Financial Services and Markets Bill

Stephen Hammond Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 7th September 2022 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Hammond (Wimbledon) (Con)]

I was not expecting to be called quite so early in the debate, given the panoply of talent on these Benches and the Benches opposite. In the interest of brevity, I will briefly concentrate on three aspects of the Bill. First, I want to guide the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

This is one of the most significant Bills that this House is likely to look at in this Session of Parliament because, as the Minister has said, the realignment of the regulatory architecture offers a unique opportunity to become more nimble, more agile, more accountable—I hope—and more pragmatic in our approach to regulation. The most important parts of the Bill take forward the future regulatory framework. Requiring regulation to comply and to promote international competitiveness will address the widely held concerns that regulators have in the past used their powers narrowly and over-cautiously to reduce risk, thereby reducing innovation, increasing costs and decreasing consumer choice, which has overall been detrimental to competition.

Creating what is, let us be clear, a secondary objective of international competitiveness and growth is absolutely right. Having this objective in place will neither undermine the regulators’ independence nor cause any prospect of a financial crash. I also do not believe, as some have said, that it is in any way a push for the lowering of standards. The industry knows that proportionate and effective regulation by an accountable regulator is the key to international competitiveness. I was interested to hear the Minister say that he thought we in this House should look again at the accountability structures of regulators. I welcome this objective, and I also welcome the cost-benefit analysis panel, which again plays into the objective of ensuring a nimble, agile regime that protects consumers while taking up the opportunities post-Brexit.

However, with the secondary objective and the cost-benefit analysis panel, there is a concern that regulators must be accountable both to this House and to the Government, but in particular to this House. I welcome the setting out in practice of some of the key performance indicators for the regulator and I recognise and welcome the Sub-Committee of the Treasury Committee, but I hope we will be able to discuss this in Committee and I urge the Minister to think about whether amendments are needed to include an obligation on the regulators to state how any new regulation will meet and further the objective of international competitiveness. I hope he will also consider an annual report, at least on the delivery of those objectives, which should include some measurement against specified key performance indicators. There should be no suggestion that the regulators are being allowed to mark their own homework.

I am sure that the Minister will clarify this later, but the cost-benefit analysis panel needs either to have external members—that must be explicit—or to make it clear that it is taking external advice. It ought also to be clear exactly what criteria are being used to measure cost-benefit analysis. Those measures would help considerably in terms of accountability. I do not believe that scrutiny and accountability affect the independence of either the PRA or the FCA. As my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (John Glen)—who I have had the pleasure of questioning in this House a number of times—knows, I want to see this industry thrive. It is key to the whole of the United Kingdom, because two thirds of the jobs in the industry are outside London. I think he too would accept that scrutiny and accountability do not threaten the regulators’ independence. They are important if we are to have a regime that continues to be internationally renowned.

I have been fortunate enough to be a member of the Treasury Committee in the past, and I hear entirely what my right hon. Friend the Member for Central Devon (Mel Stride) has said. However, I would suggest to him that as a result of the pressures on the membership of the Treasury Committee and the Sub-Committee—I accept that they have the same powers—caused by the extra work, we should open a debate on whether the House needs to think again about whether just having a Sub-Committee of the Treasury Committee is adequate, given the importance of this industry to jobs and growth across the country. I will ask the Minister, perhaps in discussions, to consider yet again a Joint Committee of both Houses on financial services, which is what happens in other jurisdictions.

I welcome so many measures in the Bill, but let me touch briefly on just one. Others will talk about the revocation of retained EU law and a number of other aspects about which Members have already spoken, but I urge the Minister to press ahead with mutual recognition agreements. They are another key way to ensure that the United Kingdom’s financial services remain at the forefront of global financial trade. It is extremely welcome that we are pressing ahead with Switzerland, but I urge the Minister to continue to press ahead with the powers that the Bill allows to be implemented and the regulators to give effect to. With those words, I warmly welcome the Bill, and I look forward to supporting it.

Financial Services and Markets Bill (First sitting)

Stephen Hammond Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we start hearing from the witnesses, do any Members wish to make any declarations of interest in connection with the Bill?

[Stephen Hammond (Wimbledon) (Con)]

I guide the Committee and witnesses to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

[Craig Tracey (North Warwickshire) (Con)]

I chair the insurance and financial services all-party parliamentary group and am a former insurance broker.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Grant]

Q I was thinking particularly about the powers to stop the damage from being done, rather than simply the power to pay financial redress, which usually takes a long time, is very stressful for victims and sometimes comes too late for victims who do not live long enough to see the compensation. The gross misbehaviour of a large number of financial advisers led to that scandal and many others. Are you telling us that, as it stands, the Bill does not give you significantly greater powers to intervene and get these people out the market as soon as you realise there is a problem?

Sheldon Mills: I think that what we would have said—I would need to look at the record to see the context—is that, effectively, we have to go through due process and understand the evidence and the data that would be there to see how those independent financial advisers are behaving. Therefore, the speed and processing of that may be what we were referring to.

If I remember at the time in relation to the British Steel pension scheme, the law was changed to allow people to exit their pensions under pensions freedoms. There was a range of issues in relation to understanding how independent financial advisers were going to respond to that. The speed and pace with which they did respond led to issues such as some of the challenges that British Steel pension holders have now. To confirm: there is nothing the Bill that specifically gives us additional powers in relation to those individuals.

Sarah Pritchard: I want to come in on a slightly broader point, which is that in the transfer of retained EU files, which encompasses part of the Bill, there are some EU files where, at the moment, the FCA will have limited lawmaking powers. The Bill will provide a framework that, file by file, the FCA will need for rule-making and enforcement powers to be considered at that time. That does not answer your question specifically in relation to British Steel, but it provides a mechanism, so you go through that analysis and assessment file by file.

[Stephen Hammond]

Q I thank the panel for coming this morning. I have two questions. Can we be clear that in the UK regulatory landscape and the international financial regulatory landscape there are public interest tests that are operated but do not affect the operational independence of regulators?

Victoria Saporta: In the financial regulatory space, the only example I know of where there is a test whereby the Government—I am not talking about Parliament—can intervene and revoke regulatory rules is in Australia. APRA—the prudential regulatory authority in Australia—has never been exercised. Whenever the IMF has done financial sector assessments, it has been critical. There are provisions, again in Canada, but the US system does not have any. It is Congress who can revoke material pieces of regulatory standards within 60 days. This is my understanding of it in financial regulation, which is separate to how it might exist in other types of regulation.

[Stephen Hammond]

Q But in the US there is obviously a different system in terms of the scrutiny of the financial system, which is probably why that power is vested there. I think that, from what Mr Mills said, there is actually already a public interest test in the CMA.

Sheldon Mills indicated assent.

[Stephen Hammond]

I just wanted to ensure that was on the record. Can we talk a bit about the metrics and transparency you might use to show that you are meeting the secondary objective—that the cost-benefit panel’s analysis will be transparent—and also how you consider you will need to show that you have met the accountability tests?

