Asylum Policy

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Thursday 20th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s question. I take the view that the Government will determine ultimately which are safe countries. The Government will make that judgment. We are open to challenge and discussion, but the Government will have to make a determination on that. In doing so, we will look at a range of factors. What does the United Nations think? What do the other agencies think? In the end, however, the Government ultimately will have to determine. Again, let me just say that it may not even be a blanket “safe” for a particular country. It may be safe, for example, now, for individuals post an Assad regime to return to Syria, but it may equally not be safe for some individuals to do that. There is a case-by-case basis for the individual, but, ultimately, we have to make that call.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s commitment to human rights, and I know it is a sincere one, but the Statement itself appears to express some irritation with both Article 8, respect for private and family life, and even Article 3, the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment and torture. In the light of our own justice and prison system being found in breach of Article 3 in the High Court just two days ago, can the Minister say a little more—give us a little more specificity—about the detail of the proposed renegotiation of Article 3 that the Statement refers to?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. We are seeking international reform of the application of Article 3. We will work with partners to reform the application of the ECHR’s prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment. That means we have to discuss it with our partners and get joint agreement, but it is an objective to which the Government are committed. It is one that will be tested. It will be in our consultation in due course. We will bring forward primary legislation with a definition of family life for the purposes of Article 8. That will be subject to scrutiny, but it will be within the spirit of maintaining our commitment to the European Court of Human Rights application. Those are fair and legitimate objectives, and I hope that my noble friend will support them in due course.

Police Reform

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Tuesday 18th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I remind the House and declare that, as a former director of Liberty, I was in unusual lockstep with chief constables in opposing what was to become the cross-party mistake of police and crime commissioners. Does my noble friend agree that the design fault that distinguishes the PCC model from others that have been discussed, including committees of councillors, mayors and so on, is in the word “temptation” in the Statement? An elected politician whose sole raison d’être is policing faces the almost inevitable temptation to dip their toes, particularly in media statements, into operational matters, and it is that design fault we need to avoid in future.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I agree with my noble friend. Key to the potential new model is that the police mayoral model/policing board model will be accountable for setting the budget and for holding the chief constable, whoever he or she may be, to account for the delivery of a police and crime plan that the police and crime commissioner signs off.

The temptation is there now for a running commentary and wanting to be the front person on any incident in a community because, ultimately, that election depends solely on police and crime performance. It does not depend, as mayoral elections do, on a whole range of issues, many of which are not directly political but many of which are. So there is a shift there which I hope will be welcome. Again I say that, at some point, this House will have an opportunity to test our proposals, because legislation will be required to facilitate these changes.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 11th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

74: After Clause 48, insert the following new Clause—
“Defence under Article 31 of the Refugee Convention(1) Section 37 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 is repealed.(2) Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (defences based on Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention) is amended as follows.(3) Omit subsection (2).(4) After subsection (3)(c) insert—“(d) section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 (illegal entry and similar offences).”(5) After subsection (4)(d) insert—“(e) section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 (illegal entry and similar offences).”(6) Omit subsection (4A).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment alters the statutory defence for refugees to ensure compliance with Article 31 of the Refugee Convention which prevents penalisation of refugees who transit in a country on their way to receiving sanctuary in another country, if they have come directly from a place where their life or freedom was threatened and they have good cause for their irregular entry or presence. This amendment restores the common law position and repeals section 37 of the Nationality and Borders Act which sought to overturn it. It also expands the defence to cover not only offences relating to those who enter with false documents but also those who enter without any immigration documents.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, noble Lords will recall that in Committee I proposed replacing Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 because it is incomplete. That section attempts to comply with Article 31 of the refugee convention by providing statutory defences for refugees who have irregularly entered or are present in the UK but who have come directly from a country persecuting them; they have presented themselves to the authorities without delay and shown good cause for their unlawful entry or presence. However, as described by our Joint Committee on Human Rights in its report on this Bill, the statutory defence

“is not fully compliant with the Refugee Convention”.

Strangely, the defence is available only to refugees who have used false documents; it does not extend to refugees who arrive, enter, or are present here irregularly, with no documents at all.

It is unclear to me why our country would privilege the refugee arriving by plane on a false passport over the stateless person or refugee with no passport or visa. Refugees are often compelled to flee with nothing but the clothes on their backs. What little they have may be stolen or lost along the way. I raised this anomaly in Committee, and my noble friend Lord Katz said that he understood what he called this “specific inconsistency”, very kindly agreeing to write to me on the point—that was on 13 October, at vol. 849, col. 113 of Hansard. As my noble friend helped explain to the Committee, also in col. 113, the defence is also imperfect and incomplete because it fails to protect from prosecution the refugee who, in fleeing persecution, stops in another safe country.

Sadly, those who drafted my noble friend’s letter to me of 24 October demonstrated neither his logic and compassion nor, frankly, any acknowledgement of what he actually said at the Dispatch Box. Indeed, the letter would be more fitting in support of opposition amendments proposed by, for example, the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, and rejected by the Government and my noble friend that day in recognition of refugees who transit countries en route to the United Kingdom. The Home Office letter said:

“The Convention is quite clear about the need for migrants to ‘come directly’ to benefit from the protections it affords them. In reality, not a single small boat that has reached the UK has set out from a dangerous country where migrants could not be reasonably expected to claim asylum. France, Belgium and the Netherlands are all signatory to the Convention and are entirely safe countries with functioning asylum systems of which migrants are able to avail themselves”.


