Baroness Neville-Rolfe
Main Page: Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Neville-Rolfe's debates with the Cabinet Office
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I also start by welcoming the Minister to her new role. I thank her and her officials for having a useful meeting with us ahead of today. Let me say how pleased we are to have a Minister who is genuinely interested in this Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, talked about the Minister’s previous involvement; I am sure that her knowledge and interest will lead us into a better place.
I will start with the two amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, Amendments 177 and 180, to which we offer our strong support. Clearly, all of us should embrace anything we can do to tackle tax abuse and tax avoidance. I hope the new Government—we are looking forward to hearing what they have to say—will prioritise this area.
My noble friend talked about Amazon, the lack of accountability and the kind of poor practice that is replicated by many companies, and gave a thorough explanation of why the legislation in front of us could be used to make a difference to cases of tax avoidance and abuse. I hope the Minister listened to those concerns seriously and considers whether this Bill is an appropriate vehicle to address them.
The noble Lord, Lord Fox, introduced a number of amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, to which I have added my name. I will not go into them in detail, only to say that we support incorporating evasion of criminal sanctions into the Bill. The failure to prevent bribery offences has been incredibly disappointing, and the Bill could be used to tighten that up and make more progress. Also clearly disappointing are the very few convictions there have been under the Proceeds of Crime Act. How can we use this Bill to make a difference in these areas where there is still concern? I am sure all noble Lords agree that we need to ensure proper and effective enforcement to curb any serious wrongdoings in these areas.
Briefly on Amendments 323, 326 and 327, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, she clearly introduced something that I had not really considered until I read these amendments. Again, “considered” is the important word here. She is absolutely right that you need to think about the strength of a subjective test and how it would be interpreted. I completely agree with her; we need to understand this better. I would be interested to hear from the Minister on this, because the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is correct that judicial review is simply not a practical option for SMEs; it just is not. How will this be interpreted and managed through the Bill? I look forward to the Minister’s responses.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their kind welcome on my appointment as Minister of State at the Cabinet Office. I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about my predecessor, my noble friend Lord True, and his willingness to engage—a model I will try to follow. I am very much in listening mode today, as we are still in Committee, working on the Bill.
I am poacher turned gamekeeper, and that can be a good qualification. As noble Lords know, I have consistently taken a keen interest in the Bill, although from a slightly different perspective. I will not delay you with a long introduction, but I am pleased that the Bill consolidates 350 EU regulations. That is simplification at a stroke: it streamlines public procurement and reduces burdens on business, and it turns EU-based law into UK law, which is why we can be confident of its progress.
In particular, it will benefit SMEs, for which we must do our best to offer a level playing field, so that they can increase their share of the £300 billion spent by public authorities each year. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, will agree with that. I am also looking forward, if I get the chance, to rolling out training on the Bill—simple, clear, comprehensive training in central and local government, and elsewhere. That will answer some of the concerns that I and others across the House have had on the Bill.
I thank noble Lords for their contributions on the grounds for financial exclusion and will try to respond constructively. I begin with Amendments 177 and 180 tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Hain. These seek to ensure that the suppliers who fail to provide contracting authorities with various details in relation to their tax affairs when bidding for contracts must be excluded from procurements. I should start by making it quite clear that the Government expect businesses to take all necessary steps to comply with their tax obligations.
However, noble Lords will know that the basis on which contracts must be awarded under the Bill is by reference to award criteria that relate to the contract being tendered, not to other matters such as where a supplier pays tax. This is the right principle to deliver value for money for the taxpayer and ensures that suppliers are not required to provide swathes of information that is irrelevant to the contract. This principle is also a feature of the UK’s international obligations, notably under the WTO government procurement agreement. It is for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to enforce the law on tax and, indeed, UK-based multinational enterprises are required to make an annual country-by-country report to HMRC. I note what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about Amazon.
The grounds for exclusion in the Bill focus on criminal convictions and other serious misconduct that raises a risk to public contracts, including, importantly, in relation to tax. But investigation does not mean guilt in this country. Exclusion is not a substitute for a judicial process. It is important to let due process run its course before subjecting suppliers to mandatory exclusions.
However, we have broadened the scope of the current regime with the mandatory exclusion grounds related to tax in Schedule 6, which cover all tax evasion offences and involvement in abusive tax arrangements. This is a significant broadening from the current regime, which is limited to where there has been a breach of tax obligations and lets suppliers off where they have repaid or committed to repay unpaid tax. I am confident that these grounds are sufficient to protect contracting authorities and taxpayers.
During that spirited defence of the need to keep things open for international companies to be able to bid, the Minister used the phrase “value for money”. Can she define the Government’s view of how they calculate value for money?
If I may, I will think about the answer, make some progress, and come back to that on a future occasion.
Well, I think that “value for money” is a clear term, but I am listening seriously to the point that the noble Lord is making in this context. Value for money is about quality and quantity; indeed, it is about many things, as I know, having been on the buyer side in real life as well as on the selling side. As for what the definitions are in the Bill, I am not sure.
I come back to the important points from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, on the subject of tax. It was clear from feedback on the Green Paper that the existing tax exclusion ground is one that many authorities are struggling to apply. By reframing the ground in terms of UK offences and regulatory decisions, we believe that it should be easier for UK contracting authorities to apply this. I also add—because I remember it well from the time that I served in David Cameron’s Government—that the UK has tried to lead the way internationally in making sure that multinational companies pay their share. Strong HMRC compliance action has secured and protected over £250 billion for public services since 2010 that would otherwise have gone unpaid, including £3 billion from those trying to hide money abroad. This is work that goes on—and work to which HMRC is devoted, as I remember well.
The noble Lord also raised tax havens. The Bill will deliver unprecedented levels of transparency in procurement, including—this point needs to be made—with respect to the beneficial ownership of suppliers. All suppliers will be expected to declare their beneficial owners when bidding for contracts. Failure to provide accurate details of beneficial ownership when asked will now be a mandatory ground for exclusion.
