Ajax Programme

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Westminster Hall

09:30

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the future of the Ajax Programme.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart. This debate has been a long time coming. Such is the Kafkaesque procedure for selecting debates that this application was granted only at the eighth time of asking; I had first requested a debate on this subject on 1 September 2025—over four months ago. Since then, the Ajax programme has gone from on track to throwing a track, and the outlook for the programme and our armoured capability, the future of armoured infantry as a concept and the current deployability of 3rd (UK) Division are now all very much under the microscope.

In this debate, I am not seeking to apportion blame, point fingers at individuals or orchestrate a witch hunt. It is clear that the Ajax programme has been failing for a number of years, although I will go on to question some of the recent specific decision making regarding the programme. Accountability sits with successive Ministers. The slow progress on delivery appears to be an issue between the Army, the Department and General Dynamics.

We can skip over the potted history of the Ajax programme—others will cover that—but, to paraphrase Rodgers and Hammerstein, “How do you solve a problem like Ajax?” Although it was based on an existing General Dynamics platform, the Army made so many additions and revisions to the existing capability that it is now considered to be bespoke technology. We are talking about a staggering 1,200 capability requirements for each of the six vehicle types under the Ajax umbrella.

The March 2022 National Audit Office report on the Ajax programme details the fact that neither the Department nor General Dynamics fully understood some component specifications or how they would be integrated on to the Ajax vehicle, leading to consequential changes to the overall design, disputes between the Ministry of Defence and General Dynamics and, inevitably, programme delays. Both the MOD and General Dynamics have been criticised for underestimating the scale of the work, the technical challenge and the sequencing of the work. General Dynamics blamed the MOD for not having fully defined acceptance criteria; the MOD blamed the General Dynamics safety documentation. The contingency within the programme was quickly used up and the programme was suddenly four years behind schedule.

Noise and vibration issues were recognised in mid-2020, with a stop notice issued in June 2021. All dynamic movement and transition activity was halted while the programme underwent a significant reset. The Army resumed training on Ajax in 2023, but paused again in November 2025. The programme’s issues from 2020 to 2021 are well documented. Those issues are a failure to establish effective governance, complex assurance arrangements, high turnover of senior staff, an ineffective programme board, weak project controls—the list goes on. The most stark, however, was

“an over-emphasis on achieving its IOC”—

initial operating capability—

“target date, which meant that it prioritised time and cost over capability. As a result, it pressed ahead with the programme without resolving performance issues.”

Given what we know now and the issues encountered less than three weeks after IOC was declared, I would like to hear an assessment from the Minister as to whether he believes that that is still an issue today.

Initial operating capability for the Ajax programme was declared on 5 November 2025 by the Government; I stress “by the Government”, because several stages to that process were not made public until last month. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry confirmed to me:

“All criteria for Ajax Initial Operating Capability…were met on 23 July 2025 and following a period of review, IOC was declared by the Army on 15 September 2025.”

We know that only because it was written on a cake in a General Dynamics promotional video of the Minister’s visit to Merthyr Tydfil. Additionally, he confirmed:

“Before declaring Initial Operating Capability, I received written assurances from the Chief of the General Staff and the acting NAD”—

national armaments director—

“that the vehicle was safe to operate. Within the letter note AJAX the vehicle was described as ‘demonstrably safe to operate’.”

The Minister added that

“prior to Ajax Initial Operating Capability being announced, I sought assurances in writing from the Chief of the Defence Staff and the National Armaments Director that the system was safe to operate, which I received.”

[Stuart Anderson (South Shropshire) (Con)]

I thank my hon. Friend for initiating this important debate. Does he agree with me that it is important for the Minister to set out that in 2022 I and colleagues on the Defence Committee went to Merthyr Tydfil, did a review and clearly stated that IOC was nowhere near deliverable in the timeframes proposed? Does my hon. Friend think it is worth the Minister setting out what checks against the Defence Committee report were done when looking at IOC?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I thank my hon. Friend for that excellent point. I was not going to cover it in my speech, so it is definitely worth adding to the record for the Minister to address in his response.

The interim National Armaments Director, the new National Armaments Director, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Defence Staff represent our most senior leaders within defence. It is hard to believe that they all would have signed off a vehicle platform that was inherently unsafe or where it was a sketchy 50:50 decision. How did we reach a point where four-star senior officers and equivalents had the confidence to sign off the vehicle’s initial operating capability, which then received ministerial approval, only for it to blow up in everybody’s face weeks later like a Wile E. Coyote Road Runner trap?

The March 2022 National Audit Office report states:

“The Department believes that the contract also incentivised GDLS-UK to prioritise production milestones over the quality and performance of the capability.”

It goes on:

“The contract incentivised GDLS-UK to achieve production milestones resulting in it continuing to manufacture vehicles while technical issues remained unresolved.”

Can the Minister give any clarity on whether that is still the case today, given that General Dynamics signed off achieving all the criteria required to meet initial operating capability, only for the entire programme to collapse less than four months later? Initial operating capability was also signed off by the Army on 15 September, before ministerial sign-off was granted on 5 November.

Last year, the then Minister for Defence Procurement and Industry stated that

“The Armoured Cavalry Programme (Ajax) is projecting the delivery of over 180 operationally deployable platforms by the end of 2025.”

Despite the various travails of the Ajax programme, production has continued throughout the training pause. As a result, we know that the Army has received just under a third of all Ajax platforms across all variants. It should be noted that the 2022 National Audit Office report highlighted that the compressed programme schedule flagged that there would no longer be time to validate the design of capability drops 3 and 4 before manufacture. Given that we are now in capability drop 3, can the Minister confirm whether the designs were validated before these vehicles were assembled and delivered last year?

The Minister also confirmed that

“It is anticipated that a further 110 platforms will be delivered in 2026, with the remaining 297 platforms delivered by 2028.”

With 180 Ajax platforms delivered, a similar number still to be accepted by the Army and all 589 hulls having now been completed in Spain, on current timelines the complete production run will have been completed by mid-2027. I believe that includes bringing all vehicles up to capability drop 4 standard.

Assuming that any resolution to the current training pause does not involve the mother of all factory recalls, there could potentially be an idle factory in Wales. What plans are there for the Merthyr Tydfil factory beyond the middle of next year? With only 18 months’ work left to complete, can the Minister assure General Dynamics employees in Wales that they will have a job once Ajax production is complete? Can he assure those employees that there will be no redundancies, given that we have no plans to purchase any more vehicles and that export plans are yet to materialise? While I appreciate that UK Defence and Security Exports sit within the Department for Business and Trade, can the Minister confirm what progress UKDSE has made regarding any potential export sales?

One of the main reasons why we are debating this topic today, and the reason for such media interest, is the social media content that has emerged from the factory and from Army personnel regarding the workmanship on the vehicles. To that end, I would like to recognise the efforts of Alfie Usher, aka Fill Your Boots, who has been instrumental in putting heat and light on this issue on behalf of service personnel. For obvious reasons, I am no trade unionist, but he has been the unofficial secretary-general of the unofficial armed forces union for some time.

I know that the Armed Forces Minister has previously liaised with Alfie on issues, and—I say this only partially in jest—perhaps the Government should reconsider his application to be the Armed Forces Commissioner. The Government are struggling to fill the role. Alfie’s application got binned back in August, but he has been doing the job unpaid since then anyway.

For those who do not follow Alfie’s account—any politician with an interest in defence really should—I should say that between the exposés and topical memes, Alfie has been the bête noire of General Dynamics and the Army, operating as chief whistleblower and ensuring that the voice of those on the ground can be heard. There have been multiple examples of concerns shared by him via social media on behalf of service personnel tasked with prepping newly delivered vehicles. A variety of issues have been highlighted and I ask the Minister, if he has not done so already, to include Alfie within the scope of the ministerial-led review to ensure full transparency and the inclusion of service personnel. They are the end users of this vehicle, and too often we ask our personnel to put up and shut up. An organisation that dines out on moral courage and pretends that it values 360° feedback should make sure that it listens to our soldiers, irrespective of how refreshingly blunt their views might be.

The evidence shown by Fill Your Boots has put heat and light on the production and assembly issues upon which blame has been placed. During the first pause in 2021, the MOD and General Dynamics did not agree on whether the levels of noise and vibration of Ajax vehicles breached contractual requirements. Given that the same noise and vibration issues potentially remain unresolved six years later, can the Minister clarify what does constitute a contractual breach?

Through 2020-21, General Dynamics undertook a supposedly in-depth review of the Ajax programme to confirm the root cause of noise and vibration issues, identify solutions and then validate them through extensive testing. They identified that noise and vibration issues were caused by the track, suspension and running gear; the engine and its mounting in the vehicle; quality issues including bolting, cable routing and welding; and performance and integration of crew headsets. The vehicles were thoroughly assessed using a noise and vibration calculator, whatever that is, to determine

“the safe operating envelopes for the platform across different speeds and terrains.”

The noise and vibration calculator provided by General Dynamics did not measure noise and vibration, which the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory raised concerns about. It estimated the maximum safe exposure time on Ajax vehicles for given conditions based on measurements from early trials. In August 2020, the first noise-induced hearing loss symptoms were reported by soldiers. In September 2020, DSTL discovered an error in General Dynamics’ measurements, which meant that vehicle crews might have been overexposed to noise and vibration. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry has told me:

“Whole Body and Hand Arm Vibration Levels were well understood, and effective mitigations were in place.”

