spent on lung cancer early diagnosis campaigns in this financial year and how much is planned for next year?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, we have provided funding for a number of local lung cancer awareness campaigns. On 10 October, we launched a five-week regional lung cancer awareness campaign in the Midlands, using TV, radio, press and face-to-face events. All those campaigns are aimed at improving public awareness of the signs and symptoms of lung cancer and to encourage people to visit their GP when they have symptoms. An evaluation of the impact of those campaigns is now taking place. I do not have the figure in front of me of the cost of those specific campaigns, but I shall let my noble friend know.

[Lord Walton of Detchant]

Does the Minister accept that, with recent advances in molecular biology and genomic diagnosis, many previously untreatable rare diseases have been identified, and that early diagnosis is crucial in order to introduce the newly available treatments for those conditions? Is he satisfied that the national Commissioning Board, with its outreach into the subnational senates, will have the facilities available to manage these rare diseases appropriately?

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the noble Lord makes an extremely good point. The answer to his question is, yes, I believe that it will have the capacity to do that. He rightly mentions advances in genomic science, which of course will have a major part to play in the field of diagnostics. As regards rarer diseases, as he will know, we are placing responsibility with the national Commissioning Board for the commissioning of specialised services for rarer conditions.

[Lord Collins of Highbury]

My Lords, as the Minister is aware, the reduction of 10 per cent in weight maintained over a period can reduce the risk of developing type 2 diabetes by 50 per cent. Small improvements in eating and drinking are needed. Will the Minister accept that the country needs a major awareness programme, led by the Government, on what to do to avoid developing type 2 diabetes; and, under the new legislation, will he continue to use his powers?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the Government have no current plans for a specific national campaign to raise awareness of diabetes. On the other hand, as part of Change4Life, which we are continuing with, we aim to raise awareness about diet and physical activity, and to create what we hope will be a mass movement to help to reduce obesity and related conditions, including diabetes. The campaign encourages everyone to,

“eat well, move more and live longer”.

There is also the very important ingredient of the NHS Health Check in this area, which the noble Lord is familiar with, for people in England aged 40 to 74. We think that this has the potential to prevent over 4,000 people a year from developing diabetes.

[Baroness Gardner of Parkes]

My Lords, I am sure that the noble Earl is well aware that not only lung cancer but all forms of cancer benefit hugely from early diagnosis. Will he ensure that one existing problem is dealt with, perhaps through further encouragement of medical education? In the very rare cases of osteosarcoma, and to a certain extent oral cancer, GPs are not really aware; cases are referred to them and are missed. Surely this must be a matter of further training in the specialities of these rare conditions.

[Earl Howe]

My noble friend is absolutely right. It is widely recognised that GPs have very important roles in prevention and early diagnosis of cancer of all kinds but that, until recently, there has been very little information available to enable GPs to benchmark their own activity and performance against that of other practices. We have launched what we are calling GP practice profiles, which will bring together a range of outcomes and process information relevant to cancer in primary care, so that GPs have comparative information available to benchmark their own performance. I think this will be a major plus in taking these variations forward.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, the responsibility for paediatric care for children aged five to 19 is moving from health—where it is to remain for the under-fives—to local authorities, and public health will be responsible for many of these campaigns for early diagnosis. In view of this, how will the Government ensure that there is joined-up information and data collection between public health, the local authority, and the point at which diagnosis of complex conditions is made, which is usually in general practice and paediatric departments, and therefore in health?

[Earl Howe]

The noble Baroness draws attention to an issue which we have been debating in various forms under this Bill, which is how we join up services and make the whole system hang together in the way that we all wish to see. The short answer to her question is that, at local authority level, the health and well-being boards will be responsible for co-ordinating that kind of information. However, we will also want to make sure that this takes place at a national level too. The outcomes data that we get from secondary care providers will in time, I am confident, produce information that will feed into public health campaigns.

[Lord Hughes of Woodside]

My Lords, I welcome the emphasis on and campaigns for early diagnosis, but will the Minister recognise that equally important is early treatment, and therefore not abandon targets for ensuring that people get early intervention of the highest quality?

[Earl Howe]

Yes, my Lords, we recognise fully that waiting times are important, and in particular diagnostic waiting times. I am certain that the noble Lord will be reassured to know that waiting times in both respects remain low, and we intend that they should remain that way.

Health Research Authority (Establishment and Constitution) Order 2011

Earl Howe Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2011 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Turnberg, for his positive comments on the creation of the HRA as a special health authority and welcome the opportunity of this debate to clarify the role of the authority on its establishment on 1 December. As I said last week when we discussed amendments to the Health and Social Care Bill, the Government have signalled their clear and strong support for research by increasing the research budget of the Department of Health in real terms over the current spending review period. I fully recognise the importance of ensuring that research is promoted within the health service. High quality health research is critical to the ability of the NHS to deliver world-class health outcomes, an end towards which we are all striving.

I think that noble Lords will agree that regulation of research is excessively complex. Both this and inconsistent local practices need to be addressed. As the Academy of Medical Sciences’s report set out, it is still far too difficult for researchers to navigate the complex national and local processes for research approvals. The Plan for Growth, which was published alongside the Budget 2011, announced the Government’s proposals. At the national level, we said that we would create a Health Research Authority to combine and streamline the approvals for health research, which are scattered across many organisations. At a local level, we said that we would transform the incentives for efficiency in research initiation and delivery. These two components are critical and we are already tackling the complex local processes for research approvals. Through the Health and Social Care Bill and the efforts of my department and the National Institute for Health Research, we are seeking to embed a positive and proactive research culture across the depth and breadth of the NHS. The noble Lord, Lord Turnberg, asked me what we are going to do about delays at trust level, and that question was echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay.

We have developed a co-ordinated system for gaining NHS permission for research that is supported by the National Institute for Health Research. It aims to standardise the checks that lead to trust approval, and centralise those that do not have to be carried out locally. In May we fulfilled our commitment to launch a framework of good practice and standard procedures to facilitate consistent local research management and greatly improve performance.

NHS trusts which adopt these standards will stop unnecessary duplication of checks, a local barrier to getting a research project off the ground that has frustrated researchers for many years. For clinical trials the National Institute for Health Research will publish outcomes against public benchmarks, including—and I address this particularly to my noble friend Lord Willis—an initial 70-day benchmark to recruit the first patient to a trial. Future NIHR funding will be conditional on meeting benchmarks.

I turn back to national-level commitments. The instruments not only fulfil our commitment to establish the Health Research Authority as a special health authority this year; alongside the directions we are giving it, they also ensure that the Health Research Authority will have substantive functions from the outset.

First, the HRA will unify the existing functions of the National Research Ethics Service from the National Patient Safety Agency and strategic health authorities. This will provide continuity and a stable platform for the National Research Ethics Service to build on the achievements it has already made. For example, a major obstacle to conducting research has been the completion of the numerous forms required to gain research approvals and permissions. The Health Research Authority will continue to run the integrated research application system developed by the National Research Ethics Service. It is an online one-stop shop that lets researchers apply for all the research approvals they need, not just to ethics committees but to NHS trusts and other health research approval bodies.

Secondly, in addition to ethical approvals, and from the outset, the HRA will have duties to co-operate with other bodies to improve the whole system: to create a unified research approval process and to promote consistent standards for compliance and inspection. This means it will promote alignment across the whole system, working closely with other bodies, such as other regulators. For example, it will work with the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency on operating a co-ordinated national approval process for research involving medicines or medical devices. It will also work with the National Institute for Health Research on promoting proportionate action to demonstrate compliance with standards that are consistent on both the regulatory and provider sides. Therefore, it will support the work of the National Institute for Health Research to promote improvements in local NHS approval processes.

Thirdly, and most importantly, from the outset the HRA’s role will be to protect and promote the interests of patients and the public. It is crucial that members of the public participating in research are—and feel—safe. The HRA will protect patients from unethical research, and enable patients to benefit from opportunities to participate in research by facilitating research which conforms to ethical standards and the law. Its role in combining and streamlining health research approvals, alongside the work of the National Institute for Health Research with NHS trusts, will improve the timeliness of decisions about research projects. This will increase opportunities for our patients to benefit from research.

The noble Lord, Lord Turnberg, asked about the ethics and confidentiality committee function within the National Information Governance Board for Health and Social Care. The NIGB is an independent statutory body established to improve and monitor information and governance in health and adult social care. It provides advice to the Secretary of State on the appropriate use, sharing and protection of patient and service user information. In particular, it has set up a committee—the ethics and confidentiality committee—for advice on the processing of patient information, including confidential patient information, under the Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002. Confidential patient information may be processed under those regulations only where the processing has been approved by the Secretary of State and, in the case of medical research, also by a research ethics committee. It is intended that the HRA will take on the Secretary of State’s role in approving the processing of such information for medical research as part of its role in combining and streamlining approvals for health research. The establishment of the HRA will help to ensure that the application and review processes are streamlined and, as I have said, follow consistent standards.

My noble friend Lord Willis asked me to summarise the functions of the HRA as a special health authority. I have already mentioned that it will assume the NRES functions from the NPSA as well as strategic health authorities’ functions as the appointing authorities for research ethics committees. In due course, it will perform the Secretary of State’s function of approving the processing of patient information for medical research. My noble friend mentioned the reference to directions in the order. Principally, those directions will relate to the need for the HRA to co-operate in the exercise of its functions with the regulatory bodies that I have referred to and with others.

My noble friend asked whether the Government have any intention to transfer HFEA or HDA functions into the special health authority. The answer is no, because we cannot. As a special health authority, the Health Research Authority is generally restricted to exercising the Secretary of State’s functions relating to the health service in England. Establishing it as an NDPB in due course will enable functions to be conferred on it which are not specific to the health service in England, including giving it functions which go beyond health, including functions relating to social care. The Academy of Medical Sciences’s report proposed that the research-related functions of the HFEA should reside with the Health Research Authority. We will be consulting on the future of the HFEA and on our preferred option that the research-related functions of the HFEA should pass to the HRA. Establishing the HRA as an NDPB will enable it in due course to take on functions relating to embryo research which are not health service functions in England.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked me about indemnity for research and the possibility of an all-England risk pool. Trusts are members of the NHS clinical negligence scheme, which indemnifies them in respect of negligence for which they have assumed vicarious liability, whether the negligent activity was standard care or research.

The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, asked about other functions of the NPSA and, in particular, the National Reporting and Learning Service and the National Clinical Assessment Service. I will write to her on that, but I can tell her that most of the NPSA’s functions are expected to transfer to the NHS Commissioning Board after Royal Assent. Patient safety will of course be at the heart of the new system. Responsibility for national confidential patient inquiries has already moved to the Healthcare Quality Improvement Partnership, which manages the national clinical audit programme.

The noble Baroness also asked me about the cost of the Health Research Authority. The funding will follow the functions. The Health Research Authority will continue the reform of the National Research Ethics Service releasing efficiency savings, we trust, for developing the authority’s other functions.

Looking forward, it is important to ensure that we maintain momentum and build on the advances that the Health Research Authority will be able to take forward as a special health authority. It is our intention to publish draft clauses on the Health Research Authority for pre-legislative scrutiny in the second Session. Future legislation will allow us to establish the Health Research Authority as a stable and independent non-departmental public body. The current regulatory framework for health research involves many overlapping acts and instruments, so there is much work to be done to ensure that we develop legislation that is fit for purpose.

