Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness

Dave Doogan Excerpts

Wednesday 8th July 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mike Martin]

All I will say is that the defence of the realm is the most serious issue for any Government.

[Dave Doogan (Angus and Perthshire Glens) (SNP)]

The hon. Gentleman is very kind to give way again, as he is right in the middle of unpicking the DIP thread by thread. Does he agree that we need to look at the manifest, substantial disappointment that we and everyone in uniform see in the DIP now that it has been announced, and try to reconcile that with how delayed it was? What does he think the Government were doing, given that there are so many black holes and missing spaces in the DIP? What does he think they were debating over the 11 months that the DIP was delayed?

[Mike Martin]

The original sin is divorcing the strategic defence review from the DIP—divorcing the vision from the resources. For the past year, the Department has been arguing first with itself about whether it can downgrade some of the things in the strategic defence review—there are a couple of instances where that has happened, which I will come on to—and then with the Treasury to get more money to fill the gap. Effectively, it wrote a vision that was far too grand for the money that was ever going to be available.

Let me turn from the money to the metal and have a look at some of the capabilities. I could give a very long speech on military analysis about which capabilities should be in or out, but I will not do that. I think it would test—[Interruption.] I know that right hon. and hon. Members would like me to do that; perhaps I will set up a Substack or something.

Let us look at the Royal Navy—the senior service. At the turn of this century—as someone born in 1982, I still feel weird saying that—the UK had 20 frigates. By the end of this year, we will have five. Pre-DIP, they were scheduled to go out of service in 2035. In a little-noticed line in the DIP, we are bringing forward that date. All five frigates, which have well exceeded their service date, are going in 2033. Their replacements, the Type 26s and the Type 23s, will come into service—you guessed it—in 2030-35. We therefore have old ships retiring on a fixed schedule and new ships coming in on an unfunded one. My back-of-a-fag-packet maths—probably the same quality of analysis goes into the MOD under this Government—shows that we will have three frigates in 2030, the year, according to our intelligence assessments, of maximum Russian threat against NATO. We need a frigate to protect our cables, another to get the carrier group out to sea, and another for our deterrent. According to the rule of three—for every three ships, we have only one at sea at any one time—that is nine frigates. If anything kicks off in the middle east or anywhere else, there is no contingency plan. We can see straightaway that there is a huge gap—the frigate gap, as many call it—and the DIP has made it much worse.

The picture with our current Type 45 destroyers and their replacements is not much better. Our Type 45s primarily provide air defence. One was parked in the Thames estuary to defend the Olympics in 2012 because we do not have any other air defence. They go out of service from 2035. Their replacements are supposed to be crewed common combat vessels such as mother ships. Various autonomous ships, which provide missiles, sensors or underwater and above-water support, are meant to be arranged around them. A whole fleet of different ships is therefore meant to replace the destroyers and some other elements of our Navy. That is the hybrid Navy that was much touted last week in the media coverage of the DIP.

I am totally in favour of moving towards autonomy as fast as we can. However, it is worth saying that the maritime domain, particularly the High North, is the most difficult in which to do autonomy. I have spent a lot of time at sea and I can tell hon. Members that everything breaks all the time. There is a reason why the maritime domain is the last to be autonomised. We started with air because that is predictable and quite easy to do, although the aircraft still do not fly in bad weather. We then moved to the ground stuff for picking up casualties and dropping off ammunition. However, the new ships—the common combat vessels—are simply PowerPoints at the moment, yet we expect to move from PowerPoints to power projection on the high seas in nine years with not just one class, but several classes of ships that have to work together. That seems quite risky to me. If we take what is happening to the frigate fleet and what is happening to the destroyer fleet together, it is fair to say that the DIP spells the end of the Royal Navy as we know it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dave Doogan (Angus and Perthshire Glens) (SNP)]

I thank the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) for bringing such a prescient and timely debate to the House. I pay tribute to the right hon. Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey) and the hon. and gallant Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns) for the step they took against what, in their view, was clearly insufficient investment, resulting in insufficient protection for these islands and the people who live here.

