Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Second sitting)

Tom Hunt Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Marco Longhi (Dudley North) (Con)]

Q I have a question for Mr Rebello. What is your view on coroners having the power to hold inquests without a hearing, particularly in non-contentious cases?

André Rebello: I have no problem with that proposal, that being another tool in the bag, as and where it is necessary, that is needed. My own preference is to go into court and record the hearing that I would have had, so that people can apply for a copy of what has been received and they can actually hear what has occurred. Certainly, it takes a lot longer to write down a considered decision than to go into court, go through the evidence orally and speak to it. Something that could take me five to 10 minutes in court, could take me an hour and a half to write down the issues, the law being applied, the rulings, the findings, determinations and conclusion, and then all the reasons which you would need for a considered judgment. That would be far, far more time consuming and may well take up far more coroners’ time. I appreciate not all coroners have access to courts all the time, and they cannot just go into court, so this is a very useful proposal, which I am sure will be used as and when needed.

[Tom Hunt (Ipswich) (Con)]

Q We understand that the Chief Coroner will be providing guidance to coroners on the proposed five measures in the Bill. Do you think that that will ensure consistency of practice across coroner areas, given that coroners are independent judicial office holders and that judicial decisions are for them to make?

André Rebello: Absolutely. We should bear in mind that coroners are judges like any other judge, and every judge is an independent judicial office holder. No other judge, other than a properly constituted appellate court, can tell another judge how to decide something or do something. However, it is important to have guidance to ensure consistency not only between coroners, but internally for each coroner. What you have to bear in mind is that every coroner determines the facts of the case on the very facts that are before the coroner. No two cases are actually the same. If the Chief Coroner is minded to issue guidance, that can only help to make these things work.

When you look at the provisions, the ability to merge coroner areas is something that has been long needed, because at the moment you can only merge unitary authorities, not parts of those authorities and that has delayed the coroner reform project. It is sensible that the disapplication of reportable deaths under covid continues because we are not out of the pandemic. On remote hearings, we should be brought in line with the Courts and Tribunals Service, with some guidance to ensure consistency, so that that facility is used where necessary, but not overused, because the rule of law and open justice is very important and people should be able to attend to see justice being done.

As we have just discussed, written inquests, without going into court, will have their need when coroners are struggling to get a court. The ability to discontinue cases when we have not ordered a post-mortem is long over needed. Occasionally, we will have a GP abroad who knows the cause of death and there is no one else qualified to give a cause of death. The only way the coroner could open up the facility to discontinue that case would be to order an unnecessary post-mortem. The proposal will enable coroners to open an investigation and when the GP returns, to discontinue and have the death registered.

That does raise another issue that the Bill does not cover, and I am sure that Members will be aware that the sunset clause in the Coronavirus Act 2020 expires in March next year. The law used to be that a doctor had to treat a patient in his or her last illness and, relying on regulation 41 of the births and deaths regulations, had to have seen the patient within 14 days of death, or seen the body after death. The Coronavirus Act gave an easement, enabling 28 days to be used, whereby any doctor had seen the patient and any other doctor could see the body after the death. It looks as if that part of the Coronavirus Act will expire before Parliament has a chance to bring into force the medical examiner and death registration provisions. There will be a big lacuna in the work coroners are carrying out. If doctors are not seeing patients face to face and cannot issue death certificates, far more cases will be unnecessarily reported to the coroner. If there is any way to continue that coronavirus easement on death certification, it would be greatly appreciated, particularly by the bereaved.

[Janet Daby (Lewisham East) (Lab)]

Q According to Transform Justice:

“Online pleas compromise open justice principles by removing the opportunity for the plea hearing to be witnessed/observed.”

It sounds like you may agree, Mr Rebello. To what extent do you think online pleas are compatible with the principles of open justice?

André Rebello: I am not sure that is a matter for a coroner, because I deal with inquisitorial proceedings in which there are no pleas.

Richard Leiper: This might relate to the Crown court part of the Bill, which I do not think either of us deals with. Online pleas would be an aspect of the criminal process.

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[Angela Crawley]

Thank you.

[Tom Hunt]

Q This is to Sara. In principle, do you agree that the Government have a duty to ensure that precious and limited judicial resources are directed as effectively and efficiently as possible?

Sara Lomri: Yes, of course.

[Tom Hunt]

Q But with such scarce resources and pressure, and such a low success rate in the cases that do get JR, how could that be seen as an efficient and effective use of precious resources?

Sara Lomri: In relation to Cart JRs, we are talking about a constitutional principle. Public Law Project and others are saying that that price tag of £350,000 to £400,000 is worth it and a good use of resources.

When we talk about Cart JRs, we talk about the case of G, who had been seriously mistreated in Nigeria and trafficked to the UK. The Government agreed at the first-tier tribunal that she was a victim of trafficking, but the tribunal came to a bunch of erroneous decisions, including that the evidence that supported her being a victim of trafficking was not substantiated, and came to the wrong decision. She brought a Cart JR, which was successful. As a result, she and her child were not returned to Nigeria, where they invariably would have been killed. That is the price tag.

We say that that is such an important procedural constitutional principle that the tribunal’s decisions should be reviewed from time to time by the High Court—by a judge who is more senior, has more time to consider the evidence, and who is sometimes better placed to make those decisions. Yes, we think that is an efficient, much better use of scarce resources.

[Tom Hunt]

Q But you accept that the vast bulk—well over 90%—of that £350,000 of scarce resources is spent on cases that are going to be unsuccessful.

Sara Lomri: It is the same amount that DCMS spent on its art collection in 2019-20. When we are talking about constitutional principles, I do not think we can say that is too much money.

