Oral Answers to Questions

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Monday 2nd September 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dunne]

As the right hon. Gentleman knows, helicopter support into the Gulf is not easy to do from the UK—or even from our sovereign bases in Cyprus. In direct response to his question about helicopters, I am afraid that I cannot enlighten him.

[Tessa Munt (Wells) (LD)]

I want to ask the Secretary of State why there has been no response whatsoever to my letters to him and his Ministers dated January, February, April, June and July 2013, or to my letters to the head of the Military Aviation Authority, dated January, February, April and June, about a number of serious concerns raised by my constituent, Christopher Jackson, relating to the safety of the Sea King helicopter fleet and the conduct of a number of individuals involved in ensuring the safety of the fleet, which I understand is now the subject of a police investigation. I would be grateful if the Secretary of State investigated what has happened, and may I receive responses by return?

[Mr Dunne]

I am obviously not able to speak for the head of the Military Aviation Authority, which has its own organisation within the MOD, but I would be happy to look into the matter. I have not heard from the hon. Lady directly myself; I will take that on board and write back to her.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Monday 17th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I cannot comment on the findings of the review, which is not yet concluded and has not yet reported to the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, but I can tell the hon. Gentleman that there is no need to bring forward the 2016 main gate decision point. That decision will be made in 2016, in order to deliver the new submarines into service from 2028, when they are required.

[Tessa Munt (Wells) (LD)]

I wonder whether the Secretary of State has responded to Rear-Admiral Patrick Middleton, who wrote in The Times on 7 May:

“With the latest developments in defence technology, the argument for Trident as a deterrent is rapidly becoming a losing one”.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Monday 25th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Philip Hammond]

It sounds like a Government who are rejecting the previous Government’s policy of sending people out to do a dangerous job without the kit, equipment and support that they need and deserve. We have a moral obligation not to put people in harm’s way unless they are properly equipped, and setting the size of the armed forces at a level the taxpayer can afford to support and equip properly is the morally correct and appropriate thing to do.

[Tessa Munt (Wells) (LD)]

I would like to ask the Secretary of State whether it is the case that when service personnel are accused of breaking the law their pay is stopped with immediate effect, which can cause real hardship to service families who are left unable to meet the costs of rent, bills and food, as well as of independent legal advice. If that is so, what is the justification for that and will he review the situation?

[Mr Robathan]

The hon. Lady raises a very important point, but I am pretty certain that that is not the case, although I will write to her if it turns out that I am wrong. Nobody has their pay stopped until and if they are convicted of a criminal offence or at a court martial. If I am wrong I will let her know.

Nuclear-powered Submarines

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Monday 18th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

As I hope I said at the beginning, I do not consider that the statement in question has taken the debate a whole lot further forward. This was an investment decision that was always envisaged in the clear policy that we set out in the strategic defence and security review, and I hope that by coming to the House and answering questions today I will have satisfied my hon. Friend’s desire to have an opportunity to ask me questions.

[Tessa Munt (Wells) (LD)]

To what other purposes could that manufacturing capability at the redeveloped Rolls-Royce plant in Derby be put with an investment of £367,000 per job, should that decision not be made in 2016?

[Mr Hammond]

I think I just need to explain to the hon. Lady that the decision in 2016 will be about the replacement of the Vanguard class submarines to carry strategic nuclear missiles. We have a second class of submarines, the Astute class of nuclear powered attack submarines. The Royal Navy will always need nuclear powered attack submarines whatever we do with the successor to the Vanguard class. So this sovereign capability is required if the Royal Navy wishes to remain in the business of having nuclear powered submarines, and we certainly do. [Interruption.]

Oral Answers to Questions

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Monday 19th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Tessa Munt (Wells) (LD)]

What is the point of having a review if no one, except a select few, has an opportunity to look at its findings? Should not the Liberal Democrats, in particular, be allowed some access to that information? [Interruption.]

[Peter Luff]

As my hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces says, I was of the view that the Deputy Prime Minister was a Liberal Democrat—and he will see the report.

Trident

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Wednesday 7th December 2011 Westminster Hall

[Tessa Munt (Wells) (LD)]

As a Liberal Democrat, I remain absolutely committed to my belief that this is a ludicrous waste of money. I am boiling with anger at the fact that, despite an alternatives review having been commissioned, it will not be published. There is no basis for not publishing it so that people can at least consider the alternatives, although my personal preference is as I have stated. Does the hon. Gentleman not agree?

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention and the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) for his. They are both very sincere and very honest on the whole issue.