Research has been a core function of the National Health Service since its foundation. It is key to the future of health and healthcare in the UK. The creation of the Health Research Authority as a special health authority is, I believe, an important step on the road to removing unnecessary bureaucracy that could stifle research in this country.

I am most grateful for the support of noble Lords. We will no doubt be returning to these issues when debating amendments tabled to the Health and Social Care Bill. In the mean time, I recognise the value of these exchanges and thank all who have contributed so fully to this debate.

[Lord Turnberg]

My Lords, the noble Earl said that in future the NIHR will require trusts to have a 70-day limit on the time in which it can consider requests. Does that also reflect on non-NIHR-funded research from other organisations or is it only NIHR research?

[Earl Howe]

The NIHR has an obvious lever available to it, which is the funding that it provides. Clearly, if research is going on that is not NIHR-funded, that lever does not present itself.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

Before the noble Earl concludes his response to that question, I should like to raise the matter of “any qualified provider”, how the all-England risk pool might relate to that, and whether there will be a research obligation and a research link in relation to the broad range of people who will provide services under the “any qualified provider” remit. It would be both their indemnity and how much they would be part of this process.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the precise arrangements for the CSND are being worked through at the moment. I will write to the noble Baroness on that. As I have described, the incentive relates directly to the NIHR funding but the benchmark is measured against other research and all studies that are going on. There is a wider dimension to this.

[Lord Turnberg]

I should apologise to the noble Earl for burdening his day off from the health Bill during several weeks of hard work. I thank him for his detailed response and will reflect carefully on what he has said. Today’s debate will be useful when we debate this issue in the health Bill proper on the Floor of the House. I hope that it will reduce the amount of time that we discuss the Bill, although I cannot promise that. We will wait and see.

Health: Cancer Drugs Fund

Earl Howe Excerpts

Monday 14th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Morgan of Drefelin]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the effectiveness of the cancer drug fund.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)]

My Lords, since October 2010, more than 7,500 patients in England have benefited from the additional funding we have provided for cancer drugs. The £600 million we have committed over three years will improve the lives of many thousands more cancer sufferers, giving them precious extra time with their loved ones.

[Baroness Morgan of Drefelin]

My Lords, I remind the House of my interest as chief executive of a cancer research charity. Can the Minister share with the House thoughts on plans for the fund, following the abolition of strategic health authorities which are currently responsible for administering the fund? Will he share with us any thoughts the department has about emerging patterns of variation in access to the fund? I appreciate that it is a new fund and that patterns are difficult to see in a field where there are small numbers. I would, however, be interested to know what steps the department is taking to issue further advice on that question.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness for her work in this area. She asked what would happen when strategic health authorities are abolished. Arrangements from 1 April 2013, which is the planned abolition date, and beyond will be the subject of discussions between my department and the NHS Commissioning Board Authority. So I cannot give her definite news yet on that front.

I know that the regional clinical panels are using their own judgment to come to decisions, and it is entirely right that they should. At the same time, they are alive to apparent variations in the drugs that are being made available through the fund in different regions, and I understand that the SHA clinical panels are working collectively now to better understand the reasons for those differences.

[Lord Clement-Jones]

My Lords, I welcome the fact that thousands of cancer patients have benefited from the cancer drugs fund, but can the Minister give an assurance that those cancer treatments currently available through the fund will continue to be available when value-based pricing is introduced in 2014?

[Earl Howe]

One of our aims for value-based pricing is to give patients better access to innovative and clinically effective drugs, which, unfortunately, has not always been the case until now, hence the need for the cancer drugs fund. That is certainly one of our ambitions for value-based pricing.

[Baroness Pitkeathley]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that one of the problems with this very welcome fund is that still too few patients know about it? Is his department planning any information campaign to ensure that patients know more about it so that they can ask for access to the fund themselves, particularly in view of the more complex structure that they will face in the NHS when the Bill currently before the House is law?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the noble Baroness makes a good point. We endeavoured to publicise the fund in April when it was created. We have reminded the health service to make the fund’s existence known wherever possible. The specific answer to her question is no, we do not plan a publicity campaign. However, we wish to ensure that clinicians in the service are as fully aware of the fund as they should be. I believe that they are, certainly at the level of secondary care.

[Baroness Gardner of Parkes]

My Lords, I have read in the paper that some very expensive cancer drugs will now be approved by NICE on the understanding that DNA testing will assess whether the patient will benefit from them. This was one of the arguments to do with giving terribly expensive drugs. Will these drugs also now be available from the same source after 2013?

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

We plan to ensure that value-based pricing will take care of the gap that currently exists in the availability of cancer drugs, which the cancer drugs fund is trying to address. In theory, until then any drug that a clinician wishes to prescribe for a cancer patient is available under the cancer drugs fund. There is no restriction that we have set; it is a clinical judgment.

[Lord Roberts of Llandudno]

My Lords, many patients from north Wales go to Christie’s Hospital in Manchester or Clatterbridge on Merseyside. How will this fund be available to them? How does Wales come out of the complexity of this situation?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, it is of course for the devolved Administrations to make their own decisions about their individual needs and budgets. It will depend on whether commissioners in Wales are willing to accept the cost of treating a patient with a drug that is not normally available in Wales. I cannot generalise but it is up to Welsh commissioners to take that decision.

[Baroness Howarth of Breckland]

My Lords, I am aware that 2013 is approaching very fast. Does the Minister’s department have a timetable for the strategy that will be in place once the strategic health authorities have gone? Will there be consultation on those plans?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, as I told the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, discussions are ongoing as to the arrangements that will be in place after the abolition of strategic health authorities. I cannot say that we have definite plans in place but I hope that we will be able to announce our plans soon.

[Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton]

My Lords, cancer treatment drugs are often used in a range of measures to treat people suffering from cancer, including both chemotherapy and radiotherapy. Is it not the case that concern is being expressed about the closure of access to radiotherapy in some hospitals, and that people are having to travel for up to three hours? I understand that this is a problem in Essex and other parts of the country. Does the Minister share the concern about people not being able to get the treatment they need if these centres close? Who is responsible now, and who would be responsible in the future under the Government’s proposals, for ensuring that reasonable access is maintained?

[Earl Howe]

We are concerned to ensure that patients have reasonable access to the treatments that they need, including radiotherapy. I can tell the noble Baroness that part of the additional funding that we are making available under the strategy for cancer that we published earlier this year will go towards widening access to radiotherapy—not only better utilising the facilities that we have but commissioning new facilities. However, I am afraid it is the case that we increasingly see specialised units being concentrated in fewer locations. Unfortunately, this will mean that some patients have to travel a little further than they otherwise would have.

Health and Social Care Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts

Monday 14th November 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Earl Howe]

That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Masham of Ilton]

My Lords, how could one not accept this amendment?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I begin by saying that I completely understand the seriousness of the issues raised by the noble Lords, Lord Patel of Bradford and Lord Noon, and others noble Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Patel of Bradford, suggested that part of his purpose was to ensure that this issue remained on the government agenda. Let me assure him that the issue is very firmly on the Government’s agenda, and I am pleased that we are having this debate today so that I can outline exactly what we are doing.

Before I turn to address the amendment, I think it would be helpful if I briefly laid out the Government’s view of the role of the voluntary sector in the NHS. We firmly believe that voluntary sector organisations have a strong and often crucial role to play, due to the experience, expertise and insights that they can offer to commissioners and the system more widely. I of course acknowledge and pay tribute to the valuable work performed by Sue Ryder and numerous other charities, including most especially hospices. We recognise that they can play a vital role in delivering innovative, high-quality user-focused services in their local communities, along with improved outcomes for patients and increased value for taxpayers. We also acknowledge, as Amendment 46 highlights, that taxation treatment is one potential barrier to voluntary sector organisations’ entry into the provision of NHS services and to their increased involvement in those services. Access to capital is another. We are very keen to explore ways to overcome these challenges. The department is discussing this, as part of a wide range of issues, with voluntary sector providers of NHS-funded services.

When I was preparing for this debate, I asked whether the Treasury was looking at these issues, and the answer is that it is. I understand that Treasury officials are already working with representatives from the voluntary sector to explore the value added tax treatment of charities supplying the NHS, taking into account the legal limitations and the potential complexities around possible solutions. We are keen that they should make speed over this. However, the introduction of an artificial one-year timetable, as this amendment proposes, would limit the scope for a full and thorough discussion and consideration of this issue. I cannot commit to that limitation. However, I emphasise that we are very keen to work at possible solutions as fast as we can. It is a complex issue. My noble friend Lady Barker pointed us towards some of those complexities.

It is worth my repeating a general point here. The Government are committed to fair competition that delivers better outcomes and greater choice for patients and better value for the taxpayer. We want to see providers from all sectors delivering healthcare services. We have not the least wish to favour one type of provider over another. Indeed, as a result, and to ensure that the Secretary of State, Monitor and the Commissioning Board do not confer preferential treatment on any type or sector of provider, the Government have introduced amendments to Clauses 144, 59 and 20, inserting a new section, Section 130, into the National Health Service Act 2006.

We know very well that the voluntary sector plays a strong role in bringing the voices and experience of patients, service users and carers to the work of improving services, often reaching individuals who are excluded or who cannot access mainstream services. The voluntary sector brings advocacy and information to support individuals to exercise choice and control over the services that they access. These are major prizes, and we wish to capitalise on them. Opening up services to greater choice, for example, through “any qualified provider”—as was pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay—allows for greater involvement by social enterprises or voluntary sector organisations. To a great extent, this is already happening.

Listening to noble Lords, I felt that there was a great deal of consensus around those points. There is a shared feeling across the House that charities have a key part to play in NHS provision, that the current VAT rules can act as a barrier and that this needs to be looked at very closely and urgently. I completely agree with that, and I would like to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Patel of Bradford, that we will ensure that this taxation issue continues to be considered urgently, as we develop work on a fairer playing field for delivering NHS services. In establishing Monitor’s new functions, the department and Monitor will continue to consider these issues and the priorities to be addressed.

The noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, asked in particular what comfort there is in this Bill for the voluntary sector. She quite rightly mentioned the Future Forum in highlighting the work of the sector. The noble Baroness will be aware that the forum gave a very strong endorsement to the Bill’s creation of a bespoke provider regulator, Monitor, in order to oversee a level playing field. Such a commitment to a fair market was and remains a comfort to the voluntary sector. Of course, we acknowledge that more needs to be done, and that includes the ongoing work at the Treasury.

With those remarks, although I am sure that I have not completely satisfied the noble Lord, Lord Patel of Bradford, I hope that I have given noble Lords the sense that we are onside with this issue and shall be pursuing it with as much urgency as we can. I therefore hope that I have done enough to persuade the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Patel of Bradford]

My Lords, I have listened carefully and with great interest to the many excellent contributions on this proposed amendment. I am grateful to the Minister for giving a very considered and what I believe to be a very sincere response by recognising the issues. Noble Lords have spoken eloquently about many of the issues: the huge numbers of services and people involved—it is absolutely the big society in action. Yet they also clearly talked about what goes to the heart of this Bill: the barriers that are there to stop the provision of equal services. My “unpopular” noble friend Lord Warner clearly outlined those barriers and I will not repeat them.

We have heard from my noble friends about the importance of the voluntary sector. The Minister clearly repeated the importance of the role of the charitable and voluntary sectors, and the fact that they work with some of the most vulnerable people in our society. I completely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about the complexity of the situation. She raised the important issue of social enterprises and the potential exemptions and disbenefits there as well.

