Immigration and Asylum: Appeals

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Monday 29th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We are moving at quite a pace. The Bill that establishes the new authority will be published tomorrow and has to make its way through both Houses of Parliament. The principle behind it is that there will be a body that is fully independent of the Government and staffed by professional trained adjudicators, with safeguards to ensure high standards, so that appellants are able to receive impartial and independent redress, as is required under our obligations. We intend still to meet our international obligations as part of this change, which I hope will give comfort to the noble Lord. He will have an opportunity to see the Bill when it is published tomorrow. At some point, this House will have the opportunity to examine it in detail. For the moment, I suggest that he waits for the Bill to be published.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I remind the House that there are lawyers on all sides of the House who have spoken on all kinds of immigration measures. Nobody impugns their ability to continue to give legal advice or, indeed, sometimes to sit in judicial office. I agree with my noble friend that there is a crucial need to deal with the backlog. Can he say a little more about the legal qualifications for the new independent adjudicators? That is more important than whether they were once a member of Amnesty International—which, by the way, is a good thing to be.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Bill will be published tomorrow and will establish the framework for the body and examine in detail the issues my noble friend has raised. My right honourable friend who is dealing with these matters is cognisant of the fact that the independent body will be responsible for monitoring qualifications and standards. I am happy to answer questions on that once the Bill has been published. I am not in the position today to be able to do that.

Concealed Surveillance Equipment in Government Offices and Vehicles

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Wednesday 10th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

In line with the practice of successive Administrations, this Government do not comment on the detail of internal security matters, but I can confirm that an electronic device was found in a communal area of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government during a routine security check. The device was not in or near ministerial offices, and it is currently being investigated by the appropriate agencies. The Government have also looked into the Daily Mail report and previous coverage and have not discovered any evidence of a tracking device being placed in Prime Ministers’ cars. This is based on inquiries made at the time, and more recently.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, and to the Minister for that reply.

That disclosure was made yesterday to a Select Committee in another place—that a Chinese cellular module was discovered in the then Prime Minister’s car—and on the previous day, there was a report of secret cameras being discovered in government offices. Surely that raises serious questions about the security of government departments, and the systematic use of both surveillance and indeed transnational repression by hostile states, including those states described by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, as being part of a “deadly quartet” of our country’s enemies.

Is it true that the location of the cameras was where consideration of the proposed embassy of the People’s Republic of China was taking place? Will the Minister make an assessment of whether there has been undue influence as a result? When will the Government give effect to the unanimous call from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I have the honour to chair, that the People’s Republic of China should be listed with Russia and Iran in the upper tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

On the latter point, the Government keep all matters, such as registration under the FIRS, under review at all times. Again, it is not appropriate to comment on any consideration of that at this time. I also say to the noble Lord that it is not appropriate for me to comment on what is a live investigation into the circumstances that I have already admitted have happened in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. I strongly caution against any speculation at this time, because the Government will need to investigate that matter in due course.

On the Chinese embassy decision, I say to the noble Lord that intelligence agencies were involved throughout the process and an extensive range of measures were developed to manage any risks. The planning decision was taken independently by the MHCLG Secretary of State and his conclusion is the result of a process that began in 2018. If I may, I return to my initial comments: the Government cannot comment on the detail of internal security matters, but those are being investigated by the appropriate agencies. I think it is best that we leave it at that.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, with apologies for jumping the gun in my enthusiasm, perhaps the Government could comment on this. It is bad enough, although perhaps all too predictable, that there is illicit surveillance by way of, for example, hidden cameras. But what about when public money is actively used to procure cameras that originate, for example, in the People’s Republic of China? I know that the previous Government banned the new installation of Hikvision cameras in sensitive government buildings. Have they all been dismantled? What about banning them from the public estate more generally?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My noble friend is pressing me to comment on these matters. I cannot comment on security issues—nor would the House, I suspect, wish me to do so—except to say that the Government will ensure that all matters in government activity are secure. The Government take every step they possibly can to make sure that the types of incidents my noble friend refers to do not happen and are prevented.

Southport Inquiry: Prevent Programme

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Thursday 16th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord mentions an important point: we are very cognisant of online radicalisation, and the Home Office is looking at what steps we can take to improve the take-down of difficult sites and to look at tracing back those sites. We are continually monitoring the whole issue of counterextremism and how that works, both through my colleague Ministers and through the security services. We will continue to monitor our support and Prevent mechanisms. Prevent has helped around 6,000 people not to go into extremist activity in the last nine years. It is a good programme but, as I have mentioned, we have tweaked it based on the experiences of what happened in Southport in the very early days of this Government.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, in addition to the points that noble Lords around the House have made—about multi-agency co-operation and single-agency lead, and indeed the last comments about the internet, and about violent and misogynistic material in particular—will my noble friend also consider issues around the challenges of parenting a very troubled and potentially violent child, and around support and accountability? Will that be on the Government’s agenda as well?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

One of the recommendations from Sir Adrian was on assessing the parents of the individual who is, I remind the House, now serving 52 years as a minimum sentence in prison for the assault. The failure of the parents to understand, establish and report the behaviour of the individual was a critical factor, so Sir Adrian has made a number of recommendations in that area. We received the recommendations on Monday; it is important to give them due consideration. We will report back to the House by the summer, but those are key areas where we need to look at what interventions can be made where there are difficult young people involved in activity that can escalate to the incident that happened in Southport.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

420: After Clause 207, insert the following new Clause—
“Amendment of section 3 (proscription) of the Terrorism Act 2000In section 3(3)(a) of the Terrorism Act 2000, at end insert “, provided that only one organisation per order may be added”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require that any order made under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 relates to a single organisation. This would enhance the ability of both Houses of Parliament to scrutinise the proscription process by allowing the possibility of voting against some Secretary of State proscription decisions, without jeopardising others.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, more on terrorism, and proscription in particular. Amendment 420 is in my name, and I support Amendment 422B in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, which would beef up parliamentary involvement, and the role of the ISC in particular, in the proscription process. I oppose later amendments that seem to limit or completely remove the role of the courts in this area.