Sheldon Mills: Sure. I am happy to start with that. We are waiting to see the final description of the clause on competitiveness. Its current iteration talks about competitiveness and growth. It also talks in terms of the medium and long-term growth of the financial services sector and the UK economy. We have started to think about what the input measures we might see. Those are the things we can act upon ourselves.

A good example of that would be our gateway—our authorisations process. Is it as efficient as it can be? Does it place unnecessary burdens on time, pace and the application of it? That can help with the entry of firms into the UK. That is important. We are doing work on our gateway now. That is something on the input measures, but we then need to think about the outcomes. It is important to think about what data and metrics are available that have a causal chain between some of the activity we have—our authorisations activity, our policy activity and so on—and the outcomes we are seeking to achieve. One of the challenges we have is that the data on the link between financial services activity and growth and competitiveness—regulatory activity—is not significant. That said, we are looking proactively to see what measures we can find.

There are also two components to those outcomes. There is the activity that our financial services industry is providing, such as lending and support in terms of insurance and so on to UK firms and overseas. Then there is an outward form of competitiveness, thinking about how our UK plc financial services industry is doing in exporting financial services across the world. Both of those will be outcomes we will need to find measurements on.

Finally, there is the meta outcome. There is certainly Office for Budget Responsibility data that talks about sustainable growth. What is the higher level growth-type outcome you can look at and seek to link? I do not have the full gamut of that, but we are working very closely on it, so that we can provide measures and metrics that can support our use of the objective.

[Stephen Hammond]

Q And those would be transparent?

Sheldon Mills: Of course, absolutely. We will be transparent on that.

[Emma Hardy (Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle) (Lab)]

Q Good morning. Sheldon, I read a speech of yours before about financial inclusion; I know it is something you care about. On the Treasury Committee, we have had a conversation similar to the one we are about to have. You probably know what I am going to ask you.

The Government have opted so far to not have a “have regard” for financial inclusion in the Bill. Do you believe that such a “have regard” for the FCA would ensure financial inclusion as a greater priority for the regulator? What else could be done with the Bill to ensure that financial inclusion is given a greater prominence?

Sheldon Mills: I hope we won’t have the same conversation as before. We have done some more work on financial inclusion following our conversations. Our position is still the same: we do not think we need a “have regard” on inclusion. We don’t think that that would add to our ability to act within our remit in line with our objectives. We have our consumer protection power and we have put in place our new consumer duty, which asks firms to meet a higher standard. We feel that we have sufficient powers to fix any problems that we feel we need to solve.

As we discussed last time, the regulator’s role is to support firms and the market to deliver to as many consumers as possible, including those who are vulnerable or might be excluded. However, we do not do that alone; we do that with partners such as Government, local authorities, charities and others. In relation to that, we are taking a proactive role and arranging a financial inclusion policy sprint in the autumn, working with Fair4All Finance and others. We will bring as many actors as possible into that space, using our innovation labs to work through the types of innovative activity we can put the financial services industry to in terms of tackling financial inclusion.

At the moment, we do not think we need a “have regard” given our current remit and the powers we have.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tulip Siddiq]

Do you have anything to add, David?

David Postings: I don’t really, no.

[Stephen Hammond]

Q Good morning, panel; thank you for coming. In their evidence to us a moment ago, the regulator said they would be transparent with regard to their responsibilities for accountability in the metrics and reporting of CBA, but Emma, in your written evidence to us, you suggest:

“The Financial Services and Markets Bill should be amended to include a power to require regulators to transparently report metrics”.

I wonder if you could comment on that a little, please.

Secondly, you have mentioned proportionality, and again in your written evidence to us you suggest that there may necessarily need to be more of it when we consider the risk, the nature and the scope of businesses, who they are there for and who their customers are. Does the Bill set the right tone for proportionality, or do you think there is still more we should consider?

Emma Reynolds: To take your first question, we think it is important that the regulators are not marking their own homework with regard to the secondary objective. We welcome what the PRA said earlier and the discussion paper it has put out, but we do think the Treasury could take upon itself a power to demand that the regulators report more frequently and when the Treasury has some concern about whether they are meeting the new secondary objective. We do think the Bill should go further in that regard. We do not want this objective to just be in an Act of Parliament and for it to never really be a reality. The question is, “Does this bite?” That is what a lot of our members are saying. We think there are ways that you could hold the regulators to account on that.

Does the Bill set the right tone on proportionality? At its core, it is an enabling Bill, so the proof will really be in the pudding. We hope so. Hopefully, the secondary objective will mean that the regulators will take that very seriously—that their regulation should be proportionate—so we hope so, but it remains to be seen.

[Stephen Hammond]

Q So, like you have just said with regard to the first question, we should look at ways of making sure that that is firmly set down, rather than just a principle.

Emma Reynolds: Indeed.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

Q May I ask you both about clauses 21 and 22, and digital settlement assets? Ms Reynolds, you talked about high standards. I wonder if you could both say whether you agree that the definition of a digital settlement asset is satisfactory and robust enough to safeguard consumers. It is rather broad.

David Postings: I think it needs to be broad, because the digital asset environment can change quickly, and if you define things too narrowly, you risk missing the next wave of change. Yes, I think it is good and wise to define it broadly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Emma Hardy]

Is there anything you want to add, Karen?

Karen Northey: No, I think I covered it earlier.

[Stephen Hammond]

Q May I refer to my themes of transparency, accountability and proportionality? Charlotte, in your written evidence you say that the Bill should be amended to achieve the correct balance between customer protection and proportional regulation, and that the opportunity for improved accountability is falling short. I rather detect from your evidence that you agree with what Emma Reynolds said about the regulators marking their own homework. Will you comment on that? Karen, in your written evidence you talk about an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary approach to regulation. Could you explain what you mean by that?

Charlotte Clark: That language is really important. How do we get things like transparency and challenge into the system? I am not sure that writing it into legislation necessarily leads directly to it, but there is something about getting the right mechanisms, the right debate and the right challenge between Parliament and the regulators, without undermining their independence. This is such a big change. I do not think any of us could be completely certain that we have got it right, but it is about making sure that we have got the right balance and the right mechanisms to hold people to account.

[Stephen Hammond]

Q So you are suggesting that we should make some other amendments to the Bill to make sure that those things are there. Sally-Ann asked another witness earlier about the need for culture change.

Charlotte Clark: A good example is the cost-benefit analysis panel. At the moment, the regulators appoint people to that panel. That could be fine; it might not be. You might want a bit more independence in there and a bit more scrutiny. You might want to think about what those processes are. It is those sorts of areas where they could imbue cultural change. Dave Postings had the example of the consumer duty, whereby they told us what the cost was but not the benefits. We all have our favourite examples of regulatory change where we think, “You haven’t quite made the argument for this; you haven’t quite shown that this is going to be beneficial.” Making sure that changes is one of the things we would want to see.

Karen Northey: I will pick up on the second part of your question, on evolution versus revolution. It comes back to the fact that there is a significant amount of legislation to be reviewed. This is kicking off and enabling a significant review. Our members believe there are a lot of things in European legislation that work, and we do not want everything to go.

