Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting)
Siân Berry Excerpts(2 days, 23 hours ago)
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Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is great to see you back in the Chair to help us to make our way through the Bill, Ms Jardine. New clause 28 is a probing amendment, and I shall not press it to a Division when the time comes. To give the context for why I have tabled the new clause, I will lay out the experience faced by a young child—I cannot give many details of the case, as the Committee will appreciate.
This young child was below school age when they became the victim of and witness to abuse. They gave clear evidence on video at the time that it had happened, and while the case was investigated and awaiting trial in court, they continued with their childhood. Their mother helped them to move on from the abuse, and she says that the memory of what happened not being constantly brought back was a key part of their recovery. However, during the court case some years later, they were made to rewatch the video. By hearing their younger self talk about the abuse, they were, essentially, properly traumatised for the first time, as they for the first time properly understood, with a real, more mature understanding, what had happened to them in detail.
That case made me realise that the process of being cross-examined and watching back original, video-based evidence in chief, even just while the prosecution team refreshes their memory of their evidence, can do victims real harm. Although I can see why it may be necessary to cross-examine a witness on what happened, based either on their memory or facts stated in the evidence, I feel strongly that putting them through the additional trauma of rewatching it themselves is not necessary and should certainly not be routine, and that that should be in the law or guidance.
My new clause would amend sections 27 and 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which are intended to relate to special measures and directions. It would ask that witnesses not be obliged to watch video recordings of their earlier evidence, and would allow transcripts, as a potentially less traumatic alternative, to be submitted for cross-examination. It would also ask for notice of questions for cross-examination to be provided in good time. Although I understand that there is no legal obligation for the videos to be rewatched, I know that it is happening even when concerns have been expressed. I want to make sure that it is clearer in the law or relevant guidance that no witness or victim is obliged, against their will, to relive the crimes committed against them.
As I said, the new clause is probing. I am grateful that the Minister has looked into the issue, and has today committed to updating the guidance. I have corresponded with her departmental colleagues who are leading a review of the victims code, passing to them more details than I can mention here on that particular case and some ideas for how relevant guidance around special measures could be amended, as that could take the place of changes in primary legislation. I hope that my bringing this point to the Committee is constructive, and I thank the Minister for her attention.
Dr Mullan
As we have heard, clause 15 clarifies the use of pre-recorded evidence for cross-examination and re-examination, which is often referred to as section 28 evidence. Our courts frequently rely on recorded testimony to spare witnesses the trauma of a live trial, so the rules governing the editing and presentation of that evidence must be clear and robust.
Clause 15 provides clarification on the circumstances under which a video recording may be edited before it is admitted as evidence in a trial. Editing may be required if certain procedural requirements were not met during the recording being taken, or if specific portions of the material are deemed inadmissible or contrary to the interests of justice. The clause requires the court to perform a delicate balancing act, weighing any potential prejudice towards the accused against the desirability of presenting the whole, or substantially the whole, recorded examination.
A clearer statutory footing for editing is welcome, but it must be applied with consistency and transparency. If recorded evidence is to protect witnesses properly, the rules for its use must be as rigorous as those for live evidence. We must acknowledge, as we discussed earlier in respect of screens, the highly variable state of court technology. In my time on the Justice Committee, I visited courts and heard that they sometimes did not have the screens necessary to show evidence. There is a huge difference between a poky little TV of low granularity and a proper screen for showing video evidence to the jury.
Sir Brian Leveson’s review and others have highlighted that malfunctioning or substandard equipment can derail trials or create grounds for appeal when it comes to the use of pre-recorded evidence. Without reliable hardware and skilled technical staff—I also heard about the challenge when something goes wrong and there is no one available to fix it—the legal clarification in clause 15 will remain theoretical rather than practical.
My final point is about the guidelines, which the Minister talked about. We must ensure that they are sufficiently detailed, rigorous and standardised, so that, notwithstanding the further clarifications in the clause, they are suitably consistent in their application.
What are the Government’s current plans to address the technological challenge on the court estate in relation to section 28 recordings? What steps will be taken to ensure that all parties have time to review and potentially challenge edited versions of recordings before they are played to a jury? The ability to challenge is vital to ensuring consistency and fairness.
Siân Berry
I support this clause quite strongly. We heard powerfully from Claire Throssell in oral evidence how important its impact could be.
Most Members will have experiences like mine through casework of cases where this clause could help. I have heard from parents and family members so distressed at how their cases have been determined, despite clear evidence, where this presumption was obviously given far too much weight in decisions. These words in legislation, which were added and have had an influence on decisions, need to go.
I want to read parts of correspondence I received after the announcement in October 2025 that this measure was going to be changed. My constituent described it as an enormous relief. They were very impatient to know exactly when this was going to come forward. I am very pleased that we are discussing this now before the end of the Session.
My constituent said:
“I have personal experience of the impact the current legal framework can have. I am unable to provide specific information as a very close family member is still going through Family Court hearings to protect a child in a case of domestic abuse. However, as recently as January this year”—
this was in 2025—
“the aforementioned person was advised by two independent firms of solicitors to avoid the Family Court at all costs, due to the ‘presumption of involvement’, allied with the inconsistent and regionally patchy training and understanding by Family Court judges in domestic abuse (in spite of changes to the Domestic Abuse Act in 2021), referring to potential outcomes in Child Arrangements as ‘a lottery’.”
I really do support this clause. I also support the amendments in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester, which will help to tackle training gaps and which also reflect experiences that I can recall from casework. They are based on high-quality work and requests from organisations that work directly with victims and survivors, who have asked for these changes. I hope that the Minister will look at making changes that further strengthen the Bill in this way.
Rebecca Paul
I begin by echoing the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. I completely understand why the Government have brought this clause forward. I welcome the debate. Similar to the hon. Member for Chichester, who spoke so eloquently, I was deeply moved by the evidence we heard from Claire Throssell. I cannot even imagine how she has coped. To do what she has done and to try to take something positive from that is an incredible thing.
The evidence this Committee has heard from those witnesses and other survivors of domestic abuse is that they feel that the family courts have not properly identified risk and believe that a pro-contact culture has, at times, overridden safety. That is extremely concerning, and it is absolutely right that we take it extremely seriously.
Child safety must come first. Where the present framework has contributed to poor outcomes, it is right that the Government act, but it is also incumbent on us today to make sure that the clause that is being repealed is indeed the cause of the harm to those children. I also make the point that, where Parliament removes an existing statutory principle, it has a duty to be clear about what will replace it.
My concern today is less with the Government’s objective than with whether repeal on its own is sufficiently precise, evidence based and thought through to achieve the Ministers’ intended objective. The Government’s own impact assessment, which has already been set out, says that
“repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”,
even though it is expected to
“change the process judges follow”.
That is an important starting point for this debate. It is really important that we do not make changes to law because everyone wants us to make those changes and thinks that will improve things when, in reality, we have the evidence and facts to know that it may not deliver those outcomes.
It is incumbent on all of us to make sure that we actually deliver the outcomes that we all desire; we all have the same ambition. I know this comes from a good place and we are all approaching this debate in the best way we can to protect children. My purpose this afternoon is to be constructive—I am not saying I have all the answers on this, and I hope my comments will be taken in that spirit. If the Government proceed with repeal, do they also need to do more to provide a principles replacement framework, clearer guidance and stronger supporting reforms?