We are not asking to make a single-line solution to the problem; we are asking for clarity and transparency. This Government have clearly talked about transparency throughout, and it is so important for us to have that information. I listened to what the noble Earl said about them still discussing how the Treasury will go ahead and that they are in the process of taking urgent actions, but those urgent issues have been there for a long time. I suppose that I go back to the issue of my day job, when I am working with service users and local communities. When working with people with mental health problems and drug issues, nobody disagrees with me. Everybody says, “Yep—this is really important and urgent. We have got to look at it and we will. We will talk and we will make sure users are on the panel”, but we are still talking about it 20 years on. We need a document or something that focuses the mind. That is why the amendment seeks to ask the Secretary of State to give us the data.

I do not think that a year is problematic. I think it should be six months. Why do we not have these data? The whole premise of lots of the services we provide is that we need high-quality data to tell us what is missing and what is wrong. I am hoping that a report will be presented to give Members of the House an opportunity to reflect on that data and to look at what is going wrong, and where, because the big danger is that there will be a discussion between the charity sector and the Treasury, and that the Treasury will say, “This is what we can and cannot do—accept it”. It is important that the House and others outside look at the data and the transparency within that and make an informed decision. I will not keep the Committee much longer. It is such an important issue and, as I genuinely think that we should have a report presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State, I therefore wish to test the opinion of the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, at the risk of stating the obvious, the massive reorganisation of the NHS proposed in the Bill, combined with the need to make £20 billion of efficiency savings, without doubt, and with common agreement across many of the professions, threatens the quality and delivery of medical training, post-graduate training and workforce planning. That is why noble Lords have been exercised about this matter from the outset.

The concern is that responsibility for medical training will be given to healthcare providers who, as I understand it, have a history of allowing service and research to dominate the agenda at the expense of education. That brings with it risks of its own. Many trusts, as other noble Lords have said, have persistently failed to support education supervisors by recognising this activity in job plans and increasingly failed to support their staff in fulfilling important national roles related to standards setting and training. I think that most noble Lords who have spoken would agree that there is an insufficient mention of the safeguards that need to be put in place to protect the quality of medical training.

The noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, and my noble friend Lord Turnberg mentioned their concern about post-graduate deaneries. Indeed, that was a major stream of work for the Future Forum. I would like to say to the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, that as he made his remarks about the Future Forum I wrote in my notes that I do not understand why the Department of Health seems to have franchised that particular piece of policy-making out to the Future Forum. I think that the Future Forum was right in what it said about the dangers and risks involved in abolishing the strategic health authorities and its recommendation that it was mandatory and critical that alternative arrangements should be made.

We know that post-graduate deaneries are currently pivotal in quality-managing the delivery of medical training in trusts, but the planned replacements, being answerable to and funded by healthcare provider units, may lack the impartiality required to drive the quality agenda at a time when it is most needed because of the fiscal pressures and the associated threat to education quality. We all agree that effective management of the complexities of post-graduate medical training require professional leadership skills and experience, which take many years to develop. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, underlined that point in her remarks. My noble friend Lord Warner put his finger immediately on the crucial aspect—how will the money be safeguarded and how will we make sure that the funding that is necessary is in the right place, is accountable in the right place, and cannot be directed into places that we would not wish it to be? How will the Government make sure that that is what happens?

I was very struck by the briefing on this matter by the Royal College of Nursing. The noble Baroness, Lady Emerton, referred to this. The Royal College of Nursing expressed its concern that Medical Education England would dominate the new organisation, HEE. I think we would all agree with the RCN that:

“It is essential that nurse educators are treated as equals and the membership of HEE is representative and not led by the medical deaneries”.

The Royal College of Nursing also believes that there is an essential role for national planning in the delivery of these important functions. I think that there are great risks in the decentralisation of education and training in terms of quality, standards and safeguards. It is unclear how the skill networks or the LETBs will be held accountable for performance issues. It is not clear what authority Health Education England will have to enforce performance issues or how its overseeing of the skills network will take place.

There are some key questions for the Minister to address. The crucial one, which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Owen, who used the expression “chasm in continuity”, is how long we will have to wait for legislation. We cannot be sure that the primary legislation that will be required in this area is going to come down the track in the next year. The Minister needs to recognise that it is too risky to leave this to chance and we have to put the appropriate duties and powers in the Bill to ensure the continuity that the noble Lord, Lord Owen, mentioned. On these Benches, we are very happy to discuss how to resolve that particular issue and how to ensure that medical education is safeguarded.

This is an important group of amendments. I am slightly worried by the statement of the noble Lord, Lord Ribeiro, that this is work in progress. The problem is that there is too much work in progress and there will be too much work in progress for the next few years. This is an area where we cannot take chances. We know from previous reorganisations, for which my Administration were responsible, that we have to be absolutely sure that we are safeguarding the education and training of future generations of workers in the National Health Service.

The most reverend Primate said that continuity and certainty are vital. I agree with him. Certainty in this area is vital. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s views, but I suspect that we have not heard the last of this subject.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the Government are clear that the education, training and continuing development of the healthcare workforce are fundamental in supporting the delivery of excellent healthcare services across the NHS. I am very pleased that so many noble Lords here today share that view. It is certainly the Government’s view. I very much welcome what have been excellent comments on this subject.

Amendment 47A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, seeks to insert a new clause placing a duty on the Secretary of State to establish a body called Health Education England. Similarly, Amendment 47B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, seeks to place a duty on the Secretary of State to “provide or secure” an education and training system and to establish Health Education England to take responsibility for these education and training functions. Amendment 47B also specifies that the budget for education and training should be calculated on the basis of total health service expenditure and,

“should be no less than the level of expenditure on education and training at the time of Royal Assent”.

The Government recognise the importance of having an effective education and training system for the healthcare workforce. The NHS invests approximately £4.9 billion centrally in the education and training of health professionals. It is vital that there is a robust system in place to manage this investment wisely, with clear lines of accountability to Parliament. I would point out to the most reverend Primate that that is exactly why we tabled Amendment 43 which, as the Committee will recall, we debated in our first session. The Committee has already approved that amendment, which is now in the Bill and which says that there is a duty on the Secretary of State to exercise his,

“functions … so as to secure … an effective”,

education and training system. It is perhaps worth my flagging up that that amendment has received a positive response from the British Medical Association, which, in the current circumstances, is a rather remarkable fact. I reiterate that it is designed to ensure that the healthcare workforce has the right skills, behaviours and training to deliver a world-class health service. But we want to put flesh on the bones here. We recognise the need to do that and I therefore undertake that we will publish detailed proposals for the education and training system ahead of the Bill’s Report stage where we will describe how this duty will be enacted in practice. However, there are parts of our plans that I can set out now.

It is vital that we ensure a carefully managed transition into the new system and protect staff and students currently undertaking training. We are taking a number of actions in developing the new system to achieve this that I would like to highlight. The Future Forum recommended that the establishment of Health Education England should be expedited to provide leadership and stability in the system. We agree and it is heartening to see that many noble Lords support this course of action. We have appointed a senior responsible officer to drive this forward and inject pace into the design and development of Health Education England.

To respond to the noble Lord, Lord Owen, while I do not share in any way his analysis of the future prospects of the next health Bill, he was right on one matter: we plan to establish Health Education England as a special health authority in 2012. This will enable it to take on some of its functions from October 2012 and be ready to be fully operational from April 2013. There is not and there will not be the chasm that the noble Lord referred to. Noble Lords will have a chance to scrutinise the establishment order and regulations to set up Health Education England as a special health authority when they are laid before Parliament in early summer 2012. Lest there is any doubt on the matter, I reassure the Committee that it is our intention that Health Education England should form excellent partnerships with a full range of bodies involved in the planning, commissioning, provision and quality assurance of education and training.

However, I can say in particular to the noble Lords, Lord Warner and Lord Kakkar, that Health Education England will provide national leadership for education and training, overseeing workforce planning and the commissioning and delivery of education and training across the system. We have been clear about its accountability to the Secretary of State to ensure that, at national level, there are sufficient health professionals with the right skills, education and training to meet future healthcare needs. Providers of NHS services will be expected to meet the obligations set out in the NHS constitution, including the right of recipients of NHS healthcare to be treated with a professional standard of care by appropriately qualified and experienced staff. Health Education England will hold responsibility for the management of the NHS multi-professional education and training budget, or MPET. To ensure that this budget is sufficient to support the development of the future NHS workforce, equipped with the right skills, our intention is to base the size of this budget on the needs of the service, supported by robust analysis of local workforce and education and training plans.

The question of postgraduate deaneries was raised in particular by the noble Lord, Lord Turnberg. The SHAs will continue to be accountable for postgraduate deaneries until 31 March 2013. Securing continuity for the work of the deaneries will be a key part of a safe transition. It is expected that deans and many of their staff will continue to take forward the work of deaneries with an emphasis on a new, multi-professional approach in the new system architecture.

To pick up one point made by the noble Lords, Lord Kakkar and Lord Turnberg, we also want to see stronger partnership working between postgraduate deaneries and universities. Further work is under way on the detail of these arrangements, with the right accountabilities for the quality of education and training lying with Health Education England and the professional regulators.

I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, about ring-fenced funding. As he knows, the MPET budget currently funds the education and training of the healthcare workforce and it is the responsibility of SHAs to invest the budget appropriately. We have proposed transparent systems to ensure that organisations receiving MPET funding under the future arrangements are held to account for using it for the education and training of the workforce.

The noble Lord also asked whether there will be a requirement to engage fully with academics. I partly covered that point but I emphasise that the new system presents a golden opportunity to build stronger links between the NHS and the academic health sector and to strengthen the educational foundation for research and innovation. Health Education England will ensure that research capability and capacity is maintained and it will forge strong partnerships with academia. Health Education England will work with the royal colleges, the Academy of Medical Sciences, regulators, universities and service providers to ensure that the needs of healthcare delivery are reflected in developing curricula in the context of the statutory responsibility of regulators.

The noble Lord, Lord Turnberg, asked me about standards. I reassure him that standard-setting will be the role of Health Education England at a national level, and this is in addition to the important role that the professional regulators play in this area.

However, despite the progress that we have made, a lot more work has to be done to get these important arrangements right. In my view, that is why it is important that we do not try to amend the Bill in a way that later turns out not to be appropriate. The Future Forum is now leading a second phase of engagement on education and training, focusing particularly on the need for greater flexibility in training, variation in standards and quality, and the need for stronger partnership working between education, academia and service providers. I take this opportunity to mention that tomorrow I am hosting a seminar with Professor Steve Field, chair of the forum, and I welcome your Lordships’ involvement.

I appreciate that the service is waiting for detailed plans for the education and training system to be finalised and published, and I have two promises that I can make on this. The first is the one to which I have already alluded. Once the Future Forum has concluded its work, and prior to Report, the Government will publish more detail on the changes to the workforce planning, education and training system. That, incidentally, will include more detail on postgraduate deaneries. Secondly, it is likely that primary legislation will be required to support the continuing development of the education and training system, including establishing Health Education England as a non-departmental public body, but we think it is important to spend time to make sure that these arrangements are correct rather than legislate at this stage. However, I can tell the Committee that we intend to publish draft clauses on education and training for pre-legislative scrutiny in the second Session in the same way as on research. This approach will enable us to ensure that the legislation is fit for purpose and that it allows additional opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny of the legislation. I hope that this undertaking will be welcome to noble Lords and will indicate the Government’s strong desire to provide maximum clarity on these matters at an early stage. Therefore, I hope that noble Lords will feel able not to press those particular amendments.

The noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, have tabled remarkably similar amendments—Amendments 133 and 199A respectively—also on the subject of education and training. The noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, wishes to impose a duty on the NHS Commissioning Board to,

“promote education and training of the health care workforce”.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, wishes to introduce a similar duty on clinical commissioning groups. As I have indicated, the Government’s intention is to delegate responsibility for education and training to healthcare providers. They are at the front line of service delivery and are best placed to understand how the workforce needs to develop and respond to the needs of patients.

Responsibility for education and training is of great importance to employers and the various professional bodies that the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, mentions in his amendment, but commissioners will also have a role. I agree entirely that education and training needs to be effectively linked with the wider system. I am aware of concerns voiced by the royal colleges and professional bodies on precisely that matter. I wish to reassure the Committee that I recognise the vital interrelationship between education and training, and commissioning decisions. That is exactly why national and local education and training plans will need to respond to the strategic commissioning intentions set out by the board and clinical commissioning groups.

Similarly, in commissioning decisions there will be a need to consider the implications for education and training—it works both ways. The NHS Commissioning Board has to work closely with Health Education England and it will be a mutually supportive relationship. Indeed, this will be a prime example of the co-operation duties that will apply to the board and to other NHS bodies. Commissioners must also promote and have regard to the NHS constitution, which of course contains the pledges that I have already referred to.

I do not intend to speak for very much longer but there are a couple of points that I ought to cover. A number of noble Lords pointed to the lack of medical school involvement in the set-up of local arrangements. I need to be clear about this: the new arrangements are underpinned by the desire to strengthen both the provider voice at the local level and the role of professionals and education providers. We envisage that one of the functions of local bodies will be to ensure strong partnerships with universities and medical schools. Providers of services will have to work in partnership; they cannot just sit alone and ignore everybody else. The form of the local provider-led arrangements is still being developed. More details will be available prior to Report, but I have stressed the links that we envisage with academic colleges at a local level.

I hope that I have indicated that, contrary to the statement from the noble Lord, Lord Warner, that within the modernisation agenda we somehow forgot about education and training, this is not at all the case. As I mentioned when we debated this before, this has been an active programme of work ever since the general election. It is a complex issue and we want to get it right. My noble friends Lord Ribeiro and Lord Mawhinney were spot on in their judgment on this. We are taking action now. We are not losing time over this.

To sum up, we have made provision for education and training in the Bill. We will publish our detailed proposals before Report and we will publish draft clauses on education and training for pre-legislative scrutiny in the second Session. With those assurances, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Kakkar]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his very detailed and extensive response, which is genuinely welcome. He has dealt with a number of the issues that were covered in this important debate. The confirmation that Health Education England is to be established as a special health authority and that a senior responsible officer has been appointed to drive forward its development at a pace to ensure that it is in a position to fulfil its important obligations and functions is a very welcome announcement. I think it will provide considerable hope that the question of education and training can be fully and appropriately dealt with in such a way that any future legislation can build upon an established structure that has already given confidence to those responsible for education and training that these matters can be properly dealt with.

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[Earl Howe]

Before the noble Lord decides what to do with his amendment, I should say that I did not wish in the least to imply that this debate was inappropriate in any way. If I did, I apologise. If I may correct one thing that he said, the draft clauses for pre-legislative scrutiny will come forward in the next Session of Parliament rather than before Report. However, we will be publishing much more detail before Report about what our plans will look like.

[Lord Kakkar]

I welcome those comments. It was not a criticism made by the noble Earl about this but by other noble Lords; there was a suggestion that it was not appropriate to discuss education and training in any detail at this stage. These were probing amendments, designed to provide Her Majesty’s Government with the opportunity to address issues, to allay concerns and to allow for further appropriate and constructive evaluation of this matter in the Bill in such a way that noble Lords could fulfil their function of scrutiny and revision to ensure that the best possible Act is finally delivered for the people of our country. With those comments, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Warner]

My Lords, I rise to speak on this amendment, mainly because of my puzzlement over why the Government want to give the national Commissioning Board a concurrent duty with the Secretary of State under new Section 1(1), given all the other provisions in the Bill which try to shape—if I may put it that way—the relationship of the Secretary of State with the national Commissioning Board. This is especially the case with Clause 20, the mandation clause. One interpretation of this concurrency is that the Secretary of State can pick and choose how he interprets his responsibility.

My noble friend Lord Hunt has mentioned, as delicately as he could, what has happened in the Home Office recently about the sometimes rather strange boundary between policy responsibility and management responsibility and the confusions that could arise. This is not the first time that the Home Office has got into this kind of territory. Your Lordships will remember the difficulties that Michael Howard, when he was Home Secretary, had with the chief executive of the Prison Service, Derek Lewis. It boiled down to this problem of uncertainty about where the remit of Ministers ended and where responsibility began, in this case with the Prison Service, an executive agency. Equally, though, I suggest it could have been a non-departmental public body.

There is a lot of history in this area where one should be extremely wary about passing legislation in particularly high-profile areas and giving concurrency of responsibility to a Secretary of State and to a powerful arm’s-length body, in this case a non-departmental public body, the national Commissioning Board. It is fraught with difficulties. I thought that the Government were trying to clarify this with Clause 20. I think the clause has been misunderstood a little bit by the new chairman of the national Commissioning Board, but the wording as it stands gives the Secretary of State the right, before the beginning of each financial year, to set out a mandate for the board.

There are a lot of safeguards in Clause 20, on both sides of that discussion and agreement. The national Commissioning Board has a lot of safeguards. The Secretary of State cannot keep coming back and adding bits and pieces as the year progresses. The Secretary of State also has quite a lot of safeguards. He or she can expect the national Commissioning Board to stick to what has been agreed in that mandate. There is no doubt about the Secretary of State’s ability to give instruction to the board and there is no doubt about his ability to change those instructions on an annual basis after proper discussion and consultation. That is very clear. One of the strengths of Clause 20 is that it does make the relationship clear between the Secretary of State and the national Commissioning Board.

I have tabled an amendment that tries to restrict the number of requirements that the Secretary of State can place on the national Commissioning Board. I can well remember the time when the noble Lord, Lord Mawhinney, was a Minister with responsibilities for health, along with his colleague the noble Baroness, Lady Bottomley, who is not now in her place. We had somewhere in excess of 50 priorities in the NHS that we were required to deliver each year. In practice, we had no priorities, because no one could hold 50 priorities in their head, so there is an issue about how far you go on mandation. Nevertheless, the structure of Clause 20 clearly states what that relationship is, on an annual basis, between the Secretary of State and the national Commissioning Board.

We would do well to stick with that kind of relationship rather than muddy the waters with a concurrency of responsibility. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say on this issue.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, as has been pointed out, this amendment returns us to the topic of the comprehensive health service. We have had a wide-ranging debate on that issue. I appreciate the concerns held by some noble Lords about the extent to which the Secretary of State will be genuinely accountable for the health service under the new arrangements introduced by the Bill. I have outlined the reasons why I believe accountability will be maintained and how accountability to Parliament and the public will be increased by our proposals. We have indicated our intention to look further at what could be done to put the Secretary of State’s ultimate accountability for the health service beyond doubt. We will do that.

However, it is a core principle of our reforms that politicians should step back from day-to-day interference in the NHS to allow clinicians to take the lead in developing services that are built around the needs of patients. That would simply not be possible if the Secretary of State retained broad powers of direction over the NHS Commissioning Board. As I have previously described, the role of the Secretary of State in future should be to set the legislative and regulatory framework; to set the strategic direction for the NHS through the mandate, as the noble Lord, Lord Warner, has rightly reminded us; and to hold the national bodies in the system to account for fulfilling their responsibilities effectively.

I also understand the argument that the Secretary of State alone should be responsible for promoting a comprehensive health service. However, I believe that there are strong arguments that, in the interests of accountability, the NHS Commissioning Board should share this duty as far as it relates to NHS services. The NHS Commissioning Board will be the body responsible for ensuring that there is a comprehensive coverage of clinical commissioning groups covering every area of the country. It will be responsible for authorising and assessing clinical commissioning groups, providing support and guidance to them, and intervening if they run into difficulties. It falls to the NHS Commissioning Board to ensure that the continuity and quality of service provision is maintained at all times.

I am afraid that the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, expose a clear fault line between the Government and the Opposition. We believe it is important that the board should be under the same obligation as the Secretary of State to promote a comprehensive health service in so far as this relates to the health services that the board and clinical commissioning groups will be responsible for. Let me be clear: the Bill’s provisions would in no way dilute the Secretary of State’s overarching duty. Indeed, they are intended further to reinforce the promotion of a comprehensive health service rather than to undermine it. With the general desire of noble Lords to strengthen accountability in the Bill, it seems odd that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, should want to weaken accountability in this way, for that is what his amendment would do.

I listened to the point made by my noble friend Lord Mawhinney that this is another facet of the issues that we are going to consider in relation to Clauses 1, 4 and 10. He made a good point. Therefore, I suggest that, in the light of our intention to consider together how we approach the duty on the Secretary of State and return to this on Report, the amendment should also be withdrawn and that any consequential changes to the functions of the board or clinical commissioning groups are considered as part of those deliberations.

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[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, my noble friend should refine his amendment by limiting the number of grammatical devices that can be used.

I raised this matter because of what the noble Earl said. I raised the reported intervention by the Secretary of State in relation to primary care trusts and the concern that because of their financial issues they are essentially putting in some artificial barriers in relation to patient treatment such as having a rule that on non-urgent treatment you have to wait a certain length of time before you can be treated, and other such mechanisms. When I asked the noble Earl how this would work in the future, he told me that it would be put in the mandate. Clearly, what will happen—

[Earl Howe]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. If the board was not delivering the mandate, it is surely right that the Secretary of State should intervene. He has powers in the Bill to do that. Equally, if it is delivering the mandate, it is also right that it should be allowed to get on without interference from the centre. All we are saying is that the Secretary of State should be clearer about the reasons for his intervention in future. That is in everybody’s interests.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

Either the mandate is so detailed that you will have reams of paper telling the board what to do or the Secretary of State will rightly become concerned at issues that arise during the year. Those issues will not be covered by the mandate as they will not have been anticipated. The Secretary of State will wonder what to do and how to intervene. He will wonder whether he will be told by the national Commissioning Board, “Back off. It is nothing to do with you”, as nationalised industries used to do. This is no different from a nationalised industry. I am concerned because I believe that giving concurrent powers to the national Commissioning Board as well as to the Secretary of State will lead to a great deal of confusion, tension and ambiguity. At the end of the day I would prefer one person to be accountable—the Secretary of State. However, I am encouraged by what the noble Earl said about agreeing to look at this in the context of the other questions about the duty of the Secretary of State. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Greaves]

It is our view that the original proposals were not working at all, and the proposals that we have now are better than the original ones. That does not mean to say that they are perfect, and it is the job of the House of Lords to check that the imperfections in them are removed before the Bill leaves your Lordships’ House.