I harp back to the figures I mentioned before: £4.6 trillion out of £10 trillion is overseas assets. That relies very heavily on a concept called delegation, which allows UK asset managers to manage European funds. From our point of view, it is fundamental that we operate in a global regulatory framework in a way that does not put at risk what is a significant success story and a significant source of revenue and growth for our country.

The reviews that the Bill enables should be done in a targeted way, focused on those measures that will make the most amount of difference in terms of allowing the UK industry to work better. But we have always said that we are not looking for regulation to be torn up and suddenly having no regulation. This is about making modifications that will make a significant difference to our industry here in the UK.

[Stephen Hammond]

Q The Bill intends to do that; it is not intending to rip up regulation. It intends to make us more competitive, while ensuring the primary objective.

Karen Northey: Absolutely, and I think the process that comes has to be done in a way that is sequenced in the right way to allow proper consultation and proper input.

[Peter Grant]

Q Ms Clark, can I come back to your comment earlier about insurance companies having been set up in Gibraltar and elsewhere offshore but not in the UK? Do you have reasonable grounds to believe that the UK regulatory environment has been a significant factor in those decisions? Can you point to particular regulatory requirements that are preventing people from setting up insurance companies here?

Charlotte Clark: Why would you set up in Gibraltar and sell into the UK market? There is not a big market in Gibraltar.

Financial Services and Markets Bill (Second sitting)

Stephen Hammond Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I think this will be the last question, asked by Stephen Hammond.

[Stephen Hammond (Wimbledon) (Con)]

Q Martin, you have mentioned that you were a regulator, and I think I heard you say a moment ago, “If it doesn’t get measured, it doesn’t get done.” Therefore I am keen to ask you about and understand—you have obviously looked at the Bill in its totality—the need for metrics on net zero, competitiveness and proportionality. Do you think there is enough in the Bill and that is testing and stretching enough? And do you think that there is enough transparency in relation to the regulators to show that they have met those metrics?

Martin Coppack: I am sorry: I just do not feel quite qualified to answer that one.

[Stephen Hammond]

Okay.

[Gareth Davies (Grantham and Stamford) (Con)]

Q Martin, I want to ask you very quickly about all the data that you have been listing in the evidence. I take this evidence session very seriously. I think that it would be really helpful if you could share the constituency data, but also, importantly, the workings. Can you just confirm that the way in which you are working out the poverty premium is not based on a best-case counterfactual?

Martin Coppack: What do you mean by “best case”?

--- Later in debate ---

[Tulip Siddiq]

I think that is quite clear. Anyone else?

[Stephen Hammond]

Q Good afternoon. That was a very clear expression of your views. I will ask three things. Do you think that we should wait and see how the intervention powers are actually defined, and how public interest is defined? Do you think there are other jurisdictions that use those powers? In terms of the definition, will it not matter how they are defined between “operational” and “strategic”?

Martin Taylor: The wording that I have seen is of course not final, but what I find strange is that it suggests the regulators are not acting in the public interest. If they have to be overruled in the public interest, clearly you think they are acting in some other interest. For me, the regulators are the public interest made flesh.

[Stephen Hammond]

Q That is a possible interpretation. The other possible interpretation is that they have acted in the public interest and on their behalf, but the Government want to have a reserve power potentially for future consideration.

Martin Taylor: The Government have enormous influence over the regulatory process. Sometimes people characterise the regulators as living in an ivory tower or something like that, as if they are academics who sit, removed from the real world, and think up rules without any feeling for what impact they might have. In fact, if you think about it, first of all, the independence of the regulators, such as it is, is circumscribed—it is set by Parliament. It is all set by primary legislation; that is No. 1.

Secondly, the wider Government and particularly the Treasury have tremendous powers to influence regulation. The Treasury appoints all the independent members of committees. The Governor and the deputy governors of the Bank of England are Crown appointments, so effectively No. 10 and the Chancellor have a certain say. The Treasury representatives sit on these committees and let the regulators know the Chancellor’s view. The Chancellor, whoever it may be at the time, writes to the committee and sets out their views on the things they ought to take into account.

There are very close working relationships between the Governor, the Chancellor and the permanent secretary, and then all the way down the chain at the Bank of England. The regulators swim in the soup like everybody else.

[Stephen Hammond]

Q I do not think that regulators are in ivory towers. I spent 20 years in financial services. They came to visit me and what they did with our firm never make me think they were in an ivory tower. I sometimes thought I had regulators who were trying to regulate businesses in which they did not necessarily have experience, but that is another story and we will get on to that later.

May I ask your views on the secondary objective?

Martin Taylor: The new secondary objective?

[Stephen Hammond]

Yes, the new secondary objective as proposed in the Bill.

Martin Taylor: I have a curious view that the fewer objectives you have the better, because the more likely you are to hit them. I have no objection to the secondary objective, if I can put it that way. It does not seem to me offensive. I was very pleased to hear the then Chancellor say in the Mansion House speech that there was a clear hierarchy of objectives, and that seemed to me to be fine. I don’t worry about that.

[Stephen Hammond]

Q I think it has been explicit all the way through that there is a hierarchy of objectives. Would you agree that the Bill should ensure that there is a clear set of metrics and there is transparency for showing how that objective is being met or is not being met?

Martin Taylor: If that can be done, I would certainly welcome it. One of the difficulties that the Financial Policy Committee has always had is that if your job is maintaining financial stability, it is not always very easy to see if you are succeeding. One can see that recently, for example, the Monetary Policy Committee has not been meeting its inflation objective. That is an objective in hard numbers, and for the FPC and for other regulatory bodies it is harder.

[Emma Hardy]

Q Thank you, Martin, for your candour. What risk could the intervention pose to financial stability and to the UK’s reputation and global competitiveness if left as it is?

Martin Taylor: I do not want to exaggerate. I said this was a corruption of the system and corruptions work slowly, so it does not make us into Argentina or Turkey overnight but that is the direction of travel, if I can put it that way. Independent regulation is not an aesthetic choice; it is a practical one. I think the transparency of the regulatory process in London—the need for the regulators to explain themselves and especially the scrutiny by Parliament—is one of the cornerstones, along with the legal system and various other things we are familiar with, of London’s attraction as a financial centre. The UK’s reputation needs a bit of tender loving care at the moment, I would say, and bringing in unnecessary measures that risk damaging it seems to me unintelligible.

Financial Services and Markets Bill (Third sitting)

Stephen Hammond Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

At the moment, that activity is far too often not regulated, so my amendment has been designed to allow the Treasury to make regulations to bring within the scope of the Bill the particular loophole that has been at the heart of a lot of investment and pension scams that I have had to look into on behalf of my constituents. I suspect that every Member of the House will have constituents who have been affected by this issue.

[Stephen Hammond (Wimbledon) (Con)]

I understand exactly what the hon. Gentleman is trying to do with the amendment, and I have a lot of sympathy, but I am not clear about its scope and extent. Is he trying to ensure that the Treasury starts to regulate crowdfunders? That is potentially what the amendment would allow. It is a very widely drawn amendment, and I seek clarification on this point.