[Tom Hunt]

Thank you.

Ellie Cumbo: Could I come in briefly on that point? We entirely agree that judicial resource is precious. As one of your earlier witnesses said, more of it would make an enormous difference to the issues we are dealing with, such as the backlog in courts at the moment. However, there are other interests that it must be balanced against, including that once again, in these cases, we would be talking about an unlawful decision by the upper tribunal. I think it is a reasonable expectation that unlawful decisions should be able to be challenged.

I would make a second point about resource. If we take the Public Law Project’s figure of around 5.7%—so around the 6%—that is not incomparable to the number of rape reports that lead to a conviction: nobody would argue that that is a waste of resource.

[Tom Hunt]

Q My understanding is that the 5.7% figure is heavily contested. In fact, I have seen figures of under 1%.

Ellie Cumbo: I believe Sara can speak to the extent to which that is a contested figure. It seems clear on paper, at least to me.

[The Chair]

Is that the end of the answers?

Ellie Cumbo: Yes, from me.

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[The Chair]

If we have time at the end. We have got three more questions that one or more of the panel may wish to answer. I call Tom Hunt.

[Tom Hunt]

Q This is for Steve. I have a certain understanding of the word “tyranny” and what it means. I can think of many regimes in the world that are tyrannies, sadly. There are too many where great harm is done to people’s lives. In this country we have by and large a sound legal system that works effectively. I understand there is a debate here about whether a lower and upper tribunal is enough and whether it is appropriate for Cart JR to have a third bite of the cherry. The debate is ongoing. Do you regret that on 26 October you used the word “tyranny” and said the Government were promoting it in this Bill? Is it unhelpful or does it help the debate?

Steve Valdez-Symonds: I do not regret the use of the word. I was drawing attention to the fact that there was considerable interference in the functioning of a judicial function in the tribunal system and the way in which the Government were legislating not just in this Bill—this is an important factor, which is not before this Committee—but in the Nationality and Borders Bill at the same time. If it is passed in its current form, it will impose direction on judicial figures in the tribunal system as to how they may perform their judicial function, and how they must or must not weigh and assess evidence and appellants in front of them, pre-empting what will be in front of them by statute.

It is a grave concern that at the same time as withdrawing in this Bill the oversight of our constitutional courts to ensure that the tribunal system works properly according to law, the Government are seeking to legislate to incapacitate those tribunal systems to manage independently and fully their own judicial functions. That is the effect of provisions in the Nationality and Borders Bill. You can look at them in clauses 16, 20 and 23. Provisions like that, although not going anywhere near as far—dating back to 2004, the time of the ouster that this Committee has discussed that was put forward by the Labour Government—have caused much confusion already.

[The Chair]

Steve, I really should have pushed Tom on this because it falls outside the scope of the Bill.

[Tom Hunt]

The comment made was in relation to this Bill, so I do not know where the Nationality and Borders Bill has come from.

[The Chair]

I think the witness tried to justify it in an explanation relating to a different piece of legislation.

[Tom Hunt]

It was a comment made by the panellist in relation to the Bill we are discussing today.

[The Chair]

Okay, we will continue.

[Tom Hunt]

Of course, the definition of tyranny is cruel and oppressive government—

[The Chair]

Sorry, Steve, you were answering.

Steve Valdez-Symonds: The point I have made is that you cannot properly look at these two Bills in isolation, because clause 2 of this Bill affects whether there is any constitutional court scrutiny of whether the tribunal system performs the functions that Parliament has set it up to perform. At the same time, you have legislation to impede that tribunal’s functions about whether it can perform those duties. You have legislation from the very Department whose decisions it will be responsible for regulating—the Home Office. I think it perfectly appropriate to raise the concern that if that sort of interference were going on in the courts of other countries, we would, as I said, describe it as tyranny. [Interruption.]

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (First sitting)

Tom Hunt Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

A few Members have indicated they wish to ask questions, so I will take them in order.

[Tom Hunt (Ipswich) (Con)]

Q There has been lots of debate about whether these reforms are necessary or good for parliamentary democracy. It is important to reflect on the fact that of course it was in the Government’s manifesto that they would propose significant reform to the way in which judicial review works. To what extent do the witnesses see the mandate of an election as important to the functioning of our democracy?

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[Tom Hunt]

indicated assent.

[The Chair]

Sir John Hayes.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Fourth sitting)

Tom Hunt Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 4th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Andy Slaughter]

We are making splendid progress. I will again disappoint those who like cliff-hangers by saying right at the beginning what our attitude is towards clause 2. We find it concerning, both of itself and on its own merits. We believe that reversing decisions in Cart, and subjecting Cart judicial reviews to ouster, is wrong on its own merits. We also think, as the Government have perhaps unwisely said, that the clause may serve as a template for further or wider use of the ouster, possibly including in more controversial areas further on. We have an issue of practicality and an issue of principle, and are therefore very likely to vote against the clause.

This short group of amendments is an attempt to improve, ameliorate and mitigate clause 2. Frankly, we found it very difficult. There is very little to recommend in clause 2, unlike in clause 1, where we at least sought to find some imaginative ways of improving it. It is difficult; nevertheless, I will in a little while speak specifically to the amendments that we have tabled. However, I will start as I did with clause 1 by setting the background so that it is clear where we are coming from on the amendments and on the clause as a whole.

An ouster clause is a clause in legislation that seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. The desired effect is that the subject matter of the ouster clause cannot be challenged in the courts. If given effect by the court, this would mean that the decision or action of an official in relation to that subject matter is final and cannot be challenged legally.

