Oral Answers to Questions

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 8th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced at the weekend, we have offered a further 125 troops to join the coalition troops training the Iraqi security forces, including more than 60 counter-IED trainers. Those additional troops will be the first UK personnel deployed to training sites outside Irbil or Baghdad and, subject to the needs of the coalition, will take our presence in Iraq to more than 275 troops. As well as further counter-IED trainers, we are offering specialist training in areas such as medical skills, equipment maintenance, manoeuvre support and information operations.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

Building and strengthening partner capacity is happening not just in Iraq but in neighbouring countries. Will the Secretary of State say a little more about what we are doing with Jordan and whether we are expanding our capability there?

[Michael Fallon]

We have begun the training of moderate Syrian forces in bases outside Syria and a number of people are contributing to that training. Progress will depend on identifying suitable moderate forces that are prepared to take the fight to ISIL, particularly in the north of Syria, and ensuring that once they are trained they are ready to rejoin that fight. We are making that contribution to the training effort being led by the Americans and proposed for four different sites, all outside Syria.

Falkland Islands Defence Review

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Tuesday 24th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Of course, such a degree of commitment and deployment of troops and aircraft would not be necessary if we did not have this continuing intimidation from Argentina. If the Argentine Government were able to accept the democratic wishes of the islanders to remain British, none of this would be necessary.

So far as resources generally are concerned, I know my hon. Friend understands that we are able to commit our troops, planes and ships around the globe within the budget we have at the moment. I note what he says about the 2%, and I know that he will join me in being pleased that we are meeting the NATO target this year and that we will go on meeting it next year.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

The Secretary of State said that the principal threat to the Falkland Islands remains from Argentina. Will he say a little more about the role that Russia seems to be playing? If the stories about the leasing of long-range bombers in exchange for beef are true, surely that must feed into a strategic review of the defence of the Falklands more prominently than it seems to be doing at the moment.

[Michael Fallon]

I have read the same reports as the hon. Lady. I do not think it would be right for me to speculate further on the nature of any particular arrangement between the Governments of Russia and the Argentine. Our job is to make sure that the islands are properly defended and to continue to respect the right of the islanders to determine their own future, and that is what we will do.

Defence Spending

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Thursday 12th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

I agree that we inherited a financial shambles, as I have said many times before, but if we are prepared to ring-fence the international aid budget, it becomes a question of priorities. My point is that we need to spend more on defence and we need to reflect what is happening on the international stage: we are failing to do that.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

It may be worth reflecting on the fact that in 2010 we spent 2.5% of GDP on defence, so considerable cuts have already been made. The 2% is a marker.

[Mr Baron]

I made the point earlier that defence spending as a percentage of GDP has been falling under this Government, but my message is not just to my own Government. There is a political disconnect between the extent of our commitments and the lack of funding that is not being recognised across the political divide. I do not hear either of the main political parties saying that we should scale back our ambitions in the world, but nor has either party made it clear that it is committed to at least 2% in the future. I personally would like to see much more than that, but everyone can see the terms of the motion.

The reservist plan has been a disaster, in my opinion, resulting in unacceptable capability gaps in the short term and false economies in the long term, as we throw yet more money at it to try to make it work. Matters are not much better in the Royal Navy, which has been reduced to a mere 19 surface ships, although a recent SDSR suggested that 30 would be more appropriate. In addition to problems with the new aircraft carrier, the lack of a replacement for Nimrod means that we are in the ridiculous situation of having no maritime patrol aircraft. We have to go cap in hand to the Americans and the French to police our waters against potentially hostile submarines. That is a ridiculous state of affairs for a country of our standing.

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[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

We have heard three excellent speeches, and I found very little to disagree with in any of them, but perhaps I did disagree with the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) when he spoke of our “misguided” interventions. Surely it was not our interventions but the way in which we carried them through that was misguided. We generally did not carry them through with enough stamina and enough commitment to the action that we needed to take.

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard), who serves on the Defence Committee and who has provided us with some extraordinary insights. We have occasionally wished that we could edit some of what he said, or make it a little quicker—we ribbed him about that mercilessly at times—but I think that the whole Committee learned from his long-term, strategic way of looking at things and pulling them together.

It might have been beneficial for the entire defence team to listen to today’s debate, for, as I look around the Chamber, it seems to me that it will turn out to be a debate worth listening to. The same applied to our last debate on defence spending: every speech contributed something. Even if Ministers take in what is said by Members on both sides of the House, they do not make it clear that they are taking any notice of some of the friendly advice that is given to them. A classic example arose during Prime Minister’s Question Time, when I raised the subject of the 2% target. It was the Prime Minister who, at the Wales summit, lectured other countries and told them that they should step up to the plate. I suggested that he might just feel a tiny bit embarrassed, but all that he could come back with was some reference to the Scottish National party. Defence is not a party political issue; it is an issue for which the House has a collective responsibility. It seems that Back-Bench debates are required to bring Members together to discuss an issue that the Government ought to encourage us to talk about, but do so very rarely.

Let me return to the question of why the 2% matters. We all agree that it is an arbitrary figure, but it is part of an international commitment: it is part of article 5. Article 5 contains no mandate for a particular kind of response, but if we continue like this, we shall have no response except sanctions. We shall not be able to respond militarily except via the Americans. It is deeply irresponsible for the mainland European NATO members to keep cutting defence spending and keep telling their publics that, while their aspirations have not changed, everything will be done through much smarter methods and in co-operation, so they will continue to deliver more by investing less.

A few years ago, someone in the Pentagon described European countries as “no-good, crummy allies”. If we continue on our present trajectory, we shall join the ranks of no-good, crummy allies, and I do not want to see that day. The hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay spoke of national and international interests, to which I would add “national and international responsibilities”. If we wish to be a significant player in the world and to fulfil those international interests, we must possess not only capacity, but reliability and steadiness.