The Home Secretary’s power to proscribe a terrorist organisation under Section 3 of the 2000 Act is an awesome power. It is none the less necessary in a democratic society, because people should not be able to have private armies. We all understand that. None the less, getting these decisions right is incredibly important. In this debate, I will not relitigate any past or pending decisions. I am looking at it from the point of view of constitutional principle. The consequences of proscription are very serious, now and in the future, so getting these decisions right is very important.

My Amendment 420 is very modest, and I am grateful to all noble Lords across the House who supported it last time, and to colleagues in the other place of different political persuasions who spoke to me privately, expressing their support for this type of change. At the moment, a single proscription order may contain umpteen organisations, which means that when that order is put before each House, there will be a yes or no vote on an entire list, rather than an opportunity for Members of the other place or noble Lords to properly scrutinise and vote on each proscription decision. By contrast, the courts are able to review these decisions individually. I suggest that, as a matter of constitutional principle, both Houses should have a similar opportunity. That is what Amendment 420 would do.

Last time, my noble friend, amiable and courteous as always, as noble Lords know, was able to offer one argument against me, which was that we have always done it this way. I hope he forgives me, but I do not think that a good enough argument. There may be a further one to come, but that is not a good enough argument to limit the reasonable opportunity for both Houses of Parliament to vote on each individual proscription decision. There is no speed issue or emergency issue because even after my amendment, the Home Secretary could make multiple orders on the same day and sign them with the same pen; there would just be individual votes and debates, as required by Parliament. That is the argument. I beg to move.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, in the circumstances I shall confine my observations to Amendments 422A and 422B. Before I do so, I say that I strongly support the amendment just moved by the noble Baroness. Were she to divide the House on it, I would support it, but I gather that, perhaps because of the press of business, that is not her present intention.

The purpose of Amendment 422A is to ensure that individuals can be prosecuted under Sections 12 and 13 of the Terrorism Act for the offence of supporting an act of terrorism only if the alleged acts amount to supporting terrorism in the sense that the ordinary citizen would understand that concept. Amendment 422A makes explicit that the necessary intent that the prosecution must prove is that the alleged acts were done with the intent of encouraging, inciting, facilitating or enabling another to commit an act of terrorism. The amendment also restricts the possibility of a demonstrator being arrested under the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Act. In general, an arrest must be authorised by a senior police officer of the rank of superintendent or above.

My suggestion to your Lordships is that the present situation is wholly unsatisfactory. It has been widely criticised, for example, by the judges in the Palestine Action case. In that case, judicial concern about statutory overreach contributed to the proscription of Palestine Action being held to be unlawful. It has also been the subject of much distinguished criticism—for example by Lord Sumption, a former member of the Supreme Court. I suggest that the position is profoundly unjust. If we consider, for example, the demonstrations that have been taking place in the streets of London, hundreds of people have been holding up placards that say, “I support Palestine Action”. Many of these characters are elderly and retired folk, rather like me; most self-evidently respectable, rather like me; and usually without knowledge of the secret workings of Palestine Action, rather like me. Now they may be self-indulgent—rather like me—and some accuse them of being naive, but are they really guilty of terrorism in the sense that most of us understand that concept? I suggest, surely not. What they are doing is using a form of shorthand to demonstrate their opposition to the policies of Israel in Gaza and the West Bank, and that they are entitled to do.

There are at least three serious objections to the present law. First, it is a serious restriction on free speech. I refer here not to the European convention, although it may be engaged, but to the long-standing tradition of English law. Secondly, to use the law in circumstances that offend the common sense of the ordinary citizen brings the whole body of criminal law into disrepute.

--- Later in debate ---

I have tried to be at least helpful on Report in acknowledging the points that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti has brought forward. I hope that she will withdraw her amendment, based on those words of encouragement, but I say to the House as a whole that I cannot support any of these amendments from noble Lords on Report tonight.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their approach to such an important debate, in particular those who made a special effort to be succinct with the long night ahead. I remind noble Lords that my amendment on one organisation per order is not about Palestine Action; it is about procedure and constitutional safeguards for the future.

I am very grateful for the way in which my noble friend the Minister responded differently from the response in Committee. I am hugely encouraged by what he said. He has very graciously offered to go back to his colleagues in the Home Office and think again on this. I feel that I have to respond in kind by encouraging him to do just that, as he has so graciously offered. I so believe in the power of our argument on Amendment 420 that, when he has those discussions, I believe he will feel able to come back with a government amendment following Report. If he is not able to do so, having had those discussions, we will see what might be done at Third Reading.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope I was clear: I will not be bringing an amendment back at Third Reading, nor can I support the amendment that she brought forward today. I recognise the issue that she has raised and we will examine and discuss that with colleagues in relation to future proscription orders before any House of Parliament.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

There we go: I was too optimistic, perhaps. None the less, I believe that my noble friend sees the power of the argument or he would not have said what he has said. There are plenty of ways in which the Home Office might consider doing one organisation per order in the future. In any event, in light of the time, and given that I do not have the support of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition or of the Government—I am grateful to the Liberal Democrats for their support—I will not try the House’s patience with a vote that I cannot win this evening. I will keep nudging my noble friend the Minister and beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 420 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 407, on the recording of sex in police data. It is a real shame that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, is unable to be with us because she would have introduced it very elegantly.

A year ago, in March 2025, Professor Alice Sullivan’s Review of Data, Statistics and Research on Sex and Gender came out. It pointed out:

“It is well-established that sex is a major determinant of offending and victimisation”.