It is as if last year’s general election never happened.

Therefore, almost all who arrive in the UK, even if eventually found by the authorities, by the Home Office or the appeal system, to be refugees, have no statutory defence to protect them from criminalisation and prosecution. That is contrary to a good faith interpretation of the refugee convention.

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This is all to say that the decisions to pursue prosecutions in cases where there is an active asylum claim are not taken lightly and to give some assurance that there is a process in place to ensure that those who stand to benefit from the defence in Section 31 are not prevented from doing so. I hope that detail provides some extra level of assurance to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and to your Lordships’ House. The Government remain committed to the protection of refugees and to their obligations under the refugee convention 1951. Given that, I invite my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti to withdraw this amendment.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for even being in the Chamber, let alone participating in this short debate. I am particularly grateful to my noble friend for his courtesy and sincerity once more.

As to the advice that he has been given, I am afraid there is a circularity about saying, “Do not worry, because we will look very carefully at whether someone has a defence”, when, on the basis of the correspondence I have been sent and this legislation, there will be no defence, even for a genuine asylum seeker or a recognised refugee who came in a boat. To me, that is a huge contradiction: “Welcome to Britain. You are a refugee and the beginning of your life in the UK will be criminal prosecution”.

None the less, I know my arithmetic, and I do not want to test noble Lords’ patience much longer— I know that there is other business. I am afraid this will have to be sorted out by the DPP or in the criminal and appeal courts. Perhaps in the longer term, the Government may think again—who knows? For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 74 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I add my support for Amendment 1. There should be a review of all these orders before layering another one on. In fact, some of that work has been done: freedom of information data demonstrates that people from minority ethnic communities are far more likely to be subject to this range of orders—Gypsy and Irish Traveller people are also more likely to receive disproportionate criminal punishments on breaching the orders—so the lack of monitoring of the use of behavioural orders is disturbing. I am sure that my noble friend the Minister does not want to continue this cycle of criminalising vulnerable and disadvantaged communities, so please can we have a formal review of the impact of the orders currently in place?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I find myself in agreement with many of the genuine human rights concerns already expressed around the Committee. I find myself in a bit of a time warp because these concerns were evidenced by the use, abuse, disrepute and ultimately disuse that anti-social behaviour orders fell into all those years ago. The criminalisation of vulnerable people, people with addiction problems, people with mental health problems, homeless people and so on is not hypothesis; it was evidenced by the practice of the original anti-social behaviour orders.

I therefore hope that, in his reply, my noble friend, who I know to be a very thoughtful Minister, will go some way to expressing how he thinks these new respect orders will improve on the very unhappy history of ASBOs. Other members of the Committee have already set out what happened in the interim. It would be useful if my noble friend the Minister could explain what will be different this time, why and how.

In a nutshell, my concerns are, first, that the threshold of behaviour likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress is low and vague. To be blunt, some people are easily alarmed and distressed. Harassment is the more objective, higher part of that threshold. That is the entry point at which vulnerable people can first fall into this quasi-civil criminal order that can sweep them into the criminal justice system rather than diverting them from it.

The second concern is that, once one is under the jurisdiction of such an order, it becomes a personal, bespoke criminal code for the individual. I remember the suicidal woman banned from bridges and the pig farmer who was given an ASBO because the pigs wandered on to the neighbours’ land. Is it really appropriate to have bespoke criminal codes for different people in different parts of the country? The postcode lottery point was made well, but there is also the issue of vulnerable people and minorities, who find themselves disproportionately affected.

Once you breach your personalised criminal code—which could be to keep away from a part of town where your close relatives live—you are then swept into the system. That is my third concern about these quasi-civil criminal orders: the ease with which vulnerable people with chaotic lives who have been let down by social services and society in general are now swept into the criminal justice system rather than diverted from it.

Finally, I share the concerns about making such orders available to even younger people, who really should not be anywhere near the criminal justice system. In a much later group—sometime next year, I think, when we will still be in this Committee and will be older, if not wiser—I have tabled an amendment, with the support of the noble and learned Baronesses, Lady Hale of Richmond and Lady Butler-Sloss, to tackle the shockingly low age of criminal responsibility, 10 years-old, that we still have in England and Wales.

