United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 18th November 2020 Lords Chamber

It is not too late for the Government to salvage this situation. The Minister has heard many persuasive arguments from many senior Members of this House already this afternoon. Ministers in this House are always trusted to do their best to prevent the worst consequences and to act on principle. This amendment offers the Government a dignified option that would remove the threat of a major national disruption. I have no doubt that the House will support the amendment this evening. I hope, with all sincerity, that the Minister can show some flexibility.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, and I would like to congratulate her and her committee for all the work they have done in connection with common frameworks. I would also like to express my support for the amendments in this group and, in particular, Amendment 1, for the eloquent reasons set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I would also like to recognise and pay tribute to the work they did in instigating the common frameworks, and to note the role of the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations in agreeing in 2017 to create the common frameworks.

If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is minded to press this amendment to a vote, I intend to support it, for two principal reasons. One is the advanced stages of discussions on the common frameworks that have been reached, as a number of noble Lords have said, and which have proved quite fruitful; the other is the lateness of this Bill and the proceedings, and the poor consultation of the devolved nations.

In progressing these arguments, I would like to refer briefly to the eighth European Union (Withdrawal) Act and Common Frameworks report and the revised analysis, which were published on 24 September. They go into some detail about the policy areas that have been covered and conclude that, in total, there are 40 active framework areas—18 legislative and 22 non-legislative. They go on to state that in some instances, policy areas include a mixture of reserved and devolved competence, including where technical standards that derive from EU law are relevant. These policy areas include four that the UK Government believe are reserved, which are subject to ongoing discussion with the devolved Administrations.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, in moving his amendment, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and others have referred to the environmental aspects. I have a particular interest in this as I am fortunate enough to be a member of the EU Environment Sub-Committee. Paragraph 1.21 of the latest report, to which I have just referred, states:

“There have been regular Frameworks Project Team meetings between officials in the UK Government and the devolved administrations, where productive collaborative work continues.”


Examples are then given. Paragraph 1.22 states:

“Multiple meetings have taken place between officials in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and their counterparts in the devolved administrations. These include working group meetings … on Animal Health and Welfare,”


plant health,

“Waste … Chemicals and Pesticides, and Fisheries.”

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, specifically mentioned the need to recognise conditions relating to the environment where divergences and different threats need to be established. He noted that there is no specific reference to the environment in the exclusions given in Schedule 1.

As I mentioned at Second Reading, for all these reasons it is bewildering that the Government have parted from the very advanced discussions of the common frameworks process. I would like to pay tribute to and thank those involved in them, particularly the Defra officials, who, in addition to all they have had to deal with at this time, have worked closely with their counterparts in the devolved Administrations.

Unless I hear a very strong argument from the Minister as to how the progress that has been made can be accommodated, I will support Amendment 1 and the other amendments in this group.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, I am one of no fewer than seven members of the Common Frameworks Scrutiny Committee, including our chair, the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, who we have already heard from, and the mover of this amendment, who are participating in this debate, which shows our interest—one of those interests you do not need to declare. I call it a debate but I fear that, sadly, even more so than usual, because of the hybrid nature of our proceedings, it is more a series of statements. That is a great pity and I look forward to the day when we can get back to all sitting round this Chamber and having a proper debate.

I also speak as a strong supporter of devolution since the early 1960s, when, as some of my colleagues here, who are nearly as old as I am, will recall, to be a supporter of devolution was not the most popular thing to be in the Labour Party. We had to work very hard to persuade the party to move in that direction. I say that now to put into context what I will say later, but I sound a cautionary note. People sometimes get on to a bandwagon, and it goes faster and faster, more and more people jump on, and they do not always know which direction it is going in and what the consequences and all the implications are.

We have had devolution for a very long time in Scotland, but mostly it was administrative devolution. We have had a different educational service for a long time. As my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, who is a Scots advocate—not practising, as she keeps reminding us—could tell us, we have had a Scots law system that is entirely different. We have had that for decades—indeed, in some cases for centuries. However, for so long, legislation in Scotland was dealt with at Westminster right at the end of lots of other legislation, as a sort of afterthought or codicil. There was little time spent on it, or interest in it. I was a Member of Parliament, along with the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and others who will remember that it was not the main business we were dealing with. That is why we pushed hard.

The main argument in favour of a Scottish Parliament was to provide democratic accountability in relation to the administrative devolution that had already taken place. But we always understood—this is what I think some people have forgotten—that Westminster remained and remains ultimately responsible for the good government of the whole United Kingdom. That is something never to forget. Some people want us to forget it, but it is very important. We have a sort of quasi-federal system. It was supposed to develop throughout the whole United Kingdom, but the proposal that the Labour Government put forward for devolution in the north-east of England was ill thought out. It was put forward at a bad time and did not get through. Had we had devolution for the whole United Kingdom things would be very different from the way they are at the moment.

The other thing is that devolution is completely different from independence. The two are completely separate concepts, and it is important never to forget that. It is in the interests of the SNP, the nationalists, to obfuscate, to muddy the waters, to pretend that one and the other are very similar, and to say, “Don’t worry”. Boris Johnson, our Prime Minister, recently showed that he does not understand devolution, but beware: equally, the SNP does not want us to understand devolution and is not using it as it is meant to be used, to benefit the people and improve the conditions of the people in Scotland.

Someone—I think the noble Lord, Lord Bourne—raised earlier that when we have Governments of similar political persuasions in Scotland and in the rest of the United Kingdom there are sometimes substantial difficulties. I know exactly that situation: I was Minister of State for Scotland in the United Kingdom Government and I dealt with an Administration in Scotland that was run by the Labour Party in coalition with the Liberal Democrats. We worked very well together. I used to meet weekly with Ministers in the Scottish Government. We had discussions about free personal care and how it should be funded. They were good, positive discussions and we all understood the position exactly.

I acknowledge as much as anyone—after all, I was a Member of the Scottish Parliament for four years, so I saw it as an MSP—the importance of involving the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish Parliaments and Governments, consulting where appropriate, giving them powers, allowing them total control over all the devolved areas and having them involved in other areas through the legislative consent Motions and the Sewel convention. I know that, and I felt it myself. But it is equally important to remember that each of the devolved Governments are not always right. Sometimes I think that some people assume that they are always right. I worry sometimes that we in Westminster do not want to be seen as big brothers, or to impose on or upset them, so we take what they say as gospel. We give them a veto where it is not appropriate. Sometimes I wonder whether those who came late to supporting devolution are the strongest advocates of taking account of their concerns: it is the zeal of the convert, perhaps.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the speeches by the noble Baronesses, Lady Andrews and Lady Meacher, who have spoken with such cogency. I agree with them.

My name appears on Amendments 2, 7, 12, 17, 31 and 42 for two reasons. The first is that I was there at the beginning of devolution in Wales and have watched it develop in ways that were described earlier this afternoon by other noble Lords. It has been successful; it has brought the people of Wales much closer to government and resulted in faster decision-making than we ever had in the old days when the nearest we had to devolution, when I was a Member of another place, was the Welsh Grand Committee.

The second reason why I speak in favour of these amendments is a more general one. I have watched with surprise, and sometimes despair, the galloping tendency of government—and it has been successive Governments—to take more executive power through secondary legislation. Henry VIII must be very surprised, if he is aware of it at all, that his powers are being asked for so frequently and when they are not necessary.

I want to focus on Amendment 7 for I, like the noble Baronesses who have just spoken, welcome the addition of the name of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, to Amendment 2. That is truly welcome. When I first saw it, I thought it showed a thorough recognition of the issues at stake because it is a significant concession. All that we are asking on this side of the debate is consistency with regard to the non-discrimination principle. That principle is of as fundamental importance as the mutual recognition principle for markets to which the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, has signed up in Amendment 2. They are plainly legislative siblings—indeed, they are almost identical twins—since they have a great deal of political and legislative DNA in common. Certainly they are equally important, and they are of equal moment in the devolved parts of the UK. I therefore feel bound to say that I am bemused by the lack of logic displayed by the Government’s failure to agree to Amendment 7 having agreed to Amendment 2.

I was talking earlier about the way in which devolution has worked. I can put that point very simply. These days in Wales, about which I know more than Scotland, legislative changes are brought about in real time as decisions become necessary. They are not always right—legislative changes are never always right—but at least there is an understanding by the public, those involved in politics in Wales and public servants in Wales that it is possible to make change. By that process, one has given a new self-respect regarding the way in which Wales is governed to elected Members, public officials and those who elect the elected Members.

What is still in Clause 6, the requirement for consultation without consent, is, unfortunately, a fig-leaf. It does not provide any reality to the role of Wales—on which I speak particularly—in this process because it can be overridden. Yes, reasons have to be given, but it is not very difficult to construct reasons. It relegates the devolved regions to a negligible role on matters directly affecting their interests. If it were necessary to do that, if that relegation could truly be demonstrated intellectually and logically as necessary, then I would be willing to support it, but I see no such explanation. Allowing executive powers in this way goes far beyond what is necessary.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, and other noble Lords on tabling these amendments. I thank my noble friend Lord Callanan for supporting Amendment 2 and, in particular, for adopting government Amendment 35 as his own. I thank the Law Society of Scotland for its help, both in briefing me and in helping me to draft an earlier form of this amendment. I want to single out for praise Michael Clancy, whom I have known for many years. He works tirelessly on behalf of the Law Society of Scotland, and Scotland more broadly, to ensure that both Houses of Parliament and other sectors of Scotland are in tune with the constitutional implications of their thinking. I also thank my noble friend Lord Callanan for tabling government Amendments 29 and 47. They are inclusive in reaching out to consult the devolved Administrations.

Amendment 2 lays to rest the dangers of many of the original provisions in this Bill—particularly in relation to secondary legislation and Henry VIII powers— that did not find favour with your Lordships’ House. I remind the House of my interest as a non-practising member of the Faculty of Advocates. I shall pursue a similar line of thought to that expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, in moving Amendment 2. I welcome government Amendments 29, 35 and 47, but perhaps we need to persuade the Government to move similarly further in other parts of the Bill. I shall seek to do so when the time comes. I congratulate my noble friends Lord Callanan and Lord True on their letter and thank them for listening to our concerns.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering. The noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, made a superb opening speech. I also agree with everything said by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. They were two superb speeches.

I want to raise something that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said in the last debate and with which I strongly disagree. He said that there is no debate in this House. This is an absolute fallacy. A normal debate is when one side puts its argument and the other side responds. What the noble Lord meant by “lively debate” is rude interruption. I do not see why we should accept that as normal debate; it simply is not. When I was first in this House, I found it extremely difficult because some rather nasty Peers interrupted my early speeches. It was very distracting for me and for those listening to me. I disagree completely with that concept of a debate. The reason we have no debate in this House is that we all agree that the Government’s legislation is rubbish. That is why there is no argument. Even the noble Lord agrees with the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes and Lord Fox. We are all agreeing, apart from—well, sometimes the Minister agrees.

How dare anyone suggest that people in this Chamber have more of a right to speak than those outside? I have kept away from this House because I did not want to risk my life or other people’s. I care about this very much. Why should people in this red and gold bubble think they are entitled to a different sort of debate? I am here now only because I am so angry about some of the Bills coming through and I cannot express my fury well enough virtually and remotely; it does not come across through the screen. I do not want to be here. I am here only because it is the best way to get my point across. Those staying away are being more rational.

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Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

6: Clause 5, page 4, line 29, after “part” insert “only”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies the meaning of Clause 5(3) regarding the effect of a statutory requirement under Clause 6.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, it gives me great pleasure to speak to and move Amendment 6, which I hope is self-explanatory. It seeks to clarify the meaning of Clause 5(3), regarding the effect of the statutory requirement under Clause 6. It should have read, just for greater clarification, “A relevant requirement (see section 6) is of no effect in the destination part but only if, and to the extent that”. That is a compromise we reached for greater understanding of the text.

The effect of Clause 5(3) will be to render a discriminatory statutory provision in UK or devolved legislation of no effect. I warmly thank the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for co-signing this amendment. In Committee, we had reservations about the meaning of “no effect”, because it lacked clarity. That was the view put forward by the Law Society of Scotland, which has helped me to draft this amendment.

My noble friend Lord Callanan confirmed in Committee that:

“Clause 5(3) will operate so that any future requirements that fall within the scope of the non-discrimination principle will be of no effect to the extent that they are discriminatory. For the benefit of the lawyers, this does not mean that the requirement is to be treated as if it never had any legal effect. Rather, it allows the continued operation of the requirement, except to the extent that it has discriminatory effects.”


The amendment therefore seeks to emphasise that the lack of effect relates only to the discriminatory element of the statutory requirement and does not otherwise affect the validity of the requirement. I hope that my noble friend will take the opportunity to confirm that that is the case.

There is also concern about the application of Clause 5(3) to a statutory provision in an Act of Parliament. My noble friend Lord Callanan confirmed that:

“As the Bill deals with trade across the whole of the United Kingdom, the intention is that this will apply to all legislation: secondary legislation, primary legislation passed by devolved legislatures and legislation passed by the UK Parliament.”—[Official Report, 28/10/20; col. 251.]


Under Clause 49, legislation means, inter alia, primary legislation, which includes an Act of Parliament. Therefore, we know that this provision means that such an Act will be of no effect to the extent that it is discriminatory under the Bill. I am minded to repeat the words of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, who mentioned that secondary legislation can be open to interpretation by the courts. I would be most grateful if my noble friend could clarify and further benefit us with his understanding of this provision.

I also comment briefly on Amendment 24 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, and others, with which I have some sympathy, as it ensures continued compliance with the principle of non-regression in Article 2 of the Northern Ireland protocol. That is a worthy aim, and I admire the enthusiasm and energy with which the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, has pursued this in the interests of her nation. With those few remarks, I beg to move and wait to hear the response of my noble friend to this little debate.

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Non-Afl) [V]]

My Lords, I speak in support of both amendments in this group. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, has already explained the purpose of Amendment 6. Amendment 24 is in my name and those of the noble Baronesses, Lady Suttie and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain.

We have been contacted by the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, which have agreed to act as a dedicated mechanism responsible for the monitoring, supervising, advising and reporting on and enforcing the UK’s commitment, under Article 2 of the Northern Ireland protocol to the withdrawal agreement from the end of the transition period. They believe that this amendment is needed to ensure that the Bill is brought into compliance with the UK’s obligation under Article 2 of the protocol to the EU/UK withdrawal agreement.

