Public Office (Accountability) Bill

Tessa Munt Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 3rd November 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

To reassure my hon. Friend, the House, the families and all others affected by such scandals, these are clauses in a Bill that will soon be sections in a piece of legislation, but they are more than that: they change the nature of the relationship between the state and its duties to its people. That is so important. Yes, this Bill is the legal architecture, but something much bigger than this has to be put in place.

[Tessa Munt (Wells and Mendip Hills) (LD)]

rose—

[Maria Eagle (Liverpool Garston) (Lab)]

rose—

[The Prime Minister]

I will take the hon. Lady’s intervention, then I will come to my right hon. Friend.

[Tessa Munt]

I welcome this Bill. Will the Prime Minister reassure me and my constituents that organisations that are contractors for public authorities and public bodies will also be covered the provisions of the Bill? It is important that where responsibilities are deferred to other bodies, they too are captured by the clauses in this Bill.

[The Prime Minister]

The hon. Lady anticipates my next point, which I will make before taking an intervention from my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston (Maria Eagle). We have to recognise that in some scandals, such as the Post Office Horizon scandal, the boundaries between the public sector and the private sector are complicated. In answer to the hon. Lady’s question, clause 4 of this Bill applies the duty to some private bodies, particularly those delivering public functions and those with relevant health and safety responsibilities, as well as relevant public sector contractors—in the Post Office case, Fujitsu—for that very reason. We have to recognise that the boundaries are blurred, and we need to make sure that the duty extends appropriately.

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[Tessa Munt (Wells and Mendip Hills) (LD)]

May I draw the House’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, and particularly to my role as vice-chair of WhistleblowersUK, a not-for-profit organisation?

The Bill places new obligations of transparency and frankness on public authorities and officials, leaving them nowhere to hide from public scrutiny of their actions. I absolutely applaud those aims. We have been offered the opportunity to strengthen the Bill, and I have a contribution to make that stems from more than a decade of listening to whistleblowers. The UK has no proper law on whistleblowing or for protecting whistleblowers. Section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which was introduced by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, gives a measure of protection from detriments to workers and employees who make what are termed “public interest disclosures”. However, that provision treats such detriments as essentially employment matters; it does not once use the words “whistleblowing” or “whistleblower” and does not extend beyond workers and employees. It is highly technical, puts all sorts of barriers and difficulties in the way of workers and employees who make public interest disclosures, focuses exclusively on the employment context, and rarely—if ever—leads to any wider investigation of the substantive matters about which the worker or employee makes a disclosure.

The Public Office (Accountability) Bill misses an opportunity: it could and should have recognised the important role played by whistleblowers in ensuring accountability. The whistleblower is, or should be, the best friend of every chief executive officer, every board, and every Minister. Whistleblowers want to see an end to crime, corruption and cover-up; they do not want to be fired for raising their concerns. Almost everyone will recognise the major scandals in which whistleblowers have reported what was happening again and again but have not been believed or, worse, have been invited or forced to leave their role. The case against whistleblowers is all about protection of reputation and the imbalance of power, and I recognise entirely what the hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Sorcha Eastwood) said.

Explicit recognition was given to the role of whistleblowers in the ten-minute rule Bill introduced by the hon. Member for Liverpool West Derby (Ian Byrne) on 9 July 2025, with the support of the Hillsborough victims. Clauses 2, 5(1) and 9 in that Bill would have been of huge significance in advancing the protection of whistleblowers. For the first time in legislation, the Bill gave explicit recognition to whistleblowing—a word which had hitherto not featured in the legislative lexicon. The ten-minute rule Bill sought to extend the concept of public interest disclosures beyond employment law; it would have extended whistleblower protection to all who blow the whistle, many of whom will be outside the scope of employment law. If that Bill had proceeded, whistleblowing as a legal concept would have broken out of the confines of employment law.

Clause 9 of the Public Office (Accountability) Bill requires public authorities to publish codes of ethics. It would be easy for the Government to take into their Bill the provision from the earlier Bill requiring public authority codes of ethics to recognise the need to protect whistleblowers. It is deeply disappointing and unfortunate that it does not, and I ask the Minister to address that point and amend the Bill in her mission to strengthen it. If that were to happen, it would be a start, but further reform would still be needed. First, the provision would apply only when the potential wrongdoer was a public authority within the scope of the Bill. Secondly, such protection as would be given would arise only indirectly through the existence of a code of ethics. Thirdly, the Bill would lack teeth to deal with breaches of the code of ethics. Fourthly, there would still be no mechanism for investigating and following up the wrongdoing that a whistleblower might have uncovered.

There remains an urgent need to set up the office of the whistleblower, and to extend the Bill’s scope to include contractors in the private sector—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

Order. May I remind the hon. Lady of the scope of this Bill?

[Tessa Munt]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I sought to pick up on the Minister’s and Prime Minister’s intention of ensuring that the Bill is as strong as it can be.

The Bill should cover contractors in the private sector as well as the public sector, as was mentioned, if it is to have real teeth and ensure that wrongdoing is fully investigated and that wrongdoers are brought to account. Will the Minister meet me and whistleblowers to explore the scope of this Bill?

Public Office (Accountability) Bill (First sitting)

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We are now sitting in public again and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we start hearing from the witnesses, do any Members wish to make a declaration of interest in connection with the Bill?

[Tessa Munt (Wells and Mendip Hills) (LD)]

I wish to declare that I am a director and vice-chair of WhistleblowersUK, which is a non-profit organisation.

[The Chair]

That is now a matter of record. If any other Member has interests to declare, will they please do so before they start questioning?

Examination of Witness

Pete Weatherby gave evidence.

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[Tessa Munt]

Q The Bill clearly has its duty of candour and assistance. You have already made comments about focusing on the chief executive or the senior leader in any organisation. Can I check with you whether you feel that that would be sufficient to enable cultural change within organisations?

Pete Weatherby: No. The reason I have majored on command responsibilities is because that is a weakness in the Bill, but the Bill applies across the piece and to all public servants at all times, with the general duty as well as the duty of candour and assistance, which is the ancillary duty, if you like. So that is really important.

We are very keen to underline that this is an empowering Bill. In many of the cases—Hillsborough is a particularly good example—ordinary, decent police officers tried to tell the truth and were not allowed to tell the truth. This is a Bill that imposes a duty of candour across the piece. Everybody knows about it. Senior officers required junior officers to tell lies—this is the evidence they themselves gave on oath. That has to be stopped, and this Bill does that. We have tried to build in it those empowerment things, including whistleblowing—enhanced whistleblowing provisions and the like.

[Maria Eagle (Liverpool Garston) (Lab)]

Q Welcome, Mr Weatherby. I would like to ask about two things, one of which is command responsibility. With Hillsborough, within four and half months, Lord Justice Taylor’s report quite rightly pinned the main blame on South Yorkshire police’s lack of proper behaviour on the day. If you had had command responsibility, that would have included the South Yorkshire chief constable and perhaps the match commander, who we know lied live on TV about what had happened. Do you think that the Bill, without command responsibility, would have managed to deal with that big problem at Hillsborough—the cover-up and the lies that were told to defend the match commander, presumably authorised and okayed by the chief constable? Do you think that the provisions, as they are, would have prevented that cover-up?

Pete Weatherby: I do not think there is a clear yes or no answer to that, but it is not strong enough. The purpose of what we want to do with command responsibility is to stop the chief constable thinking that it is okay to put the false narrative forward. If there is a legal responsibility on the chief constable to discharge the corporate duty, he is not going to do that. I think that if the amendment is made, the answer is yes; if the Bill is left as it is, it is more complicated. If it is left, I think it will make a big difference, but it will not stop as many of the problems.

There are other examples. Going back to Manchester Arena, the chief constable of Manchester put forward false evidence to the Kerslake inquiry. Those are not my words; he subsequently described it as “a very grave error”. He did that because he did not have command responsibility, and he thought he could get away with it. The command responsibility needs to be made clear, and the provision in clause 2(5) does not go far enough—it is ineffective.

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[The Chair]

The Minister has once again kindly waived her right to question, so I call Tessa Munt for the Liberal Democrats, please.

[Tessa Munt]

Q The duty of candour binds those who are in a direct contractual relationship with the public authority. I am interested in knowing how far down the line it would go to subcontractors and, indeed, subcontractors of subcontractors.

Tom Guest: It is right to identify that the extension of liability is only to direct contractual relationships, so not necessarily further down the line. I would make two qualifications to that. First, we will look at the evidence and the precise contractual relationship—what the evidence of the contract is. Secondly, I think we are talking about clause 4(2) here, which would also cover a private contractor who had a health and safety responsibility in connection with the incident. Although it does not cover the contractual relationship further down the line, that is an alternative route to liability.

[Tessa Munt]

Q What do you feel are the potential risks and benefits of requiring permission from the Director of Public Prosecutions to prosecute?

Tom Guest: Let me explain how the DPP’s consent to prosecute works. In most criminal offences, a private prosecutor or the police can commence proceedings—so they get a summons or they charge someone, the suspect becomes a defendant and they go into the court system automatically.

Where the DPP’s consent is required, that means that the permission of the CPS is required to prosecute. We apply our standard tests to that: “Is there sufficient evidence to prosecute?” and “Is a prosecution in the public interest?” They are the same tests that we apply to a prosecution. If we conclude that those tests are met, we take the prosecution forward ourselves. If we conclude that they are not met, the case does not go into the court system.

The purpose of the DPP’s consent is to make sure that unmeritorious or vexatious prosecutions cannot get taken forward. Certainly, in terms of the misconduct offences, sometimes there are private prosecutors who wish to take forward unmeritorious prosecutions, so it is a check and balance on that. If it is a meritorious prosecution, however, we will go ahead with the prosecution ourselves.

[The Chair]

It would help if Members could indicate which witnesses they wish to address their remarks to.

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[The Chair]

Once again, the Minister has indicated that she wants Members to have the opportunity to ask questions. I call Tessa Munt for the Liberal Democrats.

[Tessa Munt]

Q Can I just say how sorry I feel for you? It sounds dreadful and I am sorry. The question I should ask you is, “How confident are you that this will change the culture in public authorities?”, but I sense from what I have heard that I ought to ask, do you have any confidence that the Bill will change things?

Charlotte Hennessy: We are very confident. We have literally given 10 years of our lives, fighting to be here in this place. We have to acknowledge that Keir Starmer is the only Prime Minister who has endorsed the Bill. I would like to remind everyone that our Prime Minister made me a promise. He made a pledge to the public. It is now your duty to ensure that you fulfil that promise as well. If we were not confident in the Bill, we would not be sitting here today.

Steve Kelly: Just touching on something that Seamus was talking about before, about changing cultures within authorities and so on, I would like to give you an example that has never left me. During the Hillsborough inquests, a man in his 40s or early 50s was giving evidence. He was an ex-PC—at the time of Hillsborough, he was probably a young PC. He was being questioned about the culture within the South Yorkshire police force at the time in 1989.

I will never forget that man saying, “When you used to go Snig Hill, and you’d be walking along the corridor, you’d hold your head down when you’d see the bosses. You daren’t look at them, because we were frightened of them.” How could we encourage young officers like that to become whistleblowers? You couldn’t. We need a culture change. I thought that was a great point that this is something this law might do for not only policemen, but any public servants—anyone deserves support if they are trying to right a wrong.

That young policeman must have taken that with him to those inquests. I remember looking at his face and thinking, “That’s the first time you’ve got that out.” The burden was on him all those years as well. It should not be like that. Hopefully, the Hillsborough law will support that.

Sue Roberts: You are right; the culture changes have to be led from the very top—from the CEOs of these companies. Either they have to want to make this change happen or they need to move on.

[Anneliese Midgley]

Q I have two questions for the whole panel. To start with, thank you so much for everything that you have done. There is no doubt about it; we would not be here in this room today with the Bill where it is without your work. We heard in an earlier evidence session from Pete Weatherby KC, the director of Hillsborough Law Now, who talked about command responsibility. He said that without the amendment, a lot of the duties in the Bill are reduced to something that looks good, but is rather ineffective. He also talked about application to the intelligence services. Do you agree with what Pete Weatherby said to us today? Owing to the shortness of time, I will ask my second question as well: what do you think the Bill Committee needs to hear from you today?

Charlotte Hennessy: We completely support what Pete said earlier and the amendments that he has suggested. We are in full agreement with all the information that has been included in the Bill. Going forward, we need to acknowledge that Hillsborough is our story, but there are many, many others. We also need to acknowledge that the Hillsborough Law Now campaign group is made up of so many other examples of miscarriages of justice. They will have submitted their own evidence to you, so I will not name them all today, but we need to ensure that there is change going forward. We cannot keep allowing the same situations to repeat.

Not to be disrespectful, but ultimately we also need to acknowledge that the current laws that are in place failed to secure prosecutions against those that were responsible. David Duckenfield told that one lie while he stood over people who were scrambling for their lives. He got away with that because the Crown Prosecution failed to secure a criminal case against him. He was offered sympathy while family members had to sit and watch. He was allowed to place files so that he did not have to look at the family members that were sat in the public gallery.

