Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hanson of Flint and Lord Clement-Jones

Report stage
Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, the government amendments in this group are what I will term minor drafting changes designed to clarify the operation of the new offences in Clauses 65 to 67 and 69.

Amendments 199 to 208 and 210 to 229 make minor changes to ensure that the operation of the child sexual abuse image-generator offence at Clauses 65 to 67 is clear and consistent across the United Kingdom. Amendments 230 to 233 make drafting changes to clarify the language used in the “paedophile manual” offence at Clause 69.

These amendments do not modify the policy intention behind these offences; rather, they make necessary clarificatory changes to ensure that they operate effectively. I beg to move and hope that the House will agree.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the Government’s technical amendments. We spent some time in Committee debating the definition of a “thing” used to generate horrific CSA images. I am pleased that the Government have tabled Amendment 201 to clarify that a “thing” explicitly includes a service.

Modern AI is not just a program sitting on a hard drive but an ephemeral, cloud-based service. By adopting this broader language, we ensure that those who provide the underlying infrastructure for CSA image generation cannot evade responsibility through technical loopholes. These may appear to be technical drafting changes, but they provide the necessary teeth for the primary offences in Clauses 65 to 67.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hanson of Flint and Lord Clement-Jones

Report stage
Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group in my name are substantially the same as those that I tabled in Committee. As the House may recall, I withdrew those amendments following concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but today I am reintroducing them for the House’s consideration. The amendments relate to the provisions in Clauses 31 to 35, which introduce stricter two-step age verification checks for the sale and delivery of knives and crossbows bought online.

For the House’s convenience I will recap: Clauses 31 and 32, on knives, and Clauses 33 and 34, on crossbows, will require at the point of sale, or point of sale or hire, for crossbows, specific checks to include photographic identity plus a current photograph; and, at the point of delivery, photographic identity checks; and they will create a new offence of delivering a package containing a knife or crossbow to someone other than the buyer—if the buyer is an individual, as opposed to, for example, a company—so that knives and crossbows cannot be left on doorsteps or with neighbours.

These amendments clarify that the passport or driving licence required as proof of age for a remote sale of a knife, or for a remote sale or hire of a crossbow, must be a physical version. We are also again adding provisions that will allow the Secretary of State to make regulations, subject to—I hope this helps the House—the affirmative procedure, prescribing an alternative process for age verification, such as digital ID. These amendments are required to ensure that a digital ID can be used as evidence of identity wherever the physical ID is accepted.

In Committee the noble Lord, Lord Davies, raised concerns that the use of digital ID would be mandatory. However, I assure him that this is not a blanket requirement mandating the use of digital ID to purchase knives or crossbows; it is simply making provision for alternative forms of ID, digital or otherwise, to be used. This is to ensure that the legislation keeps pace with future potential developments in digital ID. I know that the Benches opposite have concerns about the Government’s plans for digital ID, but we have been clear that under those plans it will not be mandatory to have a digital ID. I hope that that helps the noble Lord. These provisions are about giving people a choice in how they verify their identity. It will continue to be possible for the purchaser to present a physical passport or driving licence, where they have one, as an alternative to a specified digital ID.

Furthermore, with the permission and support of the authorities in Scotland and Northern Ireland, these amendments also extend these clauses to Scotland and Northern Ireland.

We are amending the legislation to ensure that all contractors in the delivery chain are responsible for age and ID verification on delivery of bladed products and crossbows to residential premises. This is to account for situations where the delivery company engaged by the seller to deliver the bladed product sub-contracts the delivery to other companies. We believe that it is essential that all companies in the chain are responsible for ensuring that age and identity are verified before the package is handed over to the buyer; otherwise, regulations made under the Bill would be meaningless.

I hope that, having reflected on the debate in Committee, and given the changes and the clarification I have given, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will be content with these government amendments. There are other amendments in the group. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will, if he so wishes, move Amendment 177. I will respond to the noble Lord once I have heard his speech. For the moment, I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am not sure whether I am in order. I am looking at the noble Lord, Lord Katz, who is nodding, which is good news. I thank him; it is much appreciated. There is nothing worse than writing a speech and being unable to deliver it.

I welcome the government amendments in this group, brought forward by the Minister, concerning the remote sale and delivery of knives and bladed articles. As I noted in Committee, we on these Benches fully support the intent behind the Government’s measures in this area. We must strengthen accountability for businesses and sellers in tackling online knife sales. We welcome the robust two-step age-verification checks being implemented. It is entirely right that we ensure a consistent UK-wide approach by extending these provisions, including those relating to crossbows, to Scotland and Northern Ireland. It is vital that the law across the home nations is exactly on the same footing, so that criminals cannot exploit cross-border differences to acquire lethal weapons.

I also welcome the amendments that clarify the rules around identity documents. The requirement for a physical identity document to be shown upon the delivery of a bladed product provides a necessary safeguard. Furthermore, we acknowledge the provisions allowing the Secretary of State to prescribe alternative age-verification steps such as digital ID.

