Thursday 25th June 2020
(4 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesTrade Bill 2019-21 View all Trade Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 June 2020 - (25 Jun 2020)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
Gareth Thomas
I am relatively new to the Trade Bill and am only catching up with the discussions that my hon. Friend and others have had about these continuity agreements. Something odd certainly seems to have happened. It is true that the Minister has managed to get a deal done with the Faroe Islands.
The Minister for Trade Policy (Greg Hands)
On a point of order, Mrs Cummins. I think that the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington just accused Lord Price, a Member of the other House, of misleading people. I do not think that that is a permissible term to use in our debates. I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw that term.
Matt Western
I will certainly withdraw it; I recall that I used the word, now that the Minister mentions it. What I was trying to say was that Lord Price was suggesting that there was a simple procedure of cutting and pasting, and that was clearly not the case.
Greg Hands
It is a pleasure to welcome you to the Chair, Ms Cummins. I did not get the chance on Tuesday because the supergroup carried on for the entirety of the morning.
Amendment 16 seeks to remove the power to renew the sunset clause after five years, and I am afraid I cannot support it. It would undermine our ability to implement our obligations from trade agreements beyond the first five years, which risks putting us in breach of the agreements and could open us up to legal challenge. I am sure that is not what the Opposition are seeking to achieve.
Bill Esterson
If the Minister cannot support a change to the five-year sunset period, why did he support it in the previous Parliament, when it was three years?
Greg Hands
I think the hon. Gentleman’s timeline—or the timeline of the hon. Member for Harrow West—may be a little incorrect. As it happens, I left the Department on 21 June 2018, which predated that amendment being made. In any case, the context then, which I will explain, was rather different from the context now, and I think it is very desirable that it be five years, not three years, for the reasons that I am about to explain.
There is a fundamental misunderstanding in everything that the hon. Member for Harrow West just said. The power is in large part needed to make technical changes that ensure that the agreements remain operable. The fundamental misunderstanding on his part is that it is not five years extra to complete the negotiations, sign the deals or finish the negotiations—no. It is five years that is needed to make sure the agreements remain operable once they have been signed.
Before I come to the real detail, let me give the hon. Gentleman an update on some of the agreements he asked about. It was interesting to hear him focus on Andorra and San Marino. Those countries are, of course, in a customs union with the European Union.
We are in discussions with both countries, but in our view, they are largely dependent on what the future relationship between the UK and the European Union looks like, for those two countries are in a complete customs union with the European Union.
The hon. Gentleman asked for clarity about Turkey. I was surprised by that question, because I checked his Twitter feed, and he does actually follow me on Twitter, which I do not take as a compliment ordinarily. He must have seen what we put out three hours ago from my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for International Trade:
“Great to see”—
UK and Turkey—
“trade talks progress today. Let’s build on our already strong trading relationship worth £19bn. We are working hard to ensure we can reach a UK-Turkey trade deal at the end of the transition period.”
He has it right in front of him on his own Twitter feed; I urge him to read it. People mock social media—I might have been critical of social media in my time—but they occasionally perform a useful function. Helping us to keep up to date with what is going on in the world is one of the most useful aspects. So there he has it from just three hours ago.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the so-called temporary agreement with South Korea. It is not a temporary agreement. The agreement includes a review clause after two years, which is a standard feature of many international trade agreements. The review clause states—I am paraphrasing slightly—that if the two parties do not believe it is mutually advantageous to continue the agreement, there is the option not to. That does not mean to say that it is a temporary agreement. All international agreements can be cancelled by one party or the other, if they feel the agreement is no longer mutually advantageous. Of course it leaves open the possibility of doing a more extensive agreement in the future, but that is the case with all trade agreements.
When a country signs an agreement, no one is saying that it will stay in place forever. There may be opportunities in future to extend it into areas of trade that had not been thought of when the original agreement was signed. That is an entirely normal phenomenon. For example, the EU and Mexico have done an enhanced agreement based on their original agreement, which dated from about 2000 or 2002, to bring it up to date. New things come along, such as e-commerce and so on, so of course trade agreements are updated, but it is wrong to describe that trade agreement as temporary.