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but only if the so-called non-crime hate incident is face to face. What would be completely unacceptable is for people to complain that they suffered alarm or distress because of social media or online messages. Our courts will be chock-a-block with claims that all the rubbish, including nasty rubbish on social media, could be included. The courts have better things to do. It is quite simple: if you do not want nasty messages on social media, get off it. I never once had a nasty or nice message on any social media, since I would not touch it with a 10-foot barge pole. It is a vile platform and, as a libertarian, I say: let the buyer beware.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

In the spirit of Committee, I wonder whether I might challenge the noble Lord a little on this epidemic of child criminality to which he so graphically referred. I think we should park these arguably very rare cases of child homicide outside a debate on anti-social behaviour, but would he agree with me that, when it comes to fisticuffs—what would be common assault—or even theft, we know that quite small children in every home in the country are capable of fisticuffs with each other, between siblings, and taking things that are not their own? But is not a crucial difference in our response to those children? Anti-social behaviour on the playing fields of Eton rarely ends up anywhere near the criminal justice system, but looked-after children in particular are more likely to be reported to the police and end up criminalised at a very early age. So does the noble Lord agree that children in, for example, England and Wales are no more malign than children in Scotland, where the age of responsibility is 14? We should look to ourselves as adult society and our responses to these vulnerable children.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

The noble Baroness says that child homicides are very rare, but they have doubled in the past 12 years. All the statistics that I quoted were from the Youth Justice Board and the Office for National Statistics, showing a huge increase in knife crime. Then there are the police forces themselves; there is an article relating to the Met, or a discussion on a blog from yesterday, asking whether knife crime by children was out of control—and those are their words, not mine.

There has been a huge increase in viciousness, knife use and violent crime by children, and I suggest in my amendments that lowering the age to include 14 to 18 year-olds in respect orders might make a difference, if we could hive them off early. Of course, I accept that children in Scotland, as in England, Northern Ireland and Wales, will also have violent tendencies. My concern is that we are failing to intervene early enough to do anything about them; that is the whole cause of the problem in the past 30 years—a lack of early intervention to deal properly with children. For some, that will mean a caution or restorative justice; for others, it could mean better work from social services. But some prolific young offenders may need to be taken out of circulation, for their own benefit and to save the lives of other children.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg. First, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Hanson of Flint on securing the considerable legal services of my noble friend Lady Levitt. The Government are very lucky to have them both steering this supertanker. There is much to commend: its focus on several vulnerable groups, including exploited children, victims of stalking, cuckooing and so on. I hope to speak to these parts in Committee. There is further scope to innovate in other areas genuinely to improve criminal justice.

I still have some concerns about an arms race begun over 30 years ago and escalated by some parts of this measure. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994—some noble Lords are too young to remember—began raising public expectations that Governments could legislate their way to a harmonious society. Politicians purported to do this even in times of austerity, amid real-time cuts to living standards, in the justice system, and to youth, mental health and addiction services. Continued rhetorical attacks on the judiciary and fiscal attacks on legal aid have left swathes of ordinary people thinking that the law is not for them. It will arrest and prosecute them for a growing array of crimes and misdemeanours but rarely protect them from abusive employers, landlords or unaccountable corporations. That is why I welcome the imminent Hillsborough law.

The disillusionment can be disastrous. Knee-jerk politics fights the alligators but never drains the swamp. I fear that we have been breeding alligators in a swamp in which only populist far-right politics thrives. We see this long shadow in compromises to due process rights, the unregulated deployment of technology at the cost of personal privacy, and always more police powers; every year, yet more powers—broad, vague and never mirrored by measures improving police vetting, training and discipline.

In 1994, it was the end of the right to silence, suspicionless stop and search, and restrictions on gatherings featuring music with a repetitive beat. Now, and for years, the target has been non-violent protest. I share the Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner’s concerns about our existing public order statute book; and now we have the measures proposed in this Bill, and those trailed as likely new government amendments to come in Committee, to restrict cumulative protest. Protests against asylum hotels make me very anxious. But I would no more ban them than those against job losses, benefit cuts, environmental degradation, war crimes, or racism and antisemitism. What would blanket bans on face coverings at protests mean for dissidents outside the embassy of an authoritarian foreign power? With all its churches, restrictions on protesting “in the vicinity of” places of worship could render our capital an extremely un-British protest-free zone.

Recently Ministers have warned, rightly, of the existential dangers of a far-right Administration. We must never write, let alone legislate for, a blank cheque for potential future anti-democratic abuse. While today is one for broad brushes and four-minute speeches, I hope noble Lords will come prepared for line-by-line forensic scrutiny of Bill and amendment text in the vital weeks to come. The other place may invoke the will of the people, but here we read the small print.

Police: Vetting, Training and Discipline

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

To ask His Majesty’s Government, following the BBC Panorama documentary Undercover in the Police, what plans they have to change law or practice regarding police vetting, training or discipline.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

The scenes in the documentary were simply unacceptable and deeply concerning. The Home Office supports the commissioner’s drive to root out those unfit to serve the public. The Government must improve standards nationally. That is why, earlier this year, the Government made changes to discipline and vetting, and we are intending to introduce further measures later this year to strengthen suspension arrangements and to put police vetting standards on a more robust legislative footing.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful, as always, to my noble friend the Minister. I gave him advance notice of a case of a 68 year-old man convicted in Guildford Crown Court just last week of a string of pretty horrific paedophile offences. During the trial, it emerged that he had served as a police CHIS spy for many years in the environmental movement. Of course, we subsequently legislated under the last Government to give advance criminal immunities to such people. Is it time to look again at whether the system is robust enough to protect in that necessarily shadowy area of police practice?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for drawing attention to the conviction last week. Quite simply, it is unacceptable that individuals are involved in that type of behaviour while serving as police officers, undercover or not. She will be aware that there is a long-standing undercover policing inquiry, which is examining issues and will report to the Government as soon as practicable. I am expecting to be able to respond to those recommendations once they are produced.