As I made clear to the Minister previously, there is no Bench more strongly against compulsory digital ID than the Liberal Democrats’, so we remain highly supportive of the assurance that analogue physical forms of identity will continue to be accepted alongside any new digital alternatives. Embedded among these amendments, however, is our Amendment 177, referred to by the Minister, on the remote sale of knives. This amendment requires that regulations mandate the reporting of bulk knife sales to the police

“in real time, or as soon as is reasonably practicable”.

In Committee, the Minister stated that he was sympathetic to the overall aim of this amendment but argued that the current duty in Clause 36 was sufficient and that exact timeframes would be handled later in regulations, following consultation. Sympathy does not intervene in a crime. We have seen cases where young people effectively act as arms traders, buying huge numbers of illegal weapons online for community distribution. If the police are to effectively track and intercept these bulk purchases, they need that intelligence immediately, not days or weeks later when the weapons are already on the streets. Amendment 177 would ensure that operational effectiveness is guaranteed in the Bill, turning bureaucratic compliance into actionable, life-saving intelligence.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, in Committee, I asked the Government to withdraw their amendments that permitted them to require by regulations the use of digital ID for age verification for the online sale of knives and crossbows. My concern was that permitting this would be the first legislative step towards mandating digital IDs. Since then, of course, the Government have conceded that digital IDs will not be made mandatory and, while I still harbour some reservations, I am now content for the amendments to be made to the Bill.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hanson of Flint and Lord Clement-Jones

Report stage
Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As ever, I am genuinely sorry that I have not been able to persuade the noble and right reverend Lord of the Government’s case. We have taken the view that “just and convenient” mirrors the civil injunction regime of the 2014 Act, passed by a Conservative and Liberal Democrat Government. They are not words from a Labour Minister but from an Act passed in 2014 that we are mirroring in the Government’s manifesto commitment to introduce respect orders. I am sorry that I cannot convince the noble and right reverend Lord of that, and that I have not persuaded him accordingly. We may—although I do not know—very shortly have an opportunity to see whether anybody else is persuaded.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I am afraid that I remain unpersuaded. The Minister keeps mentioning the manifesto commitment, but the manifesto makes no mention of the liability threshold for a respect order, so it is surely perfectly legitimate to question the basis on which the respect order the Government are introducing is based.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The basis on which the respect order is introduced, and the phraseology used, is the phraseology his and His Majesty’s Opposition’s Government put in place for previous orders. I am not changing the wording of anything that, presumably, at some point in 2014 he and other Liberal Democrat Peers walked through a Lobby to vote for.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Actually, I did not.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord has got me there. Let me rephrase my challenge. The noble Lord did not support it, but the coalition Government he supported passed the 2014 Act. I like to be accurate in my barbs at noble Lords, and I hope that accuracy persuades him that, even if he did not vote for it, some of his noble friends in the coalition Government of the time did—a coalition that our side of the House did not look too favourably upon. I accept his personal position, but if there is division of opinion in this House and we test it, I shall move Amendment 4. I hope that other noble Lords will not press their amendments, but if I have not convinced them, they will put them to the test in the House.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, as a final throw, I wonder whether the Minister remembers how the Labour Benches voted in respect of those orders at the time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I rise to express the support of these Benches for Amendment 27, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, which seeks to increase the maximum sentence for the new offence of possessing a weapon with intent. We entirely support the creation of this new offence, which rightly bridges the gap between the simple possession of a knife in public and actually using it to threaten or harm someone. Creating a separate category for those who carry weapons with violent intent is the right approach, to target the most dangerous individuals in our society. However, as my noble friend Lady Doocey made clear in Committee, if we are to treat carrying an offensive weapon with violent intent as a distinctly more serious crime than simple possession, that distinction must logically be reflected in the punishment.

As the Bill is drafted, the new law carries the exact same maximum four-year sentence as the blanket offence of carrying a bladed article. This fails to give the courts the means to sufficiently differentiate between those who might pose a threat and those who actively intend to inflict damage or harm. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, stated, this is not merely a theoretical sentencing debate. We agree with the stark assessment made by Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, in his review following the horrific Southport attack. He made it clear that four years in prison is simply insufficient when there is clear evidence of an intention to cause mass fatalities. He recommended substantially tougher maximum penalties for possessing a weapon with intent to use unlawful violence, using the Southport attack as a case study. In his March 2025 independent review on the classification of extreme violence used in the Southport attack, Mr Hall argues that where someone arms themselves with a weapon intending serious violence, this is properly comparable to terrorism-style preparatory conduct, and that the maximum sentence should be very significantly higher than existing norms for simple possession offences.