I try to wake up early, as noble Lords know. Value for money is not defined in Clause 11(1)(a), to leave a degree of flexibility for future refinement. In practice, we will use the HMT definition, which is currently,
“the optimal whole-life blend of economy, efficiency and effectiveness that achieves the intended outcome of the business case.”
It is quite a nice mixture—economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
I thank the Minister, but the question I was rather clumsily trying to ask was whether we extract from the cost the amount of money we expect to take in tax or merely use the cost as a flat sum. In other words, with a British company paying full British tax versus one of the companies described by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, which pays no tax, does the overall cost of that service become less for the one paying tax? It seems the Minister’s answer is that the tax take is not included in the calculation of value for money.
I think we have made a bit of progress; I will not go down that rabbit hole or we will not make enough progress.
If I might, I turn to Amendments 306, 307, 308 and 320 tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Wallace, Lord Fox and Lord Hain. They would introduce new mandatory exclusion grounds in relation to offences of sanctions evasion, money laundering and failure to prevent bribery, and new discretionary exclusion grounds in relation to various financial and economic misconduct when the contracting authority has sufficient evidence in the absence of a conviction.
The mandatory grounds for exclusion cover the types of misconduct which raise only the most serious risks for contracting authorities. We have already strengthened the mandatory grounds significantly in comparison to the EU regime, but they cannot and should not cover every offence. On sanctions, the types of freezing orders referred to in the amendment are unlikely to be relevant to public contracts. On bribery and money laundering, we have included a range of mandatory exclusion grounds covering the most serious offences. This expands the scope of the offences covered in the EU regime to cover blackmail as well as bribery. However, I reassure noble Lords that the offences in question which are not listed as mandatory exclusion grounds are likely to be subject to discretionary exclusion, under the ground of professional misconduct. This will depend on the circumstances, but if the ground is met, contracting authorities could exclude the supplier.
As to the amendment to include financial and economic misconduct as a new discretionary exclusion ground, we have already explained to this Committee that the exclusion regime is not a substitute for a judicial process. I am not prepared to require contracting authorities to weigh up complex evidence of financial and economic misconduct in which they have no relevant experience. That is a key issue with the ambitious proposals described by the noble Lord, Lord Fox.
Amendments 323, 326 and 327, tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes, concern the discretionary exclusion grounds for potential competition infringements and the test for when these apply. These exclusion grounds recognise that there may sometimes be evidence of competition infringements in the absence of a regulatory decision or ruling. It is critical that suppliers known to have been involved in collusion, bid-rigging and anti-competitive behaviour are held to account, given the fundamental importance of fair and open competition to procurement.
However, I reassure the Committee that these grounds should not be used to exclude suppliers merely because they are under investigation by the CMA or another regulator; there must be sufficient evidence that a breach of competition rules has occurred. I think my noble friend pointed out that the language used in the Explanatory Notes differs from that in the Bill. I am advised that this does not reflect a difference of policy or meaning. Authorities must “consider” that the conduct specified has occurred before determining that the exclusion ground applies. She went on to ask about why there were subjective tests in the discretionary grounds. I have to say that I had some difficulty in exactly following her logic in all this, and we may need to discuss these points further after Committee. The answer is because exclusion is a risk-based measure and a last resort, and suppliers are protected by a right to challenge the exclusion decisions because of the nature of those decisions.
A moment ago my noble friend said, in respect of the amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that she did not want decision- makers trying to weigh up complex financial matters, but she somehow seems quite happy to have decision-makers weighing up equally complex matters scattered throughout Schedule 7 and in the discretionary exclusion grounds. I struggle to see the intellectual cohesion in the Government’s position.
I thank my noble friend for her further comments, which I will consider carefully. I myself feel strongly, as someone who has witnessed small construction companies being investigated by a competition authority that at the end of the day have been found completely innocent, that it would be difficult if they were not able to continue to engage in procurement during a long period of investigation. However, as she explained, we need to get right how we deal with the discretionary grounds and ensure that there is enough certainty so that authorities do not spend too much time going round in circles. We need to reflect further on the points that she has made. I think I slightly misunderstood the purport of her original amendment, so I look forward to discussing that with her. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for his intervention.
I thank the Minister for her response. The notion of, in a sense, using professional misconduct as the catch-all for everything else is something that we could pursue after Committee. It may be something that requires some definition or clarification, either within the legislation or from the Dispatch Box on Report. If that is going to be the way that the Bill operates, some clearer idea as to how it would work would help to ameliorate some of the fears that have been expressed around the Bill.
We have to get the right result but we also have to avoid a chilling effect. That is my basic approach to this.
A chilling effect on corruption is obviously positive but a chilling effect on people being prepared to engage in government procurement is not, particularly smaller suppliers, which might be put off by some of these rules. That is why we brought in Schedule 6, which will bring a certain clarity. There may be some further discussions to be had on Schedule 7 and exactly how it works.
I too welcome the Minister to her position. My question relates to a later group in which I have an amendment. Given that the Bill will allow for there to be no discrimination against any treaty-state supplier, how will a contracting body or procurement body operate under Schedule 7 for any of the suppliers from any of the countries with which we have a trade agreement? This comes back to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. It is not simply the case that businesses are going to have to work through Schedule 7 to satisfy all the grounds for this; they are going to have to do it with every single country with which we have an FTA for the suppliers coming from them. How is that making the job easier?
As the noble Lord said, we will come on to discuss those aspects, and I will try to answer that question when we get there. I have probably said enough on that.
Amendment 328 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Fox, provides for a new discretionary exclusion ground in relation to deferred prosecution agreements. This issue was explored in the Green Paper. Due consideration was given to feedback from the public consultation, as well as discussions with the Serious Fraud Office and the Crown Prosecution Service. The Government’s response to the Green Paper set out the rationale for their decision not to include a separate exclusion ground on deferred prosecution agreements. In brief, the actions taken and commitments made by suppliers as part of the DPA typically constitute good evidence of self-cleaning. Reaching a DPA requires a supplier to accept culpability for the offence, co-operate with the relevant authorities and make reparations. Prosecuting authorities typically will not consider a DPA appropriate unless the supplier has already made reforms, such as proactive changes to corporate structures or the replacement of personnel.