We are in discussions with Canada, but I return to the points that the hon. Gentleman made on Tuesday. He is so against the Canada agreement that, if there were any delay in the discussions with Canada, he should be cheering that not condemning it, because he is opposed to the agreement in the first place. I thought that would update him on where we are with the agreement.
Let me describe what it is all about. In the case of a transition mutual recognition agreement, we may need to change secondary legislation after the point of signing, and after 1 January 2021, to update the names of awarding bodies and third countries so that UK businesses can continue to use such bodies legally. It is not extra negotiating time. It is extra time to ensure that the agreement remains operable.
Alternatively, where our trade agreements reference international standards, such as environmental protection, we may need to update references in domestic legislation to ensure that we remain in compliance with our international agreements. Equally, a potential use of the power could be to upgrade the list of entities subject to procurement obligations to reflect machinery of government changes.
I used the example last week of DCMS changing its name from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport to the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. That name change might need to be reflected to keep one of those agreements operable, so a change in domestic legislation would ensure that the procurement obligations in the agreement are kept operable. It is not extra negotiating time. The power could also be used to update the list of entities subject to procurement obligations, as I have said.
I think there is a misunderstanding of the nature of the power. If Opposition Members had expressed concerns about the breadth of the power—in other words, the ability to carry on amending legislation for many years afterwards—that would be a much more legitimate concern than the professed concern about extra negotiating time. The Bill has been scrutinised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. Its 33rd report on the 2017-19 Bill raised no concerns about the delegated powers in the Bill, including the sunset clause, and welcomed our move to introduce the affirmative procedure for any regulations made. I see no reason why it should reach a different conclusion on this Bill.
Matt Western
I just want to understand the point the Minister is making. I understand the importance of it, but does it not suggest that the three-year clause in the previous Bill showed a degree of naivety on the part of Government—that they would have sufficient time on the other side to negotiate further agreements with these countries?
Greg Hands
No, I do not accept that. It has nothing to do with the negotiations; it is all about keeping the agreements operable. It is a matter of judgment, and our judgment is that five years is a reasonable time. It is renewable by the affirmative assent of both Houses. We think that that is a reasonable time to keep these powers in place, so that we can then make further changes as needed to keep those agreements operable, and it is renewable by both Houses.
Gareth Thomas
Will the Minister support our amendment to reduce the sunset period from five years to three years, as his own Government did in the previous Bill, or is he determined to reject that suggestion?
Greg Hands
I have just explained that we think that five years, not three, is the appropriate time, so we will vote against the hon. Member’s amendment if he has the audacity to push it. Given that the fundamental premise is incorrect, I would be surprised if he were to push it to a vote, because it is based on a misunderstanding of what the power is all about.
The DPRRC report did not indicate any concerns about the Government retaining the power to renew this clause. Amendment 17 proposes to render the clause renewable only once and for not more than a period of 10 years after the end of the transition period, but that is unnecessary. The clause can be extended only with agreement from both Houses of Parliament and only for a period of up to five years at a time. If Parliament judges that our use of the sunset clause has not been appropriate, it has the power to vote against renewal. As I have stressed before, without the ability to renew the clause, we will not have the power to ensure that signed continuity agreements remain operable, which risks the UK’s ability to fulfil its international obligations. If we do not have this power, we will need to put in place other powers. We should not do tomorrow what we can do today.
Amendments 20 to 23 propose to shorten the sunset period from five to three years. I have already explained why we need the power and the changes the power would make. We believe that a five-year period strikes the right balance between flexibility of negotiations and constraints placed on the power. Our signed continuity agreements are evidence that this is a limited, technical exercise to replicate the effects of existing obligations. Seeking parliamentary permission to renew this capability every three years, rather than five, would be disproportionate and places an unnecessary burden on parliamentary time.