Rule of law objections to ouster clauses have often been made in Parliament. For example, in relation to the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007, the Constitution Committee of the House of Lords objected to an ouster clause, stating that

“the Rule of Law is diminished if an aggrieved citizen is barred from challenging an allegedly unlawful decision taken by a public authority.”

It is reasonable to say that ouster clauses are at odds with the rule of law. The orthodox view is therefore that courts will give effect to them only if the statutory language introducing them is absolutely clear. The courts have said:

“It is a principle not by any means to be whittled down that the subject’s recourse to Her Majesty’s courts for the determination of his rights is not to be excluded except by clear words.”

In reality, courts are adept at reading even very clear words which purport to establish an ouster clause as not actually having the effect of creating an ouster clause.

The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 contained an ouster clause relating to decisions of the upper tribunal. The upper tribunal deals with appeals from the administrative appeals chamber, the immigration and asylum chamber, the lands chamber and the tax and chancery chamber. In the case of Cart, the Court of Appeal stated that

“the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, well known to Parliament as one of the great historic artefacts of the common law, runs to statutory tribunals both in their old and in their new incarnation unless ousted by the plainest possible statutory language.”

There is no such language in the 2007 Act. The Supreme Court confirmed this approach. This has led to what are known as Cart judicial reviews, whereby a decision of the upper tribunal can be judicially reviewed.

There has been an on-going debate about how effective Cart judicial reviews are in catching errors of law made by the upper tribunal. The Independent Review of Administrative Law panel found that there were errors of law in only 0.22% of cases. The Public Law Project has questioned the empirical evidence for that and suggested that Cart judicial reviews are much more effective, with an actual figure between 2.3% and 9.2%. It is difficult to know what the true figure is, but it is conceded that the 0.22% figure is a significant underestimate. I will say more about this later. However, I felt that that there was a degree of consensus around some of the evidence we heard on Tuesday that the figure was certainly about 3%, and possibly around 5%. I will come on to what I think the significance of figures of that kind may be.

[Tom Hunt (Ipswich) (Con)]

Whether it is 0.2%, 3% or 5%, we are still talking about a figure at least 10 times lower than the average success for other types of judicial review, which is 40% or 50%. Surely that is a significant point to consider?

[Andy Slaughter]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point. We did hear a number of different figures. I am now stretching my memory to recall exactly who said what. Was it Professor Feldman who said 30% to 50%, and Dr Morgan who posited 5%? I cannot quite remember. However, yes, there are different success rates for different types of judicial review. The point is that, even if the figure is small, Cart judicial reviews are important—I will come on to that more fully. However, if it is 5%, that is not a negligible figure. One in 20 is still a lot of cases. I am going to give some case examples to show the type of case that we are dealing with here. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will be persuaded that there are sufficient by way of number and variety or that the compelling facts of the cases are such that he would want to retain Cart reviews. We will see.

The Government said they would introduce legislation to reverse the law on Cart judicial reviews. They said that they would seek to widen ouster clauses to other areas, although accepting that they would be rare. They also said they would legislate for modifying quashing orders so that they could be suspended or have limited effect. The proposals announced by the Government appear to be more radical than those envisaged by the independent panel—I think that is true.

The Lord Chancellor recently suggested that there may be more reforms to come on judicial review. His view was that judicial review meant that public money was being squandered, as courts are overturning Government decisions. However, as the commentator Joshua Rozenberg recently put it, commenting on a decision of the Transport Secretary on the Stonehenge case, which I have already referred to today, if the Transport Secretary

“had got it right the first time, taxpayers’ money would not have been squandered.”

Rather than a Minister complaining about a court rectifying unlawful decisions, it would be better to make lawful decisions in the first place.

The clause would take away proper, full judicial oversight in a specific area of public decision making, leaving vulnerable individuals affected by decisions more at risk of injustice. It does so in a way that the Government explicitly state is a test run for other ouster clauses—trying to get rid of judicial oversight in other policy areas. We have been left with a Bill that is bad for claimants bringing cases, disincentivises others who have been wronged bringing their own, fetters discretion while dragging courts into matters of policy, and jettisons a vital safeguard for very little gain. There is nothing in this part of the Bill to help improve the quality of decision making. It simply risks making it worse. The judicial review aspects make up only a small amount of the Bill, but there is very little that we think can be salvaged.

Clause 2 introduces the ouster in respect of decisions of the upper tribunal. That means that some decisions will now be final and cannot be appealed to another court, because the clause would abolish the Cart judicial review. The upper tribunal deals with a host of appeals from various tribunals. The context is the importance of scrutiny and accountability mechanisms to hold public authorities to account.

Cart judicial review is used in cases where no other right to appeal exists. This type of judicial review is a crucial safeguard against errors in the tribunal system in decisions of significant importance for the people concerned, which often involve the most fundamental rights.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Fifth sitting)

Tom Hunt Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[James Cartlidge]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who speaks with great expertise, for making that incredibly important point. Given her medical professional background, she is aware of the importance of the law in good public administration and why the proportionate use of resource is incredibly important. She is absolutely right: we and our constituents have still not heard an explanation as to why, uniquely, immigration cases should have this special right. I am bound to point out that the longer an immigration case is in our courts, the claimant could argue that they have a stronger case to be given a permanent right to remain on human rights grounds.

[Tom Hunt (Ipswich) (Con)]

Given that the Opposition have spent so much time opposing all the steps the Government have taken to fit capacity into the system, does the Minister agree that there is a certain irony that they had planned to hold an Opposition day debate yesterday on how to sort out the court backlog?

