Health and Social Care Bill

Lord Hunt of Kings Heath Excerpts

Wednesday 7th December 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Cumberlege]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this grouping and, lest I be drummed out of the Brownies, I would like to explain that there is a typo in the Marshalled List. It should read not “detailed merits” but “detailed remits”. As noble Lords will appreciate, there is a great difference, and I do not need any persuasion as to the merits of this Bill.

The purpose of my two amendments is to be probing; I am really just seeking clarification. The Future Forum was very widely welcomed by most people, but it further complicated the new proposals in the Bill regarding how we are to organise and manage the NHS. After years of being dictated to and micromanaged, there is a real risk of paralysis, and this at a time when commissioners need to reach decisions and be truly radical.

As I understand the proposed structure, the national Commissioning Board and clinical commissioning groups will be supported by clinical networks, clinical senates, commissioning support organisations and health and well-being boards, which will work in partnership with them. In addition, we have a new public health system, which we debated last Monday, with the creation of Public Health England and the establishment of HealthWatch England and Local HealthWatch to try to improve patient and public involvement. This has the potential to cause confusion and duplication if the Government are not clear about the accountabilities, roles and responsibilities of these different organisations. I would like to take a very serious example: it is still unclear who will take the lead on the commissioning of specialist doctors and nurses responsible for safeguarding children within the NHS.

At a national level, the movement from a single department of state to a more dispersed range of organisations, including the national Commissioning Board, Public Health England, HealthWatch England, Monitor and the Care Quality Commission, could have a similar effect. The danger is that the NHS could find itself in paralysis at just the moment that it needs to make key decisions that are crucial for the sustainability of parts of the service. In particular, some of the important decisions on potential service reconfigurations are urgent if the NHS is to meet the Nicholson challenge and at the same time fulfil its commitment to high quality and safe services to patients.

It is still unclear to me, and I know that it is to some others, how the respective responsibilities and accountabilities of commissioners, providers and regulators for quality are intended to work together. We also need to ensure that additional complexity does not result in an increased administrative burden or financial cost, as the noble Lord, Lord Warner, has said, falling on healthcare organisations. I think that my noble friend gave an undertaking on that on Monday but further clarification would be welcome.

Because of these concerns about the complexity of the new structure, I am asking the Minister if he could look seriously at this issue; go beyond the organograms and design detailed remits and powers for all those in the system to minimise confusion, gaps and duplication; and be as clear as possible at the outset as the reforms are implemented, while at the same time keep under review and address any confusion, gaps and duplication between the components in the system. Change is always a challenge. The more we can reduce muddle and confusion from the outset, the more successful these reforms will be.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group which concern the duty of the Secretary of State to keep health service functions under review. This is an important provision. I note that on what will probably be the last day in Committee, we have Amendment 354, which relates to a requirement on the Secretary of State to publish a report which can then be debated by Parliament. Although it is not grouped with this amendment, it is highly relevant to it.

It would be helpful to know from the Minister just how these matters are going to be monitored and how adjustments can be made in the light of experience. As my noble friend Lord Warner suggested, although we are not going to be allowed to see the risk register—I am very doubtful that we will see it before the Bill has passed through your Lordships' House—we know that considerable risks will come with these changes. The noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, spelled out some of the key issues that we face. The last thing that the health service needs is a massive reorganisation. Clearly, there are risks and it is right that there should be a regular review by the Secretary of State.

It is also right that the Secretary of State, when reviewing the operation of the changes, reviews all parts of it. I am extremely puzzled by Clause 49 concerning the duty to keep under review. The Bill sets out the bodies to be reviewed. They are the NHS Commissioning Board, Monitor, the Care Quality Commission, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, the Health and Social Care Information Centre and special health authorities. There is no mention of the plethora of bodies that will exist in the new system. There is no mention of clinical senates, the local field forces of the NHS Commissioning Board or health and well-being boards. Quite remarkably, there is nothing about clinical commissioning groups. Perhaps the noble Earl could tell me why the effectiveness of the CCGs is not to be kept under review?