[Peter Grant]

If it became clear to the Treasury or the relevant regulator that crowdfunders were using funds for illicit purposes, rather than for genuinely good causes, I would expect the Treasury and the relevant regulator to step in. My amendment is designed to put primary legislation in place to allow the regulators to step in, and to allow the Treasury to take action, if it becomes clear that there is a problem, regardless of whether that is through crowdfunding or any other method of raising finance. The important part of the amendment is about finances being raised as a way of raising capital. The amendment does not in any way imply that it would cover, for example, crowdfunding for a good cause or to raise funds for someone who has had a serious accident. That would not be covered by the wording of the amendment.

I can understand the concerns, and I am quite happy if someone can come up with better wording—possibly in an amendment to a different piece of legislation—that achieves the aim of the amendment, but I am utterly convinced that there is a serious weakness in our current regulation. As currently worded, neither this Bill nor the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill will close down that loophole sufficiently.

At Blackmore Bond, the abuse that was taking place was stopped after it was too late. At Safe Hands Funeral Plans, the abuse that was taking place was stopped after it was too late and people had lost their money. The selling of mini-bonds to the general public, which is what Blackmore Bond was up to, is now outlawed, so action has been taken on that specific kind of abuse. Funeral plans are now regulated, so action has been taken on that specific kind of abuse. I do not want the regulator or the Treasury having always to see where the next specific company disguise is going to be, however; I want them to have the power to regulate based on how businesses take money from the general public.

With those comments, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. If he is not minded to accept the amendment, I hope that we can get an assurance that the intention behind it will be addressed at a later stage.

[Emma Hardy]

I have a general question on the clause and the designated activities regime. In the consultation response document produced by the Treasury—“Financial Services Future Regulatory Framework Review: Proposals for Reform. Response to Consultation” to be precise—some consultation respondents were concerned about what activities would physically be regulated, what constraints were to be placed on the powers of the Treasury and what the consequences for failing to comply with the regulator’s rules would be. I have not yet seen their concerns answered by the Minister. Will he address that?

[Stephen Hammond]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Maria. Will the Minister clarify quickly proposed new section 71S? The power in subsections (3) to (7) is an exceptional power, rather than a regular power.

[Andrew Griffith]

The amendment seeks to make it clear that offers of non-equity securities to retail investors—for example, as cited, retail bonds—can be brought into regulation through the designated activities regime. That is the important subject we are talking about. That regime—the DAR—has been designed to allow for the proportionate regulation of activities involving interactions with financial markets in the UK and conducted by many that are not traditional financial services firms. In essence, it is the core scope of regulation. The DAR includes a range of activities, such as an activity connected to the financial markets or exchanges of the UK, or an activity connected to financial instruments, financial products or financial investments issued or sold in the UK. Any of those can be designated under the DAR. Our contention is that it is therefore already sufficiently broad in scope. We will discuss that further when we consider clause stand part later.

Offers of non-equity securities to retail investors as proposed by the amendment would fall within the definition of the DAR should the Government wish to designate that activity in future. Indeed, proposed new schedule 6B of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which is to be inserted by the Bill and which provides illustrative examples of the types of activities that His Majesty’s Treasury may designate, includes

“Offering securities to the public.”

I can therefore give my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon the comfort that he seeks, in that the provision does extend to crowdfunding, which was his specific point.

Financial Services and Markets Bill (Fifth sitting)

Stephen Hammond Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We now come to amendments 43 and 45, in the name of Peter Grant. Would any member of the Committee like to move them? If not, we will move on to amendment 46.

Clause 24

Competitiveness and growth objective

[Stephen Hammond (Wimbledon) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 46, in clause 24, page 37, line 13, leave out “facilitating” and insert “promoting”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 47, in clause 24, page 37, line 31, leave out “facilitating” and insert “promoting”.

Clause stand part.

[Stephen Hammond]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dame Maria, and to serve under your chairmanship. I would again guide the Committee to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

For many of us, chapter 3 of the Bill is hugely important because it looks at the accountability of regulators. As the Bill could hugely increase their powers, the themes that many of us explored during the evidence session—of transparency, accountability and proportionality—are fundamental. Clause 24 deals with the secondary objective. Regulation and regulatory culture are some of the biggest factors affecting the competitiveness and attractiveness of a jurisdiction.

This is not about a race to the bottom. Any jurisdiction that is not well respected and well regulated, with tough regulation and an independent regulator, will fail on the international stage. It is about ensuring the regulator’s accountability, particularly for the objective. We heard evidence from major City trade organisations last week, and Emma Reynolds from TheCityUK said to us:

“it is important that the regulators are not marking their own homework”––[Official Report, Financial Services and Markets Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2022; c. 18, Q28.]

Charlotte Clark from the Association of British Insurers made a similar point.

It is clear that there is a track record, but we must make sure that the regulators stay on track and are held to their duty regarding the new secondary objective. Amendments 46 and 47, which are fairly simple, would change “facilitating” to “promoting”. Facilitating almost implies letting something happen, perhaps through disregard. There should be active promotion of the secondary objective to remain internationally competitive. Internationally, we would not be alone in taking such action. The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority is required to take particular account of the effect that regulation has on competition, innovation and the international competitiveness of Switzerland. There is a very similar objective for the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and no one anywhere will suggest that those are not well regulated, competitive international markets.

London trade bodies, such as the London Market Group, suggest that in the UK, some regulatory costs are up to 14 times what they are in other places around the world. When we look at the one-size-fits-all approach sometimes taken by the Financial Conduct Authority, it is clear that a distinction needs to be drawn. If we are not careful, the objective could be subsumed in others and forgotten. If we want London to be the global financial centre, we should have regard to the secondary objective. I want the Bill to set out more clearly regulators’ accountability for this objective, the intention, and regulators’ role regarding the objective.

[Craig Tracey (North Warwickshire) (Con)]

As ever, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Maria. I refer to my interest, which I declared at the start of Committee proceedings. I welcome the Bill, and particularly clause 24 because of its competitiveness duty, for which I have campaigned for quite some time. I would prefer it to be a primary objective, and perhaps the Minister will look into that, but if we keep it in its current form, then we have to go further for it to be meaningful. There must be proper metrics to ensure that the regulator follows up on it. For that reason, I support the amendments put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon.

In the evidence sessions, I was surprised to hear that the FCA was not aware of any other regulator that had a competitiveness duty. That is quite worrying. It seemed slightly detached from what our competitors are doing. We need to ensure that the FCA is pressed hard on this issue, and that there is a clear, stated objective for them to promote competitiveness in the industry. To be clear, this is not at all about lowering standards. The FCA said in its evidence that it considers jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and Australia to be robust financial centres. They all have a competitiveness duty, so a duty of that kind can be beneficial.

Let me put this into context by giving the example of insurance-linked securities. The FCA created regulations regarding them, which Singapore then lifted—took and used. Because of Singapore’s competitiveness duty, we lost one firm midway through the process. In the same timeframe, 15 firms have been regulated there, against five in this country. The estimated loss is around $700 million. That is money out of our economy that could come our way with just this simple change.