In short, post Southport, Mr Hall has been arguing that possession with intent to use a weapon in serious violence should carry far higher maximum penalties than the traditional four-year ceiling, and that a new preparation for mass killing offence, up to life, is needed to close the pre-attack gap. By raising the maximum penalty to 14 years, this amendment would provide a ceiling, not a mandatory minimum—and we would, of course, expect the Sentencing Council to issue clear guidance around how to categorise levels of seriousness, to guard against general sentence inflation. Nevertheless, the court must have the full weight of the law behind it in those, hopefully rare, cases where a lengthy sentence is deemed absolutely necessary for public protection. We cannot treat violent premeditated intent as a mere secondary factor. The punishment must be reflective of the severity of the crime, so we welcome this amendment to give the judiciary the vital tool that they need.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for tabling the amendment, and to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, for moving it. I do believe that sentences should be proportionate to the offence. That is why the maximum sentence for the new offence of possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon with intent to use unlawful violence has been set at four years’ imprisonment. That, I have to say to the House, is in line with penalties for other weapons offences.

Such offences currently carry a maximum penalty of four years, including other more serious offences, such as threatening with an offensive weapon and repeat possession of offensive weapons. It is also worth noting that even though the maximum penalty is four years, the courts—judges in court after trial—are currently not giving sentences anywhere close to the upper range on the sentencing scale, which seems to indicate that judges view the maximum penalty of four years as adequate. A maximum penalty of 10 years for the possession with intent offence would therefore, in my view, be out of line with other possession offences and potentially disproportionate, given where we are.

This is not meant to be a tennis-ball political point, but I say to the noble Lord that the new offence was included in the previous Conservative Administration’s Criminal Justice Bill, and the then Policing Minister, who is now the shadow Home Secretary, spoke eloquently in Committee on that Bill in support of the four-year maximum penalty. So there has been a change; that might be legitimate and right, but the Member for Croydon South, Chris Philp, spoke in favour of the four-year penalty that the Government are seeking only a couple of years ago. That is an interesting fact, but not one that I am intending to use aggressively; I simply want to put it on the record.

The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation has given a recommendation, which the Government have accepted, in his review into the Southport attacks: that the penalty for new possession offences at Clause 27 be kept at four years if the Government consider introducing a new offence of planning a mass-casualty attack. Let me reassure noble Lords that we are considering how best to close the gap identified. However, I do not believe that there is a case for increasing the maximum penalty for the offence in Clause 27 as proposed by the amendment.

I hope the noble Lord will agree with what the Conservative shadow Home Secretary said when he was the Policing Minister and will withdraw the amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hanson of Flint and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, these amendments build on Clauses 130 to 137, which confer powers on law enforcement agencies to extract information from online accounts as part of their investigations into immigration crime and sexual abuse cases, and to protect national security and our borders. Taken together, Amendments 441 to 444, 452, 393 and 394 ensure that the police can access information held in the online accounts of individuals subject to national security-related civil orders. These include terrorism and state threat prevention and investigation measures, as well as youth diversion orders, which are being introduced by clauses earlier in this Bill.

It is increasingly common for individuals to store data in the cloud for various reasons, such as to free up space on devices and, increasingly, because of the way devices or applications are designed, but also, regrettably, in some cases deliberately to make it less accessible to law enforcement. This is particularly the case with young people: police operational experience has shown that this cohort will regularly store data in online accounts. This data can be critical in supporting law enforcement to manage terrorist and broader national security risks. The increasing reliance on cloud data means that the police are likely to have an increased need to access cloud data as part of compliance checks where an individual—this is the important thing for the Committee—is subject to online restrictions as part of a civil order, such as the youth diversion order. These amendments will provide a clear statutory basis for officers to access cloud data when conducting a compliance check for an individual—again, this is the important point—who is subject to either a youth diversion order or a terrorism, state threat prevention or investigation measures order.

The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 contains a provision allowing for the extraction of information from electronic devices in cases where the user has died. Amendment 392 will clarify that this power also now applies to online information, as long as the authorised person is satisfied that the power is proportionate and there is no other practical way of obtaining the information.

Lastly, Amendments 389A to 389F are small but important drafting changes to Clause 132. The clause before the Committee identifies which senior officers may authorise the use of a power in Clause 130, which provides for a general extraction power for law enforcement agencies to obtain online information. Currently, the table refers to “Navy”, “Military” and “Force” but does not explicitly mention the police. I think noble Lords would wish the police to be mentioned, and therefore the amendments insert the term “Police” after each of those references to correct the omission. I hope that is clear to the Committee. This is in the specific circumstances that I have outlined in my speech, and I hope that noble Lords can accept the amendments at the appropriate time.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this grouping deals with the complex landscape of remotely stored electronic data, or what is commonly known as cloud access. Government amendments in this group, such as Amendments 393, 394 and 441, significantly expand the ability of the state to inspect online accounts through seized devices, including the interception of authentication codes. We acknowledge that, as evidence shifts from hardware to the cloud, the law must evolve. However, we remain deeply concerned by the widened scope for investigation, which carries an inherent risk of excessive prying.

