Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill
Tuesday 1st December 2020
(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberCovert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 View all Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 144(Corr)-III(Rev) Revised third marshalled list for Committee - (1 Dec 2020)
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
My Lords, in speaking to Amendment 77, I should first declare that my daughter wrote on this subject in a book on powers of investigation and human rights. I should also add that the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, very much regrets that he is unable to speak to this amendment, which he warmly supports.
I do not have much to add to the expert introduction of my noble friend Lady Clark of Kilwinning. I simply emphasise, as a former member of the NUJ, that this amendment bears particularly on investigative journalism and the exposure of illegal, exploitative or anti-social activity: writing that could arguably impact on economic well-being or disorder and which we need to protect, in the public interest, as a keystone of democracy. The confidentiality of journalists’ sources is protected by Article 10 of the ECHR’s guarantee of freedom of expression, as my noble friend Lady Clark said. Further, any statutory provision allowing the circumvention of the existing legal protection of journalists’ sources is also dangerous because it will deter those sources from coming forward.
The Secretary of State for Justice, when Solicitor-General, said that the ability of sources to provide anonymous information to journalists needed to be protected and preserved. This will not happen if those sources are at the mercy of the wide range of covert intelligence agents that the Bill would casually authorise with no judicial oversight.
As my noble friend Lady Clark said, the Investigatory Powers Act requires prior judicial authorisation as essential when any application is made to identify confidential journalistic sources. When he was a Home Office Minister, Nick Hurd MP confirmed that these protections were necessary to comply with the Government’s obligations under Article 10, that the police require a production order from a circuit judge, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, and that they must, in addition, satisfy the conditions of confidentiality. We should not dilute this kind of obligation. I hope that the current provisions are not yet another attempt by this Government to muzzle, challenge and undermine one of the democratic pillars of freedom.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker. I agree with everything she said. I also have a daughter who is a journalist so, for me, this is quite personal. I also care very much about the truth, and journalists are often the people who give us the truth in any particular situation.
I have signed Amendment 77, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Clark of Kilwinning, for it. It is slightly awkwardly included in this group, but it addresses the specific issue of protecting journalism and journalistic sources. We need that in the Bill. We have put it into other Bills, such as counterintelligence or counterterrorism Bills, and it would easily go into this one as well. It would make sure that we have a clear commitment to journalism. I realise that this is not particularly comfortable for this Government, which have criticised a lot of lefty journalists—as well as lawyers—but it is incredibly important.
This group generally shows broad support across your Lordships’ House for the principle that judicial authorisation must be built into the Bill. It must not be arbitrary or a rubber-stamping exercise; it has to be the real stuff. In many ways, comparing it with search warrants issued by a magistrates’ court is much too weak a comparison. High-level crimes can be authorised in the Bill, with deep and lasting consequences. There must be high-tier judicial oversight and approval to match.
The question is whether we can build consensus around a way forward. Amendment 61 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, is perhaps the easiest solution to this problem. It sets up the judicial commissioner as the proper overseer and sets out the legal test that must be met to grant an authorisation. In particular, it tests the reasonableness of granting authorisation and explicitly protects against breaches of human rights, which we will come to later. Overall, the Government are being offered a selection of solutions to a problem. I hope that they take one of them.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
I will speak to Amendments 12 and 61 in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. I am grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for its briefing. I am not particularly well qualified to speak on these issues, as many who have already spoken have direct experience in this regard, but I believe in due process and natural justice. I am concerned that we are reversing activity that was criminal and making it legal.
As the Law Society of Scotland has pointed out, scrutiny of the exercise of these powers lies with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who is required to produce an annual report. However, this is scrutiny after the event. It will be limited and may not provide us in Parliament with the robustness that the exercise of these powers commands. Therefore, given the nature of the policy, there should be checks and balances to ensure the effective operation of these organisations to ensure that there is public confidence in the use of these powers by providing limits on their use and adequate scrutiny.
I am attracted to Amendments 12 and 61, which the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, referred to, as well as to Amendments 46 and 73 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which have many elements that commend themselves. Amendments 12 and 61 ensure that criminal conduct authorisations receive prior approval from a judicial commissioner. In the debate last week—which seems a long time ago— there was a great coalition of views around whether approval should be given by a judge, a judicial commissioner or a member of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. I would be guided by those with much greater experience than I have in that regard.
However, it is important for there to be greater scrutiny before criminal conduct authorisation is granted, rather than after the event. In terms of due process, it should not be for the organisations, in the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of the Shaws, to mark their own homework. The issue should not be simply for a senior official in the departments—I am particularly concerned about the Food Standards Agency and the Environment Agency—and we will come on to explore those in greater detail. In the words of the Law Society of Scotland,
“The Bill authorises persons within the relevant organisations to act with impunity where authorised by indicating that the criminal law will not apply to them in undertaking acts which would otherwise result in prosecution and conviction. In most circumstances, what will happen is that justification of the criminal conduct will be sought after the event”.
I put it to the House this afternoon that that is unacceptable, and authorisation should be granted—preferably judicial authorisation, in the best format possible—before the act that would otherwise deemed to be criminal actually takes place.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Judd, has withdrawn, so the next speaker will be the noble Lord, Lord Naseby.
Lord Naseby (Con)
My Lords, in many ways, subsection (5) of Clause 1 could well be the most important part of the Bill. I should make it clear that I support MI5. Its focus and dedication to working in the national interest is second to none.
Criminal activity has to be limited and defined, but the most difficult area is defining the methodology. Who should give clearance? I am not convinced that a judge, however senior, necessarily has the right experience. In my judgment, we need someone with specific experience in this challenging area. In reviewing this matter, we should look at what other countries do, particularly the USA and Canada, as other noble Lords have mentioned. Both appear to be pretty successful in this area. I am not qualified to make a judgment on that, but I should be interested, too, in what Australia does. Reference has been made to a close friend of mine, the late Desmond de Silva, who carried out marvellous work for the UN in Northern Ireland. In that context, he produced a framework of control, which needs to be looked at because it includes areas that merit serious consideration.
Part of what we are considering is the future security of our country, which brings me to the integrated review of foreign defence, security and development policy announced recently in the other place. I shall quote from the penultimate paragraph, which states:
“I can announce that we have established a National Cyber Force, combining our intelligence agencies and service personnel, which is already operating in cyberspace against terrorism, organised crime and hostile state activity. ”—[Official Report, Commons, 19/11/20; col. 489.]
It is clear to me and, I imagine, your Lordships that life in the 21st century will be quite different from anything we have yet experienced.
Against that background, the control proposed in Amendments 46 and 73 may be the way forward. They need refining and the contributions of my friends, the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Carlile, should be considered. Noble Lords should make no mistake: this is a crucial area for the future security of our country.
Lord Blunkett (Lab)
My Lords, it is a pity, although entirely understandable, that we had to break the debate last week because not only were the contributions extremely informative and, in some cases, profound, they set the context as we continue the debate on this group.
I want to pick up a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, in relation to making the illegal legal. We are here because we want to provide a regulatory framework and powers to ensure that what was undertaken previously is set in the context of legal and authorised actions. Phone tapping, interception and surveillance were all illegal until they were authorised in a regulatory framework, which happened only in recent decades. What we are trying to do here is fill a hole to ensure that we have a grip on this and know what is being done on our behalf and that it is being done in an acceptable fashion.
That is why I want to speak to Amendment 15 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hain, who spoke powerfully and from the heart last week about his experience. I also support the concepts in Amendments 46 and 73, ably spoken to by the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Butler, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who I worked closely with when she was head of the Security Service. When I was Home Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was surprised to receive a phone call from me asking him to have oversight on terrorism, which I was pleased to do. In a non-partisan way, I say to the Minister, who does not carry responsibility for this matter, that she might take the message back to her colleagues in the Cabinet that it sometimes helps not to be seen to give your friends all the jobs. I just lay that on the table.
There is also a great deal of merit in the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lady Clark, and spoken to by my noble friend Lady Whitaker. We have seen important exposés by people embedded in homes for people with learning disabilities, children’s homes and retirement homes. We must be careful not to infringe on legitimate investigations.
However, I want to return to the debate on Amendments 15, 46 and 73. I thought that some very good points were made in relation to the proposals put forward by my noble friend Lady Kennedy. I understand why, but there is a real contradiction in putting a judge up front in charge of legalising something rather than having them act as a commissioner in reviewing a decision that has been taken. As was said last week, it misunderstands the role of the judiciary—even barristers can sometimes misunderstand the role of the judiciary—not only in terms of its profound and important role in our legal, criminal justice and constitutional life, but in terms of the skills and experience that members of the judiciary gain in building to the point where they take on the job, and the experience that they have in the job. It is worth looking at the role of the Home Secretary or, in the case of my noble friend Lord Hain, the equivalent in Northern Ireland. Their important role is legitimised by their being elected and they are accountable in the sense that they can be held to account if they report back to the two Houses of Parliament. Perhaps this proposal could be integrated with those in Amendments 46 and 73.
As the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said last week, a behind-the-scenes, behind-the-Chair discussion before Report might be a way forward. The Minister would be able to seek agreement from her colleagues so that there was sufficient movement to enable us to agree and to provide the legitimacy and accountability that everyone is seeking in this group of amendments. If we could do that, we could move forward with some confidence that we will put right something that should have been put right. Although the issue was not prevalent at the time, I accept my part in not having filled every hole in the process of ensuring that we scrutinise and have a mechanism to review, and therefore legitimise, what has taken place. I am really pleased that we have been able to continue the debate this afternoon. I hope the Minister will be able to pick up not only on the comments this afternoon but on the very substantive issues raised last week.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]
My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, who has brought to bear his own experience on this issue. I would like very briefly to speak in favour of all these amendments. In essence, there are five main proposals before the House, some with variance. They are as follows: first, leave it as it is and rely on the discretion of the prosecutor; secondly, have authorisation in all cases either by the secret services or by the Competition and Markets Authority, or any of the authorities, and, in due course, review by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner; thirdly, pre-authorisation either by a judge or by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner or a Secretary of State; fourthly, pre-authorisation, except in an emergency, by the same people; and, fifthly, real-time notification.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, about the comment made last week by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack—who spoke very wisely, as he often does, in saying that we should attempt to find the best solution. The difficulty is knowing how to do that without evidence as to the pros and cons. None of this is easy and getting it wrong will be very damaging to all concerned. Perhaps I may illustrate that by taking one of the alternatives and saying what it would be helpful to know. I shall take the example of real-time notification.
The first question I would like answered is: if the authorities can tell the Investigatory Powers Commissioner within seven days, why is it not possible in most cases to notify in advance? It would certainly be far safer to do that. Secondly, if this course is adopted, will each change have to be notified? Thirdly—this is the most serious question—what will happen if the Investigatory Powers Commissioner says that the authority should not have been granted? Will the authorisation cease immediately; and if it did not, what would the consequences be under the Human Rights Act, for example, for those affected? Presumably, any disallowance or contrary views by the IPC would not be retrospective. Fourthly, would not the report at the end of the year identifying that authority should not have been granted be more damaging than trying to stop that mistake in the first place by pre-authorisation?