But they cannot have been effective, or why would personnel still be suffering from noise and vibration-related sickness? Will the Minister confirm that any analysis of the root cause of the current noise and vibration sickness does not use the General Dynamics noise and vibration calculator, and instead seeks to use a metric that does not raise concerns with DSTL?

The measures implemented by General Dynamics included the implementation of an effective hearing protection and combined communication system, an improvement to the overall Ajax build quality, a review and amendment of build tolerances for key crew interfaces, changes to seat structures to provide greater vibration attenuation—that sounds very much like new seat cushions—and improvements to track tensioning procedures to ensure correct track tension, which reduces vibration.

On the track tension, I am aware that composite rubber tracks are now mature enough to be viable for a vehicle the weight of Ajax. Although there are still issues regarding track replacement, given that the whole track has to be replaced rather than a single track link, I note that the General Dynamics Ajax Blackjax demonstrator vehicle at DSEI had this fitted. I ask the Minister what assessment his Department has made of the feasibility of switching to composite rubber tracks as a potential solution going forward?

The 2022 National Audit Office report outlined that there were 27 limitations of use on Ajax vehicles in September 2021; 22 were safety-related and 11 were critical to achieving IOC. Can the Minister give the House assurances that those 11 limitations were resolved prior to initial operating capability being declared in 2025? Could the Minister also confirm what contractual payments were made to General Dynamics on the achievement of the criteria for initial operating capability in July 2025 or the formal declaration of initial operating capability on 5 November 2025? What is the total amount paid to General Dynamics as of today, and how much still remains to be paid? What delivery milestone will trigger the remaining payments?

With those resolutions to the previous issues identified in mind, we know that three exercises took place between IOC criteria being achieved on 23 July and ministerial IOC declaration on 5 November. We have not heard of any instances of noise and vibration sickness occurring among vehicle crews during those three exercises. Will the Minister confirm that there were no noise and vibration sickness issues among crews during those three exercises?

I asked the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry what discussions his Department had had with General Dynamics, the senior responsible officer and the British Army regarding the Ajax programme between 23 July and Exercise Titan Storm in late November. Instead of a response, the Minister told me:

“I have directed a Ministerial review that covers elements of his question. I will update the House in due course.”

The Minister was happy to tell me that he met with key stakeholders, including meeting General Dynamics after the programme was paused, but, much as I have tried, the Government have scrupulously avoided disclosing any information about what ministerial discussions have taken place with stakeholders between 23 July and 5 November.

On 1 January, I asked a named day question for answer on 7 January 2026. I asked:

“how many noise and vibration injuries were sustained…between 23 July 2025 and Exercise Titan Storm”.

Strangely, I have not received a response yet, a week after one was due—it is almost as if this is an issue that the Government do not want to disclose. Will the Minister clarify the answer to written question 101920 and put on the record how many noise and vibration injuries were sustained between the achievement of initial operating capability criteria by General Dynamics and the start of Exercise Titan Storm?

The March 2022 National Audit Office Report states that the Department

“knew of noise and vibration issues before soldiers reported injuries but was not aware of the severity of potential problems. Reporting of issues identified in trials was limited and slow, meaning that safety concerns were not shared or escalated by the Army or…DE&S”.

Has that culture been addressed? Concerns were first raised about noise and vibration by the Army trials team in late 2019, but did not appear in quarterly programme reports until March 2021. To what extent have we seen the same issue repeat itself last summer?

In December 2025, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry confirmed to me that

“Of the 61 vehicles of all AJAX types involved in the exercise, 23 AJAX Vehicles were linked to soldiers suffering from noise or vibration injury.”

I would be grateful if the Minister confirmed where those 61 affected vehicles were manufactured. Were they part of the first 100 Ajax vehicles manufactured and assembled in Spain, or were they later vehicles whose hulls were manufactured in Spain but were assembled at the Merthyr Tydfil facility? Can he also confirm whether the early production vehicles from capability drop 0 to 2, which were identified as not being fully compliant with requirements, have now been retrofitted and what capability drop are they currently equipped to?

The Minister also confirmed that

“On 22 November…during a routine training exercise, around 30 soldiers operating in Ajax reported being affected by noise and vibration exposure.”

For 30 soldiers to be affected by the same noise and vibration sickness, with identical symptoms, as a result of a known issue supposedly resolved by 2023 is simply unacceptable. It is incredibly important that we are able to understand whether there were any instances during the three exercises prior to Titan Storm and indeed to identify whether there have been any instances of General Dynamics employees affected by noise and vibration exposure during the same period, prior to or after the 23 July IOC criteria achievement milestone.

In November, I asked the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry how many compensation claims related to noise and vibration symptoms incurred during the use of Ajax variants had been made since the start of the armoured cavalry programme. The Minister informed me that it would take time to collate and review the information needed to answer the question, and that he would write to me. It is now mid-January and I would appreciate it if the Minister could provide that information in his response. It should not take two months to work out how many compensation claims have been made relating to Ajax. If I were Minister, I would have a close eye on the running tally, particularly in preparation for this debate.

On 8 December the Minister confirmed:

“We are currently undertaking reviews into the medical injuries sustained by Ajax crews, and more details on the findings will be published in due course.”

Will the ministerial-led review he has commissioned or the report from the Defence Accident Investigation Branch contain the details of those findings? In that review, will he confirm how many service personnel are undergoing treatment or have been diagnosed with hearing loss following audiometry protocols after operating within an Ajax variant?

Regarding when the vehicles will be able to recommence training, any decisions on the pause are to be made by Ministers after the investigations by the Defence Accident Investigation Branch have concluded. That suggests that the pause will be lifted after the investigation but before the conclusion of the ministerial-led review. Will the Minister clarify the timeline for the investigation, which he previously stated would take at least two weeks and so should be approaching conclusion, and the ministerial-led review, for which we are yet to see the terms of reference, which were due before Christmas? I appreciate it will still be autumn until the defence investment plan is published in March. Will the pause on the use of Ajax be lifted before the conclusion of the Minister’s review, given that the noise and vibration issues may not have been identified, let alone resolved?

This debate is about the future of the Ajax programme. Although the near future revolves around the resolution of the immediate issues that followed Exercise Titan Storm, beyond that the programme will need to achieve full operating capability, but crucially, it will be the tip of the spear in our armoured doctrine. So, a good start would be to have an armoured doctrine that is coherent.

In 2014, we ordered 589 vehicles out of an optional 1,328—below the Army’s required fleet size at the time of 686. Although that was not necessarily a defining error at the time, subsequent decisions, even as recently as last summer, have compounded the issue, bringing us to a situation where our armoured fleet is now completely unbalanced—increasingly so given the evolution of modern conflict since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the ubiquity of drones at all levels, and the current global arms race.

When Ajax was commissioned, we were still undertaking combat operations in Afghanistan. Since then, we have had multiple defence reviews, and changed our focus to the Indo-Pacific and now to the High North, and now we are talking about putting troops in eastern Europe as a deterrent to a belligerent Russia. The irony is that we still have much of the same armour designed to do that job the first time round.

The original plan was for Ajax, alongside Boxer and Challenger 3, to provide the backbone of the Army’s armoured capability within Integrated Force 2030. March 2021’s “Defence in a Competitive Age” outlines how the Army would use Ajax in its two close-combat armoured brigade combat teams, and as part of its deep reconnaissance strike brigade combat team—formations that are now putatively in place.

We cannot discuss the future of the Ajax programme without discussing how the Army plans to use Ajax within those brigade combat teams. As somebody with a background in armoured infantry, who formerly held an admittedly niche specialisation in anti-tanks, I have more than a keen interest in the future of our armoured capability. Being something of a tank-spotter, I note some glaring capability gaps based on the information provided by Ministers over the past year or so.

Let us start with the basics. In December 2024, the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston (Maria Eagle), the then Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry, stated in a written answer to my question:

“On current plans, Boxer will be delivered to four Heavy Mechanised Infantry Battalions and Divisional Enablers.”

Seven months later, however, on 15 July, she stated:

“The Army intends to reorganise its Heavy Forces units in 3 Division, such that all four would become Armoured Infantry Units based on the Ajax and Boxer family of vehicles.”

She subsequently went on to state:

“The Army intends to equip the Regular Infantry Units within 3 (UK) Division with Ares in the infantry troop carrying role: 1 Mercian, 1 Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, 1 Royal Welsh and 5 Rifles.”

What happened between December 2024 and July 2025 that saw such a fundamental change to the future of the infantry, and indeed our entire armoured capability? The number of Ares platforms to be provided has not changed since 2014: just 93. For reference, the current land equipment table shows that we currently have 604 Warrior. Ares’s role was originally “protected mobility reconnaissance support” and latterly to “deliver and support specialist troops”. It has never once been earmarked as an infantry-fighting vehicle.

The present Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), then gave this written response to my question:

“The Ares variant of Ajax is designed for mounted close combat and is being delivered to the Field Army. The decision to field Ares with Infantry Battalions was taken after a considerable assessment programme.”