DPAs will involve judicially approved terms that the supplier must commit to—for example, on actions to improve compliance and audit functions within the company, and external reviews to test those improvements to ensure that further misconduct does not occur. Non-compliance with a DPA is unlikely to be something that contracting authorities are equipped to assess. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, will understand and accept that.
Compliance is for either the Serious Fraud Office or the Crown Prosecution Service to assess, depending on which is the owner of the DPA in question. If a supplier fails to comply with a DPA, there are a number of options open to the enforcing body, including the prosecution of the supplier for the original criminal misconduct, but that cannot be part of procurement law, or for enforcement by the many differently sized authorities engaged in buying goods or services in the public sector.
Finally, Amendment 443 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, seeks to remove
“a British Overseas Territory or a Crown Dependency”
from the definition of a UK supplier. The Bill confers rights on UK suppliers in a number of places, including, in Clauses 18 and 19, an entitlement to be considered as part of a competitive tender, or, in Clause 89, to access remedies. They are also used as the basis for an assessment of no less favourable treatment in the non-discrimination provisions, in Clause 82(2). This amendment would remove this guaranteed access to the UK’s procurement markets from suppliers from Gibraltar, which is the only overseas territory or Crown dependency whose suppliers currently enjoy access under the existing procurement regime.
Although overseas territories and Crown dependencies are not part of the UK constitutionally, they do not become party to treaties in their own right. The UK must extend the territorial scope of its ratification of treaties to include them. As such, overseas territories and Crown dependencies are unable to secure rights to markets in the United Kingdom in the same way as other states. That is a long way of saying that in view of the special nature of the trading relationship between the UK and overseas territories and Crown dependencies, it is right to include them in the definition of a UK supplier.
This discussion has been useful and illuminating to me. I respectfully request that the amendment be withdrawn.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister. I particularly welcomed her comments on SMEs and training rollout. I really agree about the importance of investment in training as the Bill is enacted. However, I remain concerned about the Government’s approach, which seems supine in many respects when dealing with these multinational companies.
Only this afternoon at Oral Questions, we had a fascinating exchange about the remarkable decision to award Fujitsu a £48 million contract to upgrade the police national computer, given the role of that company in developing Horizon software for the Post Office. We were told by a Minister that in effect, there was no alternative because of the continuing arrangements with that company. Listening to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, about performance issues, corruption, competition infringements, which were added to by my noble friend, and the issues on tax, essentially the Minister has an ideological objection to the use of contracts to further government policy outside the narrow procurement interest. This is where I fundamentally disagree with her.
It is not good enough simply to say that it is down to HMRC. Procurement can be used to enhance policy in a number of areas. Many of these multinational companies are taking this country for a ride. We need to see tougher action. Having said that, I hope that we can continue to debate this important issue. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 185 would require the Minister to publish in regulations a list of countries considered to be at high risk of performing forced organ harvesting. It would also require contracting authorities to exclude suppliers from those countries from certain procurements.
Clearly, I appreciate the seriousness of the issue of organ harvesting; I agree that it is a difficult matter for the Government. This is an abhorrent practice, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, which is all the more egregious when sponsored by the state. It is an issue that has been frequently debated in recent years; I recognise the dedication with which it has been pursued by the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, with the support today of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Lord, Lord Ribeiro. It is understandable that they take opportunities such as today to draw attention to the awful things that are happening and the scale of the issue.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is right to record that the Government are taking action to address this issue on a number of fronts. The Health and Care Bill was amended during its passage through Parliament to prohibit commercial organ tourism and send an unambiguous signal that complicity in the abuses associated with the overseas organ trade will not be tolerated. Equally importantly, the Government continue to monitor and review evidence relating to reports of forced organ harvesting in China, and they maintain a dialogue with leading NGOs and international partners on the issue. This includes Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office Ministers writing to the World Health Organization in Geneva to encourage it to give careful consideration to the findings of the China Tribunal on organ harvesting, published in March 2020.
My Lords, I was talking about the international angle and the importance of doing things internationally. I am particularly grateful for the reminder of the need to discuss these issues with my noble friend Lord Goldsmith of Richmond Park. I will also talk to the FCDO, DHSC and DIT about the UK-China hospital partnership and whether there has been any use of UK Export Finance. I have not been briefed on the issue, but I will write to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, who is not in his place, and the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, if they are content.
Turning to the main issue, I must resist this amendment on a number of counts, which I will explain. First, it treats suppliers as excluded simply for being located in a country at high risk of organ harvesting. This is guilt by association. It would undermine the principle, which runs throughout the exclusions regime, that suppliers can be excluded only where the supplier or a connected person has committed relevant misconduct. This is really important to ensure fairness and proportionality in exclusion decisions. The amendment could also have perverse effects—for example, preventing the NHS procuring life-saving devices in a country, even though they have nothing to do with organ harvesting or people trafficking.
Finally, there is already a provision in the Bill which would allow for the exclusion of suppliers who participate in forced organ harvesting. The Bill is clear that any serious breach of ethical or professional standards applicable to the supplier would meet the discretionary exclusion ground for professional misconduct. It is almost certain that involvement in these practices by suppliers of goods or services related to transplant medicine or human tissue would constitute a breach under the detailed standards set by health sector institutions.
The exclusion ground of professional misconduct is intended precisely to cover all the particular ethical issues that arise in different industries and sectors. That is of course an exclusion we agreed earlier, which merited further discussion. The grounds for exclusion cannot and should not list every issue within a particular industry. I should repeat that the exclusion and debarment regime in the Bill represents a significant overhaul and enhancement of the EU system; we should not forget that.
Finally, to respond to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, I have already promised, in his absence, to write on the subject of the hospital, but I am also of course aware of the concerns regarding Hikvision.
I apologise to the noble Baroness; I got trapped in the Chamber when the doors were locked at the end of the Division—it serves me right. Some people may wish it had been permanent. I am grateful to the noble Baroness and look forward to reading her reply in Hansard.
I look forward to getting delayed in the Lobby in the next Division.
