Oral Answers to Questions

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 4th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Anna Soubry]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. That is why the new employment model that we are developing will deliver an offer to regular service personnel that supports domestic stability by reducing the frequency of moves and supports partners’ employment. We know that issues such as those two points often concern members of our armed forces and lead to a lot of dissatisfaction.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

Often the problem is the availability of housing. Will the Minister update the House on what discussions have been had with local authorities in general and Birmingham city council in particular about the provision of extra housing?

Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Wednesday 11th September 2013 Westminster Hall

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

Given that the office of the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) is on the same corridor as mine, I think it would be wise for me to share the time with him, in the interest of long-term relationships.

It was an honour to be asked to be a trustee of the new scheme, and I am happy to serve on the trust, together with the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray). There have been many tributes to Sir Neil Thorne today, and as I was sitting here I thought that as a former MP he will know that we all merely leave footprints on the sand of life and the waves wash them off. With some people, however, it takes longer before the prints are erased, and with Sir Neil I think it will take a pretty long time before what he has achieved so far, and what he will continue to achieve as life president of the scheme, is erased, and he should be proud of that. I do not think that the British are very good at saying, “I think I’ve done well,” but if anyone is allowed to say it, Sir Neil is.

The scheme is significant, but I want to make another point that has not come up so far. My first contact with the forces was a difficult one. I was the Health Minister who closed down the military hospitals, and I was not terribly popular at the time. One of the arguments used was, “You just don’t understand the forces,” which was valid, but the reason for the closures was that the royal colleges were saying that it was no longer possible to carry out the medical training in the way it needed to be done, and the NHS needed to make a contribution. Some 14 years on, the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine is in my constituency, and we are in the reverse position of the NHS having to learn from the medical services provided there. That interaction is important.

I then served on the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs for eight years, and on the Select Committee on Defence, but visits as part of the scheme have a very different flavour from the ones we do for Select Committee or ministerial work—the relationships are different. They key thing about the scheme—I was with the Navy—is that it affords the enormous and rare luxury of suddenly being able to spend four or five days thinking about only one subject. It also provides contact with people from the captain to the cooks on board, who really say what they think, and even though they are not our voters we feel that we had better listen to them and take note. It is the nature of that exchange that is so important.

I want to make brief reference to sponsorship and transparency. In the modern world, such a scheme must be absolutely transparent. Just like my fellow member of the Defence Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard), I do not think anyone has ever tried to say, “This is what we think you should be doing. This is a kind of sponsorship”—that might, of course, be just be a reflection of how insignificant we really are. This is a terrible admission: up until the point of the discussions on the scheme I had no idea that it was not just the Ministry of Defence that was picking the bill up. I had absolutely no idea that sponsorship was involved. I think that that was one of those rare occasions when ignorance is a sign of success.

It was right and proper to put the scheme on this new footing, and I am grateful to the Minister for helping to set that up. As a trustee, I will have much more involvement, so I ought to leave most of the time left to my fellow MP, the hon. Member for New Forest East.

I thank Mr Speaker and the Lord Speaker, as well as the parliamentary authorities, for realising that the scheme is one like any other, and for accommodating and facilitating it: the scheme is an extension of parliamentary activity in a different framework. The knowledge gained is fundamental. We should remember that Parliament came about because of the defence of the realm and how taxes were raised for it. We have forgotten that in many ways, but we should be brought back to remembering our primary function.

We should not just see the forces when they come back as injured soldiers—a real danger is that there is a public relationship with our armed forces only when they become victims—but be proud of what they do, understanding what they do and what a difficult job they have juggling politicians and the real world. The scheme facilitates, and I firmly believe will continue to facilitate, that learning.

Oral Answers to Questions

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 2nd September 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Our relationship with the United States is central to our defence and security, and I am confident that, whatever happened last week, the depth, strength and history of that relationship mean that it is a resilient one. The Prime Minister has spoken to the President since last Thursday, and I am confident that as a result of that conversation the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom will continue, and will remain strong and resilient.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

Given that the security situation in Syria is likely to deteriorate or certainly change, will the Secretary of State tell the House why last Thursday’s vote, whereby in essence the House did not agree to two motions, should not be revisited in future?

[Mr Hammond]

As the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Foreign Secretary have already made clear, this is a democracy. Parliament has spoken, and we take it that Parliament has spoken very clearly. We cannot keep coming back to Parliament with the same question. I think that the circumstances would have to change very significantly before Parliament wanted to look again at this issue.

Defence Reform Bill

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Tuesday 16th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who will have thought very carefully about these matters. Of course, this goes to the heart of the deliberations that we have been having. We are confident that we can put in place a model that will protect intellectual property—an issue to which I shall return.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

On a similar theme, what have been the discussions with the United States about the transfer of classified information in this context?

[Mr Hammond]

I shall talk about confidential information later in my speech. DE&S has access to certain confidential information at the moment. The arrangements will provide for the GoCo to have access to that confidential information under a regime that retains its confidentiality and ensures that it will be maintained. If the hon. Lady will bear with me, I shall address that very shortly.

If, at the end of the evaluation process that I have described, a GoCo is assessed to be the best value-for-money option, a private sector partner will be appointed to manage DE&S on behalf of the Secretary of State. As I said, this will be a radical change, but not quite as radical as some have suggested. The GoCo will always act as the Secretary of State’s agent. All contracts entered into will continue to be in the Secretary of State’s name, and strategic governance will be provided by a governance function that will remain within the MOD. The GoCo’s customers will be the front-line commands and the MOD itself; it will work to their agenda and their priorities. I can therefore assure the House that this is absolutely not about handing over billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money to a private company and leaving it to decide what kit to buy for our armed forces.