I would be interested to know whether the aim of the Ares assessment programme was simply to justify the existing total of 589 vehicles, or actually to highlight the capability required, because whichever question the Army asks, the answer always appears to be 589 Ajax vehicles. I asked to see the outcome of that assessment programme but was told that its disclosure would

“be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces”.

I suggest that, given the enemy knows that Ares does not have any armour-defeating weapons capability, the issue around prejudicing capability lies elsewhere.

Let’s walk that back a step. In my opinion, the Ares variant is not designed for mounted close combat. It is equipped with a remote weapon station that can mount a 50-calibre machine gun at the heaviest. As someone whose specialisation in the Army was armoured infantry, I know my way around a 30 mm canon. A 50-cal cannot defeat armour; it is no substitute for 40 mm APFSDS, which is the round that its Ajax brother uses.

In September, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport stated in a written answer that Ares would be,

 “used to deliver and support specialist troops across the battlefield. The term ‘specialist troops’ is used informally, and in this context refers to Anti-Tank Javelin Teams, Snipers and Support Troops.”

But by November that had changed again, with the same Minister contradictorily stating:

“Anti-tank platoons within Armoured Infantry units will be equipped with Boxer variants”.

So which is it: Ares or Boxer for Javelin platoons? Will armoured infantry battalions be tracked or a mix of wheeled and tracked, with the logistical implications of that? Will Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers light aid detachments have both Ajax and Boxer repair and recovery variants? Where are we going to keep the additional vehicles? What is the training burden of mixed armoured fleets, thereby doubling driving cadres, maintenance training, and vehicle commanders’ courses? Have we even bought a recovery variant of Boxer yet? The Army’s own website suggests it is not one of the variants within the 623. This approach is incoherent and suggests that the Army does not really know what to do with the capability it will shortly have.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. On Boxer specifically, just before Christmas I received an answer to a parliamentary question from the Department, saying that it now will not give the initial operational capability date for Boxer, and that it is subject to the long-awaited defence investment plan. Does my hon. Friend agree that Boxer has already slipped by years, and that we cannot let it slip any further?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I absolutely concur with my right hon. Friend that Boxer is a vital capability—even more so, given the training pause that we are now encountering with Ajax—and we need to get Boxer into service as quickly as possible. I welcome the speeding up of that process overall.

Meanwhile in October, the then Minister for the Armed Forces had stated:

“Currently ARES will be fielded to Training Regiments, Armoured Cavalry units and Armoured Infantry units.”

As I said, we have ordered only 93. For reference, in order to reflect the establishment of an armoured infantry battalion, we would need 45 Ares to replace the capacity of the Warrior FV510, notwithstanding how many Athena variants we would need to cover the 511 command variant. Where is the capacity to have vehicles at training regiments and armoured cavalry units? There is no redundancy built into the current vehicle fleet.

The 93 Ares platforms equate to just 23 per battalion with no spare capacity, which is not even enough to replace three rifle companies’ worth of the Warrior FV510 variant. Can the Minister explain what the future establishment of these armoured infantry battalions will be? I appreciate that he will not have that information to hand—I do not think the Army knows yet—but will he write to me and explain how an armoured infantry battalion will be structured using Ares and Boxer?

The demise of Warrior leaves a yawning capability gap that will be difficult to adequately replace without a new IFV. The then Minister for the Armed Forces stated that,

“there is no direct replacement for Warrior”,

and:

“There are no plans to extend the out-of-service date for Warrior beyond 2027, and as such an extension is not under consideration.”

The then Minister also stated:

“As the ARES platform is delivered into service, tactical doctrines will be reviewed accordingly.”

I do not expect the Minister to answer the question or to know the ins and outs of armoured infantry doctrine, but he should raise the question with the Land Warfare Centre, and with the infantry battalions that will receive Ares, to ask them how the platform will be used and what capability will then be lost.

By removing a main armament from the armoured infantry’s firepower we fundamentally change the way that the vehicle is fought. It changes the way the vehicle can move cross-country, effectively removes the option to move in bounding overwatch, and means it can never engage enemy armour. Doctrinally, it turns the armoured infantry into mechanised infantry.

Doctrinally, Ares is more akin to the Mk3 Bulldog. Despite that, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry this week informed me that Ares

“is more suitable to be employed in the direct battle, rather than in the close support role”.

Given the glaring absence of a main armament on Ares, I would dispute that assessment, which seems convenient rather than well thought through. Bulldog itself is due to be replaced in 2030, so what progress has been made in procurement of the Patria 6x6?

Crucially, in December, the same Minister stated:

“There are no other platforms within the Army’s armoured fleet which can fulfil the armoured reconnaissance role; Ajax has been specifically designed for this purpose.”

With that in mind, and given that the entire Ajax fleet is grounded for an unspecified length of time pending an investigation by the Defence Accident Investigation Branch, with support from the Army Safety Investigation Team and General Dynamics, can the Minister state how the armoured reconnaissance capability of the British Army is currently being provided given that statement, and therefore what is the deployability of 3rd (UK) Division without any formation or armoured reconnaissance capability, or even the deployability of an armoured battle group from within 3 Div?

The parlous state of the British Army’s armoured capability is on the cusp of being thrust into stark relief by the Prime Minister’s announcement last week that we had committed troops to the multinational force for Ukraine. While any detail on that force structure is currently pure speculation, it was reported by The Times that those troop numbers would not exceed 7,500. On a three-form cycle, that is circa 22,000 troops—the majority of the field army. If they are to be more than a speed bump for the vanguard of the Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, they will need capability that they simply do not have today.

Challenger 3 has no timeline, with manufacturing due to commence only once the tank’s performance has been proven in the demonstration phase. It is not going to appear anytime soon. The Government have no plan for the remaining 140 Challenger 2s that are not due to be upgraded, and not even a promise that the plan will be outlined in the mythical defence investment plan. That is against the backdrop that the defence investment plan is unfunded, with a black hole of somewhere around £20 billion, give or take an Ajax programme budget. There will be cuts, and there will be delays. Out-of-service dates are going to be stretched to their limits. Bulldog is already 63 years old, and I am sure that it is no coincidence that it will be 67 when it reaches its out-of-service retirement date.

The Chief of the General Staff wants to implement the 20-40-40 land warfare concept, of which Ajax is a key part, working in tandem with Project Asgard. That is the capability that could and should provide a continuous on-land deterrent along the eastern flank defensive line, reduce our sensor-to-effector time, and achieve the nebulous tenfold increase in lethality by reducing the kill chain to well inside the sub-seven-minute timeframe that defines the current frontline in Ukraine.

Ajax cannot be scrapped. The Army needs it. There is no plan B, and given that it is a fixed-price contract, scrapping it will save no money anyway, despite Ministers confirming that the Government have sought legal advice from the Government Legal Department. The Government have not even considered a viable alternative option in CV90, and starting that process from scratch will take the best part of a decade before we even see a vehicle, based on current queues.

Put simply, Ajax needs to be delivered, primarily because the Army needs to restore its armoured reconnaissance capability. Additionally, there is a second order effect: confidence. The British Army badly needs to restore faith in Ajax as a platform. For all the negative stories and press, the Army and the Government must work out how to rebuild confidence in their ailing platform. I know what it is to be given kit that I do not have confidence in, and to have to use it on operations and wonder whether it will let me down, or worse. I know that the Minister can sympathise with that view. We must restore faith in the platform, not only for the soldiers expected to operate with it, but for its appeal from an investor and export position.

The long-term future of Ajax depends on the ability of General Dynamics to sell it overseas. The most advanced armoured fighting vehicle in its class should be an easy sell to the nations currently in the process of rearming and upgrading. We have a history of exquisite sovereign capability that nobody else really wants: Challenger 2, Warrior, even the SA80. Each of those has suffered from a lack of development over its life cycle, too often a day late and a dollar short.

[Mr Francois]

I thank my hon. Friend for his generosity in giving way. As well as the delays to Boxer, there are now strong rumours about further delays to the upgrade of Challenger 2 to Challenger 3. As Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land is responsible for both programmes, does my hon. Friend agree that it really needs to sort itself out and get on with it?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I thank my hon. Friend again, and I absolutely concur. With the delays to Ajax, we can no longer afford to fail to upgrade Challenger 2 to Challenger 3. The fact that the timeline of that has slipped to indefinite is a serious concern for our armoured capability.

A successful export programme would fuel development of the platform and allow it to improve over multiple iterations. It would enhance our own capability, and allow us to benefit from the first-mover advantage of adopting a common vehicle platform that can be expanded with the addition of an IFV and a mortar variant, putting us in the vanguard of armoured development in the drone age. But that cannot happen without the vehicle proving its capability—first with the soldiers, then with our allies. In a crowded field, that should be a top priority.

In “The Iliad”, Ajax loses a competition to Odysseus and, distraught by the result and conquered by his own grief, plunges his sword into his own chest, killing himself out of shame at his own failure. The irony should not be lost on any of us. Fix Ajax, and fix it quickly. There is a war coming.

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

I remind Members that they should bob if they wish to be called. We are looking at around three and a half minutes each.