[Tessa Munt]

rose—

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I understand that the hon. Lady is boiling with rage. I, too, am boiling with rage, so we will boil together.

[Tessa Munt]

I apologise for not having declared that I have membership of CND at Mid Somerset level and I am vice-chair of that organisation. I should have said that earlier.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

I know from long experience with CND that nothing to do with CND can be counted as a pecuniary interest. Absolutely no one has ever made any money out of being a CND member. There is nothing financial to be declared, so I set the hon. Lady’s mind at rest. I thank her for her support and membership of CND and for the sincere work that she has done for a long time to try to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

Estimates of the cost of designing and constructing the Trident submarine replacement programme have grown significantly this year, with the MOD publishing figures in the May parliamentary initial gate report that represent a doubling of those in December 2005. The estimated submarine replacement cost has increased from between £11 billion and £14 billion to £25 billion. In addition, the Ministry recently announced significant spending plans for new warhead facilities at Aldermaston, despite officially not planning a decision on replacing or refurbishing the warhead until the next Parliament. That is the question.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Indeed. One of the facts of life is that for anything to do with nuclear weapons, nuclear equipment, AWE Aldermaston or submarines, the price goes up and up, whatever else happens.

The Liberal Democrats have called for a Trident alternative review—that is fine. The Secretary of State announced that the review will take place, fulfilling the coalition agreement by

“assisting the Liberal Democrats to make the case for alternatives.”

However, on 21 November, he said that he had no plans to publish the review. He said:

“In looking at alternative systems and postures, the review draws upon highly classified technical, intelligence and policy information covering extremely sensitive national security issues. There are, therefore, no plans to publish either the report or the information it draws upon.”

Regarding providing information for MPs to scrutinise the Trident replacement programme, the Secretary of State stated that he

“intends to provide an annual update to Parliament; the first of these was produced for the Initial Gate announcement in May of this year. The precise format and timing of subsequent statements is yet to be decided.”—[Official Report, 21 November 2011; Vol. 536, c. 34W.]

Today, the Prime Minister made a written ministerial statement on defence issues, called, “Strategic Defence and Security Review: First Annual Report”. It states:

“In addition, to assist the Liberal Democrats make the case for alternatives to the Trident system, the Government initiated a study into the costs, feasibility and credibility of alternative nuclear deterrent systems and postures. Progress has also been made on implementing the new nuclear assurances policy and the reduction in our nuclear weapon stockpile to no more than 180 warheads, both commitments set out in the SDSR.”

I find it strange that the Secretary of State would say that we in Parliament are not equipped to know the basis on which an alternative is being looked at. We are not allowed to see the information, because apparently it is all classified. We therefore assume that the alternative is simply never going to see the light of day. Despite the valiant efforts of a number of Liberal Democrat MPs to get that, on the Floor of the House, it will be extremely difficult. The Minister must explain exactly why Parliament is not equipped to know why such vast levels of expenditure are going ahead, and why an alternative is not going to be published.

[Tessa Munt]

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will agree that the Minister will have to explain that in that case—it would seem to me—the costs are not known, and it is neither feasible nor credible for us to have the particular scheme.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Absolutely. If we do not know the cost, if we do not know what the alternatives are and if we do not know the foreign policy considerations surrounding the alternatives, we move into the era—once again—where the Ministry of Defence basically does what it likes and Parliament endorses it at some later stage. So we are moving—sleepwalking, actually—into a massive level of expenditure. Never mind whether people like or dislike, agree with or disagree with, nuclear weapons—is that really a sensible way for this country to go headlong into spending £100 billion?

Bomber Command (Campaign Medal)

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Tuesday 18th October 2011 Westminster Hall

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Andrew Robathan)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Jackie Doyle-Price) on securing this debate on the very brave men and women of Bomber Command, and their appalling sacrifice, which she has described, during the second world war. I will cover this in more detail, but there are two issues here. One is the respect and admiration that we should have for those very brave people who gave up their lives in many instances in service to their country in incredibly difficult situations. The second issue is how we should recognise their bravery and continue the world’s knowledge of what they did, 66 years after the end of the second world war.

If I may recap, more than 8,000 aircraft were lost. Out of 125,000 air crew, 55,573 were killed. Statistically, a Bomber Command crew member had a worse chance of survival than an infantry officer in world war one. Some 19 members of Bomber Command received Victoria crosses. I can assure everybody here that the Government maintain a deep appreciation—a real appreciation and admiration—of the courage and sacrifice of all those who served in Bomber Command during world war two. We owe them a great deal. My own view is that every schoolchild should know what they did, and I fear that they do not. Everybody in this country should understand that one in six UK fatalities in the second world war were in Bomber Command—a staggering number.