The problem with the Bill as currently drafted arises when Clause 5 is read in conjunction with Clause 6. The commissions’ research only came to light while we were in Committee, as they were awaiting senior counsel’s advice, hence the only opportunity to have brought forward this amendment is now, on Report. I thank all noble Lords who have signed the amendment and hope that your Lordships’ House accepts that explanation.

Clause 5(1) provides that:

“The non-discrimination principle for goods is the principle that the sale of goods in one part of the United Kingdom should not be affected by relevant requirements that directly or indirectly discriminate against goods that have a relevant connection with another part of the United Kingdom.”


It may appear, on superficial reading, that Clause 5 applies only to goods and not, for example, to statutory requirements regarding employment conditions. This is incorrect, however, because Clause 6(3) provides details of what constitutes “relevant requirements” for the purposes of Clause 5(1):

“A statutory provision is within the scope of the non-discrimination principle if it relates to any one or more of the following—


(a) the circumstances or manner in which goods are sold (such as where, when, by whom, to whom, or the price or other terms on which they may be sold);


(b) the transportation, storage, handling or display of goods;


(c) the inspection, assessment, registration, certification, approval or authorisation of the goods or any similar dealing with them;


(d) the conduct or regulation of businesses that engage in the sale of certain goods or types of goods.”


The effect of these provisions, therefore, is to bring statutory provisions regarding employment conditions, including legislation regulating wages, which apply to those selling goods, within the scope of the non-discrimination requirement in Clause 5(1). This means that equality legislation regarding employment conditions introduced in Northern Ireland in order to comply with the non-diminution requirement in Article 2 of the protocol must be protected.

If there is a challenge to such employment legislation, it is not clear that the legislation can be defended on the grounds that it can, as set out in Clause 8 of the Bill,

“reasonably be considered a necessary means of achieving a legitimate aim.”

Clause 8 defines what constitutes a legitimate aim. This appears to be an exhaustive list and does not include, for example, compliance with an international treaty as a legitimate aim. To illustrate the potential impact of the Bill on the Article 2 obligation, I will set out an example of additional requirements on employers in Northern Ireland that could be introduced as a result of changes to the Annexe 1 directives that deal with the wide panoply of equality directives that could be challenged under the Bill. It is not possible to predict the exact nature and extent of future EU changes to the Annexe 1 equality directives, including new obligations on employers.

However, taking into consideration EU equality law changes already made, recent European Commission proposals and plausible future scenarios, there is a reasonable prospect that over time, the Annexe 1 directives dealing with all equality matters may be updated, amended or replaced, and additional EU requirements on employers introduced. Employers in Great Britain may consider that these changes negatively impact on their businesses and influence an employer’s decision to employ staff in Northern Ireland, and thus to provide goods in Northern Ireland, and would therefore be challengeable as indirectly discriminatory under the Bill. The equal pay example can be characterised with the EU amending or replacing the existing equal treatment directive to incorporate extended equal pay obligations on employers.

As a result of these additional requirements, an employer in Great Britain with a predominantly female workforce could decide not to employ staff in Northern Ireland and could consider that there is more limited market access in Northern Ireland than in Great Britain. Using the indirect discrimination prohibition in the Bill, the employer could challenge legislation enacted by the Northern Ireland Assembly to comply with these new obligations. Other examples could be given relating to disability discrimination, race equality, equal pay audits and gender pay reporting.

To comply with Article 2 of the protocol, there is a need to ensure that any such additional requirements on employers in Northern Ireland, introduced to keep Northern Ireland equality law aligned with future EU changes to the equality directives in Annexe 1, cannot be challenged as indirectly discriminatory under the Bill. I therefore urge the Government to accept this amendment and ask the Minister to accept a letter from me, on behalf of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Equality Commission, which will outline in depth their main concerns about this issue. Will he meet with us and the other signatories to the amendment to discuss these issues? I honestly believe that the amendment would provide legal clarity and certainty, including for employers who have responsibility under Article 2 of the protocol.

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[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

I call the Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to those who have spoken in support of this amendment—

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, I believe that a noble Lord gave notice that he wanted to speak after the Minister.

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[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, once again I thank all those who have spoken in this debate, in particular my noble friend Lord Callanan for trying to explain the Government’s position. The Bill could be made clearer if the words that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, and I want to introduce were added to it. I part company from the Minister in saying that, actually, I do not see that this proposal would interfere with other legislation. There remains confusion, but I am not minded to press this to a vote at this stage.

I thank all those who have spoken, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes and Lord Stevenson, and convey their thanks also to the Law Society of Scotland. I am sorry for Michael Clancy that we have not had more success on this occasion. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, for so clearly setting out her Amendment 24, which has great merit. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

9: Clause 6, page 5, line 29, at end insert—
“( ) The Secretary of State must publish the results of the consultation and give reasons for any decision reached.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to publish the results of the consultation and give reasons for any decision reached.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to have this opportunity to move the amendment standing in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. I thank him for kindly supporting the amendments. I shall speak also to Amendments 13, 33, 44, 60 and 74.

Amendment 9 requires the Secretary of State to publish the results of the consultation referred to in Clause 6(7) and to give reasons for any decision reached. The reason for this is the history of the Bill, which we are told was drafted at pace, and had an unusually short overall consultation period of one month. I understand the responses to the consultation were published on the same day as the Bill. There was no prior consultation on drafts of the Bill, which I understand is a most unusual procedure. Once again, I am obliged to the Law Society of Scotland for its assistance in drafting these amendments.

The obligation on the Secretary of State to consult the devolved Administrations is welcome, but the clause currently lacks any obligation on the Secretary of State to report the outcome of the consultation with reasons for the decision. In the interests of transparency, the Government should make public the outcome of the consultation for that reason. I hope the Minister in winding up this debate will see fit to do that.

The other amendments in the group all relate to the super-affirmative resolution procedure. Amendment 13 adapts Clause 8 to this; Amendment 33, Clause 17; and Amendment 44, Clause 20. Amendment 60 creates a new schedule on the super-affirmative procedure and Amendment 74 creates a new clause setting out the scrutiny procedure in certain urgent cases. The reason why the amendment seeks to introduce the super-affirmative resolution procedure, the supportive schedule and the new clause, as I have mentioned, is to up the level of parliamentary scrutiny applicable to regulations under these clauses and the new schedule, which is currently by the affirmative resolution procedure. This is partly for the reason that I gave earlier: woeful time was given, in quite unusual circumstances, in which to draft the Bill. Changing the scope of the relevant clauses, in my view, that of the Law Society and of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, may have significant consequences. It is much more beneficial to use the super-affirmative resolution procedure, because it enables longer consultation and for the views of interested parties to be taken into account.

I mentioned Erskine May previously in Committee. Paragraph 31.14 describes the super-affirmative procedure as having

“been implemented in enactments where an exceptionally high degree of scrutiny is thought appropriate, for instance, for the scrutiny of certain items of delegated legislation made, or proposed to be made, under ‘Henry VIII’ powers… The super-affirmative procedure provides both Houses with opportunities to comment on proposals for secondary legislation and to recommend amendments before orders for affirmative approval are brought forward in their final form.”

In the view of the Law Society of Scotland, with which I concur, the Bill is of profound constitutional significance. As paragraph 4 of the Constitution Committee report indicates, we need as much scrutiny of the Executive as possible. Deploying the procedure that I propose, as set out in these amendments, will achieve a better outcome than simply keeping the Bill in its present form, with the usual affirmative procedure.

I was delighted by the debate that we enjoyed in Committee on the earlier manifestation of this amendment, as summed up by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, in his objection. He said he could not “support the precise method” adopted. There may be many approaches to the super-affirmative resolution procedure, but the schedule that accompanies this amendment contains a detailed procedure. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, also noted that:

“If a Minister wishes to exercise his powers under the Bill, there is no requirement under the noble Baroness’s proposed schedule that scrutiny of his proposed amendment to primary legislation should in any way involve the devolved Administrations; no mechanism is proposed. It is true that, in paragraph 5, the Secretary of State must have regard to ‘representations’, but there is no indication from whom the representations would or should come.”


Since the Minister’s power undoubtedly includes the possibility that the proposals will, at the very least, impinge on the devolution settlement, the noble Lord goes on to say that:

“I would be more supportive of this proposal if it required as part of the super-affirmative procedure that, in the periods of 30, 40 or 60 days during which the proposals would be looked at in Westminster, there were a requirement that the devolved Administrations should at the very least be consulted, preferably that their consent to the proposals should be a necessary prerequisite. It is not enough that the Minister should ‘have regard to representations’.”—[Official Report, 28/10/20; col. 279.]


I am delighted to say that the schedule now provides a requirement to receive representations from and to consult with the devolved Administrations. We have also proposed a new clause in Amendment 74, which will deal with cases of urgency when regulations need to be presented. I am further encouraged by the fact that I understand from private discussions that the Liberal Democrats are minded to support the super-affirmative procedure, but I have had less success with the Official Opposition. There is still time for them to change their mind. On this basis, and with these brief remarks, I beg to move.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, I am very pleased once again to support the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. I want to speak briefly to three of the amendments. I will say first that the regulation-making powers in this Bill cover very significant areas. They are not minor matters. They really are important and that is why they need scrutiny. As I said earlier, the House of Lords does the work that we do best in scrutinising these issues.

I will deal first with Amendment 13. In Clause 8, the Secretary of State can under subsection (7) make regulations

“to add, vary or to remove”

a legitimate aim. That is key in defining a relevant requirement which indirectly discriminates. A legitimate aim is defined in subsection (6) as either

“(a) the protection of the life or health of”

human animals—oh, sorry, it is

“humans, animals or plants,”

not human animals; well, human animals, other animals and plants. The second legitimate aim is

“(b) the protection of public safety or security.”

Perhaps the Minister in his reply could shed light on which of these the Government would seek to amend in the future. That would be helpful.

The second amendment I want to refer to is Amendment 60. Particularly to my noble friend on the Front Bench, I commend this idea of the super-affirmative resolution. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, said she has not yet got the support of the Labour Official Opposition. Once my colleagues scrutinise this in more detail, I am sure they will come round to supporting it. The super-affirmative resolution is described in Amendment 60. It provides for the laying of draft regulations and an explanatory statement by the Secretary of State to consult the devolved Administrations and to have regard to their representations and the representations of other persons, and to allow for additional time for parliamentary consideration. That is to “have regard to” these representations. The importance of the Secretary of State’s powers under the Bill requires better scrutiny than the affirmative or negative resolution procedure. We know that and know that they are not particularly helpful ways of scrutinising legislation.

The super-affirmative procedure as defined in this schedule provides better parliamentary scrutiny, allows engagement with the devolved Administrations and enables proper consultation. Holding the Government to account is important when such regulations are being made. I hope my noble friend will come round to the view that she will at least take it away and have a look and see if, at a later stage, all Labour Members can support the super-affirmative resolution.

Amendment 74 allows the scrutiny of statutory instruments containing regulations under the Bill in such a way as to allow for their urgent implementation, rather than following the super-affirmative procedure. There was concern that the super-affirmative procedure would take too much time, and this amendment provides for issues that need to be dealt with quickly. Regulations can be made under this provision only if the Secretary of State makes a declaration that he or she is

“of the opinion that, by reason of urgency, it is necessary to make the regulations without a draft being approved under”

the super-affirmative resolution procedure. The regulations will be limited in time, under proposed new subsection (4), to a period of 28 days, unless

“the instrument is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

I hope that the Minister will consider the amendments carefully and I have great pleasure in supporting the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, in her amendments.

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Amendment 9 now refers—I always defer to the wisdom of your Lordships—to Clause 6(5) to (7), including a reference to consultations, which your Lordships have just voted to remove. So the reference to consultations in this amendment is to sections that are no longer in the Bill. Looking at the intent of the amendment, it requires publication of the results of consultation on the exercise of the powers that were in Clause 6. Well, devolved Administrations and indeed the Secretary of State are perfectly free to publish their responses if they so choose, but the Government do not believe that that choice should be made for them in the Bill. Therefore, even if the amendment still made sense in the new context, there is no need for the stipulation in it. As it no longer makes sense in context, following your Lordships’ amendment to the Bill a few minutes ago, and it does not seem to be a good way to make law to send to the other place, as it were, a floating amendment which refers to consultations which are no longer within the clause, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken, particularly the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes and Lord Beith, for indicating in principle their support for the super-affirmative procedure. I note especially the comment by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, that just because a procedure has never been used, there is no reason not to use it in this case for the purposes of primary legislation.

I am slightly disappointed that my noble friend Lord True, in responding to this debate, does not seem to get the strength of feeling, certainly north of the border, about the rather peremptory fashion in which the Bill was introduced, with only one month for consultation to be had as opposed to the normal longer period. I hope this is something that we can discuss in connection not just with this Bill but with other Bills as well: my clear understanding is that the Government always used to publish in full the responses to their consultation procedures. I used to find it enormously helpful, as a shadow Minister in the other place, to go through and dissect comments that had been made, and I used to table amendments on the basis of those. So I can see that there might be a reason why my noble friend might not wish to publish the full responses.

I was also disappointed that my noble friend said the Government would “consult appropriately”. I am not entirely sure from this little debate, given the background, the pace at which the Bill was introduced and the shorter consultation period than one might have expected, that that has necessarily been achieved. I note his comments that there will be other opportunities at this and later stages to consider how best to achieve the aims of these amendments. With those remarks, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Teverson (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 11 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, although I am very much in favour of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, as well.

Devolution has not been a disaster in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland or, indeed, London. It has strengthened the United Kingdom, our economy and our society. My great fear is that the overwhelming application of the market access principle—with those few exceptions: life or health of humans, animals and pets or public safety and security—is far too restrictive and will mean that important parts of devolution erode and disappear over time.

As with Amendment 11 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, I am particularly concerned about the environment, including climate change. I will be brief on this. We heard arguments in Committee that the most important thing was maintaining strong competition in the United Kingdom. I agree with that, but, like all things in market economies, that needs to be constrained in certain ways. While we need market competition to remain strong, it is equally important in a modern economy that innovation can take place. Competition in environmental regulation and some of these other areas is equally important to stimulate innovations in the nations of the United Kingdom that others can follow when they are successful. I see that as a key part of this process: being able to keep at the same time the different ways in which the nations of the United Kingdom can interpret environmental and climate change needs.

