(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Public Bill Committees
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we start hearing from the witnesses, do any Members wish to make a declaration of interest in connection with the Bill?
Only that the headquarters for the London Fire Brigade are in my constituency.
Examination of Witnesses
Jaclyn Mangaroo and Kate Henderson gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from the Property Institute and the National Housing Federation. We have until 2.35 pm for this panel. May I ask the witnesses to introduce themselves briefly?
Kate Henderson: My name is Kate Henderson. I am chief executive of the National Housing Federation. We represent not-for-profit providers of social and affordable housing in England.
Jaclyn Mangaroo: I am Jaclyn Mangaroo from the Property Institute. We are the professional body for residential property managers. Our members manage about 2.5 million homes across the country and are directly involved in supporting remediation projects and affected residents.
Q
Kate Henderson: First, thank you for inviting the National Housing Federation to give evidence to the Committee. The safety of residents is our No. 1 priority, and we welcome the Bill and its intention. I also acknowledge and pay tribute to the work of Grenfell United; we are here because of the tragic fire at Grenfell Tower, where 72 people lost their lives.
We are absolutely committed to accelerating the pace of remediation in the social housing sector. There was no funding for social housing remediation until the spending review in 2025. Social housing providers were paying for remediation themselves, and that took money away from major refurbishments and new supply. Since the very welcome access was granted to the cladding safety scheme, we have been able to accelerate the pace of remediation, and we expect more properties to come forward.
We can supply the facts and figures on how many properties we have remediated self-funded and how many are being remediated with Government funding to the Committee. I have the details here, but I am not sure that anyone wants me to go through the facts and figures now.
Q
Kate Henderson: Not having funding for remediation has undoubtedly taken huge capacity out of the social housing sector. Since the fire, we have been working very hard to remediate buildings, but the pace of that, without Government funding, was much slower than we would have liked. Last year’s funding has changed this, but it is not just about money; it is also about the system around it. It is about the capacity of the Building Safety Regulator, and not just external walls but internal defects, and the system of assurance and having enough technical competency to support us in that work.
Q
Kate Henderson: The new leadership of the Building Safety Regulator has undoubtedly improved things, but up until the last 18 months, when gateway 2 timeframes have started to improve, it has been very slow. It is really important that the Building Safety Regulator and the forthcoming single construction regulator are adequately resourced by Government to deliver at scale and pace. In the wider construction sector, there is huge upskilling to do to ensure we have the expertise to do fire risk assessments of external walls—FRAEWs—and get consistency of implementation of methodology with PAS 9980,. We are working with lots of people and contractors in the process, but we need many more.
In addition to needing more people with expertise, we need consistency, which I know came up in evidence this morning. At the moment, we are hearing from our members that PAS 9980 is subjective, and different assessors will come up with different decisions. You can have two assessors look at the same property; one will say it requires remediation and one will say it does not. The proposal for a mandatory audit system with Homes England is very welcome. We would like a feedback loop to be built into that system so that any poor practice can be identified and challenged and any patterns of inconsistencies can be flagged. Then, that feedback can be taken back into account in any future updates of PAS 9980.
The Chair
Q
Jaclyn Mangaroo: I agree with a lot of what you said, Kate, particularly around the upskilling and resource elements. What we and our members see is that some of the delays start much earlier in the gateway 2 process. The real problem, which this Bill, with some amendments, will hopefully tackle, is where buildings are completely stalled from the beginning—where scope of works cannot be agreed and, like Kate said, where FRAEWs differ. Standardisation and auditing of FRAEWs will definitely help, as long as that is a speedy process. I understand that we are still waiting on regulation of the fire risk assessor profession.
The Chair
If there is anything that you want the Committee to know, you can write in. Ms Henderson, you suggested that there was some information that should be put before the Committee.
Q
Jaclyn Mangaroo: That is a very good question. I think it goes some of the way by imposing that legal duty, but sometimes that does not fall on the person who will be accountable in terms of having the resources or being able to actually deliver remediation. I am thinking about resident management companies and right to manage companies that would become responsible entities and have that legal duty. They do not necessarily have the resources needed to compel a pledged developer, for example, or a product manufacturer to do that without pursuing them through litigation. RMCs and RTMCs do not really have those resources; they have the service charges, but they cannot always use those to fund litigation or remediation works themselves.
Q
Jaclyn Mangaroo: We welcome the remediation backstop, but that it would be great to see that come further forward so that you do not have to go through enforcement or sanctions to get to that remediation backstop. Particularly where we have evidence that buildings are stalled in the very early stages of project scoping, I think that that would be a reasonable opportunity for the regulators to step in and bring in a remediation manager or bring forward a remediation order or remediation contribution order. I do not think that some of those resources are necessarily being used proactively. I have not seen any transparent data on their use by Homes England and other regulators, and I think that could really help.
Q
Kate Henderson: Equal access to remediation funding, brought in last year at the spending review, is hugely welcome. It has made a big difference to our ability to deliver remediation at pace and to invest in existing homes and development. Previously, our members—housing associations—and councils had to self-fund remediation, which diverted resources away from new homes and refurbishment. Some of our members even had to sell buildings to pay for remediation work. Members are now actively applying to the cladding safety scheme and receiving funding. We are expecting starts and completions of remediation by our members to begin to increase as we get the approvals. Homes England will be able to provide more data on that.
Funding from the cladding safety scheme also funds things such as project management, which is really important to deliver remediation faster. It frees capacity within our member organisations to build new affordable homes and improve existing ones. I should say that the funding only covers external wall defects; members are still facing significant costs for internal walls, including compartmentation and fire doors. We very much welcome the cladding safety scheme funding for high-risk buildings, and new funding has become available for buildings under 11 metres that are also deemed high-risk. That opened earlier this year, and we understand that that fund for buildings under 11 metres is massively oversubscribed. It would be really useful to have the data from those applications to understand the scale of works required in high-risk buildings under 11 metres.
In the sector more broadly, there are lots of other significant changes happening. We absolutely support Awaab’s law and welcome the clarity in the decent homes standard, but recognise that those measures all add cost. Remediation funding that we have access to very much helps to meet those competing demands and makes them more manageable, but the overall financial picture remains complex and has its challenges.
Sarah Gibson (Chippenham) (LD)
Q
Jaclyn Mangaroo: That is a really good question. In some cases, it may be. We have seen it most often with the pledged developers where they are using a contractor that may be part of the organisation, and so are marking their own homework. For a responsible entity where it is an enfranchised building, or where an RMC or an RTMC has the opportunity, they have really no incentive to say that their building is safe when it is not. They have very little incentive to do that. They really want to go much further.
The regulation of the profession will certainly help to improve competency, and hopefully it will speed up the process and reduce delays, as long as that auditing of the fire risk assessments can be done quickly through Homes England. We are all about making sure that there are fewer delays, that stalled buildings can get started and that residents have peace of mind. There is no deadline. There is no set date for when buildings will be finished, so making sure that we get peace of mind, confidence and protection of residents into this Bill will be so important. That is how we have approached our written evidence to the Committee: does it speed things up, does it provide clearer accountability and will it actually give residents peace of mind and create safer buildings?
Sarah Gibson
Q
Jaclyn Mangaroo: I do not know of any particular cases of that. It is more when there is a pledged developer involved. I cannot comment specifically on any other cases.
Kate Henderson: From our members’ perspective, we have already been working really hard to deliver the duties that will become part of the Bill: for example, assessing buildings, mitigating risk, applying for funding and carrying out remediation works. We welcome the introduction of the remediation compliance plans as a way of demonstrating transparency and accountability to enforcing bodies, but also of demonstrating accountability to residents. Having clear plans and timelines will help ensure that expectations are managed, that any delays are addressed quickly, that enforcement action can be taken against bad actors and, in exceptional circumstances, that the backstop can be used to secure a route to remediation.
We welcome standardisation of the fire risk assessments of external walls methodology and the intention that every building be assessed and remediated to the same standard. As I have mentioned, the PAS 9980 methodology has already been used to access funding to the cladding safety scheme. I have also mentioned that we have mixed experience of assessors using PAS 9980 and that it can be subjective. Having a national audit system run by Homes England with a feedback loop will be really welcomed by the sector. I should also say that alongside auditing, as you have mentioned, having regulation of the competence of risk assessors as part of the introduction of a single construction regulator will help to ensure that recommendations are consistent and of good quality. That will provide assurance and transparency to all involved, particularly residents.
Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
Q
Kate Henderson: There is nothing more important than residents’ safety, and I can assure you that our members have safety as their utmost priority and responsibility. We are already delivering a huge number of aspects of remediation work that will be covered by and become statutory duties in the Bill, and we welcome that. This legislation is only one piece of the response to the tragedy at Grenfell Tower. There are other pieces of legislation, but in addition to that, a huge part of this work is around culture. It is around learning, accountability and the relationship between residents and their landlords.
As part of that, in a couple of weeks’ time we will be launching a suite of tools for our members—a Grenfell Tower reflection toolkit. This is about learning lessons from the inquiry. It is a suite of resources for board members, executives, operational levels, large organisations and small organisations, making sure that this is not just about physically replacing cladding, but about listening and acting on the information being provided by residents, having appropriate assurances in place, and making it culturally at the heart of who we are as organisations.
On whether we have the capacity to deliver these new requirements, we are already doing a lot of it, but the capacity of the overall system is not us alone. We rely on expertise, fire risk assessors, contractors and the capacity of the Building Safety Regulator. A lot of work is happening on all those fronts, but everybody is going to have to work harder. We are going to need a lot more people and a lot more expertise. We are really pleased to see the leadership of the Building Safety Regulator drive forward the pace of assessments to gateway 2. We are seeing improvements there. That needs to continue, and we are committed to working with all involved, including Government and particularly residents.
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
Q
Kate Henderson: I am not sure that as the trade body, with our members being the regulated entity, we are best placed to answer that question.
Lewis Cocking
Q
Kate Henderson: We would very much welcome clarity on the regulatory system to ensure that we get clarity on the works that need to happen in a timely way. How that would be worked out is perhaps a question for Government. I do not think I am best placed on that one.
Jaclyn Mangaroo: I agree with that. I think clarity is absolutely key for every provision in the Bill. It is not something that TPI can necessarily comment on, but we need to identify who the final decision maker is.
Andrew Cooper (Mid Cheshire) (Lab)
Q
Jaclyn Mangaroo: Hopefully, issues in those cases will be few and far between, but the backstop and the appointment of a remediation manager is the only way to go. It is important that residents have some certainty and a point of contact in somebody who will be responsible for that. At the moment, yes, I think the Bill does go far enough in those cases.
Andrew Cooper
Q
On the other side, the Government have provided some certainty to the sector through rent convergence, through the 10-year rent settlement, through the social and affordable homes programme and by bringing you in scope of the building safety fund. Do we have the balance right in the resources that are available to the sector from central Government versus what you would expect housing associations to fund directly, either through service charges or through rents paid by tenants?
Kate Henderson: Thank you very much for the question. In the last 18 months, the Government have done a huge amount to rebuild the capacity of the social housing sector—housing associations and councils. Importantly, that has included equal access to building safety funding with an additional £1 billion into the cladding safety scheme. Alongside that, we now have a 10-year rent settlement, rent convergence and the new National Housing Bank. Low-interest loans will hopefully be introduced soon. We also have, of course, the social and affordable homes programme.
The Government have very much listened and engaged and are working constructively with us. We are ambitious, both about ensuring that our existing homes and service provision are of the quality that we would all want and about building many more new homes. All our members are impacted by the building safety crisis, but those less impacted now have more capacity to deliver homes. If grant funding were available, we could deliver tens of thousands more social and affordable homes.
In terms of the balance we have now, we are looking at the overall regulatory landscape. As I say, we support the introduction of the decent homes standard and the implementation of Awaab’s law. We absolutely support and are working very hard on the building safety regulations. But there is a cost to all of this. Our ability to do all those things at once will be down to the individual priorities of organisations. We are meeting quite stringent timelines, which have been set by Government, on things like minimum energy efficiency standards. We support that direction of travel, but there is only so much money in the system.