The commercial competition is under way, and we expect it to be completed by spring next year. In parallel, we are developing a robust public sector comparator, which we call DE&S-plus, that will explore how far it is possible to go in reforming the organisation, making the maximum use of freedoms and flexibilities that we can negotiate within the public sector. If, at the end of this process, the GoCo model is indeed the chosen option, legislation needs to be in place so that we can move quickly to sign a contract with the successful bidder once a final decision is made.

[Ms Stuart]

The Secretary of State might address this point later, but how does he envisage that the GoCo will be accountable to Parliament? Would it appear in front of the Public Accounts Committee or the Defence Committee?

[Mr Hammond]

The Secretary of State will remain accountable to Parliament, but we expect that the GoCo will have an accounting officer, probably its chief executive officer, who will therefore be liable to be called before the Public Accounts Committee.

Part 1 of the Bill sets out the provisions and safeguards necessary to underpin the operation of a GoCo. The most important element of almost any organisation is its people, and the smooth transfer of the DE&S work force to the GoCo operating company will be vital to its future success. The Bill confirms that the initial transfer of civil servants would be covered by the TUPE regulations. By virtue of being a contractor-operated entity, the GoCo would have considerable freedoms, particularly relating to its ability to recruit and reward its staff at market rates—freedoms that are not usually available to public sector bodies. The Bill confirms that in its activities on behalf of the Secretary of State it will enjoy certain statutory immunities and exemptions that are currently enjoyed by the Crown—for example, in relation to the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and the Nuclear Installations Act 1965.

In addition to those freedoms, we also need to put in place a number of safeguards to protect Government and taxpayer interests. Therefore, the Bill provides the Secretary of State with the power to create a scheme to transfer the business to another contractor or, in extremis, back to the MOD, should that prove necessary. The Bill also provides for the Ministry of Defence police to have clear jurisdiction to investigate any offences that may relate to defence work carried out by contractors. It also makes provision to allow the Secretary of State to disclose information that he has received in confidence to a contractor, and to authorise the use of intellectual property. Clause 7 and schedule 2 put in place appropriate safeguards to prevent the unauthorised use or disclosure of confidential information by either the GoCo or its employees.

I am determined to drive a step change in the way in which the MOD carries out its defence procurement business, and to do so rapidly. The gradual erosion of skills and capability in the organisation over recent years cannot be allowed to continue if we are to ensure the MOD’s ability to deliver equipment to the front line. The measures in part 1 of the Bill will allow us to make the transition to a GoCo at the conclusion of the commercial competition, subject, of course, to the bids representing value for money for the taxpayer.

Part 2 relates to single-source procurement. Open competition remains the best way of ensuring value for taxpayers’ money. However, sometimes there is only a single provider of a capability we require, such as nuclear propulsion units. Sometimes the need to maintain critical national industrial capabilities or sovereign control of the intellectual property in equipment programmes requires us to place contracts with UK companies without a competitive process. European Union public procurement regulations specifically allow this for military equipment.

This so-called single-source procurement typically accounts for about 45%—about £6 billion a year—of the total that the MOD spends on Defence Equipment and Support, and it is likely to remain at that level for at least the next decade or so. Clearly, in the absence of the disciplines of the marketplace there needs to be a set of rules governing single-source procurement in order to ensure proper protection for the taxpayers’ interest.

The MOD currently uses a framework for single-source procurement that has remained largely unchanged for the past 45 years—the so-called yellow book. Under this system, which is voluntary, the profit that contractors can earn is fixed, but there are few if any incentives for them to reduce costs. Clearly, this does not serve the best interests of the taxpayer and neither does it help industry to maintain a competitive focus that will allow it to succeed in export markets. It is therefore in the interests of both the MOD customer and its industrial suppliers to create a framework with incentives for efficient and competitive behaviour.

In 2011 the Government commissioned Lord Currie of Marylebone to undertake an independent review of the yellow book. He recommended a new framework based on transparency, with much stronger supplier efficiency incentives and underpinned by more robust governance arrangements. Based on his recommendations and following extensive consultations with our major single-source suppliers, we have developed a framework that will be introduced through regulations provided for in part 2 of the Bill. At its core is the principle that industry gets a fair profit in exchange for providing the MOD with transparency on costs and the protections we need to ensure value for money. It will align the MOD and industry by allowing additional profit to be earned through delivery of defined efficiencies, sharing the benefits between industry and the taxpayer. A statutory basis for the regime will ensure widespread coverage across our single-source supply base and allow application of the regime throughout the single-source supply chain.

To police the new framework we will create a small, arm’s length body, to be known as the single source regulations office, with approximately 30 staff. Its role will be to keep the statutory framework under review and to monitor adherence to it. It will replace an existing non-departmental public body that has little power other than to oversee a voluntary framework that can be amended only by consensus. The existing regime has failed to evolve to reflect changing circumstances, largely because either party can block any change that it regards as contrary to its own interests.

The single source regulations office will ensure that we do not have to wait another 45 years to update the regime. It will be a source of expert advice to the Secretary of State and it will also act as expert adjudicator in disputes between the MOD and our single-source suppliers. Crucially, it will advise the Secretary of State on the setting of key profit rates for single-source contracts.