The point that I was trying to make, which I will finally make once more, is that there is a real difference between the two meanings of “commissioning”. If you are a GP, you can commission services from an existing, static landscape or system of provision for your patients. However, commissioning services on a wider scale, commissioning the very landscape of services and the series of organisations that exist, whether it is deciding to put more money overall on a wide scale into one area of medicine and pulling back on others or just keeping the others going as they are, or whether it is financing capital projects—where to build new hospitals, new health centres or whatever it is—is very different indeed. You need bodies on a larger scale to do that. The idea that practices on their own or small groups of practices could commission that kind of undertaking on a wider scale is nonsense. You cannot rely on the market to provide them all because that will produce chaos and a lack of provision in many areas. That is why the original proposal for GP commissioning groups, which were to be quite small, simply would not have delivered at that level. The original proposals did not indicate in any way how that wider capital commissioning would take place.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, this has been an excellent debate on a set of important issues, and I am glad to count my noble friend Lord Greaves as one of my staunchest supporters.

The NHS Commissioning Board is one of the key elements of our vision of a modernised NHS—a highly professional organisation, focused on quality and able to support clinical commissioning groups in delivering the best care possible to patients. I completely accept that these amendments were proposed with the best of intentions, to strengthen the way in which care is commissioned. However, in setting out why the Bill is drafted as it is, I hope that I can explain to your Lordships why I cannot accept them.

It will be key to the effectiveness of the board to ensure that it obtains sufficient advice and input from clinicians, public health experts, other professionals and those with relevant experience of the NHS—patients and the public—and that it has effective working relationships and arrangements with local authority government. We have stated our intention that there should be clinical and professional leadership on the board, but in terms of the legislative framework for the board it is an important principle to maintain that it should have autonomy of decision-making on matters such as its own membership and its structures and procedures, as far as possible, to determine how best to exercise its functions. This would include, for example, whether it has a vice-chair or a senior independent director, as Amendment 52B suggests.

One thing is absolutely clear. Members of the board will, in practice, need to have a range of skills, knowledge and experience appropriate to the issues faced by the board. Ensuring the right balance of non-executive members from a variety of backgrounds is key to achieving a successful board. But if the majority of non-executives were required to have a particular background, such as NHS experience, as suggested in Amendment 54, that might create an unbalanced board and effectively disqualify potential candidates from the private and voluntary sectors. I agreed with the most reverend Primate in what he said here. It is worth remembering that the board and its members will be expected to follow the seven principles of public life—the Nolan principles—one of which will mean that it must appoint a,

“well-informed choice of individuals who through their abilities, experience and qualities match the need of the public body in question”.

That sums it up very well.

A number of noble Lords made the point that if we require the inclusion of doctors and nurses or a public health specialist as put forward in Amendments 50, 52D, 54B and 56, what about representation on the board of dentists, pharmacists and allied health professionals? The list could go on. It would simply not be possible to accommodate all interests in the board’s membership adequately, and we would surely invite valid criticisms that one group is being prioritised over another. Nor would this be desirable from a Government’s point of view, given that the primary purpose of the members of the board is to hold the organisation to account. Nor, in my very firm view, would it be appropriate for a senior member of another organisation with a different purpose or remit, such as the chair of HealthWatch England, or indeed the Chief Medical Officer, to have a seat on the board, as suggested in Amendments 52C and 54A respectively. That could lead to a potential conflict of interest and confuse accountability. I agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Harris, on that point—although he is not in his place.

Of course, in practice, the board must have the freedom to determine how these varied and legitimate interests are best involved and represented in its work. The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, was quite right—the board will want advice and expertise readily available to it—but that is a different issue from board membership. It is worth bearing in mind that the board will have the freedom to appoint committees and sub-committees as it considers appropriate, and this may prove useful to the board to bring in interested parties on specific issues.

A number of noble Lords asked about public health expertise. We are coming on to debate clinical senates, but one main reason for establishing them is to bring in this wider range of expertise in a way that would provide practical benefit. This would absolutely include public health expertise. We amended the duty to obtain advice to make this explicit. New Section 13J inserted by Clause 20 makes it absolutely clear that the board must obtain advice from those with professional expertise in,

“the protection or improvement of public health”.

There will be an interrelationship between the board and HealthWatch. The board must inform the body in writing of its response, or proposed response, to its advice; it must also have regard to the views, reports and recommendations of local HealthWatch.

My noble friend Lady Cumberlege asked about the size and membership of the board. The requirements in the Bill are that there is a minimum of seven members; the Secretary of State must appoint a chair and at least five other non-executives, so that is a minimum of six non-executive members. The non-executives must appoint a chief executive, who must be a member of the board. That is to say, there must be at least one executive member. Beyond that, they may appoint other executive members as long as the total of non-executives is always more than the total number of executives. The final decision on the number of other executive posts and the nature of their roles will need to be agreed with the chair and non-executive members, but it is envisaged that the other executive members besides the chief executive will include a nursing and a medical director, a director of finance, of performance and operations and of commissioning development.

All departments are required to ensure that appointments are open, transparent and made on merit. The Commissioner for Public Appointments regulates the processes by which Ministers make appointments to the boards of certain public bodies in England and Wales, and this will continue to be the case. It is not government policy to offer confirmation or affirmation hearings for public appointments, as Amendment 52A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, would require. These are ministerial appointments to make. The Cabinet Office maintains a list of posts that are subject to pre-appointment hearings by a House Select Committee. Ministers would consider the committee’s views, but such hearings are not binding and do not represent a power of veto. Your Lordships will be aware that we followed this process in the recent appointment of Professor Malcolm Grant as the chair of the NHS Commissioning Board.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

I am grateful to the noble Earl for what he said, but did he pick up my point that the Government set the precedent in relation to legislation with regard to the Office for Budget Responsibility? The Government have moved on, and I am sure that they did it because of the importance of that body. My argument is that the National Commissioning Board will be such a responsible body that there might well be an advantage in giving the Health Select Committee rather more leverage on it.

[Earl Howe]

My understanding is that we are following the normal procedure. There is a list of appointments that are subject to Select Committee scrutiny. Departments are consulted over the list. It is our intention that the role of the chair will be included in that—and that is exactly the same situation that applied under the previous Government. The Office for Budget Responsibility is an exceptional body in this respect, given its role in providing both government and Parliament with essential, impartial information, necessary for both bodies to be able to fulfil their responsibilities. Although I will reflect on the noble Lord’s comments, I do not know that there is the parallel that he seeks to make there.

Amendment 55 would remove the requirement from the Secretary of State to approve the appointment of a chief executive of the board. This requirement is included for the important reason that the chief executive of the board will be the accounting officer for the commissioning budget, so it is entirely appropriate that the Secretary of State should approve his or her appointment.

[Lord Warner]

Can I press the noble Earl a little further on that? If a chairman has been appointed for this body who has a level of experience to enable him or her to function at that level, then requiring the Secretary of State to approve the appointment of the chief executive seems to throw into doubt whether the Government have confidence in that chairman running that kind of body—they need to be able to appoint an accountable officer as their chief executive. I find this a pretty considerable vote of no confidence in the kind of people who are being appointed as chairmen.

[Earl Howe]

Not at all, my Lords. Of course we have confidence in the chairman. However, it is a little strange to hear from the noble Lord that he suddenlythinks the Secretary of State should not be involved in an area where he has a legitimate interest to make sure, on behalf of the taxpayer and indeed patients, that we have somebody who is capable of fulfilling the role of accounting officer. This is an important role for the Secretary of State to have.

Turning now to Amendments 57, 153ZA and 153B, let me assure the Committee, and especially the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that we want to reduce the amount of NHS funding spent on back-office bureaucracy. That is why have made a commitment to reduce administration costs across the health system by one-third in real terms, saving £1.5 billion annually by 2014-15. All that money will be put back into patient care.

Clause 21 provides powers for the Secretary of State to impose certain limits on the overall expenditure and use of resources by the board and clinical commissioning groups, including in relation to administrative matters defined through parliamentary regulations, for the first time. The board has the power to set similar limits for individual CCGs. I see no reason to change this to a duty to do so, as Amendment 153B suggests. As the board will itself be responsible for overall administrative spending, I am sure it will want to use this power carefully. Within those limits, it should be for the board to determine how best to use the resources available to it, and to decide on its own structures and ways of working, and the number of staff that it needs to perform its functions effectively. It is not appropriate to set a staffing cap on an arm’s-length body.

How big will the board be? In a document called Developing the NHS Commissioning Board, Sir David Nicholson, chief executive-designate of the board, estimated that the board was likely to have 3,500 staff, carrying out the functions currently exercised by around 8,000 staff in the Department of Health, strategic health authorities, PCTs and a number of arm’s-length bodies that are being abolished, along with its own new functions. It will deliver these in a much more streamlined way.

Likewise, setting an arbitrary cap in the Bill on the number of clinical commissioning groups or on their expenditure on administration in comparison to PCTs is not, in our view, an appropriate means of controlling administrative costs. CCGs will be different from PCTs. They put local clinicians in charge and align clinical decisions with the financial and quality consequences. It is a little unfair of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, to say that we are creating a complicated and bureaucratic system, and citing clinical senates and networks and health and well-being boards. Clinical senates and networks are not new organisations in their own right: they will be hosted by the board. Clinical networks already exist. Health and well-being boards are also not separate statutory organisations: they will be hosted by local authorities. We are abolishing a whole raft of bodies under this Bill, as I have said on previous occasions. It is important to bear that in mind.

I appreciate the concerns underlying Amendments 58 and 59. It is important that there should be transparency in all the workings of the board. This is why Schedule 5 to the Bill was amended in another place to include the board in paragraph 7 as a body to which the duty in Section 1 of the Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act 1960 applies. This would include any annual meeting that the board may decide to hold. I say “may decide” because the Bill is clear, in new paragraph 12 in Schedule 1, that:

“The Board may regulate its own procedure”.

This would also apply to determining when it is quorate.

However, the Bill does include clear procedures around the publication of the board’s annual accounts and annual reports, to ensure transparency. The board must send its annual accounts to the Secretary of State and the Comptroller and Auditor-General. The latter must examine, certify and report on the accounts and then lay copies of the accounts and the report before Parliament. The Comptroller and Auditor-General is responsible for the audit of the accounts of all arm’s-length bodies. The board must publish an annual report and lay it before Parliament. The Secretary of State must then write to the board, providing an assessment of the board’s performance of its functions, publish the letter and lay it before Parliament. That gives an indication that there will be maximum transparency here.

Turning to Amendments 145A, 146A, 147ZA and 147C, I am afraid that I do not agree that it would be worth while to add the unusual burden of an explicit duty of consulting on a draft business plan. The board is already required in new Section 13P(2)(a) to involve and consult the public in planning its commissioning arrangements. Under a duty in new Section 13J, it is required to obtain appropriate advice to enable it effectively to discharge its functions, including the planning of how it will exercise its functions.

I hope I can reassure noble Lords that Amendments 147A and 147B are also not necessary. First, the duty to produce a business plan already provides for transparency by obliging the board to publish its plan. Secondly, while the Bill requires that the board’s annual report and annual accounts are laid before Parliament, that is part of specific processes for scrutiny of the board’s performance against the objectives it was set and the outcomes it has achieved. It is right and proper that the board should be held to account in such a way. Another clear recommendation by the NHS Future Forum was that the autonomy of the board needs to be respected. With this in mind, although it is right that the board should be required to produce a plan and for that plan to be published for all—including Parliament—to see, I am not convinced that it would be appropriate to have parliamentary scrutiny of the board’s plans or draft plans. The Bill places certain functions on the board, and it should be for the board to determine how it will seek to exercise these.