In the meantime, and this is the important point for the House as a whole, the Government have improved vetting and are committed to strengthening police vetting. The measures that we have brought forward this year and also in the Crime and Policing Bill, which coincidentally is before the House today, are ones which will strengthen to ensure that we root out individuals who are not suitable to hold the badge of honour of a police officer in the United Kingdom.

Asylum Claims: Religious Conversion

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Monday 13th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As it happens, my right honourable friend Dame Diana Johnson chaired the Home Affairs Select Committee then. She then became a Home Office Minister and is fully aware of the ongoing discussions. We will continue to discuss with any Church leader the basis for individuals claiming conversion as part of the process of asylum, but I reiterate to the House that claiming conversion or Christianity does not mean that the individual is accepted. That is subject to a rigorous test by officials in the Home Office.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, in the light of the substance of this Question, would my noble friend the Minister like to restate the Government’s commitment to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects religious freedom and freedom of conscience, and, indeed, to the refugee convention itself?

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 13th October 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

184: After Clause 48, insert the following new Clause—
“Primacy of the Refugee Convention(1) The Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 is amended as follows.(2) For section 2 (Primacy of Convention) substitute—“2 Primacy of Convention(1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation, subordinate legislation, immigration rules within the meaning of the 1971 Act, and guidance issued by the Secretary of State must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention.(2) This section—(a) applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever enacted, immigration rules whenever laid, and guidance whenever issued,(b) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible primary legislation, and(c) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible subordinate legislation if (disregarding any possibility of revocation) primary legislation prevents removal of the incompatibility.”(3) After section 2 insert—“2A Declaration of Incompatibility(1) Subsection (2) applies in any proceedings in which a court determines whether a provision of primary legislation is compatible with the Convention.(2) If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.(3) Subsection (4) applies in any proceedings in which a court determines whether a provision of subordinate legislation, made in the exercise of a power conferred by primary legislation, is compatible with the Convention.(4) If the court is satisfied—(a) that the provision is incompatible with the Convention, and(b) that (disregarding any possibility of revocation) the primary legislation concerned prevents removal of the incompatibility, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.(5) In this section “court” means—(a) the Supreme Court,(b) in Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary sitting otherwise than as a trial court or the Court of Session, or(c) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the High Court or the Court of Appeal.(6) A declaration under this section (“a declaration of incompatibility”)—(a) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given; (b) is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made.””Member's explanatory statement
These two new clauses follow the model of the Human Rights Act in attempting to ensure harmony between international convention and domestic law. Primary and secondary legislation, immigration rules, and guidance are to be interpreted in compliance with the Refugee Convention so far as possible. Where it is not possible to interpret primary legislation in compliance, the higher courts may make a declaration to that effect.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I will introduce Amendments 184 and 185 in my name. I am grateful for the support of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. Both amendments are inspired by the Government’s commitment in last year’s election manifesto that we will once again be a defender of the international rule of law.

The late Lord Bingham of Cornhill’s eighth principle on the rule of law is that it

“requires compliance by the state with its obligations in international law as in national law”.

The rule of law is a fundamental constitutional principle that safeguards against arbitrary power. What are we here for if not to protect the constitution?

Throughout debates on this Bill and other annual asylum Bills of recent years, noble Lords have raised concerns about compliance with international law, including the 1951 refugee convention. More than 20 years ago, in 1993, a Bill was passed through Parliament, with the noble Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham, as Home Secretary. It was implemented by the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, and contains a section titled “Primacy of Convention”. This section, still in force, provides that:

“Nothing in the immigration rules … shall lay down any practice which would be contrary to the”


refugee convention.

My Amendment 184 is in the spirit of this provision, but addresses the relationship between the convention and our domestic legal system more holistically. Drawing from the hallmark constitutional balance agreed by Parliament in the Human Rights Act 1998, it seeks to ensure harmony between primary legislation, subordinate legislation, the Immigration Rules, executive guidance and the refugee convention, so far as that is possible. It would give effect to Parliament’s intention to legislate in compliance with human rights. As with the Human Rights Act, courts would interpret laws only with the grain of the legislation and do no more than necessary to ensure compliance with human rights standards. This would help realise Parliament’s overarching intention and rectify drafting errors or address factual circumstances not foreseen by legislators.

Just as our courts have exercised judicial restraint in using Section 3 of the Human Rights Act, our independent judiciary could be trusted to exercise restraint in using this proposed new clause. Where primary legislation cannot be compatibly interpreted, then, as with Section 4 of the Human Rights Act, a declaration of incompatibility could be made which would not affect—I repeat not affect—the validity or continued operation of that law.

Those who rail against judicial human rights decisions with which they disagree should be reminded of this relationship between Sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act. It explicitly protects parliamentary sovereignty and, in contrast with, say, the US Bill of Rights, prevents our Supreme Court reinterpreting, let alone striking down, explicitly incompatible primary legislation. For the sake of completeness, the injunction in Section 2 of the Act is to “take into account”, not be bound by, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

Amendment 184 would, so far as is possible, ensure, for example, that our criminal penalties do not violate the immunity provided by the refugee convention, that our guidance on nationality does not treat refugees for evermore as not of good character if so to do would breach the refugee convention, and that refugees would not face being sent to places called safe where they will, in fact, face persecution.