I am delighted that the Minister responding is the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, who is the Government’s Minister for Climate Change. I am sure he will be absolutely persuaded by these arguments that we need these environmental innovations to help with climate change as we move forward—as the Prime Minister wants us to, as he showed in his 10-point plan today—and to make sure we keep that progress and do it in the many ways the nations of the United Kingdom wish.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am most grateful for this opportunity to follow the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, who chairs our EU Environment Sub-Committee so expertly and courteously.

I take this opportunity in supporting Amendments 10 and 11—I would marginally prefer Amendment 10, but presumably they are for debating purposes—briefly to ask my noble friend Lord Callanan whether our understanding of the Bill as currently drafted is correct, in that it appears to be very tightly and prescriptively drawn, as so expertly indicated by the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord Anderson. Would protection of the environment or the labelling provisions proposed by my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham be permitted? Is my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe correct that, for example, the labelling provisions set out by my noble friend Lord Young would already be allowed?

My understanding is that member states such as Denmark can already provide additional information for consumers, such as the calorie content of beers and other foods, and that we have not gone that far yet. Would that be permitted under the Bill as currently drafted, or do we need the amendments in this group to be moved? That would greatly assist me understand how exactly the provisions in the Bill as drafted are to be interpreted.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I am sure that the supporters of these amendments are motivated only by the desire to enable the devolved Administrations to do the right thing in environmental protection and all the other fine things mentioned in these amendments, though I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, that I have absolutely no idea what “cultural expression”, as mentioned in Amendment 21, has to do with the internal market.

I appeal to noble Lords to remember that the aim of this Bill is to ensure that the UK’s internal market operates on a frictionless basis and allows businesses to trade in the UK with the minimum of barriers as they do now. This helps businesses in all parts of the UK operate successfully and profitably, which supports the aim I hope we all share of a healthily growing economy. More importantly, it delivers for consumers because trade barriers tend to increase costs and reduce consumer choice.

I have to say that this is not a question of whether a particular regulatory rule will itself increase costs. We can argue all day about whether, say, increasing environmental regulation will increase or reduce costs for consumers. That is not the point; the point is about having different environmental regulations in one part of the United Kingdom compared with other parts and whether that will work in the interests of consumers or against them. The answer to that is clear. If such regulations have the effect of erecting further trade barriers, the consumer takes the hit.

Competition (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Monday 16th November 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, the role of competition in the economy and in protecting consumer choice is extremely important, and the EU competition rules have done so for a defining period of time. I must declare my interests: in the late 1970s, I spent six happy months as an intern—a stagiaire—in DG IV, now DG COMP. I saw a great future for myself as a competition lawyer; sadly, that was not to be.

I thank my noble friend the Minister for introducing these regulations, but a number of questions arise. It is clear that great uncertainty lies ahead for companies under the regime set out in the regulations. As my noble friend Lord Lansley alluded to, there are many unanswered questions on state aid and subsidies, which are still part of the negotiations. In the context of these regulations, what will the definition of “dominant position” be for merger policies once the CMA takes over, as regards any UK company wishing to continue to do business in the EU? If my understanding is correct, there will be a period of time when a UK company is subject to two different regimes, as my noble friend the Minister set out earlier. Obviously, that could lead to a degree of confusion.

On the ongoing rights of the European Commission in looking at live cases, what will be the position for an appeal to be made under any decision taken in those cases? Will it still have the right to appeal to the European Court of Justice or will it have to rely on entirely UK-based remedies? Which body should it apply to in this regard?

I echo what the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Bennett, said about the current unhealthy state of competition and the UK’s ability sufficiently to ensure a level playing field and protection for consumers against giant tech firms. This area concerns me greatly going forward, so I would be interested to know what proposals my noble friend has in that regard. In this brave new world of leaving the protections of the EU’s competition policies, how can he reassure British consumers that their rights will be protected? Does he at least have an update on what the situation will be regarding roaming charges from 1 January 2021? Will roaming charges revert to UK providers being able to charge fantastic amounts for our use? Obviously no one is going anywhere at the moment but, when travel resumes, will they be able to charge what they deem to be reasonable but others might deem extortionate?

If under the regulations before us today the UK courts no longer have the facility to refer questions of interpretation of competition policy in European Union law to the European Court of Justice, what protection will businesses have from potential unfair competition for their products in the rest of the European Union? It would be helpful to understand what that would be. Can my noble friend assure me also that there is no possibility of a double penalty being imposed under the two regimes appearing to run in parallel for an interim period? I know that the Explanatory Memorandum states clearly that the CMA will “have regard to” penalties that might have been imposed by the European Commission, but it would be helpful to have clarification in that regard.

Can my noble friend also reassure me that businesses that continue to operate in the EU will not face more red tape as a result of the regulations before us than is currently the case? I do not oppose the regulations, but I am deeply concerned about some of their implications.

Common Rules for Exports (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Tuesday 10th November 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, and I echo many of the points that she and other noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Empey, have made. The fact is that after 1 January 2021 there will, effectively, be a border in the Irish Sea, and these regulations reflects the consequences of that. Two separate regimes will apply, one to Great Britain and one to Northern Ireland. It is an indisputable fact and I regret that.

I want to take this opportunity to thank my noble friend the Minister for bringing forward these regulations and giving us a chance to put questions. In that regard, can he clarify paragraph (2) of the regulations, which refers to fulfilling international obligations relating to “primary products” that are defined, for greater clarity, to

“include unprocessed agricultural products and raw materials”?

The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, referred to the implications for agri-food. It is extremely important to have a degree of certainty before we reach the end of the transition period. Will my noble friend take this opportunity to further clarify the position?

Equally, can the Minister comment on the questions arising and the conclusions reached from the evidence given by his department for the 29th report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee? On pages 3 and 4, it states:

“‘we will ensure that the necessary procedures apply only to very minimal volumes of relevant trade necessary to comply with those obligations. For goods affected, the processes put in place in these very specific cases will have negligible implications for trade as a whole.’”

Surely, the issue here is that that is for the EU Commission to decide, not the Westminster Government. I am sure the Minister will wish to clarify that he and other Ministers of the Crown in Westminster have no control over that whatsoever.

Like other noble Lords speaking in this debate, I would like a number of clarifications. Certain circumstances are as yet unclear. May I ask my noble friend directly: under what circumstances will the Commission be allowed to exercise this power? Can we have further clarification and a better understanding of the implications? These regulations prove that there are going to be enormously difficult issues, particularly agri-foods going into and out of Northern Ireland and Great Britain after 1 January.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 9th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, I follow the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds in hoping that the Government will listen.

Earlier today, we had a good example of how your Lordships’ House works at its best. The Agriculture Bill has now gone through all its parliamentary stages with significant amendment—much of its achieved through debate and persuasion in your Lordships’ House. Although there are aspects of that Bill that many of us still question, nevertheless we can claim that the Government have listened and that something will get on to the statute book improved by your Lordships’ House and worthy of our parliamentary process.

We could not be further away from that with the Bill now before us. I listened with admiration and agreement to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, and to other noble Lords, but Part 5 cannot be improved. Part 5 has to go. In seeing it off—which I believe it is our duty to do—we are honouring and not abrogating the Salisbury/Addison convention, as I said on Second Reading. This was part of a manifesto commitment. It is not a law passed by some previous Government of another party. This is a law campaigned for by the Government, who won a sweeping victory in the general election last December. The early stages went through this Parliament, pre-Covid, and now we are told that the Government want to abrogate.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, in a magisterial speech, pointed out what a blemish on our national reputation this would be—and it would. We would rightly be accused of losing our moral compass as a nation. How can we talk to others about honouring the rule of law if we ourselves are pushing through Parliament an Act that abrogates a treaty willingly entered into, commended to Parliament and endorsed by it less than a year ago? As we have debated, the Bill has many imperfections—it is a real threat to devolution—but what is fundamentally wrong with it is that we are abrogating that treaty, and putting ourselves on the level of countries for which the rule of law is not of much consequence.

For goodness’ sake, we are looking across the Atlantic at the moment and seeing how crucial it is that the leader of the free world and the greatest country in the world believes in the rule of law, and not just when it is convenient. I deplore that we are in this position, and devoutly wish that we were not, but I could never support this part of the Bill. I do not like much of the rest of it, but I certainly could never support this part. We have not only a unique opportunity, but also a unique duty, to ensure that this does not pass.

We have certain powers in your Lordships’ House. We are always very wary of how we exercise those powers, and that is right, because the ultimate authority lies with the elected House, but this is something forced through the elected House by our Government, which, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said in that splendid speech, puts into the hands of any Minister the opportunity, by secondary legislation, to repudiate law.

Tom Bingham has been cited in evidence before in your Lordships’ House and has been mentioned again tonight. I implore my noble friend on the Front Bench to read carefully that marvellous little book, The Rule of Law. It will not take him long. What would Tom Bingham be saying tonight? How fortunate we are that another former Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has been able to give the lead with forensic skill, devastating logic and impeccable argument. We must not allow this to go through, and the only way of ensuring that it does not is to vote against every one of the clauses in Part 5 standing part. I propose to do so, and if necessary, will do it again and again.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow my noble friend Lord Cormack. I pay tribute to his excellent work over many years in the other place, not least in his model chairmanship of the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, which I commend today. I shall speak to Amendments 179 and 180, but I will not press them to a vote. Before I speak to them, I endorse what my noble friends Lord Cormack and Lord Howard of Lympne said. It was a privilege to serve as a humble shadow Minister in the Conservative Party under the leadership of my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne. I also pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. He has set out in his amendments why I shall certainly be voting against this part of the Bill.

On Clauses 42 and 43, the noble Lord, Lord Empey, stated the importance of agri-food and the food industry to Northern Ireland. We should pause for a moment on that point. I pray in aid the evidence that we have heard on the EU Environment Sub-Committee, that all those involved in the production of food in Northern Ireland, and industries such as road haulage and freight, which serve that industry, are distraught at the moment because they all thought that this was done and dusted in the Northern Ireland protocol and under the provisions of the EU withdrawal Act. I regret that we are now discussing those issues again in this context. I have no doubt that this was largely because of a misunderstanding of what the Prime Minister had agreed to in what formed the basis of EU withdrawal agreement.

I cannot support this because I am a non-practising member of the Faculty of Advocates and would be drummed out if I broke my oath. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties clearly states that all agreements should be kept and that every treaty

“in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”

In the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, the provisions in Clauses 42 to 47 are offensive and obnoxious, and I wish to have no part in them. I shall follow the lead of my noble friend Lord Cormack in voting against them this evening and on every occasion when I am asked.

I am grateful to the Law Society for briefing me on this and for preparing me to table Amendments 179 and 180, but if the provisions before us in this part were not bad enough, they were compounded as the Bill made its passage through the other place. The provisions in Clause 56(4) provide additional parliamentary scrutiny of the decision to commence in the sections, which, if enacted, would, if anything, compound the breach of international law. Clause 56(4) is defective for those reasons, not least because it is trying to elevate to a matter of process what is offensive and obnoxious in this part of the Bill. It also downgrades the role that we would play in your Lordships’ House by simply taking note of the commencement order for Clauses 44, 45 and 47.

I do not wish to move my amendments, but I am grateful to the Law Society for pointing out the further deficiencies in this part of the Bill. It is largely academic, because I shall be voting against all five clauses in Part 5 of the Bill.

[Baroness Altmann (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am humbled to follow so many powerful, erudite, emotional and persuasive speeches. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, presented the case brilliantly. The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, the noble Lords, Lord Newby and Lord Hain, my noble friends Lord Howard and Lord Cormack, the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, and so many others across the Committee, have outlined why it is essential that your Lordships’ House removes each and every clause of Part 5 of the Bill. We cannot allow the Government to rewrite an international agreement to suit ourselves, and to undermine the very foundation of our democracy, which is based on the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty.

I am proud to sit in your Lordships’ House, and to have grown up in this country, which I have always considered a beacon of respect for the rule of law, for upholding international law, and for honesty and moral standards of behaviour, but I too join my noble friend Lord Howard in opposing the Bill, and agree with him that this is not about whether one was for Brexit or remain. It is much more important even than that.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 4th November 2020 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

149: Clause 38, page 29, line 36, after “evidence” insert “or is subject to legal professional privilege”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes explicit reference to legal professional privilege in Clause 38(8).

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 149. It will not surprise the House to learn that I am very grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for its help in briefing me and preparing this amendment. I state once again for the record, as on the register, that I am a non-practising member of the Faculty of Advocates, so have had cause in the past to be deeply grateful to solicitors in Scotland.

Amendment 149 amends Clause 38, which relates to information-gathering powers, setting out the powers the CMA will have to gather information in support of its functions in this part; under subsections (2) and (3), it will be able to provide an information notice or require the production of a document by an individual business or public authority. The notice must describe the type of information required and when and how it is expected to be relayed. Under subsection (6), the notice must make clear which precise function of the CMA is relevant, as well as the legal and financial consequences of non-compliance. Subsection (8) sets out that no information can be requested if it could not be compelled to be given in the course of civil judicial proceedings before the court, and that a notice may not require a person to go more than 10 miles from their residence without having their travelling expenses paid or offered to them.

This begs a question, which has been identified. Through this amendment, I would make explicit reference to “legal professional privilege” in Clause 38(8), for the very simple reason that a person should not be compelled, as I just stated, under subsection (8),

“to produce or provide any document or information which the person could not be compelled to produce, or give in evidence, in civil proceedings before the court”.

This provision may apply to legal representatives, but that should be made clear by a reference to “legal professional privilege” in the clause. My direct question to the Minister is this: why is it specifically not referred to? I am sure he will say that it is implicitly relied on, but I pray in aid that legal professional privilege is the client’s privilege, not the lawyer’s privilege. It is an essential aspect of the rule of law which enables clients to consult freely with their lawyers and is widely recognised in statute. I would like it in this Bill, unless I hear extremely good reasons from my noble friend why it is not already there. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group. I also support the amendment just explained by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh.

This group concerns the information-gathering powers in Clause 38; it applies to Clause 31, under which requests for a report from the CMA may be made by anyone, and to Clauses 32, 33 and 34, under which administrations may request, respectively, advice on proposed regulatory provisions, reporting on the impact of a regulatory provision and reporting on a regulatory provision that is or may be detrimental to the market.

