Trade Bill

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Money resolution & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion & Programme motion: House of Commons
Wednesday 20th May 2020 Commons Chamber

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP) [V]]

May I start by agreeing with the Secretary of State that it is absolutely vital that we keep trade open and recognise the importance of the supply chain, and that it is absolutely essential that we stand against protectionism? We need to do that, because right now there are three main threats to trade. The first is self-evidently from the covid crisis, which the World Trade Organisation has suggested might cause a fall in global trade of something in the order of 13% to 32%. That is a substantial reduction, no matter where on the scale one looks. The second is the impact of Brexit. Assessments suggest that the UK could lose a substantial chunk of its global trade. The third is the more systemic problem that the right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), the ex-Trade Secretary, was speaking about, which is the continued implementation of new and the continuation of existing trade restriction measures, with tariffs valuing somewhere around $1.6 trillion in force.

I am not confident that those problems will be resolved any time soon, not least because there is as yet no cure for coronavirus and restrictions of one sort or another may well remain in force for some considerable time, because of the highly publicised lack of progress on the Brexit negotiations, and also, sadly, because of the absence of a functioning World Trade Organisation appellate body. This Trade Bill does not address any of those matters, other than perhaps at the margins, by trying to roll over and maintain the trade the UK has with third countries via membership of the EU and thereby minimise the losses from Brexit.

The Bill does do a number of other things, as the Secretary of State set out. It creates procurement obligations arising from membership of the GPA—the agreement on Government procurement; it creates the Trade Remedies Authority; and it gives powers to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to collect and share data. However, it is not without its problems. Let me deal with the powers relating to the devolved Administrations first. The previous Trade Bill, which was under consideration in the previous Parliament, contained provision for regulation-making powers to be available to the UK Government within areas of devolved competence. That Bill also contained a provision that prohibited devolved Administrations from using powers to modify retained direct EU legislation or anything that was retained EU law by virtue of section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) 2018 Act in ways that would be inconsistent with any modifications made by the UK Government, even in devolved areas. As a result, the Scottish Government could not consent to that, and that view was shared by the Scottish Parliament Finance and Constitution Committee.

That Trade Bill did not complete its passage and fell, and the good news is that those provisions have been removed from this reintroduced Trade Bill. However, there remains no statutory obligation for the UK Government to consult or seek the consent of Scottish Ministers before exercising the powers they have in devolved areas. However, during the partial passage of the previous Trade Bill, the UK Government made a commitment to avoid using the powers in the Bill in devolved areas without consulting and ideally obtaining the consent of Scottish Ministers. The then Minister of State at the Department for International Trade, the right hon. Member for Bournemouth West (Conor Burns), subsequently restated those commitments in his letter to Ivan McKee, the Scottish Trade Minister, on 18 March, and I hope that the Minister we hear from today will restate these non-legislative commitments.

The Bill is not without its problems, and they do not relate simply to the devolved Administrations. It allows the UK Government to modify retained direct principal EU law, and it appears to me that there are no legislative limits on such modifications. The second problem is the description of an “international trade agreement” in clause 2(2)(b), which states that it may be

“an international agreement that mainly relates to trade, other than a free trade agreement.”

As we know, modern agreements are as much about regulation, standards, conformance, dispute resolution or food safety as they are about quotas and tariffs. Many people will uncomfortable that Ministers can modify existing agreements in the way in which this Bill permits, particularly without scrutiny and consent.

That leads me to the fundamental problem with the Bill. The absence of parliamentary scrutiny and a parliamentary vote on significant changes or modifications, or, indeed, in the future, on new trade deals as may be envisaged by the Government, is a huge problem. Modern democracies need to have full scrutiny of trade agreements, from the scope of the negotiating mandate right through to implementation. That is absent from this Bill, as is any provision for scrutiny other than through the voluntary scrutiny proposed by the Government in the Command Paper published in the previous Parliament, to which I will return briefly at the end of my speech.

These issues also highlight the absence of any formal input into trade deals or significant modification of existing ones by the devolved Administrations—a problem replicated in the membership of the Trade Remedies Authority, where no formal ability exists for the devolved Administrations to propose or nominate a member with expertise in regionally or nationally significant trade.

I shall turn briefly to the Command Paper that was published in 2019 and covered the previous Trade Bill. Does it still apply? Does the commitment to publishing our negotiating objectives and scoping assessments still exist? Even if it does, does the Minister recognise that that still does not give Parliament or the devolved Administrations any role in approving them? Is it still the intention of the UK Government to provide sensitive information to a scrutiny Committee? Would that be the Select Committee on International Trade, which is ably chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil)? If it is, will any papers provided be publishable, or will they be restricted? If they are restricted, that will still leave Members of Parliament, exporting businesses and other interested third parties none the wiser about the Government’s real intentions. I am conscious of the limited time, Madam Deputy Speaker, so let me end simply by saying—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. I ask the hon. Gentleman to bring his remarks to a close. I thank him for his contribution, but we must move on. I am now introducing a time limit of five minutes, and I advise hon. Members who are speaking virtually to have a timing device visible.

Trade Bill (Fourth sitting)

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 18th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room. It may be helpful if I note that, because no one is present to pass the Hansard reporters notes, there is an email address, which is [e-mail]. To keep any great orations in their most accurate form in the record, you should email your speaking notes to that address.

Clause 1

Implementation of the Agreement on Government Procurement

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 29, in clause 1, page 1, line 4, leave out “may” and insert “must”.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on this important Bill, Sir Graham. If I may, I will crave your indulgence for a few minutes to make some introductory remarks about the Bill before I move on to amendment 29. First, I recognise the difficulty the Minister has in the absence of officials. A number of the amendments I have tabled are technical, so it is not my intention—I hope this is helpful to you, Sir Graham—to press to a Division any amendments or new clauses until we hear detailed responses from the Government, probably towards the end of these Committee proceedings next week. Of course, I reserve the right to come back to these themes on Report, if and when we reach that stage.

Right now, there are three main threats to trade, as I have said before. The first is self-evidently the covid crisis. The World Trade Organisation has suggested there will be a fall in global trade of between 13% and 32%, which is larger than the collapse in trade during the financial crisis. The second threat is the impact of Brexit. We have all seen many of the assessments, which suggest a significant fall in UK global trade. The third threat is a more systemic problem, from the continued implementation of new, and the continuation of existing, trade restriction measures, mainly tariffs—about $1.5 trillion or $1.6 trillion-worth around the world. I am not confident that any of those problems will be resolved any time soon, not least because there is no cure or vaccine for covid; because of the well-publicised difficulties with the Brexit negotiations; and because of the failure to appoint a functioning appellate body in the WTO.

However, the Bill does address a number of other matters. It implements procurement obligations arising from membership of the GPA—the agreement on government procurement, it creates the Trade Remedies Authority and it gives Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and others powers to collect and share data. It also allows the Government to modify retained direct principal EU legislation, and it appears to me that, other than a few minor restrictions, those modifications are almost without limit.

The Bill also includes descriptions of what an international trade agreement is and says that it may be

“an international agreement that mainly relates to trade, other than a free trade agreement”.

But, as we know, modern agreements are little to do with quotas and tariffs, and as much to do with standards, conformity, dispute resolution and food safety, for example. Many people are therefore uncomfortable that the Government may be able to modify existing legislation, even in roll-over agreements, in the way proposed. I am sure we will come to all those matters over the next few days.

Amendment 29 does not appear to be particularly important, but it is, because it would require the relevant authority to make the regulations referred to. The reason is as follows. The UK is already party to the GPA, and requiring the relevant authority to make regulations to implement the GPA would ensure continuity upon withdrawal from the EU. Under clause 1(1), the Bill grants an appropriate authority the power to make regulations that it “considers appropriate” to implement the GPA. If the intention is to ensure implementation of the GPA 1994, the authority should be required to make such provisions. While it could be helpful to allow the relevant authority discretion—that is facilitated by the current wording—to make regulations that it considers appropriate to implement the GPA to ensure continued alignment with EU requirements, if the intention is actually to implement the GPA in order to ensure continued alignment, the relevant authority must make the necessary regulations. I commend the amendment to the Committee.

[Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Graham. The hon. Member for Dundee East has made some important observations about our proceedings, which I agree with. We may take a slightly different view on pressing our amendments, and we will come to that in due course. I make no promise; it will depend on the nature of the Minister’s answers, his ability to garner information and what he says.

The hon. Member rightly drew attention to the impact of the covid-19 crisis on trade. He also drew attention to the importance of discussing trade, and indeed legislating for international trade, at this time in recovering our economy and the prosperity of our people. He referred to the estimated fall in the economy of between 13% and 32%. He is right that that fall is far larger than in the global financial crisis—it is the largest in history, over all the time in which such figures have been recorded. It is therefore essential that, where we can, we get what we are doing as accurate as possible.

Following the hon. Member’s speech, I now have a much better understanding of the intention behind the amendment. I am confident that he is trying to do what he has set out. The Labour party, as we made clear on Second Reading, fully support the accession to the GPA. If that is the Government’s intention, it seems entirely right that they should make sure they do so, and it is odd that they have not already committed to that in the Bill.

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[Greg Hands]

It is a good question, but the assurance I would give is that our intention is to join the GPA with substantially the same arrangements as we currently have as members of the EU. That will give the assurance of continuity as we move forward.

The power in the clause is appropriately drafted to ensure that our international obligations will be fully complied with, including by making changes to national law, where appropriate, using the power in this clause. The use of the power is expressed in the usual way. I say to the hon. Member for Dundee East that we have expressed these powers using quite a usual formulation, allowing authorities to make regulations in the circumstances set out. If the wording were to be changed from “may” to “must”, as proposed in the amendment and as he suggests, changes would need to be made in all circumstances covered by clause 1. There would, however, be certain circumstances where it would not be appropriate or necessary for regulations to be made. For example, a dispute with another party might be resolved without the need to make any changes at all to domestic regulations. Likewise, not all modifications of another party’s appendix I will require changes to domestic law. On that basis, I ask the him to withdraw the amendment.

[Stewart Hosie]

I make a number of observations. The Minister said that the Bill was about continuity. If I take that at face value, as I do, it strengthens the case for the relevant authority being required to make the necessary regulatory changes. He also said that the flexibility allows the relevant authority to respond to specific circumstances, but if those change, there are lots of reasons why it should—absolutely must—make the necessary regulations to respond to those changes. The final argument the Minister made does not hold water:

“An appropriate authority”—

must—

“by regulations make such provision as the authority considers appropriate”.

So if a circumstance stands changed where the relevant authority did not deem it appropriate to make a change, it would not be required to do so.

The hon. Member for Harrow West said that the amendment might encourage more businesses to take advantage of procurement opportunity. It would not do so directly, but, certainly, if the relevant authorities were required to do something, it might act as a nudge measure to encourage businesses to look at those procurement opportunities.

I will do what I said at the beginning: I will not seek to press these matters to a Division now, but I will ponder on the Minister’s answer. I am sure he will consult others and ponder further, and we may have a similar debate on Third Reading. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Bill Esterson]

I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 1, page 1, line 16, at end insert—

“(1A) No regulations under subsection (1) may be made until the Secretary of State has entered into negotiations with other parties to the GPA with the objective of enabling greater labour market interventions and compliance with ILO standards in any UK procurement contract to which the GPA applies, and

(a) the Secretary of State has made a statement to the House of Commons that the objective has been achieved either in full or in part, or

(b) the Secretary of State has made a statement to the House of Commons that the objective has not been achieved.”

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[Bill Esterson]

I am pleased that my hon. Friend has mentioned the innovation and entrepreneurial ability of our SMEs. The Under-Secretary of State for International Trade, the hon. Member for Beverley and Holderness (Graham Stuart), said this morning that small businesses are the “backbone of the economy”—I think I have remembered that correctly—and he is right. However, we need to encourage them more. They are innovators and entrepreneurs. That entrepreneurial spirit is often where the best ideas come from, and my hon. Friend is right that that drives productivity.

Businesses running start-ups and scale-ups with new ideas and often enthusiastic members of staff are in a stronger position to deliver the kinds of new ideas, changes and technological advances that make such a difference. Indeed, that is generally where effective research and development in technology is derived from. Lately, large firms without their own research and development departments have simply taken over small firms that do. That is because of the kind of the situation under discussion.

If we want to succeed, it is essential that we put our investment, including public investment through procurement, into those small businesses. I intended to speak later about some of the procurement problems, but I will mention one or two now. I am about to move on to public health improvements, which is the subject of the fourth amendment in this group, and in which context contracts have been awarded.