Should this real-time notification apply to everyone? Like the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, and many others who have spoken, I have the greatest admiration for the security and secret services. But is the same true of the Competition and Markets Authority and the Food Standards Agency? We have to be careful of what can happen on people’s coat-tails.
Finally, I really do think it would be useful to have the views of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner himself on this idea. He has to operate it; does he think it practicable, and what is to happen?
I could, drawing on my own experience, try to give some more details in respect of these matters, but I fear that in doing so I might be at risk of transgressing, as would other noble Lords, by inadvertently saying something very sensitive. That is why in our previous sitting, in the debate on the second group of amendments, I suggested finding a means of ensuring that there is evidence before the House to enable it to understand the deficiencies in the present law which need to be corrected, and to scrutinise the proposals for reform and try to ensure that the proposals, if necessary as amended, will work well for the future. My general experience has been, in relation to both the police and the security services, that they are rightly reticent about putting matters into the public domain. But it is often possible to put sufficient into the public domain without damage to security and methods of operation. However, you cannot do that unless you know enough about the issues and the evidence.
It is also my experience that subjecting issues of this kind to independent scrutiny and not relying on conclusions that are put forward is in the overwhelming interest of the security services, the police and the other bodies. That is because these are difficult issues of judgment that need to be scrutinised externally and independently and then addressed so that the risk of future errors is minimised and confidence maintained. That is why I would hope that means can be found to enable the House to carry out the constitutional function I have outlined. I have suggested referring either the Bill or specific issues to a Select Committee, under Standing Order 8.118, which can take evidence in private and publish a report, or—an alternative as suggested by my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich —to seek a report from an individual. I would hope that the report would enable us to do our constitutional duty, find the right answer and be able to reassure everyone that we had, on this extraordinarily difficult issue, made a decision where the safeguards were right and that was practicable. I have written to the Minister and discussed this with her. I very much hope that a way forward can be found.
Lord King of Bridgwater (Con) [V]
I am very pleased to follow the noble and learned Lord, who ended by saying that he wanted to ensure that the solution was practicable and workable. I strongly agree. This is the first time that I have had a chance to speak on the Bill. I straightaway echo very strongly the comments of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which recognised that, in an increasingly dangerous and unstable world, covert intelligence has a vital role to play in protecting our country from terrorism, organised crime and the growing threats to our national well-being. I was very impressed by the information that James Brokenshire, the Minister for Security, gave on Second Reading in another place. In the year to November 2019, in London alone, covert intelligence led to 3,500 arrests and the recovery of 100 firearms and 400 other weapons, half a ton of drugs and £2.5 million in cash. I note also the evidence given that, in 2017, covert intelligence foiled an attack on No. 10 Downing Street. Having myself been a victim of the mortar attack 30 years ago on No. 10, I am sorry that we did not have better covert intelligence then.
I also recognise that this vital tool must be put on a proper statutory basis. I have to say again that it is not before time, because it was 26 years ago that the Secret Intelligence Service and the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I had the privilege to lead in its early years, was put on a statutory basis.
Lord Campbell-Savours (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I will confine my remarks on this Bill to the thrust of Amendment 46. I declare an interest as a former member of the ISC from 1997 to 2001, under the excellent chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, who has just spoken and who equally supports Amendment 46. I am not a lawyer, but I ran with the hounds in the Commons during the Peter Wright affair of the 1980s. In doing so, I developed an interest in authorisation procedures, which I followed up as a member of the ISC.
As I read it, it is uncertainty over compliance with the Human Rights Act, the ECHR and the implied powers therein that is driving legislative reform. The problem is only aggravated by the inclusion of a raft of new bodies, some presumably with marginal quasi-professional experience of covert action. My problem is the inadequacy of post-event assessment. An annual report from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is not enough. An onerous system of prior authorisation is too much. We need a robust, uncomplicated procedure of prior scrutiny, not authorisation, where the rights of individuals and the state are fully recognised.
I place on record the statement from Andy Erlam, the principal complainant in the Tower Hamlets v Rahman case, which exposes deficiencies in the current CHIS-bases system: “An attempt was made to recruit me as a CHIS some time ago. I had taken a successful election petition against the Mayor of Tower Hamlets, Lutfur Rahman. The police officer who met me was from the Metropolitan Police. He said he was employed by the Department for Professional Standards but that he had a national role in supervising CHISs. He asked me to recruit CHISs, and documentation exists to confirm that this meeting took place. I learned that the officer who had authorised the approach to me was the same officer in charge of the two Metropolitan Police criminal inquiries into Mr Rahman, and that the commission and the City of London Police inquiry all found insufficient evidence. Yet the campaign in Tower Hamlets which I led exposed extensive corruption. I suspect that the police were compromised in some way. I experienced police harassment and an attempted arrest in the middle of the election High Court trial, an election case which I later won. If the use of undercover operations can be justified in some cases, I do not think they should ever pervert the course of justice. I believe this approach was an attempt to compromise me. Police officers who I know informally state that the use of CHISs leads to lazy policing, and it is never clear whether the police are using the CHIS or the CHIS is using the police. The current proposal to extend legal immunity to cover CHISs carrying out criminal activities is a matter of considerable concern.”
Erlam is questioning a whole CHIS-based system. I do not, but on accountability he is right. We need a far more robust system of prior evaluation and scrutiny. In this debate, we have heard demands for prior judicial authorisation, judicial commissioners, the use of prosecutors and judges, and a prosecutorial approach with warrants, and the Government are saying no—although there was a slight movement from the Government in last week’s debate, a hint at reconsideration. Anyhow, whatever the position, the Government will have their way, with their 70-seat Commons majority, so a compromise must be found, and I propose a compromise.
I have two alternatives. First, I propose that the remit of the chairman of the ISC be extended in the way that I have previously suggested during ISC debates, to give him or her prior access to intelligence-based CHIS operational activity—a prior scrutiny role, not an authorising role—in the handling of all CHIS. It would mean restoration of the prime-ministerial lock on ISC chairmanship appointments. Under this proposal, the chairman would be able to release CHIS information to the ISC only where it is agreed to do so with the agency heads, including the wider list of agencies currently being proposed.
It could be argued that to include the Food Standards Agency et al could be stretching the duties placed on the ISC chairman, and potentially in a much limited form on the committee, far too far. I say that as we simply do not know the volume of CCAs. If that was a problem, the Speakers of both Houses could be asked to nominate an agreed alterative person or persons, depending on the volume of CCAs, to carry out the function. I suggest a Member of this House, their role being prior scrutiny of CHIS operational activity, not authorisation. I believe that we have people in Parliament who, as former chairmen of the ISC or other respected Members of this House, are as worthy of access to information in the deepest recesses of the various intelligence communities et al as any agency head.
Another way forward could be to appoint a scrutiny group comprising either two or three persons as part of the same prior scrutiny process. Such a group should comprise at least one member of a legislature of high standing—again, appointed by the Prime Minister but ratified by Parliament. In my mind, a member of a legislature must—I repeat “must”—be party in one form or another to whatever process is selected. In the USA, the defense appropriations subcommittee is, by law, according to Wikipedia, “fully and currently informed” of intelligence activities. This includes being kept informed of covert actions and any significant intelligence failure. I am not even asking for that. Wikipedia goes on to say that, under certain circumstances, the President may restrict access to covert activities to only the chairman and vice-chairman of the committee. I will settle for that. I am asking, in compromise, for a lesser form of accountability under a less onerous arrangement.
Under my second way forward, the second and third persons could be judiciary-drawn and/or departmental accounting officers. To me, the appointments under both options are particularly important in this new world of heightened tension, international trafficking, greater sophistication in fraud and organised crime. We cannot underestimate these dangers.
Equally, we need a commensurate increase in accountability. After over 40 years in public life, I have learned that transparency, by its very nature, influences conduct and thereby, to some extent, control to varying degrees. I support the thrust of the amendments that extend accountability, if not the detail, as proposed in the Committee today.
Lord Bach (Lab) [V]
My Lords, it is a privilege to follow my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, whose expertise in this area is well known and has been for many years.
There are many profound constitutional issues in the Bill, and many of them have been debated in this long group of amendments. I speak in support of Amendment 76, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. My noble friend and I agree that this is not a profound constitutional amendment but we argue that it is important none the less.
Noble Lords will recall the highly effective speech of my noble friend Lord Hunt last week in which he argued that police and crime commissioners should have some standing in relation to the annual inspection of police forces by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and not just be excluded from playing any part. Of course, I must declare my interest as the elected and full-time police and crime commissioner for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. I will try not to repeat my noble friend’s arguments but will attempt to persuade the Committee to reach the conclusion that, as with all inspections of a police force, it is essential that a police and crime commissioner plays some part.
Why do I say “essential”? Many noble Lords will remember the passage through Parliament of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. The then coalition Government, in setting up elected police and crime commissioners in place of appointed police committees, were clear that the role of a police and crime commissioner was to represent the public and hold the force to account for its effectiveness, its efficiency and, importantly, its legitimacy.
Lord Janvrin (CB) [V]
My Lords, I support the case for strengthening oversight as put forward in Amendments 46 and 73, and I add my voice to those questioning the case for prior judicial approval of criminal conduct authorisations.
I speak not as a lawyer or practitioner but as another former member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, where we had plenty of evidence of the importance of covert human intelligence sources. I share the view that we need to get the balance right between, on the one hand, constructing a rigorous legal framework to support the activities of our intelligence and security agencies while, at the same time, still giving them the practical operational flexibility to carry out their difficult work effectively.
I have listened carefully to the strong arguments in favour of prior judicial authorisation. It is, as has been pointed out, what is required for other activities of the intelligence services and police. Should we not follow the practice of communications interception or search warrants? There are important differences. The person authorised to tap a phone or search a premises will be a public servant: an agent of the state. The person being given a criminal conduct authorisation may be a private citizen—possibly but not necessarily—from the margins of society, acting almost certainly from a complex set of motives and probably knowing that they are putting themselves in danger.
In the first case, authorisation seems to be essentially a judgment about compliance with the law. However, a criminal conduct authorisation requires, in addition, personal knowledge of the agent concerned and human relationships involved in complex circumstances. It is about making a judgment, possibly urgently, on human motivation, limitations and behaviour, and about operational context and risk. Therefore, on balance, I share the view that the handler or controller is better placed than a judicial commissioner to make that judgment call on what should and should not be authorised. Obviously, I am in no way against judicial authorisation in principle; it is about getting the best decision.
I would add a small point. For the handler to know that he or she is the authorising officer makes him or her more clearly accountable. It concentrates the mind to sign something off. As my noble friend Lord Anderson observed, it also concentrates the mind to know that your decision will be scrutinised immediately and rigorously. I therefore strongly share the view the present oversight arrangements should be significantly strengthened in the ways put forward in Amendments 46 and 73 to allow immediate scrutiny by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. My noble friend Lord Anderson and colleagues from the Cross Benches have spoken with much greater experience than me on the need for real-time oversight. I find the arguments persuasive. Indeed, there may be a case for giving judicial oversight powers more teeth—perhaps along the lines of Amendment 47 or something similar.
Finally, I said at the outset that we are looking to get the balance right between a robust legal framework and operational flexibility. Obviously, this applies across the Bill. I ask the Minister to consider whether, by strengthening significantly the oversight arrangements, she will mitigate some of our other concerns around, for example, immunity or the serious crimes threshold in this important Bill.
Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I support Amendment 14. I was sorry that I was unable to attend Second Reading. I was sitting on a sub-committee of the EU Select Committee and was therefore unable to welcome the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, and congratulate him on an impressive maiden speech. He gave the impression that he had been introducing Bills in your Lordships’ House all his life.
I welcome the Bill, which provides for authorising offers to be given express powers to authorise criminal conduct that would otherwise be illegal. They carry a heavy responsibility, hence the need for supervision. Given the history of direct government intervention in coal mining disputes many years ago, I look forward to debating amendments in the names of my noble friends dealing with trade unions. Powers given
“in the interests of the economic well-being”
of the state will need close scrutiny. I am proud that, in a small way, I was able to give a little legal advice to the south Wales miners during the miners’ strike—for the most part, pro bono—many years ago. During my time as a law officer for England and Wales, and separately as Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, although the Attorney-General has general oversight and appropriate clearance, I was not troubled on any issue arising from the Bill. As the House will know, law officers have general oversight and supervision of the offices of state concerning both the rule of law and other matters.
I wish to endorse and reinforce the points made by my noble friend Lord Rosser in his Second Reading speech about the need for judicial oversight prior—I emphasise “prior”—to the event. There is no argument that there should be supervision. The only issues are, first, who should supervise, and secondly, whether it should be post or prior the event. I believe that the arguments for proper prior supervision are fundamental. In our legal processes, we have judges available 24 hours a day. This particularly includes the long vacation— indeed, any time, any place, throughout the year. They can adjudicate from home if necessary; I am told that that is not unusual. Provided a judge is given the right information, a proper judgment can be given. The same applies down the line to the magistracy, which performs a very vital role. Before a warrant is issued, evidence in one form or another is given and judicial authority is given.
I was never involved as counsel on these procedures during my time as a criminal practitioner, but I can give a personal example of the availability of magistrates on family matters. My wife sat for 18 years in the London juvenile courts. Part of her duties involved the care of children who were, or might be, vulnerable. I recall many occasions when I had to leave the sitting room of our London house at the request of a welfare officer so that she could hear evidence, hear witnesses sworn in and adjudicate, pending the following morning when a proper courtroom could be convened. It was vital that there was availability. My point is that there has never been an issue with non-availability of a court sitting at any level. The Minister is not very persuasive in his brief comment in Column 1046. I need to be persuaded why you can have judicial intervention and a judicial decision in so many other fields but not in this one.
We are dealing with very serious matters. Authorising criminal conduct is important and a departure from the ordinary rules of law. If there is any problem about the security clearance of a particular judge, I would be surprised if that could not be achieved. If a High Court judge cannot be trusted, who can? It would not be beyond the administration of justice to have a panel of designated judges with experience in this field who adjudicate from time to time and can authorise the necessary activities.
This brings me back to the key question: who is to guard the guardians? This is not to denigrate the experience of the highly trained authorising officers, nor the retrospective—I emphasise “retrospective”—oversight of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Prior judicial authority is the best safeguard to ensure that, where there is a departure from the rule of law in ordinary circumstances, there is proper supervision of the activities.
Lord Rooker (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I too regret the split in this debate and certainly hope that it does not happen again. Members were left high and dry with no knowledge of what was happening on the evening concerned. However, that is in the past.
One minor caveat is that I served briefly as Minister of State both in the Northern Ireland Office and the Home Office, but I was involved purely in domestic matters—never in anything remotely regarding security or policing.
I applied to speak to this group of amendments only for the specific purpose of supporting Amendments 46 and 73 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I would have considerable difficulty supporting other amendments in this group, as I will if they come back on Report.
We have heard some powerful speeches about events of the past; in no way do I denigrate these, but this Bill is about the future. We have also heard much about the current inquiry into undercover policing. While I share the concern, and am quite appalled at some of the activities that have been disclosed, I do not see a massive connection with this Bill.
At Second Reading I said that, in the main, I think of a CHIS—a covert human intelligence source—as
“someone who is not an employee of the police or security services, but an outside, undercover informer or agent.”—[Official Report, 11/11/20; Col. 1079.]
No one is seeking a free-for-all. Some years ago, I spent a day in Thames House. Much to my surprise, I came away with the impression of liberal—with a small L—attitudes and, above all, a desire to serve and be accountable to Parliament and the rule of law.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said at one point in his speech that, in the past, he was converted to prior judicial review. I took this to be in respect of the issues he was dealing with at that time, and that has, in the main, been accomplished on other issues. I was also struck by the point he made about the FBI and Canada not using judges for prior approval. This point does not come across in some of the briefings received on the Bill.
Handling a covert human intelligence source is real, practical, person-to-person work, and Amendment 46 is a much better alternative than the others in the current circumstances. The noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, reinforced that, making the point that other alternatives do not seem practical. This was reinforced again by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, who spoke about the work of a CHIS as a specific form of intrusion that required a specialist overseer as it was not a specific one-off act. The work of the CHIS is different from other intrusions such as telephone intercepts or surveillance. It involves fast-changing situations and sometimes volatile, or possibly unpleasant, personalities. In such circumstances, a clear duty of care rests with the handler of the covert human intelligence source. Too little attention has been paid to this aspect.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, speaking in support last week, said that, to date in the debate, there had been some gross distortions of the position of the police. I too think some of the language has been extravagant, and it does not fit the here and now.
This brings me to the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. While earlier speeches in the debate drew on practical experience—in particular, that of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, as a police officer—we can now draw on the personal practical experience of someone who spent 33 years inside MI5 actually running agents in the field and who accepts that there is a life-long duty of care for the agents. Quite correctly, we do not hear much about this, but it is an important point to appreciate. The noble Baroness made a rather telling point, repeated today by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, about MI5 seeking such legislative accountability for running CHIS 27 years ago, before it was a statutory body. Given what I said at the start about what I consider a CHIS to be, it is clear to me that the noble Baroness made a powerful case for Amendment 46, adding to what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said in moving it.
Yes, of course, I accept in principle that prior judicial consent could be supported, but it is simply not practical. We need to think of the position of the agents and their handlers in the current circumstances—of those who are making such decisions today. We need to be supportive of change, accept that the situation is not comparable to telephone intercepts and other aspects of surveillance, and be wholly practical in a way that supports those doing this valuable work for the country. I support Amendment 46, unlike many of the other amendments in this group which are simply not practical.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow so many distinguished Members of your Lordships’ House—not least my noble friend Lord Rooker. The fact that this group has taken so long, has had by necessity to be split over two days and has contained so many distinguished contributions, merely highlights the gravity of the step taken in this Bill to create advanced and complete civil and criminal immunity for criminal conduct by CHIS, rather than putting CHIS itself on a statutory footing; I remind noble Lords of this. It also serves as a reminder of the care with which noble Lords approach this kind of dramatic constitutional exercise.
It would be remiss of me not to mention that this is the first sitting of this Committee since the Government announced yesterday that, once more, the Finucane family will not get the independent inquiry that they have sought for so long into the murder of the lawyer Pat Finucane. This seems highly pertinent to consideration of this Bill.
If after so long, and if after acceptance—even by a UK Prime Minister—that illegal collusion by state agents took place in that murder, and after so much criticism, including at international level, it is still not considered appropriate to have an independent judicial inquiry, that really does beg the question for the future as to whether any Government, of any stripe, at any moment in history, should be trusted with the ability to authorise a whole host of state agencies to subdelegate the power to grant immunities in relation to criminal conduct to a whole host of currently unspecified levels of authoriser or handler, and to do so without some kind of prior authorisation process. The sheer gravity of that new immunity from civil and criminal suit—which has not been the case up to now—is what I believe has caused such a plethora of alternative suggested safeguards, many of which arise in the group of amendments that we have been discussing in recent hours.
It would be invidious to cite particular interventions, because there have been so many; all have been incredibly expert and thoughtful, coming at the problem of safeguards from a great deal of alternative experience. We have heard from the retired judiciary. We have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, a very distinguished former director of MI5, who of course famously made her maiden speech in your Lordships’ House in defence of civil liberties and against the notion of 42 days’ detention without charge or trial. We have heard from a number of noble Lords who have served at Cabinet level, including my noble friend Lord Hain, who has authorised intrusive activity—necessarily, as a Northern Ireland Secretary—but has also, as he told us quite poignantly last week, been the victim of political manipulation of intrusive power.
My noble friend’s story particularly highlights how a covert human intelligence source is different from other kinds of intrusive power, as has been put eloquently by a great number of noble Lords. A human intelligence source is different because that human is at risk and, as a human, is therefore more precious than a bugging device when at risk. A human intelligence source is also more intrusive and dangerous to those being spied on, because that human will affect behaviour, not just monitor or record it.
In this group, there is a number of alternative authorisation processes and safeguards pre- and post-criminal activity, judicial and political—which, of course, makes me wince slightly. That menu is comparable to the other powers catered for in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
I remind noble Lords that the scheme of this Bill has essentially been grafted on to a pre-existing scheme in the 2000 Act. Any suggestion that there is currently no regulatory framework for CHIS is not the case—there is. Undercover operatives or agents are authorised under RIPA. However, they are not subject to external authorisation. That may be one problem at the heart of this debate—it is actually human intrusive surveillance or CHIS per se, before we even enter the territory of criminal conduct, which ought to be subject to greater safeguards. However, that is outside the scope of this Bill. It is unfortunate that, in this case, the Government have grafted something as drastic as granting advanced immunity to agents on to a pre-existing scheme without allowing legislators the opportunity to look at that wider scheme itself—because, of course, the Long Title of this Bill is so narrow in just being concerned with criminal conduct and not the authorisation of CHIS. That is unfortunate.
I hope that, in future, at the earliest possible opportunity, the Government will consider having another look at what safeguards should be applied to the authorisation or post-authorisation scrutiny of these undercover operatives and agents. That would help to deal with some of the complex arguments about whether it is appropriate for a judge or judicial commissioner to give a pre- or post- or real-time authorisation or scrutiny of actions that, ultimately, lie in the hands of the CHIS themselves. It is very difficult indeed, because of the fast-moving situations that were described by a great many noble Lords, properly to regulate such activity without regulating the operating mind, drive and ethic of the undercover person.
That brings me to my final point: it would be a great deal simpler if, ultimately, as is the status quo and the mechanism that has been so successful and has saved so many lives, we did not leave open what should be a remote possibility that an undercover operative will have their conduct examined after the fact, when it is criminal conduct, by an independent prosecutor and judge in the normal way, with all the defences that public interest will allow.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, this has been a lengthy and complex debate, and I blame the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for that; we tried to split this group to make it more manageable, but his will prevailed.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, amendments in this group are on prior authorisation by a judge; by an investigatory powers commissioner; by an investigatory powers commissioner unless it is urgent; by an investigatory powers commissioner if a criminal conduct authority is to be used to identify a journalistic source; and by a Secretary of State. Another amendment requires that an investigatory powers commissioner be notified
“as soon as … practicable, and in any event within seven days”
and that the police authority be involved in holding the chief constable to account as a result of the investigatory powers commissioner’s annual report on the use of CCAs.