09:59

[Gerald Jones (Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I congratulate the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) on securing this important debate. My constituency is home to General Dynamics, and its site at Pentrebach is where Ajax vehicles are currently assembled. I am here today to try to represent the views of the 700 or so workers at the site, many of whom are my constituents.

In relation the concerns raised in November, as I said in the Chamber following the recent urgent question, safety is the priority and of paramount importance. It is essential that everything possible is done to keep our brave servicemen and women safe. I am aware that General Dynamics is working closely with the Government and the MOD to try and get to the bottom of what happened in November and put right anything that needs to be in response. Since initial concerns were identified in 2021, the company has worked closely with the Government and robust testing has been carried out over a number of years by the company together with the MOD and the Army.

General Dynamics has operated in south Wales valleys for many years and acquired the site in Merthyr Tydfil in 2014. Since then, hundreds of my constituents and others from surrounding areas have been employed on the Ajax programme and have dedicated themselves to playing their part in building a platform that is at the forefront of our defence readiness. Just two months ago, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry was in Merthyr Tydfil to celebrate the milestone of the IOC being awarded. I was present that day and the whole workforce was upbeat about the contribution that it was making to the nation’s defence story.

General Dynamics has been committed to the local area, and I am aware that there are ongoing discussions around export of the Ajax platform to other countries. This, of course, would mean sustaining jobs and creating additional jobs in my constituency and in the supply chain across south Wales and beyond.

[Carolyn Harris (Neath and Swansea East) (Lab)]

Many of my constituents are employed in this sector, by General Dynamics and in the wider supply chain. Would my hon. Friend agree that those are the very types of secure, well-paid jobs that we need across the south Wales region?

[Gerald Jones]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend’s comment. It is important that we have certainty for those jobs and sustain and increase such jobs across south Wales, because that is integral to this Government’s growth agenda in communities in Wales and across the UK.

Merthyr Tydfil has a long, proud and historical association with the defence of our country. Merthyr was the largest iron-producing town in the world at the time of the industrial revolution, producing cannons and cannonballs for the Royal Navy, leading to a visit from Admiral Nelson himself in 1802 to the Cyfarthfa ironworks. Our area is keen to renew that role in the 21st century and play a part in creating quality defence capabilities with our dedicated and committed workforce.

As I mentioned earlier, currently more than 700 people are employed at the site and those skilled and long-term employment opportunities are vital to the ongoing regeneration of the valleys—an area where heavy industry, such as coal mining and steel, has now ceased, and new industry and employment opportunities are so important to creating hope and growth in our communities. In addition, as a proud supporter of the Union of the United Kingdom, it is hugely important that people across the whole of the UK feel included in the defence sector and ongoing Government investment in the defence capability should benefit communities in the UK and particularly the south Wales valleys.

In closing, I ask the Minister to address a few points. While I fully appreciate that the investigation has to take its course, does he have any indication of what timescale is in place for the investigations to be concluded? The longer the uncertainty goes on, the more impact it will have on the morale of the workforce in Merthyr Tydfil.

Finally, while I appreciate that the Minister is responding on behalf of the MOD, in the Chamber last month, I asked the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry if he would meet staff and trade unions at General Dynamics as soon as possible to provide them with as much reassurance as possible, something he committed to doing. Today I ask the Minister if he will undertake to raise with the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry the importance of that visit taking place at the earliest opportunity. In the event that the investigations take longer than expected, will he commit in the meantime to asking the MOD to find a way to provide regular updates to the staff and workforce until more certainty can be provided?

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

I will be bringing in the Front Bench speakers at 10.28 am.

10:04

[Katie Lam (Weald of Kent) (Con)]

It is a pleasure, as ever, to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Stuart. I thank my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) for securing this debate today.

As has already been laid out, the Ajax programme has been a disaster. It has been repeatedly delayed and enormously expensive. We have known for years about problems with noise and vibration. It is mystifying how these vehicles were signed off as safe, despite so obviously not being so. British soldiers have been permanently injured as a result. Clearly the problems with Ajax did not begin under this Government; the vehicles were expected to be combat ready by mid-2019. However, the decision about what to do with the programme now does fall to this Government. Whatever they decide, this debacle cannot be allowed to continue.

The programme’s consistent failure sends a clear signal to those who have committed their lives to serving our country that, while they may be doing their duty to this country, the British Government are not performing their duty to them. How else are our armed forces personnel supposed to interpret a programme that has been repeatedly delayed, has racked up enormous costs and, as we heard last year, poses a direct risk to soldiers? When we ask people to put their lives on the line to protect our freedoms, the very least we can do is provide them with functional equipment, on time, that does more harm to the enemy than to our own troops.

The Ajax programme does an appalling disservice, not just to Britain’s armed forces—although that is awful—but for British taxpayers. The programme has a budget of £6.3 billion, enough to pay for the running of every court in England and Wales for two years. It is £6.3 billion of people’s hard-earned money. These vehicles do not work, and I would like my money back.

If Ajax was the only failure, that would still not be acceptable, but it might at least be written off as an aberration. However, the pattern of the British Government failing their duty to the armed forces is, sadly, far more widespread. In March 2024, a former armed forces Minister told the House of Commons that the British Army’s ammunition stockpile would be exhausted in just 10 days of warfare. The Ministry of Defence has said it believes we will need to spend an additional £28 billion to meet its costs over the next four years—yet at the Budget just two months ago, defence spending rose by £500 million less than was projected in the summer.

The Government have not just failed in supplying our armed forces with the tools they need to keep us safe. In repealing the protections put in place by the previous Government’s Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023, for example, they are opening the door to another wave of prosecutions against those who have previously served. How can all of that be the right way to treat those who have risked their lives to keep us safe? What message does it send to those who might consider enlisting in the future? What other country would treat its former service personnel with such disregard?

Ajax does not tell the whole story, but it is one recent and important example. How the Government choose to proceed from here will send a signal to those who are serving, and those who might serve in the future, about whether their Government intend to uphold their side of the bargain. Regardless of political party, we should all want our armed forces to know that we support them, not just with words, but materially. I hope the Minister will provide some clarity on when we can expect a final verdict on Ajax, and what steps the Government are taking to ensure that future procurement is faster, more cost-effective and safer for those who are serving. That is the very least that our armed forces deserve.

10:07

[Mr Luke Charters (York Outer) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart. I congratulate the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) on introducing the debate, and thank him for his service in the Royal Yorkshire Regiment. May I take the House back to a visit I made to the NATO Forward Land Forces contribution as part of Operation Cabrit? I spent time in a Challenger 2 tank, and what was most impressive was not the size, the armour or the firepower, but the complete confidence that its crew had in the vehicle. Ajax was meant to deserve and earn the same trust. Before I come on to the failures in the programme, however, I want to say something about the workers in south Wales: they deserve credit for their graft and determination, not blame.

The Public Accounts Committee, of which I was previously a member, has made it clear what went wrong. It found that the programme was over-specified from the outset, with about 1,200 individual requirements imposed on what was supposedly an adapted off-the-shelf design. In reality, Ajax was neither off-the-shelf nor fully bespoke, and what was in between was far riskier. Never again must defence procurements over-specify requirements; that should be a red flag right from the start. Computer models were relied upon to assess vibration and noise rather than vigorous early testing. The Public Accounts Committee found that that approach had failed, and that the Department at the time did not fully understand the vehicle’s characteristics before subjecting soldiers to trials. Our armed forces should never have been used as human guinea pigs.

The independent Sheldon review is more damning: it found a culture in which bad news was softened as it travelled up the management chain. Senior leaders were left without a clear, honest picture of what was really happening. I thank all the soldiers who stepped forward to raise safety concerns. Despite the warnings that were given, the safety notices that were issued and the whistleblowers who came forward, GD repeatedly underplayed the scale of those issues, so it is reasonable to ask a simple question: if the design ultimately lay with the contractor, would the chief executive officer of GD be happy to have their son or daughter sent on to a battlefield in an Ajax? If those design failures did rest with GD, the taxpayer should not be left carrying the cost of retrofit.

I will touch briefly on defence exports. We must learn lessons from those abroad, particularly Leopard, which is a main battle tank. That platform was modular, upgradeable and interoperable, which meant it was a much stronger prospect for our defence export. When it comes to procurement, we should always bear defence exports in mind.

There are wider lessons too for the forthcoming defence investment plan, which must make a decisive break. We need a system that is capable of designing and testing earlier on, rather than one that rushes into production in the hopes that problems can be fixed later on. Ajax must be a turning point, not just for this vehicle, but for how we procure defence capability in this country in the future.

My hon. Friend the Minister is one of the most impressive forces in British politics; if he can climb Mount Everest in just five days—to raise money for our veterans, no less—I have no doubt about his ability to get to grips with one of the most challenging problems facing defence procurement today.

10:10

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I thank my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) for securing this important debate.

I want to briefly link the lessons of Ajax to wider concerns in MOD procurement. My hon. Friend has frequently mentioned the Boxer; having met with a key local manufacturer in my constituency, I have been made aware of the potential implication of issues with the UK Boxer mechanised infantry vehicles and Project Hunter, the procurement of laser protection and signature reduction systems under the alternative individual weapon programme. It is essential that we are agile and apply the lessons of Ajax to other such procurements. That is important locally in my constituency, since Royal Marines 42 Commando are based there and are potential customers of some of the equipment, and it is important nationally to make sure we ensure value for money, national security and operational capability.