[James Cartlidge]

My hon. Friend may have had sight of the speech I had prepared to wind up yesterday’s debate. In fact, I was ready to take part at 10 pm, when rumour had it that the Opposition might still go ahead with the debate. He is absolutely right. We have a serious backlog issue. We have been very open about that. The primary driver of the surge in cases was the fact that courts were closed during the pandemic, and social distancing measures have made it much harder to dispose of cases, particularly in the Crown court. In those circumstances, 180 days of a High Court judge’s time is a precious resource indeed, which is why we take the view that exceptions should not be made in these cases. That is not depriving potential migrants of rights because they would still have, to coin that old phrase, two bites at the cherry.

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[Tom Hunt]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Rosindell. It is certainly the first time; I would have remembered otherwise. I will talk about clause 2 in a general sense. As I mentioned to my hon. Friend the Minister in my intervention, for which I was very grateful, there is a certain irony here. We have spent so much time debating the measures that the Government have proposed to free up capacity in the court system, but they are being opposed by the Labour party, which then has the cheek to hold an Opposition day debate on Monday purely about the court backlog.

The refugees who are arriving here illegally are potential refugees. Many will not be; many will be economic migrants who are fleeing from France, a safe European country. The 2011 Supreme Court decision that led to Cart JR in relation to these cases was a retrograde step, and in some respects has given judicial review a bad name. Judicial review is an important part of the justice system, but the influence of Cart JR has been negative and has given judicial review, which is very important for our justice system and our democracy, a bad name.

There is a debate about whether the success rate for Cart JR cases is 0.6%, 3% or 5%. A success rate of 5% is still extremely low, compared with 40% or 50% for other types of judicial review. We must bear that in mind. We hear that there are 750 such cases a year, at a cost of £400,000. I raised the issue of the financial cost last week, and this was belittled by a witness, who said that the cost was

“the same amount that DCMS spent on its art collection in 2019-20.”––[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee, 2 November 2021; c. 52, Q75.]

Of course, that is not the key point. The key point is the wider pressure on the court system and on the time of our High Court judges. It is very clear that the pressure that Cart JR puts on the system makes it more difficult for our court system to get back on its feet after the impact of the pandemic. I am pleased with the practical steps that are being taken in other areas of the Bill to help with that.

This issue of the first, second and third bites of the cherry is interesting. I have not heard any practical reasons why immigration cases should be treated so differently from other cases by having a third bite of the cherry. We hear that, if there is one successful case, and even if only 2% or 3% of cases are successful, that is enough to justify Cart JR. If that is the only argument, why do we not have a fourth bite of the cherry, or a fifth? Can we say with certainty that, if we put the 97% of cases that are unsuccessful in the High Court to the Supreme Court, there will not be one or two that are successful? If one or two were successful, would that justify endless bites of the cherry? At some point, a balance must be struck. There is a limited amount of resources and significant pressure on the system. It is not unreasonable for the elected Government to make a determination about what is and is not reasonable. Even if the success rate is 5%, allowing endless bites of the cherry is not reasonable. It is not a justifiable pressure on the wider system.

Last Thursday, we also heard from the shadow Minister about many instances in which an individual had been successful in a Cart JR case in the High Court. Of course, such cases would have contributed to the 3% or 5%, but we would be here for about a week if we were to hear about each individual case that formed the 95%, or the 97%. Let us be absolutely clear: many of those individuals would be having a pernicious influence and a negative impact on our country—they would be illegal immigrants—and, frankly, the sooner we can get them out of the country, the better.

[Anne McLaughlin]

The hon. Member is talking about the sooner we can get rid of these people out of the country. One of the people I spoke about on Second Reading was a Venezuelan man who fled after state actors murdered a friend of his. He knew that he was in danger because he had witnessed that. The first-tier tribunal and the upper tribunal did not interpret his evidence correctly, according to the subsequent judge, after the Venezuelan man successfully got a judicial review. He is surely one of those people whom the hon. Member is talking about—the sooner that we can get rid of these people—because he would lose the right to have his appeal judicially reviewed, if the Member gets his way.

[Tom Hunt]

The sad reality is that in any justice system in the world, every now and then, there will sadly be a case that is not—but can we say with complete confidence that every case heard in the High Court has the right outcome? Perhaps, as I was saying, that is having a fourth or fifth bite at the cherry. We also need to reflect on the fact that the vast majority of these cases are not a good use of our judges’ time. They are not worthy of a further bite at the cherry. What is the practical argument for why they should be treated differently from anyone else in the justice system, who has two bites at the cherry? There is no argument for it.

I will draw my comments to a conclusion. Broadly, I welcome the Government’s moves in clause 2. The vast majority of my constituents would support what is happening. They believe in a fair justice system, in which we have a right to appeal—which we have here; that is not being changed—but they are realistic about the wider pressures on the court and justice systems. They see the Labour party doing everything it can to oppose reasonable and justified means to free up capacity in the courts system, while coming up with no practical arguments for how it would do so or that would be better than what the Government have suggested. That is unreasonable. Also, it is wrong to say that everyone who is going to go down this Cart JR route is not abusing the system and our good generosity as a country, because many are.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

I am inspired to speak to this part in our consideration, partly by the Minister’s eloquent explanation of why the amendments are undesirable, partly by the wise words of my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich on how the traditional system is in a way being besmirched by the gaming of it, in particular in immigration cases, and partly because of the delight of serving under your chairmanship, Mr Rosindell, which I have not done often, but am particularly pleased to do, under the watchful gaze of one of my political heroes, Joe Chamberlain, who began life as a radical and ended it as a member of a Tory Government, understanding, as you and I do, that liberalism is the triumph of frenzied licence over dutiful obligation. It is because of obligation and, in the spirit of Chamberlain, our patriotic respect for our constitution that we must resist the amendments.