It is understandable that noble Lords want prior notification—and why the police should not, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, said, mark their own homework. On the advice of one noble Lord, I read the code of practice that goes with this Bill. I have held both ranks that could grant a criminal conduct authority under this Bill. In urgent cases, that is an inspector, who can not only grant a criminal conduct authority but also grant immunity from prosecution. I was an inspector at the age of 24. I was also, subsequently, a controller of covert human intelligence sources. I spent 18 years as a uniformed officer. On the Friday I left the office as a uniformed chief inspector and on the Monday morning I was a detective chief inspector in the role of a controller. The Government may say that all the people involved in the matters considered by this Bill will be experienced and highly trained, but that is not always the case in my experience.
We should listen very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who articulated why prior authorisation is not practical, a point also made by the Minister for Security in another place and by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. From my experience I agree, although the description of MI5 handlers and agents as beyond reproach is not, in my experience, universally applicable to police handlers and informants.
Any prior authorisation would instruct CHIS to operate within strict parameters, which may no longer be necessary or proportionate once they are deployed, or may not be adequate once they are deployed, because they are being deployed into rapidly changing scenarios in an uncontrolled environment, often involving chaotic individuals. The most common use of CHIS in policing, for example, is to counter drug dealing. As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, has said, you cannot turn an agent on and off like you can a listening device.
Even the most experienced undercover officer may have to necessarily and proportionately go beyond the strict parameters of a CCA because the situation has dramatically changed in ways unforeseen by the handler. If he were to strictly adhere precisely to a CCA, he could put himself in danger of losing his life. As we will hear in later groups, children are increasingly being used as covert human intelligence sources, some of whom have chaotic lifestyles. Sometimes they are drug users or drug dealers. To expect such people to operate within the strict and precise boundaries of a CCA in such turbulent situations is not only unfair and unreasonable but completely unrealistic. To determine the strict parameters of a CCA to cover every possible scenario, in the middle of a rapidly changing situation, and when the legal immunity of both handler and CHIS depends on it, is unfair and unreasonable to both handler and CHIS.
Those proposing prior authorisation by judges, Investigatory Powers Commissioners and government Ministers may say that any conduct outside the strict parameters of a CCA will be looked at by the prosecuting authorities and a decision made whether to prosecute using the public interest test. In that case, why can the prosecuting authorities not look at all the actions of the CHIS and the handler and decide whether to prosecute?
Amendment 46, for which there seems to be a good deal of support around the House, suggests that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner should be given notice where a person grants a criminal conduct authorisation as soon as practicable and, in any event, within seven days—but, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, so what? What power does the Investigatory Powers Commissioner have to intervene? What happens if the handler corruptly tasks an informant to commit crime? As the authority has already been granted, both CHIS and handler have legal immunity, even if the handler informs the Investigatory Powers Commissioner six days later. A wronged party may be able to claim compensation from an Investigatory Powers Tribunal but criminal offences may have been committed for which the perpetrators should be prosecuted. That is why we have added to Amendment 46, to the effect that legal immunity is dependent on the CCA being approved by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. If the actions of the handler or the CHIS are not within the limits set out in the Bill, neither are immune from criminal prosecution or from being sued.
I understand completely why noble Lords do not want a criminal conduct authority to be granted without prior judicial or ministerial authorisation because of the potential for abuse. However, as others have said, it is not practical. We believe there is a way to prevent abuse without prior authorisation of a CCA, including protecting journalistic sources, which we will come to in a future group. We have listened very carefully to this debate and have come up with a new amendment; because we were part way through this debate we cannot debate that amendment in this group, but we will come to it in a couple of groups’ time. What must not happen in any circumstances is the granting of legal immunity without judicial oversight. That is what our Amendment 47 attempts to do.
Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]
Amendments 14 and 75 in my name and the name of my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark provide that authorisations may not be granted under this section until a warrant has been issued by a judge. An application to a judge must be made in writing and provide details, including the reasons why it is required, who it covers, the length of time it will be active for, and previous applications covering the same individual. Our amendments also provide that a person who grants a criminal conduct authorisation must inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner within seven days of granting the authorisation. We seek to strengthen both prior and post-authorisation oversight.
Amendment 77 in the name of my noble friends Lady Clark of Kilwinning and Lady Whitaker and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, calls for prior judicial approval before an authorisation can be granted
“for the purposes of identifying or confirming a source of journalistic information”,
and is in line with our amendment providing that authorisations may not be granted until a warrant has been issued by a judge. Amendment 46 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, Lord Butler of Brockwell, Lord Carlile of Berriew, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, is very similar to our Amendment 75 requiring a person who grants a criminal conduct authorisation to inform the Investigatory Powers Commissioner within seven days of granting the authorisation. However, all the amendments we have been discussing in this group reflect a strong feeling that the oversight arrangements set out in the Bill for the statutory power by public authorities to grant criminal conduct authorisations are inadequate and do not provide reassurance that the likelihood of this power being misused or exceeded is reduced to a minimum.
What exactly has been happening under the present arrangements is far from clear, although we are assured that they have enabled threatened terrorist atrocities and other serious crimes to be thwarted and our safety to be secured. We have no reason at all to doubt that. However, we do not know the extent to which powers have or have not been misused or exceeded since there is no means of that information consistently coming to light. Without proper oversight to act as a firm check there is a risk that some may become somewhat overzealous in how they exercise and interpret the powers they are given under the Bill, including what might be regarded as acceptable covert human intelligence activity, and against what and whom.
We believe there should be prior judicial authorisation, with authorisations not being granted until a warrant has been issued by a judge. Having to obtain a warrant before action can be taken is nothing new. Bearing in mind the potential gravity of the decision to authorise criminal conduct, the necessity to obtain a warrant beforehand seems even greater than it is in relation to other existing actions or activities requiring a warrant at present. It is a prior safeguard and check to minimise the likelihood, in what is self-authorisation by an agency or other body, of a potentially ill-judged or just plain wrong authorisation of criminal conduct, with all the consequences that might have.
Objections have been raised that sometimes authorisations are needed in a hurry but equally, access to a judge, as happens in some other spheres, can be arranged in a hurry—a point made by my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. Urgency can arise because of a rapidly developing situation that could not have reasonably been foreseen, but it can also arise because a public authority has left things later than it should have done before seeking the criminal conduct authorisation. Perhaps the Government can, in their response, give some indication of roughly how many such authorisations are currently granted on average each year, how many are needed urgently and what the definition is of urgently. Can the Government also give a general indication of the extent to which authority to commit criminal conduct is given, in a typical year, to those who have been previously involved in or who are currently engaged in unauthorised—[Inaudible]—said that all authorisations
“are granted by an experienced and highly trained authorising officer, who will ensure that the authorisation has strict parameters and is clearly communicated to the”,—[Official Report, 11/11/20; col. 1045.]
covert human intelligence source. The phrase “experienced and highly trained” sounds fine, but what do the Government intend it to mean in practice in relation to the granting of criminal conduct authorisations under the Bill? What is the definition of an
“experienced and highly trained authorising officer”,
a description the Government were happy to use at Second Reading? How much experience is meant, and in what? How much training is meant, and in what? How many experienced and highly trained authorising officers will there be in each authority that will have the power to grant criminal conduct authorisations, and how frequently are they likely to determine whether to grant such authorisations?
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for contributing to what has been quite a lengthy debate on this very important group of amendments. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett: it is a shame that we had to break the debate last time. Of course, these things are agreed through the usual channels, and it may well be the case that we have to do so again, but it did slightly break the flow, so I will refer back to what was said at the end of last week as well. I begin by saying to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that I was slightly confused; it felt like the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, was making the points from the Front Bench, but I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. If one or both of them could confirm that, that would be fantastic.
I start with the comments that my noble friend Lord King started with, which were echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. Basically, they asked how covert intelligence has stopped terrorism, stopped serious and organised crime and led to thousands of people being arrested who would otherwise do this country harm. I first thank noble Lords for the debate on the role of judicial commissioners in providing that independent oversight of criminal conduct authorisations. The Government’s priority with this legislation is to provide public authorities with an operationally workable regime to help to keep the public safe. We recognise that this needs to be subject to robust—I will go on to the meaning of that word later—and appropriate safeguards, and that is the balance that the Bill seeks to provide. During this debate, I have been pleased to hear noble Lords unite in recognising the importance of this balance.
The amendments of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Dubs, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, all require the prior approval of a judicial commissioner before an authorisation can be granted. We do not think—and other noble Lords have articulated why—that prior judicial approval strikes the balance between safeguards, which my noble friend Lord Naseby talked about, and an operationally workable power, as it risks the effective operation of this vital capability. My noble friend Lord King and the noble Lords, Lord Janvrin, Lord Rooker and Lord Paddick, all concurred. I do not think that any noble Lord would argue that this is not a vital capability, but prior judicial approval is not the only way to provide effective oversight of investigatory powers.
Noble Lords might find it helpful if I set out in more detail why this capability is unique. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, outlined, the use of a covert human intelligence source is different from other powers, such as interception or equipment interference. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made that point, and the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, pointed out that human beings are more complex than phones or cameras. Any decision on how to use a covert human intelligence source has immediate real-world consequences for that CHIS, as we call them, and the people around them.
Every one of these decisions that impacts on the safe deployment of the CHIS is made by experienced, highly trained professionals, guided by the code of practice, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, keeps telling us, is very good supplementary reading to the Bill. The use of a CHIS requires deep expertise and close consideration of the personal strengths and weaknesses of that CHIS, which then enables very precise and safe tasking. These are not decisions that have the luxury of being remade; we are dealing with people’s lives, very often, and it is critical that these decisions are right and made at the right time.
The Bill’s current clarity of responsibility and resulting operational control are the best method for protecting the covert human intelligence source, officers and the public. Even with provision for urgent cases, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, which would reduce one operational challenge of this model, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, has said, it is best that the authorising officer considers the necessity and proportionality of conduct alongside the operational specifics and safety of the CHIS. That is why deep and retrospective oversight is the most appropriate way to provide oversight of this power.
I have listened to remarks, including by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that retrospective oversight lacks “teeth”, to use his word. I reassure him that the IPC will pay particular attention to criminal conduct authorisations, and that his oversight role includes ensuring that public authorities comply with the law and follow good practice. The Bill is clear on this, but it further underpins this in the code of practice. Public authorities must report relevant errors to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—for example, where activity has taken place without lawful authorisation or there has been a failure to adhere to the required safeguards. These will be investigated by IPCO, and rightly so.
The IPC will then make recommendations to public authorities in areas that fall short of the required standard. A public authority must take steps to implement recommendations made by the IPC. The IPC could also advise the public authority that it ought to refer matters to the appropriate authorities, or ultimately report it themselves, subject to the statutory process set out in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will agree that that is a robust process.
The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hain, to which the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, referred, is similar to those requiring prior approval by a judicial commissioner but requires prior approval by the Secretary of State. It creates the same challenges as prior judicial approval and, equally, cannot be accepted.