We could sit and talk about examples all day. Norman Bettison was in this building. He briefed people about what happened at Hillsborough. He was allowed to do that. He was then made chief constable of Merseyside and then he was knighted. He was complicit in the cover-up. We have to change it. It has to stop.

Margaret Aspinall: I have to thank Maria Eagle—if you don’t mind, Maria. I always remember, a good few years ago, Maria having the power—the guts—to stand up in Parliament and say that it was “black propaganda” with Bettison. She was absolutely spot on.

When I look back over the years and think about what Charlotte was saying earlier, Mr Duckenfield—I call him Mr Duckenfield out of respect to all of you; otherwise I would not—walked away scot-free. He went missing for a couple of hours and not one person knew where he was. He could not remember where he had been; he could not remember where he was. He must have been the bloody Invisible Man because, good God, there’s no way. I think the police were scared to say exactly where he was. They were all scared; they were all covering up for each other. To me, that is an absolute, utter, utter disgrace of a system in this country.

I know we can’t bring judges up, but there is a few of them should be brought up. When we were at the private prosecution, where a judge could turn round and tell Mr Duckenfield, “Don’t worry, Mr Duckenfield, you won’t get a custodial sentence,” we knew then we had no chance—no chance. He directed the jury twice, because they came in and asked a question. For him to turn round and say, “What message are you sending out to the emergency services if you come back with guilty?”, what does that tell all of you? It tells you we had no chance whatsoever. We were up against a system that was corrupt from the very top to the bottom.

I feel sometimes we are on trial yet again for what happened at Hillsborough, because we are sitting here like this. I feel I am trying to ask all of you to do the right thing. I have asked the Prime Minister. He made that promise; he made a phone call to me that he would do the right thing. As Charlotte said, we thank him for that. He has made that promise; he will have to fulfil that promise. He has also promised it would not be watered down. For Hillsborough families—and for the likes of Ian as well, who was at that game and who knows what we have all gone through and what the survivors went through—we are here to change a system that should have been changed decades ago. When you look at all the cover-ups that have gone on—I can name them all, but I won’t, because I am sure you all know—it is a disgrace that we are sitting here now, 36 years on, trying to change the system. I am asking all of you, please don’t let anybody else go through what we have gone through. Please, I ask you all: do the right thing.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Second sitting)

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Mullan]

Thank you.

[Tessa Munt (Wells and Mendip Hills) (LD)]

Q I wish to make a declaration: I am a vice-chair and director of WhistleblowersUK. That is a not-for-profit organisation and I receive no financial recompense for anything that I do.

Thank you to the witnesses. I am very sorry to hear what happened.

Professor Waters: It is still going on.

[Tessa Munt]

I know. I salute your courage. Thank you both for saying what you did. On whistleblowing, what do you feel there might be in the way of protections within this scenario? What protection should there be for whistleblowers?

Professor Waters: Speaking just from my own experience—not as a lawyer or anything—in the last nearly three years since Ruth’s death I have been contacted by various people within Ofsted who shared some really quite disturbing information about its behaviour and its rewarding of certain members of staff who were associated with Caversham primary inspection and other appalling cases. When I have asked if they will speak out, they have said that they do not dare. They have to sign some form of the Official Secrets Act 1989. I have been contacted by numerous headteachers who have been traumatised by Ofsted inspections and have lost their jobs, health and nearly their lives. They have not been able to speak out because they were made to sign non-disclosure agreements in order to get some money to support their families.

It just seems that at every level mechanisms are put in place to do the absolute opposite of what inquests and inquiries should be doing, suppress legitimate concerns and defend people who are causing active and ongoing harm. The stronger the defence—the protections—for whistleblowers, the better, and maybe, finally, all the people from Ofsted who have contacted me will be able to go public with the things they have told me.

Deborah Coles: The only thing I would add to that is that, in the context of the Hillsborough law, we are talking about trying to effect legal, cultural and practical change. If we can help rectify the culture of cover-up, obfuscation, denial and defensiveness that occurs when things go wrong—we are talking across inquests and inquiries not only when people have died, but for other injustices—one would hope that that will help victims in the long term, because it will enable honesty and truth telling. Hopefully that will permeate across the system to those who have important evidence to contribute to inquiries and inquests.

[Tessa Munt]

Q We have had the Nolan principles of public life since 1995. If I were to pick out four of those seven principles, it would be: integrity, openness, honesty and accountability. Where are we now with the Bill in comparison with that? What is going to change the culture?

Professor Waters: I have written various messages recently to Martyn Oliver, the chief inspector of Ofsted, quoting those Nolan principles. I have received replies that apologise for his insensitivity and promise empathy. I have not asked for empathy, sensitivity or a performance of those; I have asked for honesty, but that clearly does not work. Ofsted has a code of conduct, which they kept quoting in the inquest, but the coroner clearly found that that code of conduct did not apply. There are the Nolan principles, codes of conduct, accountability hearings, and even an offence of perjury, but none of them seem to work—they are too easy to slip away from. A statutory duty of candour with the possibility of criminal sanctions is sadly what is needed—it beggars belief, but that is what is needed to make public bodies be honest.

Deborah Coles: I think the thing that people find quite shocking when we are talking about the Hillsborough law is that you have to effectively legislate to get people to tell the truth. I support what Professor Waters says about penalties, but is also about monitoring and evaluation, because the Hillsborough law will only be as good as its implementation. As I said, up and down the country, there are families going through legal processes that are so defensive and traumatising that the injustices that you heard expressed today by the Hillsborough families—and you will hear more later—about the lying, victim blaming, delays and denials are still being faced by families going through these processes today. That is why the Bill is so important.

[The Chair]

I call Lizzi Collinge for, I am afraid, what is likely to be the last question on this—we might possibly get a couple more in.

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[The Chair]

I do apologise. It is a pretty strict timetable, but I do appreciate your coming in today. It is a matter of sensitivity and I am trying to give as many people as possible the opportunity to express their views and ask questions. Thank you very much for your attendance, Professor Waters and Ms Coles.

[Tessa Munt]

On a point of order, Mr Dowd. Is it possible that we can ask witnesses who might have something to add if they can write to you as Chair?

[The Chair]

I think that is automatic. Just let me chair the meeting.

Examination of Witness

Lord Evans of Weardale gave evidence.

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[Tessa Munt]

Q I wonder if you can explain what happens. You have had a code of practice for ethical policing in force for a while, and there is the code of conduct and the Nolan principles. What is expected of police officers, in terms of serving the public and not serving their organisation, could not be clearer, yet catastrophe after catastrophe has come to light, and they continue to come to light. If I were a police officer who wished to whistleblow, to whom would I go?

Chief Constable Guildford: You would have a number of opportunities to whistleblow as a police officer or a member of police staff. First and foremost, there are opportunities for you to make a disclosure to your line management. You could make a disclosure to another supervisor. You could also make a confidential disclosure, because each force has a confidential reporting mechanism. It is a reported line, and it is done anonymously.

On top of that, we brought in some measures recently that enable people to make a report via Crimestoppers. We also very actively encourage the reporting of any whistleblowing via all our staff associations—the trade unions on the side of police staff, and the Police Federation, the Police Superintendents’ Association and the Chief Police Officers’ Staff Association on the side of police officers.

[Tessa Munt]

Q Who investigates those allegations?

Chief Constable Guildford: That often depends on who makes the allegation and whether it is criminal or conduct related. If it is a criminal matter, it is reported to a police force or the IOPC. If any criminal or conduct matter is reported and it involves a chief constable, it goes to the IOPC under the law. If it is anybody below that level, it goes to the professional standards department in each of the police forces. It is then independently assessed, and given to an investigator, who is trained and accredited, and independent of the people who are complained about and the complainant.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q I want to put on the record that my brother is a senior police officer in the South Wales police. Chief Constable, can you discuss the practicalities and the impact on policing of the new offences, specifically the new offence of misleading the public? How will it be carried out and how will it be policed? What would the impact be if we removed the harm element of that offence? How would that impact policing?

Chief Constable Guildford: Having been consulted on the way through this, having thought about it quite considerably and having spoken to the director general of the IOPC, I think that the drafting at the moment is pitched at the right level, because it says that that harm needs to be of a serious nature. When it comes to setting out harm, it mentions phrases such as “departed significantly from”.

What will the impact of that be from my perspective? I think it will encourage leaders and individual officers to do the right thing. Initially, it may increase the likelihood that a narrative would be corrected earlier. Think back to some of the foundational pillars upon which this legislation rests, and a lot of the narrative that was, let us say, placed in the public domain around Hillsborough—and sometimes around other events where there is knowledge that is known to the police service and is able to be communicated, but which for whatever reason on occasions is not. Sometimes, in my opinion, that does not help with public confidence.

Going back to the question, I think this will encourage the clarification of issues at an earlier stage. But I suppose, on reflection, from a professional perspective, we have to balance some of that with an individual’s potential reluctance to say too much too early. Of course, the public quite rightly have an expectation that facts will be clarified and that information will be shared and placed in the public domain, and that is absolutely the right thing to do. That is the balancing act. It is important that it is pitched at the right level, which in my professional opinion it is. The “harm” is economic, physical or emotional, and I think it says it should be not inconsequential, which is important. On occasion—you will know this from your family perspective—we absolutely do get things wrong, but the legislation is designed to allow us to correct those things fairly expeditiously.

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[Dr Mullan]

Q The Bill’s provisions essentially ask public bodies to ensure just that they are representing themselves in a “reasonable” manner. How would you even begin to advise a public body about what would count as unreasonable versus reasonable levels of representation at an inquest?

Richard Miller: The starting point would be the coroner, who will be a qualified lawyer and therefore very used to making assessments about what is necessarily and reasonably incurred by way of legal expense and legal work. They will be in as good a position as anybody to judge whether what the public body is doing is reasonable. It is a standard part of civil litigation that you have to justify your costs as necessary and reasonable, so it would not be a new requirement; it would just be a new forum within which that requirement was applying. The lawyers advising public bodies would already be well used to identifying what is necessary and reasonable in any given circumstance. Obviously, they will need to calibrate that advice in the light of this legislation, but it is not a new skill—it is a not new judgment that they will have to make. It is something that they already do.

[Tessa Munt]

Q I declared earlier that I have an interest in whistleblowing, and I wondered if I could ask you a question in relation to that. Those who are alive and well who whistleblow against their organisations do not necessarily have the benefit of going into an employment tribunal with any legal assistance. Might the Bill go further in that direction and assist in some way? Very often, those individuals are taking on incredibly large corporations that have ranks of lawyers. Do you have a view on that?

Chris Minnoch: That is not something I have necessarily prepared for, but I appreciate that it is an important point, so thank you for asking about it. For many years now, there has been a deficiency when it comes to employment cases, particularly since the removal of employment law from the scope of the legal aid scheme. As an organisation, it is important to legal aid lawyers and their clients—similarly, from the Law Society’s perspective, I am sure I would not be wrong in saying this—that people taking actions in the employment tribunal or facing proceedings as a result of whistleblowing have access to legal advice and representation. There is a certain element where people who benefit from union membership are partially protected by that or can have resources made available to them, but there is a gaping hole in the legal aid scheme at the moment around employment law and employment cases for employees. We would hope that the Government would consider filling that, because it is a very important point.

[Tessa Munt]

Thank you. I invite you to pass your comments to the Chair in writing at some point, if that is possible, because I do not have time to ask you about that in detail now, but I am very interested in your views.

Richard Miller: I fully agree with what Mr Minnoch has said on that point. The Law Society would also be very happy to provide more detailed views on this issue in due course.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Q Thank you both for being here this afternoon. The Government recognise that the provisions in the Bill on legal aid provide a significant expansion of legal aid. Can you talk to us about the practicalities of that expansion and say what the system needs to fulfil this commitment in the Bill?

Richard Miller: There are three areas that most need to be covered. First, what is the structure within which legal aid is delivered? We believe that the Bill does not go quite far enough here, in that it provides for legal help—the very lowest level of assistance—to families and it provides for advocacy. In most court proceedings, there is a middle level of legal representation that is provided. We think that level has benefits both for the Government and for the families concerned. For the Government, it provides greater control and greater quality control over the work. For the families—or, more to the point, for the firms representing the families—it means they are able to apply for payments on account in long-running cases, which is crucial to make this an economically viable expansion for firms.

You have to get the structure right in the first place. You then have to build up the capacity and you also have to make it attractive enough overall for lawyers who are not currently doing this work to want to come into it. Those are the three aspects that need to be addressed. Chris, do you want to expand on that a bit?

Chris Minnoch: Thank you, Richard. Minister, it is a very important question. I will start by saying how refreshing it is to come to a session such as this to talk about something positive in relation to the legal aid scheme—a positive expansion—after so many years of giving and submitting evidence to various Committees asking for these sorts of measures to be introduced. I give credit to the campaigning groups that have made this happen and to the Government for taking such a progressive step.