It is important to start with the facts around the presumption. The current presumption does not give any parent an automatic right to contact, override the welfare checklist or override the paramountcy principle in section 1 of the Children Act 1989, and it certainly does not require courts to make orders that place children at risk. The Family Services Foundation is clear in its written evidence that current law already places the child’s welfare first, stating:
“Section 1(6)…expressly ensures the presumption applies”
only where parental involvement
“does not put the child at risk of suffering harm”.
It says that practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already provide an important framework for identifying and responding to abuse in family proceedings.
Equally, I recognise the contrary concern expressed by survivors who say that, in abuse cases, the presumption can place pressure on courts to prioritise parental contact even where there are serious safety concerns and can make it harder for victims to be properly heard and protected. The real question is therefore not whether safety matters more than contact—it plainly does—but whether removing the current presumption will improve how risk is identified and acted upon, or whether it risks creating new uncertainty while leaving the deeper operational problems untouched and discouraging parental involvement in cases where it would actually be beneficial.
There are already substantial protections in the current legal framework, although they clearly fail in the worst way on occasion. The Family Services Foundation points out that the Children Act 1989, practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already equip the courts to restrict or refuse contact where “harm is shown”. It also reminds us that the UK is bound by the UN convention on the rights of the child, including article 9, which recognises that children should maintain regular contact with both parents unless that is
“contrary to the child’s best interests”.
Both Parents Matter makes a similar point, saying:
“The Presumption was introduced in 2014”
to reflect the UNCRC and provide a statutory benchmark that the safe involvement of both parents generally furthers child welfare. I emphasise the word “safe”—no one has ever said that parents should be involved if it is not safe. I make those points not to argue that nothing should change. If the Government are minded to proceed, we need a clear understanding of how the replacement framework will continue to distinguish between safe parental involvement, which can be beneficial, and unsafe parental involvement, which must be stopped. At present, I am not sure the Bill by itself gives enough reassurance on that point, and I am worried that safe parental contact will be discouraged.
That leads to one of the most important points of all. The Government’s own documents suggest that repeal alone may not be the solution that they are hoping it will be. As mentioned earlier, the impact assessment says,
“repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”,
although it is expected to change the process that judges follow. That is a significant admission. It suggests that if the Government want safer and better outcomes in family proceedings, repeal can be only part of the picture, and perhaps not the decisive part.
We should keep in mind that many of the awful failures that have rightly horrified people seem to be failures of risk assessment, information sharing, institutional practice, professional judgment and resourcing. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys puts it well:
“If abusive contact is being ordered or preserved inappropriately, then the concern lies with the quality of risk assessment, the speed and fairness of investigation, and the consistency with which courts and agencies apply the law.”
That is a useful and constructive way of putting the point. It does not deny the seriousness of the problem, but it does ask whether the solution is the right one. My concern is not that the Government want to strengthen protection; it is that repeal may be presented as more self-sufficient than, on the basis of the evidence, it really is.
I also think the Committee should be careful and candid about the strength of the evidence base behind repeal. Both Parents Matter says that the Government’s own review
“provided limited and inconclusive evidence of the impact of the Presumption. It could not determine how often the Presumption was applied in judgments, nor could it assess how harm…related to the application of the Presumption.”
It also criticises the underlying methodology:
“Quantitative analysis was based on only 245 court judgments, with over half from a single magistrates’ bench. Qualitative analysis involved only 29 parents.”
It added that the literature review
“examined only 55 studies, excluded all research published after April 2024,”
and omitted
“major studies showing positive outcomes”
from safe shared parenting and ongoing parental involvement.
Other evidence goes further, arguing that the Government review appears to have misunderstood or overstated the conclusions to be drawn from Professor Anja Steinbach’s work. I recall a striking line from Professor Steinbach, who said:
“There is plenty of research showing that contact with both parents is beneficial”,
and
“except for violence…contact with both parents is the baseline.”
I do not think that material should make the Committee cautious about treating the review as a fully settled or exhausted evidential platform for repeal.
Again, my point is not that that means that repeal must not happen; it is that we should not over-claim what the existing evidence can prove or support. I also think it is important to avoid turning this into a false choice between protecting children from abuse and supporting children to maintain safe relationships with both parents. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys says that the public debate often frames the issue in that way. However, it says:
“A good family justice system must do both. It must protect children and adult victims from abusive parents. It must also protect children from the avoidable loss of safe, loving, and important parental relationships.”
I think that is right.
The Family Services Foundation similarly said:
“reform should focus on enhancing the protections available, rather than creating conditions that may inadvertently prevent children from maintaining safe, meaningful relationships with their parents.”
That is why I urge the Minister not to present clause 17 as though all principled concern about repeal is somehow concern for parental rights over child safety. It is perfectly possible to support the Government’s child safety objective while asking whether the law should continue to recognise some clear and carefully framed way, where there is no established risk of harm, of enabling children to benefit from stable and safe relationships with both parents.
Several of the written submissions that we received raise concerns about unintended consequences if repeal proceeds without a clear replacement framework. Both Parents Matter warns:
“Removing this important statutory benchmark, and relying instead on practice and non statutory frameworks”
may increase uncertainty, inconsistency and conflict. The Family Services Foundation says something similar, warning that repeal may confuse frontline professionals, affect negotiations outside court, reduce the incentive for out-of-court resolution and, ultimately, increase strain on a family court system that is already under pressure. It notes that only a minority of separated families ever come before the courts, but many more families and professionals orient their expectations around the legal framework.
That is a serious point. Even if the court’s paramount consideration remains unchanged, removing a statutory starting point may still alter behaviour before a case ever reaches a final hearing. It may affect how solicitors advise, how CAFCASS frames disputes, how mediation is approached and how parents negotiate. With that point in mind, I hope that the Minister might be in a position to share some more detail on how she expects the changes to operate, and why she is confident that they will improve outcomes rather than simply shift conflict elsewhere.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting)
Siân Berry ExcerptsThursday 23rd April 2026
(2 days, 23 hours ago)
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Jess Brown-Fuller
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq.
Clause 7 and schedule 2 will restrict the right to appeal the decision of a magistrates court to the Crown court, and will change the process that those appeals go through. Currently, a defendant has an automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court against either conviction or sentence; in either case, the appeal is a hearing before a judge and two magistrates. The Bill will instead introduce a requirement for an application for permission to appeal based on written grounds. A Crown court judge will decide whether to grant permission, and the appeal hearing would be heard by a single judge. Instead of a rehearing, the appeal would be only on the issues on which permission is granted. If the appeal is against conviction, the judge must allow the appeal if the conviction is unsafe. If so, the judge may order a retrial in the magistrates court.
It is not unreasonable to have a conversation about the appeals process, especially as there is a small amount of evidence of the system being abused by a very small minority of defendants who believe that the appeal will be successful on the grounds that the victim or witnesses will refuse to go through the experience again. I absolutely recognise that, and we need to put essential safeguards into the criminal justice system to provide greater protection for those victims. We will be getting to the crux of that issue over the next days in Committee.