I also want to address concerns that the authorising officer cannot be trusted to undertake these duties without independent approval and the examples that noble Lords raised around the conduct subject to the Undercover Policing Inquiry and the appalling murder of Pat Finucane. We also heard reference to events at Orgreave and personal accounts from the noble Lord, Lord Hain, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. I note—the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, mentioned this—the update that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland provided in the other place yesterday on Mr Finucane’s murder. These are difficult and utterly unacceptable cases and it is right that they continue to be scrutinised. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, so clearly articulated and the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, echoed today, they are examples from the past.
The situation and framework within which CHIS operate today is not the same environment as it was then. There is stringent internal and external oversight in place and robust training to ensure that this activity is handled and managed properly. The policies and procedures used to authorise and handle covert human intelligence sources are subject to regular review and external scrutiny.
We now have the Human Rights Act 1998; authorising officers are trained in its application and how to communicate the tight limits of an authorisation to CHIS. We have also been clear that CHIS will never be authorised to form an intimate sexual relationship and the relevant sources regime places additional safeguards to protect against this in future. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner has oversight of authorisations; he will identify any misconduct by a public authority and take action accordingly.
Noble Lords have spoken about some of the horror stories from the past in the absence of a clear and robust framework. The situation is now different, and the Bill provides further clarity. As the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, my noble friend Lord King and the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, mentioned, this is a long-overdue piece of legislation that places this activity in a clear and consistent framework.
I understand the concerns that have been raised on judicial oversight of journalistic material and sources in Amendment 77. I reassure the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, Lady Clark and Lady Whitaker, that additional safeguards already exist in the CHIS code of practice for the protection of confidential journalistic material. To echo again the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, I ask noble Lords to please read the code of practice to understand the detail that sits underneath the Bill. These protections will apply to criminal conduct authorisations as well as the wider use and conduct of a CHIS.
The safeguards include a requirement for authorisation at a more senior level than that required for other CHIS activity, reflecting the sensitive nature of such information. Confidential journalistic material, or that which identifies a source of journalistic information, must also be reported to the IPC as soon as reasonably practicable, if it has been obtained or retained other than for purposes of destruction.
The amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Anderson, would require an authorisation to be notified to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner within seven days. I listened very carefully to the points made on notification to the IPC. The Bill as drafted replicates the current oversight role of the IPC in ensuring that he has unfettered access to information and documents that enable him to inspect any public authority at any frequency of his choosing. However, it is clear that providing for independent oversight which is closer to real time—I think most noble Lords mentioned this—would strengthen the oversight regime for criminal conduct authorisations by providing independent review of every authorisation soon after it has taken place.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Haskel) (Lab)
My Lords, I have had six requests to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lords, Lord Hain and Lord Blunkett, the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I call the noble Lord, Lord Hain.
Lord Hain (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her typically courteous and thoughtful response, particularly her offer to talk to a number of my noble friends and other noble Lords about possible oversight that would be acceptable to the Government. Could she look again at Amendment 15? I and my noble friend Lord Blunkett worked very closely with the Security Service, in my case when I was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland—including with the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller—GCHQ, and, when I was in the Foreign Office, with MI6. I have authorised warrants, as I have explained, for vital work in surveillance and interception, and worked with undercover officers.
I appeal to the noble Baroness to meet my noble friend Lord Blunkett and myself informally to discuss the terms of Amendment 15, because it is very practical. It can happen in real time; I have been involved in authorising warrants in real time, including one on Islamist bombers planning to attack London when the operation was live. So, it does deal with her point. It is practical; in some respects, it is the most practical of all these oversight measures. It would give greater legitimacy to and authority for the deployment of undercover officers for the purposes that she is quite properly seeking. They can play vital roles in combating terrorism, for example. I ask her to look again at this and perhaps meet us to discuss it.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
The noble Lord knows how I operate, so he can be absolutely sure I would be happy to meet noble Lords to discuss some of these amendments. I was particularly attracted to the post-facto oversight, because operationally —I do not know whether the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, is going to say something about this—prior authorisation could be very difficult. To get that notification as close to real time as possible is, I think, what we are all seeking.
Lord Blunkett (Lab)
In the light of the answer the Minister has given, including her willingness to talk with my noble friend Lord Hain, I am happy to withdraw.
Baroness Manningham-Buller (CB) [V]
My Lords, I am not going to repeat what I said in my speech, but I want to make three small points—[Inaudible.] The first is to correct an impression that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, largely corrected: that the decision to authorise is made by a handler. It is not. In MI5, it is made by a senior manager who may be several grades above the handler, so it is a twofold process.
Secondly, there has been a certain amount of reference to training. I am out of date but the training in MI5 for someone to be permitted to run covert human intelligence sources certainly involved extensive residential courses and frequent refresher training.
Thirdly, I just hope that, as we come to look in the amendments in more detail at later stages of the Bill, noble Lords will bear in mind that the details and numbers of this activity must remain top secret and cannot be revealed, because the lives of covert intelligence sources are at risk. If sufficient information can be pieced together to point to their existence or encourage people to look for them, they will be exposed and potentially killed. I know that noble Lords understand that; I hope that they will forgive me for repeating it. I am not going to engage with other points at this stage because the Minister has summed up well and I know that there will be further discussions between her and Members of your Lordships’ House.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
Try as I might, that was very difficult to hear. I think that the noble Baroness—I know that she will intervene on me again—made the following three points. In fact, I meant to pull out from the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, her first point: that authorising is done not by the handler but by a senior authorising officer. The second point was that training for CHIS handlers is extensive. She may have said “expensive” but I think she said “extensive,” because it would have to be extensive for this serious an operation.
I think the noble Baroness’s third point was that details of numbers have to be top secret to maintain and protect the welfare of the CHIS. I referred to the IPC report because I think that the noble Lord, either last year or the year before, gave numbers on juvenile CHIS, which gave a flavour of the numbers that we were talking about.
Lord Marlesford (Con) [V]
My Lords, I want to make a point on Amendment 77 on journalistic sources, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker. As I mentioned to my noble friend last week, Parliament already has an effective equivalent to judicial review. I referred to the Economist case of 1975, when the House of Commons Committee of Privileges imposed a personal penalty on the editor and a journalist—who happened to be me—of the Economist due to the premature publication of the draft report of the Select Committee on a Wealth Tax and our refusal to reveal our sources. The House of Commons debated this on the Floor of the Chamber for more than two hours and voted not to impose the penalty.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
I think the only response to that is to thank my noble friend for taking the time to explain it to noble Lords.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
In thanking the noble Baroness for her characteristically thoughtful response and her offer to meet noble Lords, I ask her also to include a discussion of journalistic sources, because the code of practice left me with some questions. I assume that the meeting will be before Report.
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
I am very happy either to write to the noble Baroness and outline what I said in more detail or meet with her before Report.
Lord Paddick (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for what she has said. I accept what she and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, said about it being a senior officer. In urgent cases, however, the police officer who actually grants the criminal conduct authority would be only at inspector level, which is not very senior. Criminal or civil liability would probably rest with the handler because the handler is the one who made the request to the senior officer—but I am glad that that has been clarified.
The Minister dismissed our Amendment 47 on the basis that it looked like prior judicial approval. It is not prior judicial approval at all and it deserves to be looked at. The Minister said that retrospective oversight is the best solution, but once a criminal conduct authority has been granted, so has legal immunity. So what if the CHIS has been corruptly tasked to commit a crime and commits a crime that should not have been committed? With only retrospective oversight, that CHIS and that handler are still immune from prosecution. How can that be right?
Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)
If I understand the point from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that the CHIS is authorised to commit something that is later deemed unlawful, my understanding of it—I will stand corrected if officials tell me differently—is that the person who authorised the unlawful conduct would themselves be liable for the deployment of the CHIS. Clearly, what the CHIS did would also be looked into post facto, but the person who authorised the deployment would be liable for that conduct in the deployment, I think.
Lord Dubs (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful for the way in which the Minister so helpfully explained the Government’s position and made a concession on one of the amendments. Like everyone else, I regret that the debate was split over two days. It gave me the slight advantage that I could read the whole transcript of the first day’s discussion on this amendment, but I am not sure that it has helped me very much in the short contribution I want to make.
We have heard some very impressive contributions indeed to this debate, and I cannot match for a second the enormous legal experience or the experience of our security services, as evidenced by my noble friend Lord Hain, former Secretary of State, and other senior Ministers. All I can do is say that my Amendment 11 stems from the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, which I still believe is a very helpful background to this debate and points the way forward, in ways that are not entirely in line with the speech that the Minister just made.
It seems to me that the nub of the issue in this group of amendments is still whether approval should be prior or after the event, or in real time, as has been said. I cannot help feeling that the argument for prior approval has not been put forward as widely as I would have hoped. We are told that prior approval would prejudice an effective operation. I am really not convinced by that argument—or at least I do not have the experience to understand it fully.
My noble friend Lord Rooker said we are not talking about history. There is a reason some of us mentioned the investigation by the police into the Lawrence family after the racist murder of their son Stephen, and why we are concerned, as my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti said, about the lack of an inquiry into the Finucane case, as announced by the Northern Ireland Secretary yesterday. The reason we cite those two is because they are the two that are in the public domain and that we know about. Other Members of this House have experience of a wider range of cases that, for obvious reasons, they cannot talk about in any detail. I make no apology for saying that, if any one of us in this House had had prior oversight of the investigation into the Lawrence family following the murder of their son, we would all have said, “No, that is unacceptable”. After all, the only point of prior oversight is that it can stop something in its tracks; otherwise, it is no better than after the event. Everybody would have said that that was wrong, and yet it happened.
We all owe a great debt to the security services—they have saved many lives—but now and again, something goes wrong and things are not right. It is because that might happen—very rarely, but it might just happen—that we are concerned about the method of approving this type of activity. That is the argument.
Similarly, with the Pat Finucane case, clearly any of us would have said no. The way that appears to have happened was wrong, and it would not have been allowed. Now we are told that there cannot even be an inquiry into it, for reasons which we will have to look into on another occasion. So I am still worried.
We are dealing with incredibly serious powers: powers to permit criminal activity, which we do not do with any other legislation, as far as I am aware. We are told that this prior approval cannot be given by judges, because judges do not have the insight into human nature that some of the more experienced people would. I do not know very much about judges, although I have had the pleasure of meeting some as colleagues in the House, but I think that, particularly those in criminal law, they have had a great deal of experience of human nature. I would have thought they would be in a good position to make the judgment, as indeed could Secretaries of State, as evidenced by the amendment put forward by my noble friend Lord Hain.
I am not convinced by the arguments against what the human rights committee proposed. I am not convinced that prior approval is not a good idea, whether it is done on the Lord Hain model, the Joint Committee’s model or the Joint Committee’s model as amended by my noble friend Lady Kennedy. All of these are ways of doing it, and I am not convinced that these are not better alternatives than having approval only retrospectively. However, we have had a long debate, and I want to reflect on what has been said before we get to Report. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Haskel) (Lab)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 16. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate, and anyone wishing to press this or anything else in the group to a Division should make that clear in the debate. I inform the House that if Amendment 16 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 17.
Amendment 16
Baroness Hamwee
(a) that”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that there is an objective test rather than a subjective test for granting a criminal conduct authorisation.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick and I have Amendments 16, 18, 20, 32 and 33 in this group, which is concerned with the test—the standard or threshold, if noble Lords prefer—for granting a criminal conduct authorisation.