Richard is absolutely right that we have to see the expansion of legal aid in the context of the current civil legal aid system in particular, but you cannot dissociate that from the criminal legal aid system because there is an overlap between the two in terms of who is delivering the service. There are fundamental weaknesses in the sustainability and in the workforce, especially regarding recruitment and retention, that have been recognised by various recent Government-led reviews. There is lots of evidence there and I am sure that, as a Minister, you are fully aware of some of the challenges you face in trying to plug those.

Richard highlighted a really important point about the technical construction of the scheme. We are already in discussions, as is the Law Society, with the Ministry of Justice and the Legal Aid Agency about how we can improve that structure to make the work as sustainable as possible, and as attractive as possible, both to existing providers and new providers.

There is a really critical element, however, which was raised earlier today in some of the evidence that I heard, about which types of lawyers are best placed to deliver these services. Despite the challenges that the legal aid scheme has faced, particularly in the last 15 years or so, we are really lucky to have a core of incredibly experienced and expert lawyers who carry out this sort of work. Our advice to the Government would be to start there and then look to expand the capacity of those lawyers.

There is an issue around capacity, because inquest work takes such an emotional toll on the lawyers involved. There are elements of vicarious trauma that are involved in these sorts of cases, so it is very difficult for your entire caseload to be inquest work for 100% of your time. There are some natural capacity issues built in, even for lawyers doing that work currently, but those are the organisations—I think one of the earlier witnesses described them as human rights lawyers—where we need to start building up their capacity by making the system as attractive as possible, so that they themselves can recruit and develop the lawyers who can expand this work.

We are also already in talks with the Legal Aid Agency about separating out inquest work from the current categories of legal aid, so it is a separate category of legal aid with its own separate supervisor standards and its own separate accreditation process—those sorts of things. Richard, you might want to address the kind of training, development and accreditation issues arising from that.

Richard Miller: Indeed, yes. We are already having initial discussions with the Legal Aid Agency about what training might be required and whether accreditation would also be worthwhile in this area. The Law Society is well positioned to deliver training at scale, as would be needed here. One thing that we would like to explore is whether there is scope for Government assistance with the cost of that training to ensure that we can get the initial boost to capacity that will be urgently required.

On the question of accreditation, at the moment our preference is not to go that far, because we must be careful not to establish too many barriers to getting that expansion in place first. Down the line, it might be that accreditation would be worthwhile, but initially I think we need to make sure that the training is there and that lawyers are aware of their obligation not to deliver work beyond their competence. That should get the expansion of capacity that we need in the short term that we can then build on.

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[The Chair]

I am afraid that this will be the last question.

[Tessa Munt]

Q Could you consider the intersection of prevention of future deaths reports with the Bill? Is there anything that should be added to the Bill, or any process that should be changed, to make those reports more effective?

Judge Durran: The Bill includes provisions that a coroner can write a conduct report. It is not clear to me at the moment what the mechanism will be for such a report and how they should be handled. At present, as I understand it, conduct reports raising concerns will be sent to the chief coroner, responses will be sent to the chief coroner, and the chief coroner will account for those within my annual report to the Lord Chancellor. What is not clear to me is the mechanism of how that will happen and whether the intention is, through regulation, to create mechanisms similar to prevention of future deaths reports.

It is important to say that I am not, nor should I be, a regulator. I am sure that many will say that publication of a report and publication of a response without any other mechanism will not achieve much. I am concerned about what those mechanisms are and whether they will fundamentally serve a purpose, or whether I will simply publish them and they will be there for people to see, but no meaningful action will be taken upon them.

[The Chair]

I am afraid that brings us to the end of the time allocated for the Committee to ask questions of you, so on behalf of the Committee, I thank our witness for her evidence.

Examination of Witness

Cindy Butts gave evidence.

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[Dr Mullan]

It would be; thank you.

[Tessa Munt]

Q It is nice to hear you, Cindy.

You referred to the families and an awful lot of individuals who considered that they were really looking forward to you being part of their solutions. Might I ask you to consider something? You were talking about language. I think that what will happen is that every different organisation will create its own code of ethics and own interpretation of the duty of candour. Is there perhaps a place for the Government, or for you and the Government, to work together to make a single version?

I suspect that the public, out there in the real world, will interpret the code of ethics and the duty of candour in a particular way, and will use ordinary language. They will know when it is right and what it is saying, but we might be in terrible danger of local authorities—some of them doing one thing; some of them doing another—and different people interpreting the rules in a particular way.

I recognise the difficulties with Nolan. They have been with us for 30 years, but clearly the Nolan principles have not worked. Is there a possibility of a single framework within which everyone understands what everyone is up to? I say that particularly because in earlier evidence from the chief constable, when he was questioned about various aspects, he thought that it was a brilliant question for other authorities, but not for his.

Cindy Butts: Thank you for that interesting question. The duty will cover hundreds—thousands, probably—of bodies, all with very different roles and remits, so having one coherent framework might be difficult, because each and every one of them needs something that is right for them and that fits the context of the way in which they work and their objectives. That said, there is value in thinking about some overarching principles that certainly ought to apply to how each organisation develops its bespoke framework. First and foremost, however, it must fit in with an overarching set of principles.

That question also points to the issue I raised before, which is about ensuring that victims and survivors are involved in the implementation. I think that they can play a crucial role in ensuring that organisations have a framework that is fit for purpose and that is informed by their lived experience. That would be how I look at it.

[Joe Powell]

Q To go back to your point about coherence, it would be helpful to hear how you foresee your role working with the additional support that will come through this law. Help us understand how it fits together. What does the coherence you might feel is not quite there at the moment look like?

Cindy Butts: I hope that the inclusion of the IPA in law means that organisations understand the IPA’s role of supporting victims, survivors and bereaved families in accessing information and advocating for them for truth—for truth telling. I hope that it is clear that the responsibility of the IPA is to help them to achieve exactly that.

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[Dr Mullan]

Q Dr Chopra, there is a challenge in the medical world. For example, you might have a cohort of people who think they are discharging their duty of candour by reporting various things about covid vaccines and the harm they have been doing, which we would not necessarily consider a good-faith disclosure. You obviously have to deal with that all the time when whistleblowers come to talk to you about something in their organisation that is not right, and you have to try to make a judgment. How do you balance the duty to listen to people with recognising that they can, either in good faith or bad faith, report things that are not genuinely a matter of concern?

Dr Chopra: When we approach looking at the duty of candour in regulation 20, we approach it both at the registration phase, when we are registering providers, and at the inspection and assessment stages, which then determines whether we take any enforcement action.

We have an assessment framework that sets out particular questions that we look at when we assess how an organisation is approaching its duty of candour. Within that, there will be policies and procedures that people need to follow. How do they deal with whistleblowers? How do they deal with people who raise concerns? To go back to Helen’s point, how are they ensuring that training is taking place for frontline clinicians, so that they have a mechanism to raise concerns or incidents that might trigger the statutory duty of candour? That is how we look at the overarching policies, processes and procedures that will satisfy us that an organisation is ready to be registered, and that we can look at them when we are going out on inspections. That is how we look at those issues.

[Tessa Munt]

Q I recognise your efforts to try to get this right, but I suppose it is distressing for most members of the public to discover that, with monotonous regularity, people who work within your services can only go to the BBC, so that the BBC can put people in undercover to find out what is going wrong and then produce a programme that everyone gets really upset about. You have had a professional and a statutory duty of candour for some time, and it is all wrapped around patient safety, yet there still seems to be a significant problem.

I have a couple of questions. First, what do you feel you can do to stop the suppression of witnesses? Will the Bill cover that? We know there are legal duties attached to this, but something has to change to stop whistleblowers suffering detriment. I do not know whether you feel the Bill is going to do it, because whatever has been in place for the last 10 years has not done it.

Secondly, the NHS has shown a willingness to accept people who have been recycled from roles in other services, departments and organisations when they might not have been deemed to have succeeded in those roles; they suddenly become chairs of trusts or take other roles in the organisation. There is something not quite right going on, in my opinion—it is my opinion.

Helen Vernon: I will talk to something that we are doing to help with that, at least in relation to the NHS duty of candour. One of the things that we have heard is a barrier to openness is the fear of a subsequent claim. As a public body, we can do something about that, because we can issue guidance to the NHS that debunks it, in essence, by saying, “It’s incredibly important that you put the duty of candour first, that you are open and honest, that you share information when it is available, and that you do the right thing for the patient, regardless of the possibility of subsequent litigation.”

That is one thing that we have been doing. It is a message that we have found it quite difficult to permeate in its totality, bearing in mind that we have clinicians coming up all the time through training, for example. We need to get to people when they are taking on a new role and we need to cover the whole of the NHS, which is evidently huge, but it is certainly something we make a huge effort on, to make sure that we remove barriers where we hear of them.

Professor Fowler: From the NHSE point of view, I would argue that progress has been made but it is imperfect. I accept that point, but I think we have seen evidence of greater levels of transparency, as I said.

Obviously, the Bill will need to interact with existing provisions, such as professional regulatory standards. We have a fit and proper person test that we apply— Arun might want to come on to that, because some of it is done through the CQC. We now have a 10-year plan that commits to radical transparency as part of its aims. Underlying that, in order to drive up quality, there is a commitment to a quality strategy, which we are working on and will look again at assurance mechanisms and how we tidy them up and simplify them to some extent, but also how we improve them.

In making these changes we have to be very cautious to understand, first, why people do not step forward if they do not step forward, and secondly, that we have obligations, for example, to protect patient confidentiality in any information we release, protect our staff, and look at proportionality. I mentioned the volume of papers we have looked at; it is important to understand that there are resource implications for clinicians’ time in responding to some of this. There is a lot of complexity to some of the things we need to look at in making sure there is not a chilling effect and that people are willing to step forward and do not see a potential impediment.

Dr Chopra: Aidan has already mentioned the fit and proper person test, but I want to make a couple of additional points. It is so difficult that we have to legislate for candour, but some of this is about culture in organisations, and there is a way of tapping into looking at an organisation’s culture. We have questions in NHS staff surveys about how confident staff feel about raising concerns, and whether those concerns will be responded to. I find that data is quite helpful to understand a sense of the culture in the organisation.

The other point I was going to mention was about inequalities, demographics and protected characteristics. A great proportion—up to 40%—of the medical workforce in the NHS come from minoritised ethnic backgrounds, and they are often the people who struggle the most to have their concerns raised. They are the ones who are scared of retribution for raising concerns. Tackling that will be a significant factor in making sure that the duty of candour, as it is currently is meant to work, is as successful as we would like it to be.

In terms of how we can measure some of that, my team was able to run about 100 of our recent reports using a large language model in AI to look at duty of candour. When it comes to comparing those providers that were rated “Outstanding” or “Good” with those that were rated “Requires improvement”, an open, transparent culture consistently came up as a likely factor. That is evidence that such a culture is more likely to lead to an organisation that we describe as discharging its duty of candour well. These factors are really important.

On the interplay point that Aidan mentioned, we will have the statutory duty of candour, the professional duty of candour, the provisions of the Bill and the NHS manager’s duty of candour. We have got to make sure that these four pieces of legislation work together.

[Tessa Munt]

Q I recognise the efforts that you are going to at the CQC. I have already declared my interest as someone who has been involved in whistleblowing for 15 years. It is alarming how many relatively senior NHS people end up in employment tribunals because they have been ousted for raising something. That concerns me hugely. I will leave it there, unless you wish to say something.

Dr Chopra: I will briefly come back on that. One of the considerations in the 10-year plan is the role of the Health Services Safety Investigations Body, which will work more closely with the CQC in time. The HSSIB has what is called a protected safe space, which allows people, without fear of accountability and retribution, to raise concerns. One of the things we are concerned about in the Bill is whether the scope of clause 5(1), on other investigations, will include investigations undertaken by HSSIB when it works closely with CQC. It will be important to protect that space for the reasons you mention.

[Lizzi Collinge]

Q First, it is a matter of public record that my husband works for NHS England—for now. I ask these questions as a representative of constituents who have been harmed, including my constituent Vicki, who died, and baby Ida Lock, who died a preventable death. Her death was graded as “Moderate harm”, which was one of the many, many failings that came afterwards. NHS Resolution focuses on resolving issues and harm caused without resorting to legal processes. How will the Bill contribute to that aim?

Helen Vernon: Those are incredibly sad circumstances and sensitive issues. I think it will be a big help and support that aim because, as I mentioned earlier, an open and transparent response right at the start has the best chance of not only avoiding somebody consulting lawyers or initiating a claim just to get answers, but avoiding that claim subsequently escalating into unnecessary and adversarial legal proceedings. We have driven down the number of cases that go into formal litigation by using alternative dispute resolution, which generally involves bringing clinicians and the organisation together with the family. But you can do that only if there is an atmosphere of trust and clear transparency as to the information that is being shared.

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[Dr Mullan]

Q But do you accept that, if you do that, a whole series of people will say that WhistleblowersUK, or a whistleblowers office, was not listening to them, not sufficiently representing them and covering up the things they were alleging?