However, clause 7 and schedule 2 are blunt instruments that will harm access to justice. We cannot ignore the fact that although a very small number of cases from the magistrates—less than 1%—go to appeal, more than 40% of those are successful at appeal. Given that the magistrates court will be hearing more complex cases that carry higher sentences, the measures will increase the risk of miscarriages of justice. Touching the appeals process at this point is unnecessary when it is currently sparingly used. The Criminal Bar Association has argued:
“Access to justice will be harmed. Who is going to find the lawyers who have time to review transcripts of evidence and prepare grounds of appeal? Who is going to pay them for that work? What about the defendants who were ineligible for Legal Aid, because of the lower cut off for eligibility?”
We discussed the eligibility cut-off in the previous clause.
JUSTICE has raised similar concerns, stating that replacing the automatic right of appeal with a multi-stage permission system
“is complicated and highly likely to be inefficient”,
and will fail defendants who cannot navigate these processes, as laid out articulately and clearly by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden.
The current process means that appeals are heard by a judge and two magistrates. The opportunity for magistrates to sit with a Crown court judge to hear appeals is an important one, as it helps with the training of magistrates and drives up standards. Under the Bill, there are no circumstances in which lay justices would sit with professional judges. We are debating a number of amendments, some of which seek to restore the conditions we have right now—retaining the automatic right to appeal—and some that go further, although I think the shadow Minister suggested that he would not press them all to a vote.
I would appreciate the Minister’s explaining whether she thinks the processes being put in place by clause 7 and schedule 2 are compatible with the principles of access to justice that she has laid out previously in Committee. I remain gravely concerned that the measures will have a huge impact on the most vulnerable in society.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I am happy to have you back in the Chair today, Dr Huq. I wish to oppose the clause and the schedule. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden for pointing out so clearly that the restrictions on appeals will push down hardest on the least advantaged people and will compound injustices in wider society, as well as the injustices put in place by other clauses.
I will not reiterate in detail the evidence we heard, or the speeches I made previously, about the risks of more errors due to the speedier but rougher and readier justice of the magistrates courts being applied to more cases, or the risks arising from higher sentences. However, clause 7 adds yet more risk to the potential harm from reducing the right to select a jury trial in clause 1 and the restrictions put in place by other clauses. This is counterproductive for the overall courts workload, too.
As others have pointed out, the clause will introduce a multi-step process. We heard in oral evidence from Emma Torr of Appeal that the
“multi-step process…will only increase the workload of both the magistrates and Crown courts. To give a very brief outline of how it works at the moment, the defendant or the solicitor can fill out a very simple form, which results in a quick rehearing at the Crown court. It takes a couple of hours at most and even less for sentence appeals.”
She also pointed out that the Law Commission had carefully considered the matter last year in a consultation paper that ran to 700 pages. She said:
“Its independent analysis was that the removal of the automatic right to appeal will increase the workload of the magistrates court and the Crown court.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 83, Q174.]
In our oral evidence sessions, we heard clear views about the lack of legal aid in magistrates courts for people without representation to meet fairly the test set for appeals. Fiona Rutherford of JUSTICE told us:
“Without a lawyer being present, and of course without there even being the right to appeal directly, you are leaving a whole load of defendants, who may well be wrongly convicted or may get the wrong sentence for the crime they have committed, floundering…I simply don’t know who will inform these people about how they will put grounds of appeal together, what grounds of appeal even are, how you formulate those, what key points you need to make in them to persuade a Crown court judge sitting alone in a room with just some evidence papers and how to put your best case forward.” ––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 86, Q184.]
These are serious matters of injustice. I do not know how the least advantaged defendants will be able to do anything to use the application to the High Court for judicial review, which seems to be the only remedy that the Minister has put forward to us today. I do not know how many miscarriages of justice are acceptable to the Minister, but I believe that these measures must not form part of the Bill, because of the impact that they will have on the right to justice for too many people.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq. I do not support clause 7 or schedule 2. I welcome the debate on various amendments and the comments from the Minister.
Clause 7 and schedule 2 would replace the current automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court with a much narrower permission-based system. At present, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court can appeal to the Crown court against conviction or sentence, and that appeal is heard by way of a full rehearing, usually before a Crown court judge sitting with between two and four magistrates. About 40% of conviction appeals and 47% of sentence appeals succeed.
We are now being asked to introduce a system that would instead require permission for such appeals, would usually proceed on written grounds, would be heard by a single judge and would limit the grounds on which permission is granted. The Government say that that would save about 500 Crown court sitting days. I feel that I may be running out of ways to phrase this sentence, but yet again we are seeing a significant roll-back of an important safeguard, justified on the basis of a small hypothetical gain.
We should ask ourselves whether an important protection is being weakened for anything like a proportionate return. On clause 7, I do not believe that it is. I strongly emphasise that appeals are not historical oddities or a procedural quirk; they are one of the principal safeguards against the risks inherent in summary justice. The Bar Council is very clear:
“The proposed change would remove a vital safeguard against wrongful summary conviction and excessive (or unlawful) sentences imposed by magistrates. The consequence risks adding to the burden on the criminal courts rather than reducing it.”
It goes further and says that the current right
“does not appear to be exercised frivolously or vexatiously.”
The Law Society made similar points in its written evidence: it said that the automatic appeal route is a “vital safeguard” and that in 2024 it was used in 2,487 cases, overturning magistrates’ decisions in 41% of convictions and 44% of sentences. It describes about 1,000 miscarriages of justice as being corrected through that route. That is the central fact that the Government cannot really get around. If four in 10 conviction appeals and nearly half of sentence appeals succeed, that cannot be read as evidence that the appeals process is being abused. In fact, it is the opposite: the process is demonstrably being exercised appropriately.
I am deeply concerned that if we roll back the right to appeal, we will be locking the door on an unknown number of cases in which a conviction might have been found to be erroneous, but will now not be identified as such. That is an unknown number of miscarriages of justice not put right, and an unknown number of lives ruined. I am not willing to pay that price for the gain of 500 sitting days, and I cannot bring myself to believe that Government Members are differently inclined.
We do not particularly need to speculate about what the safeguards protect against, because we can point to recent examples. In the notorious Hamit Coskun case, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court of a section 5 public order offence had his conviction quashed on appeal to the Crown court. The appeal court found that the prosecution had failed to prove essential elements of the offence and stated plainly:
“For these reasons we allow this appeal and quash…conviction”.
That is the automatic appeal route doing exactly what it is supposed to do and correcting a conviction that should never have been imposed.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in support of amendment 17, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester. I acknowledge the progress that we have made on the issue; it has not been as fast or as good as personally I would like, but it has absolutely been progress. The hon. Member has laid out some of the important points.
The idea that we will record these proceedings and that the transcripts will exist, but that the victim cannot have them, is obviously not sustainable. If they do not exist at all and nobody has them, that is one thing, but when they are available and some people might be accessing them—defendants, for example—it is really not reasonable that victims cannot, for all the reasons that we have discussed in relation to the Crown court. The existence of recordings will make that less of an excuse. Again, the interaction of different elements of the Bill, with longer sentences, restricted appeals and more serious cases being heard, builds an even stronger case for victims to have access to the transcripts.