Critical to ensuring that the MOD is able to negotiate prices that are fair and reasonable to both suppliers and taxpayers is the generation of better quality and more standardised cost data. Therefore, regulations enabled by this Bill will introduce a requirement for standard reports throughout the life of single-source contracts worth more than £5 million, allowing the MOD to build up a database against which future pricing assumptions can be judged and on the basis of which more robust, long-term cost forecasts can be made.

On contracts above £50 million, suppliers will also have to provide quarterly contract reports to support effective contract management, report any relevant events and deliver information about their overhead costs, allowing us better to align the industrial capacity the MOD is paying for with our long-term capability requirements. Clause 25 also creates a power for the MOD to gain access to suppliers’ records.

In order to ensure that suppliers fulfil their reporting and transparency obligations, the Bill includes a compliance regime. Failure to provide the required information on a timely basis will result in a penalty being applied under a civil penalty regime. Penalties will vary with the value of the contract and the single source regulations office will act as the appeal body for the compliance regime.

We recognise that we are requiring our suppliers to provide unprecedented levels of sensitive commercial information that would be of great value to their competitors or to market analysts. We need this information to ensure we get value for money on what is a significant proportion of defence spending, but obtaining proprietary information by statute imposes on Government a duty to secure its proper protection. In order to ensure that the increased level of transparency and reporting we require is not subject to abuse, the Bill creates a new criminal offence of unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information obtained under the new single source framework, such as forecast financial performance and investment or rationalisation plans.

Given that confidential and commercially sensitive information is already exempt from freedom of information requests, we do not think it will be necessary to bar release under the Freedom of Information Act in order to protect the information. However, I am clear about our obligation to our suppliers in respect of their sensitive information and the Bill creates an order-making power to allow the Secretary of State to invoke a full statutory bar on disclosure under FOI if the routine exemptions prove inadequate to protect the exceptional level of information that we are requiring to be disclosed to us.

Army Basing Plan

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Tuesday 5th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

Of course, new build and refurbished accommodation will be to the highest grade 1 standard of military accommodation. With respect to my hon. Friend, I suspect that part of our problem with accommodation is that some of it was originally built to last rather too long, so we are struggling to refurbish and patch up old buildings, some of which are around 100 or 150 years old. Building new building to modern standards is the way forward to provide the kind of accommodation that our troops deserve and that our covenant promises them.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

This is indeed an historic announcement. The British troops and their families will be greatly missed by the German people. My understanding is that the original treaty required two years’ written notice of the intention to withdraw and a commitment to pay for any environmental clean-up. Has the Secretary of State given that written notice, and what calculation has he made of the environmental clean-up costs?

[Mr Hammond]

I cannot give the hon. Lady a definitive answer on the written notice, but my discussions with the German authorities make it clear that they have been aware of our intentions for many years. They are completely comfortable with what we are doing, although of course they regret the fact that we are leaving Germany. We will of course be responsible for remediation of the barrack sites being handed back to the German federal authorities and work is already ongoing with the German authorities on scoping for exactly what is required, which will be different according to the intended future use of the locations.

Oral Answers to Questions

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 25th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Francois]

The case of Corporal Killick is still before the court, with sentencing deferred pending advice on his mental health. I hope that the House will appreciate that it would therefore not be appropriate for me to comment further today. However, in general terms, when on operational deployment members of the reserve forces, such as Corporal Killick, have access to the same extensive range of mental health counselling and treatment as their regular colleagues, including access to mental health professionals in theatre and treatment in military-run departments of community mental health, if necessary. This issue is a priority for the Government, who have invested £7.2 million in it.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

In response to my hon. Friend the Member for Gateshead (Ian Mearns), the Secretary of State said that he had “right-sized” the Army in line with the defence budget. How would he rebut the suggestion that that sounds like the strategic defence review was not strategic but budget-driven?

[Mr Philip Hammond]

It sounds like a Government who are rejecting the previous Government’s policy of sending people out to do a dangerous job without the kit, equipment and support that they need and deserve. We have a moral obligation not to put people in harm’s way unless they are properly equipped, and setting the size of the armed forces at a level the taxpayer can afford to support and equip properly is the morally correct and appropriate thing to do.

Afghanistan

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Wednesday 19th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for his remarks. I should have said in relation to force protection that the transition from company-level to battalion-level and then to brigade-level mentoring and advising will make the force protection challenge much easier by reducing the daily footprint of contact with Afghan forces and the Afghan population. We intend to recuperate to the UK large amounts of equipment, as we are planning to use much of it in the construction of our future Army plans, Future Force 2020, but we will, of course, ensure that any equipment that is not required back in the UK is either properly and formally gifted to the Afghan national security forces or the militaries of friendly neighbouring countries, or is appropriately destroyed.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

Out of which budget will the cost of repatriating and reintegrating equipment come? Will it come out of the £160-billion core equipment budget?

[Mr Hammond]

That is a good question. Our arrangements with the Treasury are that equipment that has been purchased as urgent operational requirements from the special reserve may be repatriated into core without any charge to the defence budget, but the cost of physically recuperating that equipment will be met from the core defence budget. In respect of armoured vehicles that have been purchased as UORs, therefore, the Army will have to decide whether it is cost-effective to bring that equipment back and overhaul and re-equip it for future service, or whether it is more appropriate to abandon it and devote the money saved to purchase new equipment.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Tuesday 11th December 2012 Westminster Hall

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure, Mr Leigh, to take part in this debate, not least because Westminster Hall is not quite as cold as elsewhere. I thank The Times for pointing out what the two Front Benchers will say in the debate: apparently, the Labour spokesman will ask for new rules of engagement, and the Minister will not entirely agree with the notion that our pilots are not sufficiently trained. I leave it to them to say their piece, but there are some areas I will not touch on because nothing is to be gained from repetition.