You mentioned regeneration. We would really welcome more flexibility in the social and affordable homes programme to deliver replacement supply as well as new supply. We are very focused on net additions. I understand that we desperately need more homes, but we do need to invest in places. Similarly, when it comes to investing in building safety measures, I have mentioned the welcome funding that came earlier this year for high-risk buildings under 11 metres. There is not enough money to support those works. If there were more money, based on assessment of the applications that have come into Homes England for the under-11-metre scheme, that would free up the capacity to do more supply. We want to do all those things; our ability to do them at pace is impacted by how much money there is in the system.
Peter Fortune (Bromley and Biggin Hill) (Con)
Q
If I can be cheeky, I have a second question, which should perhaps go to Kate. Do you have sight of your members’ risk registers? If so, how are they flashing up some of the challenges presented in the Bill?
Jaclyn Mangaroo: Much of our written evidence is focused not just on the service charges, but on the unintended consequences. It might fall on residents to fund litigation to pursue the responsible people—the polluter, effectively—to deliver remediation. We want to see greater protection for those.
There is already a lot of law, particularly under the Building Safety Act 2022, around what can be passed through the service charges and what cannot. Building Safety Act costs and service charges have gone up around 50% in the last two years. That is still a very small proportion of those service charge costs, but where residents are not protected at all is for risk mitigation measures, interim measures, fixing internal defects and non-cladding work. There is no funding for that. It is outside the scope of the remediation contract for the developers; it is outside the scope of PAS 9980.
Ultimately, when we speak to our members, mostly residents are picking up the tabs for those interim measures, regardless of whether they are waiting for the cladding to be replaced. Compartmentation, fire stopping and fire doors is a significant issue. We must look at how we fund that and how we protect leaseholders from those rising service charge costs.
The other thing, which came up this morning as well, is higher insurance premiums. We are seeing insurers and lenders price risk not just on cladding, but on those internal defects and on structural defects. We do not just have a cladding crisis; we have a safety and construction quality crisis. That is what we are finding. These buildings are not lasting as long as they should. That is coming home to roost and is landing on leaseholders. They did not cause these problems in the first place, but it is being visited upon them, so one of the things we would like to see is greater protection for those residents.
Part of that solution will be looking at the qualifying and non-qualifying leaseholder protection provisions in the Building Safety Act. We appreciate that the Secretary of State introduced proposals to change some of the rules around that. We would like to see it go altogether. Why, as a leaseholder, should you have to pay for any defect that was not of your making? The process, the regime, is highly complicated. It is very, very difficult for a leaseholder to get involved in the process, and it creates an unstable resource pot to fund the remediation, because even if you have a cap, you only pay 10% of that cap, which means that you could be waiting 10 years until the pot is large enough to undertake those works.
There is a lot that can be done to protect leaseholders from further costs from all this. Good question—thank you.
The Chair
We have five minutes left and one Member to get in, so I will be grateful if you can keep your answer quite brief.
Kate Henderson: Yes, of course. I agree with what has been said. It is important to recognise just how distressing this is for leaseholders and shared owners, who feel trapped, cannot sell their home and are facing rising service charges and insurance bills. People really need a route forward. Accelerating remediation is absolutely the key to this. For us, having access to remediation funding has been a really important step forward, but we want to work with Government to unblock delays and ensure that wider safety defects do not leave residents facing continued uncertainty. There is more I could say there, but I will not. I will just say, on risk registers, that the Regulator of Social Housing will collect this data and will be engaging with all housing associations, but they have to stress-test their business models.
In terms of risk, the Bill itself is part of a tool for addressing the wider building safety crisis. Building safety will be a top risk for all our members, and they will all have mitigation strategies.
James Asser (West Ham and Beckton) (Lab)
Q
Jaclyn Mangaroo: Where there is an RMC or an RTM director or company, they should be given access to a fund to at least fund the litigation up front; they should not have to be scrabbling around in their pockets to try to fund litigation or go after developers. That would be really helpful. It is unfair that they have taken on a role as a volunteer, as you say, are trying to do the right thing and are having this duty visited upon them. I think they will need special consideration when it comes to the enforcement and sanctions in the Bill. They do not have a big pot of money to fund either the remediation work itself or the litigation costs or legal costs to pursue the responsible parties.
The Chair
We have come to the end of our allotted time. On behalf of the Committee, I thank you very much for your evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Giles Grover and Sophie Bichener gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from End Our Cladding Scandal. We have until 3 pm for this panel. Could the witnesses briefly identify themselves?
Giles Grover: Hi, I am Giles Grover. I am the co-lead of End Our Cladding Scandal. I am a resident and leaseholder, and an RMC director and principal accountable person. I have been trapped and involved in this crisis since August 2017, and I still have a home that is not safe.
Sophie Bichener: I am Sophie Bichener, a campaigner for End Our Cladding Scandal and an impacted leaseholder. My building has been through one round of remediation. It was found to be unsafe the month after the Grenfell tragedy, and we are still working through trying to fully remediate it. Giles and I support leaseholders up and down the country who are like us: trapped in buildings that are unremediated and unsafe.
Q
Giles Grover: Essentially, improving a failed system is not the same as introducing one that is capable of fixing this crisis once and for all. We have been dealing with this for nine years, and particularly for the last two years we have been pointing out all these issues—the gaps in protection, the non-cladding defects that keep being mentioned and what needs to be done to actually end this crisis—but we have not really seen any movement.
The Bill is still focused on external walls. It puts a lot of strain on volunteer directors and rules out developers from a legal duty to remediate, and it still focuses on cladding. It does not really deal with all the issues we have seen for the last seven, eight or nine years. As far as we are concerned, it just addresses a lot of the gaps and mistakes from the Building Safety Act—the ineffective protections and the fact that people are just getting pushed from pillar to post. This Bill will make things a heck of a lot more complicated for people, and it will not deliver the certainty we need to actually end this crisis.
Sophie Bichener: We consider a lot of people and a lot of different situations. When we saw the Bill, we were able to stress-test it through lots of different buildings and leaseholders. There is not likely to be a silver bullet that fixes every single scenario, but this Bill leaves too many gaps in our minds, as Giles said, with the non-cladding defects and non-qualifying leaseholders, and it places an unfair burden on RMC buildings and leaves leaseholders with sky-high interim costs. While we wait for these laws to play out and for buildings to be remediated, many leaseholders are still struggling with the interim costs and unaffordable service charges.
Q
Giles Grover: I do not know how far back to go in terms of all the legislation that is already out there, but we can start with the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, and there is the Fire Safety Act 2021, which clarifies that, the Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022, the Building Safety Act 2022 and the changes to it with leasehold reform—and now we have another Bill. We have all these different laws that have been put in place, a heck of a lot of different interpretations of risk and different funding schemes. That will need regulators all over the place—central regulators, local regulators, MHCLG regulators. You have the developer contract, the building safety regulator, the recovery strategy unit and local remediation acceleration plans as well.
This is just adding a layer of complexity. It is not actually giving us what we need. We have some people in some buildings at some heights being protected from the costs of some defects. Rather than fixing that and addressing those gaps, we are focusing on cladding and not thinking about making a building fully safe. We have a number of buildings where the cladding remediation cannot even start because of structural issues because of non-cladding defects. It is not actually doing anything for the people, residents, leaseholders and shared owners who are the victims of the crisis—the only innocent ones.
Successive Governments have caused this crisis, along with the construction industry and the bad practice it has enabled. We still find this game of everyone blaming everyone else and saying, “They should do the right thing.” Residents and leaseholders are trapped facing attritional battles, and RMCs and RTMs are trying to get answers, and you just go round in circles. Nothing in this Bill is really going to do much to help that, whether it is legislation or delivery. Delivery needs to be key and really focused on. This just feels like more legislation—push it out, and see how it has gone in five years. It will not help people at all.
I am sorry, because that is fascinating and I could talk to you for a long time, but unfortunately other colleagues need to come in.
Q
Giles Grover: Going back to the basics and the framing of the question, cladding was the reason for the fire spreading, but we must also look at the insulation that was part of the cladding, the stay-put policy, the defective smoke vents and the defective fire doors. That is not being fixed in one go immediately. That is the first problem with this.
We have always called for compulsory purchase orders. Bob Blackman was on the Housing Committee in 2020 that called for compulsory purchase orders, if the pace was not quick enough. The Government response was, “Okay, we might consider those.” It is long overdue, and a lot of this is now putting it on a statutory footing, but how long will it take to take effect? If you look at the Bill’s impact assessment, it is about 180 buildings and 12,000 residents, so it is not real material change, the change we were promised by Labour. It is probably good, but it should have been there a while ago. We need a heck of a lot more.
Sarah Gibson
Q
Giles Grover: A lot of this is about control. On that point about building owners, yes, there is obviously going to be a conflict of interest. We have seen that. If you step back, we have had a shifting position from the consolidated advice note. It essentially says, “Remove and replace everything”, which again was probably going to be impossible. We need to get towards a proportionate approach, as they call it. Some people want proportionality, because they want to be able to move on with their lives. Other people are very worried about their permanently high insurance and so on carrying on.
A lot of this is about the operationalisation of the PAS and the tolerability. It is that control. It is about making sure that, if you have a risk assessment that comes to certain conclusions, even the Government’s own advice about understanding quality on the FRU says, “You need to make sure that conclusions are based on evidence”. There are so many assumptions: “Is that continuous? It’s probably not continuous behind the scenes. Let’s not worry about it.”
The Building Safety Act put leaseholders at the back of the queue, but a lot of what it did, unfortunately, opened the way for freeholders, developers and everyone to start gaming the system, blaming each other and saying, “Okay, it is a relevant defect; it is not a life-critical fire safety defect. It might be wear and tear actually”, which means we have to pay for it. There is too much buck-passing and shifting around, so yes, that is an issue, but again, it goes back to the fact that the way that the use of the PAS and the FRUs have been operationalised without the assurance, particularly the developers and contractors. That is a major concern of ours. I could go on, but I probably do not have time.
Sophie Bichener: Building owners over the past 10 years and before have shown that they are not willing to do the right thing and make sure that they appoint the right people to get to a decision on these homes. They have had plenty of time and opportunity to do that, and in many cases they have not. Many buildings are owned by pension funds, for example, which bought them as a sustainable investment, and they have a duty to their pensioners to keep costs low. I think they probably want to make the buildings good and sell them on at a profit if they can, so there is a real financial interest to narrow the scope of the works and get it done as quickly as possible.
Sarah Gibson
Q
Giles Grover: We have been saying this since before it was even introduced: it is all about what “tolerable” means. Again, I understand that we need something about proportionality, but so many different fire engineers will have so many different opinions and views. If something is deemed tolerable, whether it is a building that requires works or does not require works, there must be assurance and proper audits to ensure that the conclusion is based on tests and evidence.
If I am being honest, we have been through 20 or 30 years of just a lot of rubbish being built. Now everyone is saying, “Residents, leaseholders and shared owners are at the heart of this”, but they are still doing all they can to avoid liability, including financial liability. We are the ones trying to battle for answers, and we are sadly just going around and around in circles.
Sarah Coombes (West Bromwich) (Lab)
Q
One of the things that residents often call for is greater certainty about what is happening to their buildings and when, particularly what remediation work will be done and over what timeframe. What value is there in requiring those responsible to set out the steps they will take and, critically, the timetable for remediation? What are your thoughts on that element?
Giles Grover: Every single leaseholder and resident needs to understand what is going on in their building and how long it is going to take, but they also need an independent route to raise concerns. The system has been designed in such a way that, even with the developer contract and the cladding safety scheme—which is doing sterling work, but in a very constrained system—a lot of it still relies upon us having to go to the managing agent or a freeholder for answers.