The DIP manifestly writes cheques that the Treasury is ill-equipped or ill-prepared to cash. As many Members have said, there is no clear spending plan for how we get to 2030, much less for how we get to 2035. The projected expenditure on defence in the UK is not going to be incremental over those years. We are supposed to believe that, magically, in 2029 we will get to where we need to be in 2030, and the same again in 2034. A lot of us are long enough in the tooth to know that is a load of unbelievable rhetoric. Efficiency savings of £10.7 billion have never happened before, and there is a good reason: it does not happen. That is not how we fund any budget, whether CDEL or RDEL. We do not fund budgets with efficiency savings of that size.

This is serious: we have lost a Secretary of State for Defence and one of his Ministers. If we speak to men and women in uniform, as I and many other Members are privileged to do on a regular basis, we sense the palpable fog of dismay as they try—in vain, largely—to figure out what they are expected to do, how they are expected to do it and with what. The DIP generated such expectation, as did the SDR that precipitated it, but once they were finally published, they have generated more questions than answers.

Platforms matter. I hear all the time that we need to learn the lessons from Ukraine, and we do need to learn the lessons from those brave warriors defending their homeland in an existential fight with zero strategic depth. However, we are not Ukraine—this is not Ukraine—because we have access to platforms and systems that they do not. We have strategic depth in relation to the contemporary threat we face from Russia. I am not inviting Members to be complacent; I am inviting them to see beyond learning the lessons from Ukraine, and platforms and the replacement thereof do matter.

In a very brief summary, the UK just now is fielding clapped-out Vanguard nuclear bombers. When we see them coming back up the Clyde after 200 days under the waves, they look as though they have been raised from the bottom of the sea, not out patrolling for what should be 90 days, not 200 days. It is a dreadful way to treat sailors. Not one of the six completed Astute-class submarines is available for service, which is absolutely unbelievable. The new medium-lift helicopter has rumbled on for a decade, but finally got a grudging order half the size of the original. Ajax is now in its 17th year—it is absolutely incorrigible—and that is not a sophisticated novel system. It is a very good system, but it should not take 17 years. By the time it gets into service, it will be obsolete.

Those are just ordinary things that defence in the UK has demonstrated it cannot pull off, yet according to the DIP, we are going to start doing all this exquisite, novel stuff that nobody has done before, and we are going to be world leaders, which the UK always seems to think it has to be. I do not believe a word of it. I hope it is true and I am wrong, but if we cannot do ordinary, how can we be expected to believe that exquisite is just around the corner?

[The Minister for Veterans and People (Mr Calvin Bailey)]

Did the hon. Member just refer to the nuclear deterrent as “ordinary”?

[Dave Doogan]

It has been around for 50 years; it is not novel.

The hon. Member for Macclesfield (Tim Roca) referred to £45 billion for the nuclear enterprise. I think the figure in the DIP is £64 billion. That is an important point, because the Government and the one before it have refused to publish the rolling 10-year nuclear enterprise budget. If the Minister could clarify what the nuclear enterprise budget is over the rolling 10-year period, that would be helpful. I am a supporter of defence—there are a few people in here who will testify to that—but the MOD does have a case to answer. It increasingly looks like if we want £1 million of output, we need to put £2 million into the MOD pot. If we look at any Public Accounts Committee report on defence, we can see what a troubled enterprise it is. It needs root and branch reform.

I have heard people say quite a lot that we have not told the public about the threat we are under. I agree with that. I think that is a true and an honest assessment, but we need to see beyond the transmission of the threat and be prepared for the response that we might get back. I am not making a constitutional point; I am not talking about Scotland. I am talking about housing schemes and communities up and down these islands. If they are asked to put their families and their own lives on the line for the United Kingdom, they might well not be quite as enthusiastic as we might wish. They might think, “What has my country done for me?” If they are 25 years old and have grown up over the last 20 years they might think, “What has the UK done for me, because I see myself and my generation getting poorer than the generations that went before.” I might be wrong—I hope I am wrong—but we do not know it.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.