The business in my constituency has raised issues with the Boxer, such as the procurement and performance of the periscopes, the driver’s modules and the mission module. These have been raised with Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land, the prime contractor; with GuS Periscopes UK, the supplier; with the relevant defence equipment and support teams; with UTAC; with local MPs, one of whom is the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry and another of whom serves on the Defence Committee, and with the Secretary of State for Defence. To date, no response has been received. I raised a question in the recent Ajax statement and the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry was interested I am waiting for a response from him to agree a meeting. Ultimately, we need to ensure that we take lessons from Ajax and speed up talking about the potential issues with Boxer as well.

Project Hunter was designed to procure up to 10,000 KS-1 rifles for our military over a 10-year period. Included was an optical scope with a laser protection system, and a noise and muzzle flash suppression system. To date, of the significant number of rifles procured, zero have been equipped with that system. We have heard from Ukrainian veterans’ charities that up to 360 snipers have been blinded as a result of using that equipment—something we should be taking very seriously. The implication, if funding is not allocated for this promised addition to the weapons, is that we will not have the laser protection system. That would leave our soldiers vulnerable to offensive countermeasures and risk significant injurie; due to the reflective nature of unprotected sighting systems, the threat of counter-detection would also be significantly higher as it would allow opposing forces to target our soldiers.

There is also a significant reputational risk for our Government if we deploy those systems without adequate protection, especially given those reported threats. I thank you, Mr Stuart, for allowing me to mention that within this wider debate. Could the Minister use his powers to speed up the conversation that my local constituency business is hoping to have with senior figures, including the Minister for procurement, to ensure that we, at speed, learn from the lessons of Ajax and apply them as we are spending multimillions of pounds of our money at a considerably risky time in the international landscape. We may not be able to change the direction of a tanker—I appreciate it is a big job—but if we do not take this new information seriously we risk having another debate like this one, but on a different topic, in the future.

10:14

[Ruth Jones (Newport West and Islwyn) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I thank the hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) for securing this important debate.

I pay tribute to our armed forces and those who put their lives on the line to keep our country safe. We ask a great deal of our servicemen and women, so the least we can do as parliamentarians is ensure that our armed forces have the equipment they need. Like other Members, I was extremely concerned to hear of soldiers reporting noise and vibration symptoms during a training exercise on 22 November last year. I pay tribute to the Ministry of Defence for moving swiftly to respond to those concerns; the safety of armed service personnel must remain paramount.

Given the importance of the Ajax programme, I welcome the Government’s focus on ensuring that the ongoing investigations are concluded swiftly—the facts must be identified urgently. I remind the Minister that any delay will come at a cost: it will mean workers being concerned about their futures, ongoing confusion about the safety of the rigorously tested Ajax, and opportunities to export Ajax to our allies being put at risk.

The Ajax programme is a welcome product of a deliberate choice by successive Governments to develop our sovereign capability to design and manufacture Britain’s next generation of armoured fighting vehicles. Ajax is not only built in Britain; it is, more importantly, built in Wales. The General Dynamics UK facilities in south Wales are a critical part of the Welsh manufacturing landscape, supporting 680 employees across sites in Merthyr Tydfil and Oakdale in my constituency. I was delighted to visit the General Dynamics Oakdale facility just before Christmas to meet some of the 200-plus staff. I saw the wide range of skills employed on site, and especially the integration of the advanced digital technologies that make Ajax such a pioneering vehicle.

As the world’s first fully digitalised armoured fighting vehicle, Ajax is well positioned in the international market as allied countries seek to update their armoured forces. Many of their procurement cycles are expected to conclude in the next 12 to 18 months, making the timing of the MOD’s review of Ajax critical. Successful export of the Ajax could be worth up to £20 billion in the future and is essential to sustaining and growing sovereign AFV manufacturing facilities in south Wales. In learning the lessons of the Challenger programme, we cannot allow the British Army to be loaded with the lifetime costs of a unique vehicle.

In responding to current threats, the latest strategic defence review highlighted the need to expand the capabilities of armoured platforms and integrate them with evolving digital technologies. Ajax will play a vital role in delivering on those aims and the wider objective of digitising the British Army. The technical functionality and pioneering nature of Ajax also mean it is unique and cannot easily be replaced by an alternative.

In closing, I would reinforce to the Minister the importance of the ongoing reviews to not only the welfare of our soldiers, but wider supply chains and our sovereign manufacturing and defence capabilities. I urge him to ensure that the reviews are completed as quickly as possible so that we can have certainty for everyone involved.

10:17

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart. I want to say a big thank you to the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) for setting the scene incredibly well and providing lots of detailed information that is beyond my knowledge; hopefully he helped to set the scene for the Minister’s answers.

Ajax was, and is, intended to be a cornerstone of the British Army’s future capacity, providing modern awareness while protecting the soldiers who operate it. Getting it right is therefore essential, not only for military effectiveness, but to ensure the safety of those who operate it. I look forward to the Minister’s response, and I know we will not be disappointed.

There have been issues surrounding Ajax, and it is of major importance that they are resolved. For example, some service personnel experienced injuries from excessive noise and vibration, which resulted in manufacturing being paused and major safety investigations being launched; those issues were put down to design integration issues rather than error. There have also been major delays, with full operational capability delayed by many years. The programme is valued at some £5.5 billion—with billions spent before vehicles are even usable—and there are major concerns regarding value for money.

The Ministry of Defence is responsible for keeping personnel safe and ensuring that the programme delivers value and capability. Ajax must meet the Army’s operational needs and fit into wider defence plans, and we should not persist with a system that cannot be safely or effectively used. Hon Members have concerns regarding the use of Ajax—the hon. Member for Huntingdon told us what they are—so I was pleased that the Minister committed after the last debate on this topic in Parliament in December to resolve the issues. That is why his reply today is important.

[Mr Francois]

The hon. Member may know that the previous National Armaments Director, Andy Start, was paid a performance bonus in 2023-24 of £165,000, and another one in 2024-25 of £160,000, while this was going wrong on his watch. Does the hon. Member agree that if Ajax is, unfortunately, finally scrapped, Mr Start should pay that money back?

[Jim Shannon]

If he has not done the job, there should be no bonus. That would be the same for anybody, no matter who they are—you get a bonus because you do it right. But the Minister can perhaps answer that question better.

It is important that these issues have no knock-on effects on essential supplies getting to the battle zone. These delays have left the Army without a modern tracked reconnaissance vehicle, forcing reliance on ageing platforms that are not up to speed for the modern world of today. Full operating capability is now expected for 2028-29—years later than originally planned. It is down to the MOD to ensure that our Army does not suffer as a result.

To conclude, resolving the issues with the Ajax programme is vital for the safety of personnel, the effectiveness of the British Army and the credibility of the MOD’s procurement process. I look forward to hearing from the Minister and the Government how they can address these issues and restore confidence in what should have been a successful programme for the United Kingdom.

10:20

[Dame Nia Griffith (Llanelli) (Lab)]

The Minister will be fully aware that an enormous amount of expertise, investment and effort has gone into the development of the Ajax vehicle, producing a vehicle of significant and unique capabilities. I absolutely understand that we want to ensure high-quality performance and safety, and there has been extensive testing of the vehicle over thousands of kilometres, with noise and vibration limits well within acceptable levels.

I understand that the latest testing will be completed shortly, so my ask of the Minister is simple: once the latest testing results are available for ministerial consideration, we need Ministers to give absolute priority to the analysis and consideration of those results and to ensure that decisions on next steps are made without delay. Time is of the essence, and we need clarity on Ajax as soon as possible. It would be unforgivable if the latest tests vindicated the quality and viability of the Ajax project, but ministerial schedules and the machinery of government then caused delays, compounding the problems and losing us valuable opportunities.

Uncertainty is a pervasive killer. Any delay will sow the seeds of doubt in the minds of potential customers. There has been huge investment in Ajax, and if it is to pay its way and justify the investment in such an advanced capability, we need to attract orders from abroad. There is an important opportunity to showcase Ajax in early February, and it would be crazy if that opportunity is lost through poor prioritisation of the Procurement Minister’s priorities.

Then there is the workforce. For them, uncertainty—the fear of losing their job—is devastating. We have a very loyal workforce in Merthyr, who have gone above and beyond to deliver on Ajax. They not only want jobs now, but to see a future for young people, and that is dependent on securing orders for Ajax. There are also all those who work in the supply chain.

Ministers may decide that further work is needed. If so, I again stress that it needs to be done as nimbly as it can be. Decisions on Ajax will have a ripple effect on wider industry. I support our industrial strategy and our determination to rebuild our industrial base to make sure we have the capabilities to develop the likes of Ajax. For too long, procurement procedures have looked only at headline price and failed to give due consideration to the huge benefits of securing jobs here in the UK—good jobs, tax revenue, social cohesion and, as brought home more vividly through covid and the Ukraine conflict, our resilience and security.