Amendment 185 is specific to the question of immunity from criminal penalties. As your Lordships have heard time and again, Article 31.1 of the refugee convention protects refugees from

“penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence”

if they come directly from the country persecuting them,

“present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence”.

The reason for this immunity is simple. People fleeing persecution and seeking sanctuary are often compelled to arrive, enter and be present in a state irregularly. It is clear that Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 is intended to cover this defence. Indeed, it is titled:

“Defences based on Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention”.


However, it is insufficient and does not reflect the full scope of that article. It provides only a narrow defence to an insufficient list of offences, including forgery and connected offences, possession of false identity documents, deception and falsification of documents.

Therefore, while there is a statutory defence for arriving with false documents, there is no statutory defence for arriving without requisite documents. Someone who uses a fake passport to get on a boat or plane directly from where they face persecution is provided with a narrow defence, but as we know, with our ever-tightening visa regime and with airlines afraid of penalties, refugees cannot board safe planes—if they could, they might not risk crossing Europe on foot or the channel in dinghies. If they had instead walked barefoot or been trafficked and arrived in Libya, Turkey or France, having lost or had stolen any papers they had along the way, they would have no statutory defence against prosecution for irregular arrival or entry in the UK, or indeed against the new facilitation offences in this Bill and the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 before it.

This is not a mere hypothetical. The best available data shows that 556 people arriving by small boat were charged with illegal arrival and 455 were convicted—a number of them young people, who are treated and prosecuted as adults, with insufficient initial age assessments. The vast majority of those charged and convicted had ongoing claims for asylum, as well as experiences of trafficking and/or torture, but had to share prison cells with adults before being released into the care of local authorities.

In its recent report on this Bill, the Joint Committee on Human Rights stated:

“Article 31 is partially incorporated into domestic law by way of section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. However, the Committee agrees with its predecessor that this provision is not fully compliant with the Refugee Convention”.


Therefore, my amendment is one endeavour to ensure compliance. I appreciate that there are other such attempts, including from the chair of that committee, the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, in his Amendment 203. I am sure that we all wish him a full and speedy recovery from his recent injuries.

In Amendment 203I and other amendments, the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, has proposed a restrictive interpretation of Article 31.1 of the refugee convention. Our courts have interpreted the term “directly”—as in coming directly—broadly and purposively to ensure that refugees who have crossed through and had mere short-term transitory stops in other countries, such as while crossing deserts and seas, may still be exempt from penalties if they were en route to their place of intended sanctuary. The late and much lamented Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood in Adimi provided a clear test for interpreting whether someone has come directly, looking at the length of stay in the intermediate country, the reason for the delay and whether or not the refugee sought or found protection in that intermediate country. We must return to and uphold that common law position, as the late Lord Bingham of Cornhill did in the House of Lords Judicial Committee in Afshar.

As we repeatedly discuss, the entire system of international refugee protection would collapse if this were not the case—if every person were subject to penalties if they passed through or stopped in a safe country. The UK could say that all refugees are the responsibility of France. France would look to Italy, which would no doubt point to Tunisia. Tunisia would say “Libya”, and Libya would say “Sudan”. Thus, immediately, neighbouring countries would bear all the responsibility, of which they already bear a great share, or refugees would be pushed back into their countries of persecution. This was never the intention and could never logically have been the intention of a refugee convention. With this approach, like dominoes, our system of post-war legal protection and the international rule of law would fall. I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I signed the two amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, not because I have any legal training but because I trust her judgment on this. I was hoping that some of our estimable Cross-Bench KCs and former judges would stand up and say, “This is rubbish; you can’t do this”. In their absence, I will say just a few words.

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[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

I will keep talking while we get my noble friend Lord Hendy in. He will be here shortly. I thank all noble Lords particularly for their consideration today at Question Time, which was much appreciated by everyone here. My noble friend is, I hope, here now. No, he is not.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Can I interrupt my noble friend for a moment to say that I understand the reasons for breaking mid-group but that the period of the break will give me a little longer to reflect on the many positive contributions that precede my other noble friend’s return to the Chamber?

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 13th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I am perhaps not as warm towards this amendment as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, just was. It seems to me that it does give away its intention in the title,

“Primacy of the Refugee Convention”,


which fundamentally is an assault on whether we think Parliament has primacy in our view. Of course I will give way, although I have not got very far in my argument.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

As a point of information, does the noble Lord realise that the title,

“Primacy of the Refugee Convention”


is directly adopted from the Conservative’s Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, as brought forward by the noble Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham, and implemented by the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne?

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I was not aware of that, but I am not sure it changes my argument. As we have just discovered by listening to the debates about Article 31 of the convention, part of the issue here is that the interpretation of the words is contested, as we heard from the points my noble friend Lord Murray set out when he talked about restoring what he feels is the original definition—indeed, that has already been done in the Nationality and Borders Act, which I think has about half-a-dozen interpretation sections interpreting parts of the convention—and from what the noble Baroness said when she disagreed that that was the original intention.