Aerial bombardment was not new in 1939. Indeed, the first recorded example of aerial bombardment took place in the summer of 1911 when Italian aircraft, sent to north Africa to fight the Turks, dropped modified grenades on to an enemy camp near Tripoli. Damage was slight and world reaction insignificant, but it was a significant development in air power. World war one firmly established this new role. Between 1914 and 1918, two distinct types of aerial bombardment emerged. The first, practised eventually by all combatants, involved the fairly simple concept of dropping high explosives on to enemy rear areas, hitting lines of supply, command networks, fuel dumps and military concentrations. This became known as tactical bombing or, if it entailed isolating enemy forces from their own support echelons, interdiction bombing. Exactly where close support and ground attack ended and tactical bombing began was, and often still is, a debatable point.

The second form of aerial bombardment was the concept of strategic bombing. The founder of the RAF, Lord Trenchard, had postulated that the bomber was a potential war-winning weapon, as my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock suggested. If raids could be sustained, industrial plant would be destroyed and civilian morale undermined to the extent that the enemy would be unable to continue the war. So persuasive were those arguments by 1939 that it was a widely held fear, particularly in Britain, that city areas were doomed to destruction within days of the outbreak of war.

The RAF went to war organised into four separate command units: Fighter Command, Bomber Command, Coastal Command and Training Command. My hon. Friends the Members for Thurrock and for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti) will need no reminding of the feats of Fighter Command during the desperate days of the battle of Britain, but it was then, at least, primarily a defensive force. Bomber Command’s great asset was that it could take the fight to the enemy—an all too precious occurrence in those early war years. However, by the time he took over as head of Bomber Command in February 1942, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris had become disillusioned with the effects of precision bombing and was turning to area bombing. This technique required the assembly of very large bomber fleets, up to 1,000 or more, and the inundation of whole areas with high explosives and incendiaries. The aim was to use statistical probability rather than selectivity to destroy military targets, and to make a direct assault on German civilian morale. At the time, it was considered a proportionate response to the terrible damage inflicted on London, Coventry and many other British cities during the Blitz and the later V-bomb attacks.

I do not think that there should have been any guilt felt then, or now, because this was a war to the bitter end. I certainly do not believe that anybody who was involved in Bomber Command should believe that they were doing anything other than furthering the British war effort between 1939 and 1945. Debates may still rage about the strategy, but there is no doubt about the bravery and integrity of those who took part. Night after night, these brave volunteers risked giving their lives—indeed, many gave their lives. The danger was enormous: enemy night fighters, anti-aircraft fire, mechanical failures, extreme navigational challenges, and the prospect of imprisonment for those who managed to bale out in time. Sorties could take eight to nine hours and brought with them a mental as well as a physical ordeal, the intensity of which would be unfamiliar to their colleagues in uniform on the ground or at sea.

I recommend that hon. Members visit the RAF museum in Hendon, look at a Lancaster and see how the whole crew had to get out of a hatch in the front, no bigger than one of the chairs in this room, while wearing a parachute. That is, of course, one reason why so many did not get out, which is a terrifying prospect. Bomber Command pilot Mike Lewis described the experience thus:

“We went in under an absolutely cloudless sky. We were literally over the harbour when the next thing people started reporting was that fighters were climbing up. The German pilots...turned in and just sat blasting away at us and blowing us out of the sky until eventually they ran out of gas and had to go home themselves. If there had been more gasoline I think none of us would have reached our home. We were sitting ducks. It was terrifying.”

Let us not forget the absolutely crucial role of the ground crew and the in-flight engineers—more than 100,000 of them. Without them, Bomber Command would not have been able to carry out 364,514 sorties, drop more than a million bombs, and tie up vast amounts of scarce German resources that would otherwise have been used elsewhere in their war effort.

The dedication and sacrifice of those who were part of Bomber Command is not in question; the debate has always been about how best to recognise it. Those who served in Bomber Command during the second world war were eligible for one of the stars instituted for campaign service: for example, the 1939-45 star. In addition, a series of campaign stars were created for participants in particularly hazardous campaigns—this was certainly one—and many Bomber Command personnel qualified for the much-prized Air Crew Europe star or the France and Germany star.

The case for awarding a medal to those who served in Bomber Command was also considered by the relevant Committee at the time, 66 years ago. However, it was decided that this would not be appropriate specifically for service in a particular command. There is no other example that I can think of, of a particular command getting a medal. That decision was made with the benefit of evidence from all interested parties at the time—something the present Committee does not have the benefit of now.