The JCHR made the very good point in the conclusion of its report that
“it would be more effective for a test of objective reasonableness to be applied in the course of an independent judicial approval process”.
It also made the important point:
“If a test of ‘reasonable belief’ were applied to the making of an authorisation, a CCA made without objective justification would be invalid. However, the CHIS acting under the CCA would not know this. This could result in the CHIS being exposed to criminal prosecution or a civil claim, despite the fault being with the individual making the authorisation.”
The Minister has just reminded us of the duty of care to a CHIS.
New Section 29B(4) requires belief as to three matters listed on the part of the person granting the CCA. I am always keen to follow the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and we go a long way together on this group and then part company a little towards the end. Is a simple belief that something is necessary and proportionate an adequate test, or is a simple belief—to read from new Section 29B(4)(c)—that “arrangements exist that satisfy” the Secretary of State’s requirements? We will come later to what those arrangements might be, but it is the same issue. I acknowledge that subsection (4)(c) is probably more procedural than substantive.
A person might honestly believe in all these things but be mistaken. But he could still assert that belief, hence the need for objectivity—at least, an objectively reasonable belief. As the JCHR said, that is a
“standard requirement for the exercise of police powers—from stop and search, to arrest, to applying for a search warrant. This prevents these powers being lawfully exercised without reasonable justification. It is a vital protection against overzealous or misguided officers.”
That is what is in the guidance. Although I of course welcome that, it is worrying that the term is not included in the Bill. I am not clear whether that is a deliberate omission. Certainly, the legislation and the guidance should be consistent.
The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, which was moved by my right honourable friend Alistair Carmichael in the Commons, imports objectivity. We are going further by asking whether the Government should justify why something is not actually necessary or proportionate, or satisfying the Secretary of State’s requirements.
New Section 29B(6) is a gloss on Section 29B(4) and tells us what is to be taken into account in authorising the conduct—
“whether what is sought to be achieved by the authorised conduct could reasonably be achieved by other conduct which would not constitute crime.”
We would take out “reasonably”.
The Government might say that its inclusion is a safeguard for what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and I are seeking in our respective amendments. What concerns us, however, is that anything that spells out how you reach a belief or conclusion is in danger of weakening what is central to authorising a CCA: the necessity and proportionality of it. Both of those contain an element of judgment and we do not want to weaken subsections (4)(a) and (b), hence our Amendment 32.
Amendment 33 is in the same family. It would remove “reasonably” from subsection (6) of proposed new Clause 29B, which I just quoted. That subsection lends itself more to being tested, so I am less concerned about it than other amendments. Perhaps, however, I should make it clear that we are not in the business of trading one “reasonably” for another. Our other amendments are consequential.
On the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser —I think that it will be spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy—we think it preferable not to go down the route of listing matters to be taken into account, as that amendment does. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, could tell us about the case law. Simply, I would not be surprised if the Minister says this too, since she and I have had this discussion on many occasions: a list is bound not to be complete, and the more you list, the less scope there is to take into account something that is not spelled out. With that, I beg to move Amendment 16.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness for at least part of her journey, as she says. I will speak to Amendment 17 and its Scottish equivalent, Amendment 72. They would require that the authorising officer’s
“belief in the necessity and proportionality of a criminal conduct authorisation, and in the existence of satisfactory arrangements, be reasonably held.”
In paragraph 67 of its report, the Joint Committee on Human Rights rightly said:
“It cannot be acceptable for CCAs to be made on the basis of an unreasonable belief in their necessity and proportionality.”
Despite the wording of the Bill, which makes no reference to reasonableness, the Government appear to agree with the Joint Committee. We know this from Second Reading in the House of Commons, when the Solicitor-General stated, in answer to Jeremy Wright MP, that
“the code of practice sets out that there does need to be a reasonable belief that an authorisation is necessary and proportionate.”—[Official Report, Commons, 5/10/20; col. 707].
Is that a sufficient answer? I am afraid not—for two reasons. First, the draft code of practice, as I read it, does not plainly provide that belief be reasonable. Section 6.1 of the draft code, issued alongside the Bill, provides that a criminal conduct authorisation
“may be granted by the authorising officer where they believe that the authorisation is necessary”.
Section 6.3 states:
“The authorising officer must also believe that the authorised criminal conduct is proportionate”.
The requirement that belief be reasonable is not clear, even in the code of practice. Those sections of the code appear quite consistent with the requirement of a merely subjective belief. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the notion of reasonableness is—as I think the Government acknowledge—completely absent from the Bill itself, which the courts will of course treat as the authoritative source.
My point is very simple: why is the position rightly endorsed by the Solicitor-General—that belief should be reasonable—not reflected in the Bill?
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. I do not have their legal expertise but even I, a civilian, can understand that the legal tests in this Bill are absolutely inadequate.
I had the pleasure of being on the Metropolitan Police Authority for 12 years when I was a member of the London Assembly. In that time, I met a large number of police officers—some of whom spied on me—so I can understand the sort of people who become police officers. They are incredibly hard-working and very brave, but they are human and make mistakes. They certainly made a mistake when they decided to report on my activities, which were all on Twitter—my own Twitter. In any case, I have no experience of the security services—that I know of—yet but I imagine that they, too, are human. We are all prone to error.
The big problem with this Bill is that the legal tests are too wishy-washy. They give the authorising bodies free rein. If we do not contract those processes in some way, there will be mistakes—there are bound to be. It will become very difficult to challenge even the most obviously wrong authorisations. The crimes will have been committed, the damage will have been done and harm will have been caused—possibly to entirely innocent people, as has happened in the past. The reasonableness test should be included in the Bill; the Government will struggle to argue against that.
We should, however, go beyond reasonableness. That is why I have signed Amendment 19 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. The decision-maker should consider, and show evidence, that they have thought about the alternatives to authorising criminal conduct. Where criminality can be avoided, it should be. I took the point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made about the fact that, as an inspector aged 24, he was not what I would consider a necessarily appropriate person to authorise immunity from criminal conduct. I am sure that the noble Lord was an incredibly competent police officer but, even so, that is an incredibly young age to understand the impact of what you are doing.
The decision-maker should also demonstrate that they are not using this legislation to bypass other, more appropriate, legal routes to achieving their objectives. They should not be able to authorise criminal conduct where a legal route exists. For example, the legislation must not create loopholes and back doors for the authorities to conduct black ops. They must not be able to recruit a burglar where they should have used a search warrant, or a hacker where they should have obtained a RIPA authorisation. It is not sufficient for such critical issues to be left to the code of practice. It must go in the Bill. I really hope that the Government listen to the noble Lords who understand these processes and accept that we are all human and make mistakes.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. I support and will speak to Amendments 17 and 72 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.
I am sure that my noble and learned friend will be taken back to his law school days, as I have been, by the discussion of what is reasonable and what is the test of reasonableness in any given circumstances. I prefer Amendments 17 and 72 to Amendment 16 and others; I hope that, if they are pre-empted, this can be resolved on Report.
I entirely support what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said. He has gone through the draft code of practice, as he was invited to do by the Minister. I especially support his argument that the code is missing from the Bill. It is not sufficient as an understanding: I want to see it in the Bill in the circumstances that the noble Lord set out, in both the English and Scottish versions.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Haskel) (Lab)
The noble Lord, Lord Judd, has withdrawn so I call the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, the first issue to consider is the identity of the person who grants the prior authorisation. The starting point is Section 30 of RIPA, now to be amended by Clause 2 of the Bill. It is for the Secretary of State, by regulation, to specify the persons holding such offices, ranks or position within the relevant public authority as to who will exercise the power to authorise. In addition to the police forces, the National Crime Agency and the intelligence services, the public authorities designated already include the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and a variety of other authorities, as we have discussed.
The list of designated authorities, however, is not final since Clause 2(8) gives power to the Secretary of State to add more public authorities—subject, of course, to the approval of Parliament by the affirmative procedure. It is clear, therefore, that authorisations may be given by people with varying backgrounds and experience, with varying or no training in matters of this kind. If the subjective belief of one of a large number of unidentified people is sufficient to authorise an individual to commit crime, that places in the hands of the authorities an unusual and dangerous power.
What is it that the authoriser has to believe? They have to believe that the authorisation is necessary and proportionate in the interest of three things: national security, preventing or detecting crime or preventing disorder, or the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. There are varying views as to what is in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. I have no doubt that the individuals who authorised events during the miners’ strike—the unions, as advised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, as he told us, on the one hand, and the Home Secretary on the other—had diametrically opposed opinions on where the economic well-being of the country lay and on what was necessary and proportionate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, was on one side; I myself was engaged in the prosecution of the two miners who killed a taxi driver with a concrete block.
One of the dangers we must bear in mind is that the Bill might solely conjure up a picture that it applies only where well-trained operatives are under the control of senior security officers to go out and fight the baddies. That is the picture painted by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. However, as my noble friend Lord Paddick made clear from his considerable experience, these authorisations are much more frequently to be given by a middle-ranked police officer—an authoriser, if you like—or perhaps an authoriser from the Inland Revenue or one of the other designated authorities. These authorisations are given to criminals with a chaotic life who are seeking for their own purposes to ingratiate themselves with authority either for personal gain or to avoid the consequences of their own criminal activity. That is why it is essential that the test of necessity and proportionality should be objective. If it is subjective, it allows an irresponsible official to follow their own course, perhaps—as my noble friend Lord Paddick suggested—corruptly or, through an excess of zeal, to chase their own hobbyhorse or their own dislike, for example, of striking miners or protestors against road or rail development, squatting up in trees. Indeed, they might dislike members of the Green Party, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has reminded us. An objective test is a check that encourages systems of scrutiny, of consultation and of records—the recording of the reasons for the authorisation being given.
Amendments 17 and 71 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, introduce the concept of reasonableness, which is certainly consonant with an objective test. Amendment 19, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, deems the test set out in the code of practice, lauded by both my noble friend Lord Carlile and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, to be necessary reading. Why should the public not read it in the Bill? Why should it not be in the Bill from the point of view of the courts and the juries that might try cases arising under it?
Amendments 32 and 33, in the names of my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Paddick, insist that these tests should not be in any way weakened. This group of amendments conveys the same message that necessity and proportionality are not to be judged by the inclination and values of a shadowy and undefined figure. I hope that on Report, we can consolidate in order to improve this Bill.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Haskel) (Lab)
The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, have withdrawn, so I now call the noble Lord, Lord Rooker.
As the noble Lord is not responding, I call the noble Lord, Lord Mann.
Lord Mann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I will speak to a number of these amendments simultaneously, using a different word to the thematics that have come through, but with the same purpose. The word that I refer to is “competence”: the competence of decision-making, and whether the legislation, in the view of the Minister as well as the Committee, is sufficiently precise in ensuring it. We have heard words such as corruption—that is very important—and concepts of reasonableness, which are also important.
I can recall when I and other trade union colleagues had suspicions about an individual who we thought was acting rather strangely over a period of time. He was observed selling Nazi memorabilia in London Bridge Station on a Saturday morning—not a normal activity for trade unionists, even in those days. We were suspicious, and he suddenly moved on. I had a sharp thought that I would handle his pension because it was an accrued pension entitlement that was to be transferred. Rather than leave it to the finance people, who would have handled it in a very financial way, I made the calls myself. I was fairly certain that he was not who he said he was, and that for some reason he decided to look into the heart of moderate trade unionism. The question that it begged to me, rather than being a question of principle, was what a waste of resources it was—what incompetence.