These powers go beyond merely searching a phone. They allow law enforcement to walk through the digital doors of a person’s entire life—their private communications, financial history and medical records. As the Minister said, under Clause 169 these intrusive inspections can now be included as conditions of a youth diversion order. While the Government maintain that these are necessary to identify harmful online activity early, we must ensure that they are used only when strictly necessary and proportionate to protect the public from serious harm.

I ask the Minister to clarify the oversight mechanisms for these powers. We cannot allow the inspection of a child’s entire digital history to rest on a subjective belief, rather than a rigorous, objective assessment of risk. The digital ecosystem must not be a safe haven for perpetrators, but neither can it become a borderless opportunity for state surveillance.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope I can help the noble Lord. The Schedule 7 and Schedule 3 powers are exercised at pace. Some investigations, particularly those involving complex or sensitive matters, could well extend beyond three months. Evidence often emerges gradually and may be fragmented.

Statutory codes of practice provide a flexible and responsive mechanism for setting out detailed safeguards and allow for timely updates on operational and legal contexts. If we embed such details in primary legislation, with due respect to the noble and learned Baroness, that would create inflexibility and mean that we may not keep pace with changing threats or operational realities. The codes are subject to parliamentary scrutiny; they can be revised as needed and ensure robust protection. That is why I have put that argument before the Committee. If it feels that that argument is not acceptable, we will have to have that discussion later on. That is my defence against having keyhole surgery at this time.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will respond shortly, but I am sure the Minister realises that he cannot sit down quite yet. He talked about the process, the statutory guidance and so on, but does he accept the substance of the amendments and has he given an assurance to the Committee that, if it were agreed hypothetically that the statutory code guidance was an acceptable way forward, the substance of these amendments would be incorporated into it? Does he accept the case made so eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I think I have said that the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, are worthy of reflection, but we will put the discussion ultimately into the code of practice. The final settlement will be a consultation on the code of practice. I have heard what has been said today. There will be a consultation and an opportunity for the noble Lord, with his former hat on and his position in this House, and others to comment on it. That is the case I am making and I hope I have convinced the Committee. If not, methods are available. Given the late hour and the amendment target we are trying to reach, I will rest my case.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hanson of Flint and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling the amendment, which would introduce a bespoke criminal offence of digital identity theft. I know that he has tabled similar amendments—he was persistent on these matters during the Data (Use and Access) Bill. I heard the support from the noble Lords, Lord Holmes of Richmond, Lord Fuller and Lord Blencathra, and note that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, put forward a number of caveats to his broad support. These are caveats I share.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, asked whether I would read out a number of amendments to previous legislation. I may disappoint him by reaffirming those issues, as he would expect. Although digital identity theft is not a stand-alone offence, there are, as he recognises, several criminal offences already in existence to cover the behaviour targeted by his amendment. The Fraud Act 2006 made it a criminal offence to gain from the use of another person’s fraud. Cases where accounts or databases are hacked into are criminalised under the Computer Misuse Act 1990. I could read him the offences captured in Sections 2 and 6 of the Fraud Act, Sections 1 and 2 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, and Section 170 of the Data Protection Act 2018. All apply to the online sphere.

My argument, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, might have some sympathy with, is that to create a new criminal offence could be unnecessary duplication. The Fraud Act 2006 captures cases where someone uses another person’s identity and there is an equivalent common-law offence in Scotland. The Fraud Act establishes the offence of someone having in their possession or control an article which includes data or programmes in electronic form. The Computer Misuse Act criminalises unauthorised access and Section 170 of the Data Protection Act covers the deliberate or reckless obtaining, disclosing and procuring of personal data.

That is not to downplay the issue that the noble Lord mentioned. It is important and I recognise the concerns he raised. I hope that the Government will act decisively on these matters. We are currently in the process of transitioning from the Action Fraud service to a new, upgraded platform that will provide a better reporting tool for victims, stronger intelligence flows for police forces and enhanced support for victims. We are looking at doing what the noble Lord wants and upskilling police officers. We have completed a full review of police skills and the recommendations are being delivered through updated police training on this important matter. He will know that this Government have made sure that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services has now updated the strategic police requirement. That will be published this year and will drive forces to upskill their staff on wider police reform on fraud matters. We want to try to upscale and upskill capability, to ensure the police keep pace with the challenges that the noble Lord has rightly identified.

It is important to take on board the points that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, mentioned in his supportive critique of the proposals in the amendment. The Home Office has commissioned an independent review into disclosure and fraud offences. Part 1 of the review, which addressed disclosure, has been conducted; part 2, with Jonathan Fisher KC leading for the Government, will examine whether the current fraud offences are fit for purpose, and specifically whether they meet the challenges of investigating and prosecuting fraud, and whether existing penalties remain proportionate. I am awaiting that report, which may cover the areas that the noble Lord has mentioned. It is important that we have proper examination of that, and that is currently ongoing.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Without wishing to interrupt the Minister, could he give us an idea of the timescale? Would it be deliriously possibly to see this report before Report?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I should have tattooed on my forehead the words, “due course”. As ever, the commitment I can give is that it will be produced in due course. Report on the Bill will be some significant time away. We have another five days of Committee, with a gap for recess, and we will have a statutory gap before our consideration on Report after Committee has finished. It is some while away. The noble Lord is very adept at tabling further amendments on Report, should he so wish.