The whole point is that, if there are disputes about what the convention means, somebody has to decide what it means. It can be either be courts and judges or Parliament setting out what we think we have signed up to and being clear about that, and Parliament has done so in a number of cases. If you put this amendment into statute, it would effectively say that judges could assert that what Parliament said was not the interpretation of the convention and a judge would decide what to do.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said that she has been careful to word this amendment so that the court could not strike down primary legislation. If I may say so, I do not think that is a terribly good safeguard, because an enormous amount of our immigration legislation is not primary legislation but secondary legislation. All the Immigration Rules are secondary legislation made by Ministers using primary legislative powers, so unless there is something explicitly in the primary legislation which gives Ministers powers to make Immigration Rules that specifically forbids a court being able to do this, if this amendment were carried, a court could strike down our Immigration Rules.

That would in effect mean judges, not Ministers, making the decision. Of course those Immigration Rules are not just made by Ministers; Ministers draft them, but they are put before both Houses of Parliament and approved by Parliament. In the end, my contention is that, if you want to have an immigration system that carries the support of the public, decisions have to be made by people who are accountable to the public.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, talked about the convention being chipped away. Part of the issue is that a large number of members of the public do not think that it works for them. They think that people can come to this country as economic migrants, put their hands up and say that they are asylum seekers, and that that somehow gives them a free pass.

When I was Immigration Minister, I argued that we should have a tough system that lets people with a good claim stay but is clear that, where people do not have a good claim, we will kick them out. All that the charities that end up supporting them do is damage the public’s support for our asylum system. If people think that this is a way of getting around the system for economic migrants who get here, and that courts interpret the legislation in a way that is not intended by Ministers who are accountable to Parliament, it damages public support for the very principle that the noble Baroness is setting out; that is incredibly damaging.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for giving way a second time. My point is on not the big stuff around public opinion but the specific question of the danger of courts striking down the Immigration Rules. Does the noble Lord realise that the 1993 Act, which he said a moment ago does not really matter, is still in force; and that the provision I cited already prohibits the Immigration Rules breaching the refugee convention?

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Parts of the Act are still in force, obviously, but, if what the noble Baroness says were true, there would be no need to have her amendment. The fact is that, if you say that the courts can decide that the convention—as they interpret it—can override legislation, that is damaging. The world is a very different place now from what it was in 1951 when the convention was adopted. You have to reflect that by democratically accountable Ministers and legislators making decisions about how we interpret it in the modern era; that is how you strengthen the principles underpinning it, but in a way that works in the modern world. If you do not do that, you will just have more people thinking that the whole thing is nonsense and that we should pull out of it. Actually, I do not think that we should pull out of it—it needs work and it needs to be amended, but we also need to interpret it correctly. My noble friend Lord Murray’s amendment, which sets out a definition that is relevant in the modern world around people who pass through a number of safe countries then choose to come to the UK, is sensible; it would, I think, have the support of a large number of people in the United Kingdom.

In the end, the decision on whether that is the correct interpretation of the convention should, in my humble opinion, be taken by Ministers and by Parliament. It should not be taken by judges being able to insert their interpretation of the 1951 convention, as it was drafted for a very different world, and how they think it should be interpreted now. That would be a retrograde step and would not do what the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Ludford, are trying to do. I think that they are frustrated that the public do not support the provisions of the convention and they are being chipped away at, but what the noble Baroness is proposing, supported by the noble Baroness opposite, would actually make things worse, not better. If the public think that the asylum system is not under any democratic control and that decisions are taken by courts, not accountable people, the system will become less supported by the public—not more—and the whole thing will unravel. If you believe in an asylum system, which I do, and you want to strengthen it, you have to allow democratic institutions to reflect the world in which we now live, not the world in which the convention was drafted. If you do that and make it a convention that is able to be interpreted in the modern world, you strengthen it and make it more likely to succeed than doing the opposite.

For those reasons, it would strike at the primacy of Parliament to put this into law, but it would also do something that I think, fundamentally, both noble Baronesses would not support: it would weaken public support for the asylum system, which, in the end, they will come to regret.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

To be clear, I was not talking about schemes that were set up for specific groups of people in specific situations, such as those from Hong Kong, Ukraine or Afghanistan, which the noble Lord mentioned. Indeed, I am absolutely clear as well that I do not disagree with him or the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, on the principle that we would not want to leave that purely up to the courts rather than having it as part of legislation that has been proposed by Ministers and supported by both Houses of Parliament. I do not disagree with that, but the counter-counterfactual is also the case: if we excluded anyone who passed through any country in which they could reasonably stop, as a safe port of call, then we would not be taking anybody else in outside those established schemes. I do not think that is a reasonable, practical interpretation of the facts on the ground. For that reason, I am afraid that we will not be able to support Amendment 203I from the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth.

Before I finish, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, had the courtesy to say that she would not be able to be in her place until the end of this stage of the debate. She took the opportunity when speaking to rail against the increasing authoritarianism and blaming of refugees for all the ills of this country. I urge her, and indeed all noble Lords, if they think this is the case for this Government, to read carefully the words of our Prime Minister in his leader’s speech to the Labour Party conference. He set out a clear case, with humane and progressive reasons, for controlling borders. Indeed, I point to the words of our new Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood. She is very clear that for people from, as she says, an ethnic minority, having a controlled system of borders is a good thing. There is nothing progressive about insecurity, whether insecurity of income, on our streets or on our borders. This Government were elected to tackle all three things, and we are determined to tackle them.