I have one person in a building who went to the RMC, which said, “Go to the developer”; but the developer said, “Go to the building safety regulator”, and the building safety regulator said, “Go to MHCLG.” They had to fill out a correspondence web forms, but they got a stock answer that said, “Go back to your freeholder.” Yes, people need to be put at the centre of it.
There is the ability to include dates and timescales, but they actually need to be monitored, overseen and enforced, with consequences and penalties at the end of it. That way, it is not just a case of saying, “Oh, it’s the BSR and the regulatory capacities; okay, fair enough. Oh, they’ve had to do more FRUs.” The problem is that the system still allows too much to rely on those self-interested actors making those decisions. They will all tell us that safety is at the heart—but we are actually watching their actions, not their words, and they still are just not good enough.
Sophie Bichener: It is really hard to force people to communicate correctly with leaseholders. A lot of the time, freeholders are saying, “We are communicating”, but for the leaseholders, the communication says, “We’re trying really hard to fix this at pace.” Our members never have a clear picture of whether that means next week or in five years’ time. I have actually never really seen any comms about my building that give me any timeline or confidence that anything is happening.
I think it would be really hard to mandate communication that involves leaseholders, but it absolutely has to happen in order to give leaseholders any confidence that their homes will be safe and that, if they want to try to move on, move out or sell, they can get information on when the timelines for making their building safe will fall into place, and they can then feel a bit more confident not only about where they live being safe, but about, “How and when can I move on with my life?”.
Giles Grover: I should try to be positive again, because I am possibly being a bit too negative. Homes England has built stipulated communication points into its cladding safety scheme, so there are certain points of the process where you have to upload it before you get more funding. That is completely sensible; it actually looks at the quality of it and makes sure that it goes to the right people. Again, the developer contract is the one where it is about ticking a box that just says, “I am communicating 100%, so everything’s fine—see you later.” We need more consistency across the piece.
There are ways to do this, and that is what we have been trying to say for the last two and half years. We can actually simplify things, put people at the centre and save money. Sadly, we have not quite got to that point yet.
Peter Fortune
Q
Giles Grover: Not really, no. Honestly, we have tried so hard to help to show officials the way forward and what they can do to actually improve the situation. I am a residents’ management company director; because of the way that the developer contract has been handled at my building, I have tried to resign, but we cannot resign, because it will then go to the head leaseholder.
At RMCs all over the country, we have volunteers who really want to look after their homes. They are clever, intelligent people and they do the same things that freeholders do, which is to appoint agents, but they are still battling well-resourced developers and well-resourced freeholders and are trying to follow really labyrinthine policies.
There was one building in Sunderland that needed waking watch cost payments and had to put that in place in a few days. MHCLG said to them, “Fill out a building liability order, send that to your freeholder and give them 30 days to respond.” But they needed 20 grand or 30 grand that week—what is going to happen there?
A lot of it is the mentality. We have seen what has happened over the last 20 or 30 years under successive Governments, across industry. We have to put people at the centre of it and forward fund where it is needed, whether for interim measures or non-cladding defects, and then have the Government use their power to recover those funds. That would be the only sensible way forward. Until we get that in place, this crisis is not going to end.
Sophie Bichener: I would add that the Second Reading announcement on the non-qualifying improvement from three to six properties was definitely something that we had been speaking about quite a lot; we felt that had been heard, but it is not protecting all leaseholders, which is what we have said, relentlessly—no leaseholders should be paying for this. Why should one leaseholder be innocent and another have to pay for a building? Although it is welcome, I do not think it went far enough.
I feel that leaseholders are just getting more and more desperate. Giles and I have campaigned on this for 10 years. People are looking for answers and for a way out and, unfortunately, we were not able to go back from the Bill meetings we have had to say, “Yes, this is a little glimmer of hope for everybody.”
There are a few bits in the Bill that will go some way to helping some people; but, as we said at the start, it is not all people. Ten years on from Grenfell, I do not think we should still be wondering, “Will everybody be involved in the help that is coming?”. It should be that everybody has a chance to live in a safe home—if not now, they should know when that will be made safe. At present, there will still be too many people who do not have answers.
Giles Grover: The Government need to understand the number of people who hate their home right now—they are first-time buyers, and they just hate where they live. What is this system that we are living in?
Darren Paffey (Southampton Itchen) (Lab)
Q
Giles Grover: It will probably help but, again, it should have been in the Building Safety Act in the first place. Everything should have been effective from 14 February 2022. We were told at that point that freeholders would not be able to sell and pass on their liabilities, but they could; we saw that happen at a number of buildings. It might help to clarify a little bit, but it should have been there a long time ago—and what does that clarity mean? It will just mean that they carry on with this remediation that will leave us in the homes that we are trapped in, which are not fully safe and sellable, or they will force us to pay huge costs as well. Yes, we need to get to that point, but ultimately it is the gaps and issues that we need to address, so that when we get to that point we are not suffering the costs and effects.
Noah Law (St Austell and Newquay) (Lab)
Q
Sophie Bichener: Do you mean—
Noah Law
What is the economic case for not just narrowing the measures to external wall cladding?
Giles Grover: We have been trying to get that economic case made for quite a long time. We hope that MHCLG officials will make it to the all-powerful Treasury. It is about fixing the first rung of the housing ladder, which would be helpful for making sure that the housing market functions. It is giving people certainty to make sure that they can move on with their lives. It is the opportunity cost as well and the impact on growth. People cannot sell. We are trying to build 1.5 million homes, but what about the number of homes that cannot actually be sold right now, but can still be rented out? You have shared owners, and housing associations, which are meant to be charitable organisations, are refusing buyback from vulnerable shared owners whose homes are not fit for purpose. Quite simply, something that is a financial and moral imperative is not being done.
There are a number of organisations; in Greater Manchester, we have been doing this for so long that we get it, we know what we are doing and we can see all the gaps—I did not see what Kate Green said, but hopefully she raised all those. Andy and Charlie coming into the BSR was a breath of fresh air after three years of awful back and forth between MHCLG and the BSR. On Homes England, ultimately, we need the leadership we have seen there to be in place over all of this. We need proper leadership, and unfortunately that has to be non-civil servants.
Noah Law
Q
Giles Grover: There is so much self-interest throughout the system. That is how it has been built. As Grenfell United said, it
“isn’t broken, it was built this way.”
It allows too many parties to have control when they should have that control taken away from them, at least to a point where we have a consistent approach to a national standard. A lot of this is doable and we should be there by now.
The Chair
If there are no further questions, on behalf of the Committee, I thank the witnesses for their evidence.
Examination of witnesses
Sam Dumitriu and Ben Hopkinson gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Sam Dumitriu: I am Sam Dumitriu, the head of policy at Britain Remade.
Ben Hopkinson: I am Ben Hopkinson, the head of housing and infrastructure at the Centre for Policy Studies.
Q
Ben Hopkinson: There are a couple of things. There is inherently a capacity issue with the number of skilled fire inspectors. There is also a reasonable lens of professional debate within fire risk assessments. If you have a building owner and a developer, there might be reasonable professional debates over what the tolerable risks are, and that takes time. We also have to remember the sheer scope and scale of the cladding issue. I think there are 4,000 or 5,000 affected buildings across the country, and that obviously takes time. We have seen good progress being made. I suspect that, with the Bill, we will come quite close to ending it as a problem in the next few years.
Sam Dumitriu: One important thing to remember is that a lot of these important building safety projects will often themselves face bottlenecks in terms of getting approval and sign-off from the Building Safety Regulator. One of the issues that we have come across as an organisation is that many things are going through the Building Safety Regulator that probably should not be, which is leading to safety-critical issues being held up in a queue as a result.
I will give one example. We spoke to a gentleman living in Maida Vale who had a window that needed replacing. However, he was told—I think he had pretty good legal advice on this—that, in order to replace that window, he would have to get sign-off from the Building Safety Regulator. In theory, there are meant to be competent person schemes that people can go to, but, in practice, he went to three separate competent person schemes and none were willing to sign off on the works. He suspects that a lot of people are doing that kind of work behind the scenes and not going through the normal routes, but if you try to follow the rules, they seem to imply that that would be something you would need to submit. He can correct me if I am wrong, but Ben wrote about a separate case involving—I think it was a bathroom renovation, was it?
Ben Hopkinson: Yes, it was just a flat refurbishment, and that took at least nine months and several thousand pounds to go through the Building Safety Regulator. That raises questions: should restoring a flat’s kitchen, combined with installing new safety doors within the flat, really be an issue that takes nine months to get sign-off? In the first instance, should it even be something for the BSR to look at when there are a lot of other pressing commitments on its time?
To take that example, why did it end up on the desk of the Building Safety Regulator? Was it because it insisted on that, or because people thought, “Oh crikey, I don’t want to sign this off; I’ll give it to the regulator”?
Sam Dumitriu: There are two potentially different issues between the two cases we have mentioned. In the case that I mentioned, the legislation was designed, in theory, so that competent person schemes could take these issues on, and would be happy to do that. Obviously, if you are a window fitter or whatever, you have an incentive to be quick on these things if you want more windows replaced. I think the issue was that a number of them do not believe the balance of legal risk to be right, so are concerned about liability or insurance.
Getting to the bottom of this issue has been a challenge, but we do know that the competent person schemes are not actually doing the job that they were intended to do. Work is therefore being passed to the Building Safety Regulator, which is in turn creating a backlog where projects that we really care about and are important to get done for safety reasons are being held up, stuck behind them in the queue.
Q
Sam Dumitriu: When I have spoken to developers recently, they have suggested that, although the wait times for the Building Safety Regulator have dropped, part of that is because a bit of backlog is being cleared while not much is coming in. We know there has been a big slowdown in taller buildings, particularly in London, in part because other building safety regulations, such as the second staircase rule, have created new challenges around viability.
The question is: the Building Safety Regulator might be doing better now, but would it still be if it was getting the kind of throughput we would hope for, if the Government are to hit their 1.5 million homes target, for instance?
Q
A question posed by one of my colleagues, who is not here this afternoon, is: in the event that they do not agree over who should be the lead regulator on something, who should hold the ring? Who should be the organisation that actually makes things happen? Who has the coercive power, if I can put it that way? Do you have a view as to who that should be, and do you think the Bill establishes that?
Ben Hopkinson: I am well aware that the Bill contains a duty to co-operate between the three different regulators you described; it is less clear to me whether it has the means to resolve differences between them. A duty to co-operate is one thing, but actually doing so and moving forward is another. I think we have seen that happen where different regulators overlap.
I know the Fingleton review on nuclear was very clear that there are concerns about whose obligation it is to decide, and that there is a culture of excessive caution in which you never want to be the one who actually makes the decision. On who the final regulator ought to be, I do not have a particularly strong view, whether it is local authorities or the BSR. I just think it should be specified whose decision it actually is. You would then build up some level of responsibility there, rather than having a slight fudge of, “Well, why don’t we all co-operate?”
Sam Dumitriu: I agree. In theory, the Building Safety Regulator should have access to the best expertise on this; however, it also has capacity challenges. One thing that I think has been underappreciated in the move from local authorities doing building control to the Building Safety Regulator is that local authorities, with housing targets and legal obligations, have an incentive to process things faster.
It is not just that it is their job; we know that many public bodies, even when they are given statutory targets to meet a certain deadline, do not necessarily decide things in that time. Local authorities at least have some sort of pressure from the top to say, for instance, “Actually, can you decide this a bit quicker? We don’t want to be in a position where we’ve missed our housing target by this much and therefore lose our ability to have a say over this type of development.”
Q
Ben Hopkinson: Clear responsibility, and then having the incentives actually to make the decision, would be quite good. We have to remember that the new buildings we are processing applications for are inherently significantly safer than the ones they are replacing. When it comes to fire risk, the two largest risks are the age of a building and overcrowding, both of which new buildings help alleviate.