To hear some critics of the Bill, one might think that the Cart was embedded in the settlement between Parliament and the courts, and yet it is a modern thing. As you know, Mr Rosindell, it is the product of a decision by the Supreme Court as recently as 2011, when it declared that the High Court could judicially review decisions of the upper tribunal to refuse permission to appeal from the first-tier tribunal, whereas previously it was held that it could not.

At the heart of our consideration of the Bill is a fundamental difference about the character of our belief in the character of judicial review, but also a difference in our understanding of the separation of powers. We saw that in our evidence sessions. We had evidence from academics, notably Professor Ekins who, by the way, authored the report by Policy Exchange—which I commend for its excellent work on this subject. He was very clear that some of the recent decisions by the Supreme Court and other parts of the court system have challenged the supremacy of Parliament.

We also heard from Aidan O’Neill, who said he was a constitutional lawyer, and I understand he is—quite a notable one, from what I read. He said that this was about mutual respect, but mutuality is not the basis of our constitutional settlement. The roles of Parliament and the courts are distinct—the separation of powers; the clue is in the name. Of course there is a relationship between them, because this place makes laws and the courts oversee laws, but judge-made law is not consistent with our constitutional settlement and some of the perverse decisions of the courts in recent years have led, in the words of Professor Ekins, to parliamentary sovereignty being openly questioned. He said:

“Parliamentary sovereignty was openly questioned and the rule of law was set in apparent tension with parliamentary sovereignty, which is deeply wrong, I think”.—[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee,2 November 2021; c15, Q9.]

The defence of the rule of law is not a valid one, as the Attorney General made clear in her speech on these matters very recently.

The issue before us in respect of these amendments is clear. The judgment that was made in 2011 opened a new avenue of judicial review and those Cart judicial review cases have mushroomed since. This is particularly true for immigration cases, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich said a few moments ago—not exclusively so, as the Minister pointed out, but largely. This has to be changed. Given that a previous Labour Government tried to tighten the requirements for judicial review, it is surprising that the current Opposition do not understand that this is a return to a stable and steady position—a normal position—that enshrines judicial review as an important part of the way in which citizens can acquire justice, but does not allow it to become what it has become, a means for people to perpetuate political debates that they have lost earlier. This is using the courts to—I never thought we would be speaking so much about fruit during the course of our deliberations, but to use the word that has been used several times before—have many bites of the cherry. We ought perhaps to think about another fruit, just for the sake of variety, but I suppose cherries will do for the sake of argument.

As I pointed out when we last met, the Opposition were going to have a debate yesterday on the court backlog. The amendments seem to me to have the effect of doing the very opposite and do not address the issue of the court backlog. We know that a very small number of cases that are brought under Cart judicial review—something like 3%—are successful, and yet there were around 750 per year between 2026 and 2019. We have many cases being brought on a wing and a prayer, with neither the wing flying nor the prayer being answered in terms of the result of the case. There is a pressing need, just on those practical terms, to reform judicial review in this respect.

I say to the Minister—not provocatively, but I hope helpfully—that I think the Bill can go much further. I think it is a very modest reform of judicial review. I refer him again to Professor Ekins’s work. There is a good argument for changing the rules of evidence, for example, which would tighten the system considerably. There is a good case for dealing with the effects of the Adams case, the Miller case and the privacy case, which he will know had profound effects on judicial review and on the balance between Parliament and the courts.

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The Government also insisted, as we have heard, that this measure will save valuable judicial resources and money, but again, their own assessment says it will save only about £400,000 per year. Even that figure is unfairly inflated, because it considers the cost of the upper tribunal rehearing the case, which will occur because an unlawful upper tribunal permission decision has been identified by other courts. To include those costs in the impact assessment is to include savings that result from allowing unlawful decisions to stand. That position is just not acceptable.

[Tom Hunt]

A number of amendments have made it quite clear that the key issue is not the financial cost but the wider significant pressure that is put on limited, finite judicial resources. Will the hon. Member address that point?

[Anne McLaughlin]

I certainly will. If we are talking about saving £400,000, here is my suggestion for another way to do it: do not criminalise legitimate asylum seekers simply because we did not supply safe and legal routes, and they were so desperate that they arrived in this country by boat. Some £400,000 per year is what it will cost to criminalise them, according to the Refugee Council of England. Just do not do that and we will not have to worry about that cost saving.

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[Anne McLaughlin]

I absolutely agree with that. I am happy to talk about this because I do not think the Government have a leg to stand on when it comes to how they plan to treat the most vulnerable human beings on our planet.

That takes me to some examples of why the Cart JR is so important. I talked about the case of the Venezuelan man, and a Conservative Member said that it was sad but true that some people would fall through the net. We are not talking about somebody appealing a parking fine; we are talking about somebody who is alive today because he was able to access—

[Tom Hunt]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Anne McLaughlin]

Absolutely. I would love to hear what the hon. Gentleman has to say.

[Tom Hunt]

If that is the case, does the hon. Lady support a fourth, fifth or sixth bite of the cherry? How can we guarantee that at the third bite of the cherry we are going to get everyone right?

[Anne McLaughlin]

The “third bite of the cherry” is not about whether the case is correct or the person’s claim is correct; it is about whether they got the correct process and mechanics in the first place. If they were not able to access justice in the first place, they should have the right to have that heard by a judge.