I do not want to repeat the speech that I made last week. My last point concerns political leadership. It is true that defence is not a vote-winner. I would not like to live in a country where people demonstrate in the streets, demanding more weapons and military action. It is in the nature of our people to want peace, but the leaders must show that they are responsive to the needs of the defence of the realm, and are conscious of their international responsibilities.

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

The hon. Lady is making some characteristically wise observations, and I think we all agree about the 2%. Surely, however, leadership is not just about calling on all NATO members to match that 2%, but about calling for effective use of that money. Many people feel that if the 2% is not spent wisely, it is not really the end of the story. We need to be sure that it is being spent properly.

[Ms Stuart]

The hon. Gentleman is right: it must be spent properly. The 2% commitment sends signals, and gives the services and the supply chain certainly, about what is going to happen. It is no good trying to massage the figures and suddenly include war pensions in order to arrive at the 2% figure, because that would render it absolutely meaningless.

I said that I would be brief. Let me end by saying that the 2% is part of our North Atlantic treaty commitment, because part of our commitment is to a capacity that will enable us to respond to an article 5 threat. It is up to all parties in the House—and, in particular, Front Benchers—to show leadership, so that we can bring our voters with us in relation to our commitment. Without leadership, that simply will not happen.

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[Mr Dunne]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his advice. It is the case that vast majority of the headcount reductions across the Ministry of Defence have taken place within the bureaucracy—as my right hon. Friend calls it—of civil service support to the armed forces.

The lesson here is that it is no use having a budget of £34 billion if it is not spent efficiently. Driving efficiency savings out of our budget is an important part of what we have achieved, which is to get more capability for our armed forces out of the money that we spend on defence.

In 2010, the defence budget was the second largest in NATO, and the largest in the EU. In 2015, it remains the second largest in NATO and, by some margin, the largest in the EU. Using NATO’s figures, the UK defence budget is now some $8 billion larger than the next largest EU budget, which is that of France. That gives the UK one of the most effective and deployable armed forces in the world. This very day, the UK has more than 4,000 military personnel deployed overseas on 20 key operations, in 24 countries worldwide.

Our funding also enables the UK to be and remain the most reliable partner to the US in NATO. Since August, we have been the US’s largest partner in the coalition air strikes against ISIL, conducting more than 10% of air strikes. A key capability in the effort, for example, has been the result of investment in the Brimstone missile, the most advanced precision missile system in the world. We are now working to integrate Brimstone on to other platforms such as Typhoon. This is just a single capability within our £163 billion costed, funded, affordable equipment plan, which in turn enables the UK to be one of only four NATO countries consistently to meet the key metric, spending 20% of defence expenditure on major new capabilities.

The clarity of this plan allows us to invest in next-generation capability. I shall give a few brief examples. Our new aircraft carriers will deliver a step change in capability. They are half as long and weigh almost three times as much as the previous Invincible class, yet will deliver their cutting-edge capability with the same size crew. They will have the next-generation F35 aircraft flying from them, and we have ordered four aircraft to form part of the operational squadron in addition to the four currently in test and evaluation in the United States. That platform will be far more capable than the Harrier that they replace. As the Prime Minister confirmed again yesterday, the Conservative party is committed to maintaining a continuous at-sea deterrent and will build a new fleet of ballistic missile submarines, with the final investment decision due in 2016, of which I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) will approve.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

Yesterday I suggested to the Prime Minister that he might be just a tad embarrassed by the fact that less than a year ago he lectured other NATO countries about not reaching 2%, yet we were falling below it. He failed to answer that question. Would the Minister like to add anything?

[Mr Dunne]

I will come on to the issue of the 2% in a moment. We are not falling below it and we do not intend to do so in the period of the spending review. We have also presided over the modernisation of our air mobility fleet, which is now the envy of the world. Many of our NATO allies rely on our capability during operations. The Voyager air-to-air refuelling capability is being used today across Iraq by a number of our allies, not only the RAF. We are transforming our helicopter fleets. As I saw earlier this morning, we have invested £6 billion over the past four years in state-of-the-art lift, attack and surveillance capability, on time, on budget, providing flexibility so that more can be done with less.

For the Army, last year we placed the Scout vehicle contract—the biggest single order for a UK armoured vehicle in 30 years. It will provide the Army with its first fully digitised armoured fighting vehicle to give it the kind of manoeuvrability that the Chairman of the Select Committee and other hon. Members have called for. I can also confirm to my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Worcestershire (Sir Peter Luff), who did such a good job in laying the foundations for this transformation work, that we remain committed to spending at least 1.2% of the defence budget on defence science and technology. We achieved more than that last year and will do so this year. This will include more investment in disruptive areas of technology such as directed energy weapons and others, where we have committed to shift more of the balance of science and technology investment as we move into a contingent posture.

The Government’s position on the motion before the House this afternoon is clear. We will meet the 2% commitment in this financial year. We will meet it in the next. As we have been consistent, after the general election this will be a matter for the next spending review. The Prime Minister has been clear. We are committed to a 1% year-on-year real-terms increase in spending on defence equipment for the next spending review period. He has also been clear that the size of our regular armed services will remain at the level it is now, with a continuing commitment to grow the reserves to 35,000. It is not just about 2% of GDP; it is about how you spend it and what you are prepared to do with it.

The results of our reform programme speak for themselves. Four and a half years ago, we were in chaos. Today, we have earned a strong reputation across Whitehall for competence and have transformed defence capability for the better. The Treasury, even, has granted the Ministry of Defence the largest delegated budget of any Department. So we have replaced Labour’s chaos with Conservative competence. Where there was a deficit, now there is a balanced budget; where there were cost overruns, now there are cost savings; and where equipment programmes were late and over-budget, now they are overwhelmingly on time. The MOD is on far firmer foundations as we head into the next SDSR and spending review.