Part 2 of the report is being considered by the Government; we want to examine that and will publish in due course. I expect that, in the very near future, we will be producing the newly updated fraud strategy, which will address the evolving threat of fraud, including the harm caused by identity theft. Before the noble Lord intervenes, I cannot yet give him a date for that either, but I will try to help the Committee by saying that it will be soon. I will bring the fraud strategy to the House in due course, which will potentially cover some of the areas that the noble Lord has mentioned.

There is a lot going on, but there is existing legislation. I anticipate and understand that this is a genuine issue, and I very much welcome the fact that the noble Lord has brought it before us. I hope that on the basis of what I have said, he will—today, at least—withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and I will respond in a second.

First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, for agreeing with the thrust of the amendment, in his words, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his in principle support. I entirely accept the points that he made—indeed, if the additions are not there, they should be. Any amendment that is brought back on Report should definitely take heed of the reservations he raised.

For the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, I was anticipating that, in a sense, there might be too much continuity. During the Data (Use and Access) Bill, his colleagues pushed back on the idea of a digital identity theft offence in rather more adamant terms than the Minister has today. I am grateful for his in principle support, with all the reservations that he had.

The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, encapsulated quite a lot of this. As we move into the world of digital ID, having your digital identity stolen is an issue of digital and financial exclusion. It is going to be increasingly important. I was very interested that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, dug out the figures on this; the scale of digital identity theft is huge, so the number of people affected by what is effectively financial and digital exclusion is only going to grow.

However, I did take some comfort. There was a glimmer of light coming out of the Home Office, and I am not always used to that. I celebrate that, particularly in view of the fact that a review is taking place that may well report in the near future. Whatever the Minister has stamped on his forehead, I am sure he is impatient to see it, given his specific role as the Fraud Minister.

I agree with the Minister about the need for the police to have specific powers and skills. I welcome what he said about the upgraded platform in terms of understanding the evidence that is going to be under- pinning any move towards creating an offence. I think, almost inevitably, I am going to come back with something more refined on Report in the hope that the Home Office review of current fraud offences will come up with the goods. I live in hope, but often where the Home Office is concerned my hopes are only too frequently dashed. I live in hope, and I beg to withdraw Amendment 359.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I say to the noble Lord—and I hope that he takes this in the way in which I respond—that the review commenced in 2021, and it is now 2026. That is a long time for a review, and I would want to ensure that we come to some conclusions on the 1990 Act. However, at this stage, I cannot give him a timescale for the reasons that I have mentioned, about the complexity of this matter. I along with Minister Jarvis have had custody in the Home Office of these issues since July 2024; that is still three years into a review that was commissioned in 2021. I cannot give him a definitive timescale today, but I hope that the House can accept that there is active consideration of these very important matters raised by Members and that the Home Office plans to reform the Act. I hope that I will demonstrate that we are progressing this work at pace, but we need to get it right. Sadly, we are not going to be able to legislate in this Bill, but there is scope to examine issues at a later date. With those reassurances, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, unusually, light is flooding through the windows of the Home Office, and I thank the Minister, but I shall come back to what he had to say. First, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, for her support. As the Minister said, her huge experience in this area is valuable, and it is really valuable to have her support in those circumstances.

I also say a big thank you to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who thinks these things through in a very eloquent fashion. He more or less reminded me that, back in 1990, the thing that I was using was a dial-up Apple Mac Classic—probably a Classic II—which just shows how long ago the Act was.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I do not wish to disturb the noble Lord in full flow, but I have just remembered that I missed an important point for the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, who requested a meeting with either me or another appropriate Minister. I will take that request away and get back to the noble Lord in due course about a meeting with me or my colleague, Minister Dan Jarvis—or both of us—and anybody the noble Lord wishes to bring with him.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

That is a very useful offer for those who are involved in or have an interest in pushing this agenda forward. As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, also emphasised following the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, it is not just about being out of date; it is positively harmful. The Home Office appears to be aware of that, despite the stately progress on the review. The fact that the Minister has said there is a recognition of the need to update the Act is very helpful. He said that they have made progress in formulating a limited defence, but I am not quite so sure about that—let us see when it arrives. I am sure that he has engraved across his forehead the phrase “an update at some point”. That is not quite as good as “shortly”, but it is perhaps better than “in due course”. One has to take away the crumbs of comfort that one can.