When we look at the current Ajax situation, we can see why some might ask, “Why invest? Why bother with the risk? Wouldn’t it just be easier to buy off the peg and let another nation take the risk?” Apart from the fact that we may end up with a substandard product, with the problems emerging only after purchase, what happens when, as we saw in covid, other nations prioritise their own needs or supply routes are otherwise sabotaged?

No one factory exists in isolation, and if we need further proof of our interdependence, the Jaguar Land Rover cyber-attack brought it home starkly. If the JLR crisis had led to one local company—for example, a supplier of a specific part for JLR—going bust, there would have been contagion, because that would have had an immediate effect on the other car companies it supplied. Conversely, if we implement our industrial strategy by supporting foundation industries such as steel and developing advanced technologies such as semiconductors, and we make the UK a vibrant hub of new high-tech industries, they will feed off each other. That creates an attractive environment for investment and aspirational workers. Ajax is an important part of this ecosystem.

To sum up, I urge the Minister and his colleagues to ensure that the necessary analysis is undertaken as soon as they are provided with the testing information and data, and that they make their decision without delay. Any delay would undermine confidence among potential purchasers of Ajax, lead to us missing vital opportunities in the purchasing timetables of key potential customers, further demoralise the workforce and undermine broader investor confidence in our industrial strategy. A lot depends on how the Minister handles this issue.

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

I thank colleagues and congratulate them on their discipline. Last but not least, Chris Evans.

10:24

[Chris Evans (Caerphilly) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. It would be easy to blame the last Conservative Government for the operational difficulties burdening the Ministry of Defence, General Dynamics and the British Army from the outset of the Ajax programme, but I could not do that with the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois) sitting in front of me. He was often a critic when he sat on the Government Benches, and I have lost count of the number of times he said that heads should roll at Abbey Wood—it is a shame nobody listened to him at the time.

When we stood here three years ago, 37 of 39 projects were marked as either red or amber by the National Audit Office. That is unacceptable. Criticisms of the Ajax project included realistic targets not being set for the vehicle’s bespoke capability, and its complex requirements being largely ignored. As we have heard, whistleblowers were not listened to, resulting in the Ajax demonstration and manufacturing phases overlapping, which posed acute technical safety risks.

Progress reports were also often vague or overly optimistic, as we experienced in November. Ministers were assured that Ajax had achieved initial operating capability and was prepared for the Salisbury exercise. We have to ask why that was the case. A gross overestimation put the health of 30 soldiers at risk, and that is the nub of the problem. This is not simply economics; as the Minister knows, when we send someone into theatres with obsolete equipment, we are putting their lives at risk. If they lose their life, it is their family we have to be accountable to. That is what we have to remember. It is not about the defence companies or the equipment; it is about the soldier we are sending into theatre, and we should never lose sight of that.

We also have to look at the cultural issue at the MOD, which the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford constantly spoke about. Between 2011 and 2023, the Ministry of Defence welcomed five project managers, and each served for approximately two to three years. The job was unsustainable due to the complexity and breadth of its portfolio, which did not allow for effective oversight.

I will now turn to the Morpheus project, which was unfortunately delivered by General Dynamics land division. It was intended to supply the computing system for Ajax, but the system fell short of its requirements, even though the same company developed it. Ajax was expected to be the Army’s first set of vehicles based on one fully digitised platform, which was to include advanced sensors and enhanced communication systems, allowing vehicles to gather and immediately share information with other units. In stark contrast, Morpheus incurred significant costs and a delay of three years, during which time Ajax’s ability to exchange information was severely limited. The platform had the potential to significantly improve the British Army’s digital capabilities, and this country could have been a world leader in that sector. Its failure was nothing short of unacceptable.

There is no doubt that the MOD has been and is a uniquely failing Department. In opposition, Labour called for the MOD to be the first Department subject to the new Office for Value for Money, with a commitment to commission the NAO to conduct an across-the-board survey of the MOD’s wants and needs.

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

Order. I call James MacCleary, the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

10:28

[James MacCleary (Lewes) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under you, Mr Stuart. I congratulate the hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) on securing this timely and important debate.

Ajax takes its name from the “Iliad”. In that great epic, there are in fact two Ajaxes—Ajax the Great, the famous hero of Greek mythology, and Ajax the Lesser. I think it is pretty clear, from what we have heard today, which of them this project most resembles. Ajax stands as perhaps the starkest illustration of everything that has gone wrong with defence procurement in this country.

[Adam Dance (Yeovil) (LD)]

The new medium helicopter contract has reportedly been delayed. We now risk losing the site at Yeovil if the contract is not awarded by March. Does my hon. Friend agree that such delays to contracting are undermining our national and economic security, and that the new medium helicopter contract must be awarded as soon as possible?

[James MacCleary]

My hon. Friend is a committed advocate for his constituents in Yeovil and has raised this on a number of occasions. I absolutely agree: we run a real risk of not only losing the ability to build our own—

[Graham Stuart (in the Chair)]

Order. We will stay focused Ajax, notwithstanding the intervention.

[James MacCleary]

Indeed.

Let me be clear from the outset: the possible collapse of this multi-decade, £6.2 billion programme is deeply alarming. It demands answers, it demands accountability and, most importantly, it demands urgent action. The facts are stark and troubling. Just weeks ago on Salisbury plain, during what should have been a routine training exercise, more than 30 of our soldiers fell ill. They were not injured in combat or facing down an enemy on some distant battlefield; they were training on British soil in British vehicles built with British taxpayers’ money. They were vomiting, and they were shaking uncontrollably. Some spent 10 to 15 hours in these vehicles and emerged requiring urgent medical care.

That is not the first time we have heard such reports. Indeed, the Ajax programme has been plagued by issues of noise and vibration since mid-2020. A stop notice was issued in June 2021 and all dynamic movement was halted. The programme underwent what was termed “a significant reset”. Training resumed in 2023, only to be paused again in 2025. Astonishingly, this programme has been on pause for 20% of its entire life—20%.

What was the response from those in charge? In November, just before the latest incident, we were told that Ajax had achieved “Initial Operating Capability”. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry visited the General Dynamics factory in south Wales and declared that the issues were “firmly in the past.” He told us that he had been

“reassured from the top of the Army”

that the vehicle was safe. Indeed, the programme was apparently so successful that the MOD announced in November that it had just won an international award for mega-project of the year.

Three weeks later, the Minister had to return to the House to confess that he had been misled—misled by the Chief of the General Staff and the then acting National Armaments Director. These are not junior officials; they are the most senior figures in our defence establishment providing assurances about safety that have proven to be utterly unfounded.

I must ask, what kind of system allows this to happen? What kind of institutional culture permits such a fundamental failure of honesty and accountability? What does it say about the state of our armed forces that senior officials and officers declared initial operating capability when long-standing problems had merely been mitigated with new seats and earplugs in some cases, rather than actually fixed?

The Minister must now be absolutely clear about what the Government’s contingency plans are if Ajax is deemed unsafe. Moreover, he must explain what the impact will be on our NATO commitments if Ajax is further delayed due to required upgrades or scrapped altogether. Our allies are watching, and our adversaries are watching, and what they see is chaos.

This is not simply about one troubled programme, catastrophic though Ajax’s failures have been; this programme illustrates the deep-seated problems with defence procurement that have plagued our armed forces for years. They deserve better than the endless delays, cost overruns and capability gaps that have become the hallmark of how we equip those who defend us.

Let us consider the litany of failures. Ajax was ordered in 2014. It was supposed to be fully in service by 2019. Here we are in 2026, and not only is it not in service, but we are now investigating whether it is fundamentally unsafe. The vehicle was originally designed for weights of up to 26 tonnes. Through what defence analysts politely call “scope creep”—the Army loading the programme with 1,200 separate capability requirements—the weight ballooned to over 43 tonnes.

A single vehicle can now cost well over £10 million in its most expensive form, and what have we got for this money? We have vehicles that make our soldiers sick. We have a programme that has consumed vast resources and delivered nothing but embarrassment. We have General Dynamics winning awards for project controls while producing vehicles that cannot be safely operated. I note with interest that when asked whether performance bonuses relating to Ajax had been paid to officials over the last three years, the Ministry responded:

“This information is not held centrally and therefore can not be provided without incurring disproportionate costs.”

[Mr Francois]

Does the hon. Member agree that the Ministry could tell us the bonuses of the head of Defence Equipment and Support, so the idea that it does not know who else got a bonus is totally and utterly laughable?

[James MacCleary]

I do; it is an extraordinary response. All we can conclude is that the Ministry means, “Yes, bonuses have been awarded—some of them quite substantial—but we would rather not tell you exactly how much people have been rewarded for presiding over this disaster.” The senior responsible officer for Ajax earns a salary in excess of £160,000—nearly as much as the Prime Minister—with the potential for bonuses of 25% to 30% on top, so we have people earning £200,000 or more while delivering a programme that has been stopped for a fifth of its existence and is now under multiple safety investigations.

This is not merely incompetence; it is systemic failure. The 2023 review of the programme exposed precisely that—systemic and institutional problems. We need to know what progress has been made in fixing these issues, and we need to know what safeguards are in place to prevent further delays, cost overruns and, most importantly, threats to our soldiers’ safety. I ask the Minister directly: is the Ministry of Defence considering an internal investigation into how the programme could have progressed so far without those major issues being identified? Someone, somewhere, has been signing off on milestones and accepting deliverables when the fundamental problems are still unresolved.