The hon. Member for Chichester mentioned the unduly lenient sentence scheme. As we talked about in the context of Crown court appeals and the current use of the scheme, it is pretty hard to appeal an unduly lenient sentence if we do not even have access to the route to sentencing that the judge laid out to explain why they gave the sentence that they did. In my understanding, we have a later amendment that asks for an expansion in the use of the scheme in order for it to be meaningful. We talk about the unduly lenient sentence scheme, but people cannot access it in the magistrates court, even though we are about to put more serious cases into that court. At the minute, people are able to access the scheme when a case is heard in the Crown court. For those reasons, we enthusiastically support the hon. Member’s amendment.
Siân Berry
I will speak briefly in support of the amendment, to which I have put my name. Later, I hope to speak about the real difference between viewing evidence—seeing it given in real life, or going into the room where evidence is given—and being able to review it more dispassionately later in writing. Given that we are now producing transcripts, the amendment would be an important measure to provide them free to victims who may want to see what has been said in court, without having to attend court and see it in a more triggering, more visceral way, and without facing a financial penalty. It is important that the amendment is agreed to, along with everything else, to allow for a more compassionate way to treat victims.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)
Siân Berry Excerpts(1 week, 2 days ago)
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Dr Mullan
Sorry—with confidence. The Minister says she is happy to go away and double-check. She should know for certain whether people have a right to a judicial review of an allocation decision in the Crown court, as in the magistrates court. She should be able to tell us that with absolute certainty.
I have been the Parliamentary Private Secretary for a Minister, passing notes between officials and the Minister. That is why debates are structured in the way they are: earlier in the debate, someone raises a point of importance in their opening remarks, and that gives time to the Minister, working with their officials. I absolutely accept that the Minister will not always have things at the tips of their fingers, but that is why the officials are there, to liaise with the Department. I am not criticising the officials, but why have we not had a direct note so that the Minister can get up and say, clearly and confidently, with absolute certainty, that there is a right of appeal to a Crown court allocation decision?
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I have to add my voice to the point that this is an unsatisfactory situation. We have heard time and again from the Minister that the decision about allocation will be made based only on the length of sentence, but in proposed new section 74C(7)(a) to (g) on reallocation—(g) allows for any other matters—there are many points that are quite subjective where decisions could be made on reallocation, and that could have a similar impact on someone’s life. I do not think we have all the answers we need about how this will work.
Dr Mullan
I absolutely agree. We will go on to discuss reallocation, and the hon. Member anticipates the points I was going to make. The reallocation decision is even more of a minefield, with all sorts of subjectivity and challengeable elements. I look forward to discussing that.
The PPS muttered earlier that I am patronising the Minister, but I think the Opposition are being patronised. We are being asked to vote on something where we have not had absolute clarity.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting)
Siân Berry Excerpts(1 week, 2 days ago)
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Rebecca Paul
I completely agree with the hon. Lady. She has set out a good example of the type of things that happen in reality. Life is not tidy, and unexpected things happen. As we look at the Bill and whether a sentence is over or under three years, it is easy to think in simple terms but, in reality, people who work in the justice system—I have not done so, but I have spoken to people who do—understand the movement and flexibility that is required. That is why amendment 24 works really well by taking that into account. The hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who drafted it, clearly has real-world experience of what actually happens in a courtroom.
The Bill already recognises elsewhere that there can be a relevant change of circumstances requiring the court to revisit allocation, so the Government’s own drafting accepts that these matters are dynamic rather than static. If that is so, why would we not want to build in a bit more foresight at the front end as well? Paragraph (f) in amendment 24 is not some wild departure from the structure of the Bill; it sits comfortably with the Government’s own recognition that allocation decisions can become unsound as a case develops. It is simply a more prudent and realistic approach to cases in which the true seriousness may emerge only over time.
Finally, the reference in amendment 24 to “other exceptional circumstances” is extremely important. No statute, however carefully drafted, can predict every factual scenario. That is especially true in criminal justice, where the facts and human consequences of a case can vary enormously. A residual exceptional circumstances test is therefore not a weakness; it is a mark of maturity in the law. It recognises that Parliament should not force judges into injustice. If the Government truly believe in justice rather than mere throughput, they should have no objection to preserving a narrow, exceptional route to jury trial where justice plainly demands it.
Amendment 39, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, deals with the alternative, broader approach to building flexibility into clause 3. It is an especially important amendment because it puts the issue in the clearest possible terms: those of natural justice. The amendment says that a trial should still be conducted with a jury where the defendant demonstrates that to be tried without one
“would amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice.”
That is an extremely modest safeguard. It would not wreck the clause; it would merely build in additional protection through allowing an element of judgment to decide the mode of trial. It would not restore the right to a jury trial in every either-way case; it simply says that where the injustice is plain, a jury trial must remain available. I struggle to see how any Government serious about fairness could object to that.
This is an issue of paramount importance on our side, and I hope on the Government’s side too. My hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle tabled amendment 39, as well as amendments elsewhere in the Bill—in relation to clause 1, in relation to reallocation under clause 3, and in relation to clause 4—to seek to protect natural justice. We will keep making these points. If Ministers insist on creating judge-only routes, they must at the very least accept a residual safeguard based on natural justice.
For all the reasons I have outlined, I support amendments 23, 39 and 24. They would deliver the additional safeguards needed, so I urge the Government to adopt either the Opposition’s amendment or the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is great to have you in the Chair, Dr Huq. I am looking forward to today’s debates. I have not tabled any amendments to clause 3, but I want to talk about some necessary changes to the clause that fit in with this group of amendments. I hope the Committee will have patience with me.
I want to raise again the principle of jury equity, which the Government are effectively abolishing by abolishing the right to elect a jury trial completely. I previously asked whether the Minister had considered the Bill’s impact on jury equity when drafting it, but she did not answer. I also asked whether the Minister could tell us whether we can honestly expect a judge triaging a case under the provisions in the Bill ever to allow a jury trial on the grounds on which some people currently choose one, which is to allow for the possibility of jury equity to achieve real and proportionate justice, rather than the criteria in clause 3.
This issue is complicated, and trying to fix it in the context of a Bill that includes clause 1, which abolishes the defendant’s right to choose, is tricky, which is why I spoke so strongly against it. The principle and the right of juries in respect of jury equity comes out of common law. I mentioned the 1670 case, and the High Court has commented that it has been a well-established principle in common law ever since then. As it is not in statute it is, by tradition, relatively unspoken. I spoke of the case of Trudi Warner, who tested the principle through her desire to make sure that the information about jury equity was seen by people taking part in a protest. She did that not just in case they spotted the plaque in the Old Bailey, but through the demonstration that she passively took part in.
Sarah Sackman
I have to make progress. Expanding the test for eligibility beyond seriousness would dilute the focus and risk undermining both the clarity of the allocation framework and the savings these reforms are designed to deliver. I therefore urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden to withdraw her amendment.
Amendment 39 would introduce a new route to jury trial, where the defendant demonstrates to the court that the circumstances of their case are such that to be tried without a jury would amount to a breach of principles of natural justice. As I have already said and sought to reassure the Committee, those principles of natural justice are, I believe, preserved in the reforms. Those include the right to a fair hearing, the rule against bias and the duty to act fairly and to give reasons where required. As such, I do not consider that the amendment would add substantive protection beyond the safeguards already in place.