[Tom Hunt]

I take the hon. Lady’s point about the distinction in respect of what we are looking at, but people can still get that wrong. Does she support the fourth and fifth bite of the cherry?

[Anne McLaughlin]

I think the hon. Member is trying to trivialise what we are talking about and I am not going to entertain it any longer. To my mind, the justice system should not accept that sometimes people will end up dead because we did not get it right. We should be striving for justice always, not accepting injustice. I am not entirely sure that Government Members are interested, but I am going to look at some more examples given by ILPA, although I could probably give numerous examples involving my own constituents.

There is the woman from Uganda who could not live there because she is a lesbian. The first-tier tribunal and the upper tribunal refused her case and her renewed permission to appeal because they received a letter from her saying, “I have come here for a job. I am not a lesbian. Sorry I am a liar.” Anybody can see that that letter did not come from her. The upper tribunal judge admired her candour, but it was not her who wrote it; it was the appellant’s homophobic housemate. We must bear it in mind that people are given housemates when in the asylum system; they do not go and choose them. Thankfully, ILPA stepped in, she was given the right to a judicial review and won her case. She is able to live as who she is and the person she is, not having to hide from violence or homophobia, thanks to judicial review.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Tom Hunt Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 23rd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Hunt (Ipswich) (Con)]

Further to that point of order, Mr Rosindell. Extending on that theme, I was also very honoured to be at Westminster Cathedral this morning. I know how close you were to the late Sir David, and I am lucky to class you as a close friend of mine.

Sir David was somebody who was very visible in the Chamber. I remember in my first few weeks after being elected that I wanted to figure out how to do the job effectively, and I went around to canvass some names of people I should talk to about how to do the job effectively as a constituency MP. Sir David’s name came up almost as many times, and perhaps more times, than yours, Mr Rosindell. He was incredibly characterful, and I will always remember the summer and Christmas Adjournment debates when he would fire off 30 or 40 points within two or three minutes, when I would have mentioned barely one or two. It is with some sadness, though, that I say that he was somebody whom I always assumed I would meet and get to know very well, but that I was not given that opportunity. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley North, who is a fellow Catholic, I was very moved by the incredibly powerful mass. I was lucky enough to take communion today—I have had my first holy communion and Father Pat has been trying to get me to have a confirmation: he is keeping his eye on me. It was incredibly moving today, and it might have done the job. I think that I will do that.

[Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)]

Further to that point of order, Mr Rosindell. May I associate the Labour party with the remarks of the Minister and Conservative Members about Sir David? I commiserate with the Members of the 2019 intake—because of covid, they probably did not get a chance to know him. But they would have got to know him pretty quickly, with us all being back here. As somebody from a very different political tradition, I worked very closely with him for the last five years through his chairmanship of all-party parliamentary fire safety and rescue group, which was astonishing. We all know that all-party parliamentary groups have a multitude of successes and failures. That was an astonishingly powerful and well-organised body, particularly in the wake of Grenfell. It really was a pleasure not only to know him but to see how effective he was as an operator in Parliament. We will all miss him. I know that you will particularly, Mr Rosindell, as a friend. We will all miss him as a friend, a colleague and a wonderful parliamentarian.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andy Slaughter]

I am grateful for that intervention. I will come in a few moments to the powers of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, so let us see whether that satisfies the right hon. Gentleman.

In relation to the ouster in clause 2, I spoke about judicial review’s role in ensuring good and lawful administration, but as that issue has arisen again I wish to emphasise the point in this new context. Judicial review is an incentive to maintain high standards in public administration by public bodies, because the possibility of judicial review motivates decision makers to ensure that their decisions are lawful. Ouster clauses such as this one remove such motivation and, coupled with the removal of the means through with such decisions could be challenged, risk a decrease in the quality of Executive decision making.

Decisions and guidance from the courts can also help to improve policy development and decision making in Government. Judicial review provides the opportunity to bring to light legitimate concerns about a public body’s processes and decision making, and decision making in Government. Indeed, judicial review provides the opportunity to bring to light legitimate concerns about a public body’s processes and decision making and then also gives guidance on improving the processes in the future and encouraging good governance.

The same applies to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal relate to potentially very significant Executive powers in the area of surveillance and privacy rights. In this context especially, the risk of a breach of the fundamental rights of individuals is high. It is therefore crucial that Parliament has sufficient time to carefully consider the consequences of restricting judicial review in this context, and this last-minute amendment does not afford that.

Fundamentally—regardless of what anyone thinks about the merits of the Privacy International case—this is not the way to go about amending it, or even thinking about amending it. Parliamentarians will be asked to vote on what is in effect a very significant legal change, without any real appreciation of the possible effects and consequences and, as above, without the benefit of expert input through consultation and parliamentary examination. A provision such as this should be the headline measure in any Bill; it should be considered and debated seriously and properly; and anyone voting on it should have a full understanding of the issues. It should not be introduced as a last-minute addendum to an otherwise unrelated set of measures concerning judicial review remedies. This new clause as drafted will generate serious uncertainty.

There is also a substantive argument here. In the Privacy International case, the Supreme Court essentially held that it is very difficult for the Government to completely close off judicial review—in this case, concerning decisions of the IPT. The Government should be very careful about reversing that decision: the immediate consequence would be to close off judicial review. If it is thought that the Privacy International decision should be revisited in the future, it should be ensured that parliamentarians are fully aware of any consequences of doing that, and perhaps some middle-ground solution that preserves access to justice could be tried.

The amendment takes a sledgehammer to what should be a carefully crafted and sensitively considered issue. That, in my submission, is not the appropriate way to do good law making.