Flora Page: You could easily. I suppose one would seek to front-load the issues. I am not against the provisions of the Bill at all, but what the Bill deals with is after the event: some terrible thing has happened, a large inquiry has been set up and we are having to unpick the fact that people have not told the truth in real time. With something that protected and supported whistleblowers up front, one would hope to be able to bring the problem forward, and have much nimbler and cheaper investigations arising out of whistleblower complaints.

If there were disgruntled people moaning and saying their concerns had not been looked into, let them trundle along and see whether, 10 years down the line, it turns into a big public inquiry; nine times out of 10—or probably 99 times out of 100—it is not going to. My view is that we spend too much money on these public inquiries. We need to find a way to front-load the problem and support people when they first start speaking up, so they feel able to put those problems, first, into the employer domain and then, if necessary, into the public domain.

[Tessa Munt]

Q I want to place on the record that I do not believe I have met Flora before, and am not sure I have met James before, although I have connections with the organisation. However, I have met Ron Warmington before, when I was working with James Arbuthnot. It is very nice to see you again, sir.

Ron Warmington: Likewise.

[Tessa Munt]

You have already referred to the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, the fact that that puts whistleblowing into the framework of an employment law issue, and the fact that it does not protect against retaliation. The focus then is on a whistleblower proving that they are deliberately being acted against, as opposed to on the wrongdoing done by the organisation in the first place; when they come out of the employment tribunal, they are then very often blacklisted and cannot work again.

Do you feel that the Bill provides enough anti-corruption effort to ensure that, in particular, we could have prevented the Post Office scandal? As I understand it, 47,000 cases are waiting in the employment tribunal at the moment—that is the current backlog. Once this legislation comes into play, my sense is that that 47,000 will escalate beyond belief, but I will leave that with you. Does the Bill go some way to sorting this out?

James Killen: The short answer is no. What strikes me most in the Bill is that it makes the duty of candour an individual thing, and focuses very much on the corruption that goes on at the level of the chief execs. In my mind, and certainly having listened to the health people earlier, the majority of duty holders will be people who are on the minimum wage and potentially part time—what I would class as vulnerable duty holders. Those people are going to be placed in the situation of having to choose between a potential criminal sanction for not exercising their duty of candour and speaking out against a corrupt boss who will potentially pull all the levers they have in the business to destroy their career. They are going to choose between their careers and families or a potential criminal sanction.

For me, the largest omission in this Bill is that there is no form of criminal sanction for interfering in another person’s duty of candour. Culture and so on was talked about a lot earlier, and there is something there—I agree with everything that has been said about the idea of an office for the whistleblower, because I think that would take all of this away, but, if we are speaking about maybe a 60% or 80% solution, some sort of clause in the Bill that gives a criminal sanction to other people within an organisation for interfering with somebody else’s duty would be key.

[Ian Byrne]

Q We are here today for the journey of legislation to stop the culture of state cover-ups in this country. Certainly at the heart of the state cover-up of Hillsborough was the media and the role it played. There was a hugely powerful headline in The Sun by the dreaded Kelvin Mackenzie—“The Truth”—which resonated around the world, shaped the narrative and did so much damage to our ability to get truth, justice and accountability. I have a simple question for Nathan and Jacqui: are there any areas you would both like the Bill to go further with, and if so, where?

Nathan Sparkes: As you point out, there was a phenomenon of police officers briefing The Sun newspaper after the Hillsborough disaster, which was a huge part of the cover-up. Police officers were not the only public officials involved in that; the local MP was, and there is a disputed allegation that a representative of the Thatcher Government was as well. There was a huge amount of public official impropriety in that media cover-up operation. Unfortunately, that is not the only case; after Orgreave, similarly, there was a cover-up perpetrated between public officials and the media.

The history of the phone hacking scandal is a 15 to 20-year series of occasions where overwhelming evidence of criminal activity being carried out on behalf of News UK was presented to the Metropolitan police force, and every time it failed to properly investigate until it absolutely had to. That was during a period where a succession of Metropolitan Commissioners enjoyed excessively close relationships with News UK; it included a time where even an editor for News UK was hired by the Met, and there were records of eight dinners between heads of the Met and News UK editors over that period.

In more recent years, there are allegations that police fed information about the victims of the Manchester bombing to the media. Christine Flack, the mother of the late television presenter Caroline Flack, believes that police were briefing the media in relation to her case. Mazher Mahmood was a News UK reporter, and there is an allegation in a recently published book that the Met protected him from prosecution and exposure during the noughties on account of the closeness of that relationship.

I could give many more examples—I will not sit down and list them all—but the point is that there is a specific and persistent issue with corrupt relationships between public officials and the media. Our concern about this Bill is that it does not have anything substantive to address that. The long title of the Bill is very clear; it will

“require public authorities to promote and take steps to maintain ethical conduct within all parts of the authority”.

Our submission your Committee is that the Bill cannot achieve that unless it also addresses the specific phenomenon of corrupt relationships. Our proposal is that the best way of dealing of that is with a public inquiry.

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[Seamus Logan]

Not at all—I thought it was a good answer.

Flora Page: It is about incentives, isn’t it? The incentives have to be aligned for folk to do the right thing.

Ron Warmington: Yes, we have to get people to make the right decision. They will not do it just because it is the right thing to do. Some people will—even though it is costly to themselves, their careers or their companies, they will do the right thing; I have been brought up with people like that. Other people need to be persuaded to do the right thing by threats or by incentives, or ideally both.

I do not think we can just hope for the best that the ethics of corporate Great Britain and civil service Great Britain are going to change. I mean, I have seen Ministers talk utter nonsense because their civil servants parroted nonsense that was parroted to them by people in the organisations that ought to have been subject to review. I feel sorry for MPs and Ministers in those cases.

Jacqui Hames: It is important to point out that the media companies responsible for the industrial-scale phone hacking saga are corporations. They make a profit or loss, and they hide behind the free speech mantra, but ultimately they are creating a culture where this behaviour is acceptable—where criminality is acceptable. There is no doubt that a whistleblower coming from their side of the fence would be treated extremely badly.

As a victim of phone hacking, as an ex-police officer who had their personal items sold to a news corporation, I know that you have nowhere to go in those circumstances if those corporations are just going to hide behind a freedom of speech defence. It is not freedom of speech to spread misinformation and disinformation that affect the wellbeing of hundreds of people who have already gone through intolerable experiences.

[Tessa Munt]

Q We had a discussion earlier today about whether the powers also cover subcontractors. I think that is probably one of Ron’s questions as well.

Ron Warmington: I have it written down, yes.

[Tessa Munt]

Very good; I did not know that. There are also subcontractors of subcontractors, because it is commonly the case that we are looking not just at the first-tier contractual relationship, but at the second, third and sometimes fourth-tier relationships. There is a question about that.

There is then another issue. Some of you might want to comment on the fact that in March this year—I think I am right in saying this—His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs introduced a whistleblower reward scheme for reporting fraud, and on where that scheme might go and how useful it is. I have no idea how successful it has been—I do not have any figures for it—but one senses that it might be successful.

Ron Warmington: In a sense, that is where this all started, isn’t it? I mean, there were defence contracts in the United States and someone thought, “I’m going to blow the whistle on such and such a corporation, which has been ripping off the Defence Department by $100 million. Therefore, I’m going to get something out of it.” Actually, that is quite healthy, until it goes horribly wrong; it is a double-edged sword.

On the point about subcontractors, yes, we felt quite exposed when the Post Office tried to—in fact, did—implement draconian contractual terms. That was extraordinarily risky for myself, and for my fellow shareholders and directors. The only time that we could speak safely was when we had parliamentary privilege in situations such as this one. All the rest of the time, we did not; if we spoke up, we were at enormous risk. That did not stop us, as it happened.

It is not necessarily a good thing to say that an investigation firm such as my own, which is contracted to look into something that is going wrong or that has gone wrong, should be hugely protected in some way, because then it would not be trusted to do the work in the first place. You somehow have to strike a balance between the client relationship—not that the client ever should be the subject of the investigation—and some sort of protection. At the moment, the process does not work. It only worked in this case because we didn’t give a damn. As far as we were concerned, we did not really need the work, and did not need the money and did not mind being fired. But not many firms are in that lucky situation.

[Tessa Munt]

Q Forgive me, but you are a slight peculiarity in that your function was very different. I suspect that you might have a different view about an organisation like Fujitsu, which was contracted by the Post Office and which seems to carry the whole of the blame—besides the behaviour of the Post Office—for the catastrophe that happened so many people.

Ron Warmington: Pretty well the only material whistleblower was Richard Roll, whom I spoke to well before he was prepared to come out. We obviously protected him. We tried to give hints to people at the Post Office that there might be a whistleblower at some point—when I knew jolly well that there was—in order to give them an opportunity to follow the righteous path. They did not really pick up on that.

We have always been a bit like journalists—one never burns one’s source. If any investigator ever did that, his or her career would be over. Once you get a reputation for advancing your own case over the body of a whistleblower, your career is dead. It is self-interest to protect whistleblowers. I have on many occasions been asked by companies—in fact, bank chairmen—“Can you help us find out who this whistleblower is?” I have told them, “You’d better find another firm. I could find them in a heartbeat, but I’m not going to.” That is corruption coming out again: “This person’s causing our company problems. Can you help us find the troublemaker?” “No. Go away.” But not all firms do that.

Flora Page: On the Fujitsu question, it is extraordinary that, over all those years that Fujitsu was remotely accessing sub-postmasters’ accounts and using their user IDs to enter transactions, there were no whistleblowers. That tells you all you need to know about certain organisations not providing the structure and the framework for whistleblowers to come forward. There must have been hundreds, possibly thousands, of people who knew what was going on.

[James Asser]

Q We have heard from Hillsborough families today. We have heard from a Grenfell survivor. What we heard from them is remarkably similar although those two events were 30 years apart. Nathan, you have outlined other parts of the timeline that show that this has been a problem for decades. We talked about culture change, but we have reached a point where only the law will force people to behave in a decent way, which is a fairly depressing position to have got into. Given what Jacqui said about some organisations being able to put criminality as an acceptable risk as part of their business model, how confident can we be that the Bill will achieve culture change? Are there things that we will need to keep an eye on and follow up? That is an open-ended, difficult question, but I feel we should pose it.

Nathan Sparkes: In terms of public officials’ candour in investigations and so on, we endorse the position of the Hillsborough Law Now campaign, of which we are a part. Further to its amendments, the Bill does a good job.

In terms of the specific phenomenon that we have identified of corrupt relationships between public officials and the media, the Bill does not go nearly far enough. Those relationships are, by their nature, covert. They are at best improper and at worst corrupt and unlawful. The only part of the Bill that attempts to grapple with them at the moment is the code. Public officials who are engaged in that kind of corrupt behaviour are very unlikely to be persuaded to clean up their act by a code.

A whole succession of investigations, inquiries and scandals have all come to the same conclusion: we need a public inquiry into the specific phenomenon of relations between public officials and the media. Given the long title of the Bill and what it promises to achieve, that appears to us to be a significant omission. That is why we are very keen for the Committee to consider an amendment to that effect. Jacqui, do you have anything to add?

Jacqui Hames: Yes. What is the risk for the individual concerned in that transaction? If you think there is a bigger risk of being exposed and taken to court, you will change the way you behave. Having been a police officer in the ’70s and ’80s, as well as having seen things from this perspective, the difference is the culture of secrecy and reputational protection. If you can change that from the inside and say, “This is not going to be tolerated. This is what’s going to happen,” people will stand behind that. It will give them protection if they are being sucked into something that they cannot get themselves out of and are coerced. In many respects, that is the difficult area: people being coerced into behaviour that in another circumstance they would perhaps not consider getting involved in. It is a real problem that people get coerced—as Nathan said—because so much of this happens in secret.

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[Dr Mullan]

Q You can give a very short answer to this question, Mayor Burnham. Given the experience that you had with your inquiries into grooming gangs, do you agree that the five local grooming gangs inquiries should have a duty of candour applied to them—which is why I have tabled amendment 3 to the Bill?

Andy Burnham: There is no question about it, those inquiries need to have trust at a local level. I will be open in saying that the failure of some people to co-operate with the inquiries that I initiated to some degree undermines the inquiry reports. I do not think it invalidates them, by any means, because they were hard-hitting reports, but it is right to deal with these things as soon as possible. The Hillsborough story is about not letting things be unresolved for years and not leaving people fighting for years. Deal with them as up front as you can, and as strongly as you can, at the first time of asking. Obviously, if that principle applies to local inquiries and inquiries commissioned by combined authorities, we are more likely to get to the truth more quickly.

[Tessa Munt]

Q Steve, I remember the day you heard the news that there was going to be a proper public inquiry and it was very touching. I am glad that you are here. How do both of you feel about asking people who want to report to go outside of their primary employer, or the organisation for which they work? The Independent Public Advocate, who we have heard from this afternoon, is attached to that point. Do you think there is any value in requiring bodies to report their spending on legal fees and the like related to inquiries, independent panels, or whatever is set up, in their annual report and accounts or in their annual report to council, or whatever it is? Andy, will you answer first? We will then go to Steve.