I want to start by defining the parameters of this debate. The Library helpfully says that unmanned aerial vehicles—UAVs—are used by the UK armed forces and are

“more commonly known as drones. These are remotely piloted aircraft that range from simple, hand-operated systems to high altitude, long endurance systems similar in operation to small aircraft.

UAVs are primarily used to gather intelligence and provide a surveillance and reconnaissance function for the armed forces. Only a handful of systems are capable of carrying weapons. The only armed UAV used by the UK Armed Forces is the Reaper and it is only used in Afghanistan.”

It is important to remind ourselves of those distinctions and limited use. The Library continues:

“Remotely piloted aircraft operate on the same rules of engagement as manned aircraft. However the growth in the use of armed UAVs, particularly by the United States, raises a number of moral, ethical and legal issues.”

It is the moral, ethical and legal issues that I want to examine more closely.

We can see in Hansard some of the questions that are being asked, and that the debate is about collateral damage and loss of life, which some people find difficult to explain. A wider argument is that if a country has armed forces, it uses lethal force, and it does so for a benevolent purpose: defence. We have not had much chance to talk about that, and I thought that such a debate would be suitable in Westminster Hall.

To put the matter into context, I understand that, depending on who is counting, between 76 and 80 countries have UAVs, but only three—the United Kingdom, the USA and Israel—use armed drones in military operations. The Minister will be more aware than I am that this country is investing extensively in that area, whether it is in the provision of specially designed headquarters for the Reaper station here or the Anglo-French initiative for Scavenger long-endurance UAVs, so there will be even further development.

That is combined with the strange situation that almost no one in this country under the age of 30 has a defined sense of who or what the enemy is. During the cold war, it was easy to define the enemy, which was another nation state. We now face warfare in which the enemy is no longer a nation state, but a group of individuals who are far away. The process is geographically remote, and some of the warfare engagement is physically remote. That creates problems.

Lethal force is a process by which we license to kill. Curiously, in this country that phrase is associated with James Bond more than with what our armed forces are doing. Politicians should spend more time thinking about the use of lethal force, and when it is appropriate. We need to take the public with us, and it has been clear, particularly when reading newspaper reports on the use of drones in Afghanistan, that in many ways we have not taken the public with us. In areas such as Pakistan, there is an argument that the fallout is greater than the benefits.

[Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)]

I congratulate the hon. Lady on securing this important debate. On the use of drones in Afghanistan, does she agree that we need clarity from the Government on whether they are sharing location intelligence with the United States on drone strikes in Pakistan? If we want to win the hearts and minds of the public, we must carry them with us, but when they see hundreds of lives lost in drone strikes, they turn against the west and pose a danger to our national security.

[Ms Stuart]

That is an argument, but I do not want to go down that road. The hon. Gentleman has had an Adjournment debate on that matter, which I read with great interest, but I want to take in new territory. Parliament must explain why it does certain things, and take the public with it. The 1868 St Petersburg declaration refers to the requirement

“to conciliate the necessities of war with the laws of humanity.”

How to get that right is an ever-enduring struggle, and I am not sure whether we have debated that sufficiently here. That is why I am pleased to have this debate. We have become casualty-averse, and there is a debate to be had about moral equivalence, and whether it is morally superior to deal with threats remotely instead of in hand-to-hand battle. I want so spend some time discussing targeted killing, which is the area of the drone debate that causes greatest concern about whether it is right.

A defence research paper on the ethics of targeted killing defines it as

“a pre-mediated state sanctioned killing of a named individual beyond the territorial and jurisdictional control of that state, in an international or non-international armed conflict or hostilities against terrorist or non-state groups.”

In other words, we are not talking about assassination or illegal killing for purely political purposes, and that is what people find most difficult to get their head round.

Some people argue that military historians may view 19 January 2010 as being as significant as August 1945, when the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, because technology suddenly allowed a move to something that was not sufficiently explained or spelled out in the ethical framework under which we operate. Two things happened: one was the killing in Dubai; the other, much more importantly, was in Pakistan where a US unmanned aerial vehicle killed six alleged militants in North Waziristan. That takes us to the legal and ethical dilemma that we must examine more closely.

On the history of lethal force, it may be worth reading “My Early Life” by Winston Churchill in which he describes a moment during a cavalry charge:

“Suddenly in the midst of the troop up sprung a Dervish. How he got there I do not know. He must have leaped out of some scrub or hole. All the troopers turned upon him thrusting with their lances: but he darted to and fro causing for the moment a frantic commotion. Wounded several times, he staggered towards me raising his spear. I shot him at less than a yard. He fell on the sand, and lay there dead. How easy to kill a man! But I did not worry about it. I found that I had fired the whole magazine of my Mauser pistol, so I put in a new clip of ten cartridges before thinking of anything else.”

The question these days is about the moral position of asking a man, or giving him the legal authority, to kill another within a framework that we find acceptable, because some people seem to think that if it is hand-to-hand combat, it has a greater moral force or value than if it is remote. I would argue that technology takes us to an ethical area where the framework might have to be configured slightly differently, but what the state is asking of the individual has, in many ways, not changed much. People are worried about remoteness, and it is worth remembering some experiments that were done in the 1960s in America, in the wake of the Adolf Eichmann trial, about the perils of obedience. Individuals were tested on how much pain they were willing to inflict on someone just because they were ordered to do so. In a military context, it is very important that we continue to keep that in mind.