SMEs that have come to me since the start of the crisis have expressed concerns about their inability to contract directly through the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy or the Cabinet Office, or to get support for exports—this point is often made—through the Department for International Trade. They have been unable get such support because everything goes to the big firms. The big firms have their own procurement departments and they win all the contracts.

That has happened yet again with Serco, which only a few months ago was fined for failing to complete a contract successfully. Serco was the cause of so much of the problem in the failed probation privatisation. Thankfully, last week’s statement by the Justice Secretary put a final nail in its coffin. However, Serco has now won the contract for the test and trace system. It has no experience whatever in test and trace. There are companies and small firms out there that have the expertise and have been saying for months that they can do it. They have been trying to help, but they have hit a brick wall.

Once we join the GPA, I do not see why we could not negotiate along those line with our partners. Ideally, that would be part of our procurement regulations. That is possible. In the interim we need to retain the best possible arrangements and then build on them. The danger is that the public contracts regulations will expire at the end of December and we will go backwards when we need to go forwards. The Government spend nearly £6.5 billion—a very large figure—on procuring with UK SMEs. That is great, but it is not always going to the SMEs that it should.

There are other examples from the public health crisis. Companies in my own constituency have come to me wanting to either import or manufacture personal protective equipment, but they have been completely unable to do so because of the barriers to entry in our procurement system.

[Stewart Hosie]

May I seek some clarity? When it comes to general SME bidding for Government contracts, the proportion of Scottish Government contracts that go to SMEs is substantially higher than the UK Government figure. It is all done through the public procurement quota. Likewise, the manufacture and supply of PPE has been done through a specific portal, but I know there was a dedicated Minister—a Trade Minister was actually involved directly in this—and the situation in Scotland is not the same as that in the UK, as described by the hon. Gentleman. I just want to make sure that, if the regulations are changed in the way he describes, we do not end up throwing out good bits of local SME procurement from around the country—the nations and regions—and lumping it all into a Westminster system that he is right to say has not so far covered itself in glory.

[Bill Esterson]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising that issue. I have seen from the figures that Scottish procurement has been significantly better, by an order of magnitude. I do not know the balance between direct and indirect procurement, but if indirect procurement is handled appropriately and margins are still maintained and the quality and innovation is still available in the contracts, then that works.

The hon. Gentleman asked me a question. My intention is to make things easier to do, not harder. Our request is to improve the regulations, negotiate with our partners in the GPA, and to retain and enhance what is in retained EU law. This applies not only to Scotland but to local government, Northern Ireland and Wales. There are different systems and they do a much better job. For example, Manchester City Council—I want to ensure a good political balance in the examples given by Labour Members—has delivered according to an environmentally sustainable local agenda. It has delivered support for workers—the agenda set out by my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington North—and it has delivered on public health agendas, too.

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[Greg Hands]

I have already set out for the Committee the benefits of GPA membership. It is an agreement that mutually opens government procurement markets between its parties. Preserving the UK’s membership of the GPA will keep these markets open to UK businesses, ensuring that they continue to have guaranteed access to approximately £1.3 trillion per year in procurement opportunities, as well as delivering value for money to the UK taxpayer. I am slightly perturbed by the Opposition’s approach to the GPA, given that they voted against the provisions during proceedings on the 2017-19 Trade Bill. I do not believe that it is appropriate or sensible for UK businesses from across the country to be denied access to the procurement opportunities provided for by the GPA.

New clauses 1, 2, 3, 4, 10 and 14 would place a legal duty on the Government to carry out reviews of the social, environmental, public health, SME, equalities and economic impacts of any regulations made under clause 1(1). First, let me assure the Committee that a detailed impact assessment of these powers relating to the UK’s independent accession to the GPA has already been carried out and published prior to the introduction of the Bill. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee agreed with the assessment that the implementation of our independent accession to the GPA would have no direct impacts, since it simply ensures the continuation of existing arrangements after the transition period.

As I have set out, clause 1 will allow the Government to implement the UK’s independent GPA membership in domestic law, and therefore to respond appropriately to a limited set of circumstances within the GPA. The circumstances in which the powers could be used after accession are set out in the Bill and largely concern technical or administrative modifications—for example, to reflect changes in the names of Government entities as a result of machinery of government reorganisation, which all Governments engage in. The shadow Minister is right that my arguments have inadvertently drifted from being about this group of new clauses to being about the previous group, but it is an excellent argument, and no harm has been caused by making it twice. Such modifications will have no significant—if any—social, environmental, public health, SME, equalities or other economic impacts.

Aside from regulations relating to technical changes, the powers in clause 1 will also allow the Government to make the necessary amendments to domestic law to reflect new parties joining or withdrawing from the GPA. Without the power, we would be unable to meet our obligations in relation to those acceding to the GPA. As well as being unable to give rights of access to public contracts to bidders from joining members, we would also be unable to remove rights of access to bidders from those members who had left. I am sure the Committee will agree that that cannot be a situation we find ourselves in. Recognising concerns that regulations made to reflect new accessions could have material impacts, however, we will engage the International Trade Committee and the House of Lords treaties Sub-Committee in advance of any new party acceding to the GPA. This will provide ample opportunity to explore potential impacts before any regulations are made.

[Stewart Hosie]

May I ask a brief question? Is the Chair of the International Trade Committee aware of the obligation that he will have to consider this in advance?

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. I do not know whether the Chair of the Committee was aware of that, but he is now and I think he will welcome the change. He is always somebody who likes to be consulted, as we well know, so I think he would agree with me that this is a welcome move for additional consultation.

I have set out that the powers in clause 1 can be useful, but I want to be clear with the Committee about what they cannot be used for. The clause 1 powers cannot be used to implement any wholesale renegotiation of the GPA, or of the UK’s market access offer. Any such changes would require further primary legislation.

I hope I have persuaded the Committee that there would be no benefit in carrying out extensive reviews after regulations under clause 1(1) have been made. I ask that hon. Members do not press their new clauses to a Division, and I commend clause 1 to the Committee.

[Bill Esterson]

I think this is the first time in the Minister’s parliamentary career that he has ever admitted he was wrong—[Laughter.] I give him credit for being gracious enough to do so. We may have seen history in the making.

The Minister does this a lot. He claims we are against something when we are not. We spelled out in our reasoned amendment last time, and we spelled it out in our reasoned amendment this time, that we support the accession of the GPA. We voted against the Bill as a whole because we oppose the Bill as a whole. That does not mean that we oppose everything in the Bill. He knows that, but he keeps saying it. I know he likes to have some fun.

I do not object to the suggestion of asking the International Trade Committee and the Lords treaties Sub-Committee to take on additional roles, although I share the slight surprise of the hon. Member for Dundee East about the fact that the Chair of the International Trade Committee was not consulted before the announcement was made. That is not the real issue, however. The issue is that the new clauses request a review of the regulations. They do not request a review of the membership or proposed new members, so that is a rather different point. I hope that the International Trade Committee would be asked to review any proposed changes to the regulations in discussions and negotiations with our partners. I do not object to the same thing for potential accessions, but that is a rather different point from the one we were making. Having said that, and as I said in my opening remarks, they are probing provisions and we will not be pressing them to a Division.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Implementation of international trade agreements

[Stewart Hosie]

I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 2, page 2, line 9, leave out “appropriate” and insert “necessary”.

I will be mercifully brief on amendment 30. The effect of the amendment would be to limit the scope of the powers to be delegated to an appropriate authority to what is actually necessary to achieve the implementation of international trade agreements. Clause 2(1) provides that:

“An appropriate authority may…make such provision as the authority considers appropriate”—

to implement a future agreement. However, the word “appropriate” is vague and subjective. A necessity test—I am sure I have heard the Minister make this argument in the past—is clearer and more objective. The power should be limited to making the regulations that are necessary to implement the agreement.

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[Greg Hands]

Speaking to amendment 30, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Dundee East, I can assure him that all regulations made under the clause 2 power to implement international trade agreements will be both necessary and appropriate. The power is needed to implement obligations arising from continuity trade agreements into domestic law over time and in all circumstances. Our expectation is that the power will be mainly used for obligations relating to procurement or mutual recognition of product conformity assessments. To be clear, it cannot be used to implement tariff-related provisions. Without such an ability to make changes, the UK would be at risk of being in breach of our international obligations. It is the Government’s responsibility to ensure that that does not happen. The proposed amendment would prevent that by constraining the vires or scope of the regulations that can be made under clause 2, particularly when using the concurrent powers to legislate in areas of devolved competence.

I can assure colleagues that the powers in the Bill will be used in a proportionate way and that consultation with colleagues in the devolved Governments and elsewhere is a fundamental part of our approach. The Government view “appropriate” and “necessary” as synonymous, and our intent is only to make use of the regulation power where it is needed to fulfil obligations under agreements. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Dundee East to withdraw his amendment.

[Stewart Hosie]

I thank the Minister for his response and I will take his assurances at face value. I just say to him that the objective not to use this to change tariffs is not one of the exclusions in clause 2 in relation to the implementation of trade agreements. The Government might want to look again later in our proceedings at how exclusions to the use of this power are documented in the Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stewart Hosie]

I beg to move amendment 31, in clause 2, page 2, leave out lines 13 and 14 and insert—

“(b) an agreement between two or more countries aimed at reducing the barriers to trade in goods or services between them”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 15, in clause 4, page 3, line 26, at end insert—

“‘international agreement that mainly relates to trade, other than a free trade agreement’ means a strategic partnership agreement or mutual recognition agreement that is ancillary to a free trade agreement, or an investment agreement”.

[Stewart Hosie]

The effect of this amendment is clear: to provide a more precise definition of an international agreement and achieve greater clarity in the Bill. The amended wording would provide a clearer definition of an international trade agreement than is currently provided for in the Bill. That is in line with the Government’s own intention, as set out in the explanatory notes. Paragraph 31 states:

“International trade agreements are agreements between two or more countries aimed at reducing the barriers to trade in goods or services between them.”

The principle of certainty is central to good law making. In clause 2(2), an international trade agreement means “a free trade agreement”, but that is further defined in paragraph (7). Subsection (2)(b), as it currently stands, refers to

“an international agreement that mainly relates to trade, other than a free trade agreement.”

We had a discussion on Second Reading about that. These modern trade agreements have little to do with quotas and tariffs and far more to do with other things, as I said in my introductory remarks earlier this afternoon. The phrase “mainly relates to trade” does not grant sufficient certainty in terms of interpretation.

As I have said, the explanatory notes give the following definition:

“International trade agreements are agreements between two or more countries aimed at reducing the barriers to trade in goods or services between them.”

I consider that definition to be clearer than the multi-part definition currently in the Bill. This amendment does not reduce the scope of what might be deemed to be in a trade agreement, but it provides it with a purpose: to reduce the barriers to trade in services and goods. In that sense, I think it a helpful amendment, which I am sure the Government will want to look at positively as we proceed with our deliberations.

[Gareth Thomas]

I rise in sympathy with the spirit of the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Dundee East, but I wish to speak specifically to amendment 15, which seeks to insert at clause 4, page 3, line 26:

“‘international agreement that mainly relates to trade, other than a free trade agreement’ means a strategic partnership agreement or mutual recognition agreement that is ancillary to a free trade agreement, or an investment agreement”.

I join the hon. Gentleman in wanting to see good law making and, therefore, proper definitions of what constitutes a trade agreement that would be covered under the Bill. The hon. Gentleman’s amendment refers just to an agreement on trade in goods and services. Our amendment includes the Government’s definition, but expands it to make it crystal clear that it includes a range of other trade related agreements, including investment agreements.

My hon. Friend the Member for Brent North (Barry Gardiner), speaking on an amendment similar to this one at the Committee stage of the Bill in January 2018, noted the lack of detail about what constitutes an international trade agreement and worried about whether trade agreements, or agreements that had substantial trade elements, would be brought to the House for even the limited scrutiny that the Minister proposes.

Mutual recognition agreements are crucial in terms of scrutiny; many of them help to minimise unnecessary regulatory non-tariff barriers. However, they potentially have implications for phytosanitary standards, food standards and environmental obligations. Strategic partnership agreements can add social and political conditionalities to accompany the more commercial aspects of trade agreements. For example, one wonders whether there might be strategic partnership agreements with some developing countries, perhaps to provide aid for trade support as they seek to implement new trade agreements with us.