The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, may have been going through the motions but he went through them very well by explaining clearly why this amendment matters. As he pointed out, it is very difficult for the Government to claim to have a target-based campaign to reduce violence against women and girls if they do not have consistent, accurate data in relation to women and girls. Although Professor Sullivan’s review was broadly welcomed by the Government, its recommendations have not yet been acted on. This amendment attempts to nudge some action from the Government.

The issue of delayed guidance is a constant problem. The Women’s Rights Network recently contacted the National Police Chiefs’ Council, inquiring whether it intends to now record sex accurately and address what it said was the “ideological corruption of data”. The NPCC’s reply says that

“updates to the collection and recording of sex and gender reassignment questions are pending subject to the issue of national guidance by the Office for National Statistics/Government Statistical Service following the UK Supreme Court ruling earlier this year”.

That is one pending answer. Individual police forces responding to a variety of organisations’ queries about the continued use of a variety of approaches to collecting sex data—including self-ID, recording a rapist as female and so on—say that they are waiting for guidance from the ONS and the GSS. Is there anyone not waiting for guidance? It feels as though this is a waste of time that is unnecessarily adding to confusion.

In Committee, I went into detail about differing and contradictory data collection practices across police forces. I will not repeat that, but recording practices vary not just between but within criminal justice agencies and even relevant government departments. As there are 40 different databases at a national level relating to criminal justice, the data that is being collected as we speak is full of discrepancies. The Home Office’s annual data requirement on demographic data, for example, advises police forces to record sex subject to a gender recognition certificate. Other mandatory Home Office standards—on police use of force, for example—require officers to record perceived gender, with a choice of male, female or other. There are also the multi agency public protection arrangements, which focus on protecting the public from the most serious harm from sexual and violent offenders, including convicted terrorists. They too conflate sex and gender in their data collection.

However, the Murray Blackburn Mackenzie criminal justice blog discovered via a freedom of information request that MAPPA provides police officers across the UK with

“51 options to record the gender identity of high-risk offenders”.

How does it help to keep the public safe, or aid operational coherence, to know whether a terrorist or paedophile is pangender, genderqueer, agender, bi-gender or gender-fluid, just to name a few of the 51 options they could fill in? I am not trying to be glib; I am just urging the Government to bring clarity and consistency to the collection of data on sex in relation to victims and perpetrators, because otherwise I think it is unfair to claim that there is anything like an evidence-based policy when it comes to sex and, indeed, gender.

We have recently had some exchanges about the new aggravated offences in relation to transgender people, and there are people who are transgender who claim that hate speech and hate crime against them has gone up. I am not challenging whether or not that is true. But to collate the data to make a case for that, one has to make a distinction in the collection of data between somebody who is transgender and somebody who says “I am a woman” who is in fact a transgender person who identifies as a woman.

I think that, for all victims concerned, let alone for understanding the nature of offenders, we need to have accurate, consistent data across all criminal justice agencies and all police forces. I hope that the Minister will at least give us an assurance that the recommendations of Professor Sullivan’s fine and important review—which is full of detail and evidence, with practical conclusions, and which the Government have welcomed—will be acted on. If we can get that assurance tonight, that would be brilliant. If there is any government reluctance to accept Professor Sullivan’s review, it would be really helpful to understand why—what the hold-up is—and maybe the Minister could explain that too.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, given what the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said about the lateness of the hour, which I think we are all aware of, I want to be very short on my concerns about Amendments 406 and 407. I am sorry not to see the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, in her place.

My concerns about both amendments are about practicality and the dignity of people. In a nutshell, this is what they have in common: the police are going to be the race police and the sex police in addition to being the police, and they require police officers to make a judgment even against the way that the suspect—or the victim—defines themselves at any stage in the criminal justice process. I think that is a mistake.

How is this going to work? A victim goes to the police because they have experienced an assault or another serious crime. Whatever community or person they are, they will go to the police, and, under both these amendments, the police officer is required to interrogate whether they are who they say they are on sex and race grounds. I think this is a real mistake, and it will not help the police in the difficult work they have to do and certainly will not help all our communities in these difficult times.

I think that is one minute and 58 seconds. I hope noble Lords understand my point.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Anonymity is an important enabler of freedom of assembly and association. While, as we will see later, there is a problem with the police deploying live facial recognition at protests per se, a prohibition on face coverings at protests could represent a step towards the possibility of widespread biometric surveillance at protests as well. I am afraid there is no presumption that the right to protest is secure in today’s political climate, never mind under a future Government, and if the clauses in the Bill are not reined in, the right to protest will be even more fragile.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I agree with much of the discussion about this important group, but I remember that this is Report. While I share particularly the concerns about cumulative disruption, because it is Report, not Committee, I will confine my remarks to one speech in this group, with no interventions, and focus on Amendments 369 and 369A as briefly and succinctly as I can.

I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger, Lord Pannick and Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about Amendment 369A. These arguments were rehearsed with great precision in Committee. The example was given of an Iranian dissident protesting and being concerned about reprisals—and you could substitute other countries and their embassies for Iran, that was just the one that came up that day.

In the clause, the Government acknowledge that there should be some defences to the offence of wearing a mask on a protest—I have concerns about the offence itself because it presupposes that protest is a slightly dodgy thing to begin with, and I do not agree with that—and included health, religious observance and work as justifications for concealing identity, but fear of reprisals was not included. The reasonable excuse defence proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and his colleagues is a proportionate one, given what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said earlier about balancing rights. I urge my colleagues in government to think seriously about the noble Lord’s amendment because the defences currently to the offence of concealing your identity at a protest do not include the fear of reprisals, whether you are a battered woman, someone who disagrees with their employer or, crucially, a dissident outside the embassy of your homeland. I urge my noble friends in government to think again about that.