Defence and Security Review (NATO)

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Rory Stewart]

The hon. Gentleman rightly says that we have not been focused on Russia, and the United States certainly has more capacity, but it is striking that even the US significantly reduced its capacity to deal with an adversary such as Russia. There has been a lot of criticism within the entire Pentagon administration about the focus on counter-insurgency warfare, and a man called Colonel Gentile ran a huge campaign to try to get the US to focus more on conventional threats. Britain has got rid of a lot of our Russian analysis capacity. One thing my Committee’s report pointed out is that we got rid of the Advanced Research and Assessment Group, which did the basic Russian analysis, we sacked our Ukraine desk officer and the defence intelligence service reduced its Russian analysis. The same has been happening in the United States, although it is now building this capacity up rapidly, but when we go to Supreme Allied Commander Europe and look at the American capacity, we see that that Russian capacity is being built up from a very low base again, which is troubling.

I do not wish to speak for too long, because I know many Members wish to contribute, so let me return to the basic framework of my argument: conventional; unconventional; and what we should be doing. I have set out the conventional, so what should Britain be doing? The Committee believes we should be looking to exercise at a larger level, so we should begin to return to some of the kinds of exercises we did in previous eras, which involve exercising at least at a divisional level. Encouragingly, NATO is beginning to look at an exercise at a level of 35,000 people—we would like to see more of that, and we would like politicians and policy makers to be involved in that. We would like to see all-armed exercises. We are going to be looking closely at Norway 2018, which seems to be a big opportunity to do this.

We have to look carefully at this very high readiness taskforce. One thing the Committee recommended was the setting up of a deployable force under SACEUR like the allied rapid reaction corps, which could go out and respond rapidly within 72 hours to a Russian threat. It was a very good sign at the Wales summit that that commitment was made, but the details need to be improved dramatically. The framework nations are struggling to provide 5,000 people and they need to produce one brigade standing up, one currently in exercise and one standing down. We have not yet seen what is happening with the enablers. We need to see whether they will be able to move forward with ISTAR––intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance—and whether they are going to have the cyber-capacity connected. Here is another question, perhaps for the Minister: France has committed as a framework nation, but are we certain that it is committing its troops uniquely to SACEUR or are we in danger of a situation in which people are double-hatting? In other words, are the French retaining the ability to deploy their brigade to Africa when it suits them, so that this very high readiness taskforce will then be a second-order call?

But it is on asymmetric warfare that we need to focus most of all, because although Russian tanks crossing the border into Estonia would be a high-impact event, we estimate at the moment that it is a low-probability event. It is not one we should ignore, because of course were Putin to do it, we really would not know what to do. Were Putin to roll tanks across and take over even a mile or two of Estonia, NATO would be in a very serious problem. As the Swedish general Neretnieks has pointed out, it would be very difficult—it would require very considerable political will—to get Russia out of that situation. But the most likely move is asymmetric warfare first.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

On that point about capacity, it is interesting to note that in 1989 there were 5,000 US battle tanks stationed in Europe, whereas now there are 29. The capacity is not there, even if we look just at what the Americans are providing, never mind our failure to provide.

[Rory Stewart]

That is a significant point. It is true that, ultimately, the theoretical NATO capacity dwarfs that of Russia, but a lot of this stuff is extremely difficult to deploy; many nations are very reluctant to pay the money required to exercise; a lot of this money is absorbed in pension schemes; and our problem is that we are defending an enormous, multi-thousand-mile border, where Russia could, should it wish, cause trouble all the way from the Baltic to the Caucasus. We have to deal with that entire area, which may be very difficult to do, even with the 3.3 million troops we currently have in NATO.

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[Sir Hugh Bayley (York Central) (Lab)]

Perhaps I should start by looking at the Order Paper. We are being asked tonight to approve for the current year a reduction of defence expenditure—or, I should say, a further reduction of defence expenditure—of £618 million. I hope that, in his response, the Minister will say on which capabilities the Ministry of Defence was planning to spend at the start of the year have now been dropped. Looking at the second and third paragraphs of the motion, I hope he will also say what additional expenditure there has been this year for capital purposes, for which there is a considerable increase, and operations. How will those additional resources be spent?

The Defence Committee produced a good report before the NATO summit and any sane person would agree with many of the points that the Government made in their response. However, there was a lack of clear commitment and candour in the response on defence spending, which the Chairman of the Select Committee has just talked about.

It has become clear over the past year, if not longer, that we face new and challenging security threats from Russia, which the Chairman of the Select Committee also spoke about. There is not just the annexation of Crimea and the intervention in eastern Ukraine, but a new Russian foreign policy doctrine that reserves to Russia the right to intervene in other states where there are Russian-speaking minorities when the Kremlin believes it is in their interests to do so. There has been a continuity of policy going back to Georgia and, indeed, Transnistria. There are still Russian troops in northern Moldova. We have also, in the past year or so, seen new and complex threats in the middle east from ISIS or Daesh.

In the face of new and growing security threats, we clearly need new capabilities and strategies to deter our enemies and defend ourselves. We need as soon as possible a new NATO very high readiness joint taskforce and we need to be able to deploy it quickly. That will mean that this House must consider how political authority will be given for use of the first very high readiness brigade and the reinforcement brigades.

We need to discuss with our allies how other Parliaments, especially those that have a constitutional requirement for a vote in Parliament before forces are deployed, will ensure that a very high readiness force, to be deployed within 48 hours, can be deployed within that timescale if needed even though their Parliaments cannot meet within that timescale. We will need either some pre-authorisations, as we had in the old days of the cold war, under which SACEUR—Supreme Allied Commander Europe—could mobilise his assets, or acceptance that parts of NATO will move within 48 hours, even if some allies will take longer to make decisions.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

Given my hon. Friend’s extremely important work in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, does he think that the House probably has not of late taken sufficient note of the debates at the Parliamentary Assembly?