Investment treaties are returning to being a UK competence, having left our responsibility in 2009. One of the most significant investment treaties that the European Union has been negotiating—the negotiations on it have not yet concluded—is with China, where there have been 28 rounds of negotiations. I suspect that there would be considerable interest in the UK, including within this House, if the Government sought an investment treaty with China. Surely, it is right to make sure that such an agreement would fall within scope, and it would also need to receive proper scrutiny.

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[Greg Hands]

Amendment 31, which has been tabled by the hon. Member for Dundee East, seeks, as he pointed out, to modify the definition of an international trade agreement. Our definition of an international trade agreement is drafted so that it will sufficiently capture the range of agreements that we currently access through the European Union. That includes free trade agreements but also stand-alone mutual recognition agreements, or MRAs. By changing the definition, the amendment would limit important elements of trade that businesses and consumers rely on.

As Members know, provisions under free trade agreements are wider than simply goods and services; the point was made by the hon. Member for Dundee East. That is an essential fact of modern trade agreements that the hon. Gentleman’s amendment overlooks. The amendment would create an unnecessary risk that important agreements became out of scope of the powers, leaving us unable to ensure continuity of trading relationships for UK businesses and consumers. He drew attention to tariffs but, legally, we cannot use clause 2 for tariffs, as he knows, because that has to come under the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018.

Amendment 15 seeks to limit the range of agreements that the UK will be able to sign outside FTAs. Specifically, again, that would have an impact on our stand-alone mutual recognition agreements. As Members will be aware, the UK has signed agreements that replicate the effects of existing EU arrangements for mutual recognition of conformity assessment. Those arrangements ensure continuity for UK manufacturers and businesses, meaning that they are able to continue having UK testing bodies certify that their products meet the regulations of other countries. The alternative would be to send our products for testing in other countries, significantly increasing costs and making many exports unviable.

The international trade agreement power enables continuity agreements to come into effect. That includes continuity MRAs. Amendment 15 therefore risks the UK being unable to fulfil obligations arising from continuity MRAs. If stand-alone mutual recognition agreements were taken out of the scope of the power, the UK would not be able to amend product-specific UK legislation to ensure that we were able to implement fully our obligations stemming from the continuity MRAs. Not only would that harm the UK’s standing on the international stage but, more importantly, it would materially impact on UK businesses and their employees at a time when they need to be able to maintain and grow their trading relations. No member of the Committee would want to see that.

An example of that power are the Electromagnetic Compatibility Regulations 2016 as covered by the mutual recognition agreement that the EU has with the United States, which reduces regulatory barriers to trade for goods such as microwave ovens. We seek to replicate the effects of that MRA, allowing businesses and consumers to continue to benefit.

I hope that I have been able to reassure the Committee about the reasoning behind the Government’s approach. I ask hon. Members to withdraw their amendments.

[Stewart Hosie]

May I make an observation? Clearly, my amendment was driven by the lack of clarity on the face of the Bill, compared with the more elegant phraseology in the explanatory notes. The hon. Member for Harrow West spoke about investment treaties and the Minister himself about MRAs, but the fact that investment treaties and MRAs are not included in the definition—although the Minister says that it is wide enough to capture everything—probably tells us that there is an issue of public understanding of the definition of a trade agreement in the Bill.

It might be that better can be done, however it is done, and more clarity provided as to what precisely the Bill intends to cover by way of treaties in the future. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Maria Caulfield]

I am sorry, Sir Graham, but what about amendment 15?

Trade Bill (Sixth sitting)

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 23rd June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Mr Hosie, I am just checking whether you wish to speak.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

No.

[Hon. Members]

Hear, hear.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, but there is no way of knowing whether the UK-Japan agreement will be significantly different, because it is yet to be negotiated. We are trying to get an enhanced agreement with Japan, but that negotiation is under way. It is be impossible to speculate in what way, or to what degree, it will be different from the EU agreement. We are hoping for an enhanced FTA, and we believe there is further to go with Japan on that, so I do not think the hon. Gentleman’s request would be appropriate.

[Stewart Hosie]

Taking what the Minister has said at face value, it is true that reports have been published, but the affirmative resolution process that he spoke about is effectively a “take it or leave it” option. There is no ability for Members to amend what the Government have proposed. If the Government were to use clause 2(6)(a) to modify retained legislation, we would be given no more than the opportunity to take or leave something that may look considerably different from the pre-existing arrangement we had through the European Union.

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, and I plan to come to constraints on that power shortly. He rightly said that on the face of it, the power is broad, but there are significant constraints on its use. We must not forget that the continuity agreements are already in effect, and have already been scrutinised through previous processes in both the Commons and the Lords.

I draw the Committee’s attention to our track record. Of the 20 signed continuity agreements passed through CRAG, their lordships have recommended six for the attention of Parliament, most recently the UK-Morocco association agreement on 9 March 2020. As I have said, not a single one of those debates carried a motion of regret. Due to the limited scope of the continuity agreements for which we intend to use the clause 2 power and the existing opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny, the scrutiny procedure set out by the Opposition in new clause 5, to which I will turn in due course, would be disproportionate and unnecessary. That consequently means that amendment 4 is unnecessary.

I will now turn to amendment 5, which would seek to bring new FTAs within the scope of the Bill. The Government are only seeking a power in this Bill to ensure the continuity of trading relations with our existing partners, with whom we previously traded as a member of the EU. The Bill is not, and never was in its previous form, a vehicle to implement agreements with partners, such as the USA, that did not have a trade agreement with the EU before 31 January 2020.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

I was being very generous in saying that my door was open, but it is not open to discuss the content of the current negotiations with the US. That, of course, is a matter—in the proper way—for statements to Parliament, but that is a live negotiation, so what may or may not be in that negotiation is probably a matter for that negotiation.

We laid out our negotiation objectives, in a document that I commend to the hon. Gentleman, on 2 March. It lays out our objectives in the talks, which are live at the moment, so it would be inappropriate for me to go down that road. However, my door remains open to having further discussions with all the Opposition parties about the scrutiny of future free trade agreements.

[Stewart Hosie]

I think the Minister is inadvertently getting to the nub of the concerns of many people both in Parliament and outside. It is all very well him saying, “We have published this, and we have made these statements to Parliament”, but does he not recognise that simply publishing what are no more than heads of terms for negotiations, and then updates that say “Everything’s going swimmingly”, really does not cut the mustard?

[Greg Hands]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention and I am glad that he made it, because I will take him back five years to a very interesting negotiation that I had with his friend, John Swinney, which was a negotiation between the UK Government and the Scottish Government. It related to the Scottish fiscal framework: how exactly Scotland’s finances and support from Westminster would work in coming years. We—John Swinney and I—agreed that it was a negotiation between two Governments, and it was not appropriate to publish text during the course of the negotiation. We would both provide general updates on the progress of the negotiation, rather than constant updates on text. That approach led to us getting a good agreement between the UK Government and the Scottish Government. I think both Governments were not entirely satisfied with it, but both could live with it. That shows the way forward, rather than publishing after each negotiation round, or mid-negotiation, what the latest text or approach is.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gareth Thomas]

I do not intend to press the matter to a vote, in the interests of time. I am not convinced by the Government’s argument, and we may return to the matter at Report stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stewart Hosie]

I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 2, page 2, line 33, at end insert—

“(6A) No regulations may be made under subsection (1) by a Minister of the Crown, so far as they contain provision which would be within the devolved competence of the Scottish Ministers (within the meaning given in paragraph 6 of Schedule 1), unless the Scottish Ministers consent.

(6B) No regulations may be made under subsection (1) by a Minister of the Crown, so far as they contain provision which would be within the devolved competence of the Welsh Ministers (within the meaning given in paragraph 7 of Schedule 1), unless the Welsh Ministers consent.

(6C) No regulations may be made under subsection (1) by a Minister of the Crown, so far as they contain provision which would be within the devolved competence of a Northern Ireland department (within the meaning given in paragraph 8 of Schedule 1), unless a Northern Ireland devolved authority (within the meaning of paragraph 9 of Schedule 1) gives consent.”

This amendment would ensure that the consent of a devolved government is required for regulations under section 2(1) if those regulations contain matters which are within the remit of the devolved government.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 16—Role of Joint Ministerial Committee—

“(1) The Joint Ministerial Committee is to be a forum—

(a) for discussing—

(i) the terms upon which the United Kingdom is to commence negotiations with respect to any international trade agreement;

(ii) proposals to amend retained EU law for the purposes of regulations made under section 1 or section 2;

(b) for seeking a consensus on the matters set out in subsection (1)(a) between Her Majesty’s Government and the other members of the Joint Ministerial Committee.

(2) Before Her Majesty’s Government concludes an international trade agreement, the Secretary of State must produce a document for consideration by the Joint Ministerial Committee setting out—

(a) Her Majesty’s Government’s objectives and strategy in negotiating and concluding an international trade agreement;

(b) the steps Her Majesty’s Government intends to take to keep the Joint Ministerial Committee informed of progress in reaching an international trade agreement;

(c) the steps Her Majesty’s Government intends to take to consult each member of the Joint Ministerial Committee before entering into an international trade agreement and for taking the views of each member into account.

(3) Before concluding an international trade agreement the Secretary of State must produce a document setting out the terms of the proposed agreement for consideration by the Joint Ministerial Committee.

(4) In this section, ‘the Joint Ministerial Committee’ means the body set up in accordance with Supplementary Agreement A of the Memorandum of Understanding on Devolution, between Her Majesty’s Government, the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee.”

[Stewart Hosie]

Although it was not my intention to press any of our amendments or new clauses to a vote, such has been the public support for new clause 12 on the NHS that it is my intention, if and when we reach that stage of the debate—perhaps on Thursday afternoon —to divide the Committee. I am sorry to leave it so late to advise the Committee of that, but this is the first opportunity I have had to do so.

Amendment 8 relates to the powers of the devolved Administrations, or, more accurately, the ability of the UK Government to make regulations under subsection (1), which makes provisions within devolved competencies, without the consent of Scottish or Welsh Ministers or a Northern Irish devolved authority. It certainly strikes us as fundamental that, if we are to respect the devolved settlement in the UK, Ministers must gain the consent of the devolved Administrations before making changes to regulations that directly affect them, possibly negatively or in a way that runs counter to their policy objectives.

I am aware that the previous Trade Bill from 2017 to 2019 made provision for regulation-making powers to be available to the UK Government and the devolved Administrations within areas of devolved competence. That version of the Trade Bill contained a provision that prohibited devolved Administrations from using powers to modify retained direct EU legislation or any EU law retained by virtue of section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 in ways that would be inconsistent with any UK Government modifications to retained direct legislation or EU law, even in devolved areas. As a result, the Scottish Government could not recommend giving consent to the previous Bill, and the Scottish Parliament’s Finance and Constitution Committee supported that position.

That Trade Bill did not complete its passage through the House, as Parliament was dissolved and the Bill therefore fell. The good news is that those provisions have been removed entirely from the reintroduced Trade Bill. However, there remains no statutory obligation for the UK Government even to consult, let alone to seek the consent of, Scottish Ministers before exercising the powers in the Bill in devolved areas.

During the partial proceedings on the previous Trade Bill, the UK Government made a commitment to avoid using the powers in devolved areas without consulting, and ideally obtaining the consent of, Scottish Ministers. The then Minister of State for Trade Policy at the Department of International Trade, the right hon. Member for Bournemouth West (Conor Burns), restated that commitment in a letter to Ivan McKee, the Scottish Government Minister, on 18 March, the day before this Bill was introduced. I asked on Second Reading whether those non-legislative commitments still stood, and I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that today.

I know that the Minister is aware of those commitments, but I suspect that many other Committee members may not be. The non-legislative commitments I refer to are as follows. The first is that UK Government Ministers will not normally use the powers conferred by the Bill in devolved areas without Scottish and other devolved Ministers’ consent, and that they will never do so without consulting them. The second is that the UK Government will consult the Scottish Government and other devolved Administrations before extending the sunset for the power in clause 2—that is, before extending the period during which clause 2 powers can be used under the Bill.

The third is that in relation to the Trade Remedies Authority—the TRA—the Secretary of State will notify the devolved Administrations of decisions to initiate a trade investigation that will have a particular impact on the devolved nation. The fourth is that the Secretary of State will notify the devolved Administrations of the TRA’s recommendations to the Secretary of State at the same time as consulting other Government Departments, so that they can feed in their views. The fifth is that the devolved Administrations can proactively submit to the TRA any information that they consider relevant to an investigation. The final commitment is that the Secretary of State will seek the devolved Administrations’ suggestions on the optimal way of recruiting TRA non-executive members with regional knowledge, skills and experience.