The United Kingdom has always been clear that the chain of command, when it comes to killing or the use of lethal force, has always been retained within the military, whereas the United States and the CIA, as I understand it, are much more prepared to use civilian intelligence as part of that chain of command. That causes its own legal and ethical problems, because there is an argument about whether the civilians in that chain relinquish their right not to be targeted under international humanitarian law.

[Rehman Chishti]

On targeted killing and drones, the United Nations rapporteur, Christof Heyns, is now looking into extra-judicial killing in relation to the use of drones by the United States. Does the hon. Lady also think that that needs to be extended to see whether it can be applied to where the United Kingdom uses its drones?

[Ms Stuart]

I do not yet know, because I do not know what the outcome is, but to my mind, it is very significant that in the United Kingdom it is within the military chain, whereas in the United States it is not.

I am not trying to get us to ask today, “Is that particular application right or wrong?”. In the context of defence and us as parliamentarians, who are asking an Army and a public to order the use of lethal force, I want us to debate what the framework should be, rather than concluding whether it is right or wrong. I am also worried that the further away in the globe something happens, the easier it is—and the happier we seem to be—to jump to conclusions one way or another.

[Rehman Chishti]

I thank the hon. Lady for giving way again. My final point is with regard to the policy and the criteria. Drones were operated by the United Kingdom on 7 October 2007 in Afghanistan, so it is for many years that we have not had the criteria, policy, rules and restrictions, whether under a different Government or this Government. I absolutely agree, therefore, that it is vital for us to get it right.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

Until we get that right, perhaps we all ought to become a little more articulate and explicit about where and when we are prepared to say that something is right or wrong. One point that I was trying to make at the beginning of my speech is that for those over the age of 30 who grew up during the cold war, the enemy was very visible—it was another nation state, very close to home—and the space of theoretical ethical argument tended to be much narrower than it is now, when the war is happening on the other side of the globe. We should face up to that, and given that the Government are intending to spend extraordinary amounts of money on future investment, and that we have international co-operation, this place needs to be aware of what the rules are.

I want, therefore, to draw the Minister further on a number of parliamentary questions that have been asked. First, am I right in assuming that the United Kingdom has no plan to change the operational kill chain, as it is called, to be anything other than within the military? If that is so, does he agree that that ethical dimension must play an enormously important part, as an institution of the military, in their continued training, and will he give a commitment on that? Secondly, the Minister was asked when Watchkeeper will see active service, and the answer was that it will be at some stage or another, but we cannot yet tell. He said:

“The Ministry of Defence remains committed to deploying it to Afghanistan at the earliest opportunity.”—[Official Report, 29 November 2012; Vol. 554, c. 461W.]

It would be helpful to hear how early the earliest opportunity is.

Thirdly, there was a question about unmanned aerial vehicles from the new aircraft carrier for surveillance purposes. I know that there has been a string of questions about whether that is within the remit, and the latest I heard from the Minister was:

“Although not all would be suitable for carrier operations, the UK has previously conducted trials with a Scan Eagle UAV flown from a frigate and is currently considering another such concept demonstration.” —[Official Report, 26 November 2012; Vol. 554, c. 30W.]

Has there been any progress on that?

Above all, I would like to hear whether the Minister is contemplating any changes to the ethical rules, and if he does so, at what level will that happen? Will it just be within the military, and does he have any concept of a time scale? Will it go in tandem with the greater investment? As unpopular a view as this may be, I think this is a technological development in warfare that—if used within the right constraints and controls—is with us, and we had better make the best of it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I apologise to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart) for having missed the first few moments of her very interesting remarks. I was held up elsewhere. I apologise for that to her and to the House. I also apologise to Mr Speaker because I did not intend to speak in the debate and therefore did not write to him on the subject. However, having heard the very interesting contributions from the hon. Lady and from the hon. Member for Blaenau Gwent (Nick Smith), I hope that the House will forgive me for expressing a few ill formed thoughts. That may not take up much time, and we have plenty of time available.

I congratulate the hon. Lady on raising the issue. She is right to say that discussion about the ethics and morals surrounding the use of unmanned air vehicles is as great as or greater than discussion about the ethics and morals associated with armaments or any warfare that exists. It is a huge ethical problem and one that needs to be addressed. She is right to say that so far we have addressed it too little in this place, so I congratulate her on raising it. I listened carefully to her and I commend the extremely subtle and intelligent way in which she approached the issue. I agree very much with every aspect of what she said.

None the less, there is a series of misunderstandings in the world about the use of UAVs. The word “drones” itself often brings into people’s minds an image of something that is almost by definition worse than any other kind of warfare. If we asked people out in the street, “What do you think of the use of drones—unmanned vehicles firing weapons at civilians in Pakistan, for example?”, they would say, “That is absolutely disgraceful. It is scandalous. We must stop it. It is wicked. It is wrong.” There is a significant degree of misunderstanding in the public domain about the use of these vehicles. Therefore, it is right that we in this place should try as best we can to correct it.

There are two aspects to the ethical considerations. First, there are those who say that the use of any weapon of this kind at all is illegal and wicked and should not be allowed. That was said by perfectly good pacifists in this building for many hundreds of years. They would say that any weapon that potentially kills people is a bad thing and should not be allowed, and we should disarm and turn our weapons into ploughshares, or words to that general effect. That is a perfectly legitimate, although in my view incorrect, stance.