I am aware of the concerns regarding Hikvision and other Chinese technology companies; we take these concerns extremely seriously, as the noble Lord knows. We are taking action in the Bill to introduce a new ground for exclusion, specifically to address situations where a supplier poses a threat to national security. The new exclusion ground allows a contracting authority to reject bids from suppliers that the authority considers pose a threat to the national security of the United Kingdom.
It is the long-standing policy of successive British Governments that judgment as to whether genocide has occurred is for a competent national or international court. It is not for the contracting authorities. Genocide is a crime and, like other crimes, whether it has occurred should be decided after consideration of all the evidence available in the context of a credible judicial process.
This has been an important debate. I have learned a lot but, for today, I respectfully request that this amendment be withdrawn.
I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify a little her argument as to why organ trafficking—which is prohibited under the UK’s statute book—cannot be mentioned in Schedule 6 under the mandatory exclusion grounds. Under labour market, slavery and human trafficking offences, there is a fairly comprehensive list of UK domestic offences that are mandatory grounds. I do not see why that list cannot be added to, as I cannot see where the ethical grounds are included within Schedule 6 on the mandatory grounds.
Can the Minister also clarify why, in Schedule 7, on discretionary grounds, those offences are included for prevention orders? The Government seem to be suggesting that for a company that is subject to prevention orders for these heinous crimes—or could be subject to them, if it were a foreign supplier—this is simply discretionary. A contracting body would have to make a judgment itself as to what it considers would be the likelihood of a supplier meeting the threshold for a prevention order, rather than an offence. That does make any sense to me. I would be grateful if the Minister could address those two points.
I will need to take the noble Lord’s first point away and look at it. His explicit point is that there is a bit of legislation, so why do we not refer to it? His second point is tied up with how this discretionary schedule works and how we define “professional misconduct”, which, in our interpretation, includes ethical issues. I thank him for raising these issues again.
I would be grateful if the Minister were willing to consider this. It is not about the ethical point. It comes under paragraph 1 of Schedule 7, which is headed “Labour market misconduct”. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) specifically refer to slavery and trafficking prevention orders and trafficking and exploitation prevention orders. If a supplier is considered to be acting in a way that would satisfy a prevention order in the UK, it would be a discretionary exclusion ground rather than what I consider it should be: a mandatory exclusion ground. I am happy for the Minister to reflect on it and write if she cannot answer today.
Clearly, I have learned during this debate. I will obviously have to learn a little more about how we have tackled this issue. As was said right at the beginning of the debate, there is clearly some difficulty around the principle of how much detail to include and how many things to cross-reference in the Bill but, in the light of the noble Lord’s helpful clarification, I will go away, look at the various areas and come back to him.
My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and my noble friend Lord Coaker for their profound speeches. Of course, I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Lord, Lord Ribeiro, who cannot be here today.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton, put a number of pertinent questions to the Minister, not just about the UK-China hospital partnership but more generally about the principles behind our trade with China. I must say that I find government policy inconsistent and incomprehensible. The new Administration, if I can call them that, need to get a grip on what exactly our relationship with China ought to be in terms of diplomacy, trade and strategic investment. Over the past few years, it has seemed completely all over the place.
There is an argument—my noble friend Lord Coaker referred to it—about the principle of how much we should use procurement legislation for wider, desirable policy aims. I believe passionately that it is right to use a Procurement Bill to try to influence this abhorrent practice. I am grateful to the Minister because she gave a careful response and appreciated the seriousness of this abhorrent practice, which we are doing our best to help eradicate. She also acknowledged the changes made in legislation in the past few years. However, she was critical of the amendment’s wording; she has quickly taken on the mantle of ministerial office again, by finding all amendments that do not emanate from her own department technically deficient.
The Minister’s key point around what is wrong with the amendment is that it is guilt by exclusion. I understand that but I believe that the amendment is tightly drawn. It is not just about excluding suppliers
“located in a country categorised … as at high risk of forced organ harvesting.”
It would exclude only in the event of
“a public contract involving … any device or equipment intended for use in organ transplant medicine or activities relating to”
that. That is tightly drawn and entirely justifiable.
The Minister also said that these practices would be covered by the exclusion grounds in the Bill. We have now had a debate on that; I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, raised some important questions. I accept that one can look to general provisions in a Bill and say, “Well, those cover it”, but I believe that there is sometimes a strong place for explicit provision on a practice that we find abhorrent. I hope that the Minister will be prepared to discuss this with us between Committee and Report because I am convinced; I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Coaker for his pertinent comment that we will come back to this on Report. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this is a rather confusing group, so I will start by speaking to the two government amendments. Amendment 237 removes duplication of the direct award ground, which is adequately covered in Clause 41; and Amendment 245 requires appropriate assessment prior to the direct award of whether a supplier previously submitted an unsuitable tender.
Looking at the group in the round, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, raised Amendment 235A, so that we could rightly debate the direct award of contracts; and the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, in his absence, gave notice of his intention to object to Clauses 40 and 41—I think because he wants to understand what is happening and wants answers to some of the questions that have been put by the noble Lord, Lord Fox.
Clause 40 permits a direct award to a supplier, other than an excluded supplier, if a justification in Schedule 5 is met. This is based on the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement grounds for limited tendering and is similar to the current law. We have been commended by external stakeholders for bringing clarity to the justifications and reducing the risk of unintended use of these provisions. As the noble Baroness said, publication of transparency notices is an extremely important development.
Just to let noble Lords know, I will deal with standstill provisions in the next group so, in the interests of time, will not cover them in this group. But I will deal here, a little later, with sunset clauses, which the noble Baroness also raised.
I was very interested to hear the explanation for Amendments 235ZA and 243A from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. He made a lot of points that I was not aware of, which I will study, in relation to the important areas of cloud computing and UK businesses. But I make clear that existing frameworks allow contracting authorities to buy cloud-based services separately, rather than in a package. In this way, SMEs are encouraged to provide services directly to the public sector, which is something that we are keen that they do.