[Tom Hunt]

I will keep my remarks fairly brief; I see myself very much as a secondary signatory to these amendments from my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings: my much wiser, senior colleague. However, at one point last week I did think that I would be spearheading these particular amendments myself. Fate has meant that I have assumed a less significant role today.

Most of the comments that I would like to make are in relation to new clause 5, so I will hold off from making those comments now. All I will say is this. I take the point that new clause 3 is significant and Parliament needs more time to look at it. That was not the case when the change occurred after the Privacy International case. Actually, something very significant happened there. There was a major change in relation to the powers tribunal, its role and the role of judicial review in reviewing its decisions, and Parliament had no say at all in supervising that or debating it. I would be grateful if the hon. Member for Hammersmith let me know whether he agrees with my view on that. If he is concerned that Parliament might not have more time to debate the significant change suggested now, surely he would consider it inappropriate for Parliament not to have had a role back when the role of judicial review in relation to that tribunal changed so significantly.

I think that there are two debates here. If we are asking our intelligence services to carry out incredibly unique and peculiar work and we have to have a tribunal that is very specialist in reviewing and taking into account work that they do, there is one debate there, but there is a second debate. Even if someone does not agree with that and they think that there should be a right of review, surely it is only right and proper that Parliament should be in a place to debate and decide on that. It should not just happen; the court should not just decide for itself that this is the right thing to do.

As I said, I am keeping my comments brief. I will return on new clause 5, on which I have more points to make.

--- Later in debate ---

Precedent was set, and that is the problem with ouster clauses. As the hon. Member for Hammersmith will know, other Acts of Parliament, including the Intelligence Services Act 1994, Security Service Act 1989 and the Police Act 1997, contain ouster clauses that could be challenged on the basis of the Privacy International case.

[Tom Hunt]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the key issue in relation to new clause 3 is the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the complexity of the things it will deal with, and the complexity of the roles of the organisation and people it is overseeing? That complex debate should be dealt with only by Parliament. We are best placed to have that debate and to come to the right conclusion. Decisions about whether judicial review will apply to that or not should be for this place, not for the judiciary.

[Sir John Hayes]

I agree. Indeed, when I proposed the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, to which the hon. Member for Hammersmith referred and which built on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which Privacy International specifically dealt with, there was a genuine spirit of co-operation across the House. I worked closely with my then shadow, who went on to become Leader of the Opposition. I often say to him these days, “You learned your trade under me.” In fact, I think he said that to me. In any case, we worked closely on those matters and it was detailed scrutiny, as my hon. Friend has just described, that led to that Bill becoming an Act.

Indeed, we undertook extensive pre-legislative scrutiny, and one of the people I appointed to that task is now Attorney General. The scrutiny, under Lord Murphy, looked at the Bill in some detail, as the hon. Member for Hammersmith suggested, and there were long debates in the House and in the other place before it became law. As I emphasised earlier, we were determined that there should be proper safeguards.

The essence of this, Mr Rosindell, is that in these difficult, delicate and challenging matters of security, Parliament has to legislate—I would not say regularly, but as often as necessary—to allow our security services and the forces of law to stay ahead of those who wish to do us harm. The problem is that the capabilities of malevolent elements are dynamic, so the legal powers of those with the mission to keep us safe must match that dynamism. That is always challenging to Parliament, because there is a balance to be struck between the maintenance of law and the protection of liberty. That debate is the context for many of these considerations. It is not the place of the courts of make up the law as they go along, but that is exactly what has occurred.

I referred to the Attorney General earlier. She could not have put that case more plainly in the speech she made a few weeks ago at Cambridge University:

“The Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Privacy International was also profoundly troubling for a number of reasons. A decision by Parliament to limit the judicial review jurisdiction of the Courts should only be taken after the most serious consideration by the legislature. And there may well be circumstances where Parliament does consider that to be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Court should be very slow to deprive legislation of its proper meaning”.

That is essentially what the Court did in the case of Privacy International. It deprived legislation of its proper meaning. The most generous way to describe it is that the Court interpreted the decision made by Parliament in what I regard as a perverse way, and, in the words of the Attorney General, a “profoundly troubling” way.

The new clause, which the Minister will know is in scope—it is not for me to gauge that; our expert Clerks judged it, so there is no doubt about whether it is appropriate to add it to the Bill—would address that concern about creeping judge-made law in what is, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich said, a very sensitive area. I am grateful to the Minister, who made a generous offer and rightly drew attention to his helpful letter on issues raised by me and other hon. Members in our earlier consideration. I am particularly grateful to him for fully taking into account the case that I made on behalf of disadvantaged court users; his letter is most welcome in that respect. With the offer that he made of further discussion, the open-mindedness that he has shown and his clear understanding of why the new clause was tabled, I will—hesitatingly and to some degree reluctantly—beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

Evidence in judicial review proceedings

“(1) Unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, no court shall—

(a) permit oral evidence to be elicited in judicial review proceedings; or

(b) order public bodies or any person exercising or entitled to exercise public authority to disclose evidence in anticipation of or in the course of judicial review proceedings,

(2) In relation to any judicial review proceedings, or in anticipation of any judicial review proceedings, in which a public body or a person exercising or entitled to exercise public authority argues, or indicates its intention to argue, that—

(a) the proceedings concern a matter that is non-justiciable, or

(b) that an enactment excludes or limits judicial review,

(3) In subsection (2), “evidential duty” means any principle of law or rule of court touching the identification of relevant facts or reasoning underlying the measure or other matter in respect of which judicial review is sought, or any order of the court to adduce oral or other evidence.