The motto of my regiment, the Honourable Artillery Company, is “Arma pacis fulcra”, which is of course the Latin for arms are the balance of peace. I have always held very strongly to that. We won the cold war not because we disarmed, but because Margaret Thatcher took a tough line by arming the United Kingdom and supporting the United States in our nuclear deterrence. That is why the Soviet Union fell. Arms were very much the balance of peace in that context.

Therefore, to those who say that in any conditions UAVs are by definition a bad thing, I simply say that the same could apply to almost any weapon or piece of warfare that they care to mention. Of course, the tragedy is that people are killed in wars. An even greater tragedy is that civilians are killed in wars. That is an unacceptable and unforgivable thing, but unfortunately it does happen. Therefore, one of the important things that we must do in considering warfare is to work out ways in which civilian casualties—collateral damage, as it is rather heartlessly called—can be minimised. We must find ways of minimising the damage to civilians and those who are not involved in the conflict.

In addition to the belief that all weapons are a bad thing, there is a strange piece of psychology that people seem to have in their minds. The hon. Lady touched on it in her interesting tale about Winston Churchill in a cavalry charge at, I think, Mafeking. Is shooting a man from a foot or two feet away more or less ethical than firing a weapon in Nevada that kills people in Afghanistan? Most people would say that Churchill was courageous: he galloped into the teeth of the enemy and fired. He fought a person: he looked him in the eye and shot him. That is courageous. However, a technician fiddling with a computer in Nevada, who will potentially kill hundreds of people, is somehow being cowardly. He is hiding behind technology and saying, “We want no part of that; I’m doing it remotely.”

It was interesting to hear the intervention from the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) on the psychological effect that there may be on people who are firing these weapons at remote distances. Of course they are aware of what they are doing and of course they will be affected by it for the rest of their lives. The notion that because they are in a bunker in Nevada, they are somehow less affected by it than the chap on the front line is incorrect. The hon. Gentleman made an interesting point on that subject.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

I am very grateful that the hon. Gentleman mentioned that point, because that is where the institutional ethics of the training of our military come in to ensure that there is awareness that on the other end of every piece of machinery there is a human being and that therefore the relationship and the ethical considerations must remain the same. It is a constant battle of vigilance to ensure that that is never lost.

[Mr Gray]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. It is terribly important that we train all our people in the military and working in foreign affairs and elsewhere that there are human beings at the end of the weapon, whether that weapon is a knife used on the front line or a UAV from which a missile is fired remotely.

On a recent visit to Afghanistan, I was chilled by the conversation I had with a 19-year-old sniper in The Rifles. I said to him, “How many kills have you had?”, and he said, “Thirty-seven confirmed kills, sir, and about 40 or 50 others unconfirmed.” There was a young man of 19 who knew that he had killed 37 people—I think it was 37—and had probably killed 70 or 80. Is the psychological effect on him any greater or any less than the psychological effect on the man sitting in the bunker in Nevada or wherever it may be who is called on to press the switch that finally fires the weapon from the UAV?

There are two elements of concern. One is about the use of weapons themselves, which I think is a perfectly reasonable concern, although not one to which I would subscribe. The second is the question whether a remote killing is somehow less brave or less ethically supportable than an immediate killing. Again, I would not support that particular angle.

That leads me away from the negatives that people might raise on the subject of UAVs to the positives. As I said, it is terribly important that in all our warfare, whatever we are doing, whether it involves planes, bombs or UAVs, we seek to minimise civilian casualties. The use of UAVs and this extremely complex high technology is precisely the thing that will reduce collateral damage. We can, by using these things, spot a particular person from a very great height and track his movements. We know precisely who he is and can kill him very precisely, very technically, and minimise damage to civilians who may be nearby. That contrasts sharply with the use of artillery, for example. One round takes out a good square—1,000 metres by 1,000 metres—and who knows what is in that good square? It contrasts sharply with the use of bombs of all kinds, which also involves very substantial collateral damage. The use of these weapons is very particular and very precise and for that reason must be supported.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Dunne]

I will explain how the UK armed forces use rules of engagement that are clearly defined and informed by legal opinion, as the hon. Gentleman indicates.

RPAS technology is principally required and used by our armed forces for surveillance and reconnaissance tasks, as several Members mentioned, providing vital intelligence in support of our forces on the ground. While the utility of sensors is broadly similar to those aboard conventionally manned aircraft, RPAS have the ability to loiter for longer, building an intelligence picture that significantly enhances the situational awareness of commanders, forces on the ground and air crew.

RPAS surveillance and reconnaissance capability and the requirement for ever better intelligence, precision and situational awareness are such that they are now vital to mission success, as has been clearly demonstrated in theatre in Afghanistan. The UK currently only deploys RPAS for support of operations in Afghanistan. With the progress of technology and increasing appreciation of their military utility, the number deployed in Afghanistan has continued to increase, with further task lines of Reaper due to become operational next year.

To deliver operational RPAS capability for our forces in Afghanistan, a number of UK RPAS are being used for development trials and training in the UK and in a number of our partner nations. I confirm again that currently the operational deployment for RPAS is for the purposes of operations in Afghanistan, and that UK RPAS are saving the lives of both British and coalition service personnel and Afghan civilians on a daily basis. In that respect, RPAS are no different from other aircraft. The same rules that govern the use of conventional military aircraft apply to RPAS. As I said, UK RPAS are anything but unmanned.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

Just for clarity, can the Minister tell us whether there are plans to use RPAS against pirate actions off the coast of Somalia? At the moment, he seems to be stressing that we are looking at the system in terms of Afghanistan and not further.