Frameworks are of course created following a competition and they create a period of uncertainty on contractual terms, albeit they allow a closed list for contracts to be awarded, so it makes sense that they are for a limited duration—I think that is what the noble Lord was asking about. This should not lock out competitors for too long. Directly awarded contracts have a shorter duration for a different rationale: they allow contracting authorities to put alternative arrangements in place. That is the rationale, and we worry that the amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would add more time as an unnecessary burden on contracting authorities by mandating them to check for and use available framework agreements, even where these might not be appropriate. Requiring them to keep within existing arrangements can actually stifle innovation and new entrants, particularly where the prototype in development ground is being used. The framework formalities, which may include a requirement for competitive process, may be impractical in cases such as those of extreme urgency.
Perhaps I might add that what the Minister said makes a lot of sense and is helpful, but one of the problems we have is that we do not know how effective it is going to be and whether it would work until we get into that situation again. Is there any ability to build in a review once the system has been tested, perhaps against a major public problem like we had with Covid-19?
I think our intention is to try to get rid of the VIP lanes. I will take the point away but there is a committee sitting—it will unfortunately sit for a long time, no doubt—that is looking at a lot of these important issues, and at some of these lessons. It is doing things in phases, so hopefully we will begin to get some output soon. We have had the Boardman review and, as the Committee can hear, we have tried in this Bill to learn from that and not to have a preferential system. The point about non-discrimination and such things is in the same spirit. I will take away the point about spirit and what we are doing here, but we have some good things in the Bill. I have listened to what the Committee has said but also tried to convince your Lordships about what we are trying to do.
I am advised that Clause 41 would prevent VIP lanes, as regulators will set out in advance what direct awards are permitted and Parliament would not approve anything too wide-ranging—I am sure that is true. The other point is that the Bill’s provisions on conflicts, which I am sure we will come on to debate further, also help against VIP lanes. We have quite a lot of things going on here; obviously, I am worried about piling it on. Everybody is concerned, so they all come in with different suggestions for trying to improve things. But if you pile those one on the other, you end up with rules that are too burdensome and do not work too well.
On the issue of a review, I think my noble friend Lady Noakes referred to some sort of review clause at an earlier juncture. “Review” is something that one tends to write into Bills where you have a problem. Perhaps we can discuss this further before Report to see whether a review is the right thing or whether enough is going on to try to ensure that we are in a good place on the Covid front. I respectfully request that the various amendments are withdrawn, and I would like to move the government amendments in my name.
My Lords, I remind the Committee that, where amendments are grouped, only the first amendment is moved. The others must be moved or not moved as they are reached on the Marshalled List.
My Lords, it falls to me as the mover of the lead amendment to respond to the Minister. Clearly, there was quite a lot in what she said and we will need to brood over Hansard when the time comes because there are a large number of issues here. I recognise the Minister’s track record on SMEs but I am somewhat amazed that the Government have been commended on bringing greater clarity, as she put it, because our intention was to provide much greater clarity—and, indeed, equity—in all of this for SMEs. In terms of the addition of more time, burden and so on, I believe the Minister would normally think that we should go the extra mile for SMEs in these circumstances.
Certainly. We have discussed SMEs before; we have gone away to have a look at that issue. I recently held a round table with SMEs. Basically, they were positive about the Bill. Clearly, we have to see through and teach them about the new proposals. The basic point is that there are fewer different ways forward. I was quite surprised that that was the case but clearly there is complexity, and we have got to make sure that the Bill is in the right form.
My Lords, we are getting into some detail now. That is the purpose of Committee and it is very constructive and informative. I very much agreed with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, about framework alliances and whether Clauses 44 to 47 include such alliances. If they do not, why not? The noble Lord’s point requires a simple answer: yes, they do, or no, they do not. He has asked an important question about the inclusion of framework alliances.
Similarly, I thought the points of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, were really well made. Amendments 247, 248 and 249 have been put down specifically to ask the Minister whether the Government’s new subsection (3G) answers some of those points. That is the sort of detail we need to get into, as the cascade principle is really important. I think the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, also supported that.
I have a couple of specific points on the importance of transparency and openness, which we are all striving for. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, asked the Minister about what “value for money” means; that could almost be taken as a trick remark but it is crucial, as these sorts of definitions are really important. Therefore, can the Minister say what “proportionate” means in government Amendment 246? One person’s “proportionate” would be to allow people to get through without proper checks. However, without “proportionate”, the burden on some businesses and suppliers would be completely unacceptable—just too much and unrealistic. It would be helpful for the Committee to understand the use of “proportionate” in new subsections (3A) and (3D) and “may not” in new subsection (3C).
Government Amendment 246 talks about proportionate means of ensuring that suppliers have the relevant
“qualifications, experience or technical ability”
to perform a contract. It would be helpful if the Minister said a bit more about what that means.
More generally, since we are discussing Clauses 44 to 47, can the Minister explain why so many respondents to the Government’s consultation opposed open frameworks? Some 27% of the respondents did so. Is that a high negative response? I am not sure whether it is high or low, but it struck me as quite a lot. The Government did not agree with that view and ploughed on with Clause 47.
On Clause 45(3), can the Minister explain what sort of reasons there could be for a framework to exceed the normal eight years for a defence and security contract and four years for other frameworks? The Government seem to believe there might be a necessity to clarify that through their own Amendment 251, which seeks to clarify some of that but also reflects a concern about the number of years that could apply to a contract. That would be helpful.
Our limited discussion on the use of frameworks has been very important; it has sought to get into some of the details, which are what mean they do or do not work well—sometimes on the basis of what a particular word means. Like many noble Lords, I read the assessment in preparing for this Committee; you can see the point the noble Lord, Lord Fox, made in our earlier debate about a cry for clarity on what the Government are seeking to achieve. What different words mean is crucial. Building on the noble Lord’s plea to know what “value for money” means, a little more about what “proportionate”, et cetera, means in the context of government Amendment 246 would be helpful. The Minister may need a little more time to reflect on that but, if you are seeking a contract under a framework, the word “proportionate” will mean everything—or nothing. It would be very helpful if the Minister could clarify that.
With that, I think the Government have taken some very important steps forward under these clauses.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Aberdare and Lord Scriven, and my noble friend Lord Lansley, for their kind words.