I hope the Minister can confirm that those non-legislative commitments still stand. That would be particularly helpful. That would not remove the obvious need for an amendment of this kind, to ensure that devolved Governments have an input in statute to changes that directly affect them, and that, at the very least, consent is sought and received before such changes are proceeded with.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Hands]

I welcome the opportunity to discuss the important issues raised in the amendments, which I think are fundamentally on different topics from those that we have dealt with for much of today. There is significant common ground between the Government and the Opposition parties. I welcome the hon. Member for Dundee East to the debate, for his first contribution today. It was noticeable that he chose not to take part in the chaos that ensued earlier when the main Opposition party’s Front Benchers struggled with whether they are for or against the Canada agreement and so on. He wisely decided to sit that one out.

Under the UK constitution, the negotiation of international trade agreements is, as I have already made clear, a prerogative power of the UK Government. It is also a reserved matter, where the UK Government act on behalf of the whole UK. When exercising that reserved power, the Government have made clear that they will deliver trade agreements that benefit all parts of the UK—I have already referred to the scoping assessment for the US deal, showing that Scotland would be the nation or region of the UK that benefited most—unleashing the potential of businesses from all four countries of the United Kingdom.

I recognise the important role that the devolved Administrations can and should play in that endeavour, not only as representatives of their respective nations’ interest, but because we know our trade deals will interact with areas of devolved competence. As such, my Department has worked and will continue to work closely with the DAs on our trade policy.

Turning to new clause 16, I will explain why I think it is unnecessary and impractical, although the principle of engagement behind it is one that I share. The new clause seeks to create a statutory role for a joint committee of the UK Government and the devolved Administrations as a forum to discuss trade policy, but such an arrangement is already in place.

During the passage of the Trade Bill 2017-19, the previous Secretary of State for Trade, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), committed to establishing a new bespoke ministerial forum for trade with the devolved Administrations, in recognition of the importance of this relationship. That forum had its inaugural meeting in January and meets regularly to discuss our approach to trade negotiations, including key areas such as our objectives for the US trade agreement.

I am also happy to put on record my commitment to continuing to work closely with the devolved Administrations at all stages of trade negotiations, not only through the ministerial forum for trade, but via bilateral ad hoc engagement to reflect the sometimes fast-paced nature of trade negotiations. Indeed, I spoke about the US free trade agreement with all my counterparts in the devolved Administrations last month and have also recently written about the Trade Bill and other trade policy issues.

My former ministerial colleague, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood) travelled to Belfast in February to meet colleagues in the Northern Ireland Executive to discuss trade policy. For the benefit of the hon. Member for Dundee East, I restate the commitments made by my right hon. Friend, when he was a Minister, in his March letter to the Scottish Minister Ivan McKee.

In short, we are already delivering the engagement envisaged by proposed new clause, and we have achieved that while continuing to observe the important constitutional principles enshrined in the devolution settlements. In contrast, this proposed new clause would give the devolved Administrations a statutory role in the reserved area of international trade negotiations, which would be constitutionally inappropriate.

Nor is this proposed new clause practical. It would lock us and the DAs into prescribed ways of working under the existing intergovernmental memorandum of understanding, a document last updated in 2013. It would constrain our ability to develop and adapt bespoke engagement mechanisms as we embark on negotiating our first UK trade agreements for more than a generation.

Turning to amendment 8, the powers created by this legislation will be used for the purpose of transitioning trade agreements with those countries that the UK had agreements with through its membership of the EU. That will ensure certainty, continuity and stability in our trade and investment relationships for businesses, citizens and trading partners in all parts of the UK.

As parts of these agreements touch on devolved matters, this legislation will create concurrent powers. We have sought to put in place concurrent powers to provide greater flexibility in how transitional agreements are implemented, allowing each devolved Administration to implement the agreements independently in some cases, while also allowing the UK Government to legislate on a UK-wide basis where it makes practical sense to do so. This approach permits greater administrative efficiency, reducing the volume of legislation brought through the UK Parliament and through the devolved legislatures.

I recognise that the devolved Administrations and members of this Committee seek reassurance that those powers will be used appropriately. The Government have already made clear that we will not normally use them to legislate within devolved areas without the consent of the relevant devolved Administration or Administrations, and never without consulting them first. I am, of course, happy to restate that commitment here.

It is not appropriate, however, to put that commitment on a statutory footing, as, like new clause 16, it would give the devolved Administrations a statutory role in the reserved area of international trade, undermining the important constitutional principles enshrined in the devolution settlements. We recognise that the technical implementation of international obligations in devolved areas is a devolved matter. However, as I have explained, the decision on which international obligations the UK enters into is a reserved matter and a prerogative power exercisable only by the UK Government. This rightly ensures that the UK Government can speak with a single voice under international law, providing certainty for our negotiating partners and the strongest possible negotiating position for the whole of the UK, for the benefit of all of the UK.

A statutory consent provision in the Bill would in effect give the devolved Administrations a veto over a reserved matter. This would be highly constitutionally inappropriate and could lead to a situation where international agreements applied in some parts of the UK but not others. This would be a fundamental weakening of our Union and the long-established principle that in the matter of international relations the UK Government negotiate for all parts of the UK.

Additionally, placing the commitment on a statutory footing could open us up to convoluted and lengthy procedures in which the courts were asked to determine in minute detail what was reserved and what was devolved. This is disproportionate and would create significant uncertainty for UK businesses, undermining the fundamental purpose of the Bill, which is to maximise certainty and continuity of trading arrangements. Our commitment to not normally legislate in areas of devolved competence without consent, and never without consultation, strikes the proper balance between providing sufficient reassurance to the devolved Administrations while preserving international relations as a reserved matter. It is a sincere commitment that we will honour, as we have honoured the commitments made to the devolved Administrations on the Trade Bill 2017-19.

For example, we committed to seeking suggestions from the devolved Administrations on the optimal way of recruiting non-executive members for the Trade Remedies Authority, which we will discuss on Thursday, with regional knowledge, skills and experience, and we fulfilled that earlier this year.

Our new independent trade policy absolutely calls for engagement with the devolved Administrations and respect for the important role that they can and should play, but it does not call for fundamental shifts in the nature of devolution or the weakening of powers that Parliament agreed should remain reserved to the UK Government. We have worked collaboratively with all the DAs to ensure that the Bill enables us to transition arrangements in a way that delivers for the whole UK. Our existing commitments, which I have restated today, provide sufficient reassurance to the devolved Administrations on the issues covered by the amendments. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Welsh Government have recommended consent to the relevant clauses of the Bill.

I hope I have been able to satisfy hon. Members that we have recognised and met their objectives in this amendment and that the hon. Member for Dundee East will withdraw it.

[Stewart Hosie]

I thank the Minister for reconfirming the non-legislative commitments made by his predecessor in his letter to Ivan McKee. That has genuinely helped. However, the Minister falls back on the argument that bespoke powers are better than a permanent credible structure. I disagree. I think a permanent credible structure provides more stability and certainty than the bespoke ad hoc use of powers and discussions from time to time. However, in the current devolved process, I recognise that international treaties are reserved matters. I absolutely understand and respect that, but he knows as well as anyone who might be listening that the interface of the intersection between an international trade treaty and a devolved competence might be fairly high. That is all the more reason for structured statutory formal engagement rather than an ad hoc bespoke process, which may or may not satisfy one or more parties, or one or more of the nations, in the UK about the Government’s actions over a given international trade agreement.

Although I do not intend to press the matter to a vote, and I thank the Minister sincerely for the commitments he has restated, there is a fundamental difference of opinion on the bespoke ad hoc approach being suggested and a formal statutory structure, and I am sure we will return to that theme on Report. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.— (Maria Caulfield.)

Trade Bill (Seventh sitting)

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 25th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Thank you, Mr Thomas. I remind you that the debate is on clause 2 stand part. You can speak to new clause 18, but you are not moving it at this stage.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I start by addressing new clause 22 in the name of my friends from Plaid Cymru. In one regard, it seeks to do something similar to our amendment 8, which the Committee has already debated: to lay down in statute respect for devolution. We witness that in (c), (d) and (e), which would require motions relating to a ministerial statement to be approved by the Senedd, the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly prior to regulations being made to implement an international trade agreement. New clause 22 would also, at (a) and (b), empower Parliament by requiring a statement on the terms of such an agreement to be approved in the House of Commons and a take-note motion passed in the other place.

That is eminently sensible. However, I suspect that the Minister will say it is not necessary. He may suggest that it is not necessary because international agreements, including trade agreements, and the decisions to implement them are reserved matters. There is some merit in that. He may also make the case, as he did on Tuesday, that it is better if the UK speaks with a single, if not a united, voice in order to give our negotiating and trading partners certainty about what a deal may or may not deliver.

That, however, is rather to miss the point, as the hon. Member for Harrow West said. We know that some sectors or industries are disproportionately important to the economies of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, compared with their importance to the UK economy as a whole. I cannot remember the precise numbers, but it has been suggested on multiple occasions that the white fish industry is 10 times more important to the Scottish economy than it is to the UK economy as a whole. There are clearly sectors that are vital.

It is equally the case—this is probably accepted now—that modern trade agreements are by and large not about quotas and tariffs; they are about regulation, conformance and product safety. They have the ability to impinge directly on the reserved competencies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It is, therefore, sensible that we understand and respect why my friends from Plaid Cymru and others seek not just to empower both Houses of Parliament in the decision-making process on implementing an international trade agreement, but to give statutory voice to the devolved nations to ensure their legitimate interests are properly protected.

I turn to clause 2 stand part. I accept what the Minister said about the Bill being primarily about rolling over the pre-existing trade agreements that we had by dint of our very successful membership of the European Union, but I also take on board the serious point made by the hon. Member for Harrow West. He said that the Queen’s Speech described a Bill to facilitate trade, not just roll-over agreements. He also talked about the long title, which says that the Bill will

“Make provision about the implementation of international trade agreements”.

That is rather wider than negotiating and implementing roll-over arrangements only.

In the previous debate, we began to touch on some of the key flaws in clause 2 that run to the heart of this legislation. As I said on Second Reading and in my introductory remarks last week, clause 2(6)(a) allows for the Government to make provision

“modifying retained direct principal EU legislation or primary legislation that is retained EU law”,

which runs to the heart of people’s concerns. Even if I accept—and, by and large, I do—that the provision is designed to roll over our current deals, the ability to modify in that way may well mean that we end up with an agreement that is substantially different from the one we started with.

That is a concern to me. Although the Minister has said there are restrictions on how the modification process can be used, subsection (6)(a), (b), (c) and (d) allows for the modification of retained EU legislation or primary law. It confers functions on the Secretary of State or any other person, including conferring discretion. It allows for the delegation of function, and for civil penalties to be introduced for failing to comply with regulations. The only restriction in subsection (6) is the restriction on the power to make subordinate legislation. I will have to check Hansard carefully, because I think the Minister spoke about amending secondary legislation in the previous debate. That would not be possible under this restriction, but it is the only restriction in terms of the ability to modify.

That brings us to the other flaw in clause 2—namely, the five-year or 10-year limit. Subsection (7) says:

“No regulations may be made under subsection (1) after the end of…the period of five years”—

so far, so good—

“or…such other period or periods as are specified in regulations made…in accordance with subsection (8).”

Subsection (8) states:

“Regulations under subsection (7)(b) may not extend the initial five year period…by more than five years.”

This is not simply, as the Minister suggests, to ensure that regulations are up to date. This five-year period and the five-year extension—this 10-year period—actually allows for the modification of principal EU legislation or EU laws under subsection (6), with the exception of the power to make subordinate legislation. That is an extraordinarily wide power that the Government have given themselves—a 10-year period. While I accept that the Bill is principally about rolling over existing deals, the ability to modify in a fundamentally unrestricted way for a period of more than two full Parliaments is an extraordinary power for the UK Government to seek to give themselves.

On that basis, if there is a vote on clause 2 stand part, I will certainly vote against the extension of these discretionary powers to the Government.

[Bill Esterson]

It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair, Mrs Cummins, and we shall continue to enjoy serving under your chairmanship for another 19 minutes. I thank you for your contribution as joint Chair of the Committee.