I repeat that the amendments, or at least the description of them, are based on a fundamental misunderstanding. The five years are not extra negotiating time. They allow technical changes to regulations on an ongoing basis, to keep operable agreements that have already been signed. I hope that that reassures the Committee, and I ask the hon. Member for Harrow West to withdraw the amendment.
Gareth Thomas
I enjoyed very much the answer that the Minister provided. In particular, it is a relief to hear that the Secretary of State has finally got round to launching negotiations with Turkey. I hope that those negotiations will be completed by 31 December, given the huge and dramatic impact that it could have on jobs and steel businesses in the UK. I gently remind the Minister of the considerable scepticism we heard from representatives of UK Steel that that would be achieved. It would be interesting to hear later in our proceedings whether Ministers have any sort of contingency plan for the steel industry, if negotiations cannot be completed in time to get a UK-Turkey deal through.
Bill Esterson
Sorry, it is new clause 18 that I rise to speak to. I am grateful for the correction.
On 13 March 2019, an identical amendment was tabled by Baroness Fairhead in the House of Lords. I will just remind the Minister of what she said in her brief contribution:
“I trust that this House will accept this as further evidence that the Government have a strong desire to be transparent with Parliament, businesses and the general public about their continuity programme.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 13 March 2019; Vol. 796, c. 1060.]
She said that in good faith, because she wanted the amendment to be accepted. It was accepted by the House of Lords and became a substantive part of the Bill, and the Commons would have considered it had the Government brought it back in the time available. There was plenty of time to discuss it then. The Government Whip made a point of order earlier. If the Government have a real problem with timing today, they should think about the problem that was caused by their not bringing back the Bill at any time during the period after March 2019, when an identical amendment, tabled by the Government, was agreed. The Minister has to answer the question why, if this measure was good enough for the Government on 13 March last year, it is not good enough now.
Greg Hands
Over the past few days, I have outlined the Government’s position on our approach to clause 2 and I will not repeat that to the Committee. The general point about the continuity powers has been frequently made. I will focus my remarks on the Opposition amendments.
First, I must inform the Committee that the letter I promised the hon. Member for Harrow West on the position of Kenya and Ghana has gone out to all members of the Committee. I pledged that on Tuesday, so I think that is pretty swift. It should be in everyone’s inboxes.
Gareth Thomas
One thing the Minister can confirm, surely, is whether parts produced in other European Union countries will still count towards the value of the car or other parts that are being manufactured. That diagonal and horizontal cumulation is a standard feature of the rules of origin, and it might help to give some certainty to British car and car parts manufacturers that that flexibility in rules of origin will not be lost.
Greg Hands
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that; he makes a good point. I refer him to the deal that we have negotiated with South Korea and how it reflects on those rules. That negotiation has been completed. However, here, today, it is not my job to comment on live negotiations or discussions with our counterparts.
The hon. Member for Dundee East talked rightly about sectors that are important in different parts of the UK. He made a very fair point. He talked about the white fish sector being 10 times as important to the Scottish economy overall as it is to the UK. That makes me wonder why—if I understood him correctly—his party’s policy is to rejoin the European Union, where presumably the status of the white fish sector is even smaller than the one tenth it represents in the UK. That baffled me.
It is strongly in the UK Government interest to have good relationships with the devolved authorities on trade, which is a reserved matter, a prerogative matter. None the less, regulations interact with areas that are matters of devolved competence.
It is therefore perfectly proper both for the UK Government to have good relations and discussions with the devolved authorities, and for the UK Government to interact with sectors that are larger—I do not mean to say that they are disproportionately important—for certain devolved Administrations than others. That is one reason why I have gone out of my way since rejoining the Department to have meetings—I am checking my list of engagements—about Scottish smoked salmon, and with the Scotch Whisky Association, the Scottish Beef Association and other bodies in Wales and Northern Ireland, as well as in the English regions.