Just briefly on Amendment 369—I am still at just over two minutes—and enshrining the right to protest as a free-standing clause, even though it is acknowledged by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that we have Articles 10 and 11 of the convention incorporated into the Human Rights Act, I say in friendship and gently to him that I think this kind of duplication may be a mistake we would come to regret. He is quite right, of course, as are the Government on other matters to do with Article 8, that you can, and should, be more precise in your domestic legislation when attempting to safeguard rights and freedoms, but this is not that much more precise. In effect, this proposed new clause pretty much replicates Articles 10 and 11 of the convention but for the removal of morals. Frankly, I think that morals is a dead letter these days.

As a fellow human rights person—I have been working with the convention and with some Members of your Lordships’ House for over 30 years—I say that that kind of almost duplication is dangerous in legal terms. I urge the noble Lord not to press that one, just as I urge my colleagues in government to support him and others who have signed up to broaden the defence in Amendment 369A to the offence of wearing a face covering at a peaceful protest.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, can I ask her gently to explain why she does not accept that the margin of appreciation permits the Government to do things outside what we would want to see? I know that she and I both are great advocates for the ECHR, and she knows that, but the problem is that the margin of appreciation can be taken advantage of to allow restrictions we would not want to see. The first and principal point I might make in relation to the duplication point is that having the right to protest enshrined in domestic statutory law does away with the possibility that the margin of appreciation should allow restrictions that this Parliament would not wish to see.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I was trying to be brief—this is Report—but, with the leave of the House, I will answer, again as briefly as I can. I know that not everyone agrees and not every jurist agrees, but as far I am concerned, the margin of appreciation was always intended to be an international concept for an international court. Once you get to Strasbourg, it is quite right that a margin of appreciation applies so that Strasbourg respects the legislation and the jurisdiction of domestic legislators and judges.

I do not see it as a domestic legal principle at all, so I do not see that it is for even the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom to be operating a margin of appreciation when it applies the Human Rights Act domestically. I do not see that as the problem that the noble Lord does. The way that you put meat on the bones of human rights protections is with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, with the detail of the public order statute book; hence I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, about having a proper defence to face concealment. That is the detailed meat on the bones, not drafting a right to protest that pretty much replicates Articles 10 and 11.

If the concern—and I would understand this—is that a future Government will come in and scrap the Human Rights Act and pull out of the ECHR, why then have colleagues piggy-backed on to Section 6 of the Human Rights Act in the way that they drafted the right to protest? That is a mistake. I do not want to give up on the Human Rights Act and the ECHR; I will defend them as long as I have breath in my body. That is the approach because it is a hostage to fortune to have free-standing replication of particular rights in particular statutes, when we have the precious protection of an overarching Human Rights Act that applies to the interpretation of all law.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, the right to protest is an interesting concept. We all agree, on all sides of the House, that there is a right to protest. But, as with most rights—the right to free speech or the right to assemble, for example—in English common law it is not part of our law but part of our common law. We have an absence of fundamental liberties; you are free to do things unless the law otherwise prevents them. So it would be slightly odd to have the right to protest, without any of these other rights, simply inserted into our law. How would it work?

The point about public order legislation is that it always has to balance various interests: the right to protest, along with the right of those affected by those protests—third parties—and of course the police, who have to enforce what is often very difficult and complex legislation. It has to respect those various rights. The European convention did not invent these rights, but they are reflected in its Articles 10 and 11, both of which are qualified rights, not absolute rights. As Strasbourg has made clear, it is perfectly acceptable for individual Governments to determine, by reference to the circumstances that obtain in their countries, what limits are reasonable to place on those rights. Strasbourg has said a number of times that it is not likely to interfere with those. So imposing on top of our public order legislation this right to protest would, I respectfully suggest, cause only confusion in our law, making it difficult for courts and the police.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

If I could clarify—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

No.

[A noble Lord]

It has to be a question though.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I am about to ask a question.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

It is Report.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I am asking a question; is that allowed on Report? I want just to clarify: when the Minister says a tweet versus a serious offence such as a public order offence or harassment, will he accept that that can be a speech crime? I have never mentioned tweets. It is serious if you get sent to prison for a speech crime. That is why there is concern about speech.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

It is the Lobby over there.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

469: After Clause 196, insert the following Clause—
“Age of criminal responsibilityIn section 50 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, for “ten” substitute “14”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would raise the age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales from ten to 14 years so that no child under that age could be tried for or convicted of a criminal offence.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 469 is in my name and the names of the noble and learned Baronesses, Lady Butler-Sloss and Lady Hale of Richmond, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester.

I ask Members of the Committee to think back to when they were 10—if that is not too difficult. Perhaps they were studying the Victorians in primary school. If so, they might have been astonished to learn that children of any age, even younger than 10, could be prosecuted in the 19th century. But there was an important nuance; even in the Victorian Juvenile Offenders Act 1847 and its spiritual successors, the Children Act 1908 and the Children and Young Persons Acts 1933 and 1963, there was a presumption of doli incapax—that children below 14 are inherently incapable of forming criminal intentions. This had to be rebutted beyond reasonable doubt by any individual prosecution. This is the very thing that will have spared many of us from criminalisation at tender ages for our misdemeanours in formative years. Of course, most of us also have the safeguards of loving, diligent parenting and/or class privilege.

When we foregrounded this debate in an Oral Question just over two weeks ago, my noble friend Lord Watts, who is not currently in his place, in his own inimitable style, suggested that my concern about our low age of criminal responsibility was somehow a middle-class preoccupation. I agree that class is relevant to this question, but, with respect to my noble friend, his analysis is rather upside down. It is not children on the playing fields of our famous public schools who are likely to be referred to the police for the fisticuffs, minor thefts and criminal damage that is almost inevitable in early years; it is instead the poorest and most vulnerable, such as children in care, who are also preyed upon by groomers and exploiters, and even blackmailed with the threat of being reported to the police by their abusers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who participated in what I felt was a very thoughtful debate. Though it is invidious to do so, I would like to single out two contributions in particular.

