Al Carns
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, from sail to ironclad, ironclad to dreadnought, dreadnought to highly capable frigate, we need to make the next generational leap? If we find ourselves caught in programmes that deliver last year’s capability, we will remove any wriggle room or space to make that jump into autonomy and automation.
Mike Martin
I agree with everything that the hon. Member has just said, and I thank him. However, all I am highlighting is that, on past performance, going from PowerPoints to ships at sea in nine years with several classes of ship seems extremely risky. Moreover, the DIP sets aside only £1.3 billion in the first funded period to set up those ships. The remainder of the investment falls beyond 2030. I want to move to autonomy because it is the right thing to do, but that seems like an incredibly risky bet.
Al Carns (Birmingham Selly Oak) (Lab)
Everyone in this debate will rightly speak about defence spending, procurement and ammunition, and those things all absolutely matter, but I want to ask a broader question: what does warfighting readiness actually mean in 2026? For too long, we have measured military strength by the number of ships afloat, aircraft we fly or tanks we field, and those capabilities will remain essential, but recent conflicts have reminded us that wars are rarely won by militaries alone; wars are won by nations. They are won by industries that can out-produce an adversary, economies that can absorb shocks, and societies resilient enough to sustain conflict over time.
I have seen this at first hand in Ukraine. Time and again, I have met individuals whose courage is beyond question, but courage alone is not enough. Success depends on whether ammunition arrives when it is needed, whether new technology can be adapted in weeks rather than years, and whether industry can keep pace with the demands of the battlefield. The side that learns, adapts and regenerates fastest gains the advantage, and that should challenge how we think about readiness.
Warfighting readiness is no longer simply the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. It is an industrial strategy, an energy strategy and a technological strategy. Ultimately, it is a national resilience strategy. If our energy networks are vulnerable, if our communications can be disrupted, if our supply chains depend on hostile states, if our British industry cannot rapidly increase production when conflict begins, our armed forces will inherit those weaknesses from day one of any crisis. That is why resilience must sit at the heart of our national security.
We often talk about stockpiles, and rightly so, but I think the more important question is not how many missiles are sitting in a warehouse today; it is how many missiles British industry can produce every month after six months of sustained conflict. Modern warfare consumes munitions at a pace that few of us can comprehend or imagine, but Ukraine is teaching us lessons: 7,000 to 10,000 drones flying a day; 12,000 artillery rounds fired a day; and 1 million drones, in some cases, produced over two months.
Derek Twigg (Widnes and Halewood) (Lab)
I recently met a number of small and medium-sized enterprises and start-up companies that want to produce drones and autonomous systems and to integrate AI more, but they are concerned about the pace of change in the MOD. Does my hon. and gallant Friend believe that the MOD needs to start pacing up and getting on with the job of working with these companies to provide us with the sort of protection we need?
Al Carns
I could not agree more with my hon. Friend. Data is the new gunpowder. AI is absolutely critical in defence, and we should use all of our technological advantage to move faster and further than ever before. We should be bold and jump to the next generation of systems, and not wait for anyone else to lead—we should lead ourselves.
The lesson from my perspective is clear: stockpiles matter, but the ability to regenerate them matters even more. That is why I welcome the Government’s commitment to rebuild munition stockpiles, expand domestic production capacity and invest in British defence industry. Those are investments not just in military capability, but in national resilience.
The same is true for technology. Ukraine has demonstrated that innovation cycles measured in months can outperform procurement cycles measured in decades. Drones, autonomous systems, software and artificial intelligence are changing warfare at an extraordinary speed, and it will only ever get faster. Readiness, therefore, means building a procurement system that can adapt just as quickly, giving innovative British companies a route into defence and ensuring that our armed forces can evolve as rapidly as the threats they face. We have at present over 10,000 people in Defence Equipment and Support—that is, 10,000 people doing procurement. I am not saying that it is inefficient, but I am saying that bureaucracy sometimes gets in the way of speed.
Gordon McKee (Glasgow South) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. Does he agree that embedding that culture of innovation and iteration in the MOD is critical to ensuring that we can move as quickly as possible?
Al Carns
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. This is about cultural change as much as adopting technology. If we were to adopt even the very simplest AI models now in how we do procurement, and move on to the next generation, we would find that the system speeds up, efficiencies are made and the right kit gets into the right hands far quicker than it does now.