I will start with the government amendments, because even though this will not be in strict order, it will help to answer the other points that have been raised. Frameworks are a well-established commercial purchasing tool, used widely across the public sector. Having looked at some of the public responses, that percentage figure that was quoted is not worrying. Key is whether this is a sensible provision and whether we are reforming them in the correct way. The Bill makes a number of improvements to the effectiveness of frameworks, to increase flexibility, provide value for money, et cetera.
I am glad that the noble Lord referred to government Amendment 246 because it is quite a substantial and important amendment among the hundreds that I apologise for having tabled in Committee. It allows contracting authorities to set conditions of participation in a competitive selection process for the award of a contract under a framework. New subsections (3A) to (3F) impose restrictions on the use of such conditions to those which apply to conditions of participation in a competitive tendering procedure under Clause 21. These include limiting the conditions in various ways, for example, to those which are a proportionate means of ensuring that suppliers have the relevant qualifications, experience and technical ability to perform the contract, of ensuring that the conditions do not break the rules on technical specifications, and of requiring that equivalents must be allowed where particular qualifications are required. The question on proportionality is a good one. I do not have as good an answer for the noble Lord as I would like, so I will write to him on that point.
My noble friend Lord Lansley commended new subsection (3G). This restricts the basis on which proposals received as part of a competitive selection process under a framework can be assessed to all or some of the award criteria against which tenders the frameworks were assessed. This is to ensure that suppliers that have already been admitted to a framework do not have to meet entirely different criteria later. New subsection (3H) allows for the award criteria to be refined.
Government Amendments 251 to 255, and 258 to 260, relate to rules for frameworks for the future award of contracts. The remaining government amendments in this group deal variously with light-touch contracts, ensuring open frameworks work as intended, and with minor tidying-up changes.
Turning to the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, the thing that we worked on together when I was last a Minister is still unresolved, so I feel a sense of guilt.
I agree with the objective behind the noble Lord’s Amendment 245A. There is a need for this Bill to ensure that multiple contracting authorities may join to award a framework. Frameworks can result in significant savings, financially and in time, and they say that time is money. This is particularly the case where they are put in place for the benefit of more than one contracting authority, for example by centralised procurement authorities.
To that end, Clause 10 provides for contracting authorities to carry out procurements jointly and for centralised procurement authorities to put in place arrangements for the benefit of other contracting authorities. This enables them to delegate their obligations to run lawful procurements to centralised procurement authorities, in their capacity as specialists, or to jointly procure with them and remain responsible, together with their procurement partners, for the award of any resulting contract. The noble Lord will wish to look carefully at that, but I do not think that his amendment is necessary.
Amendments 247 and 248, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley, seek to add additional requirements for the award of contracts under frameworks, without a further competitive process. The first of these, a system based on the suppliers’ ranking in the competition for the award of the framework—the noble Lord talked of a cascade; we have talked of ranking—is certainly one mechanism by which contracts can be awarded under a framework without a competition. However, this is only one selection mechanism, and there are others. They might include a “taxi rank” system, where the next supplier on the list gets the work, or the supplier chosen could simply be the cheapest for that good or service, which contracting authorities might consider to be more appropriate for their requirements on that occasion. There is nothing in the Bill preventing contracting authorities from including rankings in a framework, but there is no need to require this for all frameworks.
The second requirement is to allow for the provision of additional information by suppliers in order to make an award without a competition. In this connection, I draw noble Lords’ attention to Clause 44(6), which allows contracting authorities to ask for additional information to ensure that call off competitions are effective. Sorry, that is a bit repetitive. This seems preferable to receiving large amounts of potentially unnecessary or irrelevant information and adding burdens to the award process, which we are all keen to avoid.
My Lords, this group deals with Parts 9 and 10 of the Bill. Providing suppliers with an effective remedy is not only required by the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement, the GPA—a very important international agreement—but a critical aspect to any well-functioning and accountable procurement regime. It gives the market confidence to invest resources participating in government procurement, knowing that public contracts will be awarded fairly and transparently.
As such, in most cases, suppliers have 30 days from the point at which a breach should have been discovered to raise a claim, and in the majority of procurements a standstill period will apply. The standstill period of eight working days is a short pause between the point when the contract award decision is notified to bidders and the final contract conclusion. It allows bidders to consider the assessment summary, which includes evaluation feedback.
If a claim is filed at court during the standstill period, an automatic suspension will apply, preventing signature of the contract until the legal claim is resolved or the suspension is lifted on application of the contracting authority. If the standstill passes without challenge, it protects against the contract being set aside after it goes live. Clearly, we do not want court proceedings to be the only way to motivate contracting authorities’ compliance with the new Act, which is why we have introduced the procurement oversight regime in Part 10, which will enable an appropriate authority to investigate non-compliance, make recommendations and issue guidance across all contracting authorities, as a result of the investigations. This will encourage the consistency and continuous improvement we all want to see.
Government Amendments 263 and 266 correct the reference to the contract award notice in Clause 49(1)(b) and (4) respectively.
Amendments 265, 267, 393 and 394 make it clear that any time a contracting authority chooses to enter into a standstill period, which is known as a voluntary standstill period in circumstances where the Bill does not mandate a standstill period, it must match the mandatory standstill period and be for a minimum of eight working days.
Amendment 461 clarifies that failure to have regard to the national or Welsh procurement policy statements is not enforceable via Part 9.
Amendments 464 to 469 make some textual amendments and make it clear that the automatic suspension applies only when a claim has been notified during the standstill period.
The structure and drafting of Clause 95 will be amended by Amendments 470 to 476 to make the intent of the clause easier to interpret.
There are various amendments related to oversight functions. Amendment 481 to Clause 96 makes a straightforward clarification to the meaning of “section 97 recommendation”. Amendments 483 and 484 reflect the principle that an appropriate authority may issue guidance to contracting authorities only in line with restrictions on relevant authorities in Clauses 99 to 101. Amendments 501 and 502 amend Clause 101 to reflect agreements with devolved authorities that, where appropriate, UK government Ministers can issue guidance under Clause 98 to all contracting authorities, including devolved and transferred authorities, to maximise joint working and efficiency.