With regard to the questions asked by my noble friend Lord Greaves concerning the size of clinical commissioning groups, I respectfully suggest to him that we defer them to a later group of amendments, where this issue will come up and I shall be able to talk more about it. For now, I hope that the noble Lords are sufficiently reassured to be able to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Greaves]

Before the noble Earl sits down, the question I asked about the specific role of the national Commissioning Board in relation to public health is one that he did not address. Can he tell us when he might address it?

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[Earl Howe]

I apologise to my noble friend. The national Commissioning Board will, we envisage, be tasked with commissioning a number of public health functions by Public Health England. There will be a close relationship between Public Health England and the board. Much of the work of the board will straddle both public health and the provision of NHS services. There will be an intimate symbiosis between the two bodies.

[Lord Warner]

My Lords, on Amendment 50, which I seem to have moved quite a long time ago, I will consider the noble Earl’s remarks. I am grateful to noble Lords who spoke in support of Amendment 50. Public health is a rather special case and I would want to reflect, in a later debate, on the public health amendments. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Health and Social Care Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts

Monday 14th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

I wonder whether this is one of the occasions where the organigram that we were discussing previously in Committee might be helpful. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us in his summing up when we might expect to see that diagram.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)]

My Lords, we heartily endorse the important role that clinical advice will play in supporting the NHS Commissioning Board in fulfilling its duties and carrying out its functions effectively. We fully expect clinical networks and the new clinical senates to make a vital contribution to this.

The Government intend that doctors, nurses and other experts from across health and social care will form clinical senates to give expert advice to commissioners. They will do this principally, although not exclusively, in two situations: senates will have a role in the authorisation of clinical commissioning groups, as well as having a role in advising on significant service change on a large geographical scale. Existing clinical networks will also be taken forward and developed and will advise on how specific services can be better designed to provide integrated and effective care. The Government are committed both to retaining and strengthening clinical networks and to using them to help ensure that a range of professionals play an integral part in the clinical commissioning of patient care. The networks will include patient and carer representatives that exist in areas such as cancer care, so that they cover many more areas of specialist care. Networks will have a stronger role in commissioning, in support of the board and local clinical commissioning groups.

Although we fully agree with the noble Lord, Lord Patel, in highlighting the important role that both clinical networks and senates will play in the new system, I cannot support his Amendment 51, nor can I support Amendment 224A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. The reason why I cannot accept them is the same in each case: both of them would specify the roles of networks and senates in legislation. That would restrict the range of ways in which they can operate, which in turn would limit the value that is delivered for patients.

Clinical senates and networks will not be statutory organisations, and that is why they are not referred to in the Bill. That, surely, is a positive thing. It gives them much needed flexibility in how they operate, maximising benefits for patients while minimising bureaucracy. This flexibility will allow both senates and networks to act as enablers of the commissioning system, supporting commissioners by providing them with expert advice. They will not act as another layer of management or administration which hinders progress; instead, the board will host both clinical senates and networks, allowing any supporting functions which can appropriately be shared to be organised with the least administrative bureaucracy. The review of the current system of clinical networks is identifying the features that deliver the greatest benefits, allowing the new system to build on these in a streamlined way that effectively drives improved quality and outcomes.

The board will be subject to a duty, in the proposed new Section 13J within Clause 20, to obtain appropriate advice to enable it to discharge its functions effectively. We believe that this general duty is sufficient to ensure that it seeks appropriate advice, including, of course, clinical advice. In practice, clinical networks and clinical senates will form one way in which the board fulfils this duty.

Clinical commissioning groups are also under a similar duty to seek appropriate advice. Although the board will host senates and networks, clinical commissioning groups will be closely involved in their design and functioning, as well as benefiting from their advice. It is expected that the board will issue guidance about avoiding conflict of interest where this might arise. The exact number of clinical senates is yet to be determined but they are expected to be able to offer informed, strategic advice across a health economy, which might suggest having around 15 across the country. Clinical networks will be based on patient flows rather than NHS boundaries, so variations in size will continue, but representation will always be appropriate to the remit of each network.

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[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

I have a quick initial question. If a CCG happens to be in the area of, say, a university medical school or medical hospital, how would the process of picking who would be on the clinical senate be handled?

[Earl Howe]

As I have mentioned, the senates will come under the wing, so to speak, of the NHS Commissioning Board. They will effectively be part of the board. While we have yet to receive details of how the board will configure itself sub-nationally, it will clearly have to do so in ways that make sense of the local commissioning and provider architecture in an area so, where you have a university, it might well be that medical experts from that university will be part of the senate. It is too early to say, but I look forward to updating my noble friend as and when I have further particulars.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

I stand as a supporter of the noble Earl on the concept of senates. He is not getting much support but I agree with the point that he made that if clinical commissioning groups feel that there needs to be a wider strategic view, say on reconfiguration, the clinical senate could provide useful support. The problem is that some clinical commissioning groups may not think that there is a need for a wider strategic view because they will simply seek to defend existing provision. My argument is that you may need a mechanism which is somewhat more proactive, and which can intervene in the way that the noble Baroness's wonderful South West Thames Regional Health Authority used to do.

[Earl Howe]

The noble Lord could be proved right. As I have said, we will see how the functions of senates are defined. That work is ongoing. The initial proposals for the design and implementation of senates are currently being developed and initial straw-man proposals are being tested with the intention of presenting a clear set of recommendations to the top team of the special health authority later this year, so—

[Lord Warner]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Earl but I am still puzzled about where he and the department are taking this concept of the senate and how it fits in with the regional specialist commissioning set-up, which already exists and which has 10 regional commissioning capabilities aligned with the SHA areas. I am not clear about whether that work is to be folded into the senates. Is it free-standing? Are the lessons all to be lost, and what are the costs of this? What does hosting the senate mean in terms of costs, because there are costs to these regional bodies that are undertaking the work on specialist commissioning? I am at a loss to understand how these two elements—the senates and the regional commissioning capability that is there now—coexist and what the cost implication is of hosting senates alongside those.

[Earl Howe]

I will talk in a moment about specialised commissioning and I hope the answer to the noble Lord’s question will emerge. Amendment 84, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, would require the board to commission highly specialised services, in collaboration with the sub-national clinical senates that are accountable to it.

I will not rehash my arguments around Amendments 51 and 224A, but many of the same points will apply to this amendment. Specialised services are challenging to commission; they involve complex care pathways, small numbers of providers and very small numbers of patients with rare conditions. The new NHS Commissioning Board authority will be considering options as to how it does this, including the best form for its substructures. There will be the freedom to adapt these over time and, to ensure that progress is not lost, the board will be required under existing provisions to maintain the necessary focus of clinical expertise in these highly specialised areas.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked how we ensure that clinical senates are not ignored; this is precisely why we do not want to prescribe their role in the Bill. We want senates to be enabling bodies, which is why we are inviting views on the type of advice they could provide to identify the functions of the board and CCGs where they would add value.

The noble Lord, Lord Patel, indicated that he thought the clinicians on the senate would have to come from outside the clinical commissioning group area. That is not the case; he is not correct in that assumption. There may be slight confusion with the rules we set for secondary care doctors on CCG governing bodies, who must avoid conflicts of interest, hence the need for area restrictions in that context. Experts on clinical senates can come from, in theory, all or any areas of the country. The difference between the senates and regional specialist commissioning is that the latter focuses on specialised services and nothing else. The senates could, in theory, work across all services; the two are not designed to do the same thing. The senates will be quite high level. It is expected they will be about only 15 in number, and while they may be established in a certain form they can evolve over the years to conform to the requirements that are placed upon them.

My noble friend Lady Jolly pressed me on the role of the board with regard to specialised commissioning, and I have already indicated in outline part of that role. The key point is that the board will maintain the necessary focus of clinical expertise and it will be under specific duties to obtain professional advice in the exercise of its functions. Under the regulations, the types of service the board will be required to commission will be kept under regular review. Work is going on at the moment to define what those services should be in the first instance, and I fully expect them to conform broadly to the specialised services national definition set. As my noble friend knows, the list of those services has historically changed over time and I expect the same will apply in the future.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked about the long promised organigram. In fact, our fact sheet on the overall health and care system does have an organigram in it. It includes the NHS Commissioning Board and describes how senates and networks will be hosted by the board. I refer the noble Baroness to that sheet. The noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, asked how senates will be different to academic health science centres in their focus. In short, AHSCs are partnerships of local academic and health bodies to support innovation and excellence in that area. However, they will not be impartial; they are by definition a vested interest. Therefore, they would not be the right bodies to offer the broader perspective on how services should best be configured across a region.

I hope that noble Lords will be at least somewhat enlightened by the details I have been able to give about clinical networks and senates. As I say, this is work in progress. I make no apology for that. This was very much a recommendation that emerged from the Future Forum report. We have got on with the work needed to flesh out what these bodies should be, but we have a broad and, I hope, helpful idea of their role across the wider NHS system. I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Patel]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his extensive reply. When I moved this amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Walton of Detchant, I did not think there would be such enthusiasm to join in. I was surprised by the enthusiasm generated by his amendment, and I thank noble Lords who joined in. The most reverend Primate said this amendment was not necessary. I hope that he was not referring to the amendments that I had tabled, or I would say to him that my amendments were “zuri sana”—for those of you who do not understand, that means they were very good. He understands that.

The noble Earl has, to a degree, clarified the Government’s thinking on what the role of these senates will be. As he said, it is work in progress. Of course, we will need to wait and see what the details are. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I intervene briefly in this debate to ask the noble Earl whether, in his reply, he could perhaps cross-refer to a later section in the Bill, which deals with the role of one of the entities to which my noble friend Lady Wheeler has just referred, namely HealthWatch England. In any procedure for complaints, whether about treatment or the ultimate effects of commissioning on patients and the quality of service, an independent body that represents the views of the users of the health and social care system is required. There is a whole group of relevant amendments, but it is the last group printed on this list so we will probably not reach it much before Christmas. Nevertheless, within that group is a strong line that HealthWatch England should be an independent body, which means independent not only of the providers but of the regulators. In any proper complaints system—although I do not suggest that this is the only channel for complaints—you need an independent consumer view. This has stood the test of time in several other sectors. It would be a major role for HealthWatch England if it could be built into the kind of clear procedure to which the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, referred.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, this has been a valuable debate on what is an important topic by any standards. It is vital that patients feel able to raise complaints where services are not good enough. It is equally important that there are appropriate systems for ensuring that complaints and safety incidents are effectively monitored and addressed, and that wider lessons are learnt.

Amendment 57A would require the Secretary of State to create a new procedure, whereby complaints about both health and social care providers could be brought before the board. Amendment 143A would go further by giving the board a more specific role in collecting and analysing information relating to complaints about both the provision of health services and commissioning decisions by the board or clinical commissioning groups, and making this information available to the public. The current NHS and adult social care arrangements for handling individual complaints were developed to make the process of complaining quicker and simpler, and to put the focus on meeting the needs of the complainant. It is important that all NHS organisations view and manage complaints in a positive manner and use the information obtained to improve service delivery.

