Health and Social Care Bill

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff Excerpts

Tuesday 13th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton]

My Lords, I start by congratulating noble Lords on making it through this day of debate. We are ending the day with this large group on failure, and the smaller group on pre-failure, tabled by my noble friend, in a moment or so.

In the NHS of 20 years ago, the trusts that got into problems were helped, although the help may have been brutal, with chief executives removed or moved on and nasty phone calls to trust chairs. The system gave powers of intervention from the Secretary of State through local strategic bodies, as they became. Financial help was grudgingly provided, usually for a recovery plan, sometimes delivered and sometimes not. The relationships were not defined by legal contract, and NHS contracts could not be enforced in the courts, so there was a system of arbitration within the NHS.

Those days have gone, and we now have an NHS as a network of many sub-organisations, some with linkages through real contracts. With FTs came the idea of a real contract, although in reality, of course, disputes are still sorted out long before reaching a court. We know that services, and even whole organisations, can fail as the impact of demographic, technological and behavioural changes shape our NHS. In reality, we have to deal with trusts that get into severe difficulties and may be technically insolvent, at which point a real organisation may not be allowed to trade. Then we have to accept that a whole trust might need to be shut down. Indeed, how should that be done? How should the continuity of services be maintained, how should the staff be dealt with, and how should the assets, most of which are owned by the state, be dealt with?

We know that this is the tail end of a bigger and important issue of reconfiguration. So how do we ensure that we can adapt services that show poor quality or that need to be delivered in different ways in different settings? Maybe, as with an increasing array of subspecialities, we have to accept regionalisation. Maybe we need network solutions. Is the market the way to do this? In other markets, innovations lead to changes in demand, and the organisations that cannot adapt close down. Is that what we want for our NHS?

Those who might be so inclined might like to wander through the delicate prose of Simon Burns MP in Committee in the Commons. He loves failure. The idea that you have competition is inextricably linked to having failure. It facilitates the market, brings in the innovators and drives out the inefficient. He believes that failure is a measure of market success, not failure.

It is true that in government we introduced a failure regime as we came to realise that, even after all the support and changes of management team, there may be organisations that are simply not viable. However, it is not so much that they were not viable; it is what that means, that continuing to support them is not giving value for the NHS, however much we adjust that value to include non-financial aspects. Indeed, we also wanted to bring out into the light the murky transactions used within the NHS to support organisations, through means such as brokerage loans. The tendency was for bad performers to be bailed out by the good—the opposite of a reforming system. The way NHS accounts were done also had to be changed to make this kind of smoke-and-mirrors accounting more open.

Issues around failure are more likely to operate at service level than at a whole-organisation level. To take a recent example, a well known and respected financial trust is having issues around its 18-week performance. Its general quality is good but it has signalled that it needs help, and it is indeed getting it from a Department of Health team. The question that we need to ask is: would this kind of support be available in the new world? Presumably, it would not; and even if it were, might that help be deemed anticompetitive? Would that good trust be allowed to fail? The link here to reconfiguration is inescapable.

We know and even admit in our rational moments that reconfiguration on a grand scale is what the Nicholson challenge is really about. The need to move services into community settings and to reduce dependency on the district general hospital model is widely recognised. However, we also know that reconfiguration is beset with political problems. In the run-up to the election, about one-third of constituencies had some kind of campaign to keep open a hospital, a surgery or whatever. One felt sometimes that even if there was no threat, one was invented. We had Andrew Lansley and David Cameron claiming that they would prevent any closures. I think that the Government are learning the hard way that promises made in opposition, especially during election campaigns, may turn out to be millstones when the real burden of decision-making passes to them. The examples of broken promises will continue as reconfigurations gather apace.

This is the issue to which our suspicions should be addressed. Is it part of the rationale to put the blame for nasty politically damaging decisions on others? This abdication of responsibility is characterised by the way that Ministers are trying to give away the key roles of the Secretary of State. This is in part a failure of process but is also a failure of leadership. The leadership should be accountable for delivering answers and necessary changes within a reasonable timescale. If we get reconfiguration right, the failure regime would look less necessary. This is far better for patients than the trauma of seeing their local facilities under constant threat or even being closed down. There are examples of where this has been done, and done well—and we need more of them.