[Sir Hugh Bayley]

I would always like greater attention to be given to the Parliamentary Assembly’s work, but there is a good crossover of membership between our UK delegation to the Assembly and the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Select Committee on Defence and the Select Committee on International Development. As a result, there is a cross-fertilisation of ideas and I know that colleagues on the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees who are alerted to particular information through the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meetings have been able to take that information to their Select Committees. There is, of course, movement of information in the other direction, which is a thoroughly good thing.

We need to consider not just how we deliver a very high readiness joint taskforce but how to improve our strategy for dealing with cyber-threats, our response to the propaganda war when it is waged against us and our response to the use of irregular personnel, whether that means little green men or jihadists in the middle east. We must be clear that if we and our allies are going to develop new capabilities and strategies, that will cost money. If we want to improve our defence, we must will the means to do so.

Before the NATO summit last September, the Prime Minister quite rightly called on the majority of our NATO allies who do not spend 2% of their GDP on defence to do so. At the summit, as one can read on page 10 of the Government’s response to the report:

“All Allies agreed to halt any decline in Defence spending, aim to increase it in real terms as GDP grows and to move towards 2% within a decade.”

Some of our allies have responded to that declaration since the summit. Poland agreed on 18 February to increase its defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2016. Romania, through a pact signed between the political parties on 13 January, pledged to reach 2% by 2017. The Czech Republic, while not making a pledge to reach 2%, has pledged to increase its spending from 1% to 1.4% by 2020. Lithuania has pledged to meet 2% by 2017 and Latvia by 2020. Estonia, which is already at 2%, has increased its defence spending slightly to 2.05% this year. Overall, however, western European allies are still cutting their defence expenditure, on average by 2% a year since 2009 according to Jane’s defence budgets global defence assessment. Last year, in 2014, Germany cut its defence spending by 3.9% and we in the UK cut ours by 2.3%. France cut its by 0.8%. Meanwhile, Russia has been increasing its defence spending by some 10% a year for the past five years, a 50% increase. We ought to question why we did not pick that up sooner. No one increases their defence spending by 50% unless they have some plan to use those assets.

We should also look closely at UK defence spending. According to the public expenditure statistical analysis produced by the Government in 2014, at table 4.2, in the year I entered the House, 1992-93, defence spending was £23.8 billion or 3.5% of our GDP. By 1997-98, when there was a change of Government, of course, defence spending had fallen in cash terms to £21.7 billion, and by more in real terms. At that point, it was down to 2.5% of GDP. Throughout the period of the previous Labour Government, defence spending remained at 2.5%. The Ministry of Defence’s statistical analysis shows an increase, but if we remove the increased spending on operations it remained at 2.5%.

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[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

In July 2011, Anders Fogh Rasmussen said:

“Washington will not always take the lead when it comes to power projection. The United States will demand…that Europeans assume their responsibilities in preserving order, especially in Europe’s periphery.”

That is one of our greatest challenges. We have taken peace for granted, we have taken a status quo for granted, and we have taken American support for granted. Increasingly, we are, first, ignoring what is happening in Russia, secondly, cutting back, and thirdly, finding that America turns to the Pacific and has to justify to itself why it should support the Europeans in a pursuit that it regards as our job. That means that the situation becomes very difficult.

A war of information and propaganda is going on that we are singularly losing in the west but Putin is winning on his home ground. If we look at Russian opinion, we can see what Russians think. In 1997, they were asked:

“Are the big Western countries…partners or opponents of Russia?”

Then, about 50% regarded the US, Germany, Japan and Great Britain as partners of Russia. Now, 79% of the Russian population say that they think we are their enemies. If they are then asked whether Russia has the right to annex territories, the answer is interesting: 54% say that generally Russia has the right to annex territories, but the additional 34% who would usually say, “No, not generally”, will say with regard to Crimea, “Yes, of course it can do that.” That statement is as absurd as it would be if Angela Merkel in Berlin suddenly said, “Germany will annex Königsberg because it has traditionally always been German.” We would say that that was a totally, utterly bizarre argument, yet we are accepting it in relation to Crimea. We are also accepting, with a stunning silence, the fact that Putin has single-handedly redrawn international boundaries for the first time since 1945. We are all saying, “Well, he really shouldn’t be doing this, should he?”, but not offering options of any kind.

It is worth looking at what Putinism may actually mean. Strobe Talbott says:

“Putin’s aggression only makes sense against the backdrop of what has been the defining theme of his presidency: turning back the clock…Therein lies the most malignant manifestation of Putinism: it violates international law, nullifies Russia’s past pledges to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors, carries with it the danger of spinning out of control and sparking a wider conflict, and establishes a precedent for other major powers to apply their own version of the Putin Doctrine when convenient”.

This is not just about Putin’s single-handed redrawing of international boundaries, because a number of other countries would be very happy to do the same thing. Once he is allowed to do that, they will feel that they are being given the green light to do so as well.

When we discussed the Greek euro crisis, it was staggering to hear how relatively relaxed people were about Russia offering Greece money. That should have set just about every red light raging, because it represents an extension of influence and, if we do not challenge it, it will simply continue. Putin is not acting out of strength, but out of the fact that he is terribly weak at home and therefore has to make enemies abroad.

[Mr Gray]

To enforce the hon. Lady’s point, is it not chilling that 75% of all of the equipment used by the Hellenic forces is supplied by Russia?

[Ms Stuart]

Indeed. It is an incredibly malign force, but we are not prepared to describe it as such, not only because of the historic reason that at one stage we thought Russia could become a partner, but because we now feel there is nothing we can do owing to its size and perceived power. Our debate about the 2%, what it means and how we respond has to go much deeper and address the roots of the issue.

In idle moments over the past few weeks I have been reading a biography of George I. Interestingly, it says that when George I took the throne 300 years ago the Great Britain of which he became ruler was one of the great European powers and intimately involved with the continent, and its island position rendered it immune to invasion. It was assertive and knew that it could strike its own bargains in Europe—it did not need anybody else’s permission. There was also a big divide whereby the Tories advocated concentration on seaward expansion to the West Indians, while the Whigs thought that we should go into mainland Europe.