I rise to speak to new clause 16. I remind the Minister of the point touched on by my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow West on 13 March 2019, when the Minister’s then ministerial colleague—

Trade Bill (Eighth sitting)

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 25th June 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 35, in schedule 4, page 15, leave out lines 27 and 28 and insert—

“3 A person holds office as a member of the TRA for a fixed period of five years from the date of appointment.

3A A person is eligible for renewal of appointment for a further fixed period of five years upon the expiry of the first period.”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 36, in schedule 4 page 16, line 11, at end insert—

“10A A person shall be considered unable or unfit if the Chair is satisfied as regards any of the following matters—

(a) that the person becomes insolvent,

(b) that the person has been convicted of a criminal offence,

(c) that the person is otherwise unable or unfit to discharge the functions of a member or is unsuitable to continue as a member.”

[Stewart Hosie]

Amendment 35 would establish a fixed period of office for members of the TRA and make provision for one further period of office. The reason is rather obvious. Introducing a fixed term would give TRA members greater security of tenure and therefore reinforce their independence and impartiality, as their duration of service could not be—or certainly could not be perceived to be—at ministerial discretion.

Amendment 36 would insert wording stating that a person should be considered unable or unfit if the chair is satisfied regarding any of the following matters: that the member becomes insolvent, has been convicted of a criminal offence or is

“otherwise unable or unfit to discharge the functions of a member or is unsuitable to continue as a member.”

The effect would be to define, to a greater extent at least, the meaning of “unable or unfit” in paragraphs 9 and 10 of schedule 4. Introducing a definition of “unable or unfit” would provide greater legal certainty about the circumstances in which a person may be removed from office as a non-executive or executive member of the TRA.

In keeping with the amendments and new clauses that I have spoken to so far, I do not intend to divide the Committee on amendments 35 or 36, but I ask the Minister to consider carefully how the Government might bring forward amendments at a later stage to deal with the matters of a fixed term for, and legal certainty on dismissal from, the TRA. Doing so would remove the perception that a term on the TRA, or dismissal from it, might be based on any political consideration—a perception that would weaken the credibility of the TRA—and strengthen the independence of that body. That is vital, particularly as the TRA will be invited to consider the vexed issue of some questionable, and potentially illegal, trade practices. The TRA’s credibility will be incredibly important when that particular work is undertaken, especially in the absence of a fully functioning WTO appellate board.

The Government should look again, as the Bill progresses through the other place and on Report, at how a fixed term for members might be introduced and at how legal certainty on dismissal might also be written into the Bill.

[Greg Hands]

Clause 5 will allow the TRA to be established as a new non-departmental public body, and schedule 4 outlines its governance arrangements. Those include detailing how TRA members will be appointed and how the terms and conditions of their appointment will be established. Such provisions should be familiar to those with experience of working with similar bodies.

It is crucial that the right people are appointed as members of the TRA. We are committed to appointing on merit following fair and open competition. That is why we are following standard Cabinet Office guidelines on the appointment of members of the TRA, as set out in the “Governance Code on Public Appointments”, which states that it is usual for Ministers to decide on the length of tenure. The code also sets out

“a strong presumption that no individual should serve more than two terms or serve in any one post for more than ten years”,

other than in exceptional circumstances.

Appointments will be independently regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments to ensure that the rigorous principles of public appointments and the “Governance Code on Public Appointments” are applied. Beyond that, the Government and the TRA will have regard to the need to protect the resilience of the board and to ensure that there is a managed turnover of members now and in the future. That may mean, for example, that it is sensible to make some of the initial appointments to the board shorter than five years to stagger any turnover in membership.

Specifying those details in the contractual terms for each appointment is the best way to ensure the flexibility to get the organisation off to the best start. The role of the TRA chair designate is crucial in shaping and forming the board. It is therefore only right that the Secretary of State does that through the terms and conditions for each role in consultation with the chair designate, rather than binding their hands in legislation. We are working closely with the TRA’s chair designate, Simon Walker, to start the recruitment of the rest of the TRA board members in due course. We will specify the duration of appointments as part of that process.

By contrast, amendment 35 would replace the contractual terms for all TRA members with a fixed statutory period of either five or 10 years, with no provision for any other length of tenure. That would deny the TRA the flexibility that it needs, particularly now when we are trying to ensure the best possible start for the new organisation, but such a rigid approach would be detrimental to its good governance at any time.

Amendment 36 seeks to specify a number of criteria that would deem a member of the TRA board unfit to continue in their position. Schedule 4 already provides for the Secretary of State to remove non-executive members, and for the chair to remove executive members, from the board should they be deemed unable or unfit to carry out the functions of the office. That approach will be familiar to hon. Members from the legislation establishing organisations such as the Competition and Markets Authority.

As with all public appointments, the terms and conditions for the non-executive members of the TRA are being developed in line with the “Code of Conduct for Board Members of Public Bodies”, which clearly sets out the standards expected from those who serve on the boards of non-departmental public bodies. The code provides that members of the board must inform the sponsor Department of any bankruptcy, unspent criminal conviction or disqualification as a company director in advance of appointment, or should any such instances occur during the appointment.

The code does not expressly specify that those issues determine an individual’s fitness to serve on a board or that they should be regarded as grounds for terminating an appointment, but I assure the Committee that the Government consider that that should be the case. That is why the terms and conditions of Simon Walker, the TRA chair designate, provide that the Secretary of State may terminate his appointment in those circumstances. It is very much our expectation that the relevant terms of appointment for other non-executive members will follow a similar approach.

The appointment of executive members is a matter for the TRA chair. It is therefore appropriate that the terms and conditions of their employment are managed by the TRA in a way that enables flexibility, while holding its staff to the necessary standards of integrity and professionalism.

I hope that the demonstrates to the hon. Member for Dundee East that we are establishing the TRA in accordance with the existing codes and in line with the practices adopted in other such bodies. I therefore ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Stewart Hosie]

I have no intention of pressing the amendments. I listened carefully as the Minister rattled through that answer. I have no doubt that, with the exception of the specific point he made about staggering five-year terms at the very beginning, things are being done in line with guidance that has been used previously. However, that does not really answer the point that, because of the ministerial discretion, particularly on the removal of a member, there may still be a perception, real or otherwise, that members can be removed for considerations that are political and nothing to do with their actual unfitness to serve.

While I will not divide the Committee on the amendment, notwithstanding that the Minister read his answer very quickly, the Government may want to seriously consider how these matters are addressed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Bill Esterson]

I beg to move amendment 2, in schedule 4, page 19, line 26, at end insert—

“no later than 1 August of the calendar year in which the last day of the financial year covered by the report falls”.

This amendment would ensure that the Secretary of State must lay the annual report of the Trade Remedies Authority before Parliament within a reasonable time frame.

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Collection of exporter information by HMRC

[Stewart Hosie]

I beg to move amendment 32, page 5, line 4, after “may”, insert

“, following consultation with relevant stakeholders,”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 33, page 5, line 17, at end insert—

“(7) Nothing in any regulations made under subsection (3) may require the disclosure of information or the production of documents which are subject to legal professional privilege.”

Amendment 34, in clause 8, page 5, line 45, at end insert—

“(5A) Nothing in this section authorises the disclosure of information or the production of documents which are subject to legal professional privilege.”

[Stewart Hosie]

The amendment stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey. It would impose a duty on the Treasury to consult relevant stakeholders when making regulations as specified. Those regulations are about the type of information that may be requested by HMRC and how the request is to be made. The reason for this consultation is that it provides an additional layer of scrutiny by stakeholders.

In imposing a duty on the Treasury to consult, we will ensure that any draft statutory instrument is exposed to critical comment from stakeholders in advance, which may improve an instrument and help to avoid future issues when it is going through Parliament. I think this is important, and I am sure that the Minister will recall him and his colleagues serving on many interminable Finance Bills in the days of the last Labour Government, when many people rightly criticised the additional burdens being put on businesses, particularly by the Revenue, to provide information.

If we are going to request information from businesses, trade groups or anyone else, let us ensure that we consult the relevant stakeholders first, to make sure that we are not requesting information that is not held, that we are requesting it in a way in which it is currently collected and that we are not adding an additional layer or an additional burden for business when it is, in some cases perhaps, simply unnecessary.

Amendment 33 is about protecting legal professional privilege. We are concerned that clause 7(1) grants HMRC a very wide discretion indeed to require information. The scope of this provision should be far more clearly defined, to give greater certainty about the extent of information, the anticipated frequency with which it may be requested and the method of data collection. Legal professional privilege and confidentiality are essential in order to safeguard the rule of law and the administration of justice. They permit information that may be communicated between a lawyer and a client without fear of it becoming known to a third party without the clear permission of that client. Many UK statutes already give express protection to legal professional privilege and it is vigorously protected by the courts.

It is also worth pointing out—I am sure the Minister knows this—that the iniquity exception alleviates concerns that legal professional privilege may be used to protect communications between a lawyer and client that have been used for a criminal purpose. Such a purpose removes the protection from communications, allowing them to be targeted using existing powers but not breaching legal professional privilege.

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[Greg Hands]

It is important, as we turn to the data-sharing powers of the Bill, that the Government have a more comprehensive understanding of UK exporters so that our work to build and grow UK export capability is properly targeted at and tailored to those businesses where it will deliver the maximum benefit.

Clause 7 sets out the powers needed for the Government to collect data to establish the number and identity of UK businesses exporting goods and services, particularly smaller businesses and sole traders, who may not be readily identifiable from existing data, but who may need a helping hand from the Government to develop their export potential reaching into existing and new markets. The clause provides the ability for HMRC to collect relevant data by tick boxes on existing tax returns.

Amendment 32 would restrict the Government’s ability to implement new questions to gather data on exporters at speed, by requiring Treasury Ministers to seek further consultations with stakeholders after any necessary engagement has already concluded—it would be, if you like, an additional round of consultation, which we do not think is necessary. Such an amendment would duplicate the administrative burden on stakeholders and, more importantly, delay the availability of data and, by extension, the benefits to businesses.

Amendments 33 and 34 are closely related and concern legal professional privilege, which the hon. Member for Dundee East will know is a long-standing principle that protects the confidentiality of communications between lawyers and their lay clients, and vice versa. It enables lawyers to consult and advise their clients without clients fearing that their information will later have to be disclosed. Indeed, it is a matter of general interest that any person who wishes to consult a lawyer must be free to do so under conditions that ensure uninhibited discussion. That principle is recognised and protected under article 8 of the European convention on human rights.

I can provide an absolute assurance to the Committee that the Government have no intention, either now or in the future, of using these powers to seek or share information that is protected by legal professional privilege. For clause 7, the information that has been requested from exporters is for trade statistics purposes and will be provided voluntarily. The fact that the information is being provided voluntarily is perhaps an indication of the Government’s position in respect of minimising burdens and therefore not requiring privileged information to be disclosed.

Clause 8 allows for the sharing of data that is already held by HMRC for its administrative functions. We are talking about data to be shared that has already been collected. Such information cannot therefore be subject to legal professional privilege, as it has already been provided to HMRC.

I will take this opportunity to remind hon. Members that the clauses also provide significant assurances on the collection, handling and processing of information collected under the powers. The data-sharing powers in the Bill are permissive, so all instances of data sharing must be approved by HMRC, which acts as guardian of the data. There are criminal penalties for any unauthorised sharing of data under the existing Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, which apply in respect to the data shared under clause 8. Nothing in the clause permits the disclosure of information that is not otherwise permitted in data protection laws, including the Data Protection Act 2018 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.

I hope the clarification and assurances given provide the hon. Gentleman with the reassurance he is seeking in respect of legal professional privilege. On that basis, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Stewart Hosie]

I thank the Minister for his commitment in relation to legal professional privilege, confirming that information can be shared between a client and a lawyer and, unless in the course of a criminal investigation, is completely protected. That is a good commitment to receive.

I also understand what the Minister said about information being collected to provide trade statistics on a voluntary basis. That is helpful, but I was slightly concerned at the beginning when he spoke about trying to identify the number and identity of exporters—one would have thought that the Government already knew that, and it is slightly concerning if they do not. It might be useful to understand what gaps there are in the Government’s understanding of what organisations export, what they export and to whom, but that is for another day. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 8 to 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

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[Bill Esterson]

Of course my hon. Friend is right. It is not a question just about the US. It is about other countries with different food production, safety and animal welfare standards, where agriculture will be part of the agreements. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reminding us that that is an important part of what we are discussing. You would of course have told me if I had been out of order, Sir Graham, and got me to sit down, but you did not, so I was not.