[Mr Dunne]

I was not intending to get into the wider deployment of RPAS, but it is the case that we are about to embark on a concept-of-use demonstration trial to see whether, for surveillance purposes, a maritime system could be deployed in the future, which relates to a question that was raised by the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife. It is not at present beyond the demonstration phase.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Dunne]

As I mentioned earlier, the Royal Navy is undertaking a short-duration capability concept demonstrator, to inform the future concept of use for tactical maritime unmanned air systems. We are not intending to test a specific system, but a system will go through concept demonstration next year. The uses will be for the Royal Navy to decide, if it decides to procure a system in due course.

I think I have addressed the specific questions that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston put to me.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

rose—

[Mr Dunne]

I will give the hon. Lady the opportunity to ask one more question.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ms Stuart]

Clearly we intend to keep the chain of command within a purely military concept, but some of our very close allies do not. Do we have difficulties working with other Governments whose chain of command is not purely military?

[Mr Dunne]

As I have explained a couple of times, we are at present using RPAS on operations in Afghanistan, and at present we have no other operational use in mind for UK assets beyond Afghanistan. I think that is as far as I can go on that matter at the moment.

I will pick up on some of the comments made by the hon. Member for North Durham. I am grateful for his support for the continued use of unmanned aircraft systems. I am glad that he referred to the joint doctrine document, because it begins to set out some of the issues that are of concern. However, I do not accept the need to undertake a codification of separate rules for RPAS. As I have already mentioned, and as the hon. Gentleman acknowledges, all aircraft operators must follow national and international laws, together with the rules of engagement. Those rules are the same whether an air, sea or land-based platform is being used. Similarly, we have well-established command, control and supervisory frameworks for all our operational assets, so we do not believe at this point that additional measures are needed for RPAS. I will just pick up on the thrust of why I think he was suggesting that we need to take the public with us in our use of RPAS, which is something that I agree with. There is a greater role to be played by politicians and the military in explaining to the public the utility of unmanned systems from a military perspective, from the safety perspective of our own personnel, which is obviously vital, and in minimising the risk of collateral damage when weaponised systems are used. As a Government, we need to do more, and I welcome the help of the hon. Gentleman in advocating the use of such systems to the public at large.

Defence Personnel

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Thursday 6th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot). It is also a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West (Paul Uppal), who spoke in the previous debate and reminded me—this is important—that he probably arrived in the west midlands as a Ugandan Asian at the same time that I arrived there as a German. He now occupies Enoch Powell’s old seat and I have Neville Chamberlain’s old seat. That shows our extraordinary diversity and ability to assimilate and accommodate people from all parts of the world.

[Angus Robertson]

The hon. Lady is also holding a piece of paper in her hand.

[Ms Stuart]

Yes, I am holding a piece of paper—or several of them—in my hand.

Before the right hon. Member for North East Hampshire beats himself up too much about having been wrong, he should remember that we have not yet withdrawn from Afghanistan. I hope that we will both end up having to say that we have been proved wrong, but we should be anything but complacent about what happens in Afghanistan and about the ease of withdrawal. The closer we get to the withdrawal date and the more we have to ensure the safety of our own troops—we are not entirely clear who provides that security—the more difficult it will get. The situation reminds me of when children leave home: we cannot wait for them to leave home, but the closer the time gets, the more nervous we get about their having to step out.

I want to start by addressing a big issue and then move on to something more specific. I am often accused of having a typical foreigner’s emotional attachment to British institutions, which is probably true of a few people. I have always been extremely proud of a country that has a sense of itself and its role in the world, but the recent strategic defence reviews and what has been happening in other Departments have made me begin to wonder whether we still have that sense of self and of our role in the world.

I would assert that we now have a Ministry of Defence that says that we will provide the amount of troops that we can afford in order to balance the books, rather than starting off by saying, “This is the role we wish to play in the world.” I would have expected a strategic defence review to start by saying, “We have a Navy because we are an island and therefore we need x, y and z,” and, “Our air force is a certain size because we have assessed the risk from the air.” The commitment and engagement that we wish to see outside these islands should determine the size of our Army. I have seen no such clear statement as to what we are about.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I absolutely agree with and entirely endorse what the hon. Lady says about the foreign policy baseline for any strategic defence review, but does she not agree that, if we were to start from that standpoint, it would be almost inevitable that we would end up with a requirement that was vastly greater than the nation could afford?

[Ms Stuart]

That may well be the case, but we have to start with where we think we should be and then we can work out where we ought to be. It is not just the MOD that lacks that strategic sense. At one stage, the Department for International Development had a clear statutory duty of poverty reduction, but even that is being reviewed and rethought at the moment—I am not entirely sure where that takes us. Our Foreign Office is also reducing its influence. If we consider how this country projects itself to the rest of the world, we will see that there is a lack of clarity in those lead Departments that ought to provide a collective view.

I asked myself whether this was happening all over the world and looked at comparative figures for GDP spending on NATO. Even if we look back as far as the 1950s, there is a consistent pattern within the European Union. Our country and France contribute well over 2% of GDP commitment, so we clearly have a view on where we should be in terms of spending.

It is sometimes difficult to make comparisons between armed forces numbers, because we ended conscription. The Italian and German figures in particular—they sometimes include police forces—are somewhat misleading, but nevertheless the pattern shows that we are still big significant players. We have no sense, however, of why we want to be the big players. What are we going to do?