The Liberal Democrats have long argued for a fundamental reform of defence procurement, and Ajax demonstrates precisely why such reform is so desperately needed. We would tackle these long-standing problems by replacing the current system of defence reviews with a more flexible system of continuous review of security threats and evolution of defence plans. As has been dramatically demonstrated in recent weeks, the world does not wait for our periodic review cycles, and neither should our procurement system.

We would ensure that defence procurement is part of a comprehensive industrial strategy, securing a reliable long-term pipeline of equipment procurement. Industry needs certainty, as do our armed forces, but the current approach provides certainty for neither, especially with the continued delay in releasing the defence investment plan. We would collaborate properly with our European and NATO partners on the development of new defence technologies, equipment, systems and training. We would make capital spending allocations more flexible to reduce what is called annuality, and focus instead on meeting the required in-service dates. We would invest properly in recruiting, retaining and training staff with specialist skills at the Ministry of Defence, reducing its dependency and expenditure on external consultants.

The concerns about Ajax should raise alarm bells about the continuing poor state of procurement at a time when Britian must be rearming rapidly. The geopolitical situation demands that we get this right, and Ukraine has shown us what modern warfare requires. Our adversaries are not standing still, and we simply cannot afford these failures.

The fact that the Army has paused the use of Ajax vehicles raises serious questions about the operational readiness of the units that rely on them. How does this disruption affect deployment plans at a time when our armed forces need to be fully prepared? What is the impact on training schedules? What message does it send to our personnel about how we value their safety?

The Ministry of Defence has launched a safety investigation, citing an “abundance of caution”, but the public and this House deserve clarity. What exactly is being investigated, who is involved, and when will the inquiry conclude? The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry said:

“It will be conducted at pace, but it will not be rushed.”

Which is it? The armed forces deserve transparency and reassurance, and they deserve it now. This all sends a worrying signal to our adversaries, which is why it is vital that the Government outline how they will move quickly to resolve the issues and adopt our proposals for a wider overhaul of the procurement system. We cannot afford to lumber on with a broken system while the world around us becomes more dangerous.

Difficult decisions lie ahead. The Defence Secretary has indicated that scrapping the programme in its entirety is possible. Given what we know—given the years of delays and billions spent, and given that soldiers are still falling ill in these vehicles—it is right to seriously consider that option. The mythological Ajax died of shame; one hopes that those responsible for this modern Ajax programme might feel at least some measure of that emotion. More than shame, we need action. The Ajax programme must not be allowed to fail in silence—too much is at stake. The most important thing of all is the safety and wellbeing of those who serve and being able to depend on them absolutely.

10:38

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) on very ably introducing this debate. I should begin by declaring an interest—as consistently being one of the greatest critics of the Ajax programme in the House of Commons for around a decade. Indeed, being very much an Ajax sceptic, I once described it to the Defence Committee as a reconnaissance vehicle that is

“about as stealthy as a Ford Transit van full of spanners!”.

My real epiphany, however, came when I visited the Ajax factory with that Committee in March 2022, when even the shop floor staff, for whom I had much sympathy in this situation—it was not their fault—were telling us that the vehicle was deeply flawed.

[Stuart Anderson]

I do not want to steal my right hon. Friend’s thunder, but when we were on that visit, I was absolutely shocked that the team building Ajax said that no two hulls had ever left the factory that were the same. They were all slightly different, and that was a flaw in the whole building project.

[Mr Francois]

I have with me the actual minute of the Committee’s 2022 visit, which confirms exactly what my hon. Friend said.

Ajax’s genesis goes back several decades, under Governments of multiple colours. It effectively began life in the 1980s under the Conservatives as an Anglo-American reconnaissance vehicle programme called TRACER—the tactical reconnaissance armoured combat equipment requirement. Eventually that programme broke down, and the United States continued to develop the Bradley family unilaterally. Back in Britain, under Tony Blair’s Labour Government, the programme evolved into the future rapid effect system—FRES—which itself ran into considerable trouble. As the Defence Committee report of February 2007—I have it here—brutally concluded:

“This is a sorry story of indecision, constantly changing requirements and delay...It is high time the MoD decided where its priorities lay.”

That was 19 years ago.

Following much criticism, FRES was abandoned and eventually re-emerged as the Ajax family of armoured vehicles, with six variants. In March 2010, during the dying months of the Brown Government, the decision was taken to meet the requirement by purchasing the vehicle known as ASCOD, which was also being procured by the Spanish army, in Spain, from US contractor General Dynamics. Crucially, this was originally intended to be an off-the-shelf procurement, with minimal design modification, to enter service in 2017.

The coalition Government, at the Cardiff NATO summit in 2014, announced that Ajax would be manufactured in Merthyr Tydfil, using hulls imported from Spain. In short, Labour originally ordered Ajax, but the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats decided where it would be built. Unusually, this was to encompass both a development and production contract running simultaneously. Moreover, an early decision was taken to up-gun Ajax from a 30 mm to a 40 mm weapon, involving a major redesign of the turret. In all, the Army eventually insisted on an incredible 1,200 additional requirements, totally contrary to the off-the-shelf principle.

Concerns regarding vibration and noise-related injuries to crews were first flagged by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory as far back as 2014, but it was not until November 2020—six years later—that Ministers were first informed that trials had been suspended over safety concerns. Defence Equipment and Support, after much internal angst, then issued a formal stop notice in June 2021. Ajax trials were eventually restarted in 2022, but not before the programme had been subject to trenchant criticism from the Defence Committee, the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, the National Audit Office—which famously concluded that Ajax was “flawed from the start”—and the Public Accounts Committee to boot.

In 2022, Defence Secretary Ben Wallace, rightfully exasperated by the endless delays and the quality of advice being given to Ministers, commissioned the wholly independent Clive Sheldon KC to undertake a detailed review of Ajax. Sheldon’s 172-page review—I have it here—was excoriating. To summarise it in one sentence, it painted a picture of a completely dysfunctional UK procurement system, in which serious concerns articulated at junior level were routinely ignored or explained away by senior managers. Nevertheless, the Army began preparing to bring Ajax into operational service.

On 5 November last year, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry headed up a major media event at General Dynamics’ Ajax production facility in Merthyr Tydfil to declare that Ajax had successfully achieved “Initial Operating Capability”. Given the controversial history of the programme, the Minister—who cannot be here today, but who is no fool—did exactly what I would have done, which was to ask for written assurances that the programme was safe, including from the Chief of the General Staff and the National Armaments Director. One key question, incidentally, is: who told both of them that it was safe?

Armed with letters from both of those very senior gentlemen confirming that Ajax was indeed ready to enter service safely, the Minister went ahead—we believe in good faith—and declared to the media that Ajax is

“a vehicle that is safe, effective and truly cutting-edge.”

I can therefore only imagine his horror when, on 22 November, a major regimental exercise on Salisbury plain to test Ajax’s battle-worthiness—involving two squadrons of Ajax vehicles, along with command and support variants, some 60 vehicles in all—had to be rapidly abandoned after 23 crew members reported serious vibration and noise-related injuries. Subsequently, the Minister even halted trials on individual Ajax test vehicles, after further injuries to test crews were discovered.

The response of GD UK, in the form of Mr Robert Skivington, one of its then managers, was—disgustingly—to blame the Army’s crews and their commanders in an expletive-ridden social media post. In my sorry, decade-long experience of General Dynamics, that just about sums up their management—not their workers. Moreover, I had a chance encounter with the Ajax senior responsible owner, Mr Chris Bowbrick, at the Defence and Security Equipment International exhibition last September, during which he categorically assured me that Ajax was now safe—and he even shook my hand on it. If the Minister feels angry that he was misinformed, I feel exactly the same way.

Everyone agrees we simply cannot go on with this endless stop-start cycle regarding Ajax, not least as it represents the Army’s largest procurement programme at £5.5 billion for acquisition, or £6.3 billion including life-cycle costs. It is also the Army’s biggest chunk of the long-delayed defence investment plan. In short, as safety is paramount, Ministers now have one of two stark options over Ajax: either they must fix it or fail it once and for all. Let us look at both.

Ajax has always been too big to fail. Many senior generals, senior civil servants and GD directors have their careers effectively invested in the programme. Indeed, Sheldon relates in some detail the reluctance over a long period of DE&S senior management to even admit that there were serious failings with the vehicle. I am not a qualified engineer, so I cannot pronounce on whether the problem is fixable. Some analysts argue that the vehicle is now so heavy—at up to 43 tonnes it is just two tonnes lighter than a world war two Panther main battle tank—and flawed that it cannot be saved, short of a fundamental redesign which would cost billions of pounds.

However, if this really can be sorted by technical means, then conceptually we surely need a deep fix which effectively puts the problems to bed definitively. If that can somehow be achieved at GD’s expense, then all well and good. Nevertheless, the risk is that the MOD and GD merely tweak the vehicle yet again and then rerun that exercise—perhaps six months from now—with almost exactly the same outcome. In that context, I would humbly remind the Minister of Einstein’s definition of madness, which is doing the same thing over and over again and somehow expecting a different result.