In Committee in the Commons, the Conservatives in particular appeared to believe that these unpopular local changes would be less likely under the Bill—if changes in organisations are branded as failures, then those MPs would be well clear of any responsibility. In fact, we have years of evidence because every reconfiguration has to go through a clinical and management review at an early stage—so we know what works and what does not. We could use that evidence, rely on a robust process and stop opportunist politics. However, we know that the market will not bring about these changes any time soon.

In our NHS, the best interests of patients are served by good information that allows early intervention to improve failing services. CQC inspections are also of value in raising the prospect that poor services will be detected early. If you rely on competition, how long does it take for the public to react to the information that a service is bad and for them to choose to go elsewhere, or for that to impact on the finances to the extent that the service is closed down? In our view, using choice and competition to detect and close poor services takes too long and the cost for patients is indeed too high. That is what this suite of amendments aims to tackle.

The amendment sets licensing criteria to ensure that private providers meet standards around financial stability and probity. We need to supply regular financial information for the good providers. This is, in other words, a sort of Southern Cross test. Amendment 249MBA brings into effect the remaining inactivated arrangements for trust special administration from the 2009 Act, as amendments to the 2006 Act. I remember those well. Amendment 353ZZA is a commencement provision for that. Amendment 295 states that health special administrators must exercise their functions to “protect the interests of patients”. As to the Questions that Clauses 125 to 130 stand part of the Bill, this would create a regime for private companies that provide services to the NHS to have special procedures that augment the normal company provisions under the Insolvency Act. It arguably implies that we need stronger protection from the risk of private provider failure. It should be for the commissioners to factor in the risk of using private providers and contract to ensure that arrangements are in place for contingencies. The licensing regime needs to be tough enough to prevent Southern Cross-type failure through active monitoring.

Risk pooling is what the NHS does. We do not need new risk pools, with the costs that they involve. That is why we think that the clauses should be deleted. Clauses 131 to 143 inclusive allow Monitor to set up the regime to provide special administration for both private and public providers to levy charges on providers and commissioners and to manage the finances of a risk pool.

We argue that none of that is required; it just adds extra complexity and cost. Clause 170 is about FTs and failure. The clause removes the ability to deauthorise a foundation trust. We argue that that power should be retained, along with the recognition that some NHS provider trusts may need to be directly managed under the powers of the Secretary of State.

The new clause in Amendment 303ZA makes clear that the initial effort, in the context of failure, should be remedial action rather than going straight for a failure regime. My noble friend has a similar idea behind his amendment. On Amendment 303ZB, the new clause is intended to reinforce and strengthen how reconfiguration is carried out. Under Amendment 303A to Section 65A of the 2006 Act, bodies to which trusts’ special administration regimes apply should remain, so that the special administration regime applies to FTs and NHS trusts.

Again, we are shortening the Bill and making it simpler and probably taking out quite a lot of cost. I beg to move.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

My Lords, I have several amendments in this group. I shall start with Amendment 294N, which is a probing amendment. As far as I have understood it, social enterprise bodies which are NHS bodies in all but name are coming into existence. They have evolved from PCTs under the transforming community services programme. They will be subject to special health administration arrangements. I ask the Government to confirm whether the social enterprises that come under the health special administration arrangements are coming under arrangements based on insolvency law and that, as such, that allows assets to be transferred outside the NHS and the redundancy payments are not guaranteed.

Amendment 295CA is intended to ensure that clinical commissioning groups are consulted before the Secretary of State makes regulations that allow Monitor to impose charges on commissioners. The charge imposed can include a levy to fund Monitor’s functions that have to be invoked in the event of failures. Amendment 295CB is intended to ensure that when setting such a levy, Monitor takes into account the impact of the levy on the financial stability of the organisation, especially a financial trust that is already in distress or failing. Amendment 304A requires that the commissioners are considered when the services of a failed financial trust are considered by Monitor and should be involved in the decision as to which should be continued, and that such services must include some continuation of education and training, because in planning for the future workforce, if a whole lot of posts were suddenly lost, it would destabilise the workforce planning. That is in addition to considerations such as the service provision and issues of equity and access. That becomes particularly important because if you do not have the staff with the appropriate training, you cannot, in the long term, provide the service anyway.