(4) Nothing in subsection (2) or (3) affects an evidential duty that may arise in relation to judicial review proceedings other than in relation to a measure or other matter that is argued to be non-justiciable or to be excluded from judicial review by legislation.”—(Sir John Hayes.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andy Slaughter]

With respect to the right hon. Gentleman, I do not agree that that is what is happening. Even if he had a point there, I am trying to make the point, by looking at the changes that his new clause would make, that there are already safeguards in the system to prevent that and that the rules are tightly drawn in relation to evidence and disclosure. The courts do have discretion, but they use that appropriately and reservedly.

Any limitation of the disclosure of evidence, as well as oral evidence, beyond the current test risks undermining the effectiveness of judicial review proceedings for all parties. The current form of judicial review, which has limited disclosure requirements on the parties, works only because the parties are subject to duties of candour. In many respects, the disclosure obligations, where parties must submit all relevant evidence and information relating to the case to the court, ensure that the duty of candour is complied with. In the vast majority of cases, both parties comply fully with the duty of candour, but on the rare occasions when they do not, the judge’s disclosure powers can be used to ensure proper compliance.

In cases where the duty of candour would be limited by the proposals in subsection (2), which I will come to, the basis for limited disclosure requirements falls away. The combination of subsections (1) and (2) may mean that a claimant in a case is faced with the inability to obtain any disclosure at any point from a public body.

In effect, weakening those disclosure powers weakens the duty of candour, which is a vital aspect of fairness in judicial review. If public bodies feel that they do not need to comply with the duty, it will severely weaken the position of claimants, contribute to an inequality of arms in judicial review proceedings and risk completely barring, in practice, the ability for the claimant to bring a judicial review. For all sorts of reasons, including funding, the tight restrictions on bringing claims and the difficulties of bringing claims, there are already substantial problems for any claimant in beginning judicial review proceedings.

Subsection (2) would enable a public authority to effectively disapply the evidential duties, including the duty of candour, by indicating its intention to argue that the matter is not justiciable. That would make many cases completely un-triable. As I have said, the current form of judicial review, with limited fact-finding and disclosure requirements, works only because the parties are subject to a duty of candour. The duty requires a “cards on the table” approach and, as has been noted,

“the vast majority of the cards will start in the authority’s hands”.

For claimants to have the ability to get over the starting line and bring judicial review proceedings, the defendant body must be subject to the duty of candour. The duty ensures that all relevant information and material facts are before the court, and that any information or material facts that either support or undermine their case are disclosed.

As the “Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide” recognises, compliance with the duty of candour is “very important”. It helps to resolve matters efficiently and effectively. By requiring both parties to undertake full disclosure of relevant information early on in proceedings, it allows for a proper assessment of the merits of the case. That can help public bodies show claimants early on evidence that the decision was taken lawfully, which can lead to an early settlement, withdrawal of the challenge or at least the narrowing of the issues in dispute. That avoids substantial unnecessary costs and use of court time.

New clause 5 should have no place in the Bill. Subsection (2) would enable public authorities to disapply the duty of candour where they indicate their intention to argue that the matter is not justiciable. When this is combined with increased difficulty with accessing evidence through disclosure orders, set out by subsection (1), claimants will be denied access to evidence required to advance their case, making many cases unworkable. I therefore hope that the Minister will also resist the new clause.

[Tom Hunt]

It is a pleasure to grace this Committee again through a contribution, and to support my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings on new clause 5. It is obviously not related to new clause 3. We did attempt to table other new clauses, but we were unsuccessful because they were deemed to be out of scope, but many of those new clauses were, in fact, not dissimilar to or disconnected from new clauses 3 and 5.

In terms of whether different Lord Chancellors are mild korma or vindaloo, I am usually a korma man, but when it comes to review, I am perhaps more vindaloo, because I think that we do need some significant changes in this area.

I very much welcome the Bill, which, with or without these new clauses, is a significant step in the right direction. I have been pleased to sit through all our sittings in support of the Bill, and I think that the Minister has led proceedings very effectively. It has been quite interesting, because although I do not profess to be a lawyer—I am not a trained lawyer or professional—I am an elected Member of Parliament who cares about my constituents and my constituency, but also about this country and the relationship between the Executive, the legislature and the courts, which is vitally important. I make no apology for commenting on these matters and getting involved, because I think it is very important that elected Members of Parliament do so.

We are very lucky to have our judiciary, and the rule of law in this country is respected all over, but some of these figures can be remarkably prickly—and I have noticed that many seem invariably to have the EU flag on their Twitter profiles. I think there is almost a view that elected Members of Parliament are knuckle-draggers who are not entitled to have a view on a lot of these issues. Well, I disagree. I think that when it comes to matters such as sentencing and the operation of the courts, we as elected Members of Parliament, regardless of our specific views, should absolutely be confident to air them and should not be intellectually intimidated by certain individuals.

I sympathise with the broader view about judges assessing law and procedure, rather than getting sucked into contested facts, and about how evidence sessions can sometimes draw them away from their core function and into dangerous waters. There are many cases. The Adams case is connected to new clause 6 so we will not discuss that, but there is an obvious connection between it, the Miller case and the Privacy International case, which we discussed earlier, and that is the creeping role of the courts beyond their brief and scope, and I think that that has damaging consequences. In the Adams case, in terms of the debate on whether it is enough for a Minister or a Secretary of State to make a decision, I really struggle to agree that it is for judges to decide what is appropriate against established Acts of Parliament. That does not make any sense to me. I think that clarity in this area—and Parliament, through legislation, clarifying the relationship between the Executive, the legislature and the courts—is vitally important.