Even in the past several years, buildings have become significantly safer, with sprinkler systems, fire evacuation lifts and no flammable materials in cladding. We really ought to figure out all we can do to make it easier for new buildings to be built. If that means assigning a regulator a specific task and trying to avoid the paralysis you get when multiple regulators have some share of the say, that would be an improvement.
Q
Ben Hopkinson: Yes. There is definitely limited capacity within regulators, so we have to figure out where that capacity gets us the biggest safety improvement. Given that existing buildings are less safe than new buildings, they should be the priority for the BSR or a similar regulator.
Sam Dumitriu: I agree with that; I am happy to accept completely what Ben says.
Sarah Gibson
Q
Sam Dumitriu: There is a trade-off between prescriptive and more flexible regulation. Sometimes you might like to have very clear rules, even if they err very far on the side of caution. I think that in the case of building safety, what we have had is a few pieces of Government guidance in the past that have probably been too tick box and restrictive, and that has caused problems. I think that the approach of PAS 9980 is the right one in focusing on proportionality. I also support the position in clause 44 on tolerable risk.
As mentioned, it is very important that we prioritise the types of remediation that happen, because there are very large constraints in terms of who can deliver and assess these projects. As a result, you need some way of making sure something is proportionate and remediation is not necessary in every case. It can be very costly and that work can also potentially push other projects back in the queue.
The area of policy that I have spent the most time focusing on in recent memory is the regulation of nuclear power, and Ben has also raised the Fingleton review. We have some very similar issues here because it is a question of “health and safety principles”, “reasonably practicable” and terms like that. You tend to see regulation that errs on the side of caution—which in safety is understandable—but there can be a tendency to do work that is not 100% necessary.
In the case of building safety, one consideration around external cladding is that you often might have a building owner who has financial interests in the cladding being remediated that are not solely safety related. There might be a different cladding material that requires less maintenance, is more resistant to weather or might make the building nicer. If there is a potential safety case, what you do not want is a situation where that cladding is changed even though we are pretty confident that, in the event of a fire, everyone can be safely evacuated—the building might experience some damage, but ultimately the people inside the building get out okay, which is what we really care about. My instinct is that we do not want to move to a system that requires more work being done over what is proportionate. It is really important when we look at all of these things.
I think that in the Building Safety Act, in many cases, we have erred on the side of regulation beyond what is proportionate, particularly around second staircase rules for buildings above 18 metres. I think that it could very easily be raised to 30 metres without providing any real risk to the public. We need to be very cautious about insisting on things beyond what is proportionate.
Ben Hopkinson: “Tolerable” seems to be the right standard in the Bill. There is a completely understandable drive for caution and safety within these complex issues. However, we have to be careful about proportionality. Already the Bill’s impact assessment shows that the costs of it are 10 times higher than the benefits. If you removed tolerability and mandated complete safety, how expensive would that be? Would we accidentally shut down new construction because we are burdening house builders with incredible asks on development capital?
There are a lot of competing issues here and tolerable seems to strike the right balance. Certainly, you want to make sure that the kind of buildings that are most unsafe are the ones that are remediated first, and removing a tolerable guideline risks buildings with only minor imperfections being treated exactly the same as the ones with the most dangerous cladding. I think that the Bill, as drafted, seems sensible and obviously we will look at the regulations as to how “tolerable” is actually defined.
Sean Woodcock
Q
Ben Hopkinson: The fact is that there has been good progress—although it is not perfect and it is not done yet. I think that the Bill is useful in contributing to the remaining cases that are outstanding. Certainly, having 40% or 45% of homes completely remediated already is, I think, good progress being made. I did not say that it was done.
Sean Woodcock
Q
Ben Hopkinson: These kinds of tasks necessarily take time. It would be brilliant if you could snap your fingers and remediate all of the buildings really quickly. Unfortunately, there are inherent bottlenecks in capacity and skills—on which good progress has been made on resolving. However, it is not resolved completely yet. I suspect that with this Bill and more time, more buildings will be remediated.
Q
On centres, we heard this morning that Manchester, for example, has 129 buildings that have not been touched yet. That demonstrates that this is not just a London issue but a nationwide one. Equally, in London the building of high-rise properties has virtually come to a halt. In your opinion, is that because of the constraints that we are putting on them, to which this Bill will add, or is it because of the lack of skills? Alternatively, is it other costs or something else that we are not aware of? Will this Bill that we are considering end up causing further delays? I know that is a complicated question, but this is where we are coming from.
Sam Dumitriu: Ben, you published a paper on this yesterday.
Ben Hopkinson: Yes, I had a paper out two days ago about this.
It is important to remember that the macroeconomic conditions right now are not that favourable to housing. We have high build-cost inflation and high interest rates. That is a complete reversal of the situation 10 years ago. Yet, while we have a worsening macroeconomic environment, we are also seeing an increased burden on construction. Just in the past four or five years we have seen biodiversity net gain requirements, the residential property developer tax, the building safety levy, the second staircase requirement and the future home standard. All of those are burdens and all have a cost. Individually, they might be justified, but taken together we have seen a complete slowdown in new construction, especially in London, where over the past two years starts have been running at about 10% of the housing target.
These are the worst conditions for housebuilding in London since the second world war. We have to be honest about what new builds can be expected to pay for. It is not like there are infinite amounts that can be taken for Government priorities. In London specifically, my modelling found that 57% of the clearing price of a new build flat is downstream of Government policy. If we are building only 10% of the target, have a desperate housing shortage and new homes are inherently safer than older homes, we have to be realistic about the burdens that we are placing and work on easing them. I think that the Bill will not have that much of an impact on new builds—it is more about existing properties—so I am not really concerned about that.
Q
Sam Dumitriu: There are two real channels through which this could further increase costs. One would be about access to capital. If you are a developer and it turns out that you have to do some remediation works, that comes from your balance sheet, which means you do not have that money to invest in future projects. The extent to which that is a constraint is up in the air: if you are a developer that mainly focuses on London, you probably have capital to spare, and you are returning money to your shareholders anyway because of all the other problems that Ben has just described. The other concern would be about further cost inflation: increasing demand for those skilled workers will have knock-on impacts. However, I do not think they will be particularly large.
There is a broader point about the way we treat development as a cash cow. One of the problems is that politicians of all parties tend to shy away from raising taxes through the most visible means. There is the famous quote, I think from a French economist, that the art of taxation is plucking the goose with the least hissing. We tend to look for places where taxation can be done off the books—where we can fund spending in ways that are not particularly visible. We saw at the Budget—I welcome this—greater scrutiny by the Treasury of what goes into our energy bills, because we have kind of treated energy bills as a source of taxation.
The Chair
May I steer you back to what the Bill is about and to the questions, rather than a much more general view?
Sam Dumitriu: I am just saying that if we want to place cost burdens on developers, we need to be transparent about when there is a strong justification for doing so. At the moment, I think the justifications in this Bill make a lot more sense than those for many of the other burdens we place on developers.
James Asser
Q
One problem that we face on the back of the cladding scandal is that so many of the buildings we are dealing with are very new. As I was telling the Committee earlier, I have five tower blocks evacuated, with hundreds of people homeless. All those blocks are under 10 years old. Naturally, all the neighbouring developments are now questioning whether they are safe, because of their similar age, even though they are different buildings by different developers.
People have to trust that new buildings are safely built, but they are looking over their shoulder when new development comes along—you see a lot of that now. Although I understand your point, to sell and develop, you need trust for those new buildings; people need to be able to say, “I’m going to move into them.” Where do we factor that in? A big part of the cladding scandal is that it has stretched into so many new builds. Logically, you should be right, but there is that problem.
Ben Hopkinson: I am well aware of the somewhat justified concerns about quality in new builds, especially given that new builds are expected to fund all these different priorities, and corners are sometimes cut on certain issues. However, just think about what new builds now have that older buildings do not: no flammable materials on façades; they all go through the Building Safety Regulator; and they all have sprinklers, wet risers for water all the way up, firefighting lifts, smoke ventilation, three fire doors between a flat and an exit, and two means of escape. There have also been certain changes to the way that fire brigades handle large incidents. Taken together, I think you can feel pretty confident that new builds are safer than existing buildings.
Sarah Coombes
Q
Part of the Bill is about holding product manufacturers liable. A lot of Government money has gone to fixing this, and developers have also put in money, but we feel that product manufacturers so far have not played their part in the equation to fix this safety crisis. Do you have any comments on that part of the Bill in terms of getting all this stuff sorted and fixing some issues you have raised?
Sam Dumitriu: One concern when you are trying to work out who is really liable for a problem is that there are often a lot of cooks. Cladding materials that could be used safely in certain contexts have often been used in the wrong context, and in that case you would not want the liability to fall on the manufacturer.
One of the reasons why this has been a slow process is that some of the things we are dealing with are very complicated. Sometimes, you are dealing with people who have left the country and found ways of avoiding things, which is not acceptable, but you are also dealing with cases where there is genuine professional disagreement. In those cases, you do not want people responding to that by coming up with a done decision that is not necessarily correct.
Ben Hopkinson: I echo that. Clearly, manufacturers have not been contributing to the remediation, and there are definitely instances where they should have. I have one broad concern. If a cladding manufacturer has been mis-selling or was not following the rules and regulations in place at the time, they should absolutely pay, and it is good that the Bill is holding them to account. But if the manufacturer followed all the Government guidelines at the time, it is a little bit more complicated, because you do not want to do too much retrospective liability increasing. That will make people unsure: “If I follow all the Government guidelines and regulations right now, but something that neither the Government nor any of the manufacturers or developers foresees then happens, am I on the hook for that?”
There has to be some limit to these retrospective claims, because they destroy investor confidence and any attempts to build new buildings. If you can be held liable even if you followed all the rules in place at a time, why would you want to manufacture building products or build the homes we desperately need? If a cladding manufacturer mis-sold a product or was clearly engaged in corporate malfeasance, they should be punished, and money should be recouped from them. But if they were acting honestly and following the rules at the time, that is a much more difficult circumstance.
When we are changing the standards, this becomes a Government burden and should in turn be funded from general taxation, if we think as a society, “These are changes we should make to buildings.” We do not want retrospective attempts to take back money from people who were following the rules, because that just leads to people not wanting to invest in the first place.
Noah Law (St Austell and Newquay) (Lab)
Q
The Chair
You have less than a minute.
Ben Hopkinson: If they are running the risk of still having excessive liabilities even if they follow all the rules in place at a time, they might not choose to sell to or invest in the UK at all. We do have to be careful there. If they are engaged in malpractice or mis-selling, we should absolutely go after them.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witnesses for their evidence. We now move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witness
Alexander Cook gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Alexander Cook: I am Alexander Cook, the managing director for special projects at Vistry. I oversee the group’s building safety remediation programme.
Q
Alexander Cook: First, on behalf of Vistry, we have been at the forefront since the tragic events of Grenfell in 2017 to make sure we are proactively managing and liaising with building owners. We signed the pledge in 2022 and the developer remediation contract in 2023. To date, 51% of our developer buildings started are completed. It is worth noting that, if 27 buildings had not had delays from blockers this year, we would have been at 70%. I can give some real world examples from our experience of where that has happened.
Q
Alexander Cook: The targets were always a stretch. There are a number of developers that have achieved it, as per the remediation acceleration group data that is issued in the quarterly reports. There are challenges across all of these projects. These are multi-stakeholder projects, so you have fire engineers, responsible entities, RTMs, managing agents, lawyers and project managers. When you try to go back and forth with each of these parties, throw in a scope dispute or an RTM dissolves, and you have to go to a freeholder.
Good progress has been made across the industry, and we are at 51% across the board. The majority of those are sitting in the top right quadrant. To date, good progress has been made, and Vistry has been working proactively with all its buildings to move this forward, but there is still a way to go. We are confident that next year we will be able to get a lot of these things moved forward with some of the support we have had from the MHCLG.