I want to pick up on one or two of the points raised earlier in the debate. There was an exchange between the hon. Members for Reigate and for Chichester relating to change of circumstances. That is dealt with in clause 3, which makes provision that where a charge is added to an indictment—an indictable-only charge—the case would be reallocated to a jury trial. Similarly, there are change of circumstances provisions where there is material new evidence meaning that the judge can make a decision that a case should be more appropriately heard before a jury. That is provided for and is intended to meet the sorts of complex scenarios that both hon. Members raised.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion raised again with me the issue of jury equity. I have heard the arguments. I have listened carefully to her as she has raised them on a number of occasions and I listened to the witness who raised them as well, but we do not think it is appropriate to make a specific carve-out for a specific category of offences in this context.
Finally, the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle raised again with me the argument that we either do not need to do any of this, or we should wait to see how our other measures pan out—the huge investment in lifting the cap on sitting days and in legal aid, the workforce and the efficiency drive.
Siân Berry
I appreciate the Minister’s comments, but will she clarify what she meant by a particular category of offence? I could not have been clearer in my speech that I did not want to make an exception for protesters. I spoke specifically about people being prosecuted in cases where it was the powerful versus the underdog. Will she clarify what it is she is rejecting?
Sarah Sackman
I am rejecting the addition of any other carve-outs or exceptions beyond the test of seriousness that we lay down in these measures, which is dictated by the likely sentence, the test proposed by the independent review of the criminal courts.
Siân Berry
On a point of order, Dr Huq. I alerted the Minister earlier to the fact that I was going to say this. I want to ask what can be done to correct the record in respect of the Minister’s comments about a case that I referred to in my speeches on Tuesday and that Tim Crosland referred to during evidence. On Tuesday, the Minister said that
“some of the cases he mentioned, including the Elbit Systems trial, which the hon. Lady mentioned, contained an indictable-only charge, meaning that the case would receive a jury trial, as that one did in fact.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 14 April 2026; c. 140.]
I am afraid that the Minister was referring to a different case from the one I was referring to. The recent case that has been in the news surrounding a retrial was related to a break-in at Elbit Systems in August 2024. The November 2022 jury acquittal that I referred to was about protesters who threw red paint symbolising blood at the London headquarters of Elbit Systems in October 2020. In that case, none of the offences was indictable-only; they were all related to criminal damage. I just wanted to put that on the record, and I hope that the Minister will accept that correction to her comments.
Sarah Sackman
Further to that point of order, Dr Huq. I am happy to respond. We were probably at cross purposes. There was obviously a very high-profile case, which is the one that I thought the hon. Lady was referring to when she mentioned Elbit Systems. That did involve the indictable-only charges of aggravated burglary and grievous bodily harm with intent, but if she was referring to a different case and we were at cross purposes, I am happy to correct that aspect of the record.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Stephen Morgan.)
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)
Siân Berry Excerpts(1 week, 4 days ago)
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The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. As I was saying earlier, when I was cut off mid-flow, clause 1 supports a more efficient use of court resources by preventing cases of lower-level seriousness from escalating unnecessarily to the Crown court. I was responding to the point made by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about jury equity. Her comments and those of others, most notably the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle, concerned the question of whether one should look at the characteristics of the defendant when allocating the mode of trial, rather than the seriousness of the crime, which is the objective test we have included in clause 1.
In essence, the approach taken is an objective one, and it adheres to the principle of equality of treatment when it comes to the mode of trial, because it is driven by the seriousness of the crime. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion made a point about freedom of expression and the right to protest, and they of course make up a cornerstone of our democracy, but some public order offences, depending on their seriousness, are currently heard in the magistrates court and some will be heard with a jury trial. That will remain the case, although of course some, depending on their seriousness and the likely sentence, might be heard by the Crown court bench division.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
Tim Crosland’s point was that the Government are, in effect, abolishing the principle of jury equity. Can the Minister tell us that we cannot ever expect a judge to triage a case based on the fact that the true interests of justice might lie with a defendant relying on the principle of jury equity? Will she admit that the principle of jury equity is being abolished by the clause?
Sarah Sackman
I heard the evidence from Tim Crosland. I put to him that some of the cases he mentioned, including the Elbit Systems trial, which the hon. Lady mentioned, contained an indictable-only charge, meaning that the case would receive a jury trial, as that one did in fact. Some cases will go to the Crown court bench division and will therefore be heard in front of a judge.
The point is that the seriousness of the offence and the likely sentence make up the applicable test under the Bill, rather than who the defendant happens to be, their past history or the particular type of offence. The objective test is the same, regardless of whether the defendant is a young person from a working-class background, a young person of colour from a particular marginalised community, a practising solicitor or an environmental campaigner. Under the processes, they will all be treated equally. We are not creating carve-outs for particular types of offences or particular kinds of defendants; the seriousness of the case is determined by the court through the application of the test, and that is what determines the mode of trial.
Sarah Sackman
No, it has a total air of unreality. If we look at the current system, I think we all agree that it is not working for any participant in the system. It cannot be when there is a backlog of 80,000 and above and we hear the stories we are all familiar with, which hon. Members have put to me, whether they are supportive or not, about the delays in the system, the creaking courts and the more than 1,000 trials that did not go ahead on the scheduled day because of an absence of either a prosecuting or a defence barrister. We are trying to rectify that with our investment in the workforce.
We have to make decisions about the system as we find it, not as we might dream it to be in some academic seminar. The fact is that we have all made a choice, because 90% of trials in this country are already undertaken by magistrates. As I said, I do not think anyone is seriously suggesting that those are not fair. The state’s obligation is to guarantee a fair trial. Whether those trials are heard by lay magistrates or by a district judge, they uphold principles of natural justice. I do not understand why anyone would say that the trials that take place day in, day out in our magistrates courts do not uphold principles of natural justice and article 6 of the European convention on human rights—which, by the way, includes the obligation to conduct criminal trials within a reasonable time. The importance of timeliness, and the inherent importance of timeliness to a fair hearing, is enshrined explicitly in article 6.
The state’s obligation is to ensure that fair trial—it is not a jury trial in every case—and we have always made that threshold decision. The removal of a defendant’s ability to insist on their choice of trial venue does not change that. The right to elect does not exist under the Scottish legal system, for example, and no one would seriously suggest that the Scottish legal system offends the principles of natural justice. Our justice system is rightly respected around the world, irrespective of where a case is heard.
Siân Berry
The Minister has made many points about magistrates court hearings being as fair, but she seems to have forgotten the amount of evidence we heard during the oral evidence sessions. Witnesses acknowledged that magistrate court hearings were “rough and ready” and “rough around the edges”, that mistakes may be made, and that the Bill later removes the automatic right to appeal, which is an important safeguard against what she must admit is the slightly inferior justice that can be found in the magistrates courts. Will she not admit that and talk more about the appeals situation?
Sarah Sackman
No, I will not accept that it is inferior. I maintain the position that it is proportionate to the severity of the cases currently dealt with in the magistrates court. When asked why they want to retain jury trials, and timely jury trials for the most serious crimes, the Opposition seem to be arguing that one of the virtues of the jury system is citizen participation. But our lay magistrates are also citizens. An amendment that we will come to later argues that magistrates should be in the Crown court bench division. The rationale that lay participation would be better lies behind that, but—
Sarah Sackman
Let me finish my point. I find it incongruous and arguably inconsistent when I hear Members say that the ideal form of the system is citizen participation in the form of a jury, only to then, all of a sudden, describe lay magistrates hearing summary-only trials—which they do fairly, day in, day out—as somehow inferior, because that is also citizen participation. [Interruption.] I do not know if the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion is asking me to give way again, but I shall do so.