To prepare reports, information needs to be gathered. The powers enable the CMA to ask any person for any document in their possession or to require any person who carries on a business to provide estimates, forecasts, returns or other information as may be specified. As the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, has already highlighted, it can further specify the time and place at which, and the form and manner in which, the information is to be provided. It may also require conversion of a non-legible record into a legible and intelligible copy of information. There is no acknowledgment of how onerous this may be other than in subsection (8)(b), which says that travel expenses must be offered if a person has to go more than 10 miles from their place of residence. This could impose significant burdens on individuals or small businesses, to whom time is money.

It does not indicate that the information sought is only that which is readily available; it seems there is nothing to stop it requiring the preparation of estimates rather than, say, just the forwarding of those that might have been given to customers in the course of business. Many businesses may well be happy to assist in what is tantamount to a survey about the effects of regulation, just as many respond to consultations, but for small businesses it could be a burden. For sole traders it may mean a significant loss if income is dependent on work, whether that is as a plumber, lawyer, childminder, shopkeeper or anything else.

I am aware that the template of CMA market study investigations and Section 174 of the Enterprise Act have been followed, but are we truly looking at comparable circumstances? Market studies have more statutory requirements and guidance around them, such as the requirement of a market study notice and all the defined stages and practices. That does not seem to have been transposed into this. Nor are the circumstances those of known market deterioration caused by market participants—for example, it may just be about proposed or enacted regulation, with any flaws caused by administrations, which is completely different from when businesses, collectively or individually, have themselves created oligopolies, monopolies or concentrations.

In Amendment 150, I put forward that there should be provision for loss of earnings—why not, if the circumstance is that the expertise of the business is being sought? An alternative way to collect this kind of information is through consultations or by commissioning research. The CMA is empowered already under Section 5 of the Enterprise Act to commission such reports without resorting to enforced business responses. The members of the panel that will prepare the reports are being paid for their expertise, so why not those others who are being harvested for information?

My Amendment 156, would insert a new clause:

“The CMA must take account of the effects of additional duties imposed on small business in its approach to the exercise of its functions under sections 31 to 34, and its powers under sections 38, 39 and 40.”


This is not a strong amendment, but at least it makes the point, as otherwise there is no guidance. I am sure that MPs would interest themselves in the sorry stories they will be sent if there are burdensome requirements but, absent something like this, they have nothing to point to when overstepping has taken place. I will return to this matter in the context of penalties in the next group, but when there has been no wrongdoing that brings about the request for information—possibly burdensome requests, enforceable through fines rather than encouragement—it seems a wholly disproportionate measure. As I have said, I do not believe the cause is comparable with current CMA market studies.

Whither now the comply or explain principle—I have always been more of a “make them comply” person, as my track record will show, but these measures offend me in principle and seem to come from the department against business. I can see the matter is different if the business is under investigation for their own doings, but there is no distinction made in the clause. Clause 39 has a “without reasonable excuse” provision and I intend to probe that in the next group but, for now, can the Minister clarify the limits to the burden that can be put upon small businesses and the circumstances envisaged? Something of record has to be made.

As a final related point, there are also circumstances, of course, where much more has been opened up for challenges by businesses through Clause 31, giving the CMA reach into both administrative decisions and to other companies. My noble friend Lord Fox will say more on that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

On my noble friend’s first question, she will notice that Clause 38(8) states:

“A notice under subsection (2) or (3) may not require a person … to produce or provide any document or information which the person could not be compelled to produce, or give in evidence, in civil proceedings before the court”.


I hope that that resolves the matter. I will write to her on her second point.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

I thank everyone who has contributed, including my noble friend the Minister in summing up the debate. We had an excellent discussion on the issues, and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for raising them because they are pertinent. I am slightly confused as to why it is necessary to include in the Bill powers that already exist. We are told that they are not new, yet my noble friend will not agree to include in the Bill a matter that is already causing alarm.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, for alerting me to the Constitution Committee report in that regard. It has highlighted its concern and received a verbal undertaking from the Lord Chancellor. I should repeat that we are referring to the Law Society of Scotland, not the Scottish Law Commission. If both the committee of this House and the Law Society of Scotland are concerned, that verbal reassurance is not enough. I may well reflect on the matter and come back on Report. However, for the moment, I am grateful for having had the opportunity to debate this matter and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 149 withdrawn.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 2nd November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judd (Lab) [V]]

Thank you. My Lords, I will be brief. I just want to say how much I commend the amendments from my noble friend Lord Stevenson. He is setting out principles which are very important, rather than just the general purpose, and for that we should be grateful. I would also like to put on record that I am glad that he has taken, on previous amendments, the point that what we must be aiming for in all this is a situation in which there is a sense of shared ownership and the shared involvement of all the parts of the United Kingdom.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for introducing these two amendments and giving us the opportunity to probe the very heart of the functioning of the OIM in terms of its independence. Can my noble friend the Minister say how the Government will ensure that this body will be independent? My noble friend will be aware of my concerns and those of others that the Government have got into the habit recently of creating such public corporate bodies and then trying to direct how they operate. Recent examples are, as the noble Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb, just alluded to, the Trade and Agriculture Commission, which falls within the Department for International Trade, which basically does not provide any resources to those who serve on the commission and, even more recently, the Office for Environmental Protection which, apparently, is to be appointed by and subsumed within Defra. So that is my main concern here, and there is much to commend in Amendment 115 as to how the body corporate is to be set up.

Furthermore, the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, asks in subsection 2(2) of Amendment 131 for consultation with the devolved Administrations. I would prefer it if went further, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, requested: consent for such appointments should be sought from the devolved Administrations. Presumably, if the Government were to adopt the terms of this amendment, it would be the OIM that would ensure the level playing field, which I imagine is the Government’s intention. However, if it was not the OIM, can the Minister explain which body would, as in subsection 3(2),

“rule that any distortive or harmful subsidies are illegal and should be repaid”,

and, as in subsection 3(4),

“recommend to the Secretary of State changes to the test for a harmful subsidy, the scope of exemptions, and time limits on approvals”?

There should be a body to ensure levelling-up, not just of the regions but between the four nations. I hope that the Government are taking a consistent approach here, in their position on the European Union and their position on state aid between the four nations of the United Kingdom internal market. It would not behove the Government to be seen to be parti pris on their position on competition and state aid in this regard.

I share the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and others, in the previous debate, regarding responses not always being published. I am having great difficulty, and perhaps the Minister can point me in the right direction, but rather than a summary of the responses, it would be enormously helpful if the Government published the responses to the consultation regarding this amendment in full, and preferably before the next stage of the Bill. That would enable us to form our own view of who said what in response to the consultation.

With those few remarks, I would like to put the key questions to the Minister: how do the Government intend to ensure the independence of the OIM, and how do they intend to carry the devolved Administrations with them in this regard?

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, so far there have been four groups of amendments dealing with the CMA and the OIM, and three different Ministers fielding. That perhaps summarises the fragmented nature of this Bill and the unjoined-up nature of what we are seeking to achieve. In those four groups, and this group, amendments have sought, in a sense, to correct and improve this Bill, but there is no point, because this Bill is beyond that stage. Other speakers have sought to probe and get information from the Government, and there has been no point to that either, because the Government have not answered questions. Despite extremely well directed, forensic analysis and questioning, the Government have ducked, dived and shrugged.

In addition to supporting the request made by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for the consultation to be published, I would like this Minister, who is before us for the first time in this debate, to answer the questions on this group, and to undertake, on behalf of the other Ministers, to answer all the questions that the last four groups have presented, because they are all extremely important to understanding what on earth the Government intend to do.

--- Later in debate ---

There are so many unanswered questions in this part of the Bill that I am drawn to the conclusion that what we have before us is based on political rather than economic reasons. This part of the Bill wants us to take on trust the way the Government will behave towards the other Governments in the UK. It has failed to answer the big questions that need to be answered before we can agree to enshrining so many important matters for the four countries that make up our union and, most importantly, how Wales is going to get its £2.2 billion, promised in this very Chamber.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord German. I would like to build on some of his questions, particularly the question of who administers the funds, especially in relation to regions and local authorities in England.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for his Amendment 132 and for the chance to debate Clause 48 stand part. The noble Lords, Lord German and Lord Stevenson, and a number of others, asked about the situation going forward in respect of the Barnett formula. Is it the Government’s intention that that will remain in place, or is it the implication of this part of the Bill that the formula will be replaced by a new shared prosperity fund on the criteria that we are currently debating here?

My main concern as someone living in England, albeit of Scottish descent, is about the shared prosperity fund. Who will administer it and to whom will applications be made? How will a balance be reached between rural and urban areas? I declare an interest as a former MP in North Yorkshire for 18 years. I was delighted by the announcement in February this year that £6 million of funding has been allocated for a rural connectivity project in North Yorkshire with the specific task of helping to unlock the rural economy’s potential. It will be to the benefit of farmers and rural communities to support superfast mobile connectivity and rural broadband generally.

Looking at Clause 48(2) as it currently stands, however, rural broadband or broadband and mobile connectivity simply do not appear. Does that mean that, whichever nation or local authority or region you live in, once this shared prosperity fund comes into effect, these funds will disappear? Funds that have only just been allocated this year, presumably, under the existing European Regional Development Fund, will run their course. Is my understanding correct that the omission in the Bill of connectivity—either rural or urban, in whichever nation or region we happen to live in—means that it has been dropped from the shared prosperity fund? I will be interested to know and understand why, in particular, infrastructure has been limited in Clause 48(2) to,

“water, electricity, gas, telecommunications, sewerage or other services (for example, the provision of heat) … railway facilities (including rolling stock), roads or other transport facilities”.

It goes on over the page. I am severely disappointed—I am sure that others living in rural areas will feel the same way—that rural connectivity is being overlooked. It is not acceptable in this day and age that special provision is not being made for rural areas. The 5% who are the hardest to reach are being overlooked. I understand that the Scottish Government have given very generously to rural businesses in this regard, to their benefit and that of English customers who are buying from them.

I want to repeat a question posed by a number of other noble Lords: what is happening with regard to match funding? Will it continue to be required as it was under the ERDF and the European structural funds? How will economic development be administered? Is it going to be the case that local authorities such as North Yorkshire, Ryedale District Council, Hambleton District Council, Harrogate District Council or York City Council will have to go cap in hand to the Government? At this stage, it will be interesting to have more flesh on the bones of Clause 48. Who will determine what the balance is to be in applications from rural and from urban areas?

On the much-vaunted policy of the levelling-up agenda set out so effectively in the Government’s manifesto and to which they promised to commit themselves during the life of this Parliament, and which I entirely support, what role will the shared prosperity fund have in levelling up the regions and local authorities?

I want to end on this note. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, referred to the ERDF and structural funds having regard to levels of deprivation. It is not generally understood that rural areas have pockets of deprivation that are every bit as bad as those which are generally better known and recognised in urban areas. With these few remarks, I look forward to the answers from my noble friend.

[Baroness Randerson (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this is a very important group of amendments because they deal with another recentralising measure in this Bill; that is, powers for the UK Government to spend money on wholly devolved areas of competence. Let us remember that power without spending power is hollow. At the least, this is a petty pot-shot at the devolved Administrations, while at the worst, it will lead to a direct conflict of policies and a huge waste of taxpayers’ money.

Let me give a hypothetical example on environmental spending. You could have the Welsh Government subsidising wind farms and the UK Government paying to close them down. Before anyone scoffs at that idea, in relatively recent years the Conservatives in Wales have campaigned against wind farms. In the best case scenario, it will lead to disjointed rather than joined-up policymaking.

The list of specified policy areas goes well beyond the usual devolved areas, so this is clearly a naked power grab. However, all of this is unnecessary because the UK Government can and do spend money on the devolved areas, but they do so in partnership with the devolved Administrations. City deals are a prime example of this successful approach. In these deals, the UK Government will set out pretty stiff conditions for additional funding. They do not simply hand over the cash. If we take the example of higher education, universities in Wales and Scotland receive funding from UK research funds, and here I declare an interest as chancellor of the University of Cardiff.

If the Government feel that they are not getting full recognition for their funding, they should take a leaf out of the EU’s book and put a badge on it. As the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop, said in his truly excellent speech, they should not just fund and forget. In 2012 in the Wales Office, we recognised that the Welsh Government did not have enough capital funding for the significant infrastructure improvements that were needed if Wales was to compete economically. We gave the devolved Administration additional borrowing powers and we worked with the Welsh Government to agree a shared programme of funding for, for instance, the South Wales Metro. We worked with the grain of their views, but we still set the framework. Now I hear that the UK Government are threatening to build the M4 relief road, which the Welsh Government and local people have rejected.

Looking back to the days prior to devolution in Wales, there used to be huge rows about the smallest details of how social and economic support from the EU should be spent. Often, rather foolish decisions would be made by central Government, which were basically too remote from the areas concerned. The proposals in this Bill threaten a return to that centralised, counterproductive approach.

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Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

134: Clause 31, page 23, line 18, leave out “from time to time”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment deletes the phrase “from time to time” from Clause 31(1).

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[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, it gives me great pleasure to move this amendment and speak to the others in my name. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for her support; I think she is going to speak at some stage on the clause stand part debate. I take this opportunity to thank once again the Law Society of Scotland for its briefing and its assistance in drafting these amendments.

Amendment 134 would delete the phrase “from time to time” from Clause 31(1). The reason for this is simply to state that reviews should take place on a more structured and regular basis than simply from time to time. I would like to press the Minister on what the intended timeframe for a review is within the terms of Clause 31.

Amendment 135 is on a similar theme. It looks to set out the significance of a matter that the CMA would review under the terms of Clause 31, and to press the Minister to say that surely it must be intended that the CMA conducts reviews into important and significant matters only. Is that the Government’s intention? Currently Clause 31(1) provides the CMA with an extensive power to conduct reviews. In my view that should be used only in accordance with clear rules that will ensure that only important issues are reviewed. The purpose of the amendment is to press my noble friend and the Government on what would instigate such a review and be deemed a sufficiently important and significant matter for this purpose.