Q
Alexander Cook: Vistry has a dedicated special projects team with funding allocated to remediation, so it is a priority for us that does not take away from the day job. We have, however, had challenges on the new-homes side with Building Safety Regulator applications, which have delayed delivering those homes for up to nine months. We obviously acknowledge that residents need safe buildings, and that is the priority, but some of those statutory approvals are where the blockers have been.
Q
Alexander Cook: We have seen improvements. Of our applications? Not yet. We have had seven remediations applications submitted, all of which had time extensions and three of which are now approved, so we can see the backlog starting to come down. We have not had a fast application or a statutory timeframe application as yet, but we know industry colleagues that have, so we can see the improvements that have been made. Hopefully, going into next year, their recruitment will improve and their capacity and consistency of decisions will help all of us move forward.
Q
Alexander Cook: We support the co-operation of all authorities and the fact that they have to issue their statement. From my reading of the Bill and the proposals, Homes England is going to be the auditing authority of the fire risk appraisal of external walls, which is dictating the scope. The way it works in the developer remediation contract is that MHCLG will be the auditor of the FRAEW. If there is a dispute between the parties, it is the deciding function. It would seem logical that Homes England performs that function if that is the proposal in the Bill.
Q
Alexander Cook: We welcome the changes on manufacturer redress and section 149. That will help make sure that all responsible parties are held to account and share the costs. It will not make any difference in terms of us accelerating our works and delivering what we need to. It just means that the funding at some point will be recovered and will help the future growth of homes, which Vistry is uniquely placed to do as part of the Government’s affordable housing programme.
Q
Alexander Cook: The clarity of the section 149 changes, especially for reliance and the evidence required to hold manufacturers to account.
Sarah Gibson
Q
Alexander Cook: We support the standardisation of the FRAEW methodology and the recent changes to that for the “tolerable” risk changing as well. We will always see subjectivity in fire engineers’ opinions. The auditing by Homes England will hopefully control some of that. There is always more that could be done in terms of charters and control of fire engineers. I think the more the industry has, that will help.
There are a lot of examples where we have had conflicting fire engineers’ opinions in both directions, increasing and decreasing scope, but they are independent of Vistry, so they are not controlled by us. They are appointed, but they follow their own charter’s ethics and morals and set the scope outside of any other interests.
Sarah Gibson
Q
Alexander Cook: Yes. I believe there are chartered fire engineers out there, and that makes sense for them.
Sarah Gibson
Q
Alexander Cook: I think fire engineers should be, as they are now. Improvements could always be made in terms of the fire assessors, and that could be done through the Bill, with guidance on clarifying those roles, especially for FRAEWs.
Darren Paffey
Q
Alexander Cook: There is definitely no “unwilling”. Everyone wants to remediate and they want to get to the same goal. People want to co-operate, but it is not necessarily about co-operating; it is about their response times. When so many parties are involved, maybe changes to the Bill could introduce a stricter turnaround time from responsible entities, and that might introduce acceleration. For us, one of the particular delays and blockers is where you have fire engineers, lawyers and responsible managing agents taking a little bit longer to get through all of those before they actually get a response. When you multiply that by the hundreds of buildings, it soon adds up. The changes to the Bill will help, but I think there is still a way to go.
Darren Paffey
Q
Alexander Cook: It could be. A lot of the things that we come up against with lawyers are in terms of how the remedial works contract is drafted. If you think of construction contracts, it would not be unreasonable for there to be definitions of delay. Rather than just having “a reasonable excuse”, which is a bit broad, you could have specifics, and then there could be timeframes related to some of those, which would help to accelerate buildings where the responsible entities are not performing.
Peter Fortune
Q
Alexander Cook: I cannot comment widely on the market—that is not my speciality area—but I can say that we have seen that safety is a factor in residents’ requirements, which is completely justified. We have also had experiences in London, as I said earlier, where delays to projects have then affected the supplier demand, in terms of where people are available—what flats, what height, and so on—across the UK. Ultimately, the market has slowed in London, particularly due to the regulator’s decisions that have not allowed us to get on site. With our dedicated team on the remediation side, it has not affected the delivery, as such; if we were able to proceed, we would have.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, I thank you very much on behalf of the Committee for your evidence. We will take a short break before the next panel.
The Chair
We now hear oral evidence from Ian Abley and Steve Day. We have until 4.20 pm for this panel. Could I ask you to introduce yourselves briefly for the record?
Steve Day: Thanks very much for your time today. I am Steve Day. I am a building safety campaigner, and have a national campaign called buildingsafetyscheme.org. There are notes applicable to my evidence on the website.
Ian Abley: Good afternoon, Chair. I am Ian Abley. I used to be a site architect, and then, after Grenfell, I started working for the Fire Protection Association. I have spent most of my life trying to work out what “properly build” is in the first place.
Q
Steve Day: I will take that from a leaseholder’s perspective. I am a leaseholder in a block of flats in south-east London, in Woolwich. We have highly combustible Euroclass E on our fire shafts, which is the second most combustible material being retained under PAS 9980; it is banned on new buildings. The Association of British Insurers has confirmed that there will be permanently high insurance if these combustibles are left on.
We have two fire reports. One was commissioned by the building owner and the builder, and it basically said, “Leave the panels in place,” without any fire performance test evidence to show the risk of leaving it on. Then the residents raised £4,300 to do a review of that fire risk assessment and it said, “These panels are dangerous. These must come off.” Both are valid under PAS. The building owner has clearly stated in writing that they will choose the cheaper of the two reports—the one that leaves the dangerous panels on the sole means of escape, using PAS as justification.
PAS has two flaws. First, it ignores building regulations at the time of construction. Building regulations are the baseline for the fire safety order. The fire brigade operates on the assumption that the building regulations at the time of construction are complied with. If you have a remediation standard that does not really look into these building regulation breaches, you can see why the insurers are giving us permanently high insurance—in addition, of course, our insurance doubled with RAAC. We have £6,000 a year service charges, and because of these retained panels on our sole means of escape under PAS, we have no chance of getting the charges back down, so no, the Bill is not helping us.
I do welcome the parts of the Bill that are useful. This is a very difficult subject for me, because I lost one of my best friends, Amanda Walker, who worked on my building safety scheme campaign with the Earl of Lytton and actually presented to Parliament. She was so taken down by the building safety crisis that she took her own life. To be clear, the coroner said it was misadventure, so I am not saying that I know more than the coroner, but I know how badly the building safety crisis affected her and ruined her life. I want to pay tribute to her and to the Government for recognising that part of her campaign as an enfranchised leaseholder was to be protected from cladding costs. They have announced that that is happening, so that is good. The new legal duty to remediate is good, as is the remediation backstop.
The key problem is that the Building Safety Act is identifying building safety risks, but the remediation standard to deal with the problem is watering it down to a tolerable standard that does not recognise as an issue building regulation breaches at the time of construction, which are unlawful breaches. Secondly, it does not require any fire performance test evidence to know the risk of leaving banned material—combustibles are banned on buildings above 11 metres. The insurance is high, as the ABI has confirmed in its evidence to other Committees. Leaseholders are in a terrible position. I will let Ian come in now, but thank you very much for the question.
Ian Abley: I want to stress that leaseholders entered a market where there was a constant, which they expected to have. They may never have read the building regulations, but the constant was always there and sensible. That was requirement B4(1), which said that a building should “adequately” resist the spread of fire up its external walls, which you would expect. My mum would expect that; my sons would expect that. That has been a constant since the Building Act 1984 split the approved document from the requirements.
A difficulty is being replicated in clause 44 of this Bill, however. “Adequate” was never defined except in the approved document, and now “tolerable” is being substituted for the word adequate, which is worse. The failure after Grenfell was not to interrogate what was “adequate”. Since then, we have found out—through great effort, a long period of time and a huge inquiry—that class zero was the problem, because the approved document contained approval for combustible cladding. It did not contain approval for combustible insulation, so it does not explain the defects over 30 years of construction found by people such as Andy Roe, as he described this morning.
The substitution of “tolerable” for “adequate” just leaves that issue free-floating. While the Building Safety Regulator is being given sharper teeth and may be able to bite better, it is being muzzled by the introduction of the concept of tolerability in place of the concept of adequacy.
I would argue that the only Secretary of State post-Grenfell to grapple with the adequacy problem was James Brokenshire. He did a very good job—actually, an extraordinarily clear-headed job—before he sadly died of cancer, which was to introduce modifications to regulation 7, which is about materials and workmanship. He took the problem out of the approved document and stuck it in regulation 7, so that builders could not ignore it.
The difficulty with the approved document arises from section 7 of the Building Act 1984, which means that the approved document is non-mandatory but nevertheless statutory guidance. So you can ignore it, provided you satisfy the requirements.
Let me illustrate the two things that the Bill needs to grapple with and should sort out. There are all of the defects that builders have created by ignoring the approved document and therefore not complying with the requirement, such as putting combustible insulation in high-rise buildings. Since 2006, that has been clearly prevented under paragraph 12.7 of fire safety regulations, and prior to that builders should not have been using combustible insulation on high-rise buildings. That is made difficult because the approved document had a fundamental flaw, which originated in class zero; the wording did not change from 1976 right up to the Grenfell Tower fire.
That test in 1987 was being given a water-cooled frame to test thermoplastics, in other words the kind of cladding that was on Grenfell Tower—aluminium composite material. The problem materialised at the Garnock Court fire in Irvine in 1999. At that time, Nick Raynsford did not remove class zero from the approved document or modify it, and nor did anybody else after that, despite the Government’s own unpublished research on the subject. Not only was class zero known to be wrong at the time, but the policy was sustained all the way through the code for sustainable homes—when insulation was being pushed, including in high-rise buildings—right the way up to the Grenfell Tower fire, when its consequences became obvious.
Class zero served as misguidance. What the Bill needs to do is to define what “adequate” is, and not sell the PAS to the people who would like to open this process up to a subjective view of tolerability.
Q
Steve Day: No. We say that rather than incremental improvement of the protections, we would like all leaseholders to be protected from all costs related to building safety defects. What we say is that if building regulation breaches occurred at the time of its construction, you did not get what you paid for. The builders should not be allowed, under PAS, to get away with that; they should remediate to the standard of the current building regulations. That is not betterment; that is punishment for breaking the law at the time of construction.
Secondly, if the regulations have changed post-Grenfell and the defects are a result of regulations changing regarding things that were lawful at the time of construction, we say that the buildings affected should be remediated to as low a standard as is reasonably practicable, with fire performance test evidence for those combustibles in buildings above 11 metres.
To answer your specific point, what is happening in the Bill is that we have protections that provide no protection at all for buildings below 11 metres. The under 11 metre fund has closed, so there is no protection. There are partial protections for those that have more than six properties, and no protection at all for non-cladding costs. Then we have the risk of multiple remediation. Under PAS, the fire risk assessor is encouraged to deem some remediation tolerable without any evidence to know the risk of leaving it on. Then it says, “But, by the way, if you can, you should bring the risk down from tolerable to low,” so the PAS is encouraging you as a fire risk assessor to undermine “tolerable”. Then, it says in the 2026 version, which is the latest one in force, “When you do a refurbishment, you should potentially do a bit more, because that tolerable standard is a little bit suspect. Do a bit more.” The PAS itself does not trust its own definition of tolerability.
On the other side of that, if it is deemed tolerable, under a highly subjective assessment, these fire risk assessments are done every year and can recommend that the PAS assessment is redone potentially every five years, like EWS1, which is expensive in itself, but we may have to fork out another 40 or 50 grand in five years’ time. Then, with all the defects deemed tolerable—remember it is ignoring building regulation breaches at time of construction and leaving defects on without any evidence to know the risk—there is a good chance that tolerable risk might become medium or high under the PAS for a subsequent remediation.