Andy Burnham: If I can quickly pick up your point, Tessa, I absolutely agree that there should be full transparency on legal expenditure by public bodies, including police bodies and NHS trusts. I think that the lack of a requirement has led to very unfair situations when the state has lawyered up, as I said before. To me, the Bill should create an entirely new regime that does not allow bereaved families to face the full might of the state, when they have barely any legal representation.

[Tessa Munt]

Q My caveat would be that it is not just the state per se; we have heard that there are any number of private organisations that act appallingly—whistleblowers come forward, and we need to catch that in the scope.

Steve Rotheram: I obviously support any whistleblowing protections. Certainly, if there is any enhancement, it should be a requirement for consultation with trade unions when we develop better codes of ethical conduct. There is definitely stuff we can do on that.

We need to empower public servants to foster a culture of candour, and that is why the Bill is so important. Thanks very much, Tessa; I remember you and others, too—it was quite a moment in Parliament. Do not forget that those people have been fighting since we left to get something like this on the statute book. The weight of responsibility on all of you on this Committee is enormous, and I know that you will do well by the families and those campaigners.

Andy Burnham: No pressure.

[Joe Powell]

Q We heard earlier today about the failure of a local authority: the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea in the Grenfell case. In the brief time that we have, I am interested in how you will both seek to enforce this, if it is on the statute book, in your combined authorities and the local authorities under you, or those that you work collectively with. Do you need anything else included in the Bill? Do you have thoughts already about how you will set up enforcement and monitoring to make sure that it drives the culture change that Steve just talked about?

Andy Burnham: We want to see a change, as advocated by Hillsborough Law Now, with respect to command responsibility, so that the responsibility is not just corporate but individual. Obviously, the Hillsborough story is the failure to go that last bit of the journey towards individual accountability, which I think bedevils the British state still. In all the examples—Grenfell being a primary one, as well as Hillsborough and the Post Office scandal—where is the individual accountability? We would very much endorse what was said to you by Hillsborough Law Now. It is not about a chief executive or chief constable not knowing what is going on underneath; when there is a corporate cover-up, there has to be some individual accountability for that.

It pains Steve and me that we were never able to achieve that in the Hillsborough example. With the Taylor report, the reason the trial of the criminal cover-up collapsed was because those officers gave their false police statements to Taylor, and Taylor was not an inquiry covered by the oath. That is why the courts said that their evidence could not be admitted, and therefore they were allowed to lie and faced no accountability. We would both say that the command responsibility is really important here. We need to start holding people individually to account for the appalling things they subject people to on occasions.

Steve Rotheram: It needs to be strengthened, that’s for sure. That is to ensure that chief officers, chief executives or chief constables—whoever they might be—are personally accountable for crimes. If the Bill ensures that the responsibility sits with those at the top, and those best-placed to effect change, I am fairly certain that they will not want to be that person who is held responsible, and therefore they will change the culture within those organisations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tessa Munt]

Q What impact do you feel the Bill, as drafted, might have on whistleblowers? You mentioned whistleblowers; I have an interest in whistleblowers. Do you feel the Bill has been built to support and encourage whistleblowers generally?

Daniel De Simone: I am more equipped to talk about MI5 and the case that I have been involved with, but whistleblowers are clearly incredibly important in my job. I would want to see every protection for whistleblowers, whereby organisations foster a culture in which whistleblowers feel able to come forward and do not feel that it is harmful for them or damaging to their career. I would obviously encourage anything that can be done to encourage that.

[Tessa Munt]

Q You obviously use the services of whistleblowers.

Daniel De Simone: Absolutely, and I frequently rely on confidential sources, like police officers, who provide me with information that, under the law, they probably should not provide. For example, I have spent a very long time investigating the Stephen Lawrence murder, and that has led to a review to look at whether the case should be reopened. That is a good thing, and the family are very happy with the fact that that has happened, but it simply would not have happened without officers helping me who probably should not be helping me. The fact that they did has led to good things.

[Tessa Munt]

I suspect my colleague is going to ask you about journalism more generally—surprise, surprise.

[Seamus Logan]

Q Daniel, are you familiar with the proposals from Hillsborough Law Now?

Daniel De Simone: I have read their submissions.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Third sitting)

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd December 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Mullan]

Absolutely. The Bill is focused on those examples that are clear and egregious, where it is easy to say that there has been a failure of candour or a deliberate attempt to cover up. The legislation will cover many other situations, however, including Members of Parliament. As Members of Parliament, we are expected to operate with a degree of frankness and candour, and yet just this week we have been fiercely debating whether one of our own has or has not done that. It is important for Members to reflect on the wideness of the ramifications outside the purely obvious examples of what might constitute candour, or a lack of it.

[Tessa Munt (Wells and Mendip Hills) (LD)]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that we have, in yesterday’s resignation of the chair of the Office for Budget Responsibility, quite a sensible example of what he is trying to express? That gentleman was due to be in front of a Select Committee of this House this morning, but by resigning, he has skipped being held to account for what he must know about the situation. Candour should surely also apply to those who have resigned.

If I may, Sir Roger, I refer back to the fact that one of the deepest problems has been the resignation of senior police officers. Because they have resigned, they skip away over the horizon and are not able to be held to account. There is only one way that someone should not be held to account, which is through not being on this earth any longer.

[The Chair]

Order. Sorry I have to keep intervening; let us get this right from the beginning, and then it will stay right all the way through. Interventions must be interventions, not speeches. There is a degree of leeway in Committee that does not exist on the Floor of the House, but nevertheless, please try to confine interventions to brevity if possible, because otherwise Members will be here all night. I concede to the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle that, while the Bill clearly relates —and has related very heavily in terms of evidence—to Hillsborough and Grenfell, it covers a much wider range of issues. We need to remember that.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

This is one of those moments when, should the hon. Gentleman wish to press new clause 2 to a vote, which he may not, it would not be called now; it would be called later in the proceedings, because all new clauses are voted on at the end of the consideration of the Bill.

We come now to amendment 31. This is one of those occasions when we are debating two separate groups of amendments to clause 2. We have the choice: the clause stand part debate can take place now or at the end, but not both. Let us bear that in mind.

Clause 2

Duty of candour and assistance

[Tessa Munt]

I beg to move amendment 31, in clause 2, page 2, line 23, at end insert—

“(ba) their failure to act, omission, or approval or tacit approval of an action are or may be relevant to the inquiry or investigation, or”.

This amendment clarifies that an indirect wrongdoing would be considered as an occurrence of misconduct or failure when examined as part of an inquiry, investigation or inquest.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 42, in clause 2, page 2, line 35, at end insert—

“(ca) where the authority or official has relevant records, including digital messages and communication, retain and disclose those records;”.

Amendment 32, in clause 2, page 2, line 39, at end insert—

“(f) ensure all relevant public officials can safely disclose information to an inquiry, investigation or inquest.”

This amendment requires public authorities or officials who assisting an inquiry, investigation or inquest to demonstrate that they have taken steps to ensure relevant persons can safely disclose information relevant to an investigation.

[Tessa Munt]

Amendment 31 would clarify that an indirect wrongdoing would be considered an occurrence of misconduct or failure when examined as part of an inquiry, investigation, inquest or independent panel. The purpose of and rationale for the amendment is that it would ensure that the Bill clearly covers situations where a public office holder has contributed to wrongdoing. I emphasise that this is about senior figures; I am not talking about junior civil servants and others who have little power. The amendment would apply where that senior public office holder has contributed to wrongdoing through not only direct action but a failure to act, such as an omission or tacit approval.

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

indicated assent.

[Tessa Munt]

I thank the Minister. Amendment 32 would require public authorities or officials assisting an inquiry, investigation, inquest or independent panel to demonstrate that they have taken steps to ensure that relevant persons can safely disclose information relevant to that investigation. The amendment would require public authorities to take proactive steps to ensure that all relevant officials can safely disclose information. It would strengthen protections for those providing evidence, helping to prevent retaliation or intimidation, and ensure that inquiries and investigations have access to all relevant information for thorough scrutiny of public officials’ decision making.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills for tabling these amendments. Amendment 31 seeks to ensure that, under the duty of candour and assistance, an inquiry or investigation, or, as she stated, a review panel, is notified by public authorities and officials of all relevant acts or information, including omissions or failures to act. We agree wholeheartedly, and I reassure the hon. Lady and all members of the Committee that the Bill already achieves the intent of the amendment.

Clause 23 provides definitions for terms used throughout the Bill. It specifies that an

“‘act’ includes an omission or a course of conduct”.

Therefore, in clause 2, “act” is to be read as including any omission or course of conduct that may be relevant, which could include approving the actions of others. To “have information” could include information that a person approved the actions of another person, or had knowledge of them and did not prevent them.

Amendment 42 would place a requirement on public authorities under the duty of candour and assistance to retain all relevant records, including digital records. Again, the Government agree with the intention behind the amendment, and believe that the provisions in the Bill are designed to achieve it in practice. Clause 2(4)(a) requires authorities and officials to provide information likely to be relevant to an inquiry or investigation if requested. They will not meet that obligation if they allow the information to be lost or destroyed when they ought to be providing it. In addition, the individual in charge of an authority has an obligation to take all reasonable steps to secure the authority’s compliance with that duty. That would necessarily involve ensuring that information is accessible within the authority, so that it can meet its obligations under the Bill.

Amendment 32 seeks to ensure that the Bill has adequate safeguards to protect those complying with the duty of candour and assistance. We agree that ensuring that public officials feel safe to disclose information is essential, and several aspects of the Bill speak to that point. The duty of candour and assistance provides appropriate safeguards for the protection of sensitive information and onward disclosure and ensures that officials can feel confident that the information they provide will be handled appropriately.

[Tessa Munt]

Can I ask the Minister for clarity? A lot of the proposed legislation seems to deal with when an investigation has been called for or set up. There may be a significant gap between that and when an authority knows that something has gone wrong and that an investigation, inquiry, inquest or independent panel is likely to follow. Is there is a way in which the duties can kick in the moment that somebody recognises that something will come of that rather than when an investigation is called for formally?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

There are two versions of the duty of candour: the always-on duty of candour by which every public servant should have to act in their everyday life, and the duty of candour with criminal sanctions attached to it that kicks in when there is an investigation or inquiry. The whole point is that they will work hand-in-hand. The former will prevent the latter—that is the intention. The code of ethics and the guidance that we talked about in an earlier debate will assist, but that will require a significant culture change across the whole public sector; it will not be easy or happen overnight. I am not naive enough to believe that it will be fixed just because we have the legislation. It will take a momentous effort by all of us to ensure that the culture seeps down from the top. That is also the intention behind the implementation, which we will come to later in the debate.

I reassure the hon. Lady that part 2 of the Bill requires public authorities to set out the process for exactly how public officials can raise internal complaints, to promote a culture of internal challenge. It also requires public authorities to set out their whistleblowing procedures, drawing officials’ attention to any legal protections they may benefit from. Although we are sympathetic to the intent behind amendment 32, we do not think that it will provide sufficient clarity on what public authorities would be expected to do to ensure that officials feel safe to disclose information, nor how that would operate as part of their duty of candour and assistance, for which non-compliance entails criminal sanctions.

Given those assurances, I urge the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.

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[Tessa Munt]

The Minister has made her points. I am hopeful that we will end up with those reassurances. We will pick up these points later in the Committee. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Seamus Logan (Aberdeenshire North and Moray East) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 2, page 2, line 39, at end insert—

“(4A) Where a public authority or public official is under an obligation to respond to or assist an inquiry or investigation under subsection (4) they should do so within 30 working days.”

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[Maria Eagle]

Indeed.

[Tessa Munt]

I rise to support amendment 3, proposed by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle. I am also a co-signatory of amendment 1, and I thank the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston for her reference to it. I echo the comments that have been made about Primodos and many other things. We have investigations, inquiries, inquests, and independent panels—and no doubt something else will come up at some point. Will the Minister clarify that point and agree that we should have some common language to cover all those things? As has been mentioned, independent panels do come up quite often.

I seek clarity on investigations and inquiries that might be taking place already. My understanding is that the Bill will not affect them, so if someone has something that they want to raise, they will probably need to wait until the Bill has become law. That seems slightly perverse, in that there may be people who want something done within the next six months who are going to have to sit and wait. I would like some clarity on that.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank hon. Members for a useful debate getting into the detail the provisions—that is why we have Bill Committees. It would be beneficial for me to clarify exactly how the Bill applies to non-statutory inquiries, as outlined by my right hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Garston. The duty of candour and assistance will apply to all statutory and non-statutory inquiries and inquests described in schedule 1. Non-statutory inquiries are defined as those caused by a Minister; those that include the delivery of a report with a view to publication; and those that the Minister has confirmed in writing relate to matters of public concern.