Amendment 137 looks at the purpose of a proposal that should be made only, as I state here, by the Secretary of State or others that I have set out. The purpose is to ensure that only the Government and the devolved Administrations can make a proposal to the CMA to conduct a review. The reason for that is that the Bill currently provides that the CMA can receive and consider any proposals for undertaking a review, so in fact anyone can refer a matter to the CMA. Surely it must be intended that there is some qualification relating to this to exclude vexatious or frivolous referrals that might be deemed to be wasting the time of the CMA or others involved. The purpose of this probing amendment is to restrict the capacity to make referrals to the Government and the devolved Administrations, and to ask my noble friend if that is indeed the Government’s intention.

Amendment 144 looks at Clause 32, taking out “part” and replacing it with “or the entirety of”, thereby ensuring that the Secretary of State can request advice on a report for the whole UK, not simply a part of the UK. That is simply to note that the Secretary of State may request the CMA to provide a report for any part of the UK under Clause 32(11)(d), but not apparently for the whole of the UK. It is my intention to resolve that anomaly and clarify whether my understanding is correct.

Amendment 146 would delete Clause 35(4), which states:

“A duty of the Secretary of State to make a statement to Parliament is to be discharged by laying a copy of the statement before each House of Parliament.”


Is it not the case that such duties should be discharged in person directly to Parliament by making an Oral Statement rather than by laying a copy of the Statement before each House? Or do the Government intend to use that procedure and this is just the phrase that they have used? My amendment seeks to probe this.

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In the light of the various reasons and reassurances that I have given, along with my explanations in some detail of the purpose and reasoning behind the clauses, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those noble Lords who have contributed to the debate. I did rather enjoy my noble friend’s description of not wishing to overburden the CMA with expectations; I do not think that that is quite the case as yet. As the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayter, Lady Randerson and Lady Finlay, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, have said, we are seeking to ensure that the devolved Administrations are consulted, that consent is sought and that they are respected. That was the main thrust of the argument.

I am disappointed that my noble friend does not find common cause with my amendments. I am very grateful in particular to my noble friend the Duke of Montrose for highlighting the fact that, as he recognised, which is most pertinent, most of the reports will in fact emerge from the devolved Administrations. That is why it is bizarre that the Secretary of State can be excused from speaking to these reports from them so that Parliament itself, along with the devolved Administrations, would be made aware of his arguments and reasons for either accepting or rejecting the reports.

My noble friend’s response begs a question which it will be interesting to explore at subsequent stages. If the Government are not prepared to accept a de minimis rule on what the status of referrals and the reports to be made by the CMA would be, that begs a question about how we define the distortion of the market. I spent six happy months in the European Commission looking at how competition was being distorted in the context of the single market, which we have just left, and what defined a distortion of the market. I shall seek to develop that argument at a later opportunity. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 134 withdrawn.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th October 2020 Lords Chamber

It is self-evident why it was banned, although I will not go into the detail. We were feeding animal protein back to animals, and we discovered that that is not a very good thing to do. In terms of giving to animals what we might call food waste that humans have wasted, we have to be particularly careful, because it cost this country billions of pounds in 2001 to deal with the foot-and-mouth outbreak that was traced back to pigswill manufacturing. This is a fundamental issue and I want to know how it is going to be prevented from reoccurring if the operation of Clause 2 is left as it is. I will leave it there.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. I shall speak to my own amendments but I have a question following on from what they have both said which relates to an earlier debate, particularly when in summing up the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, linked Clause 39 of the Agriculture Bill to the clause relating to the movement and mutual recognition of goods.

Clause 39 of the Agriculture Bill relates to marketing standards, and I have a specific question to put to my noble friend the Minister that I hope he will address head on in view of the remarks made by both the previous speakers. If, in the course of events in the new internal market arrangements under this Bill, the Food Standards Agency with responsibility for England came out with different provisions to Food Standards Scotland, and in the event that the latter adopted different rules for, especially, animal products, food and animal feed, how would that impact on the free movement of goods? Could it eventually mean that there was no longer any mutual recognition, and Scottish goods could not pass into England or other parts of the United Kingdom in those circumstances? Would the same apply if the Food Standards Agency in England produced different rules to other parts of the United Kingdom? It is extremely important that we understand those impacts.

I will now speak briefly to my Amendments 20, 22, 26 and 45. I am extremely grateful for the extensive briefing I have obtained from the Law Society of Scotland and for its drafting of these amendments, which are probing in nature but address some key issues. Amendment 20 is a probing amendment to seek the Government’s interpretation of Clause 4(2)(b). Clause 4 purports to mean that certain regulatory divergences that currently exist will continue to be able to be enforced against goods produced in or imported into other parts of the United Kingdom and would not be able to be so enforced were they introduced after the mutual recognition principle comes into force. However, the Law Society of Scotland has noticed that, in order for a statutory requirement in a part of the United Kingdom not to be a relevant requirement for the purposes of mutual recognition, the conditions in subsection (2) must be met.

There are two conditions in subsection (2), and my comments will relate specifically to subsection (2)(b), which provides:

“The conditions are that, on the relevant day … there was no corresponding requirement in force in each of the other three parts of the United Kingdom.”


What provisions do the Government imagine will be captured by the current terms of Clause 4? For example, food and feed law is mainly derived from EU law, and, in terms of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, this body of law is retained EU law, implemented throughout the UK. Are Scottish food and feed regulations, and, by implication, all retained EU law, excluded from the application of the mutual recognition principle because there are corresponding requirements implementing the same EU obligation, albeit in slightly different terms, to fit into the relevant law in each of the other parts of the United Kingdom? How does the mutual recognition principle relate to common frameworks? My Amendment 22 simply has a consequential effect, following on from the deletion of Clause 4(2)(b), making the necessary changes there.

Amendment 26 probes the meaning of Clause 5(3), regarding the effect of a statutory requirement under Clause 6. It appears that Clause 5(3) would render a statutory provision in devolved legislation “of no effect”. This lacks clarity. Am I right in thinking that the statutory requirement is valid? Is it valid but cannot be enforced? Is it voidable? It is also not clear regarding the application, if any, of Clause 5(3) if the statutory provision is in an Act of Parliament that applies to England only. I would be grateful if the Minister would take this opportunity to clarify this.

The amendment applies the statutory language that exists in Section 29 of the Scotland Act 1998 to Clause 5(3) in an effort to bring clarity to the point. Section 29(1) provides:

“An Act of the Scottish Parliament is not law so far as any provision of the Act is outside the legislative competence of the Parliament.”


It is not the intention of this amendment to amend the Scotland Act 1998 but rather to say that that Act provides, in my view, much clearer language than the Bill. These statutory provisions could be challenged by private parties and will presumably also be a basis for challenging devolved legislation. Assuming the inability to modify the Bill under Clause 51, it will in all cases prohibit legislation that is contrary to its principles. Presumably that is the intention, but it is not the clearest way that that outcome could have been achieved, so I am grateful for this opportunity to seek clarification.

Finally, Amendment 45 is a probing amendment, looking to understand a phrase the Government have used: “substantive change”. What do they interpret as substantive change in connection with changes to statutory requirements? I am grateful for this opportunity to speak to these probing amendments.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 21 in my name is effectively consequential on the changes I have already proposed to ensure that the market access principles are only applied once regulations have been brought forward, relating to a specific type of goods, when it has proved impossible to reach agreement through the common frameworks process.

The Bill proposes that legislation already in place at the time Part 1 of the Bill comes into force cannot be caught by the market access principles—at least where the restrictions imposed by that legislation are not ones that exist across the United Kingdom. This amendment would simply apply that same principle in the context of a process whereby the market access principles could only be switched on by regulations approved by both Houses, meaning that restrictions to the exercise of devolved powers would only be switched on in specific areas where the Government have made regulations to that effect. In other words, the rules on non-discrimination would apply only where a devolved legislature sought to introduce new statutory requirements in the particular area covered by the regulations. This seems to be both logical and respectful of devolved competencies.

I also record my support for other amendments in this group, notably Amendments 7 and 8, which seek to limit the mutual recognition principle in ways that seem thoroughly appropriate, and Amendment 20 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. This last amendment touches on an important point and would, on its own, if adopted, broaden the scope of the exemption for prior legislation. It seems to me—and please correct me if my understanding is wrong—that this would address one of my major concerns, which is that the legislation seeks to prevent regulation that increases standards but does not impede regulation that lowers them.

The Bill as currently constructed would mean that, if this Parliament decided to legislate in England for the current ban on the use of hormones in beef cattle to be removed, for example, then the fact that a ban had previously existed in Wales and Scotland could not be invoked to prevent the sale of such beef in those nations. This is because the condition in Clause 4(2)(b) would require the Welsh and Scottish Governments to demonstrate that a “corresponding requirement” had not previously existed in England.

In a letter from the Minister that I received just as we started this debate, he stresses, if I have understood it correctly, that a potential for harmful regulatory divergence did not exist during our membership of the EU, but, at the end of the transition period, that will change and create a significant risk of harmful divergence between the four nations. He goes on to write that the Government have consulted widely on the proposals and have had overwhelming support from businesses and industry organisations on the steps they have outlined to protect our internal market from discriminatory behaviours.

I would be most grateful if the Minister could kindly tell us, either today or in a letter following today’s debate, details of the results of that consultation because I think it is important that those of us speaking to amendments really understand the background of the results that came in. I will be most interested in the Minister’s reply to all the amendments in this group, particularly Amendment 20.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

I have had a further request to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am struggling to understand the Minister’s reply on Amendments 26 and 45. I am particularly concerned about Amendment 26, which is a probing amendment and simply asks for greater clarity, which I do not think we have had. Is he saying that the statutory requirement has no effect? Does he mean that it is valid or not? Is it enforceable? I am trying to avoid a situation where there is any doubt whatever, and court action might be taken. I do not quite understand his answer that the possibility of court action is excluded if, in the view of others, a statutory requirement has effect and could, therefore, be actionable.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

No, it does not mean that the requirement is to be treated as though it never had any legal effect. Rather, it allows the continued operation of the requirement, except to the extent that it has discriminatory effect.

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[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I apologise in advance if noble Lords are in for more technical explanations. We will take together the minor technical amendments in my name to Clauses 3 and 4. All involve drafting improvements or clarifying technicalities. None of these amendments results in a change of policy, but they need full and proper scrutiny in this Chamber and noble Lords deserve an explanation of the improvements that they make to the Bill.

First, I turn to Amendment 9. This clarifies Clause 3 by identifying what is a relevant requirement in relation to a specific case where particular goods are sold. Without this amendment, there could be ambiguity as to whether a requirement needs to apply to all sales of all goods to be a relevant requirement. For example, where a business has produced a tin of biscuits in Scotland and seeks to rely on the mutual recognition principle to sell them in England, this amendment makes it clear that the relevant requirements are those that would apply to the sale of the biscuits in England and to the equivalent, hypothetical sale of the biscuits in Scotland, Northern Ireland or Wales. Requirements that apply to other sales of other goods—for example, requirements that apply to the auctioning of a painting—would not be relevant requirements in this context. Without this amendment, there is a risk of legal uncertainty over which requirements are relevant. This could create confusion, costs and inconvenience for businesses.

Amendment 10 provides similar clarification. It emphasises that subsection (2), which defines and therefore enables one to identify a relevant requirement in relation to a particular sale, makes relevant requirements only in relation that sale. Requirements are not relevant in any general way; they are relevant only in relation to the sale in question.

Amendment 18 clarifies that Clause 4(1)(a) refers to a specific sale of goods, rather than a hypothetical sale of goods. It makes clear that we are referring to an actual sale of goods and not to a hypothetical sale. As a result, the amendment removes any potential ambiguity around which existing statutory requirements are excluded from the mutual recognition principle. This amendment also ensures consistency with Clause 3(1), as proposed to be amended by Amendment 9—also in my name. Once again, we are considering requirements which apply specifically to a particular sale—for example, the requirements that would apply to the sale of a tin of biscuits in England, as per my previous example, but not all requirements that might apply to any other sales of goods. This makes clear which statutory requirements might be excluded, if the conditions in Clause 4(2) are met.

Amendment 19 corrects a small drafting error in Clause 4(1)(a). This paragraph refers to “a” part of the United Kingdom when it should refer to “the” part of the UK mentioned in the opening words of the subsection. It removes any ambiguity around which part of the United Kingdom is being referred to in Clause 4(1)(a), so that there can be no doubt that when we are considering English requirements, we are considering how they apply in relation to a sale in England. Without this amendment, there could be confusion over whether we are referring to just those requirements which apply in England or to requirements which could apply in any part of the UK.

Finally in this group, Amendment 23 aligns the language used in Clause 4(2) and 4(5). Both provisions refer to a hypothetical sale on a particular day, rather than to an actual sale. These subsections set out the conditions for when an existing requirement will be excluded from mutual recognition. Both should refer to a hypothetical sale on the relevant day. This amendment clears up the ambiguity by making it clear that both subsections refer to a hypothetical sale, rather than to an actual sale. Aligning the language in this way will make the drafting of this clause clearer and will avoid any confusion over why the wording is different in Clause 4(2) and 4(5) when both should refer to a hypothetical and not to an actual sale.

Taking again the example of the sale of a tin of biscuits, Clause 4(2) and 4(5) refer to the statutory requirements around the sale of biscuits, which would have been enforced in different parts of the UK on the relevant day, which is the day before this Bill comes into force, if the tin of biscuits had been sold on that day. This means that we will always be talking about a hypothetical sale here, and the amendment to Clause 4(5) makes this clear. Without this amendment, it is not clear that Clause 4(5) is referring to a hypothetical sale, which may cause confusion. I beg to move.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am interested to know why the Minister felt that these amendments needed to be moved at this time; what provoked that? Furthermore, who decides—and in what circumstances—what is a hypothetical sale, as opposed to a real sale?

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

I have no wish to add to the general confusion.

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Does the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, agree with his colleague in that terminology?

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I welcome this opportunity to agree with what has been said by previous speakers, and particularly thank those who have contributed to this debate through the 24th report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, for putting into effect the conclusions of that report. The report is indeed striking in its conclusions, and in particular in the power of the language used. I think students of constitutional law will be watching these deliberations very closely to see whether this is a new trend on the part of the Government or a one-off.