I remind the Committee again that there are real concerns about the impact on human health of using antibiotics and growth hormones. That is in addition to the impact on animal welfare, and the contribution that things such as antibiotics make to the potential for a growth in problems such as zoonotic diseases, and diseases crossing species—something we should all be extremely concerned about in the middle of a pandemic that probably results from exactly that.

The hon. Member for Tiverton and Honiton (Neil Parish) said in debate on the Agriculture Bill that he had been promised that the issue would be covered in the Trade Bill. He recognised that the Agriculture Minister who made the promise was possibly not in a position to make it. He said:

“We are being led down the garden path—we really are”.—[Official Report, 13 May 2020; Vol. 676, c. 300.]

Will the Minister tell us whether his hon. Friend has been led up the garden path? That is how it looks to most people out there, as well as to us in Committee.

[Stewart Hosie]

I want to speak to my new clause 11. Trade deals can put pressure on food standards and lead to the importation of food of a low standard. We know, for example, that the US Administration wants the UK to lower its food and animal welfare standards  precisely to allow the export of products currently banned in the UK. The new clause includes a ban on the importation of food produced to standards lower than those currently applying in the UK.

The US and other countries have far lower animal welfare standards and adopt practices that are illegal in the UK for health and environmental reasons, such as the production of chlorine-washed chicken and hormone-fed beef; use various pesticides outlawed in the UK; and produce genetically modified crops, which are completely outlawed in Scotland. We believe that the quality of Scotland’s food and drink produce, and indeed that from elsewhere in the UK, as well as the standards of production, are essential to retaining our established international reputation in those products.

[Drew Hendry]

Is the new clause not an opportunity for the UK Government to do the right thing and prove to the public that they are not trading away food standards and Scotland’s international reputation to the highest bidder? If they do not accept it, will people not justifiably conclude that that is part of their plan?

[Stewart Hosie]

I think people are deeply concerned. No matter how many times Ministers give assurances from the Dispatch Box or elsewhere—Conservative MPs know this—because of what is said by our negotiating partners, there is deep concern among the public and, in particular, those who work in agriculture about standards that may be reduced. My hon. Friend is therefore absolutely right that by accepting various amendments or new clauses, the Government have an opportunity to cement our standards and rule out in negotiations the reduction of standards rather than simply by words in a speech.

New clause 12 in effect does two things: it affirms the UK’s rights and obligations under the agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in appendix 1A of the WTO agreement; and it prohibits the import of food into the UK if standards in the exporting country are lower than those in force here. I do not think there is anything contentious about that, nor do many people in the real world. I suspect the Minister will not be at all surprised that various campaign groups, including Global Justice Now and the Trade Justice Moment, support such objectives.

The list of supporters for such measures is deep and wide. Scottish Land & Estates said:

“Scotland’s producers need guarantees from the UK Government that domestic production and environmental standards are upheld as part of future international trade deals. Our extremely high environmental and food safety standards are amongst our key selling points, and this must be protected after we leave the EU to ensure we don’t find ourselves in a ‘race to the bottom’.”

As NFU Scotland has said that it is concerned that the UK Government’s approach to future trade policy creates the potential for the importation of agri-food into the UK produced to an inequivalent and uncompetitive standard of production, one would think the UK Government should listen. The new clause would ensure that the UK Government had a duty to protect the quality of domestic food supply by ensuring that imported foodstuffs are held to the same standards as domestic foodstuffs are currently. I commend it to the Committee.

[Greg Hands]

I turn to new clauses 9, 11 and 17. I am aware of the strength of feeling from colleagues on both sides of the Committee on this important issue. I spoke about the commitments the Prime Minister gave in his Greenwich speech to upholding high standards, which were also in our manifesto.

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Members, however, should consider the unintended consequences of this new clause. It would force us to effectively ban safe food imports that meet our current import standards but do not follow the same production methods as we have in the UK. That is crucial to understand. It would significantly disrupt UK food supply chain resilience, commercial relationships and bilateral relations with partner countries.

[Stewart Hosie]

The wording that the Minister uses is fascinating. We were talking about production standards. He spoke about production methods. Those are not the same thing.

[Greg Hands]

I am happy to have a debate with the hon. Gentleman about the difference between standards and methods, but I am not sure that the difference is that big.

The dictation of our domestic standards to our trading partners might well appear a laudable goal, but the new clause would require them to keep aligned with just seven days’ notice. Subsection (3) of the new clause states that a register

“must be updated within seven days of any amendment to any standard listed in the register.”

Our trading partners’ standards would therefore have to remain dynamically aligned to our domestic production standards with just seven days’ notice. That could have serious consequences for our existing trade flows, let alone anything negotiated in the future.

This is true for the developing world. The beans that we can buy at Waitrose in Fulham—I imagine that they are similar to the ones at Waitrose in Putney, for example—come from Kenya and Egypt. The last time I bought beans was at the weekend. Bananas from the Caribbean might not have production standards that are the same as those in the UK, but they can still meet our import standards.

Those markets would not be able to keep up with our changes. Given just five days’ notice, they would have to dynamically align with whatever the UK decided and, within seven days, make the changes to their domestic production standards. That strikes me as being wholly impractical. The impact of the new clauses could be severe on livelihoods in the developing world. I invite Opposition Members to go and see some of the Kenyan or Egyptian beans being produced and tell some of those workers that, as a consequence of new clause 9, they might well find themselves having to align with UK production standards in the future.

The new clauses might have been drafted with the US in mind, but this is UK law and it would apply to all our trading partners. These measures would likely render inoperable the very continuity agreements we have been discussing and, indeed, potentially prevent a deal with the EU itself. There would be an irony in the UK, through our domestic law, seeking the EU to dynamically align with our standards.

As I said on Tuesday, the UK banned veal crates some 16 years before the EU, and we can take great pride in that; it is a great achievement. The idea that the EU would sign a trade deal with us whereby it would have to commit to dynamic alignment with our standards with just seven days’ notice is highly questionable, to say the least. Members who want continuity with those 40 deals should not vote for these new clauses, nor should those who want a trade deal with the European Union.

New clause 9 would have the unwanted effect of discouraging partners with whom we are yet to sign a continuity agreement from negotiating with us. This Government were elected on a manifesto promise that, in our trade negotiations, we will not compromise on our high environmental protection, animal welfare and food standards, and we will not. Parliament will have significant oversight of any regulations made under this power, and any statutory instruments brought forward will be subject to the affirmative procedure. Given our robust commitment to British food and farming, I ask the hon. Member for Sefton Central to withdraw the new clause.

Like new clause 9, new clause 11 stipulates that all food imported to the UK should be held to the same standards as that which is produced in the UK. The proposal stands in the name of the hon. Member for Dundee East, although I suspect he has the same intentions as the hon. Member for Sefton Central in tabling it. I have already provided assurances that EU import standards, praised by the NFU and others, will be replicated in domestic law at the end of the transition period. Our import requirements include a ban on using artificial growth hormones in domestic and imported products, and any changes to existing legislation would require new legislation to be passed by Parliament.

Given that we have high safety standards in place, and that the wider unintended consequence of the new clause would be to threaten both the resilience of our food supply chains and our opportunity to ensure that we secure continuity for British businesses and customers through our ongoing continuity negotiations, I hope that the hon. Member for Dundee East will not press the new clause.

New clause 17 stipulates that any animal welfare or sentience regulations arising from trade agreements must be aligned with existing commitments in UK and retained EU law. I can assure Members that our world-leading animal welfare standards are at the heart of our continuity negotiations. None of the agreements already signed with 48 countries is inconsistent with existing standards, as the parliamentary reports published alongside those agreements demonstrate. In fact, the UK has some of the most comprehensive animal welfare regulation in the world. We have introduced one of the strictest ivory bans in the world and we have a manifesto commitment to end excessively long journeys for slaughter and fattening. World Animal Protection rated the UK as having the joint-highest animal welfare standards in the world, tied with Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden.

I share Members’ desire to ensure safeguards both for British consumers and for farmers. However, the protections we are already putting in place, coupled with the unintended consequences of the proposals, mean that these measures would be of no benefit. Our manifesto commitment is clear: the Government will stand firm in trade negotiations to support farmers, protect consumers and safeguard standards. I hope that that explanation, alongside the 20 continuity agreements that Parliament ratified, provides reassurance to the Committee that the Government’s commitment to maintaining standards is being delivered. I therefore ask hon. Members not to press their proposals to the vote.

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Brought up, and read the First time.

[Stewart Hosie]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 13—International trade agreements: consent for provision of healthcare services—

“(1) A Minister of the Crown may not, under section 20(1) of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, lay before Parliament a copy of an international trade agreement which makes provision for the supply or provision of healthcare services (including medicines and medical devices) unless each of the devolved authorities has given their consent to that agreement.

(2) ‘Devolved authority’ shall have the meaning given in section 4 of this Act.”

This new clause would ensure that HMG is not able to lay before Parliament a trade agreement which could have an impact on provision of healthcare services without the consent of the devolved administrations.

[Stewart Hosie]

New clause 12 would ensure that the UK Government had a duty to restrict market access to healthcare services, including medicines and medical devices. We tabled the new clause precisely because trade deals have the potential to negatively impact health services. Although the UK Government have repeatedly pledged that the NHS is not on the table in trade negotiations, leaked documents detailing conversations between UK and US negotiators reveal that health services have been discussed, including the US “probing” on the UK’s health insurance system—whatever that means—and that the US has made clear its desire for the UK to change its drugs pricing mechanism.

[Drew Hendry]

Is this not a similar situation to that in the previous debate on food standards? The Government could easily make a commitment to rule out these things—to do the right thing and show the public that the NHS and medicines are not at risk. They could reassure people by putting that in the Bill and ensuring it does not happen. Otherwise, they are just saying to the public, “This may well be part of the plan.”

[Stewart Hosie]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. As in the previous debate, the Minister has said that there will be no compromise on standards. I do not doubt for one second his sincerity, but let us just put it in the Bill so that everyone is absolutely satisfied. In that sense, my hon. Friend is absolutely right—let us rule it out in legislation.

[Andrew Griffith (Arundel and South Downs) (Con)]

I would love the hon. Gentleman to expand on his theory of harm in respect of health services. If ever there was an example of the global effect of the law of comparative advantage, it is the advances in modern healthcare. There is a remedy available to him should he wish to remove himself from the benefits of diagnostics from Düsseldorf, biogenomics from Boston or pharmaceutical projects from Dublin. There is a mechanism known as a living will, whereby he can instruct his heirs and his family to ensure that he is at no point treated by any of those marvels of modern healthcare and that he can go back to experiencing the benefits of herbal potions and remedies and all those other forms of modern medicine that he would seem to prefer by cutting himself off from the benefits of free trade with the world.

[Stewart Hosie]

I have benefited from the national health service; indeed, it has probably saved my life on a number of occasions.

I have no doubt that some of the drugs purchased are still under patent by private companies. Some of the diagnostic testing machinery was made in Germany. Nobody, but nobody, is talking about restricting any of our health services in terms of purchasing. We are talking about marketisation, which has failed when it comes to the health service.

The new clause has a specific carve-out for the NHS and all health-relevant services regulation, making it illegal for the Government to conclude a trade agreement that altered the way NHS services are provided, liberalised further or opened up to foreign investment by dint of a trade agreement—not by a policy change, not by part of the NHS somewhere on these islands saying it would be a good thing to do, but by dint of a trade agreement being forced on us from somewhere else.

On negative listing, these clauses—we know this from other examples—require all industries to be liberalised in trade agreements unless there are specific carve-outs. The reason this is an issue is that it is not always easy to define what services count as health services and what are more general. For example, digital services may seem irrelevant to health, but NHS data management and GP appointments are increasingly digital. Negative lists therefore make it harder for Governments to regulate and provide health services for the common good. No-standstill clauses are ratchet clauses, because these provisions mean that after the trade deal has been signed parties are not allowed to reduce the level of liberalisation beyond what it was at the point of signature. That can make it difficult to reverse NHS privatisation.

Let me give an example of where had a standstill or ratchet clause been in effect, it would have caused real harm. In Scotland, cleaning in hospitals was historically carried out by private contractors, and the rate of hospital-acquired infections rose dramatically. The SNP Government took the decision to return it to NHS cleaners, and the rate of those infections fell dramatically. Imagine if an investor-state dispute settlement had been in place, if a ratchet clause had been in place—we would have been unable to do that, and if people had died from hospital-acquired infections because the Government were not allowed to take the public health measure of returning cleaning to the public sector, it would have been an absolute scandal.