What I take most comfort from is the fact that we have a cyber security and resilience Bill, which will come to this House after hitting the Commons, where it had its Second Reading yesterday. If the Home Office picks up a bit of pace, there might well be the opportunity to produce a clause there to provide the kind of defence that we are talking about today. I understand that the Minister has a rather Trappist vow at this point, in terms of being limited in what can be said, but we very much hope that he can be let loose at some stage in the future. We look forward to that but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Computer-generated Child Sexual Abuse Material

Debate between Lord Hanson of Flint and Lord Clement-Jones

Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The simple answer to the noble Lord is yes. The Government expect Ofcom to exercise its powers under Section 121 of the Online Safety Act where needed. A consultation ran to March 2025. We expect advice to the Home Secretary by April this year, and we will act when that advice comes forward.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, given the recent experience with AI platforms such as Grok generating unacceptable non-consensual sexual images and the warnings from the Internet Watch Foundation, I welcome recent comments from the Secretary of State for DSIT about Grok. However, what discussions are senior Ministers having with technology companies directly to ensure that they understand their duties under the Online Safety Act and will comply?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord should know that my view is that Grok is creating degrading non-consensual images, that that is an absolute disgrace and that Grok should take action on it. It is simply not acceptable. Ofcom has powers to tackle this. I will give a similar answer to the noble Lord that I gave to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile: there is a consultation on this. Ultimately, though, it is not acceptable. Ofcom will act, and if it does not the Government will.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hanson of Flint and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I remind the Committee that the position of any of these individuals—as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned in her initial contribution—will be subject to consistently heavy management. These are serious offenders. There is a Probation Service. There is a MAPPA process. There is the registration. I have given the assurance that both names will be included in that registration.

Every piece of legislation that any House of Commons and House of Lords passes is subject to people breaking it. That happens, but there will be significant consequences in the event of that occurring. I am simply saying to the noble Baroness who has proposed this amendment, and to the proposals in the Bill that are genuinely welcome across the Committee, that there is significant supervision of sex offenders, and the requirements are as I have outlined to the Committee already. I hope that on that basis, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I am glad he focused on risk mitigation, and I think we got there in the final few paragraphs of his response. We need to take very seriously what he said, and I hope that if anything he said needs qualification, he will write to us subsequently, because this is a really important area.

Social Media: Scam Adverts and Fraudulent Content

Debate between Lord Hanson of Flint and Lord Clement-Jones

Thursday 11th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the role social media platforms play in enabling scam adverts and fraudulent content.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

The Government take seriously the criminal abuse of online advertising to promote scams, distribute malware and launch phishing attacks. All social media platforms and advertisers must play a role in driving out fraudulent activity. Under the Online Safety Act, the largest social media and search services will be required to address fraudulent adverts on their platforms. More can be done, and further action will be set out in the Government’s forthcoming fraud strategy, for which I am responsible.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, we face a wave of increasingly sophisticated AI-generated scams, yet, despite what the Minister has said, Ofcom’s updated road map has pushed the consultation on the codes of practice for fraudulent advertising into mid-2026, meaning that new online safety protections are unlikely to be fully in force until 2027. Given the rapid evolution of AI fraud, what steps are the Government—and indeed the Minister, as the designated Fraud Minister—taking to speed up the vital protections provided by the Act? Will the Government ensure that robust action against all scam advertising is included in the fraud strategy and will be quickly implemented?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I met with Ofcom recently. I know that the facts he has laid before the House are correct, but Ofcom wishes to proceed at pace to ensure that it can bring that regulation into power as soon as possible. Early in the new year, I will produce the revised fraud strategy. The previous Government had a three-year fraud strategy. We have updated that. It has taken about 15 months to work on it. The fraud strategy will look at a number of key threats, and the emergence and future threats of AI will be a key aspect of the government responses. I hope I can bring the fraud strategy before the House in relatively short order in the new year for consideration, discussion and implementation.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hanson of Flint and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I think I can say yes to both those points. If I cannot, I shall revert to her shortly.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, on these Benches, we support the intent behind this blizzard of government amendments. Of course, as the Minister says, the effect of these amendments and other consequential changes is to apply tougher maximum penalties and provisions relating to offensive weapons in Scotland and, in certain cases, Northern Ireland.

It would be extremely useful if the Minister could say whether the law in each of the home nations is the same. I assume that is the effect of all these different amendments—that the UK should be on exactly the same footing, however and wherever you commit that offence. Even though I understand that it was at the request, in the first instance, of the Scottish Government.