Amendment 304B is intended to ensure that commissioners are involved in the board's role in agreeing arrangements to secure continued access to NHS services will be achieved. Will that include the board’s selecting which commissioner would become lead commissioner for the process during a failure?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, this has been an excellent short debate on a large number of amendments, but focusing on a critical issue, which is what should happen to providers when they get into significant difficulty. While the debate has focused on the role of Monitor, it is the Government’s firm view that commissioners should lead the process of ensuring there are services available to meet the needs of local communities.

The Government brought forward amendments in another place to improve our proposals for ensuring continuity of services. These included removing provisions to apply an insolvency-based approach to foundation trusts in the form of health special administration. If a provider of NHS services becomes unsustainable, there has to be a legal framework that provides effective safeguards to protect patients’ and taxpayers’ interests. We have therefore taken an evolutionary approach in developing proposals to ensure sustainable local services. The Bill sets out a clear framework to achieve this.

We will maintain the existing regime for foundation trusts but we will improve it significantly. First, we have removed the need to de-authorise a foundation trust. This is because the Government are committed to all NHS trusts becoming foundation trusts, so that all NHS providers have the freedom to innovate and drive sustainable improvements in quality and efficiency, and are accountable locally. I am aware that the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has tabled amendments which relate to the issue of de-authorisation and we will discuss those when we reach the appropriate clause.

Further, the Government will also ensure taxpayers’ interests would be protected by securing solutions that make best use of available NHS resources. We do not want patients to use, or taxpayers to subsidise, poor quality, inefficient services or providers. Instead we will ensure an end to the culture of hidden bailouts. That is why Clauses 131 to 143 set out provisions for a transparent financing mechanism to fund continuity of services during a period of administration. In addition, I reassure noble Lords that the existing regime for NHS trusts, as distinct from foundation trusts, set out in the 2009 Act, would remain in place. Through a separate health special administration regime, legislation for the first time will also extend equivalent protection to patients who use NHS services provided by a company. Provisions set out in Clauses 125 to 130 would achieve this.

I turn to Amendment 282ZA. The Bill gives Monitor broad powers to collect financial information for the purposes of monitoring providers’ financial stability. Monitor will be gathering a range of information, including financial, to enable it to undertake an ongoing assessment of risk. Monitor would also be able to intervene in order to support a provider to recover and to prevent failure where possible.

I understand that some noble Lords are concerned about the range of interventions available when a provider becomes distressed. Providers themselves can take a range of actions, including improving the management capability and expertise that they have. Commissioners are responsible for securing access to local services and they can use contractual levers to respond to poor performance and prevent provider failure. Monitor would intervene on a provider on the basis of a predefined distress test to prevent failure where possible. The CQC would monitor providers’ compliance against patient safety and quality requirements.

This locally led approach is especially appropriate where there is a pressing need for services to be reconfigured to ensure sustainability. I am sure that noble Lords will agree that a reconfiguration is more likely to succeed if it is based on close partnership working between commissioners, providers, local authorities and their local communities.

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[Earl Howe]

My Lords, when I refer to providers of NHS services, I am referring to NHS providers and non-NHS providers. It is to be determined who will contribute to the levy. That is being worked through and I am sure that the noble Baroness will have noticed from the document that we published the other day that this work is ongoing. We will make further announcements about that in due course.

On Amendment 304B, I say that the board should consult the relevant commissioners but it must make the decision itself, which is what the Bill provides for. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked whether social enterprises will be within the scope of the health special administration regime. Social enterprises are companies so they will be within the scope of health special administration. It is right that they are not treated as NHS bodies as when assets are transferred from PCTs robust rules apply, as I have set out in detail in previous debates. She asked whether the NHS Commissioning Board would nominate a lead commissioner if a provider becomes unsustainable. The answer is yes.

I hope that noble Lords will find that series of explanations helpful and I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

Before we finish this set of amendments, I want to mention a particular group. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for her intervention, as I want to refer to charitable sector providers who are finding fundraising particularly difficult now. They are beginning to be hit by the downturn in the economy and the downturn in giving, and there is a real risk that some of the charitable sector providers will find themselves in difficulty. If a levy is imposed on them as well, in terms of their registration with Monitor, that may tip them over. My request is that, in looking at all this, there will be separate consideration of the charitable sector providers from other providers.

[Earl Howe]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness and will take that point away.