My understanding is that the Bill is in large measure to deal with the political fallout of the Government agreeing to the EU withdrawal agreement and the Northern Ireland protocol. Perhaps I am wrong, but that is my understanding. My further understanding is that, when Parliament agrees to delegate powers to the Executive, it does so on the strict understanding that the Government will act on behalf of Parliament with respect for the rule of law and parliamentary democracy. Clearly, in all five parts of the Bill, this is stretched to breaking point. As has been said, the reliance in the Bill on the sweeping Henry VIII clauses is breath-taking. So I entirely echo what has been said by previous speakers and find that I have great sympathy with the amendments.

[Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Non-Afl) [V]]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, and to agree with the amendments in the names of my noble friend Lady Andrews and the noble Lord, Lord Fox. For me, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee is particularly instructive, because it has issued a very scathing report which states quite clearly that, in the absence of a convincing justification for the Henry VIII powers in those clauses, the power is inappropriate and should be removed from the Bill.

The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, said that perhaps the Government wish to use these powers to get their way in terms of the withdrawal agreement—an international agreement which they signed only one year ago with the European Union—and to undermine the Northern Ireland protocol, which in turn could undermine another international agreement, the Good Friday agreement. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that the people of Ireland, north and south, who voted for that agreement and who by and large support the principle behind the Northern Ireland protocol—to prevent a hard border on the island of Ireland and to prevent any further turmoil, trauma, distress or levels of terrorism—will not take kindly to any of that.

I was also very taken with the words—referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Fox—of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, a few years ago about parliamentary sovereignty. Yes, parliamentary sovereignty is the antithesis of executive sovereignty, and I do recall, as a former Minister in the Northern Ireland Executive, that I was always told that the Executive are accountable to Parliament. Can the Minister advise the House whether there has been consultation of any kind with the devolved Administrations? I know that Scotland and Wales have so far refused to give legislative consent to the Bill, because they clearly see the powers within it as totally egregious in terms of what they can do, and in terms of no consent being required from them and no real consultation. I also know that in the Northern Ireland Assembly there was a majority vote against the UK Internal Market Bill.

I believe that there are three different issues with these powers. Giving too much power to Ministers to change the rules of the UK internal market via regulations without proper parliamentary scrutiny is wrong. It is interesting to note that the regulations in these clauses require first a consultation with the devolved counterparts, so there is a need to obtain their consent to such regulations, but that consent is clearly absent. That is what Amendments 13 and 28 are all about.

The Bill also has an extremely narrow understanding of exceptions to these principles. If we compare it with the EU internal market where other objectives such as environmental improvement can be used, at least in certain cases, to restrict mutual recognition and keep more ambitious domestic rules, we see that the Secretary of State also has the power to add, vary or remove exceptions, as set out later in Clause 8 for non-discrimination and in Clause 10 for all the principles to which Amendment 47 refers.

There is no doubt that the UK Internal Market Bill will become a protected environment that the devolved Administrations will be unable to repeal or modify. That is why these amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, are apt and timely. They should be supported because both the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Constitution Committee believe that the use of these powers is wrong.

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Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

14: Clause 3, page 3, line 27, leave out subsection (9) and insert—
“(9) Regulations under subsection (8) are subject to super-affirmative resolution procedure (see Schedule (Super-affirmative resolution procedure)).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that regulations under subsection (8) are subject to super- affirmative resolution procedure and introduces the supportive Schedule in respect of super-affirmative resolution procedure.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to have this opportunity to speak to these amendments, which in large measure refer to the possibility of introducing the super-affirmative resolution procedure in the parts of the Bill where it is deemed most necessary. Again, I thank the Law Society of Scotland for briefing me so well and for assisting me in drafting these amendments for our consideration.

Paragraph 31.14 of Erskine May states:

“The super-affirmative procedure has been implemented in enactments where an exceptionally high degree of scrutiny is thought appropriate, for instance, for the scrutiny of certain items of delegated legislation made, or proposed to be made, under ‘Henry VIII’ powers. Sometimes it is the only procedure available and sometimes the responsible Minister is given a choice of order-making powers that includes the procedure, a choice that can be constrained at a preliminary stage by either House.”


I remind noble Lords that the super-affirmative procedure provides both Houses with opportunities to comment on proposals for secondary legislation and to recommend amendments before orders for affirmative approval are brought forward in their final form. It is important to note that the power to amend the proposed instrument remains with the Minister.

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[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I note and hear what the noble Lord has said, but I think he would allow me not to enter into speculative discussions. I have put to the Committee a response to a question—a response provided to me to advise the Committee. As for its application, that is a matter that would be speculative and could be considered further. I will stand by the words that I put before the Committee.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I was grateful for the opportunity to probe the extent to which this procedure of super-affirmative resolution may be more appropriate.

My noble friend Lord Naseby might not think that this is a matter of life and death, but if you are dealing with perishable goods—particularly animals and their movement over what will be internal borders—that might be the case. I part company with my noble friend on the EU-Japan agreement; it actually does not go that far. My understanding is that what was heralded as a bigger market for cheese, which will be very welcome, relies on the EU allowing us to use what is left of its quota that it does not wish to use. It is the leftovers—the crumbs under the table. It could be very helpful to our cheese producers, but it is not quite as straightforward as one might first think.

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The House is really dripping with irony today, as noted earlier, with the Government and their allies lauding the benefits of free unencumbered trade while slicing that off from the continent. I look forward to the Minister’s answer to how dictatorship from Westminster over the other nations squares with taking back control.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am delighted to speak to a number of amendments in my name but also to lend my support to Amendment 16, which I have co-signed, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town. It is essential that we seek the consent of the devolved Administrations in these circumstances, rather than just simply consult, for the reasons the noble Lord, Lord German, gave in moving his Amendment 15 and those alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in the earlier debate. I hope that the Government and my noble friend the Minister will look favourably on the request that we should seek the consent of the devolved Administrations.

Again, I am grateful to the Law Society for its drafting of and briefing on the amendments I have put forward. In Amendments 17 and 31, I am seeking greater transparency and inviting the Secretary of State to publish the results of the consultation and give reasons for any decision reached.

I pray in aid the conclusions of the Constitution Committee report on the Bill, at paragraphs 76 to 79, which criticise the powers set out in Clause 3(8) in particular. Paragraph 78 states the following:

“The Government should explain how the consultation process for amending the relevant requirements for goods would work and how disputes would be resolved.”


At paragraph 79, it says:

“We agree with the DPRRC that the power in clause 3(8) has not been justified and should be removed from the Bill.”


I seek to oblige the Secretary of State to consult the devolved Administrations but also to go further and make public, in the interests of transparency, the results of the consultation and the reasons for any decision taken on the basis of that consultation.

Similarly, my Amendment 42, asks for consultation with the devolved Administrations in a host of circumstances, before, as my explanatory statement refers to,

“amending the list of legitimate aims.”

Amendment 43 says that, in relation to Clause 8:

“The Secretary of State must publish the results of the consultation and give reasons for any decision reached.”


Amendment 49 seeks consultation with the devolved Administrations before amending Schedule 1. Amendment 62 seeks consultation with the devolved Administrations before preparing guidance under Clause 12. Amendment 65 is a consequential amendment. Amendment 75 seeks that consultation be sought with the devolved Administrations before amending Schedule 2.

Finally, Amendment 100 seeks consultation with the devolved Administrations before the definition of “legitimate aim” in Clause 26 is amended. I refer here to both the definition of “legitimate aim” being amended and to the guidance having earlier been published. With those remarks, I urge my noble friend and the House to look favourably on these amendments.

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Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

32: Clause 7, page 5, line 41, leave out “actual or hypothetical”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes the description of local goods in Clause 7(3).

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I perhaps need to correct something. I may have mis-spoken when I spoke to Amendments 17, 31 and 42. Of course I meant to refer to the devolved Administrations, as is written in the amendments. I apologise if I did not say that on every occasion, but obviously I was referring to consultation with the devolved Administrations. I am grateful for the opportunity to correct that.

I am delighted to have a short debate on whether Clause 7 should stand part and, within that, Amendment 32 in my name. Clause 7 makes provisions relating to “direct discrimination”, and, among these, Clause 7(1) sets out:

“A relevant requirement directly discriminates against incoming goods if, for the reason that the goods have the relevant connection with the originating part, the requirement applies to, or in relation to, the incoming goods in a way—(a) in which it does not or would not apply to local goods, and (b) that puts the incoming goods at a disadvantage compared to local goods.”


Subsection (2) states:

“Goods are put at a disadvantage if it is made in any way more difficult, or less attractive, to sell or buy the goods or do anything in connection with their sale.”


The particular difficulty I have in Clause 7 is subsection (3), and in particular:

“‘Local goods’, for the purposes of this section, are actual or hypothetical goods”.


The purpose of Amendment 32 is to probe the description of local goods and, in particular, what actually constitutes “hypothetical goods”.

Again, I am grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for its help in briefing and preparing me and drafting this amendment. It has concerns about the definition of “local goods” within this purpose, including actual or hypothetical goods. It is very strange that there is no definition of hypothetical goods, and the opportunity that my Amendment 32 creates is to simply ask the Government what they mean by “hypothetical goods” and why on earth we are using such an expression in these circumstances. I am sure it will give my noble friend the opportunity to return to his favourite tin or box of biscuits in this regard.

I will also raise a question that my noble friend Lord Callanan did not answer in summing up an earlier debate, when I asked who decides what is hypothetical? So I will take this opportunity briefly to ask my noble friend the Minister why we have inserted “hypothetical goods” in this clause? What on earth does this mean, and who determines what is hypothetical and what is real? With those few remarks I beg leave to move Amendment 32.

[Lord Naseby (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I cannot presume to know what my noble friend on the Front Bench is going to define as “hypothetical”, other than to say that I spent 15 years of my life in the marketing profession, as I have already said to your Lordships. In that time, I worked with food manufacturers and pharmaceutical, agrochemical and household-product companies. Each of those markets, and many others, will have on its list test-marketing activities with different strengths, varieties, perfume levels and activity levels: a whole host of variables.

The companies will not know which is the actual product they are going to market—and they might not even market it at all—so, at a certain point in time, those products are hypothetical. They are not registered under a trade name: they are test markets and, quite frankly, that is the normal process for consumer goods. So, as far as I am concerned—and I do not think that I need to speak at great length on this—this is perfectly understandable to anybody who has worked in the pharmaceutical, agrochemical, household-product or food world, or any other product category.

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[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this little debate, which I hope wins the prize for the shortest debate during the passage of the Bill. I am grateful for the attempt of my noble friend Lord Naseby to give us the benefit of his marketing experience and take a stab at what is meant here, but I am very much in line with the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Stevenson, in that I think it would help to have an explanation in the Bill. Many Bills include definitions, and it would help if this was one such.

One hypothetical example that springs to mind is that, in the days before cloning, one would never have thought that a cloned animal could be bred in the way that Dolly the sheep was by the Roslin Institute, which is part of the University of Edinburgh. As my noble friend has gone to the trouble of explaining—I hope I understand it a little better—in the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine. It is regrettable that we do not have a definition in the Bill that would save court time and legal fees, going forward.

I very much enjoyed the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, particularly his hypothetical question about how this would apply to virtual sales. I do not think we have had an answer to that, so I would be grateful if the Minister could write to us.

Generally, the difficulty I have with Clause 7 has been eased, to some extent, by the explanation from the Minister. As my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay said in an earlier debate, a lot of EU law has been passed over and retained. The non-discrimination part of EU law, under the treaties, is on the grounds of nationality and is inherently clearer. The complicated process we have come up with in Clause 7 could be summed up by how no one can discriminate against a good—or a service in a later part of the Bill—simply because it comes from a different nation of the United Kingdom. That could have been explained more clearly, but I am grateful for the opportunity to have had this little debate and the explanation, as far as it went, from my noble friend Lady Bloomfield. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 32 withdrawn.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I am in sympathy with the words just uttered by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, but I wish to speak to my own amendment, Amendment 36, and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for her support.

My amendment is concerned with the meaning of words and, to some extent, achieving compatibility, as far as possible, with devolution legislation. It is directed to the definition of the expression “legitimate aim” in Clause 8(6), which sets out two aims, one of which is

“(a) the protection of the life or health of humans, animals or plants”.

If the draftsman of the Bill was to look at Part 1 of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998, under heading C5 he would find similar words set out in one of the exceptions to the reserved powers; that is, exceptions which mean that the things described are within the devolved competences of the Scottish Parliament. It refers to the

“protection of animal products, plants and plant products for the purposes of protecting human, animal or plant health, animal welfare or the environment.”

My point is that what one finds in subsection (6)(a) takes part of what is found in that provision but misses out some other important words. The phrase I quoted from the Scotland Act draws a distinction between animal health and animal welfare. There is some basis for that distinction because there are things that are designed to achieve the welfare of animals that are not directly related to their state of health. So there is some force in considering the addition of “animal welfare” to the formula in that provision. It also refers to the environment, and nowadays, thinking of all the concerns we have about the environment, I would have thought one could, without damaging the purposes of the Bill, include the words “protection of the environment” within the formula of the clause.

These are drafting points. I draw them, if the Minister will forgive me, more to the attention of the Bill team and the draftsman of the Bill to see whether he can find room for including words in my amendment. It is to make sure that they cover what I take to be the broad aim of the language; it is the kind of discussion we might have had, had we been given time, around a table, discussing how those particular provisions should be framed.

I am not trying to damage the Bill or adjust it in any more significant way; I just want to see that the language used covers the aim of the provision fully and completely. It is on that basis that I brought forward this amendment.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in this interesting debate on these particular amendments, many of which I support. I will limit my remarks to Amendment 37 in my name; I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, for her support in co-signing.

The purpose of Amendment 37 is to bring the definition of “legitimate aim” set out in this clause in line with the source of EU law as contained in articles 34 to 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In particular, I refer to article 36 of that treaty, which states:

“The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified”


on the grounds I set out in my little Amendment 37. It goes on to say:

“Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.”


For reasons similar to those set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in speaking to his Amendment 36, I think that it will be helpful to have

“public morality, public policy … the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property”

brought into Clause 8. This would be a drafting improvement, so I also make a plea to the drafting team in that regard.

I listened with great interest to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said on adding the regulation of animal welfare. It goes to his point in a debate earlier this week on the link between this Bill and the Agriculture Bill, particularly regarding the marketing standards covered by Clause 39 of the Agriculture Bill. It would help enormously if we could have some seamless references across different Bills—in this case, the Agriculture Bill and the Bill before us this evening, the UK Internal Market Bill.