It should be clear that these brave men and women were not overlooked. They were considered at the time. In 1985, Lady Harris awarded an unofficial medal and began a campaign historically supported by the Daily Express. Both my hon. Friends have said that there is a huge body of opinion supporting this; actually, although there is a great deal of sympathy and a huge amount of respect for those who served in Bomber Command, I have not seen the evidence of a huge weight of opinion that says that we should institute a medal now.

[Tessa Munt (Wells) (LD)]

I wrote to the Minister on 13 August last year on this very point, and included a copy of a letter from Mr Henry Pam, who served in Bomber Command. He made the point:

“The Air Crew medal was not presented to those of us operating after the invasion of France etc. in 1944. Why?”

Many of those gentleman—and ladies perhaps, but mostly gentlemen—who served in Bomber Command are no longer alive. It seems mean-spirited not to consider what is happening to those who remain and to the families. We should grant some recognition by way of a medal.

[Mr Robathan]

I am just coming to recognition, but I point out to the hon. Lady that, if we were to institute a medal, that medal should go to every person who was killed in the second world war, or their descendants, and indeed to all those who served in the second world war. It would not only be the survivors; everyone would deserve a medal. If people were killed in the first or second world war, their campaign medals were still awarded. That is how such things are done. People who served and were killed certainly deserved their campaign medals, which were given to their descendants. That is right and proper and still happens today.

[Tessa Munt]

Were those particular gentlemen not extraordinary in their courage and bravery? As the Minister wrote in his letter to me, Mr Pam had received the 1939 to 1945 star, the France and Germany star, the defence medal and the war medal for 1939 to 1945. The peculiar situation in which Bomber Command found itself should surely be a prerequisite for handing out some sort of medal in recognition.

[Mr Robathan]

The hon. Lady is of course entitled to her opinion. Those people were incredibly brave and I in no way wish to detract from my admiration for them. My hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke referred to his son, and yet the even younger men of Bomber Command did things one can hardly believe—but then, so did those who served in Fighter Command, and they did not get a medal, and nor did those brave men and women in the Special Operations Executive who parachuted into occupied France, the majority of whom were executed when they got there. My hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock is saying that the people of Bomber Command were brave, and I believe that we recognise their bravery—we should do so, and we pay tribute to it—and that is what I am coming on to.

Since I became a Minister, I have been involved with the Bomber Command memorial. The Bomber Command Association is establishing a national memorial and has even cut the turf—I went to the turf-cutting ceremony in the summer. In October 2008, the Prime Minister, while in opposition, said:

“I have always believed that the 55,000 brave men of Bomber Command who lost their lives in the service of their country deserve the fullest recognition of their courage and sacrifice.”

I believe the same.

The Ministry of Defence is pleased to chair the Bomber Command memorial funding campaign, which is moving ahead with pace, and that was mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock. A construction contract has been awarded and the Bomber Command memorial will be located in Green park, opposite the RAF club on Piccadilly. We are aiming at a completion date in 2012. I am actively supporting the memorial and was meant to be having a meeting in a little over an hour with Malcolm White of the Bomber Command Association. Unfortunately, we had to cancel that meeting, but I shall be meeting him shortly to discuss how to facilitate the memorial, as well as various issues that have been in the newspapers. That will be the best and most fitting memorial, which will last long after we have all gone, reminding people of the sacrifice of our forefathers.

On the medal review, in the coalition’s programme for government it set out its intention to review the rules governing the award of medals, as a part of the commitment to rebuild the military covenant. A draft review was produced to enable us to consider the various views, and we sent the draft report to the campaign groups, including the Bomber Command Association, along with an invitation to submit comments. That review has now been carried out and the closing date for responses from the campaign groups has now passed. The formal responses we received have been carefully considered, but it is worth noting that the Bomber Command Association offered no comments on the medals review. The review will be published in the not-too-distant future.

There is no doubting the bravery and sacrifice of all those involved in the thousands of sorties made by Bomber Command over occupied Europe during the second world war. They made a real difference to the outcome of the war. It is equally clear that that difference was a crucial one, recognised by the other side. Hitler’s armaments Minister, Albert Speer, who more than anyone else in Europe knew about the true effect of the bombing campaign and the ability of the Germans to maintain the war, summed it up thus:

“It made every square metre of Germany a front. For us, it was the greatest lost battle of the war.”

In a sense, there could be no more convincing testimonial.