Siân Berry
Apologies to the Minister for heckling. The point about the right of appeal is absolutely key. If mistakes are made in the magistrates court, it is currently the case that they are corrected at quite a rate. We heard evidence on that. Those two things give Opposition Members genuine and legitimate cause for concern.
Sarah Sackman
On that specific point about appeals, a tiny fraction of cases—I do not have the figure in front of me, but I am happy to share it later—are appeals to the Crown court. The hon. Lady is right that we heard evidence that a significant proportion of those— I think it is around 40%—are successful. I expect them to continue to be successful under the reformed system, which introduces a permission filter. All the permission filter does is root out unarguable cases in a way that is consistent with the appeals process in the Crown court and in civil jurisdiction.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting)
Siân Berry Excerpts(1 week, 4 days ago)
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Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is great to see you in the Chair today, Ms Jardine. I oppose clause 1 and its many implications for justice. It takes away the defendant’s right to elect a trial by jury for all either-way offences, which, according to the Bill’s impact assessment, will reduce jury trials by half. That is no minor thing, and I agree with the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle that clause 1 must be removed from the Bill, as well as clauses 2 to 7, which we will debate later.
Compared with the removal of half of jury trials, there would be a highly contested and—in the Government’s own estimates—much smaller impact on efficiency in the courts. There is also the potential for the workload in the magistrates court and the Crown court to increase beyond what is estimated. As Emma Torr from APPEAL highlighted during our oral evidence session, this will include new allocation processes and new multi-step processes for considering appeals, and the need for judges to spend time outlining reasons for their decisions, which juries do not have to do. The chair of the Bar Council of England and Wales also told us about the impact on confidence in the system, stating:
“Overall, the jury system is seen as the only part that still works, so why are we focusing on that? We want to focus on all those aspects that will reduce delays now, rather than hacking at a constitutional cornerstone, which also reflects community participation.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 40, Q72.]
This cutback in jury trials is not the measure promised to victims of sexual and domestic violence in the Labour manifesto, and later we will consider amendments that would what was promised. This cut is not a measure that will, under the current system, help victims through more compassionate and better trained court processes, or by improving outdated buildings where they currently risk contact with their abusers. The lack of legal support for magistrates court processes could, as we heard from the head of JUSTICE, lead to more victims being cross-examined by their own abusers.
We heard clearly from the leaders of the circuits that those working in criminal justice day in, day out have not yet been able to employ the real efficiencies that could come with more investment and innovation, and that would bring down the backlog without the measures in the clause. Those include the better user of technology, more sitting days, blitz courts and improvements at the investigation stage. I believe that we must act on the backlog, but that must start with those measures and the increased investment that is needed to correct what the chair of the Bar Council told us about investment under successive Governments. She said:
“We saw a rapid cutting of MOJ funding between 2009-10 and 2022-23: it declined by 22.4%. We are about 30% below where we should be.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 41, Q75.]
The main point I want to express today is my concern about the motivation behind the choices that the Government have made in these proposals by taking up, and deviating from, the recommendations of the independent review of the criminal courts in a particular way, and about how the severe erosion of the principle of jury equity can apply to certain types of defendants and certain offences in a way that I suspect this clause is aimed at. That really eats away at a constitutional cornerstone in a truly historic way. It eats away at the principle of jury equity.
We know that jury trials are more often chosen by black and other minority defendants, and that public confidence in a jury of their peers to see through institutional biases is real. We know that defendants whose crimes have been protests, motivated by the public interest and committed to expose or impede powerful corporate or corrupt organisations and practices, also feel this way.
Tim Crosland’s oral evidence on behalf the campaign group Defend Our Juries, which was set up before this Bill was proposed in anticipation of an attack on jury trials, told us about key recent protest cases where juries have chosen acquittal and applied the principle of jury equity in practice. Those included:
“In April 2021, the Shell six, who had spray painted “Shell Lies” on Shell headquarters, were acquitted by a jury. In January 2022, the Colston four, who toppled the statue of the slave trader Edward Colston into Bristol harbour, were acquitted by a jury. In November 2022, members of Palestine Action, who had defaced Elbit Systems—suppliers of drones to the Israel Defence Forces—were acquitted by a jury. In January 2023, members of Insulate Britain were acquitted by a jury for blocking roads.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 89, Q192.]
Tim Crosland told us how the principle of jury equity is there to apply to cases of conscience in which people’s actions were motivated by the public interest. He told us about the High Court’s 2024 judgment in the case of 69-year-old retired social worker Trudi Warner, who had displayed information about the principle outside a court hearing a protest case. It is worth our listening to more details of what was said in that judgment. Paragraph 16 discusses how the principle of jury equity is well established in our common law and recognised across the common law world. The judge gives several examples from Canada, New Zealand and the United States of the principle being applied. The judgment also talks about how its origins lie in Bushel’s case, from 1670, which
“arose out of the prosecution of two Quaker preachers for holding an unlawful assembly. The Recorder of London, presiding at the trial, directed the jury to convict. The jury refused. They were fined and imprisoned until payment. It was this imprisonment that the jurors successfully challenged by habeas corpus, on the basis that juries have a right to find facts and apply the law to those facts according to conscience and without reprisal.”
The judgment also quotes Lord Bingham, in another landmark judgment, on the principle’s history. He states that
“the acquittals of such high-profile defendants as Ponting, Randle and Pottle have been quite as much welcomed as resented by the public, which over many centuries has adhered tenaciously to its historic choice that decisions on the guilt of defendants charged with serious crime should rest with a jury of lay people, randomly selected, and not with professional judges.”
He added:
“I know of no other real checks that exist today upon the power of the executive.”
In my speech on Second Reading, I pointed out that a number of offences created recently to react to successful direct action protests now sit in the triable either-way category. They include, in the Public Order Act 2023, new offences about interference with key national infrastructure, including blocking roads, and specific offences about causing serious disruption by tunnelling; and, in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, the offence of causing public nuisance, which replaced a common law offence and applies a higher penalty for acts that create serious annoyance or inconvenience, such as noisy protests.
Importantly, Tim Crosland pointed out to us in his oral evidence that the choices the Government have made in how to implement this measure will serve to virtually eliminate jury equity in practice. He told us that, of the more than 200 people jailed in the past few years for peaceful protest, only one has been jailed for more than three years. In that light, it is suspicious that the Government have chosen three years as the threshold in the Bill, despite the Leveson report’s recommendation of two years. Sir Brian also recommended raising the financial threshold below which criminal damage—often how direct action protests are charged—is charged as a summary offence and kept in the magistrates court, where sentences are limited, but the Government are not raising that threshold. Sir Brian also said that restricting the right to elect for jury trial was
“contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at the current…12 months”,
but the Government propose powers to increase them instead. He also recommended that the new bench division should sit with a judge and two magistrates, to maintain a lay element in these Crown court cases, but the Government have chosen to ignore that, too.