This comes on to my real worry, which, as a leaseholder, is saleability and insurability. The ABI has condemned PAS. It was excluded from the steering group, which is questionable, because it has been saying for a long time that PAS is not good enough in its current form and needs to take into account the risk post Grenfell of the genie being let out the bottle and people not trusting building regulation compliance. Let me explain why. These are the June 2024 figures of life-endangering building defect rates in four of our top house builders—it was on BBC News, and it is published on the Government website. Barratt Redrow has a 35% life-endangering defect rate as per the developer contracts, Bellway 43%, Taylor Wimpey 77% and Crest Nicholson 69%. These defects have been all over the built environment for the last 30 years.
We should not be having a tolerable assessment that says, “Oh, by the way, if it’s deemed tolerable now, it may either be upgraded to high in the future, or you need to do a little bit more later on when you do a refurbishment and we need to push it down.” All of these are extra costs. If we combine the threat of rolling, unlimited remediations, the cost of all the protections that partially protect and or include no protection whatsoever for buildings under 11 metres, and the 11 metre cladding fund closure, you can see that the simplest solution is to protect all leaseholders. In doing so, we would actually be able to ensure that there would be certainty. I think the definition of permanently complete on a remediation should be that the insurance comes down so the extra building defect premium is removed and the property is sellable.
There is also the risk of the market concerns around this. There is potential for significant financial crisis-type litigation in respect of mortgage-backed securities. I came from an investment banking background and worked in IT in Lehman Brothers and JP Morgan. We look at risk. If you have a load of buildings in which all the defects have been ignored by a watered-down remediation standard and all the defects have been left on without any fire performance test evidence, do you not think that the insurers or the lenders might have picked that up? They are watching today. What I am saying is that if we want to contain this, we really need to recognise that those alarming defect rates I have just quoted to you, which are all available in the public domain, mean that there could be litigation in relation to the UK mortgage-backed securities that are sold to anyone who wants to buy them. Credit, insurance and other derivatives related to UK mortgage-backed securities could blow up.
My buildingsafetyscheme.org team and I have analysed the prospectuses of some of the leading bonds in mortgage-backed securities, and some do not even mention the credit risk of the non-cladding liability; some mention the cladding liability, but do not mention the non-cladding liability; and some do not mention any liability at all. These are all linked to UK residential mortgages, so they are not being honest in the documentation that they sell bonds on. There is a problem here.
I am very conscious that I have taken up half the session.
Steve Day: Yes, I am sorry I went on a bit.
Q
Steve Day: Yes, I did not actually say it, but it was another element that I was happy about. The cladding manufacturers largely have escaped liability. I do not know if you followed our campaign with the Earl of Lytton in the House of Lords. We initially had a remediation scheme, which was trying to make developers pay for breaches at the time of construction with a wide construction industry levy, which did bring in construction manufacturers. That aligns with our approach, but there are some areas where you could extend the levy. The build-to-rent sector, for instance, has largely escaped it. They could contribute, given that they are building. Build to rent would be an area.
Before the Committee, we had a look at the latest status of developers and house builders. The top 10 have £24 billion in net assets, largely due to hoarding land banks and making significant returns to shareholders. We looked at just how much were share buybacks and dividends. For instance, Barratt Redrow has announced an intention to return £400 million to shareholders. With £24 billion plus £400 million, they can afford to pay a little more to cover all these leaseholders. On the buildingsafetyscheme website, you can see a breakdown of all the information that I am giving here, including the items of the mortgage-backed securities—we are going to publish those so that everyone can see the exposure due to bad building in this country.
I really encourage the Committee to look at whether freeholders may evade their responsibilities. There have been certain restructuring events that you might want to consider, which may mean that you have a good bank/bad bank scenario as we had at Lehman Brothers, where some assets may be transferred to the bad bank, and then there is no money to pay the remediation liabilities. I would recommend looking at anti-avoidance measures, potentially as an amendment to the Bill.
Sarah Gibson
Q
My worry is that we have seen poor construction and a race to the bottom over the last 30 years in the UK construction industry, and now the Government are hoping to build large amounts of new housing. How do we make sure that the housing that we are building now will not be the retrofits of 2050, and that we will not be in the same position then? What key things do we need to be doing to make sure that this does not happen again? Is it a question of building control? Is it a question of enforcement? What do we do to make sure that we do not end up here again?
Ian Abley: It is a question of regulation 7. You already have the tools to do it. They are adequate. Building regulation requirement B4(1) said that the external walls should be adequate to resist the spread of fire. That is still the case. The definition of “adequate” is the thing that is missing. But that forces you into a world of very straightforward thresholds of what is and what is not safe.
The problem with tolerability, to my mind, is not so much that it has not collapsed into a low. If the high and medium-risk buildings that already exist are declared as such to the Building Safety Regulator, they have to go through building remediation, which puts them back into the building regulation loop. The structure of PAS actually encourages anybody with a medium or high-risk building who cannot afford to remediate to shop around and find a fire engineer who will give them a “tolerable” report, and they magically get to avoid the building regulation process entirely.
Regardless of David Crowder’s intent for setting up a structure that looks vaguely like something that the Health and Safety Executive would do—with the carrot of risk going from unacceptable through tolerable and down to acceptable—what PAS does is encourage remediation avoidance. Any impecunious building owner is going to find it far cheaper just to employ a fire engineer who will give them a “tolerable”. I have seen that on an epic scale with a signatory to the developer remediation contract.
It is a beautifully connived process where everyone seems to be doing their job, but all that happens is the risk gets accepted by the building owner and then the process stops. The estates of buildings fall off the statistics, and it looks like the remediation problem is not as big as was first thought. If clause 44 mandates the tolerability wheeze into the legislation instead of defining “adequate”, you will see that right the way down to the 11-metre height.
Sarah Gibson
Q
Ian Abley: As Giles Grover said, you need a technical standard that is the legally minimum adequate of what is requirement B4(1). Why would you employ an incompetent fire engineer to give you a rubbish report? The builders who have the money will employ the most competent fire engineers who will use their skill, knowledge and experience, but their behaviour is another thing—they are just acting like mercenaries.
Steve Day: We are seeing that at Royal Artillery Quays. You have one fire engineer saying, “It is safe to leave these panels on,” without caring about justifying it with evidence, which he puts in his report, and another two fire engineers saying, “These are dangerous. The are banned on new buildings for a reason.” The building owner just chooses which report they want. We spent £4,300 of our own money on this—that is how much we cared about getting the right opinion—only to be met with a terse email saying, “Sorry, we don’t have to listen to you because of PAS.” That is the problem we have.
We have to do the two reforms on the buildingsafetyscheme.org website. Please look at those, because they are what the country needs, and they are what the banks, lenders and insurers need. You cannot put this back in the box; the insurers and lenders will not let the Government do it. You need to protect all leaseholders, you need to deal with building regulations breaches at the time of construction, and you need fire performance test evidence to know the risk of leaving things on and, otherwise, to take them off. Only leave them on if you have evidence—that is the rule. If they did that, we would have safer buildings. We are not remediating buildings to a permanent state, either, because of the rolling remediations. These are big issues that we need to resolve.
Ian Abley: Could I make a point about the insurers? Building regulations are not about property protection, and they never have been. PAS 9980 is not about property protection. The insurers have their own standard, which corrected the error of class 0, once they had worked out that it was an error and the inquiry had come to a conclusion, and it adopted James Brokenshire’s standard. The insurers cannot ignore health and life safety, which is all the building regulations have to achieve. The insurers only want Brokenshire’s law for life safety. They do not need anything else for property protection, because there is nothing else. Brokenshire’s law was reasonably practicable and low risk. PAS 9980:2026 itself recognises Brokenshire’s law as low risk. It does not actually name it; it just copies and pastes the text.
The PAS has avoided one of the other aspects of building requirement B4(1): it only deals with the combustibility of the walls and the compartmentation and cavity barriers around windows. It does not deal with the conflagration problem of radiant heat from one building to another, so it cannot claim to be building requirement B4(1). As far as I can see, PAS 9980 was written as a way to undermine James Brokenshire’s law when the calls for proportionality came in, because people were bleating that James Brokenshire’s law was too onerous. It is not. It is the reasonably practicable thing to do for life safety.
Steve Day: The problem—I will not say too much, I promise—
Sarah Gibson
I probably ought to bring it to a halt, because I am conscious of the time.
The Chair
There are no further questions from Members, so I thank you both for your evidence.
Sarah Gibson
If that is the case, Chair, I am quite happy for Steve to finish his statement. I was just conscious that if someone else was trying to come in, we were running out of time. Sorry, Steve. I did not mean to interrupt you.
Steve Day: Thank you. I really appreciate that.
Ian Abley: If not, I had a question for the Minister.
Steve Day: Do you mind if I just do mine?
The Chair
Okay. We will have to move on, because there are no further questions from Members. Thank you both very much for your evidence.
Examination of witness
Dame Judith Hackitt gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Dame Judith Hackitt. We have until 4.40 pm for this panel. Dame Judith, could you briefly introduce yourself for the record?
Dame Judith Hackitt: Yes. I am Dame Judith Hackitt. I authored the independent review of building safety and fire regulations immediately after the Grenfell Tower fire, which led to the series of recommendations that formed the Building Safety Act. Since then, I have been chairing the industry safety steering group, working on driving culture change within the built environment sector.
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: This remediation Bill builds on a number of things that we have learned since the enactment of the Building Safety Act 2022. I am very supportive of many of the measures in it, although there are a few other things that would help enormously. I think it goes a long way towards addressing some of the shortcomings that we have learned of in the last few years, but there are some other things that we could do to make it move even faster.
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: With pleasure. The most important thing that we need to do within this remediation Bill is to give certainty to residents, in particular, who have been waiting a very long time to know whether their buildings need remediation and whether they are safe. Although some of the recommendations move us in the right direction, they do not take away the uncertainty and the room that exists for people to debate in court or through lawyers what needs to be done and by whom. Unless we address that and give residents certainty, we are missing an important opportunity in this Bill.
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: I certainly think it is open to too much interpretation. As I have shared with lots of people, we now have the ability to see what other people have done around the world, so we can see that there is perhaps a better way to do that. I have recently been reviewing the activities in Victoria in Australia, and they have completed all their remediation. Granted, it is on a different scale from ours—they had to remediate in the region of 1,000 buildings—but it is all complete. It has been completed to a standard that was set centrally, about which there is no dispute, and everyone has bought into it.
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: Yes, I do. Defining tolerable risk in statute and getting buy-in from residents and other stakeholders, including investors and insurers, is key to making progress. That would ensure not only that residents feel reassured that we are working to a consistent standard, but that we have a basis on which to rebuild confidence in the markets in our building stock.
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: Yes.
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: Yes. It would need to be a risk framework for all existing buildings that are in scope.
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: I personally do not have a view one way or the other on whether Homes England is the right place to put that. What I do have a view on is that it needs to be an agreed risk framework that everyone has bought into. It needs to be a body that has the technical competence to oversee that and, in cases where there is a dispute, to overrule that and agree the standard to which the buildings are going to be remediated.
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: I think it is impossible to characterise in one word. It is a very mixed picture still. I am going to focus on buildings in occupation, because we have moved a long way when it comes to new build. The new regulatory framework and the way in which that drives certain requirements has moved us a long way in terms of building the right culture for new build.
The big problem that we have to address, and which the Bill is clearly aimed at, is the lack of progress at the right pace when dealing with buildings that are already in occupation. There, I think the culture is very much one of diffuse and unclear responsibilities, even now. That is exacerbated by a lack of competence and a lack of knowledge among the people who are deemed responsible. The sad part is that because of all that, legal disputes take precedence over taking care of residents and reassuring them that their safety is of primary concern.
I will leave it there because I am mindful that other colleagues want to come in.
Sarah Gibson
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: The part about fire engineers’ competence and how we assess that is being addressed separately from the Bill. We already know that there is more work we need to do there, and I am involved in that.