There is a similar story on captives. We do not have any set up here. The reason cited is over-burdensome regulation. The industry agrees that there needs to be regulation, but it needs to be proportionate, and we need to ensure that it does not block investment in this country. I hope the Minister will consider the amendments and see what can be done to strengthen the measures.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Griffith]

The hon. Lady is right to pull me up on my failure to address her point, although later clauses and amendments also address it. I am familiar with TheCityUK’s proposal, and the Government are prepared to look at that area. She gave an example of the regulators helping the real economy through sustainable investments, and potentially reporting some metrics against that. That is worthy of consideration.

[Stephen Hammond]

I should have said at the beginning that I warmly welcome clause 24. The purpose of the amendments was to tease out the Minister’s exact thoughts. I was pleased to hear that he thinks there is regulatory step forward. I was also pleased to hear that the Government may look again at some of the wording in chapter 3. Will he meet me and colleagues, perhaps next week, or some time in the future? With that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25

Regulatory principles: net zero emissions target

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 26 stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Again, there is largely agreement about the aims of clauses 25 and 26. We are on the cusp of a complete transformation in the way our economies have to work. Sometimes, I think we do not quite understand the extent of the transformation that will be needed and the speed at which it will have to be done, given that we are so behind in our attempts to reach net zero and avoid catastrophic climate change. It really is the last few hours, in terms of the biodiversity and climate stability of the Earth, for us to be able to do this.

The scale of the required transformation is mind-boggling. Virtually every piece of infrastructure in existence in our society will have to be transformed. That will have to be done through public-private partnerships, investment to lead the market in areas where there is market failure and investment in innovation in financial services to help to provide that investment, but also through proper regulation, which is what these clauses are about. All those things have to be done in a timely way to create the circumstances for realising all the capital investment potential that will be needed to make this change happen, especially in established economies with old infrastructures, which are often the largest emitters of carbon, as it happens. All of that has to be done virtually in parallel, so that we can try to reach these important targets.

It is very important that, through these clauses, the Government have agreed to incorporate the legislative target of reaching net zero by 2050 into this part of financial services law. However, they have amended it by replacing what was there before—the “have regard to sustainable growth”—with the target. Is that the right way to go about it? By getting rid of that “have regard”, do we lose an opportunity to make progress, rather than just focusing on a future output? That is not a philosophical question; it is a practical one. Why have the Government decided to replace the “have regard”, rather than enhance it? Will the Minister reassure us that, in the context of having to retool the way we do almost everything in all our infrastructure, we could not have gone with both? Will there be the potential for people to think, “We’ll put everything off until closer to 2050,” because the “have regard” has been replaced with an end-date output target? Can the Minister justify why the Government thought that was the best approach?

When regulation is being refocused on net zero, there will be those who wish to greenwash what they are doing—I will use that phrase; the Minister understands what it means—in order to continue to attract investment and piggyback on the good will of people who wish this change to happen when, in the case of those companies, it is not happening. I suspect there is a little bit of that going on at the moment. How does the Minister envisage enforcement mechanisms and proper regulation being put in place to ensure that greenwashing is not going on everywhere? Such greenwashing would move us away from meeting the target. Not only would it be to the detriment of consumer interests; it would squeeze out more genuine activities, firms and investment if it were allowed to be too prevalent.

[Stephen Hammond]

I am not sure whether I am supposed to, Dame Maria, but I refer the Committee to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

Like many Members, I welcome the thrust of clause 25 and think it is important that we are setting the principle of net zero in legislation. However, I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire. Clause 26 amends FSMA 2000 in relation to the content of the annual report. I will not go through all the arguments that we may well make when my hon. Friend’s new clause is debated, but I want to register with the Minister my concern about the phrase “in its opinion”. There is a reputational risk for the regulator, as much as for anyone else, if someone were to examine it later. I will not detain the Committee any longer, but I will want to speak to this point quite extensively when my hon. Friend’s new clause comes up.

I ask the Minister to look at the phraseology and consider whether it is appropriate. As we have all said in Committee, during the evidence sessions and in widespread discussion of the Bill, the need for clear metrics, regulatory transparency and regulatory accountability is key. That is one of the things we have all welcomed in the Bill.

[Tulip Siddiq]

We welcome clause 25 and the new regulatory principles for the FCA and the PRA, which will require the regulators, when discharging their general functions, to have regard to the need to contribute towards compliance with the Climate Change Act 2008—legislation that, I remind the Minister, was brought in by a Labour Government.

However, we think that the Bill lacks ambition on green finance. The Government promised much more radical action. We were promised that the UK would become the world’s first net zero financial centre, but we are falling behind global competitors. In the evidence session, William Wright, the managing director of the New Financial think-tank, stated that the UK is a long way behind the EU on both the share and the penetration of green finance in capital markets. Research by the think-tank has suggested that green finance penetration in the UK is at half the level of the EU and roughly where the EU was four years ago.

I will discuss what the Opposition would like to see in the Bill on green finance when we discuss new clause 9. For now, will the Minister set out what assessment he has made of the impact that clause 25 will have on investment decisions and other financial service activities in the sector?

In the evidence session, William Wright suggested that there is “a disconnect” between the Government’s stated position that the UK is already a global leader in green finance and the ambition for the UK to become the leading international green finance centre. Does the Minister really believe that the provisions in clause 25 are sufficient to close that gap? How much further will the Government go on this agenda? Does the Minister think we have been as ambitious as possible in the Bill, considering that the problem is on our doorstep and is so important for future generations?

Financial Services and Markets Bill (Sixth sitting)

Stephen Hammond Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Hammond (Wimbledon) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 48, in clause 28, page 40, line 39, at end insert—

“3RF Requirement to publish specified information

(1) The Treasury may at any time, by notice in writing, direct a regulator to measure its performance against specified metrics and to publish such information if—

(a) the regulator does not already publish such information, or

(b) the Treasury consider the information published is insufficient for the purposes of holding the regulator to account.

(2) A direction under subsection (1) may—

(a) specify the element of the regulator’s performance to be measured;

(b) specify the appropriate metrics to be used;

(c) specify the period for which performance must be measured; and

(d) specify the date by which the performance information must be published.

(3) As soon as practicable after giving the direction under subsection (1) the Treasury must—

(a) lay before Parliament a copy of the direction, and

(b) publish the direction in such manner as the Treasury considers appropriate.

(4) A direction under subsection (1) may be varied or revoked by the giving of a further direction.”

I again guide the Committee to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Clause 28 amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. It gives the Treasury the power to make or to direct rules. A key element of our discussions has been transparency and accountability, and the amendment is designed to make things a little clearer by ensuring that regulators report regularly and transparently on key metrics. The regulators are already mandated to report to His Majesty’s Treasury in their annual reports, which have to contain some performance metrics; the issue is that those metrics are selected by the regulator themselves. At the moment, an oversight body has the power to send for “persons, papers and records”, but it does not have the power to mandate regulators to report on specific performance metrics over time. I think that that leaves a hole in terms of both accountability to Parliament and transparency of regulators.

I accept the evidence that Martin Taylor gave the Committee that Parliament and the Government have a huge amount of influence. Equally, though, the chief executive of the Prudential Regulation Authority, when asked elsewhere for his thoughts on the competitiveness objective, described a lot of it as a “red herring”. When asked how he would report on the competitiveness objective, he said that he had “no convincing answer”. It is important that there is a convincing answer, and that is, in effect, what my proposed new section 3RF of the 2000 Act would provide.