[Mr Jeremy Browne (Taunton Deane) (LD)]

Grand coalition is what you need.

[Ms Stuart]

It is so good to have a second Lib Dem here so that we can get some commitment for a nuclear deterrent, although the hon. Gentleman is not going to be here for much longer.

Essentially, we were able, even at that stage, to define what we thought Britain’s role in the world was. We had a strategy that allowed us to say what our foreign expansion and defence should be like.

How will the Great Britain that the next Prime Minister takes over on 8 May be described in 300 years? I think the answer will be that it was a country that had more seats than any other country at international tables and that is was a member of the P5 at the UN, and of the European Community and the Commonwealth, but that it did not know what to do. It kind of still wanted to project power, but it could not make up its mind whether it was a greater Denmark or still a serious member of the P5. It was singularly incapable of defining which threats it was meant to meet. It could not make up its mind whether its foreign policy was a 19th-century-type mercantile protecting of trade routes, or whether it should at times be a necessarily aggressive force for good. It took its allies for granted, particularly the United States of America, and it would host huge summits in which it would lecture other countries and the rest of the NATO members that they should not drop the 2% target.

What are we doing now? The Government sit here complacently and Ministers feel not the slightest bit ashamed that they do not stand at the Dispatch Box and say, “We are still complying with our commitment to 2%, as we said we would in Wales and as we urged other countries to do.”

Americans once referred to Great Britain as “no good, crummy allies.” It is absolutely right that the arbitrary figure of 2% not only says to the rest of the world, Putin and any other putative Putin that we are serious, but tells our allies, “We are reliable. We will stick to what we have said we will do and we expect exactly the same from you.” We cannot go on criticising the United States of America and telling them, “You guys just keep trotting around the world being its policeman,” but then, when they are no longer there, say, “Where are they?” If we want to be the grown-up country we have been for a very long time—a country that sits with a veto at the P5 and a nuclear power—we have to be absolutely clear about the role we wish to play in the world.

When the Prime Minister elected on 8 May—I hope it will be my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband)—commissions the strategic defence review, it will have to start by addressing our role, what we wish to do and what the financial commitments will be. One thing is for sure: the 2% will be the absolute minimum. It will probably not be enough, but it would be shameful if this House did not continue to press for us to stick to our commitments and to those we expect of others. Rather than being a no good, crummy ally, we should be reliable, effective and clear in our purpose.

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[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

This has been one of the best debates in which I have taken part during my few years in the House. It is a great pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray), a fellow member of the Defence Committee. As he said in his powerful speech, the tone was set by my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), who produced an outstanding summary of the difficulties that we face. If I could pick just one other speech, it would be that of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart), who said things that were so similar to what my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border said to the Conservative dinner in west Berkshire in January that it makes me wonder whether she was there. It was a fantastic speech and I agreed with it.

At the same time as President Putin was exerting his pressure on Crimea, my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex (Sir Nicholas Soames) gave me the speech that his grandfather had made in the Munich debate in 1938. I urge all Members to read that speech and to take out certain place names and individuals’ names and replace them with more contemporary ones. If they do so, they will see how prescient that 1938 speech was, and how it applies to the crescent of instability that faces us.

My hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border spoke about an arc of instability around the eastern borders of Europe, but I would suggest there is a crescent of instability that starts in Nigeria and goes through the Sahel and the Maghreb. It includes parts of the horn of Africa and east Africa, and, of course, Iran. It then goes through to the tragedy of Syria and Iraq and up to the difficulties we face on Russia’s western border and the threats we have to consider in an article 5 sense in terms of the Baltic states. That is a sobering canvas for us to consider in our debate.

On Ukraine and the Baltic states, in President Putin we have the leader of a powerful nation that has surrendered all pretence of adhering to the concept of rules-based governance. That is profoundly worrying.

I agree with my hon. Friend that the world is in perhaps the most dangerous state it has been in for decades, and it is in that context that we encourage a future Government to look at our defence posture in the years ahead. As my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland (Mr Simpson) said, this process cannot, and should not, be driven through the silo of the MOD and how it is funded. It has to be looked at across whole area of government and beyond—not just in terms of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, our intelligence services and the Department for International Development, but in the context of our alliances, certainly with our most important neighbour, the United States, but also with France, our closest neighbour. I am particularly interested in that alliance. I am not as hopeful about that as I would like to be, but I believe we should be looking at that in the context of the Lancaster House agreement. I have learned profoundly to respect France’s defence forces. I have seen them operating in places like Mali. France has its own economic problems, but I feel there is the makings of a good strategy, as it has a footprint in certain parts of Africa and elsewhere which we should be supportive of, and we have a footprint in certain places, such as the Gulf, where we can take a lead, and together we can work in ways that benefit both of us.

My hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border, the Chairman of the Select Committee, mentioned a point to do with languages, and it is something that I go on about. I strongly believe that we should make that a virtue in the armed forces, particularly among those who want to acquire staff rank and beyond: they should be rewarded if they master a language, whether that is French, Arabic, Russian or something that we feel we may have need of in the future. There has been a lamentable lack of language skills in the past; we seem to have forgotten about that. To the credit of the Foreign Office, it is now trying to encourage our diplomats to speak many more languages, and we should do so among our armed forces as well.

My hon. Friend spoke about the two types of warfare that we face. We will not only face asymmetrical conflicts versus the al-Qaeda franchises that exist around the world—to which I would add extortionist campaigns by terrorist based organisations, perhaps in failed states such as Somalia, and the piracy conflict, which will be ongoing—but face what, for want of a better term, I shall call a conventional threat. My hon. Friend described that threat much more eloquently than I ever could. However, I suggest that there could be a third element, which I would describe, almost oxymoronically, as non-kinetic wars.

