Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Baroness Manningham-Buller Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blunkett (Lab)]

In the light of the answer the Minister has given, including her willingness to talk with my noble friend Lord Hain, I am happy to withdraw.

[Baroness Manningham-Buller (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I am not going to repeat what I said in my speech, but I want to make three small points—[Inaudible.] The first is to correct an impression that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, largely corrected: that the decision to authorise is made by a handler. It is not. In MI5, it is made by a senior manager who may be several grades above the handler, so it is a twofold process.

Secondly, there has been a certain amount of reference to training. I am out of date but the training in MI5 for someone to be permitted to run covert human intelligence sources certainly involved extensive residential courses and frequent refresher training.

Thirdly, I just hope that, as we come to look in the amendments in more detail at later stages of the Bill, noble Lords will bear in mind that the details and numbers of this activity must remain top secret and cannot be revealed, because the lives of covert intelligence sources are at risk. If sufficient information can be pieced together to point to their existence or encourage people to look for them, they will be exposed and potentially killed. I know that noble Lords understand that; I hope that they will forgive me for repeating it. I am not going to engage with other points at this stage because the Minister has summed up well and I know that there will be further discussions between her and Members of your Lordships’ House.