I pause at this point so that my noble friend Lady Noakes and others can speak to their amendments.
My Lords, this has been another interesting debate. This group is on oversight and remedies. If you are going to have something worth legislating for, it has to have some sort of oversight and remedy. In other words, you have to see whether you are achieving what you wanted to and, if not, know what you going to do about it. It is therefore an important section, but to do that you have to have the right fundamentals in the Bill to have oversight and remedy.
I agree with my noble friend Lady Thornton’s amendment. She has been consistent throughout this Committee in trying to ensure that the Bill reflects the importance of social value. The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, supported that in his remarks. I know my noble friend will continue to argue for it, and we will support her should she wish to take it further on Report. It is really important, and I thank her for that.
As we are coming to the end of our remarks, I shall say that I agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on Amendment 353A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, on what has happened to the procurement review unit. It was in a Green Paper and it seemed to be universally applauded—except, obviously, somewhere in government, so it was struck out. It would be interesting to know why it was struck out. Everybody supported it, except the Government, so why were they wrong and the Government right? Sometimes I find it baffling to understand why something is done. A procurement review unit seems essential to review what you are seeking to achieve. It is not a weakness but a strength. Those are my remarks about that.
I have to say this openly to the Committee: I am devastated that I did not notice the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes: Amendment 477. Honestly, it is absolutely brilliant. The noble Lord, Lord True, has been promoted for being a socialist in charge of the Bill; the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, is on her way; and now we have this from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. Clause 96 is quite astonishing. I reread it to make sure; when I read it before, it completely passed me by. I will read it out, because people will not understand if they read Hansard without also reading this. Clause 96(1) says:
“An appropriate authority may investigate a relevant contracting authority’s compliance with requirements of this Act.”
So, we have a really important government Bill that will become law, and then, in subsection (5):
“In this section—‘procurement investigation’ means an investigation under subsection (1)”—
which I have just read out—
“‘relevant contracting authority’ means a contracting authority”,
as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, points out,
“other than … a Minister of the Crown or a government department”
and various others. Why would the Government set up something that is desperately important—in other words, a procurement unit—which makes purchases of hundreds of billions of pounds, but their own Bill says they will not investigate them?
Amendment 477 is brilliant and, as I say, I am devastated that I did not think of it or notice it. Fair play—I am very fair. More seriously, the amendment points out something that fundamentally seems to be a flaw in the way the Bill is drafted. Otherwise, there must be some incredible explanation or reason that I cannot think of—I do not know if anyone else on the Committee can think of any.
To finish, oversight and remedies are an extremely important part of any Bill, because that is how you ensure that what you seek to achieve is achieved and that you are held accountable. The amendments seek to answer those questions. Unless the Minister is able to respond in a way that persuades us, I think there are certainly one or two issues that we must come back to. With that I will sit down. It is a brilliant amendment, honestly.
I thank noble Lords for an interesting debate on these non-government amendments. I do not think that I have a perfect reply to my noble friend Lady Noakes’s three questions. We are due to meet to discuss various aspects of the Bill and I would like to explore her questions further, and then perhaps I can write to the Committee when it is clear to me what the right replies to those questions are.
I will attempt to comment on the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has just talked about, on why government departments do not have the same obligation to have regard to recommendations under Clause 97. It is a simple question, and our response is that it is not necessary to include government departments in Clause 96 and 97, because the appropriate authorities have sufficient influence over contracting authorities to ensure that any recommendations that result from an investigation are duly taken into consideration. To confirm, investigations, findings and progress reports may be published by the relevant authority acting as a further incentive. It is simply unnecessary to provide statutory powers in respect of government departments, whereas due to the different relationship with non-central contracting authorities, statutory powers were required to ensure appropriate engagements for these purposes. As noble Lords will know, we have quite a well-developed procurement operation now, right at the heart of Government, sitting in the Cabinet Office, which I think is an improvement. That is why it is not provided for in the Bill.
Just before I leave voluntary standstills, let me say that I will make sure we come back properly on the exchange we had earlier. We want to maintain voluntary standstills for dynamic markets—they are intended to be quick to use, agile and efficient, as we heard from my noble friend Lord Lansley—and for light-touch contracts, which are often for time-sensitive services such as the provision of health and social care. We do not want to make the light-touch contract rules stricter in this regard than current legislation, as we think that could lead to some problems.
Amendments 349A, 349B and 353A were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, and others. They seek to legislate for the procurement review unit with a new clause. The procurement review unit, which is very important, is not specifically referenced in the Bill as it will be exercising statutory and non-statutory powers on behalf of Ministers. The proposed new clauses would therefore conflict with existing provisions. Furthermore, considering the importance and potential implications of the decisions the PRU will support the Minister of the day in making—the proper statutory process—we believe it would be inappropriate to delegate that ultimate responsibility to unelected officials below ministerial level.
The PRU will work on behalf of the Minister of the day in two key areas. The first area is debarments. Clauses 56 to 61 set out the process for the establishment of a debarment list of excluded and excludable suppliers; this has already been debated. Under these clauses, it is envisaged that the PRU will investigate whether a supplier is subject to an exclusion ground and whether the issues in question are likely to arise again. The PRU will issue advice to the relevant Minister, usually the Minister for the Cabinet Office, who will take the final decision whether to add the supplier to the debarment list.
The second area is improving compliance with the Bill. Clauses 96 to 98 provide the framework and statutory powers required for carrying out procurement oversight. The PRU will exercise these oversight functions on behalf of the Minister and make proposals regarding any investigations, recommendations and statutory guidance it considers appropriate for the Minister’s ultimate approval.
I will have a little more to say about this later on, so why not let me finish? If I do not answer the noble Lord’s questions, we will try to get at what is needed.
Amendments 477 to 480 seek to examine why government departments have been excluded from the appropriate authority’s investigatory powers. The definition of “relevant contracting authority” in Clause 96 is in recognition of existing governance. Ministers already have the authority to investigate government departments without the need for statutory powers; I think I have said that already. There are also established routes for co-operation with investigations.