Let us be clear, however, that we are never going to get to a point where fire engineers always agree on a single solution, because the nature of the beast is such that different solutions may be arrived at that give an acceptable level of risk. That is one of the reasons why we have focused on making all the regulation outcome-based so that it gives people the opportunity to look at different routes and so on.
In the cases where disagreements occur, it is really important to have a body that can stop that becoming a long-term delaying process and a dispute through the courts, and focuses on agreeing what is going to be done, getting it done and letting other things play out while speeding up the process whereby residents get to a position where they can both feel safe in their building and, indeed, sell their properties and move on if that is what they want to do.
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: I am not here to suggest for one minute that we should copy everything that has been done by Cladding Safety Victoria in Australia. However, when you look at the series of measures that it has put in place, there is a lot that we can learn. I have already talked about the agreed risk framework that everyone buys into. In addition, to speed up the process, it arrived at a mechanism whereby, when people cannot agree on what needs to be done, progress is not slowed.
Progress still takes place: the Government pay for it, but they take over the right from the building owners to recover costs from the parties who are held to be responsible. The Government are therefore acting in the intermediary space, not as the funder for work that others fail to do. It is a model that we could learn from, of that I am convinced.
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: Yes, I do. As I said, I am very supportive of what the Bill is trying to do, but in a number of areas we are missing an opportunity to go a little further on writing specifics into primary legislation, rather than leaving it to guidance that is open to interpretation and without certainty.
Peter Fortune
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: Yes.
Peter Fortune
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: I cannot answer the second part of that question, I am afraid. We have to get to a landing on what is an acceptable level of risk. I know that will not be easy, but I think it has to be done centrally, rather than allowing these debates and different interpretations to continue. They are holding up progress, of that there is no doubt.
Peter Fortune
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: Personally, I think the language is unfortunate. We need to be talking about life safety here. It must be an acceptable level of risk that does not put people’s lives at risk. Part of the debate is property loss versus life safety—what matters is life safety.
Peter Fortune
I do not understand what the reluctance is.
Dame Judith Hackitt: Neither do I.
Sean Woodcock
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: Is the question whether I think people are less committed to—
Sean Woodcock
My feeling at the time of the Grenfell disaster was that the view from the top down—from industry, Government, local authorities and so on—was that everything would be done, whatever the trade-offs, to ensure that this was sorted, the remediation happened and so on. As we get further away, there is a danger that the consensus and impetus have broken down slightly. Do you have any worries on that? Am I wrong to worry about that? Is it driving some of the issues?
Dame Judith Hackitt: You are absolutely right to worry about it, because we can look at many other industry sectors and see that, with the passage of time, the sense of urgency that follows a disaster tends to decay as you get further and further away from it. What we must never forget in this case is that we have no guarantee that this will not happen again.
The area where we are most at risk is with existing buildings because, as I have said, we have moved a long way. We have a new regime in place for new build, which I am confident sets new standards, and we have new rigour in place to ensure that buildings are built properly. We always knew that going back and addressing existing stock would be the challenge, but it would be unforgivable not to do that. Those are the buildings that affect existing residents the most, and they have been living with this for nearly 10 years.
Noah Law
Q
Dame Judith Hackitt: One of your colleagues spoke a moment ago about the need for trade-offs. I would not advocate prescription and fixed, inflexible definitions in relation to new build, where there is the opportunity to be creative and to innovate in the way we build, and where new things will come along that will enable us to do things in different ways. In the case of existing stock, where speed and the reassurance of residents are of paramount importance, having a very clear, non-disputable standard is really important.
The Chair
If there are no further questions from Members, I thank you for your evidence, Dame Judith. Thank you very much.
Examination of witness
Dr David Crowder gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Dr David Crowder: Good afternoon. My name is David Crowder, and I am a partner at DCCH Experts. Probably more relevant to this session is that I am the lead technical author for PAS 9980. I will not list my various other credentials as they are in my written evidence.
Q
Dr David Crowder: I will start by saying that my written evidence was not about the Bill; I am here for questions regarding PAS, because I am conscious that there has been a lot of debate about that. My personal view on remediation is that it has taken too long. I investigated Grenfell myself—I spent a year inside the tower, from when it was still burning. I do not want to see that again.
I have worked as fast as I can, and I know many other fire engineers who are, frankly, tired after 10 years of working flat-out on this. There are not enough of us. That is a sad side effect of fire engineering not being a very popular subject pre-Grenfell, and going from being a bit of a sideshow in the industry to suddenly being the thing that everyone demands for a building project. There is now movement to try to increase the number of courses. Given that my qualifications and training took well in excess of 10 years to achieve, I am not particularly optimistic about how much faster things can go unless there is a fundamentally different approach, but I support remediation taking place as quickly as possible.
Q
Dr David Crowder: A different approach. Fire engineers are currently capacity-limited. As I say, everyone I speak to in fire engineering is doing everything they can.
Q
Dr David Crowder: No. That is the short answer. Most of my work is in disputes, legal cases and prosecutions. I am well aware that there is a significant degree of panic about meeting that deadline among the good building owners and developers, because they take it seriously. The practicalities involved make it extremely challenging for those who are willing. For those who are not, I do not hold much, if any, hope of them meeting that deadline.
Q
The Bill concentrates on cladding. To a degree, that is understandable, because we all saw the pictures of Grenfell and the fire going up the outside. One of the reasons why the stay put policy that the fire brigade deployed in the early stages of the fire failed utterly is the breaches inside the building, as opposed to just the cladding going up the outside. Do you think the Bill could have been expanded to cover fire remediation internally as well as externally?
Dr David Crowder: I do. However, I would suggest there is an equally acute problem with internal fire protection as there is with cladding. There is a difference between what was expected of buildings built 10, 20 or 50 years ago versus those built today. I am aware of the criticism, but the PAS has tried to consider buildings of all ages by taking a technology-agnostic view of risk to try to work out what is safe enough—I am sure we will come back to that. We use the term “tolerable”, and again I am sure we will come back to that.
I have been privy to a lot of this, and the difficulty with internal compartmentation is that if you ask a compartmentation specialist or passive fire protection contractor to look at a building, they will insist on current best practice installations because that is part of their professional requirements. There is not currently an equivalent mechanism by which you can look at fire stopping or a fire door that is 20 or 30 years old and reach a conclusion as to whether it still provides adequate performance or needs to be replaced for good reason, as opposed to simply being an old door.
Q
Dr David Crowder: Well, no. Having written it, I am supportive of the standard and what it is trying to achieve. Again, I refer the Committee to my written evidence. The standard is just that, a standard. It is a document. It is not the same as its users. It does not have the power to police its users. As Dame Judith mentioned, a lot of work is going on about the regulation and professionalisation of the fire engineering industry. I can only support that. I am a chartered engineer registered with the Engineering Council, and I have to comply with the ethical behavioural principles of the Engineering Council as part of my work. Those include integrity, honesty and pushing back on anyone who might try to persuade me to behave in a certain way.
Chartered engineers are not the only game in town. There are also incorporated engineers and engineering technicians. They all do different things. Chartered engineers tend to be in leadership, big-picture positions. Incorporated engineers have a greater tendency to be doers—they are more middle-management level. Engineering technicians tend to do very intricate, detailed work. They do the sort of thing that a chartered engineer is not good at. Fire alarm technicians are a good example.
The key point is that they all have to sign up to the Engineering Council’s statement of ethical principles. Having that kind of registration across the board would be extremely helpful in providing confidence in how users are actually applying the PAS. We did a lot of work in how we rewrote the document we published in September to try to address the shortcomings. For example, we have been as strict as we can. Bear in mind, it is a voluntary standard. As it stands, it does not have any power, but we require that any deviation from what is in the standard is recorded in the report so that there is transparency.
Equally, if there is a difference of opinion where a customer, or whoever, commissions multiple FRAEWs—or one simply follows another chronologically—we now require the appraiser to say why they have a difference of opinion with the previous FRAEW. It is no longer a black-box environment where customers, or indeed leaseholders, are simply receiving FRAEWs, seeing that there is a different outcome and not understanding why. We have put a lot of work into trying to improve the transparency of the process.
Equally, we are bordering on hand-holding the appraisers through the process. We have defined the decision-making process that they have to follow at every stage to work through how they deal with uncertainty, to make sure that they are making good, conservative, worst-case assumptions where they do not know things, and only improving upon that once they have evidence that allows them to do so.
Q
Dr David Crowder: “Tolerable” is a word. “Adequate”, “reasonable”, “tolerable” or “good enough” could be used.
Q
Dr David Crowder: I worry about the consequences of doing so. “Tolerable” and, equally, all the other words serve the same purpose, particularly when you think about health and safety law. The intention of the PAS was to support the fire safety order to enable risk assessment. I am sure we will come back to that in a second. “Tolerable” or “adequacy” obviously take into account the level of risk, which we can look at as an absolute level. Is risk high, medium or low?
The question of tolerability, which is similar to proportionality, or “as low as reasonably practicable” as appears in the Health and Safety at Work Act, relates to the ability to pay and what is within the duty holder’s gift to actually do in order to address risk. If Parliament decides to enshrine “tolerable” in law, that would have to be accompanied by some level of resource that puts the duty holders on the same playing field in terms of what they do to meet that bar.
That is because, for example, what a housing association with tens of thousands of properties can afford to do is very different from an individual family who have decided to make their investment pot a block of flats. I have dealt with customers who put all their life savings into building a block of flats, and it ended very tragically. Their ability to pay is not the same as a big housing association with tens of thousands of properties. That is the risk. Again, the PAS is simply trying to address a problem. It is a scientific, engineering-led process, but if we choose to set the bar at a particular level in terms of safety, we have to make sure that people can meet it.
Q
Dr David Crowder: In terms of the original commission that was given to the British Standards Institution by what was then the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, it was written purely as a method for appraising the risk of external wall construction. This is responding to the Fire Safety Act amendment of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. A legal duty was created in the wake of Grenfell Tower to ensure that owners of existing buildings had a means by which they could carry out a risk assessment. Under article 50 of the fire safety order, there is a duty for the Secretary of State to provide guidance to enable risk assessments to be carried out.
Once the provision for risk assessing external walls was added, there needed to be guidance to fulfil that role. The PAS is not formally identified in that sense, but my personal view is that that is what it is for. It is not a design document, and it is not there to circumvent building regulations. It supports an entirely different branch of legislation. As has been mentioned by previous witnesses, if an FRAEW recommends building work, that work becomes subject to the building regulations, but that is distinct from what the PAS is doing. The PAS simply looks at the building in its current state and enables a decision to be made on whether or not something should need to be done. It is not an evaluation tool either—I know that RICS refer to it as part of their EWS1s. It is simply doing the job of appraising risk and the life safety impact of buildings.
Q
Dr David Crowder: I do, yes. I take the view, which I know is somewhat different from that of some witnesses you heard from previously, that the ban reflects Government, and indeed the country at large, losing faith in the construction industry, and concluding that the industry cannot be trusted to work with combustible materials. In the building regulations, regulation 7 sits apart from the functional requirements under schedule 1. Those are all couched in terms of safety, whereas regulation 7 simply says, “Do not use combustible materials.” That is fine, and I do not have an issue with it, given the way that trust has fallen away, but I am confident that it is perfectly possible to build a safe external wall façade, despite it containing combustible materials.
I am equally confident, as I have seen examples, that just because an external façade is non-combustible, it does not make it safe. I have seen a nine-storey-high terracotta rainscreen with no cavity barriers and weak enclosure around the windows, which means that smoke is potentially ducted across the nine storeys of that building. It is non-combustible—great, but it is still a life risk to the residents in that building.
Q
Dr David Crowder: Again, I have not focused my interest on the Bill; I am concerned with the PAS. Currently, the Bill simply refers to the PAS, and the PAS gives a definition of whether a building is safe in terms of the risk of external fire. I know it is not for me to ask the questions, but I suppose there is a question to put back to those writing the Bill: are you seeking simply to limit the ability of any square metre of external wall to burn—to reduce its propensity to burn at all—or are you looking in the round at whether the people in the building are safe, in spite of the possibility of some fire spread?