I mentioned ISDS. There should be no ISDS clauses in trade agreements which only allow private investors to challenge Government policy when, for example, it affects their profits. Failure to abide by those clauses can result in legal challenge from trade partners or, if there is a separate ISDS clause, a challenge from private investors. I have used a number of examples on a number of occasions, and I will use another today very briefly. It is from April 1997. The Canadian Parliament banned the import and transportation of the petrol additive MMT because of concerns that it posed a significant public health risk. The Ethyl Corporation, the additives manufacturer, sued the Canadian Government under chapter 11 of the North American free trade agreement, an ISDS-type arrangement, for $251 million to cover losses of what it called the expropriation of both its production plant and its good reputation. That was upheld by the Canadian dispute settlement panel, and the Canadian Government repealed the ban and paid that corporation $15 million in compensation. That was over a petrol additive that was deemed to have a negative impact on public health. We believe it is quite wrong for large corporations to use these ISDS-type arrangements to sue Governments simply for taking steps to protect the wellbeing of citizens or for simply enacting public health measures which they believe to be right and for which they may well have an electoral mandate.

The new clause also instructs that there should be no changes to drugs pricing mechanisms. We know that the US, for example, has stated that it wishes to challenge the drug pricing model which keeps prices low for ordinary people in the UK. This could also happen through intellectual property and non-patent exclusivities. We need to be very alive to that. It would be bad news for patients, taxpayers, health boards and trusts around the country. In our judgment, trade agreements should never be used to facilitate that.

Our new clause 13 is an adjunct; we simply sought to add a different degree of protection for the health services in the nations, and to ensure that the Government would not be able to lay before Parliament a trade agreement that would have an impact on the provision of healthcare services without the consent of the devolved Administrations. That is secondary to the substantial points we are trying to make and the protections that we wish to put in place with new clause 12.

[Gareth Thomas]

Given the extra protections that new clause 12 would lock into law to keep the NHS safe from future trade agreements’ effectively pushing higher pharmaceutical prices or further marketisation of the NHS, we will happily support the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Dundee East. Indeed, his new clause supplements the protections that amendment 12, had it been agreed to earlier in our proceedings, would have put in place to protect our public services more generally.

We, too, are aware of the leaked documents that the hon. Gentleman referred to, revealing that discussions have already taken place in the UK-US trade talks about possible measures that the American pharmaceutical industry might want, clearly supported by Donald Trump’s chief negotiator, that would effectively push prices up. Given that we have substantially lower pharmaceutical drug costs than the US, the fact that the Americans are continuing to push such measures is profoundly worrying.

Ministers have said that the NHS is not on the table in the UK-US talks and, like the hon. Gentleman, I take that at face value, but it is worth saying that until the text of a trade agreement is published, we will have no way of knowing for sure what is in it. The precedent of the EU-Canada deal does not give reassurance in that respect, as it used the negative list approach to services liberalisation, to which he referred. The Minister will remember the considerable concern that Germany had chosen to add in carve-outs for the whole of its national health service, whereas the UK had not taken such a comprehensive approach.

The NHS Confederation and The BMJ have both published a series of concerns, setting out the ways the NHS could be undermined by a UK-US trade deal. One concern that is highlighted, which again the hon. Member for Dundee East referenced, was the use of ISDS—investor-state dispute settlement—provisions. Again, investor-state dispute settlement provisions were included in the EU-Canada deal, which Ministers count as a roll-over deal.

It would be helpful if the Minister would embrace the spirit of these new clauses, support new clause 12 being added the Bill and, in his wind-up remarks, confirm that he will not push a negative listing approach in a UK-Canada specific deal and that there will not be ISDS provisions in such a deal.

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However, that is not the issue here. What is more important is the fact that our commitment that the NHS will not be on the table applies to the NHS in all parts of the UK, including in the devolved nations. So, I hope that I have provided the hon. Members with some reassurance that the new clauses are therefore unnecessary.

[Stewart Hosie]

When the Minister described the end of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 process, it is a take-it or leave-it option, with no ability for Members to make amendments whatever. I do not think that is satisfactory, to be brutally honest.

As I have said before, I do not question the sincerity of this Minister. When he says that the NHS is not for sale, that no trade agreement has ever affected how the UK deals with its public sector, that the NHS is protected by carve-outs, and that drug pricing and other things are not on the table, I think he is being sincere. But if we put in place a mechanism whereby those protections are not in the Bill, it does not take a huge leap of imagination to imagine some Trump-supporting figure coming up through the ranks of the Tory party and sitting in a chair just like the Minister’s, and making rather different decisions.

So, on that basis, I am afraid that I have to press for a Division on new clause 12.

Question put that the clause be read a Second time.

Trade Bill

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Monday 20th July 2020 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. In case the House is not already aware, after the next speaker, we will have a time limit of four minutes on Back-Bench speeches, which, of course, does not apply to Mr Stewart Hosie.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

There are four significant flaws with this piece of legislation: the absence of devolved consent, real protections for the NHS, the preservation of food standards and meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. I believe that our amendment 10 and new clauses 7 and 8 deal with the first three, and that new clause 4, tabled by the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly), deals with the final issue.

I wish to speak to amendment 10 and new clauses 7 and 8, which are in my name, and I will start, slightly in reverse order, with amendment 10. It relates to the powers of the devolved Administrations, or as I said in Committee,

“more accurately, the ability of the UK Government to make regulations under subsection (1), which makes provisions within devolved competencies, without the consent of Scottish or Welsh Ministers or a Northern Irish devolved authority”––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2020; c. 237.]—

granting consent. It strikes me as fundamental that if we are to genuinely respect the devolved settlement in the UK, Ministers must self-evidently gain the consent of the devolved Administrations before making changes to regulations that directly affect them, possibly in a negative way, or in a way that runs counter to those Governments’ policy objectives.

I am aware that in the previous Trade Bill, under consideration between 2017 and 2019, there was a problematic provision for regulation-making powers to be available to the UK Government, but the good news is that those provisions have been removed from this Trade Bill. It is the case, however, that there remains no statutory obligation for the UK Government to even consult, let alone seek the consent of, Scottish Ministers before exercising the powers in this Bill in devolved areas.

I know that the Minister has said that these powers would not normally be used without seeking consent, and his predecessor did offer a number of a non-legislative commitments to the Scottish Trade Minister Ivan McKee in March. I am genuinely pleased that the Minister, during the Bill Committee, committed to honouring those non-legislative commitments. He said:

“I restate the commitments made by my right hon. Friend, when he was a Minister, in his March letter to the Scottish Minister Ivan McKee”,

and that is genuinely very welcome. However, he went on to say, in opposing what was then amendment 8 and similar Labour new clauses that dealt with the same issues:

“In short, we are already delivering the engagement envisaged by proposed new clause, and we have achieved that while continuing to observe the important constitutional principles enshrined in the devolution settlements.”––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2020; c. 240-241.]

I disagree. Giving the UK Government the ability to directly effect devolved powers without the statutory requirement to even seek consent is not observing the devolved settlement.

[Jim Shannon]

Our trading ability is something that concerns each and every one of us across the whole United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Would the hon. Gentleman be prepared to support new clause 4, which would give the authority to the devolved Assemblies and the Scottish Parliament, and further, would mean that proposals came to the Floor of the House for ratification? Surely supporting new clause 4 would be a step to making that happen.

[Stewart Hosie]

I am more than happy to support new clause 4, not least because I have signed it, but it is a slightly different thing.  Ensuring parliamentary scrutiny, about which I shall say a little more later, is important, but it is different from the seeking of consent from those Administrations whose policy direction may be affected by a UK Government decision.

When we debated the identical new clause in Committee, the Minister went on to say that

“this proposed new clause would give the devolved Administrations a statutory role in the reserved area of international trade negotiations, which would be constitutionally inappropriate.”––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2020; c. 241.]

He was partly right, in that it would give the devolved Administrations a statutory role, but only in so far as the provisions of a trade deal affected devolved competences. That is not constitutionally inappropriate; it is a matter of good administration and respect.

The Minister’s key argument against what was proposed was that it was not “practical”. He said:

“It would lock us and the”—

devolved Administrations—

“into prescribed ways of working under the existing intergovernmental memorandum of understanding, a document last updated in 2013.”––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2020; c. 241.]

Well, that may be an argument for revisiting the MOU, and it might also be an argument to say that the Government should adhere to the terms of the MOU under any circumstances, but it is a strange argument for opposing this amendment. Surely it is better to base negotiations on an agreed framework, or better still an agreed statutory framework, rather than to leave them to chance, make up the rules on the hoof and give an impression of UK Government acting in an arbitrary way.

The Minister’s key argument was as follows:

“As parts of these agreements touch on devolved matters, this legislation will create concurrent powers. We have sought to put in place concurrent powers to provide greater flexibility in how transitional agreements are implemented”.

So far so good; however, he went on to say:

“This approach permits greater administrative efficiency, reducing the volume of legislation brought through the UK Parliament and through the devolved legislatures.”––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2020; c. 241.]

It cannot be right that the UK Government intend to legislate, or can legislate, in areas of devolved competence for the sake of administrative efficiency. There are far bigger and wider principles at stake than that.

Let me turn to new clause 7, tabled in my name. We know that trade deals can put pressure on food standards and lead to the importation of low-standard food. For example, the US Administration has made it clear that they want the UK to lower its food and animal welfare standards. The new clause includes a ban on the importation of food that is produced to standards lower than that in the UK. We know that the US and other countries have far lower animal welfare standards and adopt practices—including chlorine-washed chicken, hormone-fed beef and the use of various pesticides and GM crops—that are illegal in the UK for health and environmental reasons. None of that is a great surprise to anyone in the House. We believe that the quality of Scotland’s food and drink produce and, indeed, of food and drink produced elsewhere in the UK, and the related standards, are essential to the maintenance of our established international reputation in those areas.

[Steve Brine]

I wonder whether the people in Scotland, like the people in England and in my constituency in Winchester, might not be way ahead of the politicians. Ultimately, will not the consumer decide? Just recently, we heard Waitrose make it clear that it would not be selling any imported product that was produced to a lower standard than we currently enjoy in this country, with its new boss citing chlorine-washed chicken. I just wonder whether the public might be ahead of us on this already.

[Stewart Hosie]

I want to be careful in how I answer that. I hope the hon. Gentleman understands that perhaps those who can afford to shop in Waitrose—the Minister boasted in Committee that he was Waitrose fan—have a choice; perhaps somebody who is counting every penny and does not have access to anything other than the cheapest food is not in the position to make the same choice.

In effect, new clause 7 would do two things: it would affirm the UK’s rights and obligations under the SPS agreement—that is, the application of the sanitary and phytosanitary measures in annex 1A of the WTO agreement; and it would prohibit the import of food into the UK if standards in the exporting country were lower than those in force in the UK. I do not think there is anything contentious about that.

It is not just campaign groups like the Trade Justice Movement that back this. It is not just Scottish Land and Estates and the National Farmers Union that back measures like this one. The British Medical Association has weighed in, saying:

“The Bill presents an opportunity for the UK to present itself as a global leader on standards on food imports for the benefit of human, animal and plant health, and the environment. To fulfil this opportunity, it is vital that our current high standards are upheld and protected in any trade deals.”

It suggests that new clauses 7 and 11 should be backed in order to achieve that.

It is also necessary to have this on the face of the Bill because the Government’s approach to protecting food standards is slightly confused. In Committee, the Minister said:

“This Bill is about…continuity… Imports under continuity agreements must continue to comply with our existing import standards.”

I welcomed that. However, he added:

“Decisions on those standards are a matter for the UK and will be made separately from any trade agreements.”––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 305-6.]

There is the point of concern, right there. The UK could, if it wished, lower standards, opening the door to all sorts of imports. Let us make sure that that is not possible, at least in the roll-over arrangements, by including the UK’s obligations under the WTO phytosanitary agreement in the Bill. That is important because although the purported objectives of the Bill are about roll-overs, the definition of “trade agreement” is very wide and the long title does not restrict its use only to roll-overs.