This is the first time non-statutory inquiries have been set out in law, but we envisage that this category could include investigations held under other names, such as independent panels, provided the criteria set out are met. Amendment 1 would automatically extend the duty of candour and assistance to independent panels and reviews established by Ministers. The Bill includes a power to extend the duty to other categories of investigations, or to specific investigations via secondary legislation. It is therefore not the case that if an investigation is not covered in the Bill, the duty of candour can never apply.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tessa Munt]

To give an example, if the local authority children’s services department sets up an investigation into something or does one of its serious case reviews—or whatever they are called now—are that organisation, the people within it and the actors in the event that prompted it covered by the duty of candour? Can the Minister be really clear about that?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am happy to confirm that they will be. They are not currently, but the Government are tabling an amendment to cover that point, and we will come to it later in Committee. Should that amendment be made, the Bill will cover those local authority investigations.

The Cabinet Office is undertaking further work to look at how we reform inquiries. As part of that, we will consider how the different types of inquiries, reviews and investigations could be more clearly defined, and when and how they could best be used. That will inform how the duty is used.

The duty of candour and assistance is a powerful tool to ensure co-operation with investigations, but it would not be useful in all circumstances. Most reviews focus on matters of policy or technical issues— for example, the curriculum and assessment review, the net zero review and the review of the future of women’s football. In those cases, applying the duty would be unnecessary and might risk making reviews more difficult to establish and slower to report. Where the duty is applied, it must be properly monitored and enforced, and therefore frameworks for compliance and the protection of information need to be in place. We must avoid unintentionally impeding or delaying certain types of investigations by introducing unnecessary and unhelpful processes and bureaucracy. We therefore think the Bill strikes the right balance in which investigations it applies to, with the power in the Bill providing us with the tools and flexibility we need to extend the duty where it could be useful.

I have spoken to my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden about how we move forward with her campaign. She has been an incredible and ferocious campaigner for the Primodos families for many years. I have met her and the Primodos families, and I am committed to working with her on a way forward to ensure that the duty of candour can assist.

Amendment 3 is designed to apply the duty of candour and assistance to inquiries that the Secretary of State has designated as local inquiries into grooming gangs. I thank the shadow Minister for raising this important issue. As he will be aware, we are moving at pace to establish a national inquiry into grooming gangs under the Inquiries Act 2005. It will be overseen by an independent commission with statutory powers to compel evidence and testimony so that institutions can be held to account for current and historic failures. The inquiry will be independent of Government and designed to command the confidence of victims and survivors and the wider public.

The Bill already applies the duty to statutory and non-statutory inquiries called by Ministers, including this new inquiry. To strengthen the Bill, we have also tabled an amendment extending the duty to inquiries called by local authorities, and we will debate that shortly. That amendment, combined with the existing provisions in the Bill, will enable the duty to apply to either local or national inquiries into grooming gangs. I therefore urge the shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

These three amendments are minor and technical. Government amendments 8 and 9 update schedule 1 to refer to a “senior coroner”, thereby identifying the statutory office for consistency with the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and other legislation. Government amendment 10 replaces a reference to this “Schedule” in schedule 1, paragraph 4 with a reference to this “paragraph”. This is a drafting refinement to clarify that the definitions in new paragraph 2A of schedule 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 apply only to that paragraph rather than to the entirety of schedule 5. I commend these amendments to the committee.

[Tessa Munt]

Might I seek some clarity on what happens with area coroners as opposed to senior coroners?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I can confirm that an area coroner, for the sake of the Bill and under the Coroners Act, is classed as a senior coroner.

Amendment 8 agreed to.

Amendments made: 9, in schedule 1, page 30, line 38, after “to the” insert “senior”.

This is a drafting refinement.

Amendment 10, in schedule 1, page 32, line 1, leave out “Schedule” and insert “paragraph”.—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This is a drafting refinement.

Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 3

Section 2: further provision

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Yes, of course. I have mentioned the covid-19 inquiry—it would have been impractical for every single worker to come forward to an inquiry—but I add that the chair of an inquiry must give reasons, publishing them and outlining why it would not be practical, or not helpful to the inquiry, not to bring forward a position statement.

Subsection (7) is vital to ensure that the duty of candour does not cut across existing laws, such as those on data protection or safeguarding.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Extension of duty to other persons with public responsibilities

[Tessa Munt]

I beg to move amendment 29, in clause 4, page 4, line 19, after “authority” insert—

“or any sub-contractor in any chain of provision to a service provider”.

This amendment ensures that any person involved in providing a service to a service provider which was subcontracted will fall under the duty to comply with the duty of candour and assistance to an inquiry or investigation.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Tessa Munt]

I am delighted to have got to this bit. I speak to this clause in particular, because I am extremely concerned that the duty of candour should capture subcontractors and the contractors to subcontractors. It is unbelievably common for those committed to carrying out contracts with local authorities, Government or public bodies generally to subcontract and subcontract and subcontract. There is absolutely no reason why those organisations and the people involved should not fall under the duty—those people are often the whistleblowers who tell the primary organisation, or their own, what it is that they have seen. I feel strongly that we should ensure that any person involved in providing a service to a service provider, where there is subcontracting in place, should comply with the duty of candour and assistance to an inquiry, investigation or all the other panels and various things that we have referred to this morning.

The duty should apply not only to the primary service provider, but to the subcontractors, whether individuals or organisations. That would close a potential accountability gap by making it clear that all parties involved in providing a service must co-operate fully with inquiries, investigations and panels. It would help to ensure that relevant information is not withheld purely due to contractual arrangement. That would support comprehensive scrutiny of decisions, actions, omissions and service delivery.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise briefly to support the amendment and the points made by the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills. It is about not just existing contractual arrangements, but how there might be perverse incentives for people to create different structures if they think that, through contracting or subcontracting, they will escape the accountability under the Bill. I am keen to hear from the Minister.

Probably the example that everyone has in mind is the Post Office scandal. That was a direct contractor, but it could have had subcontractors and so on. When the Post Office was conducting its private investigations, it might have used subcontractors to do some of those investigations. That would not be an unusual step for an organisation to take, so it is important that we get clarity on this issue.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tessa Munt]

If subcontractors get contracted and know that they are working for a local authority or Government body, they just need to pass on that responsibility within the contractual terms. The difficulty comes the moment there is separation between the organisation that is subject to duty of candour and a subcontractor of a subcontractor. It is not difficult—we do these things with payment terms—so I plead with the Minister to make sure that we cover subcontractors. It will not be satisfactory for a subcontractor at tier 1 to speak for a subcontractor at tier 3. It will not happen. It will not be robust enough. I foresee all sorts of slippage, especially when there are whistleblowers two or three tiers down the contract. I plead with the Minister again to reconsider what she is saying.

Secondly, what happens when the senior body—the overarching organisation—is abroad? If I may use an example, Wessex Water—I am not picking on them for any particular reason—is owned by Pennon Group, which I understand is Malaysian. What happens when the head office is abroad?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am happy to pick up both those points. On the first point, I will work with the hon. Lady to ensure that we find a way forward in terms of ensuring that there is no unintended gap and that we are not missing anything. A balance has to be struck between how far we go in the private sector before we are covering everybody with a duty of candour. However, we can find a way forward here.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I agree. I am committed to working with hon. Members on a way forward.

On the point made by the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills about what happens if the head office is abroad, the Bill will provide the inquiry or investigation with the powers to obtain information from an individual wherever they are, even if they have retired, if they have resigned or if they now live abroad.

[Tessa Munt]

On the basis that we can all work together to make sure that we cover subcontractors, including the different tiers of subcontracting, I am happy to withdraw the amendment. I was going to press it to a vote, but the Minister has assured me that she will try to do something before Report and I recognise that we have support on both sides of the Committee. I thank the Minister very much indeed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Offence of failing to comply with duty

[Ian Byrne]

I beg to move amendment 54, in clause 5, page 5, line 18, after “objectives” insert:

“or are reckless as to whether it will do so,”.

This is simply a strengthening amendment that has come from the lawyers, and which I hope the Government will take on board. It is worth pointing out that we only have one shot at this. We need to ensure that there is no unfortunate language that perhaps does not allow the Bill to be as strong as we need it to be, so I hope the Government will accept the amendment.

The current wording in clause 5(1) sets the mental element of failing to discharge the duty as intent, and the mental elements of failing to provide the information in the duty as intent or recklessness—being cognisant of the risk and choosing to take it nevertheless. We feel, and I certainly feel, that this is a baseless distinction and an anomaly. The mental element should be the same, and the amendment would rectify that. It is simply a strengthening amendment to make sure that we shut any gaps.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I understand that that has been corrected online, and the matter is now on the record as well.

[Tessa Munt]

I beg to move amendment 27, in clause 5, page 5, line 21, at end insert—

“(1A) If an offence under this section is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of—

(a) a senior officer of a public authority, or

(b) a senior officer of a body corporate with relevant public responsibility under section 4 of this Act, or

(c) a person purporting to act in such a capacity,

the senior officer or person (as well as the public authority or body corporate) is guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”

This amendment would hold senior officers liable for the offence of failing to comply with the duty of candour and assistance if it is proved that they consented or connived in that failure.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 33, in clause 5, page 5, line 21, at end insert—

“(1A) Where an offence under this section is committed by—

(a) a public authority, or

(b) a body corporate with relevant public responsibility under section 4 of this Act,

the chief officer or chief executive (as well as the public authority or body corporate) is guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”

This amendment would place a personal responsibility on the chief officer or chief executive of a public authority or a corporate body with public responsibility under Clause 4 for an offence of failing to comply with the duty of candour and assistance.

Amendment 44, in clause 5, page 5, line 21, at end insert—

“(1A) Where the duty falls on a public authority or other body, responsibility for the discharge of that duty falls on the Chief Officer or Chief Executive for the purposes of this section.”

Amendment 34, in clause 11, page 9, line 24, at end insert—

“(1A) Where an offence under this section is committed by a public authority, the chief officer or chief executive (as well as the public authority) is guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.”

This amendment would place a personal responsibility on the chief officer or chief executive of a public authority for an offence of misleading the public.

Amendment 45, in clause 11, page 9, line 24, at end insert—

“(1A) Where the act or statement is made by or in the name of the public authority, responsibility for it lies on the Chief Officer or Chief Executive for the purposes of this section”

[Tessa Munt]

The amendment would ensure that any person involved in providing a service to a service provider—we are back to our subcontracting discussion —will fall under a duty to comply with the duty of candour and assistance to an inquiry or investigation or any other body, which we have discussed this morning. The intention is to ensure that senior officers cannot evade accountability simply by turning a blind eye to failures to comply with the duty of candour and assistance. The amendment would make them liable where it is proven that they consented or connived in a breach and would close the loophole around responsibility for indirect wrongdoing.

Sir Roger, do you wish me to speak to amendment 33, too?

[The Chair]

Yes. Amendments 33, 44 and 34 are grouped, but you are only moving amendment 27.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tessa Munt]

Thank you, Sir Roger.

Amendment 33 would place a personal responsibility on the chief officer, or the chief executive of a public authority or corporate body with public responsibility under clause 4, for an offence of failing to comply with the duty of candour or assistance. What is needed is clear personal accountability on the chief officer or chief executive for any failure to comply. That ensures that senior leaders cannot avoid responsibility for breaches within their organisation, and reinforces the expectation that those at the top maintain a culture of openness and co-operation.

[Ian Byrne]

Amendments 44 and 45 go to the heart of what we are trying to do regarding the Hillsborough law, which is about command responsibility. It is about cultural change. I got the briefing note from the Minister, which I am very thankful for, which outlines where we feel the Government are now, but I think there is a debate among many of us about whether we feel that is strong enough. I just want to outline why I feel that, and why I feel that these amendments are worthy of consideration by the Minister.

The duty of candour and assistance applies to both public authorities and individuals. Where the duty falls on an authority, responsibility for compliance and enforcement measures must land on individuals; otherwise, those measures are basically rendered ineffective. The clause 5 and clause 11 offences require intent or recklessness, a concept that is difficult to apply to a legal—rather than natural—person. Where the criminal law has corporate offences, including proof of intent or recklessness, liability is established by attributing the mental state of directing minds to the corporation. That may be appropriate in some contexts, but here, proof of wrongdoing or failure leads only to liability on the authority and a fine paid by the taxpayer. I just do not feel that goes far enough.

The original 2017 Public Authority (Accountability) Bill dealt with that by making the chief officer or chief executive responsible for the discharge of the corporate duty. We feel that that is both fair and practical, as it places the responsibility on the person with the ability to ensure that authorities are properly led, and a high hurdle of intent or subjective recklessness ensures that he or she does not get prosecuted for inadvertence, or if he or she is misled by others. That also provides an effective deterrent.

I go back to the fact that we are looking at cultural change here; I feel that understanding that they would be responsible would sharpen their minds. Prosecution of a corporation just means that the taxpayer pays a fine, and we have seen that before, with a slap on the wrist and no cultural change.

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

I totally agree. I am absolutely reassured that the Bill, as drafted, does just that. It ensures that there is criminal liability on the head of a public authority to ensure that everything is covered. However, as I have already stated, when something goes wrong in an NHS setting and we know that something has gone wrong but are unable to find out exactly what, despite the head of that NHS trust having all the procedures in place for applying the duty of candour, it would not be fair or reasonable to put criminal sanctions on the head of that NHS executive.