We very much support the way in which the amendments reflect the gravity of the kinds of violence that plague our communities from these offensive weapons and that the manufacture, supply and possession of these articles will be met with the full force of the law. We welcome not only the amendments but the original provisions of the Bill, but we need to think of not just penalties but prevention. I hope some of those provisions will make individuals accountable with the digital identity, which we also support.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, I would like an answer to the question of whether the analogue identity provision will continue. Otherwise, that could lead to forms of digital exclusion, which I do not think that we or the Minister would welcome.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s comments, which I will respond to in a moment, but it is important that I clarify the point referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. I was half right. The answer “yes” is to the question of passports; it is correct that digital passports or driving licences can be approved documents. There is a power by regulation to add other documents; at the moment, the PASS card is not added to that as a form of identification, but obviously it potentially can be in due course, if Governments decide to add that. That will again be subject to regulation. I apologise, but the noble Baroness asked me a question and I gave her the answer in good faith, but it is best that we clarify that point now.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and I am genuinely sorry. I understand where he is coming from, and I am grateful to him and the Opposition Whips’ Office for giving notification that they would have concerns over those matters, but I am sorry that he has done it. We are in the 21st century; digital ID is becoming a commonplace issue. I understand that we are going to have steps to have age verification, such as acceptable digital ID, as the norm in future.

As I set out earlier, it is to allow different forms of digital ID to be used to verify purchasers’ identity information. When changes to the acceptable proofs of identity, digital or otherwise, are proposed, they will be subject to the affirmative procedure, so there would have been an opportunity for the noble Lord, and in both Houses, to oppose or question at that time, but I understand where he is coming from. I am of the view that as technology progresses, there will be different types of digital ID which might be acceptable. It is not an attempt by the Government to speed up or usurp the process; it is just future-proofing, because there may be digital ID on a range of issues.

As an example, I have a digital and a hard copy of my railcard. I show both at different times, depending on which one is easiest to get to. Digital ID is progressing, and it will continue to do so. There are potentially new digital documents, such as the recently announced digital ID card, coming downstream. As with any new legislation, that is still a matter for Parliament to consider, but if a Bill comes before the House—after the outcome of a consultation, it might be in the next few weeks—that is something we are trying to future-proof accordingly.

I hope that, given those assurances, the noble Lord is prepared to support all the amendments, but I guess that he will not—that is a reasonable position for him to take and one we must look at. To help him today, in a genuine spirit of trying to help, if the noble Lord remains unpersuaded, which I think he is—he confirms that he is—I will move only Amendments 57 to 70 and Amendments 193 to 209 to Clauses 28 and 29, respectively. I will not move Amendment 210A, which makes equivalent provision for Northern Ireland to that contained in Clause 36 and, in due course, the related consequential and drafting amendments to the Bill, so that we can look at these matters on Report and not have that debate and discussion today. At this stage, I will not move the amendments to Clauses 31 to 35 and the associated back-of-the-Bill consequential amendments. The Committee should rest assured that I will bring them back on Report, and if the noble Lord has his disagreements then, we will test the House. If the House votes one way, we accept it; if it votes the other way, we potentially test the House again. That is a matter for discussion and debate downstream.

There is nothing to fear from the proposals for someone having a digital ID and showing it when receiving a knife or weapon through the post. That is not something to be afraid of. We are in the 21st century —I am in the 21st century at least, let us put it that way. We will go from there.

I also assure the noble Lord that paper documents such as passports and driving licences will be acceptable as forms of ID, as well as potentially any digital versions of those in due course. I hope that satisfies his question.

I welcome, in a spirit of co-operation and consensus, the agreement from both Front Benches to the provisions for Northern Ireland and Scotland, so that in those areas there is a United Kingdom response from the three Administrations who deal with these matters in a devolved or non-devolved way. I commend the amendments I said I would move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, I thank him for what he said. I am slightly baffled. There is no Bench more strongly against compulsory digital ID than the Liberal Democrat Benches, so I find the Minister’s assurance that the analogue form of identity will continue—and digital ID in this instance, whatever is prescribed by the Secretary of State, is an alternative form of identification—wholly convincing, but if we must come back on Report and debate this at length, so be it.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

Will the noble Lord respond on the mandatory conditions on the digital proof-of-age pass, which he confirmed would be published before December?

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hanson of Flint and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group are technical amendments that affect provisions in the Bill containing data-sharing provisions. Within the relevant clauses and schedule, there are general provisions that bar the disclosure of data if such disclosures would contravene data-protection legislation. These protections against data-protection overrides are now no longer needed within the Bill, as a general provision to the same effect is now made by Section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by Section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. That Act came into effect on 20 August and, now that the general provision is in force, the amendments remove the redundant duplicative provisions from the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s confirmation that the amendments are matters of purely technical housekeeping, because they remove provisions that are no longer needed, and that this is caused by the insertion of Section 183A into the Data Protection Act 2018 by Section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. I must confess, having spent time in the salt mines of the then Data (Use and Access) Bill, that this did not come to my attention at the time, but I am sure it is a valuable piece of legislation.

This creates an overarching safeguard, ensuring that new enactments such as this Bill do not automatically override core data protection requirements. However, I must say that the fact that the Government’s intentions are technically sound in this respect does not remove the need for clarification and specific statutory safeguards in certain highly sensitive policy areas, which we will be debating in due course. I thought I would put the Minister on notice that we will be calling for the adoption of additional safeguards ensuring that new powers in the Bill are fair and proportionate: for instance, the DVLA access and facial recognition provisions in Clause 138, which grant powers for regulations concerning police access to DVLA driver licensing information. We remain deeply concerned that the power granted by Clause 138 could be used to create a vast police facial recognition database, and we will be looking for additional safeguards.