On the asymmetric counter-insurgency conflicts, there is great thinking—perhaps in the Government, perhaps in our normal institutions, but also in academia—about how we can fight using smarter, shorter and more intelligent interventions. We are unlikely to go in again in the way we did in recent conflicts. We are unlikely to build another Camp Bastion in the desert and remain there for a decade. We shall need less mass in terms of personnel, and that mass could be proxied to the host nation. The deployments will be shorter, but they will require certain skills that we are very good at delivering, including training, equipping, mentoring and carrying out humanitarian work. They will also involve the intelligent use of special forces and of specific equipment such as drones.

On conventional warfare, I entirely agree with the pervading consensus in the Chamber about the need to respond dramatically in regard to thinking, to equipment and to matériel in the context of an article 5 response. If there is one thing that should keep us awake at night, it is the threat from the extraordinary recent developments on Europe’s eastern border.

Non-kinetic warfare involves carrying out defence activities now so that we do not have to fight wars in the future. It is about looking at countries in which instability could emerge, and about engaging with them across a whole spectrum of activities—not only through the use of military personnel but through diplomacy and intelligence and the use of the private sector, non-governmental organisations and our aid budget—to stabilise them so that they do not descend into the kind of instability that would require us to fight an expensive war in the future. It is with pride that I say that the new 77 Brigade, which is based in my constituency, is starting to develop an interesting new style of combating this kind of threat. It is built on the finest traditions of our armed forces: let us remember the work of T. E. Lawrence and Orde Wingate and how we rebuilt parts of France and Germany after the war.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman, but must not those forces also have a clear sense of what they are fighting for, what they believe in and what they stand for? The new 77 Brigade, which is a great idea, will not be effective if we in this place do not give it a clear sense of why it is carrying out its activities.

[Richard Benyon]

I entirely agree with the hon. Lady.

Non-kinetic warfare also involves thinking about the way in which the great figures of the past behaved. To use modern management-speak, they thought outside the box. Sitting in some techie office in London, there is probably a 20-stone IT expert who knows more about social media than anyone in the armed forces ever will. He will never pass a battle fitness test, but he might be just the person to destroy the kind of social media development that we have seen Daesh operating in parts of the middle east. I really hope that that kind of innovative thinking will be carried forward.

I also hope that we concentrate on the need for intelligence gathering and recognise the lamentable failings of the past 50 years—relating, for example, to the Falklands war, the Arab spring and 9/11. There have been failings in almost every conflict, and it is not just us: let us not forget the Yom Kippur war. None of those attacks was foreseen, and our intelligence forces need to be better equipped and better skilled.

I agree entirely with the figure of 2%, although it is of course a political construct. We could achieve a figure of 2% by having more military bands and spending money in silly ways. Also, 1.9% well spent might be better than 2.1% badly spent. It is a line in the sand, however, and it is one that our friends and our potential enemies will see as vital as we tackle the crescent of instability that surrounds Europe’s southern and eastern borders.

Oral Answers to Questions

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 23rd February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on his initiative. The north of England provides the greatest proportion of our soldiers, regular and reserve, and the relaunch of the Army recruiting campaign’s reserve component last month involved a major event in Liverpool, as he knows. There will be more in the north. Following the Secretary of State’s announcement in October of the intention to restore a post-nominal award to recognise long service in the reserves, I should like to take this opportunity to confirm that such an award will be restored for those of all ranks who achieve 10 years’ service.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

The new 77th Brigade, which will focus on psych-ops, is expected to recruit about 40 % of its members from the reserves. According to press reports, however, by Christmas only about 20 had been recruited. When does the Minister think he will achieve the full complement?

[Mr Brazier]

For obvious reasons, some of the detail of the recruiting in that area will not be published in the House, and I am sure that the hon. Lady—my hon. Friend, if I may call her that—will understand those reasons. There is, however, a big upturn in recruitment right across the reserves, as the figures I gave the House earlier indicated.

Trident Renewal

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Dr Lewis]

I was generous in giving way to the hon. Gentleman so soon after he has made his own contribution. All I would say is that I know there was a vote on that day—that is what I just said—and if he tells me that a majority of Scottish MPs may have voted the other way, I accept that; but Scotland is, by choice, part of the United Kingdom and decisions on issues such as this are decisions for the United Kingdom as a whole. I do not believe even the SNP thinks that devo-max ought to include defence policy. If it does, we are in an even worse situation than I anticipated.

We heard from the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey), who is a friend of mine, about moving away from the cold war. What one moves away from, one can move back to, and more quickly than one anticipates—particularly if, as the Chairman of the Defence Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), said in his excellent speech, one’s enemies or potential enemies have good reason to doubt one’s will and determination to stand up for the agreements one has made and to use the deterrent power one has to prevent war from breaking out in the first place. I was very surprised that the hon. Member for North Devon did not think that the events in Ukraine had any bearing on our discussions today. I think the events in Ukraine are highly relevant, particularly as NATO has a rather strange open-door policy to membership, which it should not have. It should not grant membership to any country that we are not prepared to go to war for if it is invaded.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman also accept that the importance of Ukraine and Kiev is that this is the first time that we have had a unilateral breach of international borders since world war two? It is the kind of thing that we thought would not happen again, and it has, so the context remains the same.

[Dr Lewis]

It does indeed, and what really worries me is that because the intensity of the fighting has been so great, it is easy to imagine that it could spill over into a nearby country that is a member of NATO. If that happens, we would be at war with Russia. It is frightening to think what our summer would have been like if we had previously gone down the route of admitting Ukraine to NATO membership, sympathetic though we are. I remember that we stood by during the uprisings in central and eastern Europe that occurred when half the continent was under Russian control. We were very sympathetic to the Hungarians, and I remember with total clarity that we were terribly sympathetic to the Czechoslovakians, but nobody seriously suggested that we could go to war for those countries because of the geopolitical realities at that time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Vernon Coaker]

The hon. Gentleman tempts me to respond. We will vote for the policy we believe in. That is the policy I am laying out before the House, and we will vote accordingly.