Hon. Members talked about the unrestricted nature of the power, but it is not quite right to say that this is unrestricted. Any changes made are subject to the affirmative procedure, and the power is only to amend secondary legislation that is direct retained EU law, again subject to the affirmative procedure. It is not as if that is an unrestricted power.
Returning to equalities legislation, I remind colleagues of constraints in the Bill, including the fact that the affirmative procedure is required for any statutory instruments made under the power in the clause. Parliament will rightly make its voice heard on regulations made, but as the Prime Minister outlined in his Greenwich speech, the UK will always be an open, equal and fundamentally fair country. That will remain true regardless of EU membership or any other international agreement. We have not needed the EU to tell us what is appropriate in the field of equalities. For example, the EU provides a minimum of 14 weeks’ paid maternity leave, whereas Britain offers up to a year’s maternity leave, 39 weeks of which are paid, and the option to convert it to shared parental leave. Moreover, UK workers can get statutory sick pay for up to 28 weeks, whereas the EU has no minimum sick leave or sick pay legislation.
Promoting respect for British values, including equality, the rule of law and human rights, is and will remain a core part of our international diplomacy. That is what our continuity programme provides, alongside certainty to business and consumers. It is not, and never will be, about undermining equalities legislation.
I turn to new clause 22, tabled by Plaid Cymru Members. For the benefit of Members who have not sat on a Bill Committee before, it is entirely possible for those who are not members of the Committee to table an amendment—I would not recommend that course of action for Government Members—as we see the hon. Member for Arfon (Hywel Williams) and his colleagues have done. On Tuesday, in a debate on similar issues, I set out that it is an essential principle of the UK constitution that the negotiation of international trade agreements is a prerogative power of the UK Government. The prerogative power serves a crucial role in ensuring that the UK Government can speak with a single voice under international law, providing certainty to our negotiating partners.
Of course, international negotiations are a reserved matter under the devolution settlements—an area in which the UK acts on behalf of all the nations of the UK. These important principles are complemented by the UK’s dualist approach to international law, which provides that international treaties cannot of themselves make changes to domestic law—I think we will return to that this afternoon. This approach ensures that where our agreements require changes to UK domestic law, the UK Parliament will scrutinise and pass that legislation in the normal way. Where that legislation is made by the devolved Governments, the devolved legislatures fulfil that role. It is right that Parliament and the devolved legislatures should have that role, which is why we have provided that regulations made under clause 2 will be subject to the affirmative procedure.
We have also committed ourselves to not normally using the clause 2 power to legislate in devolved areas without the consent of the relevant devolved Administration, and never without consulting them. Combined with the scrutiny mechanisms in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which the hon. Member for Harrow West was so enthusiastic about 10 years ago, those procedures will ensure that the UK Parliament can see exactly what we have negotiated, and if it does not agree with it, can take steps to prevent the Government from implementing and ratifying the deal. There are therefore already rigorous checks and balances on the Government’s power to negotiate and ratify a new agreement.
By giving Parliament an automatic veto over trade agreements, the new clause would cut across those procedures and undermine the important constitutional principle that it is for the Executive to negotiate and enter into deals, and for Parliament to scrutinise them. The new clause would also give the devolved legislatures an automatic veto over our agreement, which would be wholly inappropriate given that this is a reserved matter. On a practical level, a veto for the devolved legislatures would also lead to a situation in which one part of the UK could prevent the rest from benefiting from an agreement.
The Government recognise the important role that the devolved Administrations and the UK Parliament can and should play in our trade agreements, and I welcome the opportunity to put that on the record again. My Department works closely, as I have outlined, with the devolved Administrations and Parliament to deliver trade policy and trade agreements that reflect the interests of the UK as a whole, but we should do so in accordance with the long-standing principles enshrined in our constitution, rather than seeking to undermine them. I hope that reassures the Committee. I ask hon. Members not to press their new clauses, and to agree to clause 2 standing part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Maria Caulfield.)