Under the current regulations, a complaint about poor service provision may be made either to the service provider or to the commissioner of that service. It is important that people have that choice. Someone may be deterred from making a complaint to the service provider if they consider that it may impact on their future healthcare provision. We consider it right for these general principles on complaints handling to be carried forward into the new system architecture. In future, we envisage that complaints about service provision would be made to the service provider, or to either the local clinical commissioning group or the NHS Commissioning Board, depending on which had commissioned that service. They would also deal with complaints about how they have performed their own functions.

Of course, where it proves not possible to resolve a complaint locally, the complainant has the right to refer the case to an independent arbiter. In the case of an NHS complaint, this referral is to the Health Service Ombudsman. The system of handling complaints will therefore continue to operate largely as it does now. The arrangements for monitoring complaints will also be similar. The NHS standard contract already requires all providers to report complaints information to commissioners. This information is collected by the NHS Information Centre and would be available to the NHS Commissioning Board. This is then discussed as part of the clinical review meetings between commissioners and providers, who are required by regulations to implement learning from complaints and other incidents. It will be vital that the NHS Commissioning Board is able to identify any emerging trends from this information.

In reply to the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, the board will be assisted by both the local healthwatch and HealthWatch England, which will act as a conduit for the views of service users about their experiences of complaints handling. It will also be able to make recommendations to providers and commissioners about how services and procedures could be improved. There will be a duty on NHS organisations to have regard to the recommendations of the local healthwatch, which will also put pressure on providers and commissioners to improve.

Finally regarding these amendments, the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, makes the valid point that it is important that information about complaints is made available to the public. Patient and service-user generated information, which includes complaints as well as information collected from patients and staff through surveys, real-time feedback, ratings of services and patient reported outcome measures, are all vital in helping patients to make informed choices about their care.

Separate arrangements currently apply in reporting patient safety incidents that have or could have resulted in harm to a patient. These are reported in anonymous form through the National Reporting and Learning Service, operated by the National Patient Safety Agency. Safety has to be the key priority of all those working in the health service. We cannot allow it to be an add-on or an afterthought. Patients rightly expect that any service provided with NHS funding will be safe.

For this reason, we want to put safety at the heart of the NHS by transferring these functions from the NPSA to the NHS Commissioning Board. Clause 275 therefore makes provision to abolish the NPSA as part of our plans to reduce the number of arm’s-length bodies. Instead, new Section 13Q, which Amendment 143B seeks to remove, gives the NHS Commissioning Board responsibility for those functions currently carried out by the National Patient Safety Agency. This is in relation to collecting information about patient safety incidents, analysis of that information and sharing the resulting learning within the NHS and more widely.

Safety is, of course, another of the core domains of quality. We believe that the NHS Commissioning Board, as the body that will be legally responsible for ensuring continuous quality improvement in the NHS, will be best placed to ensure that this learning is translated into improved practice. Its unique perspective will allow it to ensure that appropriate levers are used to drive safety improvement across the system. Bringing safety right into the core of commissioning activity in this way is the most powerful way of driving a safety agenda through the NHS.

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[Lord Patel]

Before the Minister sits down, will he please confirm that the primary care doctors and the primary care team will also be obliged to report patient safety incidents?

[Earl Howe]

My understanding is that that is the intention. The clinical commissioning group will wish to monitor the quality of service provided by its member practices and the outcomes that those practices achieve. As part of that monitoring we fully expect that safety will be a core component.

[Lord Greaves]

Before my noble friend replies to this group of amendments, I hope that I may ask the Minister a question on something on which I confess total ignorance. The Minister said that many of the functions of the National Patient Safety Agency in collecting statistical information would be transferred to the national Commissioning Board. What other functions does it have and what will happen to them?

[Earl Howe]

Will my noble friend allow me to write to him on that point?

[Baroness Jolly]

I thank the noble Earl for his reply, the noble Baroness, Lady Wheeler, for her commitment to quality and the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, for the patient voice input. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, what I want to say might have been a little long as an intervention in the Minister’s speech but it will be very short as a speech. I simply want to ask the noble Earl, when he replies to this debate, to address in a considered way how the Government intend to deal with an enormously significant and worrying conflict of professional interest that could arise in this context. Anyone who is a member of a clinical commissioning group, whether he or she is a GP or not, must presumably be committed and signed up to the priorities, policies and plans of that clinical commissioning group. However, where that individual is also a GP who has his or her own patients, some of those patients may have conditions that do not get a very high priority in those plans and policies. Surely there is an immediate conflict of interest. In the present circumstances, the GP can say to his or her patient: “I am doing my best to battle with the PCT to get the treatment that I really think you need”. However, in the situation that arises as a result of the structure in this Bill, that GP would be on both sides of the table. He would be arguing with himself and making representations to himself. Surely the noble Earl would agree that it is a thoroughly unsatisfactory situation. Can he assure the Committee that it will not arise and, if it does, that the Government have a clear set of rules or procedures for dealing with it?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, we have had another well informed and stimulating debate. I will start by going back to the beginning. On paper, clinical commissioning groups can seem like a dry concept, but I would encourage your Lordships to look beyond the words and duties on the page and consider what CCGs will be able to achieve in practice. GPs and other front-line professionals already make the clinical decisions that determine how most NHS resources are used. Putting them in charge of shaping services will enable NHS funding to be spent effectively to provide high-quality care.

I have seen at first hand the work of primary care clinicians—GPs, nurses, allied health professionals and others—in leading the commissioning of services. I have been struck on numerous occasions by their dynamism, innovation and their absolute dedication to ensuring that their patients receive high quality care. It is in that context that we should consider our debates on this topic, including this one, which have focused primarily on ensuring that CCGs have effective governance arrangements, but have also touched upon CCG boundaries.

I do not agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, that the arrangements are weak. We have already responded to the Future Forum’s recommendation to strengthen the Government’s arrangements for CCGs and made it a requirement for every CCG to have a governing body. We recognise that good governance will be critical to the design and operation of CCGs, in order that they act transparently, manage conflicts of interest and have the proper checks and balances in place to provide assurance that decisions are taken in ways that protect patients' best interests, promote continual improvements in quality and provide assurance that public money is well spent.

That is why I believe that the Bill already achieves the intent of Amendment 60, which would place the Secretary of State under a duty to publish a code of conduct for CCGs, incorporating the Nolan principles on public life. I am fully in support of CCGs adhering to the principles established by the Committee on Standards in Public Life. However, new Section 14L already states that the main function of a governing body of a CCG includes ensuring that the group complies—and these were the words quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Warner—

“with such generally accepted principles of good governance as are relevant to it”.

The Nolan principles, or any successor principles which the Committee on Standards in Public Life or another body was to issue, would be foremost among these. However, the provision in the Bill will also encompass any other relevant, generally accepted principles of good governance issued by appropriate bodies, such as the Institute of Good Governance, and therefore has the potential to be of wider effect. That is why I feel that Amendment 171 is also unnecessary, as it appreciably narrows the field of vision of the governing body.

In addition, the Bill already sets out other provisions which relate to a CCG’s conduct. For example, with respect to the constitution of a CCG, the constitution must include arrangements for ensuring absolute transparency. It must specify the arrangements for discharging the CCG’s functions, its decision-making process, how it will secure transparency about the decisions of the group, and how it will deal with conflicts of interest of members and employees of the CCG or members of the governing body.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Warner]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Earl, but I was aware of that. My concern was that it seemed to leave to clinical commissioning groups the decision on what type of information they put in that. They could put in a whole load of information that was not comparable with any other clinical commissioning group. The whole point of my amendment was that there should be a level of standardisation so that we could see the different levels of performance in different CCGs.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I take that point on board. It is my understanding that the NHS Commissioning Board will wish to set common standards for CCGs to follow. However, I will follow up that point with the noble Lord. As I said, the Bill requires each CCG to prepare annual accounts, independently audited. The board may, with the approval of the Secretary of State, direct CCGs as to the methods and principles according to which their accounts must be prepared, and the form and content of such accounts. Therefore, there will be scope for the board to drive consistency in the area the noble Lord mentions.

I turn now to Amendments 169, 175BA, 175C and 101A, which concern membership of, and appointments to, CCG governing bodies. In response to amendment 169, as the Bill stands, under new Section 14N, regulations may already provide that members of governing bodies must include the accountable officer of the CCG. Paragraph 11 of Schedule 1A also specifies that the accountable officer may be one of the following: a member of the CCG, or an employee of the CCG or any member of the group. Restricting the accountable officer to being the “most suitable senior employee” of the group, as Amendment 169 also proposes, would narrow who the officer could be and ignore other able candidates, so I am not attracted to that amendment.

Amendment 175BA, and Amendments 175A and 175B, which we will be discussing in more detail in a future group, clearly intend to ensure CCGs have access to professional or other expertise to advise on all areas of their work. This is undoubtedly important, but the governing body is not the route to achieve this. As the Future Forum advised, a clear distinction should be made between governance of CCGs and clinical involvement in designing care pathways and shaping local services.

Clinical involvement in designing pathways or shaping services is exactly what a CCG will need to ensure in exercising its duty in new Section 14V, which requires a CCG to obtain advice appropriate for enabling it effectively to discharge its functions from individuals, who, taken together, have a broad range of professional expertise.

Clinical senates and networks will, of course, be crucial to effectively meeting this duty and to ensuring that CCGs can access specialised advice, as will the local knowledge and public health knowledge held by health and well-being boards. We believe there is a case for ensuring that governing bodies include the voices of some other professionals—at least one registered nurse and a secondary care specialist—but it would be unhelpful, as the Future Forum also acknowledged, for governing bodies to be representative of each group. That could lead to bodies that are too large and slow to do their job well. CCGs should have the flexibility to determine the professional input into their governance arrangements.

Amendment 175C would provide for regulations to be made setting out how lay members are recruited and remunerated. Subsection (3) of new Section 14N already makes provisions as to the appointment of members, including lay members, to the governing body. Paragraph 12 of Schedule 1A allows the CCG to pay members of its governing body such remuneration and other expenses as it considers appropriate. These existing provisions cover the intent of Amendment 175C.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, can the noble Earl assure me that the appointments will be made by independent bodies, and that it will not be a case of the board of the CCG making the appointments to itself? In terms of corporate governance, can he also assure me that non-executives will be in a majority as they are on every public body which the Government have recently enacted?

[Earl Howe]

If the noble Lord will allow me, I will answer those questions in a moment. Amendment 101A would similarly duplicate existing provision by placing a duty on the NHS Commissioning Board to ensure that all CCG governing bodies meet the requirements for clinical and non-clinical representation. The board already has to do this; under proposed new Section 14C, the board can grant an application only if it is satisfied that the applicant CCG has made appropriate arrangements to ensure that the group will have a governing body which satisfies any requirements imposed by or under the Act. That would include regulations made under proposed new Section 14N providing for minimum levels of clinical and lay representation.

Amendments 170A, 175D, 175CA and 175CB seek to introduce alternative governance arrangements for CCGs. These amendments would remove the existing functions of the CCG governing body and, through the proposed new schedule, replace the governing body with both a board of directors and a board of governors. I was grateful to the noble Lord for explaining where this idea originated. However, the amendments do not propose functions for these boards to exercise. They concentrate almost solely on the form of CCG governance; they neglect the function. As to that form, there is much here which is already provided for in the Bill and in relation to a governing body. I should perhaps explain that our preferred approach is to set through regulations the key requirements in relation to the composition of the CCG governing body and the logistics of their qualification, appointment, tenure and so on. This will, most importantly, allow flexibility for the approach to evolve over time and in the light of experience.