Multilateral disarmament works only if all parties feel more secure. Were the UK to abandon its nuclear deterrent on its own, and not in conjunction with other nuclear states, then neither the British people nor our NATO allies would feel safer.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

Does my hon. Friend acknowledge that we would be in deep breach of not only the principle of deterrence, but the collective international responsibility we currently have through owning Trident and being a member of P5?

[Vernon Coaker]

I very much agree on the need for us to recognise our international obligations.

On the subject of NATO, I would like to return to a point that others have made. Is it not time for the Scottish Nationalists to be frank and open with us all? NATO is a nuclear alliance. The Scottish National party wants to be a part of that nuclear alliance. It has to recognise—I say this with respect—that membership of NATO comes with membership of the nuclear umbrella group and the nuclear planning group. Every single nation that the SNP points to as not having nuclear weapons is a member of that nuclear planning group, and is therefore involved in nuclear possession. The SNP position appears to be: no to nuclear weapons unless they belong to NATO. I understand that the motion has been moved not only by the Scottish National party, which is in favour of being in NATO, but by Plaid Cymru and the Green party, which are against being in NATO. Clearly, the smaller parties need to talk to each other.

Labour is clear. Let me say this unequivocally: our position, in an increasingly uncertain and unstable world, is that it is right for the UK to maintain a credible, minimum independent nuclear deterrent based on a continuous at-sea posture. It is right to want to deliver that deterrent in the most capable and cost-effective way, and in a way that best contributes to global security. It is right, therefore, to want to examine all the UK’s military capabilities, including nuclear, as part of the next strategic defence and security review, and to state that we would require a clear body of evidence for us to change our view that continuous at-sea deterrence provides the most credible and cost-efficient form of deterrent. That is why, as the hon. Member for New Forest East mentioned, in 2007 Parliament voted to maintain the deterrent and to authorise spending on the concept phase and initial gate. It is why MPs will be asked again to vote on constructing a new class of Vanguard submarines in 2016. As the Defence Secretary said, no single successor submarine will be built until approval is guaranteed by this sovereign Parliament. We should not forget that this is a programme that would create thousands of high-quality jobs and apprenticeships in Scottish docks, Barrow construction yards and throughout a multibillion pound supply chain that will benefit about 850 companies, the overwhelming majority of which are based right here in the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Dunne)]

Today’s debate has shown one thing above all, which is that the House takes a strong interest in nuclear deterrence.

I should like to begin by congratulating the minor parties on securing the debate, and all those who have made a contribution. I may not be able to refer to everyone individually in the time available. We are fortunate to be able to rely on the crews of our submarines and their families, and the men and women, both military and civilian, who support the nuclear enterprise. Their support is essential to maintaining our nation’s credible and effective minimum nuclear deterrent based on Trident, operating on a continuously at-sea posture, and we thank them for their unwavering dedication.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

rose—

[Mr Dunne]

I am afraid that I cannot take interventions.

I remind the House that it is the first duty of any Government to ensure the security of the nation, its people and their vital interests. This Government do not, and will not, gamble with the United Kingdom’s security. We recognise that people wish to be reassured that money spent on replacing the current Vanguard-class submarines will be money well spent. That has been reflected by several hon. Members in the debate. As my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), who chairs the Select Committee on Defence, eloquently pointed out, this is not just about money. It is a big decision, but costs are important too. The Government agree that the strategic deterrent should be subject to the same discipline in bearing down on securing value for money for taxpayers that we are applying across defence procurement.

We will continue to scrutinise and improve the procurement programme for Successor, but we should not forget that capability is a long-term issue. We are talking about maintaining a strategic deterrent in service until 2060, and it is essential that we can protect the UK against future uncertainties during that period. The world has always been an uncertain place, and the task of defending the nation has always been supremely challenging, and never more so than in the nuclear age. Some hon. Members have questioned the threats and the nature of deterrence—Members have very different views on the subject. As the Secretary of State said, we are now in the second nuclear age, with existing nuclear powers commissioning new capabilities. The problems of proliferation have become sharper, and the emergence of new nuclear states is a reality. The need for the nuclear deterrent is no less than it has ever been. Only today there have been reports in the US raising doubts about continuing co-operation by Russia and its working with the United States to protect stockpiles of weapons and materials.

We have heard impassioned speeches by Members on both sides of the debate. I commend the consistency that most speakers have shown on this vital topic. I was reminded by some speakers, notably the right hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Dame Joan Ruddock), and the hon. Members for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), of speeches from the 1980s. My hon. Friends the Members for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) and for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) argued with equal passion and considerable expertise. My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt) has clearly travelled in one direction in this debate, while at the same time the hon. Members for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) and for Sedgefield (Phil Wilson) have travelled in the opposite direction.

The hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson), as usual, is trying to have it both ways. During the campaign last year on the referendum, which settled the issue of independence for Scotland, he argued that Scotland’s defence would rest on the presumption of NATO membership. To be accepted as a member of NATO requires a nation to accept protection under an umbrella of nuclear compatibility, yet the motion seeks to do precisely the opposite in respect of our own nuclear deterrent. As the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) pointed out, all NATO allies except France, a nuclear-weapons state, participate in NATO’s nuclear planning group, so an independent Scotland would either have to participate in NATO’s nuclear planning process, which would be odd for a Government with a declared opposition to nuclear weapons, or it would have to persuade the 28 allies that it should hold a unique anti-nuclear position in a nuclear alliance—not a credible position.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex pointed out, the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) showed that he did not understand his own party’s motion. We should be clear about this. We are making the maingate decision next year on replacing four Vanguard-class submarines with four Successor submarines—that is, no increase in proliferation or stockpiling of weapons. In fact, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State made clear, and as set out in today’s written statement, this Government have already reduced the number of warheads deployed on each boat from 48 to 40 and the number of operationally available warheads from 160 to 120.