Ultimately, rearmament is not about preparing for war because we expect it; it is about ensuring that war never happens in the first place. The purpose of rearmament is deterrence, and deterrence rests on three foundations: capable armed forces, political resolve and the industrial capacity to sustain both. If any one of those is missing, deterrence becomes far less credible when faced with an autocratic nation with huge industrial resilience. As we discuss rearmament today, let us think beyond platforms, procurement and spending lines. The defining lesson of modern conflict is that warfighting readiness is not simply a military condition; it is a national condition.
Calum Miller
The hon. and gallant Gentleman is in a unique position to advise the House on his assessment of the DIP as published. Can he give us his view on whether the quantity of funds provided and the certainty of the period over which they will be provided are sufficient to achieve the kind of industrial step change that he is advocating in his excellent speech?
Al Carns
I have been clear, since several weeks ago, that I was not content with the funding for the DIP or the transformational nature of it. I have been really encouraged in the last couple of weeks by the speed at which it is moving. We need to move more, and I think the spending review in due course will round that off. My perspective is that we must not underestimate the level of change that is required. This is systemic within the Department and within the single services, and it has to move a quantum leap forward—no pun intended—if we are going to deliver the change that is required.
If Britain wants armed forces that are capable of fighting and winning, we must build a country that can endure, adapt and sustain them. In modern conflict, as Ukraine has taught us, the line between the military and civilian worlds has all but disappeared. That is what true readiness looks like, and that is the challenge before us.
Ian Roome
I certainly do, and I will come that later in my speech. There are areas where the Government seem to have cut corners: munitions reserves, medical support, industrial resilience—all essential for enduring a longer crisis.
Professionals talk logistics. In 1940, Sir Winston Churchill appointed Lord Beaverbrook to rapidly streamline aircraft production. Lord Beaverbrook responded by throwing out all the old rules and doubling production output inside 12 months. His sayings have become famous, describing the factories as the frontlines of the war. He said:
“Organisation is the enemy of improvisation”,
“Committees take the punch out of war,”
and
“The need is great, the time is short, urgency must be the watchword.”
He sounds like a nightmare to work for, but he helped rescue this country in an hour of great crisis.
Al Carns
What the hon. Member says brings a huge historical relevance to today. Throughout history, whenever we have been moving towards crisis, we have got rid of almost all of our procurement rules and regulations to streamline capability and get it into the hands of warfighters. Does he agree that the procurement system and those 10,000 people in DE&S could use AI and some of the incoming quantum capabilities to streamline our whole procurement process?
Ian Roome
I agree with the hon. and gallant Gentleman, and I thank him for his distinguished service too. We are seeing that in how we are learning lessons from Ukraine. I have been out there and seen the systems, so I totally agree. Defence reform is a very important element that the MOD should look at, and I am sure the Minister will have something to say about that.
I cannot find that spirit of urgency that Lord Beaverbrook showed in 1940 in the defence investment plan. The purpose of rearmament is not to prepare for war; it is to prevent that disaster, to deter aggression and to bolster our allies. As Liberal Democrats, and I am sure across the House, we believe Britain’s security depends on our alliances. A stronger Britain means a stronger NATO. A safer Europe means a safer United Kingdom. We must preserve the peace previous generations sacrificed so much to secure. Let this House be remembered not as the House that scrambled in an emergency, but that saw the danger coming and acted.
The Minister for Veterans and People (Mr Calvin Bailey)
Did the hon. Member just refer to the nuclear deterrent as “ordinary”?
Dave Doogan
It has been around for 50 years; it is not novel.
The hon. Member for Macclesfield (Tim Roca) referred to £45 billion for the nuclear enterprise. I think the figure in the DIP is £64 billion. That is an important point, because the Government and the one before it have refused to publish the rolling 10-year nuclear enterprise budget. If the Minister could clarify what the nuclear enterprise budget is over the rolling 10-year period, that would be helpful. I am a supporter of defence—there are a few people in here who will testify to that—but the MOD does have a case to answer. It increasingly looks like if we want £1 million of output, we need to put £2 million into the MOD pot. If we look at any Public Accounts Committee report on defence, we can see what a troubled enterprise it is. It needs root and branch reform.