Perhaps I have misread the Bill and this will be done in some other way. But I find it remarkable that this Bill is built around GPs and clinical commissioning groups, which are untried and untested, yet they are not to be kept under review. Looking at the architecture of this Bill, one begins to see very tight control of most of the health service but when it comes to clinical commissioning groups, issues of corporate governance, conflicts of interest or any of the other matters, it is incredibly light touch. It is as if we are to believe that, somehow, this part of the reforms is believed by the Secretary of State to be so remarkably able to carry out its duties that very little monitoring, performance management or review is to be undertaken. I would be grateful to know why clinical commissioning groups in particular have been left out of this list.

Amendment 243A concerns the annual report. In Clause 50 we see a requirement on the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on the performance of the whole service in England, which must be laid before Parliament. That, of course, is welcome. But my amendment asks that the report should include a statement on progress towards reducing relevant inequalities, on integration of services, on waiting time performance, and on health outcome performance. No doubt the noble Earl will argue that it is a list, and that the Secretary of State’s annual report is bound to cover these matters.

However, we are in new territory when it comes to specifying matters in the Bill. We are told that the Secretary of State is stepping back from involvement in the National Health Service, and that we should not worry about that, because there will be a mandate, and a constitution. All will be well. Those of us with some experience in these matters are rather doubtful as to whether that is sufficient in terms of accountability. In that context, it is right for Parliament to set out some details which we would expect the Secretary of State to report annually. Of course, there may well be other matters which one would wish the Secretary of State to report on, but my four areas cover some of the main points.

Amendment 245B relates to the intervention orders under the 2006 Act. I would be grateful if the noble Earl would confirm whether those intervention orders apply to the NHS Commissioning Board and clinical commissioning groups. If they do not, perhaps he could explain why not?

Amendment 245C deals with liabilities and the Secretary of State’s responsibility in relation to NHS organisations. Again, could the Minister confirm whether this duty applies to the NHS Commissioning Board and to clinical commissioning groups?

Amendment 245ZA relates to the general power of the Secretary of State. In page 289, line 30, the Government seek to dissipate the general power of the Secretary of State, as is currently set out in Section 2 of the 2006 Act. I realise that this takes us back to the crucial debate we had on day 1 about the powers and duties of the Secretary of State. The Explanatory Note which relates to this says that the reason for changing the wording is because there is no longer a duty on the Secretary of State to provide services. Given that those matters have been, in a sense, put to one side, is this part of the package that is being looked at, because it does relate to the general powers of the Secretary of State?

My noble friend Lord Warner made some very apposite points which I certainly support, and I was very interested in the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege. I had been agonising about her amendments, and she has very helpfully clarified a point for all of us. She has really put her finger on it. I am disappointed that she did not take part in our debate at our last sitting ,when we discussed the complexity of the new arrangements.

We were promised a streamlined approach. What we have got instead is a highly complex set of arrangements. The NHS Confederation has expressed its concern about their complexity. I therefore like the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, that asks the Government to try to clarify for us who on earth is responsible for what in the new system.

When it comes to the key issues of the reconfiguration of specialist services and of funding, someone out there is going to have to hold the reins. Some agency or body is going to have to sort the problems out. It ain’t going to be the clinical commissioning groups. They are too small and they will not be able to do it, so someone else will have to. Is it going to be the clinical senates, or are we going to have to rely on the local government health and well-being boards, or will it actually be the local offices of the NHS Commissioning Board? I know that it will be the local offices of the NHS Commissioning Board. If that is so, we come back to the fact that that is patently going to be where the power is, and surely they ought to be made accountable. That is why I had an amendment down on our last day in Committee to turn them into statutory bodies. I detected a modicum of sympathy around the Committee, but not much more than that. However, the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, as a distinguished former regional health authority chairman, knows that when we had the RHAs it was they that, in the end, had to intervene and sort problems out. There needs to be some sort of agency to do that in the future, and I think we should be told.

[Baroness Murphy]

My Lords, I had not intended to intervene but I have been stimulated to do so by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. The model being described of the Commissioning Board and its regional offices—the outposts—is very similar to the model that functions rather well for universities. There is the Higher Education Funding Council for England, which is centralised but also corporate with all its regional offices. The vice-chancellors, who you might say are the chief executives of the local organisations, relate directly to HEFCE. However, the regional executive officers are there to act as a moral support and a conduit. They do not necessarily sort out problems, but at least they are aware of them and know which areas the central body ought to be looking at. That is not so different from the way the regional officers from the Department of Health worked during the time of the district health authorities, between 1983 and 1990. If it is well done, and it has certainly functioned well for the duration of HEFCE, then it seems to me that it is a model which can be built on and developed. Is not that the way the problems the noble Lord is talking about will be resolved?