Given that, and given the time of night, I will conclude and ask the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray, not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their engagement in this group, even though some engagement was with a rather broader brush than ideally one would like in Committee. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, did not need to be self-deprecating about not being a lawyer, nor did other noble Lords need to damn my amendments with faint praise for being surprisingly “legally coherent”, even though they disagreed with the substance.

Some noble Lords were of course going to use these amendments for the big debate that rages in our countries at the moment around the refugee convention. However, to go to the detail of my amendments, neither of them would affect the big debate about whether we should be in or out of the refugee convention, or whether we should be in it but periodically ignore it. My amendments were attempting to achieve some coherence in our statute book, which I think is what a Committee stage on a borders Bill should be about.

There are anomalies in the way that we are half-pregnant with the refugee convention at the moment. The noble Lord, Lord Harper, did not quite believe me when I said that Section 2 of the 1993 Act already provides that the Immigration Rules may not conflict with the refugee convention and therefore courts may decide on that matter. I would like him to believe me or, if he does not, to look at the statute, because Section 2 of the 1993 Act is still in force. The noble Lord then said that if what I say is correct, we would not need my amendment, but of course the rules are just the rules. Underneath the Immigration Rules there are executive decisions and guidance, and above the rules there is legislation.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, rightly and understandably brought up the question of democracy, and other noble Lords engaged in the age-old debate about what democracy is and the relationship between elected parts of the constitution and the courts. There must be a relationship between the two because there is no democracy without the rule of law and arbitrary decisions could be made. The moment you legislate, you are passing some role to the judiciary. Some of us are happy with that and some of us do not want quite so much of that, but my amendments would expressly preserve parliamentary sovereignty as the overriding principle in our legislation, even under the Human Rights Act.

On Amendment 185, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for identifying the point I make about the anomaly in the current position. I am sorry to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, because clearly I did not make myself clear enough in my opening remarks; he said that my amendment would be a licence for people to come with forged papers. The anomaly I refer to is that, as a refugee with forged papers, you get protection from prosecution now, but not as a refugee with no papers. That is the detail of what I was trying to achieve in these specific amendments, notwithstanding this very general debate, and I am grateful for that. For the moment at least, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 184 withdrawn.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 8th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak on the two amendments together. Section 117C, on the deportation of foreign criminals, which the noble Baroness is seeking to amend, provides at subsection (1) that this deportation is in the public interest. I suggest that the well-being of children is a matter of public interest. There is a lot of noise about the deportation of foreign criminals at the moment, and the noble Baroness has rightly focused on the position of children. As the noble Baroness has identified, the family unit, about which politicians talk an awful lot, is generally in a child’s best interest. I am not sure about there being public interest in children being properly brought up. I do not disagree with the concept, but I am not sure how you define it.

In Amendment 187, there is a reference to maintaining contact by electronic means. I have been aware over the years that, although the means have developed, “Skype families”, as they used to be called, were desperately distressing for everyone concerned. I heard one example many years ago of a child who thought that daddy had no legs, because they had never seen the father below chest level. So, although it is not Skype these days, the principle remains.

I wish the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, a quick recovery and I thank her for bringing this to the attention of the House.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I too wish a swift and full recovery to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. Her colleague has ably set out the thinking behind this amendment. I suspect I am more sympathetic to it than some members of the Committee, but I suggest the following additional observation on a point that it demonstrates, even to those who feel very anti anyone who has committed a crime ever being able to stay in the United Kingdom.

The amendment demonstrates that Article 8 of the convention is broadly drawn, so there is room for considerable debate about where the line should be drawn on what is a necessary and proportionate interference—for example, to prevent crime or for the purposes of immigration control. A great deal of latitude has always been allowed to signatory states as to where, in the first instance, democratic politics and the elected Government of the day think that discretion should be framed. For many years, Governments of both persuasions have attempted to structure that discretion—just as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is doing in one direction in this amendment—by a combination of primary legislation, Immigration Rules and policy. So, anybody who says that one needs to resile from the European Convention on Human Rights because of Article 8 is either misguided or not misguided at all and is doing this for various political reasons.

I have been a lawyer for only 31 years, but my understanding is that there have been only four removal cases since 1980 in which the UK Government have been found in violation of Article 8. So, if people are upset about the way domestic courts are drawing the line in particular cases, I suggest that that is something for domestic legislation—primary or secondary legislation, rules, guidance and so on. It is in no way a justification for some of the toxic debates about international human rights that we have heard in recent days, weeks, months and years.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I too send my best wishes to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. We shall miss, for a temporary period, her distinctive contribution to this House.

I am puzzled by this amendment, essentially for the reasons my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti mentions. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is part of our law. There are suggestions that proposals may be brought forward in relation to its application, but it remains part of our law. The Minister will tell me if I am wrong, but there is nothing in the Bill that purports to remove Article 8.

Article 8 requires adjudicators, tribunals and courts to have regard to family law issues and the interests of children and parents—families—and that seems entirely appropriate. There is a balance to be struck in these cases. We are talking about the deportation of criminals. Sadly, there are people here on a temporary basis who commit serious crimes and who need to be removed. It is right and proper that the interests of families are taken into account, but that already happens. I do not see the need for the amendments.