The first is the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington. It is quite a big thing to come to Committee and say, “I have listened. I still have concerns, but I have changed my mind in the face of an argument from the opposite side of the aisle”. I pay tribute to him for that, remembering that it was his party, not mine, that took us into the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in the first place. I am very grateful to him. He does great credit to his party and this House.

I must thank the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for a lifetime of public service and of considerable distinction at the Bar, on the Bench and in your Lordships’ House. It was she who gave the answer to the legitimate concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, about what would fill the gap in relation to dangerous and bad behaviour by young children if they were not to be criminalised: they would be dealt with in the family court and would be supervised and treated with a welfare approach, rather than a criminal justice one.

I thank everyone. I am obviously disappointed to some extent with my noble friend the Minister’s response, but I hope that the door is not slammed closed. I understand that a Back-Bench amendment is not necessarily the way to deal with something of this complexity and magnitude. However, I note, for example, that the Bar Council of England and Wales is currently conducting a commission into the age of criminal responsibility. I hope that, if the Government do not engage with it, they will at least watch those developments very carefully. This amendment was tabled on the basis of an age of 14; I may consider returning on Report with the proposition of age 12. For now, at least, and with thanks, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 469 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

470: After Clause 196, insert the following new Clause—
“Safeguards against abuses by Covert Human Intelligence Sources(1) Section 27 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) For subsection (1) substitute—“(1) This Part applies to criminal conduct—(a) under an authorisation under this Part, and(b) where the conduct is in accordance with the authorisation.”.(3) For subsection (2) substitute—“(2) This part also applies to civil liability in relation to any conduct which—(a) is incidental to any conduct within subsection (1), and(b) is not itself conduct an authorisation or warrant for which is capable of being granted under a relevant enactment and might reasonably have been expected to have been sought in the case in question. (2A) If a person acts in accordance with a criminal conduct authorisation under section 29B (covert human intelligence sources: criminal conduct authorisations), the nature of that authorisation and compliance with it shall be considered and deemed relevant to—(a) any decision as to whether prosecution for a criminal offence by that person is in the public interest,(b) any potential defences to such charges of criminal conduct, and(c) any potential civil liability on the part of that person, and the quantum of any damages.(2B) The protections in subsection (2A) only apply where the conduct is not carried out for the primary purpose of—(a) encouraging or assisting, pursuant to sections 44 to 49 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (incohate offences), the commission of an offence by, or(b) otherwise seeking to discredit,the person, people or group subject to the authorised surveillance operation.”.”Member's explanatory statement
These amendments replace provisions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 as amended by the Covert Human Intelligence Sources Act 2021 granting complete advanced criminal and civil immunity for authorised operatives and agents, with a public interest defence as long as they did not act as agents provocateurs.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I am trying the patience of the Committee, but Amendment 470 is in my name.

In a week when our entire politics is reeling from the betrayal, treachery and most likely serious criminality of a now disgraced Peer, I hope we might all empathise with victims of abuses of power by covert human intelligence sources—CHIS—or police or other agency spies. Notwithstanding the ongoing public inquiry into the decades-old spy cops scandal, the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 granted prior and absolute criminal and civil immunity to officers and agents of a whole host of public bodies if acting under a new scheme of pre-authorisation to commit crime. By this one Act, the centuries-old principle of equality before the law was breached.

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[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes a very fair point. I was referring to the issue of county lines and why children may be used. I deprecate the unacceptable activity to which she refers; none of us would support the fathering of children in a pretended relationship, so she makes a very fair point.

I was talking about Huntingdon Life Sciences and animal rights activists. That violence escalated to a significant level over a number of years, which culminated in the violent attack on and near-death experience of the then chief executive of Huntingdon Life Sciences. It was a very unpleasant period. Therefore, there was a reasonable case to be made that the Metropolitan Police, Cambridgeshire Constabulary and others needed to embed officers and intelligence assets within the animal rights movement to alleviate the risk of further serious criminal activity. That was an animal rights issue, but it could easily not have been.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, concedes very fairly that she does not want to circumscribe cases where you have to do long-term surveillance of, say, a terrorist plot which might be carried out were it not for police activity and long-term embedding of people. That is separate to cases where there has not been an operational rationale for preventing criminal activity, so I accept that there is a difference.

That is why this amendment is rather heavy-handed. No doubt the Minister will refer to the commissioner, who will look at whether these activities are timely and appropriate, but words matter. Incidentally, when the noble Baroness mentioned the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021, I think she made an unusual inference that it was to facilitate criminal activity. I may have been mistaken in hearing that and she may want to intervene.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, is completely right; that is the purpose of that Act. The Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act is all about authorising CHISs to commit offences, because we understand that that is sometimes necessary to keep your cover.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

That is true as far as that goes. However, in the wider context, the principal objective of that legislation is not to enable people to commit crimes but to prevent people being subject to endless civil and criminal litigation that may arise from their duties as representatives of public bodies, be they the security services, the police et cetera. So I think that the noble Baroness is being slightly unfair to the Ministers at the time who put through that legislation. What she outlined was clearly a corollary of passing that legislation, but it was not the principal reason, as I am sure she will concede.

The reason I wanted to speak is to interrogate the details of this amendment. Looking at paragraph (2B)(b) of the proposed new clause, I wonder what is meant by

“otherwise seeking to discredit, the person, people or group subject to the authorised surveillance operation”.