As far as the recent examples of cases in which jury equity has been applied are concerned, all those deviations from the recommendations point in the same way. In the light of evidence that other measures would be more effective at backlog reduction, it therefore seems to me that at least one motivation for adopting this measure is to stop the embarrassment of jury equity. I did not get the chance to ask the Minister about this during the oral evidence, but has she discussed with colleagues, companies or other interests targeted by protesters the implications and impact of the Bill and this clause, in deviating from the Leveson recommendations in the way that it does, on the important principle of jury equity?
Finally, on Second Reading, I raised the question of whether these measures are yet another part of a package of the Government’s wider attacks on civil liberties. I have described this package as a “toolkit for tyrants” that includes
“digital ID, facial recognition surveillance on our streets and the erosion of fundamental asylum rights—all things contrary to our British values and which should not be packaged up for this or any future Government to use against minorities…and dissidents.”—[Official Report, 10 March 2026; Vol. 782, c. 249-250.]
I would like the Minister to reflect on the potential future impact of this attack on jury equity under a much worse Government.
Alex McIntyre
While we are on the subject of British values, is the Green party in Westminster’s position that criminals should go to jail? A Green party candidate in Scotland has said that they should close all the prisons in Scotland. Can she clarify the Green party’s position on that for the Committee?
Siân Berry
The Scottish Green party is a separate party from the Green party of England and Wales, so I cannot vouch for its policies. However, the Green party’s justice policies look in the round at what is effective in reducing crime, rehabilitating offenders and improving society, based on evidence. I am sure that the Scottish Green party have those principles in mind with any policy it puts forward.
That is the end of what I was planning to say, and I hope we will hear more from the Minister about the erosion of jury equity and what Tim Crosland, in relation to the Bill, called its complete elimination. This will be an important effect of what is being proposed, and it has not had enough debate as yet.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)
Before I turn to the substance of this clause, I want to begin by setting out the perspective from which I speak. Before entering Parliament, I worked as a prosecutor for more than 14 years. During that time, I dealt with a wide range of serious cases, including sexual abuse, rape, domestic violence, historical child abuse and cases involving families and vulnerable victims.
On a daily basis, I saw at first hand the impact of the criminal justice system on victims, witnesses and their families, as well as their emotions, their concerns and the importance of ensuring that justice is done fairly and transparently. Although I have not practised in recent years, my understanding of the system remains current. I remain in regular contact with practitioners, including solicitors, barristers, members of the judiciary and colleagues in the CPS, and I continue to follow closely what is happening in both the magistrates court and the Crown court.
In addition, during my time as a shadow Justice Minister, I worked on issues relating to prisons, probation and the courts, and I have seen how changes in the system, including the increased use of technology, remote hearings and the handling of evidence, have affected the way that justice is delivered. So I speak on this Bill from a position of experience and of ongoing engagement with the criminal justice system. Colleagues will be relieved to know that I will not be repeating this preamble in any future contributions.
Let me begin by addressing what lies at the heart of this Bill: the restriction of jury trials. Trial by jury is not a procedural detail; it is one of the most fundamental safeguards in our justice system. It reflects the simple but powerful principle that when the state seeks to take away a person’s liberty, that decision should not rest with the state alone, but with ordinary citizens—a jury of their peers.
That principle has a deep constitutional root—from Bushel’s case in 1670, which established the independence of juries, to its role across the common law world, trial by jury has long stood as a protection against arbitrary power. That is not just a feature of our legal system, but a principle reflected across the common law jurisdiction and a recognition that justice must be seen to be done and must not rely solely on the state. It is also one of the reasons that the public has confidence in our system.
The proposal in clause 1 to remove the right to elect a jury trial is not a trivial matter. It covers offences such as theft, fraud and stalking that carry real-life consequences, including custodial sentences, reputational harm and long-term impacts on people’s lives. The Government argue that the measure is necessary to deal with the delay in the system. I have great sympathy with the Government about the massive delay in the court system but, respectfully, jury trials are not causing that delay.
Sarah Sackman
I am not sure who to give way to, but I will give way first to the hon. Lady—I will try to be as fair as I can.
Siân Berry
We are debating clause 1, which as I understand it will completely remove defendants’ right to elect; the rest of the Bill puts in place procedures whereby other people—judges—will decide whether a jury trial is held. The right to elect a jury trial is being completely abolished. Is that not correct?
Sarah Sackman
The hon. Member is right. Where currently a defendant charged with a triable either-way offence has the ability to choose trial by jury in the Crown court, even in a scenario in which a magistrates court has accepted jurisdiction over their case, that ability to choose is removed by clause 1. Currently, defendants do not need to justify that choice; presumably they choose it because they consider that they will derive some advantage from it. The reform that we are making is to remove that ability to choose and, rather, to place the responsibility with the court to allocate the mode of trial according to the seriousness of the offence.
There was much discussion raised by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle, and I believe one or two others, about the approach, and whether we should have an approach driven by the characteristics of a particular defendant—whether they are of good character, whether they have previous convictions—but that is not the approach we have chosen to take. The approach we have chosen to take is one in which it is the expert court, independently, that is triaging the case and allocating mode of trial based on the seriousness of the case. The best and most objective proxy for that is the likely sentence and the allocation guidelines, much in the same way as magistrates currently allocate trials in their mode of trial hearings.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (First sitting)
Siân Berry ExcerptsWednesday 25th March 2026
(1 month ago)
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Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
Q
Dame Vera Baird: No, it is not. It has been, I am afraid, ramped up outside these rooms, with all these Churchillian speeches suggesting that jury trial is being taken away, full stop. That is completely untrue, as you rightly say.
Siân Berry
Q
Professor Hohl: One thing to remember here is that over 90% of domestic abuse cases are already heard in the magistrates court. VAWG comprises not just sexual violence; it includes domestic abuse, sexual violence and sexual offences. There are some that will be in the either-way category.
We have had a really emotive conversation this morning. One of the issues is judge-alone versus jury trials, and there is a lot of emotion on either side. When we look back at the actual research, there is mention that judges may have biases, and a judge-alone trial may disadvantage people. If that is the genuine concern, why are we happy to accept that for sentencing and admissibility? Why is it that in all the law we are making to guide admissibility of evidence, we trust a judge to separate between myth and stereotypes and facts, but not a jury? If we are genuine about it, we have to go a lot further around oversight and accountability in the judiciary. It would be odd to just worry about it on that specific issue.
I would also like the Committee to consider the evidence around juries. This is not to cast shade on juries but to pause and look at the research, which shows that juries, too, have biases, and there are worries about myths and misconceptions. The research on juries shows that these problems exist there, too. These issues exist with judges and juries. The remedy is not going to be either holding on to the status quo or not. The remedy will be something utterly outside of the discussion we are having that is about accountability and oversight.
Some of the measures in the Bill go that way—for example, recording creates transparency, and judges having to spell out the reasons for their verdict also goes towards that. The debate has moved a really long way away from what the research actually tells us, to quite an emotive batting to and fro. If there is space for the Committee to consider that wider evidence, I would recommend it is looked at.