I want to leave the Minister with a final example of that muddled, confused thinking. In my experience, it is always when we are not entirely sure what we want to say that we end up constructing sentences that are utterly meaningless. The Defence Committee took evidence yesterday on the Army 2020 review and I was struck by something called, “Figure 1: Force Development Deductions”. I invite the Minister to look at the relevant paragraph. I will not bore the House by reading it. It has about 10 sentences and I am glad that the word “broadband” is in there, because that is about the only word I understood. I drew the attention of our witness, General Sir Peter Wall, to that paragraph and asked him about it, and he confessed his confusion about the precise meaning of that integral part of the report. He promised the Committee that he would consult the Babel fish and provide us with an English translation. I think that demonstrates that the MOD needs to be much clearer, particularly post-Afghanistan, of what we think our forces are for. It is no good just to say, “This is how much money we’ve got,” even though the money is important.

This might again be a sign of my emotional attachment as a foreigner, but I am always struck by the island blindness of this country. This is an island, so how can we compromise some of our surveillance abilities? What will happen to maritime security? It is staggering. That is my general point for the Minister.

My second point is much more grounded at home. Last week, I went to meet Malala Yousafzai’s father—the family are currently in my constituency at the Queen Elizabeth hospital and the Royal Centre for Defence Medicine, which do extraordinary work. It was particularly pleasing for me to see that good work, because I was the evil Minister who closed down the military hospitals in places such as Gosport and I remember being denounced in endless Adjournment debates for doing so.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

I closed the last one.

[Ms Stuart]

But we closed them not because we wanted to, but because the royal colleges were telling us that the MOD could no longer provide the best medical services. Ten years ago, the NHS looked at the Ministry of Defence and said, “You guys really need to step up to the plate and improve your act.” Now, some of the work within defence medicine is miles ahead of what the NHS is doing in terms of rehabilitation and care. We have unexpected survival rates among soldiers, which one can see in the latest evidence from Afghanistan, that are well beyond what the NHS could do. That is a good development.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Mr Mark Francois)]

To go back to the hon. Lady’s point about numbers, I declare an interest because my mother was Italian. The hon. Lady’s point about the carabinieri being included is right. In my experience, the Chief of the General Staff is a very plain-speaking gentleman. If there has been any difficulty with that particular paragraph, I am sure that she will get a very clear reply. I echo her comments with regard to the role of 3 hospital at Camp Bastion. The stunning statistic from that facility in Helmand is that however severely wounded they are, 98% of the people who go through its doors alive come out alive. That is an incredible statistic and we pay tribute to that hospital.

[Ms Stuart]

I also want to draw attention to the creation of the Fisher house on the site of the Queen Elizabeth hospital, which has 18 en-suite rooms. It will be ready next year and will have much better facilities for the families. That is another good development.

I do have concerns about the future. At the moment, our young injured heroes are young injured heroes. In 10 or 20 years’ time, they will be middle-aged, probably overweight like many of us, and will no longer have the image of a hero. Will we still look after them properly then? The military covenant mentions that point.

The paper on the military covenant, which arrived so nicely in time for this debate, refers to the establishment of

“a unified Defence Primary Healthcare Service”.

I urge the Minister to talk to colleagues in the NHS about this matter, because I am in no way convinced that the commissioning structures that are being put in place, now that primary care trusts are no longer doing the commissioning, are sufficient to ensure that the very specialist services that our veterans need are provided not just for the next year, five years or 10 years, but in the long term. It is so much easier for Americans, because registering as a veteran gives them access to free medical health care. We do not have that in this country and it is easy to forget that in years to come, they will still have very special needs.

I read through the report just before the debate and it states that we are planning to create that service, but we need to be more specific. Will it be a specialist commissioning unit? Will there be national commissioning? If so, how will it work throughout England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, given that health is a devolved issue? This is going to be key in the long term to veterans trusting what we provide through the military covenant.

This is a very useful debate. The key thing that I urge the Minister to go away with is that we need to have a much clearer sense of purpose and of what we want our armed forces to do. We must not just look at them when they have been injured or have given their life, as important as that is; I want them to be honoured, celebrated and recognised for the job that they want to do, and that is the job of fighting. We as a country need to have a sense of when we think something is worth fighting for. That needs to be spelt out at some stage or another by the Government.

Oral Answers to Questions

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 26th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Mr Mark Francois)]

I assure my hon. Friend that we take the issue of accommodation very seriously. Within a week of my appointment, I attended an Army Families Federation conference where one corporal in particular raised with me the issue of his quarters at Aldershot. Two weeks later I went to knock on his door to see them for myself. I hope that that counts as taking it seriously. We have recently put £100 million back into the budget for accommodation. We anticipate further announcements on this subject in the context of the basing review.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

In his exchanges with my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis), the Secretary of State agreed about the need to deal with corruption in Afghanistan. I understand that the first prosecutions in relation to the Kabul bank scandal are taking place. Is the Secretary of State convinced that there are any prisons in Afghanistan at the moment that would be secure enough to hold anybody convicted?

[Mr Philip Hammond]

Strictly speaking, this is not a matter for the Ministry of Defence. However, the working of the Afghan justice system does concern us, not least because our normal practice until recently has been to transfer UK detainees into the Afghan justice system to allow them to them to be processed. There is a great deal of work to be done to get the Afghan justice system into a satisfactory state.