That seems a very wide-ranging paragraph and a recipe for much litigation in the future. Should it eventually be found on the face of the enacted Crime and Policing Bill, the way that it will be interpreted will give rise to a situation where the police, the security services and others are much more reluctant to enter into long-term surveillance of the kind I discussed earlier in seeking to thwart a terrorist plot, because of that quite wide-ranging and open paragraph.

Generally speaking, the noble Baroness has made a very fine point and I agree with much of what she said, but I genuinely do not understand the point of that paragraph. If it is a way of describing an agent provocateur, I understand that—and, because she is a prominent lawyer, she will no doubt tell me where that is found in other pieces of legislation. However, currently, that paragraph could be misinterpreted, and it will circumscribe the capacity of the security services and the police to do their job and protect individuals. For those reasons, while I am not necessarily against the amendment, I would like further clarification if possible.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it might not surprise the Committee to hear that I do not support this amendment and I am sure I will find myself making the same arguments as the Minister when he responds.

In 2021, Parliament passed the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act, which was introduced to this House by my noble and learned friend, Lord Stewart of Dirleton. Its effect was to create a legislative framework through which covert intelligence officers can be authorised to participate in conduct which would normally be criminal. The criminal conduct authorisation might be granted under Section 29B of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, as inserted by the 2021 Act, only if it is proportionate and necessary, in the interests of national security, prevention of crime and disorder, or in the interests of our economic well-being. Subsection (6) of that section also requires the person authorising the criminal conduct to ensure—and this is important—that all alternative avenues that do not make use of criminality have been exhausted. Subsection (7) states that the decision to grant an authorisation is required to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998. Finally, there is an explicit goal for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

Therefore, there already exists a number of safeguards to prevent covert intelligence officers overstepping the bounds of their authorisation and to ensure that the authorisation itself is tightly drawn and strictly necessary. When a criminal conduct authorisation is granted, the officer to whom it relates is permitted to engage in the specified criminal conduct and cannot be prosecuted for that conduct. It is perfectly well understood and accepted that covert agents do, on occasion, have to engage in such criminal conduct in the course of their operations. It is absolutely right that the law protects them when this is the case.

It is also worth noting that the 2021 Act did not create new powers for the police and intelligence services; it simply placed on a statutory footing the mechanism by which they can be authorised to engage in criminal behaviour. This is surely preferable to having the whole system working on the side and in the dark.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, proposes in her Amendment 470 to remove the criminal and civil immunity provided to officers when they commit a criminal offence in pursuance of an authorisation to do so. She proposes replacing it with a defence to criminal or civil charges. However, she has also included an exception to that possible defence—when an officer encourages, assists or attempts to discredit the person who is under surveillance. I find this a startling exception. If a covert officer is given a criminal conduct authorisation and that authorisation, taking into account all the available safeguards, includes permission to commit an inchoate offence, I cannot see why that officer should not be able to do so. Certainly, the officer should not be held criminally or civilly liable.

I am sure the Minister will have further points to add, but we on these Benches cannot support this amendment.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Is the noble Lord saying that he supports officers or their assets acting as agents provocateurs, inciting crime rather than investigating it?

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I am not saying that at all. We all recognise that things have gone wrong, but what I say generally is that this type of policing—indeed, quite a number of aspects of policing—is about testing the law. Certainly, this is the case with the involvement of CHISs.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Given what has been said, I will reflect on the comments that have been made. It is important that Sir Brian Leveson has his independence and oversight. I shall look at my gut feelings on this, but I will consider it, take advice and see where we are outside the debate today. In relation to my noble friend’s amendment, I still hope that, given what has been said today—a valuable discussion has been had—she will withdraw it.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Again, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in what I think was an important and thoughtful debate. There is quite a lot of common ground, actually. There is common ground that we must have covert human intelligence sources. They must play a role in investigating the most serious crimes, in particular. There is further common ground that part of keeping someone’s cover in, for example, a criminal gang or a terrorist cell, must inevitably sometimes include participating in criminal activity; otherwise, those around them will spot that they do not belong. Again, that is common ground. There is also common ground that it was right to put activities that were previously completely in the shadows on a statutory footing, as happened in 2021.

The difference between some Members of the Committee and others is about whether, when someone is authorised to commit criminal offences in such a role, that authorisation should bring advance total immunity for all purposes, civil and criminal, or whether instead the authorisation should equip them with a public interest defence. That is the difference between us. It is a question of principle but also of practice as to where the balance should be struck, and which system—the one currently on the statute book or something like the one I propose—would give a better balance of safeguards for the brave and genuine public servants who do this work without abusing the trust, but also for the rights of citizens to be protected from abuse. That is the difference between us. Which mechanism provides the most proportionate approach? I do not think there is a gulf, but this is something to keep under review and keep discussing.

As I said earlier, in the report from which the Minister read selectively, Sir Brian Leveson talks about reporting being good, but even he concedes, in the same report, a lack of “specificity” on occasion, only a “general descriptor”, a “number of errors” and so on. So there are some issues that warrant serious and ongoing scrutiny.

My noble friend the Minister may regret telling the Committee that he now has special responsibility for inquiries in the Home Office—his kindness may be a liability—but I suspect that we will want to keep pressing him, not least on the progress of the inquiry on the past but, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, on the way the system is operating today. The report suggests that the system today is not operating in the way that we would ideally like. With that, for the moment at least, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 470 withdrawn.