Conversely, if it emerges that Ajax is somehow fundamentally flawed and cannot be fixed, then the other option is to end the cycle of denial, rip off the plaster and fail it. That would then involve the Ministry of Defence in potentially tortuous negotiations with General Dynamics, in essence, to get its money back so that it could spend it on something else, such as the BAE CV90, which now successfully serves in many NATO countries—and which lost out to Ajax in the first place. If GD was not willing to accept liability, although many think it should, the MOD would probably have no recourse other than to sue it for liquidated damages for delivering a vehicle that was demonstrably not fit for purpose. To conclude, that could involve the Department in a highly aggressive court case potentially lasting years, but which would no doubt also be highly injurious to the reputation of General Dynamics as a global defence manufacturer. This cannot go on; Ministers must fix it or fail it once and for all.

10:48

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Al Carns)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I am grateful to the hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) for securing this debate.

It will not be lost on the audience that I am not the Minister of State for Defence Readiness and Industry, but I am a former Royal Marine with 24 years of service and now also the Minister responsible for the armed forces. I can assure hon. Members of this Government’s commitment to the safety of our service personnel. That is absolutely paramount. It underpins a bond of trust between all MOD activity and the Government, and it is a vital strand of our responsibility to ensure that our service personnel are provided with the correct equipment that is safe, but also reliable and effective.

That is why Ministers were so alarmed by the symptoms reported by 35 soldiers who operated Ajax vehicles during November’s exercise Titan Storm. I can update Members that of those 35 people, nine are now back to normal duties, two were found to be suffering from symptoms unrelated to Ajax and the remaining 24 continue to be monitored by our medical services, primarily for hearing and vibration. We will ensure that they receive all necessary support as they progress. I can also confirm that the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), alongside the Chief of the General Staff, will visit affected units and speak to affected soldiers later this week, having written to them at the end of the year.

Exercise Titan Storm represented the latest chapter in a programme that has been well documented by parliamentary Committees and independent MOD reports. Ajax was approved in 2014 with a date for initial operating capability of 2020. Today, after significant delays, just over 180 vehicles have been delivered. The symptoms reported by some of our soldiers operating Ajax during Exercise Titan Storm have led to four separate, rigorous investigations. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry plans to further update the House on this matter next week, so hon. Members will understand that I may leave some of the specific questions—including the 37 from the hon. Member for Huntingdon; on average, one a minute—for that Minister to answer in detail.

Along with the investigations into the vehicles by the Defence Accident Investigation Branch and the Army safety investigation team, which were set out to Parliament by the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry on 8 December, a ministerial-led review into the implementation of previous recommendations has also been commissioned. It focuses on the basis of written assurances given to Ministers ahead of the announcement of initial operating capability in November. As set out in his written ministerial statement on 18 December, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry subsequently also directed a pause on all Ajax trials to allow for an investigation into a second safety incident reported during a trial at Bovington on 12 December.

Each of the 23 affected vehicles have now undergone 45-point inspections, with further instrumental testing, including for noise and vibration, taking place literally as we speak. In that incident, the affected soldier received medical support and did not require hospitalisation. The vehicle involved was not one of the 23 from Exercise Titan Storm; it was a separate vehicle being used to establish a safety baseline for comparison. I can confirm that that soldier has now returned to duty with no issues whatsoever, and that discussions are ongoing between the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry and officials within the Department on appropriate next steps regarding the potential restart of those trials.

As many of my Welsh colleagues have pointed out, the Ajax vehicles are built in Merthyr Tydfil to support a UK-wide supply chain of more than 230 companies and over 4,100 jobs. Because of the importance of the programme to south Wales, Ministers have been in close contact with the Welsh Government; the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry met the Welsh Economy Minister, Rebecca Evans on 15 December.

As I mentioned earlier, because previous investigations and adjustments should have fixed the recent challenges to the programme, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry has put in place a ministerial-led review that will assess how the Department has implemented the recommendations of previous reviews, and suggest improvements to the process of providing timely and accurate information to Ministers. To ensure the independence and rigour of that process, that review is conducted by experts who are not part of the Ajax programme. Ministers, the Chief of the General Staff and officials are also working closely with General Dynamics to resolve the issues, and will continue to do so. Most recently, at ministerial level, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry met senior managers from General Dynamics on 9 December. He plans to meet them again next week, and has future plans that are in train to meet the workforce again.

It is important that each of the investigation teams are given the time and space required to get to the bottom of the recent incidents, and past failures, so that we can take the most appropriate and accountable next steps. I want to be clear that there is no predetermined outcome. Ministers will be led by the facts and all options are absolutely on the table. As the Defence Secretary has said of this programme, we must either back it or indeed scrap it.

[Stuart Anderson]

When or if trials resume, what assurances will we get that no future British troops will be put in harm’s way by testing Ajax?

[Al Carns]

I can assure the hon. Member—and I note his background—that the safety of our armed forces will be the No. 1 priority when we commence those trials. That has to be the baseline common denominator as we move forward. I reiterate that the Defence Secretary said that we must back it or scrap it; the evidence will allow us to make that decision.

I will cover off some of the 37 questions that were asked earlier. When we talk about initial operating capability, there is a slight dichotomy. We mentioned a perceived rush to IOC for Ajax on the one hand; on the other hand, collectively hon. Members are asking why Boxer’s IOC is moving. It cannot be one or t’other. We have got to allow the teams and experts to ensure that IOC is met in the safest possible manner and that any lessons from Ajax are pulled across into the Boxer programme and other big capability programmes, as has been mentioned by some hon. Members, so that we can understand and learn from them.

We are also, in some cases, our own worst enemy—we have had over 1,000 capability requirement changes throughout the programme. As we change the capability, the platform changes, the cost changes and the time-trialling system changes, and we need to reduce that as we move forward with major capabilities. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry will update the House in due course, covering things such as capability changes and requirements and how many noise vibration issues there were in Titan Storm, and he will answer the rest of the multitude of very detailed questions that were asked earlier today.

On British military doctrine, it is really important to recognise that Ukraine is changing the whole character of conflict and how we fight. Terms such as armoured recce, ranges of gun systems and the reason why we built the tank in the first place—to carry a gun and to deliver firepower at pace—are changing because of the development of technology. We are wrestling with a whole set of capability changes, which are changing the character of conflict. We must not learn false lessons from Ukraine but pull the most effective ones and draw them into our capability programmes that in some cases were set in place 10 to 15 years ago. It is a very complex system of moving forward, but I can assure Members that we are learning those lessons from Ukraine and trying to incorporate them as best we can into the current programmes. What I would say is that Ajax started in 2014, and we have had 10 years of progress, but also a huge amount of mistakes. Those lessons will be pulled across into Boxer.

My hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare (Gerald Jones) outlined the invaluable skills and capability of the staff that have actually created these systems, and some of the capabilities that they have brough to bear are absolutely second to none. The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry will report next week, and he is more than happy to meet both union and industry visitors in due course.

The hon. Member for Weald of Kent (Katie Lam) highlighted some issues with the direct threat to our armed forces that the capability may present. What I would say is: allow the facts to do the talking, allow the review to come out next week, allow the report to be presented to the House, and then let us work out whether this capability can actually add value, whether it is in the armoured recce space or armoured infantry roles and so on. From my perspective, it is important to allow the facts and the honesty of the review to pull through.

I express my gratitude once again to the hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon for introducing the debate and to all Members for their continued attention to Ajax programme. I trust that we have collectively been clear about where we stand on this. Multiple investigations are under way. All Ajax activity—training, exercise and trials—has been paused until these investigations are complete. Ministers will receive findings in the coming weeks, and all options remain on the table.

Importantly—it has been mentioned multiple times, and I have been at the bottom of the food chain in the military as well—I thank Alfie and Fill Your Boots; I thank the men and the officers for highlighting these concerns and speaking truth to power; and I thank the armed forces collectively for working collaboratively with us to come to an amenable solution that gives them the capability that they deserve.

10:58

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I thank everybody who participated in this very detailed debate. The Welsh Members who spoke represented the workers at the factory in Merthyr Tydfil extremely well; it is important that their voices are also heard in this debate. From my perspective, it is very important that we focus on how to deliver Ajax as a capability. I appreciate everything that the Minister said about the changing character of conflict and the changing nature of warfare. Ukraine has certainly moved the dial, particularly on armoured warfare and the survivability and lethality of armour going forward, and I know that the Chief of the General Staff has a very detailed view on how he wants to progress our lethality across the Army, particularly with regard to what that looks like going forward.

Ajax is in danger of being superseded by events; indeed, there is a potential that it is almost out of date. It is important that we consider how to make it relevant for the future, given that it has had a significant investment. Yes, it is late, but we can still utilise it, if we can harness its capability. I spoke to soldiers who have used the platform successfully—there are some—and they were positive about the capability of the vehicle. The wider issue is that we do not have an armoured capability that backs that up. It is the tip of the spear, but the handle of the spear is not up to standard. There are some serious concerns around how we maintain the capability of Challenger and what the armoured infantry looks like in the future. I would like to thank everybody for participating in the debate.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the future of the Ajax Programme.