With those few remarks, I am grateful to have my noble friend consider favourably Amendment 37.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I added my name to Amendment 37, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. However, there are several other amendments on the same theme, all highlighting important considerations that should be legitimate aims. The legitimate aims in Amendment 37 have been in use from the EU treaties, as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, explained. That makes a starting point: they have been tried and tested as well as embodying the status quo, even though, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Lord, Lord Young, explained, in the EU, they apply in a wider context to mutual recognition as well.

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Moved by

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

66: Clause 14, page 9, line 13, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
“(4) “Sale” has the meaning given in section 61 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment brings Clause 14 into conformity with the existing law of sale.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful for this opportunity to speak also to Amendment 67. I am grateful to the Law Society for its help, as with other amendments, including Amendment 37, in preparing and drafting them.

The amendment looks at bringing Clause 14 into conformity with the existing law of sale. The reason for this is that the Sale of Goods Act 1979 defines a contract of sale of goods as,

“a contract by which the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a money consideration, called the price.”

It further defines an “agreement to sell” as a contract of sale whereby,

“the transfer of the property in the goods is to take place at a future time or subject to some condition later to be fulfilled”.

The introduction of a new definition of “sale” as set out in the Bill, without reference to the Sale of Goods Act 1979, could produce confusion and lack of clarity among traders and consumers alike. I should be grateful if the Minister could explain the reasons for the Government departing from the definitions of “sale” in that Act to avoid any confusion.

Similarly, Amendment 67 would leave out Clause 14(6)(c). This has the effect that I have just set out. Clause 14(6) applies to other means of transferring possession or property unrelated to sale, including barter or exchange, leasing or hiring, and gift. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why the Government are seeking to extend the Bill to these transactions, in particular to gifts, which transfer ownership of the item donated without payment or consideration. With those few remarks, I would be grateful to hear from my noble friend why these changes are being sought in the Bill. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)]

Having looked at that question, I would rather write to the noble and learned Lord giving a full answer—but I will do so very speedily, before we come to the next stage.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to have had this little debate. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for identifying even more issues than I and the Law Society of Scotland had done.

I thank my noble friend Lady Bloomfield for her answers, as far as they went, but, bearing in mind in particular the way that procedure operates in this place as opposed to the other place, it is extremely important that we have a very full letter. Perhaps she could write to the three of us who have contributed, as well as putting a copy of her letter in the Library, before we get anywhere close to the next stage.

I would like to, and still do not, understand why we are bringing in a new definition of “sale” that has a different meaning from that in the Sale of Goods Act 1979. I do not know whether my noble friend is saying that we are widening the definition to include what is generally understood in EU law, but I do not recognise any of this from what is before us in the Bill, so I would be grateful if my noble friend could write to me and say what, precisely, is the legal basis for widening and changing the definition in the way that the Government have in that regard.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for the definitions that he gave and the illustrations that he posted as being a particular problem north of the border. I am also grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, because I think this is absolutely vital: none of us here this evening wants to put up barriers to trade between the four nations of the United Kingdom. However, it is absolutely essential that we have clarity on the face of the Bill for the reasons that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, has given: we do not wish to have to resort to private-law actions before the courts—that, surely, is not acceptable. I quite understand that the Government have had to bring this Bill forward in something of a hurry, but I am here this evening to help them identify these issues.

Certainly, I am now even more confused as to why Clause 14(6)(c) has been introduced, particularly as regards the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, referring to Clause 8(6) in this regard. However, rather than delay proceedings this evening, I will say that it would be extremely helpful to have a written understanding from my noble friend Lady Bloomfield as to why we are in this position this evening. With those remarks, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 66 at this stage.

Amendment 66 withdrawn.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Russell of Liverpool) (CB)]

The noble Lord, Lord German, is not taking part in this group, so I call the next speaker, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

I will speak briefly to several amendments in this group. Regarding Amendment 70, again I raise the question of substantial change, and whether that means a “significant amendment”. I am seeking clarification on the part of the Bill to which this refers.

Amendment 81 would delete “of no effect”, as would Amendment 84. Can the Minister say what that means when replying? It is very unclear. I am again grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for its help in putting forward and drafting these amendments.

In Amendment 92, what is meant by “less attractive”? In my view, to put a service provider at a disadvantage is a serious matter in a Bill such as this. Using a phrase such as “less attractive” as part of the assessment of disadvantage is subjective and lacks clarity. I would be very grateful if, when summing up, the Minister could just clarify what his understanding of “less attractive” is.

I turn to my Amendments 103 and 103A. Amendment 103, which would take out “mainly” and insert “substantially”, is a probing amendment to understand the meaning of “mainly” in connection with the gathering of experience—for example, in relation to Clause 23(7). In my view, Clause (23)(7)(b) requires further definition. How should “mainly” be measured? Will it be by the time spent as a proportion of the whole qualifying experience or by some other measure? How will this experience be recorded and verified?

The same questions arise in regard to that aspect of the experience obtained elsewhere than in the UK. The purpose of my Amendment 103A is to ask whether we are excluding all other experience than that obtained in the UK. I pray in aid my own experience, where I practised law in Brussels in two different situations. Would that experience, and the experience of others as well, qualify for the purposes of the Bill? I am grateful for the opportunity to move these probing amendments and I look forward to the Minister’s clarification of these points.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I want to speak to this group of amendments for two simple reasons. First, services are incredibly important to the UK and to all four nations within it. As I said on Amendment 4, they are vital to the success of our economy, making up more than 80% of GDP. They range from financial services, mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, which I believe now provide more jobs outside London than in the City, to arts and entertainment of every kind. Invisibles, including legal and accountancy services where we have world-leading expertise, represent more export value than goods.

Secondly, I am mystified by the clauses on services, which are the subject of these amendments. The arrangements seem to work well currently. No doubt some protection is provided by the carryover of EU rules under the withdrawal Acts, which are relatively light touch because attempts to align local rules within the EU on services were also light touch.

We are forcing on to the service industries apparently new rules and new exemptions linked to the principles of mutual recognition and non-discrimination. There could potentially be a whole load of bureaucracy and regulation associated with this activity, which business, the service sector and regulators will need to understand. Lobbyists may try to secure new rules that benefit narrow interests, as they do in Brussels now. Moreover, as someone who takes a morbid and forensic interest in these things, I find the impact assessment—welcome though it is in principle—extremely disappointing. These are usually very helpful to Committee discussions, but the assessment asserts on page 2 that

“the cost savings to businesses, consumers and the wider UK economy would be expected to significantly offset any costs imposed by this legislation, translating into a net benefit to the UK economy.”

The small and micro business assessment on page 37, a section to which I always pay the greatest attention as small business is the lifeblood of this country and key to its dynamism, says:

“Due to a lack of historical need, there is a shortage of data on businesses trading between different parts of the UK. It has therefore not been possible to identify the volume of such businesses who operate across borders, nor the extent to which they benefit because of the hypothetical nature of the future regulatory regimes.”


So we have no evidence to justify the new powers, nor an assessment of their consequences. We almost seem to be creating borders for services where none existed before, which is surely the opposite of what we want.

We need to understand better how this part of the Bill will work, but the material presented so far has stumped me, as a business operator who has worked in various industries across the UK and the world. In that connection, let me ask a simple question on marketing activity, which is not listed in the schedules: would I be permitted to discriminate in favour of a company that was Welsh to help with the marketing of Welsh products or would I have to take time to listen to pitches from English-owned—or, indeed, US or Canadian-owned—companies?

In response to a number of understandable probing amendments in this group, can my noble friend the Minister kindly justify the provisions simply, with some good worked examples relating to significant service sectors, and assuage my fears? I must say, at this point in time, I am confused and therefore concerned.

Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (Coronavirus) (Extension of the Relevant Period) Regulations 2020

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Tuesday 27th October 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I add my congratulations to my noble friend the Minister on bringing forward and introducing these regulations. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said, it is regrettable that the debate comes so late after they have been introduced. I will ask a number of brief questions.

Do the Government know how many companies have actually relied on the moratorium provisions, which we have discussed on previous regulations, and to what extent? I welcome these provisions and it would just be helpful to know how many have been operated. In paragraph 7.7 of the Explanatory Memorandum, reference is made to the need for

“temporary rules … to remain in place to allow time for permanent rules to be drafted”,

which would require “further secondary legislation”. Can my noble friend explain to us today what the timetable is for these permanent rules to be brought forward? Are they already in train and has the consultation period been embarked upon?

I am sure that my noble friend will keep an eye on the extent to which creditors are suffering from the fact that these protections have been given. Is he aware of any particular difficulties being incurred by them?

Overall, I welcome the thrust of the regulations. The deadline is today being extended to 31 December. Like my noble friend Lord Bourne, I ask my noble friend the Minister whether he envisages bringing forward a further extension to that timetable, which is likely to be needed.

I also echo the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett. Across the north, businesses are being particularly hard hit at this time. Many retailers in areas that are in lockdown are looking at potential liquidation. These regulations will obviously be welcome to them, but it seems that they are being discriminated against, as they are suffering greater restrictions than those operating in other parts of the country. I look forward to my noble friend’s reply. I support the main thrust of the regulations and welcome the opportunity to discuss them.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 26th October 2020 Lords Chamber

When we come to look at what we want to do and the concept of the devolved Administration, other matters such as diversity, choice and quality are not necessarily reflected if the price ticket always gets attached to being what the “consumer” is all about. Therefore, my heart is telling me that the broad sentiment is right, but my head is asking whether the amendment is, perhaps, not yet quite right or not in the right place. I will, of course, be listening, as the debate progresses.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I support Amendments 1 and 2, to which I have lent my name; they are probing amendments to ask the Government a number of questions. The concept of the internal market in European Union terms is relatively recent: we have only had the single market since 1992. Of course, devolution followed some five years later, so both are still relatively new in terms of the British constitution.

British competition rules are loosely based on—and generally have always reflected—the original competition rules of the EU treaty on state aid in Articles 85, 86 and 92. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has been right to highlight that, in what we have been used to in terms of both EU competition rules and British competition law as applied by the CMA, what is missing in the Bill is a reference to consumers. The flip side of competition policy to make sure that companies behave well is to ensure fair competition as well as protection of the consumer. I wonder whether leaving out any reference to consumers, both here and in later parts of the Bill, was deliberate. Why is there is no specific reference to consumers in the Bill, as Amendments 1 and 112 would provide?

 

Equally, Amendment 1 relates to safeguarding and the environment. That begs another question. We are told that our current regulations setting out food safety can always be changed by secondary legislation and that we do not need an Act of Parliament to do so. But that could lead to the situation—particularly if it remains devolved, and the Government have repeatedly stated that this is their intention—where we have to ask: to what extent will divergence be tolerated? For example, if the Food Standards Agency of England made substantial changes to our food safety requirements, would Food Standards Scotland simply diverge and not necessarily follow those changes? In future, could a product produced in Scotland, meeting Scottish environmental and animal welfare standards—I will be supporting the forthcoming amendments regarding those—still be allowed to be imported into England if it no longer met those same standards? This seems to be an obvious potential crisis for Scottish, Northern Irish and Welsh farmers some way down the road. The Government might want to rethink their idea of not having UK-wide standards. I would be most grateful if, when summing up, my noble friend could turn his attention to that potential conflict and the potential for divergence.

Turning to proportionality and subsidiarity, I absolutely agree with Amendment 2, to which I have lent my name, and later amendments. The Bill must clearly set out only what is necessary to achieve its stated objectives. My noble friend will probably answer that this is self-evident, but it bears repetition. Personally, I see some merit in having it on the face of the Bill. The principle of subsidiarity might seem clear now, but I ask my noble friend to consider the horrific situation, some five or 10 years down the road, when we may face a federal Britain. What impact would that have on subsidiarity?

On procurement, does my noble friend share my concern that despite all the potential benefits around procurement provisions that I envisage us enjoying by leaving the European Union—for example, we would no longer be bound by the threshold of €136,000, beyond which any public contract must be put out for tender, meaning that we could source many more of our English, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish foods into public institutions such as schools, hospitals, prisons and others—we have completely lost that advantage because through the Trade Bill we are joining the Agreement on Government Procurement, which, surprisingly, has exactly the same threshold of $135,000? We seem to be jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire, without getting all the opportunities that were promised to our farmers by leaving the European Union, such as sourcing more local food to schools, hospitals and other public institutions. That will in fact not come about, because we will be bound by international rules on public procurement. Have the Government done a cost-benefit analysis on how much competition we will face from other providers to source their foods into our public institutions, as opposed to the potential benefits our farmers might have from tendering in other international jurisdictions to source our home-produced food there?

I look forward to hearing my noble friend’s reply to this little debate.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I want to add a few words in support of Amendment 2. Proportionality and subsidiarity are part of the language of EU law which, while relatively new in historical terms, we are now very familiar with. It would be a mistake to think that as we reach the end of the transition period, we should leave these concepts behind. Proportionality, after all, is deeply embedded in our own public law, and has been for decades. It has long since been recognised that black-letter law alone is not a good guide to the way in which public law and public affairs should be administered. One simple example can be found in the civil litigation rules, where the word appears to make it clear that the courts should seek to obtain a just result with appropriate speed and expense in giving effect to the rules that are set out in the document. The point is that individual facts and circumstances vary greatly across the spectrum. Proportionality allows them to be taken into account and avoids blunt decisions where a greater need is to fit the facts together with the rule to find a suitable result that will achieve the desired object.

Subsidiarity too is now deeply ingrained in our constitutional arrangements. It is part of the thinking behind devolution, and the word is used with reference not only to Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland but to devolution throughout England. The great advantage of this is that local decisions are best taken with regard for local circumstances. For them to be taken centrally sometimes misses the point and leads to solutions that are inappropriate given the local circumstances. It is a useful tool best used in the administration of our affairs to make sure that things are properly organised across the whole of our United Kingdom, which, after all, is what our new internal market is all about.

Both these principles are sound and appropriate guides as to how the two basic principles which are set out in Clause 1 should be administered. I support the argument that, somehow, these principles should find a place in the Bill. Quite how that is done I leave to the draftsmen, but Amendment 2 is at least an important start to make sure that the significance and relevance of these principles are appropriately recognised.