Shamima Begum

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I can assure the noble Baroness that the individual is not being used as a political football. The previous Government took the decision under the British Nationality Act 1981 to deprive her of her citizenship status. It is not a step that is taken lightly; it is taken only after careful consideration of advice by lawyers and in conjunction with international law. We have examined the decision to date and upheld it. There is a court case, and the Government judge that we are not going to comment on that while it is going on, but the noble Baroness’s points have been heard in this House, and we will obviously examine them.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, regardless of the particular case and the ongoing proceedings my noble friend the Minister describes, what does he think of the broader policy conundrum that if developed democracies take citizenship away from subjects and citizens who are perceived to be dangerous, we render large numbers of people stateless and create a powder keg of resentment, fomenting all sorts of challenges that will make us less, not more safe?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I come back to the point, which my noble friend will be aware of, that this is not a decision taken lightly or very often. The previous Government issued 10 citizenship deprivations in 2020, eight in 2021, three in 2022, two in 2023 and only one in 2024. When the decision is taken, it is on the basis of advice, and that no one is left stateless in doing so.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Chakrabarti Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

We all agree that we need reliable data and, by the way, that should and can include data on gender reassignment as a separate protected characteristic, even on self-ID in terms of keeping that information. It should not be the basis on which we collect crime data in relation to the different sexes, although it is important to acknowledge that it is possible that transgender people, or those who identify as transgender, might well be the victims of crime more regularly, or they may be the perpetrators. I am happy to know that information as well, but not through the conflation of sex and gender in the bottom-line collecting of crime statistics.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I just looked about my person at my identification documents and found my House of Lords pass, which at least at this point does not record my birth sex. I suppose “Baroness” might arguably do the trick—or not, I do not know. I suspect it would not be enough for the supporters of these two amendments. I also looked in my handbag, and my two bank cards do not record anything approximating my biological sex.

In an earlier group, I heard noble Lords opposite speak very compellingly about what the police are up against and how they are tearing their hair out because of the bureaucracy. Last week, I agreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, in particular and other noble Lords opposite when they spoke to an amendment to ensure that, were there to be digital ID, the police could not demand that information on request in the street. A number of noble Lords made very strong and passionate speeches on that issue.

I wonder about the workability and the wider consequences of the amendment, were it to be added to primary legislation. It is very broad in scope, dealing with anybody who is subject to arrest or a charge or caution for any offence. It would place a firm obligation on the police to record the person’s birth sex and any discrepancy between that and what the person identifies as or what is on any documents that they present. How on earth is this to work without, I suspect, far more intrusive searching than is necessary for every offence, from a minor public order protest offence to shoplifting to insider trading? In each scenario, the police would be required to make a determination of the person’s biological sex, requiring a fairly intrusive examination and challenging and questioning. That would be quite a traumatic and degrading experience for anyone and might be disproportionate to the offence being investigated.

I agree that crime can be highly gendered; we know that because all we have learned about violence against women and girls, but I fail to see that this kind of determination is necessary at the point of arrest for insider dealing or even for a protest offence. And, if we are talking about headaches for the police, I can imagine in a large protest every arrestee being briefed by their comrades and colleagues deliberately to identify in a mischievous way just to give the police a headache.

I ask noble Lords to think again about the contradictions in the positions that they are taking on this very long Bill. Workability, proportionality and whether this kind of intrusion into the lives of not just people who have changed sex or are transexual but of anybody who is subject to arrest and charge, particularly a woman with short hair, for example. I am reading stories about women who have had mastectomies for breast cancer being challenged in gym changing rooms because of the way they look.

I ask noble Lords to think about the wider consequences and the proportionality of what they propose.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. All of us who care about the safety, security, integrity and autonomy of women are also concerned about, for instance, a so-called trans-inclusive strip search policy which allows, for instance, a 6 foot 4 inch man who self-identifies as a woman to search a very vulnerable young woman at a police station. That is an issue of great concern, and were we to adopt this amendment, it might be ameliorated.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention, but that is a separate issue—it is about who is allocated to which duty at the police station, and it is perfectly reasonable for the police themselves to organise who conducts a strip search and who conducts a strip search on whom. That is not what the first or second version of the amendment is about; it is about an obligation on the police to make a determination of the biological sex of anybody they are arresting, charging or cautioning. It comes from noble Lords who, as I understand it, oppose compulsory digital ID that could conceivably require some determination at the point of registration. I applauded those compelling speeches last week from noble Lords about that being too much of an intrusion on the citizen who is innocent until proved guilty at the point of encounter with the police. How are the police going to do this?

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

I have never spoken in this Chamber on digital ID; I want to make that clear for the record, because the noble Baroness used the plural in talking about all those present. I also want to come back on her very emotional intervention, for which I am grateful as she clearly feels very passionately about this. Most of us have more confidence in the police than she may be demonstrating, because a lot of this is common sense, as the public at large understand. Some 50% of the population are women and girls, and they deserve to be protected. The number of people we are referring to is very small, but among that number are some really bad actors. This is a foundational principle of our criminal justice system, so how does she square the emotional circle in saying that this is not possible without infringing rights?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

As a woman, I have often been called emotional in debate, but that is the nature of the patriarchy. I did not mean to be emotional; I am just trying to ask about the practicality of this proposed obligation on the police to be the determiners of the biological sex of a person they arrest, not for sex offences but for any offence. I heard in some of the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for example on the importance of knowing as much about a prisoner as possible, an argument for making a clear determination in a prison setting, because one needs to determine who should be imprisoned with whom. I understand that. I can certainly envisage this being highly proportionate and relevant for arrest and investigation for sex offences, but that is not the breadth of this proposal. This is for any arrest, charge, caution or suspect, which would be overbroad and a complete administrative and practical nightmare for police officers.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

Can the noble Baroness clarify a couple of things? First, does she recognise any problems at all about the data as it is presently collected—in different forms by different police forces, and then used as national crime data as though it is reliable and consistent? Does she have any qualms? I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, would be happy to work with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, as great legal minds working together, emotionally or non-emotionally, on better wording. I can understand that, but the import of this is the data.