The hon. Member for Moray and several others made much of the cost of the overall programme, particularly the sums being spent or committed ahead of the maingate investment decision. It might help the House if I clarify the actual rather than the fantasy costs of the programme. Several hon. Members have referred to £100 billion as the cost of replacing Trident. We simply do not recognise this figure. The Government White Paper presented to Parliament in 2006 estimated a cost of £15 billion to £20 billion, at 2006 prices, for the Successor submarine infrastructure and refurbishment of warheads. We remain within these initial estimates, which in 2011 were updated for the capital costs of Successor submarines to £25 billion at outturn prices.

Some hon. Members acknowledged the economic impact of this programme. In addition to the important design and manufacturing facilities for the submarines at Barrow, which the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) mentioned, for the propulsion in Derby, and for the warheads in Berkshire, there are of course those involved in the submarine operating base at Faslane—the largest employer in Scotland. We have identified over 850 businesses in the supply chain across the UK that will potentially be involved in the Successor programme. This is one of the largest capital projects in the UK.

The shadow Defence Secretary, the hon. Member for Gedling, revealed two things. First, we heard the renewed commitment to a minimum credible independent nuclear deterrent delivered through CASD—continuous-at-sea deterrence—in the most cost-effective way. I, and other Government Members, welcome that. It will be interesting to see how many of his colleagues join him and me in the Lobby to reject the motion. I hope that he has the support of his party. I noticed that he claimed the support of the leader of the Scottish Labour party, but not of his own leader.

Secondly, and revealingly, the hon. Gentleman declined to confirm, in answer to my specific question, that the Labour party is committed to a four-boat solution. Perhaps this explains the nuances between the hon. Gentleman, who spoke before Christmas of a minimum credible deterrent, and the Leader of the Opposition, who, when challenged, talked of a least-cost CASD.

Oral Answers to Questions

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 12th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Francois]

For obvious reasons, NATO takes this threat very seriously. For instance, I believe it has a centre of excellence based in Estonia helping to provide advice to other NATO countries. We in the UK also take the threat very seriously and have invested heavily to counter it.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

In response to the hon. Member for Norwich North (Chloe Smith), the Minister said that the recruitment for cyber-reserves was on track, but he could not give us precise details because it would breach confidentiality. I have always subscribed to the notion of “trust but verify”. Will he indicate by what means—numbers or some other means—we can ensure that the information is accurate and correct?

[Mr Francois]

I went and verified. I visited the joint forces cyber-group at Imjin barracks in Innsworth in November, and I was able to meet a number of reservists, one of whom was from the Bank of England, who had recently signed up to help provide for the defence of our country. We do not give out publicly the number of people recruited for the cyber-reserves, and I hope the House will realise that there is a logical reason for that. The recruitment is, however, on track, and the quality of the individuals I met at Innsworth were, I have to say, extremely impressive.

UK Armed Forces (Iraq)

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

The advance of ISIL is a direct threat to this country and other western countries, which is why some 40 countries are involved in the international coalition and why a number of them are considering putting personnel in to assist the training effort. On my predecessor’s second question, the support and enlistment of the tribes of the Anbar is critical in pushing ISIL back towards the western frontier of Iraq. There have been encouraging signs, but it is up to the Iraqi Government and the reformed Iraqi army to ensure that, in all their actions, they command the support of Sunnis, Shi’as and Kurds.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

Some of us had the privilege to meet British and Danish troops in Iraq last week. The training includes medical training. Given that 60% of peshmerga injuries are caused by improvised explosive devices, where loss of blood is a significant factor, why are we not training them in the use of tourniquets, which was very beneficial to our troops in Afghanistan?

[Michael Fallon]

I will certainly look at that suggestion. We gained expertise in countering IEDs and vehicle-borne explosive devices in Afghanistan and, as the hon. Lady says, we also accumulated considerable expertise in dealing with the injuries that they cause.

Oral Answers to Questions

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 24th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

There have been losses to the Iraqi and the Kurdish forces, which is an indication that they are taking the fight to ISIL, and it is important that we support them in that task. The Iraqi Defence Minister handed me a list of some of the gaps in their capabilities. We are now looking at that and seeing what can be supplied from our inventory, and we are encouraging other countries to do the same.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

10. When (a) HMS Queen Elizabeth and (b) HMS Prince of Wales will set out to sea under their own power for the first time.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Dunne)]

In September the Prime Minister announced that he would bring both carriers into service so that we always have one carrier available 100% of the time. Final equipment installation and system commissioning plans are being developed for both the aircraft carriers, so we expect HMS Queen Elizabeth to proceed to sea under her own power for the first time in 2017 and HMS Prince of Wales to do so in 2019.

[Ms Stuart]

Can the Minister confirm that British F-35Bs, not US marine corps planes, will be the first to operate from the carriers?

[Mr Dunne]

What I can confirm to the hon. Lady and to the House is that we have today signed a contract for the first batch of four operational aircraft for the first squadron to operate, both from the aircraft carriers and on land.

Reserve Recruitment

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 17th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend. He says that the policy should have been tested; the recommendations came out of an inquiry chaired by the Chief of the Defence Staff. They have been strongly and publicly supported by the Chief of the General Staff, both publicly in front of the Select Committee on Defence and privately in front of the all-party group, of which my hon. Friend is a member. We know that we can achieve this; the plain fact is that we said that it would take five years. We are unblocking the recruiting system. The units that I visit all suggest that they are well on their way. We will achieve the targets.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

When those reforms were originally launched, one of the key principles was for the reservist force to “routinely share” jobs that were once the

“exclusive domain of Regular forces”.

There was therefore that integration. Back in October, when the Chief of the General Staff suggested that reservists would be used only in emergencies, he was kind of rebuked for not being in line with Government policy. Is not the reality now that the original policy of sharing is no longer possible, and we are reduced, because of the numbers, to using them only in national emergencies?