I found later that I was on the Economic League blacklist. I found out why by a fair amount of research. I looked into the case of the—I think it is fair to say—loud-mouthed communist, the very good actor Ricky Tomlinson, whom I got to know over the years. He was stitched up for being an industrial activist for no good democratic reason. He was a communist without any question and he was loud-mouthed, but he was participating in a perfectly normal way in our civil society, and yet he was stitched up.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]
I can be very brief in support of Amendment 17 and its Scottish equivalent. The intention appears to be clear: that the belief of the person has to be reasonably held on an objective basis. It would, in fact, be quite exceptional to have any other provision. It seems to me that the Bill ought to be clear and, on such an important point as this, there should be no room for ambiguity or argument if this matter ever comes before a court.
Lord Naseby (Con)
My Lords, I listened to my noble friend opposite and his detailed, and quite persuasive, contribution. I mentioned competence in the previous group. It is absolutely vital, but I do not need to say anything further on it, because the noble Lord has covered that in great depth.
The other two amendments—Amendments 16 and 17 —both claim to be more objective, and there is a powerful case for clarity. My only other comment is on Amendment 19. I do not want to be too hurtful but frankly, all it does is complicate the whole issue by a huge margin. For anybody to balance
“the size and scope of the proposed activity against the gravity and extent of the perceived crime or harm”,
they really need to be very experienced in the whole of this market. That is not at all possible.
It is difficult for my noble friend on the Front Bench. I can see that there is a need to get more bite into it, if possible, but it is not an easy issue. The contribution on competence from the noble Lord needs to be taken very seriously.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]
My Lords, during this sitting of the Committee, I have just discovered about the passing of Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, one of the first members of our Supreme Court and a former Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland. I am sure that all noble Lords will join me in mourning him and sending our condolences to his family. He was a great judge and human being. Being a senior judge in Northern Ireland when he was created a great deal of risk for him and his family, but I will remember him for his humanity and sense of humour just as much as for his courage and intellect.
On a small preliminary manner, the Minister made a comment on the previous group. Our hybrid proceedings are amazing in so many ways, but they may create confusion on occasion. I apologise to her if I contributed to that because, when we are on Zoom from home, there is no Dispatch Box. There is a metaphorical one but not an actual one. To be clear, in the last group my noble friend Lord Rosser spoke for the Opposition and I spoke for myself. Last time, you heard from my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton and my noble friend Lord Rosser for the Opposition. Shortly, you will hear from my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark, who will speak for the Opposition. That may be easier, because I can see him in the distance via my Zoom; he is physically in the Chamber. I apologise for that—or if the Minister was making a joke at my expense and I have just wasted your Lordships’ time for a couple of minutes.
The amendments in this group are important, not least because of the Minister’s response to the previous group, and particularly to what I will call the Paddick question. Noble Lords will remember a hypothetical put by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, essentially about what happens when things go wrong. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has spoken of everyone’s human frailty, and legislators need to consider, despite all the expertise, brilliance and public service principles of those operating legislation, what happens when things go wrong. The noble Lord put the hypothetical of a criminal conduct authorisation that had been corruptly given, but executed by an undercover agent in good faith. What would happen then? The Bill has a three-way relationship at its heart—a triangle, if you like—between the person who authorises criminal conduct, the person who executes it and any victim of that criminality. Your Lordships are considering a crucial legal relationship.
If I am right, the Minister responded to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, with an answer akin to saying that the person who issued the authorisation—in this example corruptly—would be liable. I think she suggested that there would still be no liability for the undercover agent, because they had acted in good faith, be it on a corrupt authorisation. They had been used, if you like, as the tool of the corrupt authoriser. They would continue to have criminal and civil immunity, but there would be an unspecified liability for the person who issued the authorisation.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)
My Lords, I have looked carefully at the amendments in this group. Amendment 16 moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and consequential Amendments 18 and 20, all seek to remove the reference to “belief” in relation to a criminal conduct authorisation to make clear that it must be necessary and proportionate. I understand the point that she is making, including on consistency in the Bill and accompanying guidance; I know what she is seeking to do and have sympathy with it. However, I looked carefully also at Amendment 17 from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which seeks to insert “reasonably”. I concluded that that is probably a better way to achieve what the noble Baroness seeks.
These are matters of judgment at the end of the day, and we have all been careful in our consideration. However, in this case, I found the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, more persuasive and likely to find more favour with the Government, if, as they say they are—and I have no reason to doubt them—they are seeking to reach agreement with the Committee on these very difficult issues and ways in which we can all improve the Bill. For me, reasonable belief would be a belief that an ordinary and prudent person would hold in the circumstances, judging the situation in the light of the law and the information before them. That is the right way forward.
Amendment 19 in the names of my noble friend Lord Rosser, myself and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, simply seeks to place in the Bill the proposals advised in the code of practice, including determination of proportionality. It is important to provide that certainty in order to allay concerns raised across the Committee. I take on board the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on this matter but they are covered in the guidance, and placing those matters in the Bill is the right way to go. I hope that that provides the reassurance noble Lords are looking for. We would be interested to hear from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, where he thinks he can go on these issues if he cannot accept the amendments in their present form.
In his response, will the noble and learned Lord address the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, on the motivation and experience of those authorising such activity? There has been some suggestion that although it may be very senior officers, in some cases, in the heat of the moment, those involved perhaps would not be so experienced. That is a fair point and we need to address who is authorising this conduct.
Amendments 32 and 33 from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have been tabled to ensure that the necessity and proportionality tests are not weakened. I understand the points being made, and we deserve a full explanation from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart.
It was good to hear from my old and dear friend, the noble Lord, Lord Mann, who made some very effective points about trade unions, following his work in the trade union movement, to which I can attest. He referred to the nonsense of infiltrating groups that are no threat to the national security of our country but are a bit of a nuisance. There are plenty of those about, but they are not a threat to national security and, frankly, are probably more a threat to themselves than anyone else. They can be a bit of a nuisance around the factory gate or power station gate, but investing time and money on these people is a complete and utter waste of time. Who would authorise activity in relation to those groups? That is worrying. Some senior people have authorised others to waste their time going into those organisations.
On the other side of the coin are the appalling and disgraceful abuses that have taken place. Equally, we need to ensure that that will never happen again. We need reassurance on those matters. The inquiry will have to consider how we deal with them in the future.
My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti asked the important question of where people go to when their rights have been abused. We of course hope that that never happens again, but where would people go if it did? We need to know that people will be protected when they find themselves in a situation that has gone wrong. If there has been proper authorisation but an offence has been carried out, how do people seek redress?
I look forward to the Minister answering those points and others raised in the debate.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)
My Lords, perhaps I may begin by discussing the question of the test of necessity and proportionality. That test is well recognised and understood in investigatory powers legislation. The drafting in the Bill is consistent with the existing legal framework within which it will be incorporated. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for his amendment which seeks to add a requirement for the authorising officer’s belief in the necessity of proportionality for an authorisation to be a reasonable one.
New Section 29B, which provides for criminal conduct authorisations, has been drafted to align with the existing Section 29 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, which provides the underlying authorisation for the use and conduct of a covert human intelligence source. In setting out that a belief must be reasonable only for criminal conduct authorisations, the amendment would risk creating inconsistency and cast doubt on the test to be applied for other authorisations. I refer your Lordships to section 3.10 of the updated CHIS code of practice, which sets out that the person granting the authorisation should hold a reasonable belief that it is necessary and proportionate.
Amendment 16 from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, seeks to change the test set out in the Bill for considering whether conduct is necessary and proportionate. Again, the drafting of the Bill is in keeping with the rest of RIPA, where the test for authorisation is that the person granting it holds the belief that the activity is both necessary and proportionate. To remove the reference to “belief” risks introducing inconsistency and casting doubt as to how other provisions should be interpreted.
It would also be wrong if the necessity and proportionality test were not based on the belief of the authorising officer. A number of contributions have been made in the debate today, and on the previous occasion when we discussed this matter, regarding these decisions being taken in the context of live environments, affecting real people, often in dangerous situations. Decisions will need to be taken based around the particular and specific facts of a case at a particular time, and the specific environment in which covert human intelligence sources find themselves. I seek to reassure the Committee that the authorisation process is intended to be, and has been designed to be, robust—I appreciate that the adjective “robust” has come in for some scrutiny in your Lordships’ House today—and to support those involved in the decision-making process in making the right assessment.
Your Lordships were concerned with the level of training of CHIS handlers. They and their authorising officers are experienced and must be highly trained. I defer to the personal experience of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. However, to anticipate what I will say shortly, it is important to bear in mind that we are taking matters forward from today, as opposed to dwelling on the failings of the past. CHIS handlers and authorising officers will have clear and detailed guidance that they must follow in deciding whether to grant an authorisation for criminal conduct. The test for necessity and proportionality is well documented and understood by authorising officers. In addition, the material setting out the rationale of the authorising officer will also be available to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as part of his oversight function.
I turn to Amendment 32. The Bill sets out that, in deciding whether an authorisation is both necessary for a defined purpose and proportionate to what it seeks to achieve, the authorising officer must consider whether the intended outcome could be achieved by some other non-criminal conduct. The amendment seeks to ensure that this does not undermine the requirements of the necessity and proportionality test contained in the Bill. It does not. In fact, it enhances the rigour with which the proportionality test will be applied by specifying a factor that must be taken into consideration when proportionality is assessed.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
I have received two requests to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who I will call first, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. I call the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his courteous and measured response, but can I press him for clarity on the Government’s position on my Amendments 17 and 72, so that I can work out where to go next?
First of all, as I understood it, the Minister asserted the importance of making the new Section 29B consistent with the existing Section 29 of RIPA, which he said did not require belief to be reasonable. But he then relied on section 3.10 of the code of practice, which in contrast to sections 6.1 and 6.3, which I cited earlier, does, as the Minister put it, imply a requirement of reasonableness. The Minister first pleads for consistency and then identifies an inconsistency between part of the code and the Bill, without undertaking to amend either. I may, of course, be missing something. Could the Minister please explain whether the Government support a requirement of reasonableness, as the Solicitor-General appeared to do in the Commons, in which case will he undertake to amend both the Bill and section 6.1 and 6.3 of the code of practice to bring them into line with section 3.10 of the code of practice, to which he referred? Or are the Government against a requirement of reasonableness, in which case could he explain why?
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his supplementary question. I apologise for having omitted to answer specifically the detailed point that he made in the course of his submission earlier—something I have been guilty of in the past in my appearances in your Lordships’ House.
Amendments 17 and 72 would insert a requirement for the authorising officer to hold a reasonable belief that conduct is both necessary and proportionate. As the noble Lord has identified, the position is that the amendment cannot be accepted as the Bill has been drafted in line with the requirements of the rest of RIPA, including that for the underlying Section 29 use and conduct authorisation. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, identifies a conflict between the terms of the code of practice that I quoted, at 3.10, and the terms of the Bill, and, more to the point, I think, identifies a potential conflict in what was said in the other place in debating these subjects. In those circumstances, I would be very happy to engage with the noble Lord and write to him on the matter.