[Tessa Munt]

Is not the point that, as the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire North and Moray East said, it focuses the mind of chief executives and very senior officers in an organisation if there is the possibility of punishment—of criminal sanction and imprisonment? I take the point made earlier about a fine probably being of absolutely no consequence to an organisation. So often we have heard that what people who have been offended against, in whatever way, really seek is a swift apology and acceptance that something has gone wrong. That is going to come from the duty of candour, but we need to have a sanction available against chief executives and senior officers so that they focus on making sure that their organisations comply and act in an appropriate way.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I genuinely do not think that we have crossed wires here. The intention of the Bill is the same as that of the amendments; it is just about how we are doing this. Our approach holds the heads of authorities and the heads of all public organisations accountable for the things that they can reasonably be expected to do or not do. There is no exemption here: it is about whether they have done it or not, and about what is reasonably to be expected of them. We are confident that such accountability, as drafted in the Bill, will drive positive cultural change. The amendments in this group would unintentionally have the potential to criminalise a chief executive even if they did not have knowledge of the offence being committed and they had taken all reasonable steps to ensure the compliance of the organisation. We can find no precedence for such an approach and are deeply concerned that it could have a chilling effect on recruiting public sector leaders.

I reassure the Committee that the Bill ensures accountability right at the top. I am happy to share further information with the Committee, setting that out exactly as it is, and I urge the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills to withdraw amendment 27.

Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Fourth sitting)

Tessa Munt Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd December 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

We talk about focusing minds. The Bill will clearly focus minds, because a chief executive can face criminal prosecution and potentially prison if they are not candid, if they consent or connive with someone not being candid, or if they fail to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the authority is candid. Those are three different and distinct routes to criminal prosecution that will sharply focus minds. We need to hold senior individuals to account for things that they can actually do. Clearly, they cannot personally verify the accuracy of potentially hundreds of thousands of documents.

The whole Bill is about creating a new culture and accountability. Whenever an individual fails in their duty, they should be held accountable—whoever they are—and that can carry up to two years’ imprisonment. It is a privilege to see you in the Chair, Mr Dowd, but in this morning’s session, before you were in the Chair, I said that this entire Bill Committee is about listening. It is about listening to the families, campaigners and those who have come before, and considering all the work they have done to get us to this place. It is about listening to them with regard to what it means for the Bill to be a Hillsborough law.

I have listened to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool West Derby and other Committee members today, and I am committed to meeting him and finding a way forward. If there are genuine concerns regarding command responsibility, and Members feel that we are not going far enough, I am committed to listening and working with my hon. Friend on a way forward.

[Tessa Munt (Wells and Mendip Hills) (LD)]

I am delighted that the Minister is listening; that is helpful. I would be grateful if she could consider my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle and me to be part of the discussions with the hon. Member for Liverpool West Derby. That would save me a great deal of trouble in quoting the questions from the right hon. Member for Liverpool Garston in our evidence session last week. I was intending to read out a good deal of the further comments from Hillsborough Law Now and Pete Weatherby in my summing up. I do not know whether the Minister is up for this, but it might be helpful to invite that particular gentleman.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

He will be part of the discussion.

[Tessa Munt]

I am delighted to hear that he will be part of that discussion, because I think he has a good grip on everything, and it saves me reading the Minister a page and a half of his comments today.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I have seen them.

[Tessa Munt]

I am sure the Minister has seen them, but I was going to quote them none the less. I have mentioned the Office for Budget Responsibility, which I know is an organisation with fewer than 100 people. There we have somebody—regardless of the fact that, I am sure, he is not all over the emails and all the rest of it; the work that his office does with his employees, those who work with him and so on—who took what might be considered an incredibly honourable stance and resigned his position over something that happened in the last week. That is absolutely laudable. He is an illustration of how command is absolutely at the centre of this issue.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I totally agree that there should be responsibility and accountability at the top of any organisation. We are not doubting that; that is the intention of the Bill. Does the hon. Lady believe that the head of the OBR should have potentially been subject to criminal sanctions in that instance? Resigning is one thing; going to prison for up to two years is very different.

[Tessa Munt]

No, but it might be difficult to quantify. There certainly was no danger of anyone losing their life or being very seriously injured, and I presume we would not be looking for whistleblowers in his organisation, because he has taken responsibility. I take the point, but he has done the right thing in that situation. Will the Minister clarify something that I raised earlier: what will happen with people who resign—by resigning, the head of the OBR has avoided any chance of going in front of the Treasury Committee today—and those who have retired? It is clear that people can remove themselves from the framework, currently. Does the Minister have something to say about that?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I believe that I stated this earlier, but should an official inquiry or investigation be called, the head of the OBR, who has now resigned, or the head of any organisation—we are speaking in hypotheticals here—who was involved in an inquiry or investigation and had resigned, retired or moved abroad would be compelled to come to give evidence under the duty of candour. They would not be excused.

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[Tessa Munt]

I thank the Minister for that clarity. On the basis that we are going to meet to discuss this, and that Pete Weatherby and hon. Members from the Minister’s party will be involved in those conversations, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Tessa Munt]

On a point of order, Mr Dowd. I am not entirely clear about the process for this, but I realise that in the morning session I should have declared that I have an interest as the vice-chair and a director of WhistleblowersUK, which is a non-profit-making organisation. I want to retroactively declare that in relation to this morning’s proceedings and start this afternoon’s proceedings by making that absolutely clear.

[The Chair]

Thank you.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising an important issue. Amendment 43 would, as he states, make authorities set expectations for staff on how to retain and disclose their digital records in accordance with the obligations under the duty of candour. Proper record keeping is important to ensure accountability and propriety in decisions made by public authorities. That applies where records are on paper or held digitally— for example, in a WhatsApp group—and it is important that organisations have policies and processes in place to manage these effectively.

However, the Government’s view is that the code of ethical conduct is not the correct vehicle for establishing those processes. The Public Records Act 1958 already places certain requirements on public authorities. Under that Act, the Keeper of Public Records issues guidance to supervise and guide the selection of historic records —including digital records—worthy of permanent preservation.

Disclosure to inquiries and inquests will require the detailed consideration of various factors, including the fact that the authority’s legal obligations include the duty of candour and assistance, the protection of personal or sensitive information, and the relevance to the inquiry’s terms of reference or the inquest. Authorities may also require specific legal advice. Separate and bespoke policies will therefore be required. The professional duty of candour established under clause 9 is intended to focus on what candour means for each public official going about their business in their day-to-day role. I therefore request that the hon. Member for Cheadle withdraws the amendment.

On the point about whether WhatsApp messages are covered, and specifically disappearing messages or those deleted in the course of work, as they sometimes are, the duty of candour and assistance requires all public officials and authorities to provide all relevant information. If a public official was part of a WhatsApp chat in which relevant information was exchanged, they would be obliged to inform the chair of that fact, and if disappearing messages had gone or the chats had been deleted, they would have to provide an account of what was discussed, to the best of their recollection, even if the messages had since been deleted or vanished.

[Tessa Munt]

I know that we dealt with this matter earlier, but I again put on the record my concerns about subcontractors in tiers 1, 2 and 3, who often hold key information. We need to find some way to make sure that they are within the scope of this provision.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I recognise that concern, which I share, and we are looking at that in terms of the passage of the Bill. As I have stated, the duty would be on the public authority, official or subcontractor to disclose all the information to the chair of the inquiry or investigation.

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[Tessa Munt]

How helpful has the existing law been in relation to the covid inquiry, which my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle mentioned? I am not sure that has quite got to the base of everything. Does the Minister have any suggestions about improving the Bill to be explicit about what we expect?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Again, I totally agree with the policy intention. If the Bill had become an Act when the covid inquiry was under way, might that inquiry have carried things out differently, or provided information in a new way or in a new light? We cannot answer that. All I can say is that the purpose and intention of the Bill is to ensure that any inquiries or investigations seek the whole truth and that all information is disclosed so that we are never put in that position again. That is the intention of the Bill, and we have made sure it is as robust as possible to provide for that.

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[Tessa Munt]

I rise to speak to amendment 26, which has some similarities with what the hon. Member for Liverpool West Derby just outlined. I am extremely keen to ensure that people are really clear about what they have to do when they wish to report. This relates to clause 9(5)(c) as well.

As has been mentioned, the Employment Rights Act 1996 tends to guide people towards the employment tribunal if something has happened. Currently, if something has gone wrong, that is where people can end up. As I mentioned last week, my understanding is that the employment tribunal has a backlog of 47,000 cases. My sense is that when the Bill comes into effect, which will not be very long, there will be masses more people who find themselves guided by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 to head for the employment tribunal, which does not seem to be an adequate place for people to deal with their complaints.

The employment tribunal is for those who are considered to be a worker, be that an employee or somebody acting in a voluntary capacity. Amendment 26 would require a public authority’s code of ethical conduct to include information on the person to whom someone can make a protected disclosure—what we know as whistleblowing —and how the person would be protected against detriment. It is incredibly important that the code of ethical conduct sets out clearly how individuals can make a protected disclosure and the protections available to them.

The amendment would strengthen the whistleblowing safeguards by providing staff with clear guidance on the safe reporting of wrongdoing. It should address some of the gaps in protection without creating a specific outside body. I have already spoken to the Minister about the idea of an office of the whistleblower; I understand that is outside the scope of the Bill, but it is really important that whistleblowers can come forward with confidence while remaining within the statutory framework, and that they have somewhere safe to go.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank Members for raising those important points. We discussed whistleblowers and the protections needed for them a lot in the oral evidence sessions. It is essential that if there is wrongdoing in an organisation, those working for the organisation can come forward and raise the alarm, and be confident that they will be protected when doing so.

Through the Bill, public authorities will be required to promote and maintain standards of ethical conduct, and their leaders will be held accountable for that. In doing so, leaders must ensure that their authority’s code of ethics contains information about any whistleblowing policies or procedures.

[Tessa Munt]

Does the Minister accept that a huge number of authorities, bodies and organisations may not, whether wittingly or not, recognise somebody as a whistleblower? There is a real danger in people believing that they are whistleblowing and that they will have protection, yet the companies not recording them as whistleblowing incidents. How does the Minister see that working?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The hon. Lady has pre-empted my next comments. The Bill will ensure that workers who are protected against retaliation by an employer for blowing the whistle about wrongdoing—known formally as making a protected disclosure under the Employment Rights Act 1996—are more aware of their rights.

We believe that certain elements of the amendments are unnecessary. For example, while we are absolutely sympathetic to its aims, amendment 26 would require employers to provide information on prescribed persons that is already online, on gov.uk. The amendments could also introduce confusion—

[Tessa Munt]

rose—

[Alex Davies-Jones]

And that is the very confusion the hon. Lady mentioned. If she lets me finish my point, I will give way.

Amendment 50, for example, may lead some people who work for a public authority, but are not workers, to believe that their disclosure may qualify for whistleblowing protection under the Employment Rights Act 1996. We do not wish to cause that confusion. I point the hon. Lady to our work on whistleblowers across Government, which will of course inform work on the passage of this Bill.

[Tessa Munt]

I want to mention the huge number of occasions when I dealt with constituents and others, when people have been—I would say—entrapped into signing non-disclosure agreements or NDAs, which mean they feel that they cannot talk to anyone. They even fear talking to their MP. It is not clear to whom they can speak, and part of my desire is to ensure that each authority—I am not saying that the Minister should say what should be disclosed and to whom; this is for every organisation—should have someone identified. They should make public that safe place or safe person to whom anyone can report, be they in or outside the authority—that comes under the next subsection, I accept—as workers or employees. This business of NDAs needs to be sorted out once and for all, because it is pervasive and incredibly destructive.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

The hon. Lady will be aware of the work we are doing on NDAs in the Victims and Courts Bill and the Employment Rights Bill. A lot of work is happening across Government on how we can protect individuals who are being forced to sign NDAs or those who feel unable to come forward and whistleblow. That work is being done holistically and is led by the Department for Business and Trade. I am happy to discuss her concerns more broadly in Committee, during the passage of the Bill, and outside the Committee.

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[Ian Byrne]

I am filled with confidence by the Minister’s response on whistleblowers. I know that she will be taking this seriously, because it goes to the heart of changing the culture of organisations that have failed us time and time again. This whistleblowers element is extremely important. I am happy to hear that Minister is up for engaging with us across the Benches to strengthen these provisions, which is desperately needed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Tessa Munt]

I beg to move amendment 28, in clause 9, page 8, line 22, leave out subsection (6) and insert—

“(6) The Secretary of State must introduce a standard template for ethical conduct of conduct for completion by public authorities which satisfies the requirements in this section and which may be added to by public authorities to include information specific to their organisation or function.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to introduce standard template to ensure a consistent and high standard approach to completion of code of ethical conduct documentation across public authorities.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 25, in clause 9, page 8, line 25, leave out “may” insert “must”.