Amendment 477A was tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton—it is good to see her in the Committee—Lady Hayman of Ullock and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and the noble Earl, Lord Devon. Amendment 482 was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. These amendments would expand the scope of the statutory oversight powers beyond compliance with the Bill, straying into areas of policy. The scope of the statutory powers provided by these clauses has been carefully drafted to maintain the boundary between law, which must be adhered to, and policy, where some leeway is allowed in terms of its implementation.
Expanding Clause 96 and/or the Section 97 recommendations to include social value, as well as considering how contracting authorities have chosen to meet obligations to have regard to policy and principles, would blur that boundary and start to erode the autonomy of contracting authorities, which we recognise are best placed to make policy implementation decisions that are appropriate for their business. It would also move the statutory regime away from objective and measurable concerns into more subjective areas of debate, which could impact the effectiveness of the oversight system. We believe that the scope of Clauses 96 to 98 creates a proportionate, effective and compelling incentive for improvement. It is worth noting, however, that the drafting of Clauses 96 and 97 does not prevent the Minister from making observations regarding a contracting authority’s policy implementation. Policy guidance can indeed continue to be provided to contracting authorities.
Non-statutory procurement policy notes, which we have discussed before, are currently released to guide contracting authorities. In the new regime, under Clause 98, statutory guidance, which may be published as a result of investigations, can also address matters of policy. Contracting authorities will be required to have regard to any guidance released under Clause 98; I think this helps to deal with the social value issue. The removal of Clause 97(3) would result in the appropriate authority having the power to intervene in specific procurements.
The restriction in Clause 97(3)(c) ensures probity of the procurement by, for example, preventing a Minister of the Crown from using Section 97 to exert influence over which supplier is awarded the contract. That is an important point. To remove this restriction would be concerning to contracting authorities and suppliers alike.
Finally in this group, the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Hayman, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, tabled Amendment 486A. This seeks to stipulate that the expertise of SMEs, voluntary organisations and social enterprises is accessible to an appropriate authority that is conducting investigations under Clause 96. The PRU will be managed and delivered by a small, experienced team of civil servants based in the Cabinet Office, supported by a panel of experts, which can be consulted regarding investigations and any resultant Section 97 recommendations and guidance under Section 98. The Cabinet Office aspires to provide perspectives from procurement experts from across the Civil Service, local authorities and various types of private organisations, including SMEs and VCSEs, to benefit the oversight regime.
However, it should be recognised that having a panel which includes external procurement professionals is dependent on the availability of suitably qualified individuals and the ability to manage any potential conflicts of interest. I am therefore unwilling to make a legislative commitment of the kind proposed. However, the establishment of the panel will be transparent, and appropriate documentation will be published in due course, including on the process for appointing members. It seems to me that this is an important error, which is why I make that point.
Can the Minister clarify whether it is the Government’s intention that the PRU will be an appropriate authority, so that panel members themselves will have legal powers under Section 96? If not, I am really confused as to what legal powers the panel will have when it comes to calling for documents, and what duty will be on other contracting authorities to provide the panel with any information at all. At the moment, it does not look as if the panel is considered to be an appropriate authority, so it will not have any other legal powers under Part 10.
Following on from what the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has said, and from what the Minister said about how this could not be in the Bill because it is a policy initiative, the procurement objective in Clause 11(1)(b) is “maximising public benefit”, which is a policy issue. All the noble Baroness is trying to do is ensure that social value is looked at by the appropriate authorities. Actually, it is more defined and specific in law, because there is a social value Act but no public benefit Act. The Minister’s answer that it is just a policy issue really does not stack up.
We do have a social value Act; I think the answer is—subject to correction—that social value features in the NPPS, the policy guidance note, and that failure to have regard to the NPPS is challengeable via judicial review rather than by suppliers for breach of statutory duty under Part 9 of the Bill. That is more appropriate as the NPPS will inform procurement strategy, and failure to comply should not result in suppliers being able to seek compensation from the public purse in respect of an individual procurement. There is quite a lot of complication in that area, but that is the approach. There is a social value Act, but obviously I will listen to what has been said today.
To return to the PRU, the unit will exercise powers on behalf of an appropriate authority. The panel will consult the PRU when appropriate and, if the Government set up a panel, as Governments often do—we have various panels in different departments that I have been involved with, and in my experience they tend to endure; certainly this one will be useful—the PRU will make recommendations to the Minister, who is the appropriate authority and will make the final decisions. That seems to be the right approach constitutionally.
I am grateful for that response. To be clear, will the panel be the investigating body?
No. The PRU, a Civil Service unit, will be the investigating body, which will consist of experienced people of the right kind. The panel will advise that body.
I am grateful, but Clause 96 says the “appropriate authority may investigate”. The Minister has been referring in this short debate to “investigations” with regard to the panel. I am grateful that she has clarified that it will simply be an advisory group, not an investigatory group, and will not itself have the legal powers to seek documents. I am therefore not entirely sure what the PRU will do other than what existing civil servants do, which is to advise Ministers.
We have put together this whole new system of procurement, which includes various checks and balances. Panel members will be available for the procurement review unit to help regarding investigations and the unit’s work. Their reports and recommendations will help with moving forward on procurement and the complexities of this change of the law. Their advice can be published, and we will be able to reference the assistance that the panel has provided. That is the approach that we are proposing following a process of consultation. The PRU is central. I am sure we will revert to this issue.
The Minister will have got the message that there is deep disquiet about how this will be structured and will operate. If the Minister has time, can she reflect on Hansard and write a letter before Report setting out how this unit will be set up and what its roles, on a statutory or non-statutory basis, will be? That would be very helpful.
Of course, I will write setting out how this will work. I ask the Committee to look at it constructively in the light of what we are trying to achieve across a very wide area of procurement. I go back to where we started in Committee, as this is probably the final amendment this evening, and say that there is also a process of cultural change, training and so on that will be going on, which is an important complement to the investigatory powers that we are looking at in this amendment.
I respectfully ask noble Lords not to move their amendments.