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[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, all noble Lords who have spoken on the amendment have got a deep understanding of a very complex system—the legal aid system—which I certainly do not, so I will leave the fundamentals of the amendment and how the legal aid system works to those who have a great deal of professional knowledge about the system.

However, I noted the observation from the noble Lord, Lord Bach, when he moved his amendment, that a modest investment would be required now in order to deliver the plans that he has outlined. Can he give some indication of what that modest investment would be? While accepting that it sounds like a simple question, I suspect that the answer is probably complex in terms of the netting off of savings elsewhere through a more efficient process and so forth. Can he also say what proportion of the existing legal aid budget that would represent in order to get the system to the level that he feels would be satisfactory, and where the additional capacity would come from and how long it would take to come through the system?

If the noble Lord could answer those points—or perhaps the Minister could in his winding-up speech—it would be very helpful, certainly to give some context to the non-professionally qualified Members of the Committee.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I also support the amendment from my noble friend Lord Bach and pay tribute to him not just for the amendment but for decades of service to access to justice, not least through successive Labour Governments and leaderships. I also congratulate him on his rather impressive list of supporters; clearly, there were many who were knocking on the door to be supporters but could not get in there quickly enough to be signatories.

I remind the Committee that we are talking about incarcerated people. This is not all migrants by any stretch, though no doubt more and more will become incarcerated in the future; there has certainly been a growth in detention in previous decades. These are incarcerated people, which means that the instinct behind the amendment from my noble friend Lord Bach is not a 1998 instinct or even a 1950 instinct; it is actually coming from a 1215 instinct—and noble Lords will understand that I do not mean 12.15 this afternoon. These are incarcerated people who are not getting access to legal advice around their incarceration and potential urgent removal from the country without legal advice. I do not think that most members of the public realise that that is the situation.

Obviously, I think this is a no-brainer, but I must try to walk in other people’s shoes and think about what the objections to the amendment might be. Clearly, if you believe that Governments and successive Home Offices and their officials always get things right and that legal process, and legal advice in particular, is just a burden and impediment and that we should ask my noble friend Lord Bach questions about how much this is going to cost et cetera, that is an obvious objection to the amendment. Another objection would come if you were of the view that non-nationals have no rights or should not have rights. If you take those two objections together, you very quickly pave the way for many more Windrush situations. I remind the Committee that nationals were swept up in that particular scandal because of the callous approach to non-nationals.

That takes me to the very important speech by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, comparing the lot of these incarcerated people with those who are swept up in the criminal justice system but have PACE protections that these people do not have, even though these incarcerated people are often not even accused of the kind of criminality that many criminal suspects are. These are incarcerated people; yes, for the most part they are non-nationals, but they face very serious consequences, quite possibly for reasons that are not a huge fault of their own.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. I put it to the Committee that I sense that my noble friend Lord Bach’s amendment is now being interpreted as being potentially much wider than certainly I took it to be on initial examination of that amendment.

Recess has meant that we have not had as much discussion about that as we may have wanted to have. The main point here is that, under current MoJ/Home Office determinations, 30 minutes is available, and subsequent legal support is available subject to tests of eligibility, et cetera. I think that goes parallel to the wish of the Government to put in additional advisers to speed up applications, to make sure that there is better-quality initial decision-making, but I am always grateful to be advised by the Committee.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for giving way. While he is still on his feet—I love that device—and before my noble friend Lord Bach responds, I think I am hearing an understandable response to the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, and the noble Lord, Lord Empey, that at the moment none of us has a view of precise figures, but we could examine that, and maybe that should go into the mix of a future discussion on Report.

However, I have to agree with noble Lords who have said that this is not a zero-sum game between justice and efficiency. Indeed, I just wanted to ask my noble friend the Minister whether he agrees—I think he indicated that he does—with judges who have had to deal with cases of unrepresented people about how much time and energy that adds to hearings that, I believe, the Government actually want to speed up. In any calculation that the Minister comes back with on Report, I hope that officials will add that component for delay—an unrepresented person in an asylum case; that should go into the mix.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend. I draw the Committee back to where we are at the moment: an individual in detention can have 30 minutes’ worth of legal advice very quickly after they have requested it. There may be an issue around take-up. We are monitoring take-up on a regular basis and want to increase that take-up, but that 30 minutes is there. If further advice is required, on the merits test that can be taken forward as of now.

My noble friend’s amendment may take that issue wider than that discussion. It is the Government’s objective to speed up claims to get to decisions on asylum. We are doing that through executive action, not legislation, increasing the number of people taking decisions and making it much quicker and fairer, because that is in the public interest, as has been mentioned by all. I do not think we are going to resolve that issue in Committee today. I have tried to set out where I think we are, and my noble friend has tabled his amendment.

Serious questions have been raised on these issues by me, by the noble Viscount and by the noble Lord, Lord Empey. I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment, because I believe the Government’s case as I have put it is the right course of action on those issues. If we are going to have even further discussion on the points he has made, we need to have some better information on which to base it, even though I accept that for some members of the Committee, that becomes a matter of principle.