Amendment 23, in clause 9, page 9, line 5, at end insert—

“(13) The Secretary of State must ensure appropriate and adequate funding is provided to enable public authorities to train public officials so that they are aware of the standards contained within the code of conduct relating to them.”

New clause 4—Monitoring compliance with duties under the Act—

“(1) The Secretary of State must commission and publish annually an independent report which monitors public authorities’ compliance with their duties under the Act.

(2) The report must assess—

(a) public authorities’ record-keeping, disclosures and responses to inquiries and investigations;

(b) the effectiveness of enforcement and sanctions provisions in the Act in helping to ensure that public authorities and public officials perform their functions in line with the duty of candour in their dealings with inquiries and investigations; and

(c) the effectiveness of the provisions in the Act for supporting persons, including public officials, making protected disclosures and for reporting wrongdoings to an inquiry or investigation following a major incident.

(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of each report before both Houses of Parliament.

(4) The first report must be laid within the period of 12 months of the passing of this Act.

(5) Each subsequent report must be laid annually beginning with the day on which the previous report was laid.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to commission and publish annually an independent report with the purpose of providing an oversight mechanism to monitor compliance with duties under the Act.

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[Tessa Munt]

The amendment seeks to ensure that all public authorities and organisations adopt a consistent and high-quality approach to their codes of ethical conduct by requiring the Secretary of State to introduce a standard template. This should not be prescriptive, but it should at least form a basis for every organisation and a minimum standard, in order to promote clarity, uniformity and accessibility, making absolutely sure that staff can understand it.

[Maria Eagle]

I was looking at the amendment paper this morning. It was probably mistyped, but my copy says that the Secretary of State must introduce a standard template for “ethical conduct of conduct”. Should that be “codes of conduct” or “ethical conduct”?

[Tessa Munt]

I thank the right hon. Lady for her intervention. She is absolutely right: the amendment should not say “conduct of conduct”, it should indeed say “codes of conduct”. I hope the Chair can note that, and forgive me for any confusion.

I am hoping—by misspelling everything—to promote clarity, uniformity and accessibility, making it easy for staff to understand their obligations and the processes for reporting wrongdoing. By standardising the minimum content in ethical codes, the amendment would strengthen accountability, support a culture of integrity and help to ensure that protections, such as those for whistleblowers, are applied effectively across all public authorities and organisations. I recognise that the Minister has spoken pretty strongly against doing this; none the less, I am seeking clarity. Having a minimum standard set by the Secretary of State might be helpful, but I recognise that the Minister has already had a good old go at saying no.

[Seamus Logan]

I rise to speak to amendment 23. The Minister will be aware that if the Bill is enacted, as we are all confident that it will be in due course, a large number of public authorities will face significant new training requirements. When we met with the intelligence services chair, Sir Ken McCallum, he readily acknowledged that there will be significant training implications for his organisation, and MI5 is quite small in the broader context, particularly if one thinks of the national health service, the civil service, the police, and so on.

The Minister has told me that the money resolution has already been passed, and there are no new additional resources attached to this Bill, other than in relation to legal aid—I think that is in the schedules. Amendment 23 seeks to ask the Minister to reconsider that in the light of what I have said about training needs. One only has to think of things such sexual harassment, equality training, and so on, and the massive training requirement that fell upon the public bodies many years ago. I was one of those who underwent that training. It was a significant training requirement, and I expect that the duty of candour and the code of ethics, and so on, will also have a major training requirement. With amendment 23, I am asking the Government to reconsider whether adequate funding is available to organisations to undertake the training that will follow from passing this Bill.

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

I thank both hon. Members for tabling the amendments in this group; I will respond to each in turn.

First, amendment 28 would require there to be a standard template for a code of ethics. The Government recognise the importance of supporting public authorities to develop their codes of ethical conduct, and we commit to doing so. Clause 10 confers a power on the Secretary of State and the devolved Governments to issue guidance that authorities will be required to have regard to when drawing up codes for their organisations.

The newly established Ethics and Integrity Commission will in time also have a role in supporting public bodies by making toolkits, best practice and guidance available for public sector bodies. Although we envisage that standard templates will be useful, as I have already said, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. We wish to retain the flexibility to allow each individual organisation and sector to consider what would work best for them, but support will of course be available for them in doing so.

Amendment 25 would require a public authority to modify its code for specified circumstances or for specified people who work for the authority. I want to reassure Members that clause 9(7) provides for public authorities to specify that their code may apply with modifications in specified circumstances or to people of a specified description who work for the authority.

The intention of clause 9(7) is to enable authorities to reflect different expectations or obligations that apply to different groups of employees—for example, a school’s code of conduct may apply differently to teachers and janitorial staff. It could also reflect different processes that apply in different situations, for example, in an emergency situation compared with everyday business as usual. The Government’s view is that it should be for the authority to determine whether and how it uses that flexibility, noting that it must set out the reasons for doing so—that is important. We do not think that authorities should be required to do so, which is what the effect of amendment 25 would be.

Amendment 23 would require the Secretary of State to ensure that adequate funding is available to public authorities to provide training to their officials on compliance with the code of ethical conduct. I again want to assure hon. and right hon. Members that the Government have an ambitious plan for the implementation of the Bill. The Bill is just one part of the puzzle; it needs to be implemented fully, workably and effectively. It is just part and start of the culture change that we want to see in public sector organisations. The plans will of course include training for public servants, as well as oversight of the codes themselves.

A number of public sector organisations are already working on cultural or leadership programmes, and implementation of the Bill may be undertaken alongside or as part of existing initiatives to ensure that the code is seen as central to driving change in the organisation’s culture on a sustainable basis. The Bill requires public authorities to promote and maintain standards of ethical conduct among those who work for the authority. The duty ensures public authorities will be accountable, while allowing flexibility for the practical arrangements that each authority might put in place. I hope that assures the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire North and Moray East, and I am happy to work with him and others on the implementation of the Bill as it goes forward.

Finally, new clause 4 would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent report setting out whether and how public authorities have complied with the duty of assistance and candour. The Government agree that it is essential that the duties in the Bill are properly upheld and enforced. That is why the Government are ensuring independent oversight of implementation of the Bill’s provisions. The Government have committed to commissioning an annual independent assessment report to ensure that public bodies are complaint with the codes of ethics requirement in the Bill. That report will make clear which parts of the public sector are rising to the challenge and which are failing to do so. We will not be afraid to name and shame who is abiding and who is not.

Compliance with the duty of candour and assistance at inquiries and investigations can, sadly, be judged only by the inquiry or investigation itself. They are responsible for monitoring compliance with the legal duty and for taking enforcement action, such as referring the case for criminal proceedings if necessary. I would like to assure all Committee members that the Government are absolutely committed to ensuring effective implementation of all the measures in the Bill and to achieving the cultural change that is so desperately needed. I therefore urge hon. Members not to press their amendments.

[Tessa Munt]

I am glad to hear what the Minister has to say. Sunlight is the best disinfectant; if anyone in the public can track through their complaint to something that is published on annual basis—I assume the Minister means annual—that will give people a lot more confidence that this being taken incredibly seriously.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Yes, it is annual.

[Tessa Munt]

I thank the Minister for her contribution. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

I again thank my hon. Friend for tabling these amendments. I hope that I will provide him with some clarification and assurances on exactly why we have adopted this approach in our drafting. The provisions that amendment 55 would amend are typical in legislation. They provide that actions legally done by the Crown or the holder of a particular office, such as a Secretary of State, can be attributed to a Government Department.

The definition of a “public official” in schedule 2(3) includes an individual who

“holds office under a public authority”.

By removing the explicit reference to the holder of a particular office, the amended paragraph would actually, and no doubt unintentionally, narrow the scope of what can be attributed to a Government Department. Only actions that are strictly acts of the Crown could then be attributed to a Government Department for the purposes of the duty of candour provisions and associated offence, as well as the misleading the public offence, not those done legally in the name of the Secretary of State. In our view, this would actually weaken the Bill, and I therefore urge my hon. Friend to withdraw amendment 55.

Amendments 58 to 60 seek to apply the duty of candour and assistance, along with the misconduct in public office offences in part 3, to staff employed on local contracts overseas, including consular staff at embassies. My hon. Friend is correct to note that there are two examples of this exclusion in the Bill, one from the definition of “public official” in relation to the duty of candour, and one from the definition of “civil servant” in relation to part 3. They exclude what are known as country-based staff. These are, for example, locally engaged staff who are employed by an embassy or consulate generally to do administrative or support work, such as site maintenance.

While employed by the embassy or equivalent, these individuals are subject to the laws of the country in which they live, and they are supervised by United Kingdom civil servants who are subject to all parts of the Bill. In excluding locally employed staff from the provisions in the Bill, the Bill follows all precedented approaches relating to these staff, such as the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. To take a different approach would be a significant and unprecedented change. I hope my hon. Friend understands that clarification and is content not to press amendments 58 to 60 to a vote.

I turn to schedule 2 and clause 10. Many of the Bill’s substantive provisions apply to a public authority or public official. Schedule 2 defines those terms for the purposes of part 2 of the Bill. There are different definitions of “public authority” for different parts of the Bill, and I appreciate that this can be confusing, so I hope to clarify why. Part 2 of the schedule sets out the definitions of “public authority” and “public official” for the purposes of the duty of candour and assistance and the offence of misleading the public. These are broad definitions that are intended to capture anyone, including private companies, who exercises a public function.

Paragraph (2)(4) sets out that there are express reservations for the courts, Parliament and the devolved legislatures, reflecting long-standing constitutional conventions of self-regulation and independence. The north-south bodies established under the Good Friday agreement are also excluded to avoid capturing officials in the Irish Government.

[Tessa Munt]

In the interests of clarity, will the Minister explain whether the intelligence and security services are now captured by the list in part 2? Will she also explain what happens to regular or reserve forces when they are abroad, when they might be subject to devices such as the court martial? Those are two very specific things.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am happy to clarify both those points, and I assure the hon. Lady that they are captured in this part of the Bill.

“Public official” is defined in schedule 2 as all of those who work for a public authority or hold office under a public authority—including those that the hon. Lady mentioned—and individuals who hold a relevant public office. That is defined to include offices that are established in legislation or by Ministers, where the UK or devolved Government are wholly or mainly constituted by appointment made by the Crown or Ministers, and they exercise functions of a public nature. Former public officials are also included in that—for example, retired civil servants and those who have resigned from the service. There are various exclusions, such as for individuals acting in a judicial capacity, non-executive elected members of a local authority who operate executive arrangements, and those in the private service of the Crown.

Part 3 of the schedule sets out the definition of “public authority” for the provisions on standards of ethical conduct, including the requirement to adopt a code of ethics. That definition of “public authority” is limited to the core public authorities, those commonly understood to be part of the state. The definition includes a list of named public authorities. That includes Government Departments, the devolved Governments, the armed forces, the police, local authorities, NHS bodies, schools, and any bodies that are both established by Ministers of the Crown and are wholly or mainly constituted by public appointments. That is intended to capture the wide range of arm’s length and other public bodies. The definition does, however, include the same exclusions for Parliament, the courts and those north-south bodies that were previously mentioned.

[Tessa Munt]

I again seek clarity. Are non-executive directors of an NHS trust, for example—who might be party to all sorts of information—within the scope of the Bill? I would also like to check whether school governors—and schools that are academies sometimes use different names, such as “partners”—are also picked up in the list.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Yes, I can confirm that. Those provisions of the Bill contain a power to allow the definition to also be extended by secondary legislation to private companies that exercise specified public functions. That would allow the code of ethics provisions to be extended to specified high-risk public functions by secondary legislation—for example, in privately run prisons.

Finally, I turn to clause 10, which provides that guidance can be issued by the national authority if it wishes to do so, for the purposes of chapter 2, which relates to the standards of ethical conduct. That means that the Secretary of State and the devolved Governments can issue guidance on how public authorities can fulfil their duty to maintain high standards of ethical conduct, including in drafting and adopting their codes of ethical conduct.

Clause 9 sets out minimum standards in law that all codes must legally meet. We have the option to use guidance under clause 10 to set out best practice in each of those areas, encouraging authorities to consider what arrangements they can put in place to ensure that the highest standards of ethical conduct are in place. However, as we have already discussed, given the diversity of the public sector, there is no one-size-fits-all approach, and any guidance that is issued will allow each authority to consider how those requirements in the Bill can best be implemented to serve them in a way that best suits them and the needs of their organisations and sectors. All public authorities will be legally required to have regard to the guidance.

UK Ministers will be responsible for guidance for UK and England-only bodies, and the devolved Governments will have powers to issue guidance that relates exclusively to devolved matters. That is to reflect the devolution settlement, and it ensures that the devolved Governments can provide guidance to the public authorities to which they are responsible and—speaking as a Member of Parliament for a devolved area—also that they could potentially also be bilingual, as they would have to be to comply in Wales.

We intend to work closely with our devolved colleagues on the development of any such guidance, and I again put on record my thanks to all the devolved Governments for their collaborative and collegiate approach to working with us on the Bill to ensure that we have a unified approach.