As I have stated quite clearly, I do not believe that this is about a race to the bottom. We need a well-regulated, tough regulated, transparently regulated jurisdiction. Regular accountability on performance is in no way an infringement of a regulator’s independence; I think that it would enhance the regulator’s reputation. The amendment therefore sets out a number of metrics on which a regulator might be asked to report. That could work relatively easily. For instance, the Treasury could use its powers to set out more clearly the elements on which the regulator should measure and report its performance. It could also set out definitions that are relevant to the measures themselves. I think that the direction potentially should be able to be scrutinised by the public, and particularly by Parliament and the Treasury Committee, and that the information should be published, and published more frequently.

My amendment is designed to ensure that the regulator not only has the objective, but has to report on it on a very clear set of metrics, which would then allow us in Parliament and the public to ensure that it is meeting the objective.

[Tulip Siddiq (Hampstead and Kilburn) (Lab)]

I thank the hon. Member for tabling the amendment. In principle, Opposition Members are supportive of providing regulators with clearly defined metrics to assess their performance. We would need further information about how it would work in practice before we could lend our support to the amendment, but in principle we are in agreement with the views that the hon. Member has outlined.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Andrew Griffith)]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon for raising this important issue, and I note the potential, in-principle support of the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn, speaking for the Opposition.

The Government agree that it is vital to have appropriate public metrics for holding regulators to account on their performance. FSMA already requires regulators to report annually on how they have discharged their functions, advanced their objectives and complied with their other duties. In addition, schedules 1ZA and 1ZB to FSMA provide that the Treasury may direct a regulator to include such other matters as it deems appropriate in the regulator’s annual report.

As part of their annual reports, both the Financial Conduct Authority and the PRA publish data on operational performance. The FCA annually publishes operating service metrics relating to authorisations, timeliness of responses to stakeholders, and regulatory permission requests, among other things. In April 2022, the FCA also published a comprehensive set of outcomes and metrics that it will use to measure and publicly report on its performance. The PRA annually publishes data on its performance of authorisation processes.

Amendment 48 seeks to allow the Treasury, in addition, to determine what metrics the FCA and the PRA should use to measure their performance and over what period, and other technical aspects of the measurement and publication of metrics. Let me reassure my hon. Friend of the importance that I attach to the matter he has raised. I have discussed it with the CEOs of the PRA and the FCA since taking up my role, and I will continue to do so. I am open to discussing the matter with my hon. Friend outside the Committee to see what further reassurance the Government could give, or what further measures we could take. I therefore ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Stephen Hammond]

I thank the Minister for his response, and I thank the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn for hers. Clearly, there is a willingness across the House to look at this matter again, so I am going to take the Minister at his word—as I always do—and accept his kind reassurance. Perhaps he might ask the hon. Lady to join us in that discussion, because it would be beneficial. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Andrew Griffith]

Clause 28 enhances FSMA by enabling the Treasury to place an obligation on the FCA or the PRA to make rules in a certain area of regulation. Equivalent provision for the Bank of England and the Payment Systems Regulator is made in clause 44 and in paragraph 7 of schedule 7.

FSMA requires that regulators advance their objectives when they make rules, set technical standards and issue guidance. The regulators must also take into account eight regulatory principles when discharging their functions. It is generally up to the regulators to determine what rules are necessary, but as set out in the future regulatory framework review consultation in November last year, that approach may not always be sufficient. There must be a means for the Government and Parliament to require the regulators to make rules covering certain matters, in order to ensure that important wider public policy concerns are addressed. That approach has already been established in legislation through the Financial Services Act 2021, which required the FCA to make rules that applied to FCA-regulated investment firms.

Clause 28 enables the Treasury to make similar regulations and place an obligation on the regulators to make rules in a certain area. The clause aims to strike a balance between the responsibilities of the regulator, the Treasury and Parliament now that we are outside the EU. It does not enable the Government to tell a regulator what its rules should be; it simply enables the Government, with the agreement of Parliament, to say that there must be rules relating to a particular area. The FCA and the PRA must continue to act to advance their objectives and take into account their regulatory principles when complying with the requirements set under this power. The Treasury cannot require the regulators to make rules that they would not otherwise have the ability to make.

I assure the Committee that this power will always be subject to the affirmative procedure. That is the most appropriate procedure, as it means that Parliament will be able to consider and debate any requirements set in this way. It also ensures that the Government are able to act to ensure that these requirements stay up to date with changing markets, rather than setting them out in primary legislation, where they could quickly become out of date. The clause enhances the FSMA model, enabling the Treasury to ensure that key areas of financial services continue to be regulated following the repeal of retained EU law and in the future. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29

Matters to consider when making rules

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Griffith]

That is, of course, possible, but it would be unusual. There is regular discourse between His Majesty’s Treasury and regulators, and I consider the risk that the hon. Lady raises relatively small. The regulatory bodies would consult on that change if required.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Public consultation requirements

[Stephen Hammond]

I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 34, page 47, line 38, at end insert—

“(2B) The FCA must publish a list of all of the consultees.”

Again, I guide the Committee to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. The amendment is very simple. I welcome clause 34. It sets out public consultation requirements and, after proposed new section 1RA of FSMA 2000, inserts proposed new section 1RB, concerning requirements in connection with public consultation. The key word here is “public”. Proposed new section 1RB(2) states:

“The FCA must include information in the consultation about any engagement by the FCA with…statutory panels”.

That is a public consultation, or it should be. Therefore it seems only appropriate that the FCA and the PRA list all the consultees to the public consultation. That is what amendment 49, for the FCA, and consequential amendment 55, for the PRA, provide. That is a very simple request. If the Government cannot agree to it today, I hope that they will take it away about think about it very carefully.

[Andrew Griffith]

Amendment 49 seeks to require the FCA to publish a list of all respondents to any public consultation. I recognise that my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon intended for the requirement in amendment 49 also to apply to the PRA, where the same issues would arise.

The Government believe that policy making is at its most effective when it draws on the views, experience and expertise of those who may be impacted by regulation. Meaningful stakeholder engagement makes it more likely that final proposals will be effective, understood and accepted as fair and reasonable. The Government also recognise the importance of transparency in supporting the effective scrutiny of the regulators, and are bringing forward a number of measures in the Bill to support that.

I remind my hon. Friend that FSMA already requires the FCA to publish information regarding responses to their public consultations. In particular, section 138I of FSMA requires the FCA to publish an account, in general terms—I accept that that is different from what my hon. Friend proposes—of representations made in response to consultation, and of the regulator’s response to them.

Although I therefore support the ambition behind the amendment, there is a risk that the additional requirement on the FCA to publish a list of all consultees to every consultation could deter stakeholders that want to respond confidentially from engaging fully with the regulators’ consultations.

The Government sympathise with my hon. Friend’s point, but I ask him to withdraw his amendment. I am happy to meet with him, with officials, to see whether there is a different way in which he can obtain the comfort he desires, or in which we can take the matter forward.