I have heard people say quite a lot that we have not told the public about the threat we are under. I agree with that. I think that is a true and an honest assessment, but we need to see beyond the transmission of the threat and be prepared for the response that we might get back. I am not making a constitutional point; I am not talking about Scotland. I am talking about housing schemes and communities up and down these islands. If they are asked to put their families and their own lives on the line for the United Kingdom, they might well not be quite as enthusiastic as we might wish. They might think, “What has my country done for me?” If they are 25 years old and have grown up over the last 20 years they might think, “What has the UK done for me, because I see myself and my generation getting poorer than the generations that went before.” I might be wrong—I hope I am wrong—but we do not know it.
Mr Francois
NATO is the most successful defensive alliance in history, and article 5 is its absolute fulcrum. We must maintain our commitment to article 5 to keep all NATO nations safe.
In 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, Churchill said that an iron curtain had descended, leading us into the cold war. In the mid-1980s, under Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, defence spending was gusting about 5% of gross domestic product. When the Berlin wall came down in 1989, countries across the west took a peace dividend. Francis Fukuyama wrote his famous book “The End of History” in 1992, and many in the west believed that the threat of world war had finally receded. When the Conservatives left office in 1997, we were spending around 3% of GDP on defence, and that downward trend continued under Tony Blair’s Government—although, in fairness, he was only doing what many other western democracies were also doing.
Today, we face a revanchist Russia led by Putin—
The Minister for Veterans and People (Mr Calvin Bailey)
Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
The Minister for Veterans and People (Mr Calvin Bailey)
I am pleased to have been a signatory to the application for this debate, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) on securing it. [Laughter.] Therein is a lesson.
The subject of the debate—rearmament and readiness—could hardly be of greater importance to our constituents, our military and the future security of our nation. I thank Members of all parties who have contributed to a compelling discussion, and I welcome the opportunity to respond to some of the points that have been raised. You can enjoy the confusion of my moving between my speech and the notes I have taken.
I will attempt to explain how the Ministry of Defence is working to get our armed forces warfighting ready as an urgent priority. However, I will start by responding to the principal criticism of the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) that there is no new money. I emphasise that £300 billion is new money; £15 billion is new money. I will never, ever let you forget the cold water that I endured in the messes of the bases on which I served—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
Order. Please can I remind you that saying “you” is not acceptable in this Chamber, because it refers to me?
Mr Bailey
The removal of funding specifically in 2010 resulted in the removal of Nimrod and the reduction of our shipyards and boatyards, which has led to the risks that are manifesting today. The Opposition cannot deny that is the reason that we are in the position we are in now.
Mr Bailey
In time.
Two years ago, this Government inherited a defence programme that was overcommitted, underfunded and fundamentally unsuited to countering the very real threats we now face. Since then, we have published a strategic defence review, the defence industrial strategy and, most recently, the defence investment plan. We are building a far more modern and lethal military, through massive increases in defence spending, radical reform of the armed forces and close collaboration with our NATO partners to protect Europe’s and Britain’s borders, showing Putin that the alliance remains as strong as ever.
As technology reshapes warfare at the fastest pace in history, and as the world becomes increasingly dangerous, our overwhelming focus at the Ministry of Defence is to get warfighting ready as fast as possible, and that was the critical tilt in the change between the two Defence Secretary’s DIPs. This DIP is a defining moment in that journey, committing, as I said, £298 billion for our armed forces over the next four years, ensuring that they have the kit and weapons they need. That is £15 billion more—more than significant—and £1.5 billion more than was announced just a few weeks ago.
The DIP means that UK defence spending will rise in real terms by 27% between 2023-24 and 2029-30—the largest sustained increase since the cold war. Indeed, the Ministry of Defence budget will grow faster over this Parliament than the budget of any other major Department. The £74 billion allocated next year—2027-28—is £20 billion more for our armed forces than the last year of the previous Government, and the budget will continue to grow in real terms for the rest of this Parliament.