This is where tolerability comes in. A number of public consultations have occurred around what people are content with. Let us start with buildings that comply with the building regulations as written right now, and buildings that have solid masonry wall construction. They are low risk, because the walls simply do not burn, so there is no hazard that anyone needs to concern themselves with in terms of the external walls. That does not mean that external fire spread will never occur, because you can still get window-to-window fire spread, but the walls will not make the problem worse.
If you have combustible material, the follow-on question is: how far does it go? How far up the wall could the fire spread if that combustible material was involved? Does it cross compartment lines, and is there therefore a likelihood of the fire going somewhere else? The final question then concerns the internal arrangements: if that spread should occur and covers a reasonable distance across the building, are there facilities for people to get out of the building?
We have taken a very scientific approach to it, and I am not sure it is conducive to legislation, to return to your question. There is probably a shorter, punchier way of doing it, but my fear, and the driver behind the way the PAS is written, is about giving people options and not assuming that everyone has the resources to do absolutely everything to mitigate risk.
Sarah Gibson
Q
You mentioned that, for fire engineers, control and signing up to ethical standards and so on is in the process of being done. One would therefore expect that fire assessors, who are, of course, more likely to be involved in the remediation we are talking about, would also be included in that regulation. My question is: do you think that the level of control over those applying the assessment and the ethical codes that go with it are sufficient to limit the issues we have seen around discrepancies? Is it more a question of enforcement than legislation for what is causing the discrepancies?
Dr David Crowder: I think that enforcement would help. The answer to your question lies not necessarily within “tolerable” but in the freedom that users have been given to simply reach different conclusions and walk away. That is what we have tried to clamp down on with the redraft.
By way of example, I review FRAEWs on occasion, and I am quite obviously well versed in what PAS 9980 says. We have risk tables in the PAS that give different risk ratings to different features of buildings, and I have seen instances where appraisers will quietly slip in that a feature of a building has a different risk rating from what the PAS says it should have, and that then flows through and changes their outcome. The new PAS—the 2026 edition—says that, for any deviation, including that, you have to declare in your report that you have done something different. With multiple appraisals, people now have to explain why they have reached a different conclusion.
I have seen instances in the past where appraisers are restricted by their professional indemnity insurance and all they can do is condemn combustible cladding. They will not be given professional indemnity insurance unless they condemn everything combustible and give the okay only on stuff that is non-combustible. I argue that it is an ethical problem that they are allowing their work to be influenced by a pressure other than the science and engineering—that needs to be declared. If that is the reason their report says something different from the previous one, they need to say that that is the case.
Equally, it might just be because they do not have the risk appetite. If it is simply risk appetite, they need to say that, so that people can take them to task and we can start getting some clarity. We have done everything we can to try to narrow the field, and I would like to see more appraisers being held to account when they are providing answers that people do not understand.
The additional thing is peer review. We have also prescribed in the 2026 edition that when an appraiser is reviewing somebody else’s FRAEW, they should not simply start again at the beginning, run through the whole process and then reach their own answer, which is likely to be different because different engineers have different views. We now positively say that they are instead expected to go through the other engineer’s work—
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of the time allotted for this session. On behalf of the Committee I thank you for your evidence.
Examination of witness
Florence Eshalomi MP gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from the Minister. We have until 5.20 pm. Could the witness please briefly introduce herself for the record?
Florence Eshalomi: Good afternoon. I am the Member of Parliament for Vauxhall and Camberwell Green. I am also the Minister of State with responsibility for homelessness, democracy, communities and faith. That includes building remediation.
Q
Florence Eshalomi: One of the things that the Government have been looking at is the fact that PAS 9980—as the Committee may be aware—was designed and developed by the British Standards Institution and went through a rigorous consensus-based public consultation process. On balance, we feel that it provides a robust and proportionate, industry-recognised methodology for assessing the risk. I think it is fair to say that residents will see fire as not discriminating. However, it is a case of making sure that we are looking at the issues around a building’s external walls and the action needed to keep residents safe. That is at the forefront of everything that we are trying to do in this potentially quite long and technical-seeming piece of legislation.
The other thing is around looking at how PAS 9980 will be put into practice and into law to make sure that it is consistent with external wall requirements. There will be secondary legislation at a later stage to require that a fire risk appraisal of external walls be carried out. That will help to give clarity about how external walls should be assessed, and we hope that this will also give regulators a firm benchmark in terms of targeting or challenging any poor assessments.
Q
Florence Eshalomi: One of the key things that we are trying to do is look at some of the other areas contained within the inquiry. We feel that this approach will be better in terms of making sure we are legislating on the key areas around the principle that the developer pays in terms of the levy and the additional measures for non-qualifying leaseholders. All those issues are coming to the forefront first.
Q
Florence Eshalomi: This is an area that we are still keen to look at and are developing with leaseholders and insurance companies. You may be aware that the Financial Conduct Authority is going through a review at the moment on the issue of how remediation and reductions in risk are reflected in the pricing structure. My understanding is that the Treasury Committee is also looking at this. What we are seeking to do with this Bill is strengthen the confidence in the assessments’ decisions through the independent auditing of the FRAEWs, including powers to audit the assessments that conclude that no remediation is required.
With regard to the question of risk maybe being posed and assessed as tolerable, I will go back to some of the comments the Committee heard earlier. Essentially, we need to make sure that residents are safe, but a tolerable risk does not mean that a building is unsafe. Today’s evidence sessions have also highlighted some of the other areas in which leaseholders are rightly pushing us to go further in terms of some of the internal wall defects, which in some cases are causing some of the issues around insurance. I am hoping that during the passage of this Bill, we can look at some additional measures.
However, the building insurance premiums can sometimes reflect a range of areas, not just external wall fire risk: it could be claims for things such as flooding, water or other damage. I think that we need to look at the whole issue of building insurance as a package in the round, not just the external wall risk and the issue of what is and is not tolerable.
Q
Florence Eshalomi: What we need to distinguish is the fact that PAS 9980 as it stands does not remove or replace the need for buildings to comply with building regulations; maybe we need to make that a lot clearer. This is around highlighting that any remediation work that needs to be carried out must also meet building regulations that may apply to that. Again, there is the technical aspect of the Bill, and what we are seeking to do with this legislation is make clearer who owns that risk. PAS 9980 and building regulations serve two entirely different purposes. We are very clear on what building regulations are doing in terms of the regulations for new buildings, whereas PAS 9980 considers the risk and tolerable risk of buildings as they stand now, looking at the critical issue around safety when it comes to life and to external walls.
On the question of whether we should revisit the whole issue of “tolerable”, that goes back to my response to your initial question. Across the sector and industry, we feel that PAS 9980, set by the British Standards Institution, strikes the right balance in trying to find a way forward through something that has been at an impasse for many years—successive Governments have tried to resolve this.
It is about how we get the best approach in terms of moving forward in a really complicated but important area that is affecting so many people up and down the country. They want a resolution and to know that if something goes wrong in their building, which a number of them have invested a lot of money in—sometimes their life savings—they know who they can go to to remediate that. A lot of them bought in good faith and they should not have to turn themselves into building experts just to know that the building they are living in is safe.
Sarah Gibson
Q
We have not had accountable assessors, so we can have an assessment that decides that a building is tolerable but actually that tolerable level, as decided by an assessor, turns out not to meet the standard of building regulations, even at the time of construction. Why are we surprised that people cannot then sell their houses, get mortgages, or get insurance? We should not be. We must recognise that if we are going to put in a new piece of legislation, which will add to the amount of legislation that a leaseholder must look at, it has to be watertight—forgive the expression. The point has been raised today and it still concerns me: there is a lack of clarity about where—with which agency—the buck actually stops. A leaseholder needs to know where to go at the end. Who is really, finally responsible and accountable?
We also must make sure that the assessors who make the decisions can be held accountable, and that they have an ethical code in place to make sure that they cannot be manipulated by their employer. We should make sure that we make those points really clear during scrutiny of the Bill. That will make a difference to our leaseholders, who have waited so long for this legislation. I want to make sure that the Committee irons out those points over the next few weeks.
Florence Eshalomi: I totally hear that and accept it. To be honest, no one Bill can fix this mess. We are trying to make sure that leaseholders who have invested in good faith are not burdened with all the costs, hence the Bill introduces the charge for construction product manufacturers, which is important. To date, construction product manufacturers have not played their part in fixing the mess they created.
We are trying to strike the right balance. We have heard from the National Housing Federation and the LGA. If colleagues from the LGA, and other councillors, were here they would highlight the difficulties that they have in bringing forward new development. I see that acutely in my constituency, where—as the Committee knows—the Government introduced measures to change housing targets, which is having an impact.
A more prescriptive, blanket approach could lead to more extensive remediation, but will it make residents safe? Will it achieve the ultimate goal? How can we have the least disruption to residents? Some residents may have to leave their homes, and some will have additional costs—we must make sure those costs are recouped—and ultimately slower remediation. How do we make sure that we give more power and support to BSR to get the buildings that have been identified remediated?
We must be honest: although the issues in New Zealand are not similar to those here, there are areas where we can definitely learn. I will task officials to look a bit closer at that, and see if there is anything in the Bill that we can tweak during its passage. It is about being open, honest and receptive to those challenges, about making sure that we are being challenged and ultimately about trying to get something right as we progress the Bill.
Andrew Cooper
Q
Thank you for that; it is really important. I am not sure if all colleagues are aware of the new highlights from Minister Pennycook today in terms of charges being passed on to leaseholders. It is allowing leaseholders to interrogate and ask their building freeholders for more information around the insurance costs. It is allowing leaseholders to challenge some of those costs as they come forward. These are all measures we hope will help in some cases where leaseholders have been asked to pay more but in essence get a much poorer service.
Separate to that is the draft Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Bill, which I know you have campaigned on for a very long time, Mr Cooper. We are hoping it will come back to the House before the end of the year. The Prime Minister committed to that in PMQs yesterday. That will help leaseholders in terms of challenging unfair ground rents, where we are seeing many leaseholders pay in excess of £1,000 for nothing.
There are big issues around the service charge. Some leaseholders actually want to get rid of their managing agents, so the right to manage is another area being covered. We are looking at a whole range of packages to help leaseholders who have ultimately made that commitment to a home, because for many of them that dream has turned into a nightmare.
I hope, as the Bill progresses, the packages in it, especially some of the packages for non-qualifying leaseholders and packages for buildings under 11 metres, will help alleviate some of the cost of living pressures that many leaseholders up and down the country are facing.
Andrew Cooper
Thank you, Minister. I was going to ask you about the draft Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Bill, but you got ahead of me.
Q
Florence Eshalomi: I am happy to take that away, look at it and come back to the Member.
Q
Florence Eshalomi: It is important that we try and get a Bill that can get support across the House. That might mean sitting down with Opposition and Government Members to make sure we are bringing forward amendments that would help strengthen the Bill. We feel that the range of packages, as drafted, are strong enough, but that is something I would be willing to work with Members on.
Q
Florence Eshalomi: I am hoping so. One of the areas that Lord Andy Roe and Charlie Pugsley outlined was capacity across industry. A key issue that has been raised is around the quality and competency of fire assessors; making sure they are in place to carry out the assessments, first and foremost, is quite important. We are working to ensure we are helping and speeding that up.
I know that local government colleagues will raise the extra burdens cost, and we are looking at that. Hopefully, all these different measures should help, ultimately, to speed up that remediation. We have a target; we have not met that target yet, but we are on course and working at pace to make sure we hit it in time.
The Chair
I do not think we have time for a further question. I thank the Minister for giving evidence. We have now come to the end of the session. The Committee will meet again at 9.25 am on Tuesday 17 November to begin line-by-line consideration.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Sarah Coombes.)