[Stephen Hammond]

I am very pleased to hear what the Minister said, because he has broadly accepted the thrust of what I said. I think he is offering me the chance to explore with him the circumstances in which a body does not wish for its name to be published in respect of a consultation. I am prepared to have that conversation with him so that I understand why he thinks that that might constrain the FCA and PRA. With that reassurance from the Minister, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 35 stand part.

--- Later in debate ---

Although I am, again, sympathetic to the intention behind these amendments and I regret somewhat that we are even in this position—that, as the regulator perhaps does not have the industry’s confidence in its existing CBA process, the Bill Committee would need to discuss this matter—I ask my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon to withdraw amendments 51 to 54. I commend clauses 38 to 42 to the Committee.

[Stephen Hammond]

Again, I direct the Committee to my entry on the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I warmly welcome the creation of cost-benefit panels. In my view, the greater the understanding of the cost and benefit of a regulation, the greater the understanding of the impact, and therefore the effectiveness, of the regulation, and the greater the transparency of that process.

I am pleased that the Bill includes this clause because it sets out the agenda, membership, metrics and outputs that each of these panels should make. I guess the real answer I am trying to get from the Minister—I have listened carefully and I think we have had most of the response, but I want to test him a little more—is that, if we are to get all the desirable outcomes from setting up these panels, we must know how much they are a creature of the regulator and how much they are independent of the regulator.

The Minister clearly said that there is an implicit assumption that the regulator would follow an independent line for these panels. If the purpose of the panels is purely to provide evidence and they are controlled by the regulator, those recommendations will be accepted, but it is key that there is an independent panel.

I agree that regulators are not in ivory towers, as Martin Taylor said in his evidence to us. I do not think there is substantial implicit control, nor do I think there is not an implicit desire to see independence, nor do I think that there is not implicit influence by His Majesty’s Treasury. However, if we want to build the world’s leading regulatory regime, it must be seen to be tough and proportionate, and that is why these panels are very helpful. I therefore support the aim of clause 40.

My amendments seek to address the concern that the panel has marked its own homework—the excuse that “the dog ate my homework”—and the point about independence. I understand that members of the panel could already be external, but I want to make it clear that “could” is not enough; there should and must be external members. I hope that the Minister will be able to give me that further reassurance that that is very much the intention of the Bill.

I take on board exactly what the Minister said about my amendment 52, in that the FCA already has to consider the representations and place them on record. However, I am quite concerned by the wording. I think the Minister got my point, which is about the wording “from time to time”. Those of us who have had the honour to stand at the Dispatch Box will have been asked questions such as, “When is that happening, Minister?”, to which the response is often, “Soon,” or, indeed, as we heard the Minister say this morning, “In due course.”

The regulator might say to us that it is going to publish the responses “from time to time”. I take the point that the Minister does not want to fetter the regulator, but I am concerned that, if there is not something either in implicit guidance to the regulator or potentially set out, “from time to time” could be whenever the regulator chooses and potentially not annually. Therefore, if it were to say “annually or more frequently” I would be a lot happier. I listened to the Minister’s comments and I think he probably has sympathy with what I am saying, but I will listen to his response to my remarks.

[The Chair]

Before I bring in the next speaker, I apologise to the hon. Member for Wimbledon, who I probably should have brought in first. I apologise for that; it is a bit awkward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Hammond]

Indeed. We ask the FCA to produce an annual report as well, so this is not out of line with other expectations.

[Andrew Griffith]

My hon. Friend has finished my point for me. This is not uncommon in statute, so while the Government do not accept the amendment and will vote against it, I have committed—and I do so again—to meet my hon. Friend and consider these matters further before Report.

[Stephen Hammond]

Having listened to the Minister, I think amendment 51 might already be included in the Bill, amendment 52 appears to be fettering, and 53 and 54 —it looks like I am going to enjoy substantial tea and biscuits at the Treasury next week. As such, I do not intend to press my amendments to a Division.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 39 to 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 43

Exercise of FMI regulatory powers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 45 stand part.

Financial Services and Markets Bill (Ninth sitting)

Stephen Hammond Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 3rd November 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Dame Angela Eagle]

My hon. Friend makes an extremely good point: tech developments sometimes leave people behind. That is not usually deliberate; sometimes it is thoughtless. However, we in Parliament must ensure that all citizens in this country are able to participate in what is, increasingly, effectively a utility, even though it is not in public hands—I make no comment one way or the other about that. Being unable to access banking services for whatever reason is a real disadvantage, whatever an individual’s age or time of life.

That is a primary reason why we must ensure that what the market cannot provide, regulation provides. I am interested in what the Minister has to say about that. This issue will get bigger as more and more services go online. Regulation cannot happen merely at the end of a process, when access has completely disappeared. Even in some places where bank offices still exist, not everybody can access them. As a Parliament, we are people who point our regulators in particular directions to deal with emerging issues, and this is an important one. I look forward to what the Minister has to say.

[Stephen Hammond (Wimbledon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma. I will make a short speech. It is more of a speech of curiosity. I listened very carefully to my next-door neighbour, the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden, who said what most members of the Committee would probably say. She will know as well as I do that everybody looks at my constituency and thinks “leafy Wimbledon suburbia”. But she will also know that parts of south Wimbledon, of Raynes Park and of Morden town centre, which we share, have exactly the problems that she spoke about.

I may have misheard the hon. Lady, but she said that she did not wish to compel banks to stay open, or did not think that we necessarily could do so, and she spoke therefore about the establishment of banking hubs. What I am curious about is how banking hubs would be established. Are we saying that, as part of getting or maintaining a banking licence, there should be a contribution to a social fund, so that banking hubs can be established around the country? Are we saying that that levy should be extended, particularly because some of the harm that we are talking about is the rise of online banking? Should online banks make a contribution to the cost of those banking hubs? Or are we saying—I think it was said that the hubs should be inside local authority areas—that local authorities should offer them, for instance in town centres?

That is a genuine point of curiosity. As in previous discussions with the hon. Members for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle, for Wallasey, and for Mitcham and Morden—my next-door neighbour—there is huge sympathy for ensuring that our constituents, including vulnerable constituents, have access to banking services. But we need to more tightly define the practicality of how we ensure that they have that access.

[Siobhain McDonagh]

I am completely open-minded about how the hubs are paid for, but they have to be paid for from the banking sector itself. I would not wish to put the responsibility on already overstretched local authorities. Many high street banks have had decades of loyal support from these customers, and they cannot just walk away from that responsibility and ignore them. They have been good, loyal customers. There should be a banking hub, but not at the point that the last bank closes. We need to have a view towards what happens in the future. There can be collaboration about sites, but there needs to be access to those services.

[Stephen Hammond]

That is extremely helpful in setting out the thought processes behind the new clause. One of the issues that the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn might wish to clarify is that, if the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden is correct, the new clause has to contain the stipulation that to get a banking licence in the United Kingdom, one needs to pay a certain amount of social levy so that banking hubs can be established. For me, that is the issue with the clause. I therefore suggest that the hon. Member for Hampstead and Kilburn might want to take it away and bring it back on Report, or have a discussion with the Minister about exactly how the levy that the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden is effectively talking about is to be established. This new clause does not make that clear, and therefore, frankly, the practicality of the new clause—notwithstanding that we all agree with its intent—is clearly flawed.