Sir Julian Lewis
I congratulate the Minister on acceding to office, but he needs to appreciate that the cost of all Departments goes up in absolute financial numerical terms year on year, but the way in which we measure the investment in defence is by looking at it as a proportion of GDP. During the cold war, when the risk was almost as high as it is now, we were spending 4.5% to 5% of GDP. Vladimir Putin does not have nine years for us to spend 3.5% of GDP. Those are the measurements the Minister has to look at; we are nowhere near spending enough.
Mr Bailey
Twenty four years of serving this great nation means that I am acutely aware of the risks that the Opposition presented me and manifested during my time in service. That is why I am resolute in addressing these challenges and why I am backing the defence investment plan.
Let me make one point crystal clear: Britain has always met its NATO spending obligations in the past, and under this Government we always will. That begins with the early delivery of our first commitment to raise defence investment to 2.7% of GDP next year, compared with just 2.3%, which was missing from the Opposition’s analysis of the decline in our defence spending.
Alex Baker
The debate about percentages of GDP is slightly irrelevant, because even if defence spending were raised to 3%, we have no ability to spend that money within the industrial base, as we do not have the capacity. Does my hon. Friend agree that we need to look at a much more innovative approach to some of these things, with multilateral options? I have been campaigning for the UK to join the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank for over a year.
Mr Bailey
My hon. Friend has advocated for the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank and alternative finance methods for the past two years. It was pleasing to see the DSR Bank announcement from Canada over the last couple of days alongside the multilateral defence mechanism announcement from our Government, which, significantly, was joined by Poland. I hope that we will see the DSR and the MDM aligned as we go forward.
Mr Bailey
Not at the moment.
Let us jump forward to tech. It is not about how much we spend but about how we spend it, as we heard repeatedly in the debate. It is about how we rearm and get to warfighting readiness. The DIP will energise the transformation of our armed forces and target resources to reflect how war is waged today. We will sequence the delivery of a NATO-first transformed and integrated force powered by modern technology. Through the DIP, AI autonomy and uncrewed systems will receive the sustained increase in support that reflects their strategic importance.
I will pivot to the remarks made by the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells about the hybrid Navy. The DIP speeds up the transition to the hybrid Navy. I have a great deal of respect for him, but it is incoherent to talk about future manned flight but talk down an autonomous fleet. On my visit to Portsmouth only last week, a member of our Royal Navy said “Never again” as we walked past a Type 45, and made it clear that the work on the Type 83 had stopped a significant time ago—it is an incoherent conversation. For the Type 23, every refurbishment takes two to three years and costs us £100 million, while £115 million has given our nation the autonomous capability that we are rolling out in the middle east. That is how incoherent the hon. Member’s argument is.
Mike Martin
I specifically said that I am fully in favour of moving to autonomy as fast as we can. All I questioned was whether we could go from a PowerPoint concept for multiple vessels to their being at sea on operations within nine years. That is all I questioned—not the idea that we need to move to autonomy.
Mr Bailey
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. I agree that this will be testing, but we must take up the challenge, and we need people like him on the Defence Committee to ensure that we are held to account while we proceed with delivery.
The DIP also speeds up the transition to: a digitally enabled Army that is 10 times more lethal; the next generation of combat air, including a potent mix of crewed and uncrewed air power; a new uncrewed systems taskforce to rapidly develop and deliver field autonomous capabilities; and Europe’s biggest drone testing site in Swindon. I remind those who do down our nation and say, “We aren’t building enough” that at the moment we are providing 150,000 drones a year to Ukraine.
Steve Barclay
Could the Minister clarify why the efficiency target has gone up over 73% in a year compared with the strategic defence review? Was the SDR just too unambitious?
Mr Bailey
I thank the right hon. Member for his question. Perhaps we should have a discussion about it outside, because of its ambiguity—[Interruption.] The right hon. Member and I will speak afterwards.
The programme of rapid rearmament mentioned in the motion of this debate has not only begun; we are well on our way to delivering it, with significant and further increases in funding to come. That means an unprecedented investment in new technologies, new munitions, new factories and new jobs. It means creating a path to 3% and then 3.5% of GDP, and having honest public conversations about the very serious threats we face. As a fellow veteran, I know how committed the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells is to strengthening UK defence. I hope we get behind this national endeavour, which represents an historic upturn in support for our military and for our brilliant service personnel who keep Britain safe in an increasingly uncertain world.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)
I call Mike Martin to wind up very quickly.