Turning to Amendment 59A on the subject of the area covered by CCGs, in the light of our lengthy debate on this last week, a letter will shortly reach your Lordships to provide further information on the arrangements for geographic areas of CCGs. It includes some analysis of the key issues which I hope will be useful and reassuring. We accepted the Future Forum recommendation that the boundaries of CCGs should not normally cross those of local authorities. If a CCG wishes to be established on the basis of boundaries that will cross local authority boundaries, it will be expected to demonstrate to the NHS Commissioning Board a clear rationale in terms of benefits for patients; for example, to reflect local patient flows and to secure a better service for patients. The board will also be required to seek the views of emerging health and well-being boards. In addition, CCGs will have the flexibility to enter into lead or joint commissioning arrangements with other CCGs; for example, for commissioning of lower volume or more specialist services. I hope that this reassurance will satisfy the noble Lord’s concerns.

Finally, Amendment 92ZZA seeks to mandate the Secretary of State to make regulations imposing a ban on shareholders and employees of commissioning support organisations being given a seat on a CCG committee or governing body of a CCG—I assume that it is the governing body that the amendment refers to rather than the NHS Commissioning Board. We agree that there should be no conflicts of interest between a CCG and any commissioning support organisation that it uses. The support offered by such organisations should inform decisions made by CCGs, but we have always been clear that CCGs cannot delegate their duties or responsibilities. However, such an absolute ban would not take into account situations, for example, where a CCG may wish to invite individual employees from commissioning support organisations to provide expertise on a committee. The Bill already requires CCGs to have robust provision for managing conflicts of interest in how they discharge their functions.

It is clear from the debate that these amendments were proposed with the best of intentions, but I hope that noble Lords will feel that the points that I have made are sufficiently compelling to encourage them not to press the amendments.

I have a few questions that I would like to answer briefly. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, suggested that the chair and deputy chairs of CCGs should be lay members. Each CCG must have at least two lay members. We are specifying that, and we have committed that one of the lay members of CCGs will be either the chair or the deputy chair of the governing body.

The noble Lord, Lord Rea, asked me how a CCG’s geographic area would be determined. The primary factor in establishing the CCG’s boundaries or geographic area would be the practices that made up the membership of the CCG. The NHS Commissioning Board must satisfy itself that the proposed area for a CCG is appropriate and that the CCG can commission effectively for that area. That is a very condensed explanation of what the Commissioning Board will be looking for.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, suggested that he could not understand how CCGs would be accountable. Accountability is a key area. There is no doubt about that and I share the noble Lord’s desire to get this right. We listened to the Future Forum when it said that there is a balance to be struck between the need for good governance and the need to avoid overprescription. Perhaps that is a generally accepted principle—I certainly agree with that. I think the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, goes too far. However, we are absolutely clear that CCGs will be materially accountable in a number of ways. I could recite a number of ways that I have in front of me, but at this hour it might be appropriate for the noble Lord to receive that in writing from me. I would be happy to do that and to copy it round.

On the subject of conflicts of interest, we will be having a very full debate in the context of Clause 20 on conflicts of interest. I have a lot of material here, but essentially there are principally three safeguards in the Bill to prevent conflicts of interest: statutory requirements on clinical commissioning groups to have in place arrangements to manage those conflicts of interest—those have got to be set out in the group constitution; secondly, strengthened governance arrangements as regards the governing body, and I briefly outlined those; and specific provision for regulations to require that the board and the clinical commissioning groups adhere to good practice in relation to procurement and in commissioning healthcare services.

My noble friend Lady Jolly asked who will appoint members of the clinical commissioning group boards. We will work with patient and professional groups and with emerging clinical commissioning groups to determine the best arrangements for appointing members of governing bodies. As I have indicated, the Government will issue regulations in due course, setting out in more detail the requirements for appointing non-GP members to the governing body.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked whether non-executives would be in the majority on boards. I am not currently able to give that assurance. We are still working with a wide range of stakeholders on the regulations for governing bodies. We are well aware of concerns in this area. I will take the noble Lord’s points very firmly on board.

Very briefly in this group, I would also like to speak to government Amendments 172, 173 and 175, which are minor and technical in nature. Amendment 172 clarifies that the remuneration committee of the CCG governing body has the function of making recommendations to the governing body on its determination of allowances payable under a pension scheme established by the CCG for its employees under paragraph 10(4) of Schedule 1A. Government Amendment 172 allows regulations made under new Section 14L(6) to make provision requiring CCGs to publish prescribed information relating to determinations of the allowances payable under a pension scheme. Government Amendment 173 makes provision for the board to publish guidance for governing bodies on the exercise of this function. I trust the Committee will join me in supporting these minor and technical amendments.

[Lord Whitty]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that detailed reply to what has been a fascinating debate. I fear, however, that he will have to return to a number of these issues.

The issues of accountability, governance, conflicts of interest and transparency are about confidence in the new system—not only confidence in this House but confidence in the population. The issue of coterminosity—which I thought was a word I had invented but I am glad that others took it up—is also vital to that because people understand the county boundary and where the services are and that there is a relationship between them. I am grateful for the Minister’s offer of a letter on the geographic boundaries but, before we complete the consideration of the Bill, we will have to be clear what the relationship between local authorities, providers of social services, those responsible for public and environmental health and the new CCGs is going to be. That also is an issue of confidence and understanding by the population and the people who use the health service.

Having said that at this hour of the night—I note the Chief Whip’s impatience—I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

NHS: Hinchingbrooke Hospital

Earl Howe Excerpts

Thursday 10th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)]

My Lords, we do not know Circle's profit margin. I can, however, explain the basis on which Circle will be paid. Circle will effectively receive a success fee for bringing the trust into surplus and keeping it there. If Circle does not make the trust operate at a surplus, it will not receive any fee and it will lose money on the transaction. Circle will receive all surpluses up to the first £2 million of any year's surplus, and then a share of surpluses of more than £2 million to keep it incentivised to generate the further surpluses that the trust will retain.

[Baroness Thornton]

I thank the noble Earl for that comprehensive explanation of taxpayers’ money. The issues I want to address are ones of transparency in process and criteria. Will the Minister provide details—I do not expect them this morning—of the meetings and minutes of meetings between Ministers, civil servants and Circle Health Ltd, and meetings with Mark Simmonds, MP, who is a paid adviser to Circle and a former member of the Conservative Front Bench? How will the Department of Health know whether this is a good deal? I can see how we will know whether Circle has made a profit or not. What is the objective here? Will a clinical as well as a financial audit be built in, and will those results be made public? In other words, how will the taxpayer know whether this is a good deal?

[Earl Howe]

I will, of course, write to the noble Baroness with detailed answers to the first part of her question, which would take too long for me to answer now. I can say that this is a transfer of risk to the private sector. That is why it is a good deal. It is also a good deal in another sense, because patients will still have a hospital in Hinchingbrooke. This is a hospital that in common parlance could be described as a financial and clinical basket case. No NHS bidders were willing to take it on. When the previous Administration left office, only independent sector operators were in the frame to do so. We therefore knew at the last election that there would be an independent sector solution. I think that it is a win-win situation all round. It is good news for Hinchingbrooke patients, and I understand that under normal Freedom of Information Act rules the contract involved will be made available, subject to commercially confidential details being redacted.

[Baroness Jolly]

My Lords, will the Minister please tell the House who was consulted in making this decision and what sort of support was found among the local community and hospital staff?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, there was extensive consultation, but the important point for my noble friend to understand is that this was a locally led process. Ministers—and, for that matter, civil servants in the department—were not involved in the decision process. The decision was made by the strategic health authority board and the recommendation then came to Ministers. However, I can tell my noble friend that support for this decision has been very widespread, not least among the medical community in the area.

[Lord Laming]

My Lords, will this hospital continue to provide the same range of facilities as it does now? I understand that it does not provide A&E, for example, but will it be given the freedom to reduce the range of services in the future or will it have to carry on with the same services that it provides now?

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, as part of the franchise, Circle is committed to maintaining the current level of services, including accident and emergency and maternity services, as long as commissioners continue to purchase them for local patients—a commitment made following a consultation in 2007. Any proposals for a significant change to the services provided at the hospital will be subject to public consultation, as with any NHS hospital.

[Baroness Knight of Collingtree]

My Lords, am I correct in deducing from what my noble friend has said that the choice was either no easy future for this hospital or the course that is now being adopted?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, so serious were the problems of Hinchingbrooke, both clinically and financially, that frankly the alternative to a franchising solution might have been closure of the hospital. I think that Ministers in the previous Administration reached that conclusion. It is one of the largest accumulated deficits that we have ever seen in any hospital. The problems facing Hinchingbrooke are therefore very significant.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, given the number of trusts that are in financial difficulties, can the Minister indicate whether he anticipates any further moves of this kind? If so, what processes would the department wish to see in place to ensure both value for money for the taxpayer and the highest possible clinical standards after any such transfer of responsibility?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, we do not envisage any other solution of this kind in any other trust. Of course, close monitoring will be necessary, and the contract with Circle is very clear in this instance—it has to perform according to the specification. As I said earlier, if it does not turn the hospital around, the financial risk up to £5 million of deficit, cumulatively, lies with it. I believe that this is extremely advantageous for the taxpayer. On the clinical side, of course the CQC will be extremely concerned to ensure that quality of care is not just turned round but significantly improved.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, can the Minister tell us how often Circle is reporting to the CQC on the clinical outcomes, given that there have been clinical problems at this hospital, how often it is reporting on the financial turnaround and to whom it is reporting?

[Earl Howe]

No, I cannot, but I shall write to the noble Baroness.

[Lord Avebury]

My Lords, if it is this easy for a private company to make the necessary economies to put this hospital back on course without compromising patient care, as was claimed by the spokesman on the “Today” programme this morning, can the noble Lord say why—a question that was not answered on that programme—the NHS could not make those economies itself?

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

The previous Government tried very hard to put an NHS solution in place. As I mentioned, by the time they left office no NHS provider was willing to step in and say that it was capable of turning Hinchingbrooke around—the problems were that serious. Given that situation, an independent sector solution was the only one on the table.

[Lord Haskel]

I do not want to sound like a penny-pinching accountant, but exactly how do you work out profit on a hospital? How do you work out a surplus? What about capital expenditure? What about depreciation? What about all these other things that are involved? Have all these things been worked out?

[Earl Howe]

They have, my Lords, but the best way of answering the detail of the noble Lord’s question is to say that I will send him as much detail as possible from the contract, which factors in all the matters to which he referred.

[Lord Woolmer of Leeds]

My Lords, the Minister referred to an accumulated deficit. What is that deficit at this point? Will the contract require the new providers to ensure that that accumulated deficit is, over the years, paid off, or is it to be written off at the point at which the new provider takes over?

[Earl Howe]

The accumulated deficit is approximately £39 million; part of the arrangement specifies that Circle will work towards paying off that deficit over the 10 years of the contract.

[Lord MacKenzie of Culkein]

I understood the chief executive officer of Circle Health Ltd to say on television this morning that his organisation was a social enterprise on the Waitrose model. My understanding of Waitrose is that all employees are partners and that profits are either paid back to the partners or reinvested in the company. Is that the situation with Circle Health Ltd?

[Earl Howe]

My advice is that Circle is part-owned by its employees; more than 50 per cent is owned by them. The remaining share of the ownership is by private sector investors.