[Andrew Griffith]

I once again note the strength of feeling on both sides of the Committee. The hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden has spoken in a number of debates on clauses of the Bill about the importance of bank branches to our constituencies and local communities. When I visit her constituency to see the opening of the new cash machine, perhaps I will be able to review the provision for myself.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Stephen Hammond Excerpts

Consideration of Lords message
Monday 26th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con)]

It is a privilege to have an opportunity to contribute on the amendments made in the other place. I want to speak briefly about the accountability and scrutiny of the regulators, and the crypto and digital assets recognition in the Bill.

Chapter 3 refers in general to the accountability of the regulators and amendments 6 to 9 refer to the obligation to promote growth. The amendments are extremely important and I welcome the Government’s response to them and their setting the tone in accepting and working with such changes early on. International competitiveness is important for all our constituents. As Members have said, it is inevitable that consumer-focused elements in social media drive campaigns that rightly receive attention in the broader media, forcing change from regulators and established institutions, but the regulator must also strike a balance to ensure that businesses and the industry itself are internationally competitive. This is an important sector to the UK economy. As the Minister said in his introductory remarks, all constituencies will be affected by the Bill. There will be hardly a constituency that does not have someone employed in the sector, so amendments 6 to 9 on international competitiveness are important in striking the right balance between consumer demands for cash and ensuring that the sector is competitive so as to be sustainable over the long term.

Scrutiny and accountability of the regulators are also important. My right hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire (Dame Andrea Leadsom) complimented the Treasury Committee, and it is important to do so, but Select Committees have limited capacity to scrutinise the role of all regulators on all occasions. I should probably declare an interest as a member of the regulatory reform group that is working to reform the approach that regulators take, hence my comments on the international competitiveness of sectors in general. The regulatory reform group has highlighted that there could be a role within Parliament for a Joint Committee to scrutinise the activities of regulators, to ensure that measures such as the clauses on international competitiveness are lived up to and met.

Has the Minister formed a view about how the scrutiny referred to in the Bill can best be achieved, because clearly that will be not in the Bill but in regulations thereafter? It is up to the House to decide on how best to scrutinise this, but the Joint Committee as suggested by the regulatory reform group is a good starting point for the debate. Does the Minister recognise that there is a strong need for additional parliamentary scrutiny of the regulators, and not only in financial services, although this Bill enables him to comment on that sector? It is good to see that my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond), who also sits on the regulatory reform group, is present. Brexit has provided a great opportunity to deliver for many of our constituents, but it can only do so if the regulators take a different, more proactive and positive approach to supporting industries, rather than, as some might say, restricting them, in addition to the excellent work done by the Treasury Committee and other Select Committees thereafter.

I turn to chapter 2 generally and clauses 21 and 22 and clause 65 referring to cryptoassets and digital assets and distributed ledger technology, or stablecoins as others would refer to them. The Minister will be aware that I have raised cryptoassets and digital assets on a number of occasions and called for strong direction. I pay tribute to the Government, as the Bill gives the framework for a clear policy direction so that regulators can rightly support and offer confidence to those getting involved in the sector. This is also an opportunity to start delivering on some of the calls made in the Kalifa review and to provide the certainty that many seek as they research cryptoassets, digital assets and distributed ledger technology. When can we look forward to the strong policy direction that we need to ensure that the UK is ahead of the curve in this sector and repeats the fantastic success that the fintech sector has had as a result of the clear policy direction and framework given in the past?

[Stephen Hammond (Wimbledon) (Con)]

As many colleagues across the House have said, the Bill addresses one of our most important industries and therefore is one of the most important Bills we will be considering in this Session. At the outset the Government said their aim with the Bill was to make UK regulation appropriate and proportionate, to be internationally competitive, to boost growth and to enable better outcomes for consumers and business, and those themes come through strongly in the Lords amendments. I should have said at the outset that I refer the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests.

It was a pleasure to serve on the Bill Committee, which the Minister conducted in a constructive way, listening to a number of comments about accountability and transparency, which I shall come on to later. In Committee we spent a lot of time discussing financial inclusion, and the hon. Member for Glenrothes (Peter Grant) was critical of the Minister and rejected the proposal for having arrived late. Actually, that guard for financial inclusion is already in the substance of the consumer duty being digested and implemented by the FCA. Much as I am sometimes cautious about what a regulator says, the fact of the matter is that the regulator says that it has those powers already.

I will not detain the House on the work that the Minister has done on deforestation, because my right hon. Friend the Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling) has spoken about that more eloquently. I ask the House to think carefully and to support the Government’s amendments in lieu on the net zero objective, because the amendments in lieu sensibly ensure not only that the Bill builds on the Climate Change Act 2008 and the Environment Act 2021, but that regulators consider the exercise of their functions “relevant” to the making of such contributions. At I said at the outset, the Government intended the Bill to be both appropriate and proportionate, and for regulators conducting functions in this area, “relevant” seems to be a key point.

The Minister will know that throughout Committee, I was keen to discuss the secondary competitive objective and ensuring transparency and accountability. Throughout Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire (Craig Tracey) and I raised issues about membership of panels, metrics and the need for reports, and I congratulate the Minister on listening, because, with some of the amendments that he proposed on Report and the tranche of Government amendments coming from the Lords, the Bill has a lot of good. Much as I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Alun Cairns) that a Joint Committee of the House to scrutinise and hold the regulator transparent would be the perfect solution, I do not think we should let perfect get in the way of good, and there is a lot of good in this Bill, particularly with a number of the amendments that create a need for a report. I also congratulate the Minister on looking at the membership of panels. Far too often, there is a temptation of regulators to mark their own homework, and we must ensure that does not happen if the regulator is to be accountable and, therefore, regarded as effective.

It is clear that the secondary objective is a secondary objective, but if we are to have a thriving financial services industry in the future, this jurisdiction must enjoy international confidence and be internationally competitive. It has been said any number of times, but the costs of becoming a new entrant—with new applications, in some cases—are 14 times more than in other jurisdictions. That cannot be right. The movement in this Bill to sort that out and place a burden on the regulator for international competitiveness is key.

My final point, the Minister will not be surprised to hear, is that I am pleased to see what amendments 37 and 38 do. They seem utterly sensible and in line with the need, first, to be transparent, as in amendment 37, and secondly, to be appropriate and proportionate, as in amendment 38. When the Government produce the secondary legislation, I am keen that they define carefully the metrics for how the reports that the regulator produces are judged, to consist of operational effectiveness, the health of the market and the regulatory burden, as well as international comparisons, because that will be the key test of the Bill. I know he will take those things on board in future discussions. I look forward to supporting the Government this evening.

[Anna Firth (Southend West) (Con)]

I rise to speak in support of Lords amendments 72 to 77, which seek to protect the right to free cash access services for customers. I thank the Minister very much for his hard work in preserving this valuable resource and also for listening to and engaging with Back Benchers from all parts of the House.