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[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Cormack, who has spoken so passionately, as did the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I, too, also pay tribute to the contribution made by the then Conservative Government at the start of the Good Friday agreement. Speaking on the eve of the US elections, never has it been more timely to remind ourselves of the ongoing importance of that agreement.

Given that I do not think that there will be another opportunity to do so, perhaps I may briefly refer to the original Clause 1(3) which states that the principles set out in that clause

“have no direct legal effect except as provided by this Part.”

If they have no direct effect, presumably statutory instruments will need to be introduced for them to have effect. Will they become directly applicable at the same time in all four constituent parts of the United Kingdom?

I welcome in particular the probing nature of Amendment 3. I shall refer in passing to the evidence that we took in the EU Environment Sub-Committee. I am disappointed by the seeming lack of urgency reflected by the Government in preparing, in particular, farmers, producers, the road haulage industry and other interested parties involved in the production of or associated with agri-food, which of course is a mega business for Northern Ireland. In our letter to the Secretary of State, we concluded:

“We urge the Government to consider the likely impacts on Northern Ireland businesses and consumers of the increased levels of checks and controls that will be required as a consequence if the UK-EU future relationship negotiations are not successful.”


We noted that in his original reply the Secretary of State did not acknowledge the challenging timetable to implement the protocol in this regard. I know that when we come to discuss Part 5, there will be opportunities to consider this in more detail, but Clause 11 already looks at some of the details in Part 1 that relate to this.

I will use this opportunity to ask the Minister to assure us that in parallel with the consideration of this Bill, that what the Secretary of State said in reply to the sub-committee on 7 October, which was that the Government are actively engaging with the Northern Ireland Assembly, along with Northern Irish farmers, producers, hauliers and all those who are involved in the agri-food industry to enable them to be fully prepared to do business on 1 January 2021, is the case. Leading up to July, the evidence we took indicated to the contrary. There had been no direct contact of any specific nature with the Northern Ireland Assembly and certainly not with those interested parties from which we took evidence. Can my noble friend put my mind at rest that this has now moved on and that there have been direct contacts with the Northern Ireland Assembly and with the parties that will be affected in this regard?

[Baroness Suttie (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. Along with the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, they have shown that there is much agreement about this matter on all sides of the House. The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, always speaks with passion, conviction and experience on matters to do with Northern Ireland, especially on maintaining the progress made since the 1998 agreement. I hope that his wise counsel was listened to by the Government Front Bench today. The noble Lord, Lord Hain, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, set out very clearly in their powerful speeches why we feel that these amendments are necessary, and I am very glad to have been able to add my name to Amendments 3, 157 and 177. As my noble friend Lord Carlile said so clearly, this is a matter of peace and stability.

I would like to make four points. As the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, and the noble Lord, Lord Hain, said, it is frankly staggering that the Government are claiming that they are acting to protect the Good Friday/Belfast agreement through the introduction of this Bill. As has been said by many noble Lords, it is the Government’s own withdrawal agreement and protocol that they are now trying to reverse through measures set out in this Bill. They were either wrong in their assessment of the impact of the withdrawal treaty on the Good Friday/Belfast agreement 10 months ago or they are wrong now. Can the Minister clarify which is the case?

My second point is that ahead of the Brexit negotiations, the European Union carried out an extensive exercise mapping the connections between the Belfast agreement and the single market. Clearly, it is important to recognise that north-south co-operation under strand 2 of the Good Friday/Belfast agreement has moved on extensively since 1998. Can the Minister say whether a similar mapping exercise was carried out by the UK Government on the potential impact on the Good Friday/Belfast agreement ahead of the drafting of this Bill?

My third point concerns the hugely important area of rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland have expressed understandable anxiety about the protection of these rights following the introduction of this Bill. Can the Minister confirm that there will be no reduction in the rights as set out in the Good Friday/Belfast agreement and that the relevant obligations in the withdrawal treaty will be implemented in full? Can he also clarify whether an impact assessment was carried out specifically on the potential impact on rights and equalities?

My final point is about the Good Friday/Belfast agreement itself. We are blessed to have many noble Lords from all sides of the House who were directly involved in negotiating that agreement. We have several former Northern Ireland Secretaries, including the noble Lord, Lord Hain, who I have appreciated working closely with in producing these amendments. As my noble friend Lord Alderdice said in the Second Reading debate on this Bill last Monday:

“Those of us who spent many years of our lives negotiating and implementing that agreement had assumed that if we could find a new future for the people of our islands, we could find a way of maintaining our relationships with the rest of the European Union.—[Official Report, 19/10/20; col. 1357.]


This Bill now puts a very real strain on that relationship with our European partners, not least because of the potential impact on the Good Friday/Belfast agreement. When the Government committed to the Northern Ireland protocol, it was on the understanding that it was to

“be implemented so as to maintain the necessary conditions for continued North-South cooperation, including for possible new arrangements in accordance with the 1998 Agreement”.

Following the introduction of this Bill, do the Government still stand by that commitment?

It is deeply depressing, as the noble Lord, Lord Hain, has said, that Brussels and Washington appear to understand with greater clarity than this Government what is at stake if we start to disrupt the careful checks and balances based on trust and consent that are so essential to the Good Friday/Belfast agreement. That is why these amendments are necessary. We need to have this continuing commitment in the Bill. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]]

I was attracted to speak to this group of amendments by Amendments 5, 11 and 53, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and, as I have listened to the debate, I have begun to wonder even more why the Bill is required in the first place. At the risk of upsetting my good and noble friend Lord Foulkes—and I certainly do not want to get involved in Scottish internal politics; that is my caveat for what I am about to say—as a Minister in MAFF, Northern Ireland and Defra, and as chair of the Food Standards Agency, I worked very closely with several Ministers in the Scottish Government, and I always found them totally professional and focused on the issue at hand at the time.

Nobody has asked me to make a speech today on this matter, but I am going to raise matters raised by Food Standards Scotland in consultation in August and in the recent letter in October. The very reason the Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland exist is to ensure that policy formation, regulation and enforcement in relation to protection of consumers’ interests are clearly separated from those responsible for food industry growth and promotion. Food Standards Scotland says the Bill blurs that distinction, which has been in place since the FSA was formed after the BSE crisis in the 1990s. Both the FSA and the FSS have a legal duty to

“protect public health from risks which may arise in connection with the consumption of food”.

That comes from the Food Standards Act 1999 and the Food Scotland Act 2015.

Only a few weeks ago, the UK Government confirmed in their report on the common frameworks that the powers they have to restrict devolved competence under Section 12 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act—referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop—had not been used precisely because

“significant progress is being made across policy areas to establish common frameworks in collaboration with the devolved administrations.”

No party has ever expressed the need for, or provided evidence in support of, a statutory framework to regulate the UK internal market in the way that this Bill tries to do.

It is worth pointing out that the current internal market makes provision to allow the devolved Governments to impose conditions such as labelling and composition requirements or price mechanisms on food business operators in order to meet a public health objective, provided that the proposal meets an overriding public interest test. The Bill makes no equivalent provision and, indeed, makes clear that business cost is the primary driver, with no consideration of either public health costs or non-financial consumer interests and protection. The Bill does not advance the protection of consumers, other than in cost reduction. If consumer interest is defined solely by cost, it is inevitable that it will drive down standards, because lower standards are less costly.

I will briefly deploy three examples of existing responsible policy-making that is fully in line with current UK market issues and industry pressures. They are all evidence based, taking account of industry impacts as well as consumer interests. These three examples of why the present arrangements work were all given in August to the Business Secretary, Alok Sharma, by Food Standards Scotland—to which he has never responded.

The first is the fortification of flour with folic acid to improve pregnancies affected by neural tube defects. This policy has been advocated for some time by the Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition and I have raised it in your Lordships’ House on several occasions since November 2013. In the absence of UK Government action, Food Standards Scotland was asked by the Government there to carry out an assessment for Scottish Ministers. It did, and concluded that the nature of the UK market was such that all flour would require fortification and differentiation in product lines was not possible. Food Standards Scotland concluded that a separate Scottish solution should not be followed. UK-wide action is currently under consideration, of course.

The second example is the prohibition of the sale of raw drinking milk in Scotland. The original wide ban has been continued in Scotland, based on illness and deaths and the advice of the Advisory Committee on the Microbiological Safety of Food. Controls in England, Wales and Northern Ireland are less restrictive than in Scotland, so different rules apply. The current system works, and Food Standards Scotland is at a complete loss to understand why the Bill appears to save the existing unique provisions; it is clear that future provisions introduced on public health grounds are not protected. In other words, what will be saved now would not be protected if further provisions were introduced. The Government are making assertions that, without legislative underpinning, unnecessary regulatory barriers could emerge between different parts of the UK. The Government have given not a shred of evidence to support this assertion.

The third example concerns allergen information for consumers on “prepacked for direct sale” foods—that is a unique type of food. Working with Defra, the Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland developed proposals to improve information following the tragic death of a teenager eating a baguette containing undeclared sesame seeds. Four options were considered as part of a UK-wide consultation. In short, option 4 was recommended as in the best interests of consumers, even though option 1 was the cheapest for industry. Under the Bill, if, for example, one of the bodies had opted for option 3—slightly less than option 4—the body that had chosen option 4 would have to go for option 3. Worse still, using the Competition and Markets Authority, it is likely that option 1, which was simply aimed at raising consumer confidence without regulation, would be chosen. It would be the cheapest for industry but the most unsafe for the consumer. These three examples of responsible policy-making show that the current common frameworks system should be used, and be shown to fail, before we move to the mutual recognition system outlined in Clause 2.

Finally, as was referred to earlier, diet conditions might in future require labelling of, for example, high fat and high sugar on public health grounds. This can work perfectly well under the current arrangements. Under the Bill, however, one part of the UK could be lobbied to reduce information on packaging which other parts would be required to follow. I cannot support the lowest common denominator; it is unsafe for consumers. I hope that, in due course, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, will press his solution.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am delighted to speak to and support the amendments in this group. The debate demonstrates that it is not just Part 5 of the Bill that has created concern. In particular, I support Amendments 5, 11 and 53 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and Amendment 170 in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern.

The House owes a great debt of service to the two noble and learned Lords for so clearly identifying the problems with the Bill and its complete oversight and omission of the common frameworks. In particular, they identify the problem of future common frameworks and their relationship to the Bill. But my concern is that, as there has not yet been agreement on the 18 common frameworks that may require legislative decisions, there may be some uncertainty. I note in passing that, of the 18, a large majority relate to issues being dealt with by Defra. They primarily concern agriculture, food and, to a certain extent, the environment, and that is a source of concern.

I express a concern over Schedule 1 and the impact on movements of animals and farm goods, in the event of threats to human, animal or plant health. The noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, referred to the default position appearing to be mutual recognition. Paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 1 refers to the “first condition” that would form an exclusion:

“the aim of the legislation is to prevent or reduce the movement of unsafe food or feed into the part of the United Kingdom in which the legislation applies … from another part of the United Kingdom”.

As the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, set out in some detail—I entirely endorse what he said—it is all very well when the Food Standards Agency in England and Food Standards Scotland take a similar view. I put to the Minister, for his reply when summing up the debate, my view that Schedule 1 indicates the need for common standards of human, animal and plant health to ensure free movement between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. I thought that was the whole purpose of the Bill.

What will happen in future if the Food Standards Agency in England and Food Standards Scotland take different views on food, animal feed or a product from either state? Will Scottish produce be blocked from entering other parts of the United Kingdom, under Schedule 1 and other parts of the Bill? That would cause me great concern.

Finally, I endorse and support Amendment 170, in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay. He has identified the problem that there is simply no statutory basis for common frameworks. If so, would it not be better to have a common frameworks statutory basis to deal with all the problems that have been addressed during the debate?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, it seems that most of the noble Lords who have taken part in this debate have looked at the Bill through one end of a telescope, which focuses on the powers of the devolved Administrations and the threats or perceived threats to them. There is another end of the telescope you could use to look at the Bill, which shows that businesses in all parts of the UK need the certainty of knowing how they will be able to trade within the UK, going forward. That is important for those businesses trying to build a successful economy, particularly coming out of the Covid pandemic.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 19th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am delighted to have the opportunity to participate in this debate. I warmly congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, and my noble friend Lord Sarfraz, on their excellent maiden speeches, and I bid them a very warm welcome to the House.

My noble friend Lord Callanan set out the reasons why, in his view, the Bill is necessary, in particular to extend market access of goods, services, professional qualifications and other aspects, and to create a coherent internal market now that we have left the European Union. There were always going to be complex questions arising following Brexit, including what happens to the powers that are returned to the United Kingdom, and how those powers are exercised by the Parliament at Westminster and by the devolved Administrations. I pay tribute to the work of both the Government and the devolved Administrations through the common frameworks. This has been an example of excellent co-operation and achievement in reducing to just 16 or 18 issues that will require further legislation.

One area that has not been referred to a great deal during this debate is how agriculture will be dealt with following the adoption of the Bill in its present form. Scotland has a separate agricultural policy that is much the envy of North Yorkshire, Cumbria, Northumberland and other farmers in the border regions. It gives rise to the question of how those policies will be administered now through the common frameworks.

I follow what a number of other noble Lords said earlier, particularly the noble Baronesses, Lady Andrews and Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, in asking the Minister specific questions. What is the situation now, and where does the Bill leave the common frameworks? Is it intended that work will continue to proceed on the achievements that have been made to date on those frameworks?

I really have no quarrel with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, set out in moving his amendment, nor with my noble friend Lord Cormack. I also found myself in absolute agreement with my noble friends Lord Howard and Lord Lamont. What I regret most about the Bill in its present form—not just Part 5, to which many have referred, but Parts 1 to 4, although Part 5 in particular—is the fact that the Government are increasingly standing alone internationally and domestically, claiming that they alone are right and everyone else is wrong. There are 27 member states in the EU and they have reached, and maintain, a common negotiating position. It is a matter of note, and it is to be welcomed, that there is a change in that negotiating position announced by the EU today.

The Bill in its present form shows how we risk forming barriers and disagreements with the devolved Assemblies, which will be hoping to work as closely as possible with the Parliament at Westminster. As my noble friend Lord Vaizey has said, there is time, and hopefully scope, to retrieve this situation. I wish the passage of the Bill well, but in heavily amended form before its adoption.