On Clauses 192 to 194, concerning international law enforcement information-sharing agreements, the cross-border transfer of data inherent in such agreements presents significant civil liberties concerns, so we will be calling for mandatory privacy impact assessments. That is just a taster.

In conclusion, while the Government’s amendments are technical in nature, we will in due course be using the opportunity to embed specific, robust statutory safeguards for a number of new powers in the Bill.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Hanson of Flint and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I think it is the Matterhorn at this stage, rather than Everest, but we will see. I thank the Minister for his very full reply, and I thank all noble Lords for their support for this set of amendments that I and my noble friend Lady Doocey put forward. The Minister has set out his stall; he is clearly very wedded to the current wording, and that will merit careful consideration. I recognise the point he made about this being a manifesto commitment, but Amendment 1 is not designed to negate respect orders; it is designed to review the existing suite of anti-social behaviour legislation in order to make sure that it is effective.

I recognise the point the Minister made about the 1 million incidents, but we do not know at this stage, other than from the Minister’s assertions, that the respect orders are going to be effective in dealing with those, or, indeed, whether existing powers would have themselves been effective.

The Minister did not really explain why the current legislation is inadequate. He also did not for one second admit that the current regime of PSPOs and CPNs had its faults.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The real difference between this legislation and the existing legislation is that action can be taken immediately. I think I did touch on that point, but if it was not to the noble Lord’s satisfaction, I apologise. We can take action immediately on a breach.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I think we are going to need some more convincing that that is the case, compared to anti-social behaviour injunctions. So, we remain somewhat unconvinced.

We have the common aim across the House of achieving an effective system that is fair and proportionate. The one chink in the Minister’s armour was that he was prepared, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to consider the wording “necessary and proportionate”. I very much hope that he will consider that as a possible amendment to his proposal.

I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that Governments reach for the statute book; we need to consider whether existing legislation is sufficient. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, called for a pause. Whether it is a pause or a review, we will definitely want to return to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

Just briefly, because this is a very important aspect of the enforcement of respect orders, I ask whether the Minister is saying that all that is needed is that it is shown beyond reasonable doubt that the respect order has been breached, or does one go back to the original decision on the civil balance of probabilities—the reasons for the respect order? Is it purely that you have to show beyond reasonable doubt that the respect order has been breached, in which case it is still a civil balance of probabilities requirement for the original respect order to be enforced?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

There is a determination, and I believe the legislation before us today is clear on that matter. We will debate this still further, undoubtedly, but there is essentially a respect order where the court will consider the potential breach and will make a judgment on it, and having examined that, it will determine the issue in relation to that breach. The noble Lord raises that issue now, but as regards Amendment 19 before us today, which is the point I am making now, limiting the scope of where an interim respect order can be issued risks further harm for communities as a whole.

I will just focus on the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned. She covered in the last series of amendments the same issue, in a sense, about capacity, which is important. It will be a matter for discretion of the applicant and the court to determine what requirements will be most suitable in line with the resources and options that are available in a given area. So, again, that discretion is there at a local level to determine; for example, if an alcohol awareness course is required, then self-evidently an alcohol awareness course has to be available for the individual to take up that course. Those judgments will be made at a local level by the local individuals who are determining these matters.

Again, I refer noble Lords to the economic impact assessment that we have published. The ASB package is expected to lead to

“an overall reduction in prison places”.

The respect order replaces the civil injunction, and we are not expecting additional cases per se. Once in a steady state, annual prison places for respect orders will stay more or less the same, and we expect respect orders to have a neutral impact on prison places, given that they are replacing civil injunction powers. So I hope that that again reassures the noble Baroness in relation to the resource question of the additional impact of these matters. With those comments, I respectfully request the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Apple: Advanced Data Protection Service

Debate between Lord Hanson of Flint and Lord Clement-Jones

Monday 31st March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I can only say that to my knowledge, that is a matter for another nation and not this one, and not this Home Office.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, further on a non-operational matter, are the Government always clear that their actions conform to the judgment of Podchasov v Russia by the European Court of Human Rights last February? It held that weakening end-to-end encryption or creating back doors could not be justified. Therefore, the Government could be in breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the right to privacy. Are the Government happy to be in the same boat as Russia as regards individual rights and encryption?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord will know that Russia and this UK Government are so far apart that there is no correlation between the two under any circumstances. In fact, we will also once again publicly condemn the illegal invasion of Ukraine by Russia. That is how far apart we are on these matters.

Access to data happens only under specific circumstances and with strict safeguards, so that robust action can be taken against child sex abusers and terrorists. That is the position of the Government. If any data is accessed, it is accessed by the Investigatory Powers Act for the tribunal, and under strict regulation, for the purposes of stopping bad people doing bad things.