We support the erection of a fitting memorial to those whose courage made such a critical contribution to the successful prosecution of the air campaign in the second world war. My hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock is right when she says that it is not too late to honour the brave men and women who took part in Bomber Command. We are honouring them next year with the erection of the memorial, which I applaud.

Question put and agreed to.

Armed Forces Bill

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Tuesday 14th June 2011 Commons Chamber

We have a duty to protect young people, which sometimes involves protecting them against decisions that they make at an age at which, in other circumstances, we would not consider it appropriate for them to make the sort of commitment that is involved or to put themselves in situations that might lead to their being in harm’s way or to their lives being at risk.

[Tessa Munt (Wells) (LD)]

I thought this might be a good opportunity to point out that new clause 7 would alleviate some of the difficulties mentioned by the hon. Gentleman. With extensions to education and training in 2013 and 2015 up to the ages of 17 and 18, more young people might find themselves momentarily attracted to joining the forces. They can get through the first part but, as the hon. Gentleman’s point about the young people who have gone absent without leave shows, they sometimes experience a crisis in their lives. New clause 7 would alleviate the problem.

[John McDonnell]

I think that new clause 7 would bring an immense improvement to current practices and I support it, but I object in principle to the recruitment of children into the military. For 13 years, I was the part-time house father of a children’s home when they were run as family units and one could pursue one’s own career while also operating as the father of a family group. In that time we dealt with a large number of young people from extremely disturbed backgrounds and prepared them for fostering into ordinary homes. A number of those who came to us were extremely vulnerable and I remember many of them going into military service at a very young age, almost because they were looking for the security of an institution because they had, frankly, been institutionalised as a result of their lives in care. At the time, I thought those young people were extremely vulnerable and were making the wrong decision. At the age of 16, people are too young to make that major decision to go into the armed forces and put themselves under a disciplinary regime that can result, as it has done, in a number of youngsters being put in corrective establishments. As I have said, some others have been sent to war zones. I would welcome a careful rethink from the Government about this issue and I hope that they will consider coming back with proposals to accept the measures in new clause 7 and to follow other European countries in phasing out the recruitment of children into the Army.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Robathan]

The hon. Gentleman is right. I could not agree more. We get some very high-quality people—I presented the prizes at Welbeck two weeks ago, and there is also the apprentice college, Harrogate.

[Tessa Munt]

I could not agree more that young people should be in college or in education of one sort or another. If that is attached to a military establishment, that is fantastic. Will the Minister confirm, however, that three 17-year-old service personnel were deployed to Afghanistan and two to Iraq between April 2007 and April 2010? I know that that is not very many young people, but the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty), who is no longer in his place, implied that in Committee he had heard evidence that that did not happen. I may be incorrect. Can the Minister clarify the position?

[Mr Robathan]

I think the hon. Lady has in her hand a parliamentary answer that I gave her on exactly this issue. Those cases occurred under the previous Government and it was a mistake in each case. Funnily enough, the young men involved wanted to go on operations. A mistake was made, out of 24,000 reservists, as we have just heard, deployed on operations Telic and Herrick. Thousands are deployed each year and I am afraid that mistakes are made. If memory serves me right without having the answer in front of me, I think that two of the individuals mentioned were within a few days of their 18th birthday, and one was found out and sent back. We try to rectify mistakes when they are made, but there are a large number of people and if they do not own up to their age, that can be a problem. We do not intend that that should happen and we will pursue the matter to make sure that it does not.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Monday 31st January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

There are two imperatives. The first is to ensure that we have the successor programme. The second is to ensure that we do it within the financial constraints that the Government are forced to take on board, given the economic position that we inherited. Through the value-for-money study, as the hon. Gentleman well knows, we looked to see how we could extend the life of the current programme, if possible, to minimise the expenditure in early years. That is helpful not only in reducing the deficit in the period set out by the Government, but in ensuring the success of the programme itself.

[Tessa Munt (Wells) (LD)]

It would appear from the answers to freedom of information requests that the steel, the computer systems and the combat systems, among other things, for the first submarine have been ordered and will have been paid for. It also appears that the three reactors for the first three submarines will have been ordered and paid for before MPs can scrutinise the main gate business case. What will remain unspent for the first submarines? Will we be so financially committed that the whole main gate decision is made irrelevant?

[Dr Fox]

Whatever amount of money is spent on the lead items, technically it is up to any Parliament at any time to determine whether any programme can or cannot go ahead. It is clear from the coalition agreement that we are committed to maintaining a continuous at-sea minimum credible nuclear deterrent that will protect this country from nuclear blackmail and ensure that we make our role apparent in reductions in total nuclear armaments.