I am being reminded just now that we have already included wording in the updated code of practice to set out that it is expected that the belief should be a reasonable one, and that the Security Minister confirmed this during the debate in the Commons.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
I am not sure we want exchanges in this manner. Minister, are you complete or are you continuing?
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
With your leave, I was about to indicate that I think it better in the circumstances—and where there has been an exchange across the floor of the House—if I were to clarify my remarks in writing to the noble Lord
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)
I want to make just a couple of points. I do not accept the noble and learned Lord’s point that, if you put things in the Bill, you risk leaving things out. It is possible to craft an amendment, to go on the face of the Bill, that covers those eventualities. There is always a concern that, when things are left to guidance and codes, sometimes they do not have the certainty and force of legislation. I think that an amendment can be crafted that covers both: you get the certainty of the main things but leave the door open, accepting that things can change. Both can be done, and that is a better way forward rather than leaving it all to guidance.
The noble and learned Lord also made the point that we should be looking forward and not back. I get the point of looking forward, and I accept it, but, equally, in looking forward, we are informed by what has happened previously. It is important that we take that on board as well. We need to ensure that the Bill is doing the job it needs to do, and that is addressing issues that happened in the past; not just the issues mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Mann—which were, frankly, ridiculous—but, more importantly, the real issues of wrong-doing, abuse and great hurt that have taken place. We need to ensure that the Bill stops that in the future.
The other point that we will keep coming back to is the whole issue of what will happen if the CHIS has immunity and someone has something wrong done to them. Where do they get redress? That is a fundamental issue: how do they get redress if the person who has done something wrong has immunity? That is a question we need to answer in the next few days.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
I am obliged to the noble Lord for that final submission. We do, I acknowledge, need to address these matters over the next period of time, as the Bill moves forward. I acknowledge to the noble Lord, and others who have contributed, that mistakes were made in the past around blacklisting and the penetration of bodies that need never have been penetrated, or of bodies that were engaging in legitimate activities. Acceptance of that will inform the manner in which we proceed further.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My noble friend Lord Paddick has been using his experience of the past—experience is, by definition, the past—to inform and improve the future. That was rather what my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford was talking about, with his reference to the range of organisations from which authorisations for criminal conduct may come. He mentioned people entitled to give authorisations who will not have the same experience as those in the police and intelligence services.
I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I do not refer to every contribution that has been made, though I am grateful for all of them. However, I want to pick up the point about considering the position if things go wrong. That is a very large part of our task in this House, in scrutinising legislation, and it will necessarily mean positing hypotheticals. I will certainly want to pick up the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Mann, when we come to consider the term “economic well-being”.
I remain concerned about Section 29B(6). We have the test of necessity; you cannot really strengthen necessity but you could weaken it. If subsection (6) is to have any meaning, then I am worried that it must weaken it.
To go to the heart of all this, the argument from the noble and learned Lord is that we should be consistent with Section 29 of RIPA, which is about the authorisation of covert human intelligence sources. New Section 29B is about criminal conduct authorisations. I would regard that, as other noble Lords have said during the Bill’s passage, as much more serious than what is covered by the current provisions of RIPA in terms of covert intelligence and intrusive investigation as well. Yes, it will be a fast-moving, live environment, but I do not think that that is an excuse not to act reasonably. I really feel that we have to get the Bill right, and that means importing objectivity.
I have still not understood the points made in response to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, about why we should not have the term on the face of the Bill. I think that the noble and learned Lord said that it would not be appropriate, but I might not have noted that down correctly. He did say that it would not be efficient. I hoped that he might develop that point, but we will have to pursue that after this afternoon’s debate. We are clearly gathering round Amendment 17 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and I think that Amendment 72 is its Scottish equivalent. My noble friend and I are very happy to cede the ground to those amendments; we went a bit far, but I cannot conceive of an answer to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. We have not heard one so far, so would be delighted to support him if he pursues the matter at the next stage of the Bill, which we very much hope that he will. It will soon be 5 pm, so I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 16.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, we need to halt our proceedings before too long so that we can move on to the coronavirus regulations, but the next group of amendments is very small with only a small number of speakers. If noble Lords are willing to keep their contributions as brief as possible, that would assist us in finishing this group before we break for the coronavirus regulations.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 19A. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division should make that clear in debate. I should inform the House that if Amendment 19A is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 20 and 21 by reason of pre-emption.
Amendment 19A
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I have written a very long speech, so I hope I will not hold people up for too long.
There are a lot of things in this Bill that I absolutely loathe. In fact, I probably loathe it in its entirety and I wish the Government had never brought it forward. However, my Amendment 19A is about changing the rules for criminal conduct authorisation by statutory instruments. What we have seen again and again with this Government is little power grabs—little bits of erosion of our democracy—through various statutory instruments that they have consistently brought over the past few months. Their majority of 80-plus in the Commons has simply gone to their heads and they feel that they can run the country without your Lordships’ House, which is absolutely ridiculous.
It is a pleasure to introduce the amendments in this group, and I look forward to all the important points that other noble Lords are going to put. The amendment is quite simple—just that the Government should not be able to change the rules without proper parliamentary scrutiny; and let us face it, statutory instruments are not proper scrutiny. We are talking here about the state being able to authorise people, quite possibly criminals, to commit crimes. Even I will accept that that sometimes has legitimate applications, such as taking down terrorist cells or breaking up organised crime. But let us face it, that will not be all that this is about. It creates a set of extreme ethical, moral and legal dilemmas, so much so that it must be Parliament—not the Government, whom I do not trust anyway—that makes the decisions on when and why this is allowed.
I think that proposed new clause 29B(4)(c) in Clause 1(5) is a tacit admission by the Government that there are insufficient safeguards built into the Bill and that they want to backfill that with secondary legislation and a code of practice. That just is not good enough for something of this magnitude. I want a clear confirmation from the Minister that that is not what is intended and that the Government will in some way accept that and make it clear.
When speaking to an earlier group of amendments, the Minister talked about not dwelling on the failures of the past. That is all well and good, but if you do not dwell a little on the failures of the past you are doomed to repeat them. That is exactly what I have been saying all through our consideration. We have seen repetitions of failures and somehow the police, the Government and the security services do not learn fast enough. I am hoping for a very positive response from the Minister, please. I beg to move.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)
I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, has withdrawn, so I now call the noble Lord, Lord Naseby.
Lord Naseby (Con)
I have two short comments. First, Amendment 21 sounds wonderful on the surface, but who will determine who is appropriate, or is it just the Secretary of State? Would it not have happened in any case? Secondly, on Amendment 81, I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. There is nothing worse than having a situation where the rules of the game—or the provisions or the instructions—are changed in one area without understanding that it has a knock-on effect in another area. As I understand this amendment, it is basically saying that they must all take place at the same time and not at different times. If that is so then I am totally in support of it.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]
To be short, my Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. Matters as grave as criminal conduct authorisations for state agents should be regulated in primary legislation and not be subject to delegated powers thereafter.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I am afraid that we have a number of amendments in this group. I have quite a lot of sympathy with Amendment 19A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, but it seems to me that proposed new subsection (4)(c) is not anything like of the same order as proposed new subsection (4)(a) and (b). I read it as being procedural and think that it would not make it more difficult to satisfy the necessity and proportionality requirements. I hope the Minister can confirm that.
Amendment 21 deals with proposed new Clause 29B(4)(c), which provides that the Secretary of State can make an order imposing requirements for the CCA to be authorised, and the person authorising it must believe that there are arrangements which satisfy those requirements. If the Secretary of State believes—if that is an appropriate use of the word, given our last discussion—that further requirements are necessary and would be of wide interest, in the fullest sense of that word, consultation ought to play a part.
Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]
My Lords, the amendments in this group would variously remove the power for the Secretary of State to impose requirements restricting when a criminal conduct authorisation can be granted, require the Secretary of State to consult with such persons as are appropriate before imposing requirements, and require regulations in which the Secretary of State imposes additional requirements that must be satisfied before a criminal conduct authorisation is granted to be subject to the affirmative procedure. There is also an amendment in this group which would restrict the power of the Secretary of State to bring different provisions of the Bill into force at different times and in different areas, to ensure that all the safeguards provided in the Bill always apply.
We will await with interest more detail from the Government in their response as to the nature, extent, purpose, reasons for and frequency of the requirements that the Secretary of State might wish to impose by order before a criminal conduct authorisation can be granted, and why it would not have been possible to include this greater detail on the face of the Bill to reduce the possibility of this power being exercised at any time in the future in an inappropriate manner. We also want to hear the Government’s response to the concern about safeguards always being applicable, which has led to the amendment restricting the power to bring different provisions into force at different times.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, turning first to the order-making powers, addressed first by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, the ability of Parliament to scrutinise statutory instruments is a broader topic than this debate permits me to go into. As to the order-making powers in this Bill, these powers allow for additional requirements to be imposed before a criminal conduct authorisation may be granted, or for the authorisation of certain conduct to be prohibited. I assure the Committee that they can only be used to further strengthen the safeguards that are attached to the use of criminal conduct authorisations. They could not be used to remove any of the existing safeguards. I particularly seek to assure the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, on that point. The requirements that can be imposed under these powers concern matters of practicality and detail, and therefore it is appropriate that they be contained in secondary legislation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether there was a precedent for such powers to be subject to the negative procedure. The equivalent powers in Section 29 of RIPA are both subject to the negative procedure. Taking similar powers in respect of criminal conduct authorisations to those already contained in Section 29 will allow the Secretary of State to make equivalent provision for Section 29 authorisations and criminal conduct authorisations, where appropriate, so that similar arrangements are in place for both. There is a high degree of interrelationship between the two provisions. While the Government do not have any particular safeguards or limits in mind, such requirements may arise in the future that will need to be legislated for.
An example of the past use of the Section 29 powers is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Covert Human Intelligence Sources: Matters Subject to Legal Privilege) Order 2010, which imposes specific additional requirements that must be met regarding the authorisation of a CHIS in connection with material subject to legal professional privilege. Were any changes proposed in the future, the relevant persons would of course be consulted prior to those changes being made. Amendments 21 and 58 are therefore not considered necessary.
Turning to Amendment 81, the Bill contains provision to commence the Act for different areas on different days, to allow time to make any necessary secondary legislation, issue guidance, undertake appropriate training and put the necessary systems and procedures in place, as appropriate. I assure the Committee that this power will not be used to delay commencing those sections relating to safeguards. The power could not lawfully be used to frustrate the will of Parliament in this way.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate, even those who did not agree with me. It was lovely and very heart-warming to hear the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, agree with a Lib Dem Peer, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her support, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for her sympathy and exposition of the whole group, which I perhaps should have done myself. I felt that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made an extremely good point in asking why there should not be greater detail in the Bill now.
The Minister made a very nice and emollient response, but there is always the problem, not in distrusting the Ministers we have here, in your Lordships’ House—we trust them to have good will and be ethical—but in distrusting the Government, as many of us do. I imagine that possibly a majority in the country distrust the Government at the moment. So I do not feel completely reassured, and will think about bringing this back on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords for their assistance.