New clause 8 would ensure that the UK Government have a duty to restrict market access to healthcare services, including medicines and medical devices. We tabled the new clause precisely because trade deals potentially have a negative impact on health services. While the UK Government have repeatedly pledged that the NHS is not on the table in trade negotiations, leaked documents detail conversations between UK and US negotiators and reveal that health services have been discussed, including the US probing the UK’s “health insurance system”, and the US has made clear its desire for the UK to change its drug pricing mechanism. The new clauses therefore include specific carve-outs for the NHS, all relevant services and regulation, meaning that it would be illegal for the Government to conclude a trade agreement that altered the way that NHS services are provided, or liberalised further, or opened up to particular sorts of foreign investment.

There could be no use of negative listing because such clauses require that all industries are liberalised in trade agreements unless there are specific carve-outs, and it is not always easy to define what services count as health services. For example, digital services may seem irrelevant to health, but NHS data management and GP appointment systems are increasingly digitised. There could be no standstill or ratchet clauses, because these provisions mean that after the trade deal has been signed, parties are not allowed to reduce the level of liberalisation beyond what it was at the point of signature.

There are many examples of real-world potential impacts; I will give just one. The Scottish Government had private cleaners in the NHS and quite a high degree of hospital acquired infection. The private cleaners were replaced by NHS cleaners, and the level of hospital acquired infection fell dramatically. Had a ratchet been in effect, let alone ISDS, it might not have been possible to do that, with detrimental mortality and morbidity consequences for real patients. The clause also states that there should be investor-state dispute settlement clauses in trade agreements. They only allow private investors to challenge Government policy when it affects their profits. The BMA piled in to this debate, as well, saying:

“The Bill must rule out Investor Protection and Dispute Resolution mechanisms which undermine the supremacy of UK courts and risk deterring, delaying or blocking public health improvement measures.”

We have seen examples around the world of where that has happened. It is fundamentally quite wrong for large corporations to be able to use ISDS-type arrangements to sue Governments simply for taking steps to protect the wellbeing of their citizens, or for enacting public health measures that they believe to be right and for which they may well have an electoral mandate.

[Barry Gardiner]

The hon. Gentleman is making a fine speech. Does he agree that it seems a considerable irony that those Government Members who were so determined that this country should not be subject to any supranational court system should hereby, in an ISDS clause, enable our Government to be sued by foreign companies in specialist supranational courts in a way that is not even accessible to our own domestic companies?

[Stewart Hosie]

Yes, and I made that point. It is wrong for these provisions to be available only to investors in the way that has just been described. If we want a supranational body that adjudicates, arbitrates and works, let us have the UK Government put some pressure on their friends in the United States and get the WTO appellate body back up and running and functioning again. That would be the best thing for trade around the world.

New clause 8 would also instruct that there should be no changes to drug pricing mechanisms, which could also happen through intellectual property and non-patent exclusivities. That would be bad news for patients, taxpayers, health boards and trusts around the country, and our view is that trade deals should not be used to facilitate it.

In opposing a new clause like this one in Committee, the Minister said that

“the NHS is not, and never will be, for sale to the private sector”.

Fine. He said:

“We have always protected our right to choose how we would deliver public services in trade agreements, and we will continue to do so.”

Fundamentally, his argument was that “however laudable” the new clause was, it was “unnecessary”. He went on to explain that the UK already had

“rigorous checks and balances on the Government’s power to negotiate and ratify”

trade agreements

“via the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010”.––[Official Report, Trade Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 315.]

There are two big issues that jump out, given what the Minister said—and I have it in full if he wants to re-read it. First, there is absolutely no practical reason why protections for the NHS demanded by the public should not be included in the Bill. Secondly and more importantly, because the so-called “rigorous checks and balances” in CRAG amount to little more than a take-it-or-leave-it choice at the end of the negotiations, the need to protect the NHS from the outset in legislation is paramount.

I commend amendment 10 and new clauses 7 and 8 to the House, and I hope—time permitting—that we can press new clause 7 and amendment 10 to a vote.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. We now have a time limit of four minutes.

Trade Bill

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments & Ping Pong & Ping Pong: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th January 2021 Commons Chamber

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I agree. I put the question back to my hon. Friend, as I have to other hon. Friends. If, on balance, the courts decide—we have faith in our courts—that this is likely to be genocide, I simply ask why would we be doing a trade deal with a country that is guilty of genocide. We may not wish to disagree, but the power still remains. The pedantic point put forward by the Government was that it was all about loss of power. I say that that is simply not the case. It would certainly not be in our amendment, because it is very specific that the Government have to do that.

On the vexatious claims point, the High Court is quite capable of dismissing anything on that level. By the way, this is the highest bar that can be set for any accusation. To try to wipe out an ethnic group is the No. 1 crime in the world. The High Court knows that and would dismiss anything that was vexatious. There would be no point in doing otherwise—that would demean it and wreck its reputation.

The Government say that the amendment, being limited to genocide, is practically unenforceable. Well, maybe that is true, in which case we need to look again at the UN charter, but the reality is that right now this is unenforceable—nobody out there can bring a charge of genocide, because they are blocked. We come back to the same point: we argue about genocide, and the Government say they do not want to do deals with people who commit genocide. I have huge admiration for my right hon. Friend the Minister. We have worked very closely together on many things. However, I noted his language when it came to accusations of the sale of the NHS. He said, “Not and never will be sold.” When it came to China and a trade deal it was, “No plans to do one yet.” We can be emphatic from the Dispatch Box when we want to be. We can make absolute statements when we want to, but when we do not—I have been in Government—we simply do not. That tells us everything we need to know. The Government need to have that check on them.

I conclude by saying that the Government cannot have it both ways. If they say it is for the courts, then the question is which court and the amendment says that. Overall, I have to say that the amendment is not anti-China, but it is anti-genocide. We need now to stand tall. We left the European Union because we did not want to accept judgments from a court over which we said we did not have power. We did not come away because we disliked our courts. I think we have the best courts in the world, and I think they can make this judgment. My question, therefore, is this: what is it about? Why did we leave? So that we would stand tall and have a global vision about the morality of what we do. I say to my colleagues and to those on the Front Bench that tonight is about more than just pettifogging. Tonight is all about shining a light of hope to all those out there who have failed to get their day in court and to be treated properly. If this country does not stand up for that, then I want to know what would it ever stand up for again. I urge my colleagues to vote to keep Lords amendment 3 in the Bill.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP) [V]]

If I may start by making some general observations, we have previously agreed with the Secretary of State for International Trade about the necessity of keeping trade open, recognising the importance of supply chains and how important it is that we stand against protectionism. I am happy to reiterate all of that today. Indeed, we all should, because we need to combat the three main threats to trade. The first, self-evidently, is the covid crisis, which the World Health Organisation suggests could lead to a massive fall in global trade. The second is the impact of Brexit, and thirdly, we must address the systemic problem of the continued implementation of new trade restriction measures, and the continuation of existing ones. For example, tariffs valued at somewhere north of $1.6 trillion are in force around the world. I am not confident that any of those problems will be resolved any time soon, and the Bill does not address any of those matters directly. It is presented mainly as trying to facilitate the roll-over of existing deals, and maintaining trade that the UK has with third countries, which is vital.

The Bill does a number of other things, as the Minister set out. It creates procurement obligations arising from membership of the agreement on Government procurement. It creates the Trade and Agriculture Commission, and gives power to HMRC to collect and share data. As I have said, however, it is not without its problems, as evidenced by the large number of amendments that have come from the other place, which cover a large number of areas. I will address those issues shortly—and hopefully briefly.

As the Scottish National party has made clear during the passage of the Bill, a number of the problems relate to the impact on the devolved Administrations and consent, the role and powers of any scrutinising Committee, parliamentary scrutiny and approval, international standards and agreements, food and animal welfare issues, concerns about the NHS and, as we have just heard, concerns about human rights in trading partner countries. The amendments from the other place deal with a number of those issues.

Let me summarise the SNP’s attitude to the main amendments. Lords amendment 1 seeks to enshrine parliamentary approval of trade agreements. That is one of the fundamental problems with the Bill as it stands. The absence of meaningful parliamentary scrutiny and a parliamentary vote on significant changes or modifications, or in future on new trade deals that may be envisaged by the Government, is a massive problem. Modern democracies need full scrutiny of trade agreements, from the scope of the negotiating mandate, right through to implementation. Without amendment 1, the CRaG provisions, which are prayed in aid by the Government, amount to little more than a “take it or leave it” choice at the end of the negotiations, without the ability to amend. That is inadequate.

Lords amendment 1 also requires the UK Government to consult the devolved nations. That is not consent, but it is progress of a sort.

Lords amendment 2 seeks compliance with international obligations. We raised that matter previously, and new clause 7 on Report was designed to do a number of things. First, it was intended to affirm the UK’s rights and obligations under the sanitary and phytosanitary measures in annex 1A of the WTO agreement. The amendment focuses mainly on human rights, but it also states that before publishing trade objectives, the Government must conduct a risk assessment to consider whether the agreement would comply with the UK’s international treaties and other obligations. It seems eminently sensible to ensure that any free trade agreement complies with international obligations, whether human rights obligations or otherwise.

Lords amendment 3 deals with genocide, and as the Minister knows, there has been a great deal of support for such a measure. There are some serious concerns about the amendment as it stands, not least in allowing the English High Court to determine what is and what is not genocide, but the principle of revoking a trade deal with a state committing such heinous crimes is beyond reproach.

Lords amendment 4 covers IT and related activities in the NHS. I have previously argued that there should be no use of negative listings, because such clauses require that all industries are liberalised in trade agreements unless there are specific carve-outs, and it is not always easy to define which services count as, for example, health services. Digital services may be irrelevant to health, but NHS data management and GP appointment systems are increasingly digitised. There should be no standstill or ratchet clauses, because those provisions would mean that after a trade deal was signed, parties would not be able to reduce the level of liberalisation beyond what it was at the point of signature. Lords amendment 4 explicitly excludes the use of such negative listing and ratchet clauses and rules out the use of ISDS-type provisions for public services, including health, which would be extremely popular with the public.

Lords amendment 5 addresses ratification, including the requirement for a debate. I have previously asked whether, if it was the intention of the Government to provide sensitive information to a scrutiny Committee, that would be the Select Committee on International Trade, chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil). I also asked whether any papers provided would be publishable or restricted. Lords amendment 5 would force the Government to publish an analysis, which would presumably ensure that such information was more widely available. The amendment would also ensure that a debate was held, on the recommendation of such a Committee. That is a very sensible measure indeed.

Lords amendment 6 deals with standards, including food and animal welfare standards, which are of massive concern to the public. As I said on Report, we know that trade deals can put pressure on food standards and lead to the importation of low-standard food. For example, the previous US Administration made it clear that they wanted the UK to lower its food and animal welfare standards. We suggested a ban on the importation of food that was produced to standards lower than those in the UK. Lords amendment 6 is clear that a Minister of the Crown should ensure

“as far as possible that a future trade agreement is consistent with United Kingdom levels of statutory protection regarding, among other things—

(a) human, animal or plant life or health;

(b) animal welfare;

(c) the environment;

(d) food safety, quality, hygiene and traceability;”

and so on. That is an eminently sensible thing to do. The amendment also states that should a Minister seek to change standards, they would have to “seek the consent” of the devolved nations in advance. That is absolutely the right way to proceed.

Lords amendment 7 seeks additional protection for children online, ensuring that legislation is consistent with international treaties. Lords amendment 13, which I understand the Government are minded to accept, addresses the relationship with the devolved Administrations, ensuring that Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs can provide information to the devolved Administrations so that they can fulfil their obligations in terms of trade.

A comprehensive trade Bill is vital, but it has to be right. This Bill has been subject to dozens of amendments in the other place, many with widescale public support. There is still a great deal of work to be done and compromises to be made before this Bill is acceptable.

[Dr Liam Fox (North Somerset) (Con)]

I want to say at the outset that I completely agree with the need to set ethical frameworks in all our overseas dealings, including trade. In so far as these amendments deal with China, I also completely agree that the treatment of the Uyghurs is a violation of historic proportions that should be condemned whether or not it meets the very high legal test of genocide. We should be willing to take action when we think that behaviour does not meet that very high international bar.

However, I am against these specific Lords amendments for four reasons. First, I think trade policy should be conducted via the elected Government through Parliament. I, along with many Conservative Members, voted to leave the European Union to take back control. I do not want to take back control from unelected judges in Europe and give more power to judges in the United Kingdom, however high the esteem in which they are held. I want the decisions about the ethical nature of our policy to be decided in Parliament, by elected parliamentarians. I agree with many of the elements that are being discussed here. I do not want to see more powers coming back from Europe, only for them to be exercised by royal prerogative; I want to see them exercised by the democratic House.