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her helpful intervention and I fully accept what she says. I want to make two points. First, we need an acknowledgment by the Government that there is going to be a kind of intermediate tier that, in the end, they can turn to when there are problems—if CCGs cannot work out a strategic approach or if reconfiguration is not taking place, as well as all the things that arise in the health service generally. My second argument is that I believe the health service is somewhat different from HEFCE in that it touches everybody, and the kind of issues that this intermediate tier will intervene on are likely to concern the public much more. There is then a case for making the intermediate tier a statutory body. Essentially there are two points here. I certainly agree with the noble Baroness about the importance of a helpful enabling intermediate tier which occasionally needs to intervene.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, as I have observed on earlier occasions, I believe that this Bill increases Ministers’ accountability for the health service through a range of mechanisms. However, perhaps I may begin by saying to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that I agree that the Secretary of State’s annual report is an important mechanism through which he will account for the system. I am sympathetic to the objective behind Amendments 243 and 243A, which seek to specify areas for inclusion in the Secretary of State’s annual report, but I can reassure noble Lords that I expect to see mention of areas such as the reduction of inequalities set out in the report, as these issues are the foundation of a high-performing health service.

The Bill also sets out extensive powers of intervention in the case of failure, which are essential if Ministers are to be able to retain ultimate accountability for the health service. The intervention powers in the Bill are specific to the organisations to which they apply, which is the issue covered by Amendments 245B and 245C. With that point in mind, I believe that the powers set out by the Bill strike the right balance, enabling appropriate freedom for NHS bodies while ensuring that the Secretary of State can intervene in the event of their failure.

The Secretary of State’s duty of keeping performance under review only applies to national arm’s-length bodies. It does not refer to CCGs. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, questioned why that was. We think that is right; however, the CCGs will very definitely be kept under review. The Bill sets out a robust process for the board to hold CCGs to account and sets out extensive powers for the board to keep the performance of CCGs under review and to step in where they are not performing.

The noble Lord also queried why there was no mention of a range of other bodies, such as senates and field forces. The answer is that they are part of the NHS Commissioning Board, which is specifically mentioned. As regards health and well-being boards, as the noble Lord will know, we intend them to be part of local government. I do not think local authorities would take very kindly to the Secretary of State for Health keeping them under review.

There are also a number of amendments in this group that are concerned with the transparency and accountability of arm’s-length bodies, such as the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Warner. Much like the Secretary of State’s annual report, each arm’s-length body’s annual report and accounts must be laid before Parliament. I simply remind the Committee that all ALBs are under a duty to exercise their functions effectively, efficiently and economically, and the Secretary of State is required to keep under review how effectively they are exercising their duties and functions.

Finally, I turn to co-operation between the bodies in the system. The Bill sets out a formal duty on each organisation to co-operate, and the department will hold organisations to account for the way they work with each other, not just how they perform their own functions. As regards Amendments 240A, 243ZA, 350 and 351, I hope I can reassure noble Lords that, through these two routes, the department will work to ensure that duplication is prevented and gaps do not emerge. If the Secretary of State believes that the duties of co-operation are being breached or are at significant risk of being breached, he will be able to write formally and publicly to the organisations. If the breach is significant, sustained and having a detrimental effect on the NHS, the Secretary of State will have a further ability to lay an order specifying that the organisation should take certain actions only with the approval of another specified body, other than the Secretary of State himself.

Amendment 245ZA looks to reinstate a power at Section 2 of the National Health Service Act 2006, which would enable the Secretary of State to provide services. We believe that the role of the Secretary of State should be one of oversight, direction-setting and intervention when organisations are failing. We have had many hours of valuable discussion on this topic; so while I fully understand the various concerns raised by noble Lords, I remind the Committee that all sides of this House have agreed to a process of engagement and discussion on this subject. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked specifically in relation to this amendment whether this issue was covered by that process. The Clauses 1 and 4 process, as I call it, is considering the issue of the Secretary of State’s accountability for the NHS in the round rather than specific clauses in the Bill; so, yes, this would be covered by that process.

I hope that I have provided enough detail on these clauses to enable the noble Lord to withdraw this amendment.