Secondly, the noble Baroness rightly points out that many of us are committed to campaigning against violence against women and girls. How can we reliably know how many women and girls are victims of such violence or who the perpetrators of that violence are? We cannot just assert it unless we have reliable statistical data. That is the point of the Sullivan review, which I hope she would show some respect towards even if she is not quite clear that she supports this amendment.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

To be clear, a perpetrator is someone who is convicted, not anyone who is arrested. As I tried to suggest in response to the comments about incarceration, it is much easier to justify greater intrusion at the point of conviction, particularly if someone is going to prison. I do not think this is about drafting; it is about the practical policy the amendments are proposing. How on earth is it viable to put this obligation to be the determiner and decision-maker over somebody’s biological sex? Is it reasonable to put that on every constable? I look forward to hearing from the noble Lord on the Opposition Front Bench, because he served as a police officer for many years and with some distinction. He may know better than I whether this will be welcome for police officers in their everyday duties, for every arrest and every offence.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I have attached my name to this amendment. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, who has been courageously raising these issues of gender identity and sex, over many years and before it was fashionable, through the prism of wishing to protect the safety and security of women. I applaud her for that. I also thank my noble friend Lady Cash, who speaks with great professional expertise and experience.

Notwithstanding the passionate case put by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, it is surely the case that policy, particularly when we are dealing with sensitive issues such as crime data and violence against women and girls, which is rightly a government priority, should be formulated and delivered on the basis of robust, peer-reviewed, empirical evidence. Who can logically argue against that? That is what the amendment is principally about.

We have heard about the Sullivan standard. The context in which we are working in putting forward this amendment is that sex is a protected characteristic and the Equality Act 2010 has been clarified by the Supreme Court. It is extremely disappointing that the Equalities Minister, Bridget Phillipson, continues to obfuscate and delay proper timely guidance being issued by a number of bodies in respect of, for instance, access to single-sex spaces. The Supreme Court stated plainly that under the Equality Act, “sex” refers to the material reality of being female or male. That determines how single-sex spaces function in a mixed-sex society, from women’s changing rooms to prison, and justifies excluding men where doing so is necessary and proportionate. That remains the case, which is why this amendment is very important. It is in that context that it would hopefully be incorporated into the legislation.

As we know, the Sullivan review was commissioned in February 2024 with the aims of identifying obstacles to accurate data collection and research on sex and gender identity in public bodies and the research system, and setting out good practice guidance for how to collect data on sex and gender identity. Sullivan recommended that:

“Data on sex should be collected by default in all research and data collection commissioned by government and quasi-governmental organisations … The default target of any sex question should be sex (in other words, biological sex, natal sex, sex at birth). Questions which combine sex with gender identity, including gender identity as recognised by a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) have a mixed target”.


She also recommended that:

“The Home Secretary should issue a mandatory Annual Data Requirement (ADR) requiring the 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales and the British Transport Police (BTP) to record data on sex in all relevant administrative systems. Relatedly, police forces should cease the practice of allowing changes to be made to individual sex markers on the Police National Computer (PNC)”.


This is about public trust. That is why my noble friend is quite right to refer to the situation of Police Scotland, which in November 2025 moved officially to record the biological sex of all suspects. The chief constable stated that it will ensure that

“by recording accurately biological sex, our crime data is accurate”.

The Scottish experience proves that it is possible to maintain a respect-based approach in person, using preferred pronouns in custody, while ensuring that the official record reflects the material facts needed for “statistical rigour”. The deputy chief constable of Police Scotland, Alan Speirs, confirmed that recent legal rulings provide the necessary clarity that “sex” in law refers to biology. This gives police the mandate to record it as such without infringing on the Human Rights Act or the Equality Act.

If police forces do the wrong thing on this, it can result in calamitous situations. I declare my interest as a member, at least for the next month, of the British Transport Police Authority. The British Transport Police, without any proper guidance from the National Police Chiefs’ Council or Ministers, decided unilaterally in autumn 2024 to launch a transitioning and non-binary search guidance policy, which meant that even individuals without a GRC were permitted to search anyone, including a woman, provided that the person doing the searching, for instance, said that they were a woman—even though they were a biological man.

That advice was quickly rescinded. I argued, as a member of the authority, that it was a disastrous mistake. It cost many thousands of tax pounds in legal fees that the force has had to pay as a result. The organisation Sex Matters launched a possible judicial review against that decision. It took the focus away from policing, front-line activities and operational efforts in order to engage in virtue signalling on the basis of the preferences of the chief constable and the senior officers at the British Transport Police. It did not do anything about the 11% clear-up rate for offences of violence against women and girls that, unfortunately, remains prevalent on the transport network in this country.

I cannot understand how any noble Lord, on the basis of tackling crime and the objective of having the data available to allocate resources properly, can realistically argue against the amendment because it has the background of the Sullivan review and Ministers’ acceptance of the Supreme Court ruling in 2025. On that basis, the Ministers should look benignly on the amendment, because it is not onerous and draconian; it is realistic, fact-based and based on empirical research. Therefore, it should be adopted because, if nothing else, it would greatly improve the efficacy of this largely important Bill, which we on this side support. It would mean that police officers could properly address the issues with the facts behind them, rather than the ideological absolutism that unfortunately marked much of the debate and the hostility to collecting data in the criminal justice system on the basis of gender identity rather than sex. It is a good amendment, and I hope that the Ministers will be able to support it.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I will not detain the Committee—

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

The noble Lord was not here at the start of the debate.

[Baroness Donaghy (Lab)]

The noble Lord was not here at the start of the debate.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

It is Front-Bench speeches.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

It is Front-Bench speeches.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

The noble Lord has the right to speak in Committee, of course. Conventionally, we tend not to hear from Back-Benchers after the Front Benches have started winding, but of course he has the right.