John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)
Q
Professor Hohl: This is an unanswerable question. What is fairness? [Interruption.] Well, it is an answerable question, but not a black and white one. We have heard this morning about a separation between the speediness of justice and the fairness of justice, as if they were two different things, when all the research shows that, for both defendants and victims, the time taken is part of justice. To artificially separate them does not work.
The way we measure the fairness of the system is about due process, not about outcomes. We cannot measure fairness through conviction and acquittal rates. The way our system is set up is about due process. Due process is not taking place when the system is on its knees, so getting the system to function better, so that due process can take place, should lead to a fairer system—provided that the Bill functions as intended.
Courts and Tribunals Bill
Siân Berry ExcerptsTuesday 10th March 2026
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
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Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It was a privilege to be here for the powerful and effective speech from the hon. Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols).
When literally thousands of venerable members of the legal profession are saying so clearly that jury trial restrictions will not be effective or practical and may be counterproductive, and that they threaten our rights, surely the Government must listen. The Green party’s reasoned amendment sets out clear reasons for the awful court backlog that is letting down so many victims—it talks about Conservative underfunding over many years—and sets out the missing resources that will help to properly solve it. It is rare for us to agree with some colleagues on anything, but the fact is that we are all right on this point. We need alternatives to the restrictions on jury trials in the Bill, including intensive listings, more sitting days, legal aid investment, better buildings and better services to deliver defendants to court.
The Green amendment also raises the question of whether these measures are yet another part of the Government’s wider attack on civil liberties. They are building a toolkit for tyrants also out of digital ID, facial recognition surveillance on our streets and the erosion of fundamental asylum rights—all things contrary to our British values and which should not be packaged up for this or any future Government to use against minorities, protesters and dissidents. This is all so dangerous. Can the Minister truly deny that the growing acceptance by juries of defences of proportionality or necessity in some protest cases was not a factor in the inclusion of the unnecessary and dangerous curtailment of jury trials in the Bill?
The category of triable either-way cases where jury trials will be restricted includes several of the specific offences created or made more serious by successive Governments in the wake of successful non-violent protest action. By successful, I mean non-violent actions that have—yes—caused inconvenience but which did what non-violent direct action is for: directly aiming to prevent harm to people or the environment, or to create a stir that raises public awareness of serious injustice. Actions made into more serious offences have included interference with infrastructure, blocking roads or demonstrating in airports, specific tunnelling offences, conspiracy to lock on to each other during protests, or symbolically using statues in actions, as well as some kinds of noisy protests—for being annoying.
Along with the wider principle here, I am so concerned, in connection with rights and liberties around dissent and resistance to state power, that juries could no longer be able to judge the public interest or proportionality of the actions of defendants of these kinds of charges. Such people have achieved so much progress throughout our history—that, nobody can deny. The Bill should not affect our citizens’ rights in this way. It should be about real investment in our courts to ensure that justice is not delayed for the victims, who we all care about.
Oral Answers to Questions
Siân Berry Excerpts(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
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Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Jake Richards)
Decisions on remand and sentence length are made by judges independently of Government, and it would be wholly wrong for a Government to intervene in a judicial matter.
Siân Berry
I am disappointed that the Minister has not acknowledged the real harm and suffering that is going on, which is an obvious consequence of the escalation by Ministers of the number of crimes with which people taking protest action are being charged. Does he not agree that incarcerating people for long months and years without trial for offences that are in essence political has no in-principle place in a democracy such as ours?
Jake Richards
I do accept that there are issues with remand, which are caused by the huge backlog in the court system which this Government are trying to fix. I look forward to seeing the hon. Lady and her colleagues in the Green party support our proposals when they are introduced next month by the Minister for Courts and Legal Services, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green (Sarah Sackman).
Jury Trials
Siân Berry Excerpts(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)
From prepping for this debate, I know that the policy is one that tries to solve an administrative problem by simply changing a principle. The three areas I will try to cover—we will see how I get on—are the principle, the policy process and the practical side.
To deal with the principle first, we have heard a number of times that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay does harm trust and it can prolong suffering, but justice done wrongly corrupts the system itself. The Justice Secretary knows that, as in his own Lammy report he said that juries act as “a filter for prejudice” during trials.
Moving on to the policy process, on the one hand the Government are saying that the policy is much needed to help with the admin side, but on the other hand they are saying that these are very small changes. We only have to look at the letter written by the Secretary of State to the Justice Committee to pull some of that apart. It states:
“Of the c.3% of criminal trial cases that proceed to a jury trial in the Crown Court, over half would still proceed to the Crown Court and get a jury trial post-reform.”
However, later it says:
“An alternative way of expressing impacts is to account for cases that will be retained in the magistrates’ courts after the reforms. Based on projected case volumes and case mix, of those cases that still proceed to the Crown Court post-reforms, around three-quarters of them are still expected to be allocated a jury trial.”
So we already have a discrepancy, in the same paragraph of the letter, in what the numbers are.
The question, “Has any modelling been done?”, has been asked multiple times. We again know from the letter addressed to the Committee that modelling has been done, because it says:
“The assumptions underpinning the modelling of the reforms I announced last week are subject to the Concordat process that agrees sitting days with the judiciary and it would be improper to pre-empt the conclusion of this process.”
In short, modelling has been done, so if Ministers want to strengthen their argument, why would they not produce that modelling? When we have asked the Minister who is at the Dispatch Box—she was asked again by my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (James Wild), for the seventh time—whether an impact assessment has been done and not released, or is being done and will be brought forward, we have not got an answer. One would have thought that if you had done the work—
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I am also grateful for the motion and for the opportunity to object, cross-party, to the restrictions on our important rights to a trial by jury. I was, however, hoping that the Conservatives would, in this debate, admit some real responsibility for the awful state of our criminal justice system. Will he correct that gap in any further way in his contribution?
Dr Evans
I refer the hon. Lady directly to the opening speech. If she sits and reads Hansard, it was very much different regarding that point.
I will move on to the other practical points we need to talk about—some even in the letter—about process. For example, the letter states:
“judges will assess the likely sentence in accordance with the Sentencing Guidelines. They will consider the facts of the case to make a determination of likely culpability, harm”—
and so on. It then goes on to say:
“eligibility is based on likely sentence length, any triable either-way offence could be in scope of the CCBD, if it were likely to receive a sentence of 3 years or less”.
What happens if the judge decides that they would not go to a jury trial? Later on, the same letter states:
“judges will retain the full sentencing powers available in the Crown Court, meaning there is no restriction on the sentence that can be handed down in the case.”
That points out the fact that a judge could make a decision at pre-hearing that the case need not go to trial because the sentence will be less than three years, and after that find out that the sentence will actually be five, six or seven years. There is a real discrepancy.
The letter also states:
“As you know, we do not have minimum sentences in law.”
That is demonstrably not true—think about drug trafficking, firearms or repeat knife offences. We only have to look at section 28 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, which talks about how using a knife for a second time will result in a minimum of six months. That was codified and updated in section 315 of the Sentencing Act 2020. The letter is filled with holes.
I thank Joanna Hardy-Susskind, who has pointed out a lot of these issues. She has done a lot of working explaining that the MOJ does not even understand the letters it is putting out in defence of this policy. If the Ministry was to release the modelling and the impact assessment, it could demonstrate to us all why we should make the change.
I am running short of time to talk about the practicality, so I will close where I started.