Middle East: Defence

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 9th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

Order. Members will have noticed that there are still a lot of people on their feet. I am aiming to finish this statement at around 6.45 pm. I call Richard Foord.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

The Secretary of State made the distinction between permitting the use of British bases for offensive action and for defensive action. I understand the need to protect and defend British citizens in the middle east, but can the Secretary of State explain how he is seeking to maintain this distinction between offensive and defensive action, given that it would require a degree of control over US military activity that the British Government may not possess?

[John Healey]

The hon. Gentleman is a military man by experience. He will understand the nature of the requests that nations make of each other, the agreements that they put in place and how those work. Accessing, basing, overflights—that is exactly the request that we had when it was clear that the Iranian response to the first wave of attacks took us into a new phase. It was a request from the US that we allow US bombers to operate from Fairford and Diego Garcia for specific defensive purposes: to take out the Iranian missile positions. That is what they are doing.

NATO and the High Arctic

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Westminster Hall

[Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)]

As ever, Dr Huq, it is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I thank the hon. and gallant Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for securing this geostrategically important debate and drawing this issue to the attention of the House.

At a moment when the world’s attention is understandably distracted and drawn to other parts of the world—whether to the brutal war in eastern Europe or the escalating tensions in the middle east—it would be all too easy to park an issue such as this and see it, perhaps, as something for the future rather than as something for immediate attention. I contend, however, that that would be an enormous strategic error; history, after all, has a terrible habit of punishing those who overlook the vital importance of geography.

The opening up of the Arctic is undoubtedly one of the most consequential geopolitical shifts of the 21st century. As we know, climate change is transforming the region at extraordinary speed. Retreating sea ice is opening new maritime routes and increasing access to energy resources and critical minerals, drawing renewed strategic interest from major powers.

At the same time, the co-operative governance structures that once defined the Arctic are under strain. For much of the post-cold war period, the region was described as “High North, low tension”. That description no longer holds. The era of Arctic exceptionalism seems to be over. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fractured the Arctic Council and accelerated the wider geopolitical tensions that now shape the region. Strategic competition is returning to the High North—not as a distant possibility, but as a clear and present reality.

Although the United Kingdom is not an Arctic coastal state, we are undeniably a near-Arctic nation. We are geographically proximate, strategically exposed and directly affected by developments in the High North. Instability in the Arctic affects our maritime approaches, north Atlantic shipping lanes, subsea cables, offshore energy infrastructure, and ultimately the deterrent posture of the Royal Navy. For the United Kingdom, the Arctic is not a remote frontier; it is part of our immediate strategic environment.

A few weeks ago, I had the enormous privilege of visiting Greenland and Denmark, alongside my Liberal Democrat colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for Bicester and Woodstock (Calum Miller). I can report that in Nuuk, Greenland’s capital, life often appears outwardly calm. The harbour is busy and the cafés are full. The rhythms of daily life continue, despite the long Arctic winter and the limited daylight available in February, when I was there. However, anyone spending any time talking to Greenlanders will hear something quite different: a persistent and gnawing anxiety about what might be coming down the tracks from not Moscow or Beijing—nobody realistically thinks that either Russia or China pose an immediate threat to Greenland—but, extraordinarily, from Washington.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

My hon. Friend knows a great deal about this subject; I am also grateful to the hon. Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for securing this debate.

Yesterday, President Trump suggested that our current Prime Minister is no Churchill. Should we not add that the current President of the United States is no Franklin D. Roosevelt? FDR was a big supporter of the development of the United Nations and knew about the importance of sovereignty. Does my hon. Friend share my view—I think he will—that who governs their countries is a matter for the Danes and Greenlanders alone?

[Dr Pinkerton]

I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend for his intervention; the President of the United States is perhaps more Teddy Roosevelt than Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He seems to be living every day under the impression that his mission should be to expand US territory and to plant the US flag, no matter how loyal and allied the country in question has been in the past.

I clearly recall the deeply offensive remarks that the President of the United States made about both Britain and Denmark’s past military contributions to US international adventurism. I remember watching a film called “Armadillo” about the extraordinary work that Danish troops did on the frontline in Afghanistan. I agree with my hon. Friend’s comments wholeheartedly.

For Greenlanders, this is not a recent experience; they have been living with the threats of Donald Trump for the best part of 12 months. Over the past year, he has repeatedly suggested that the United States should “acquire” Greenland, presenting the idea as a matter of American national security. Sitting here in Westminster, it may be tempting to dismiss such remarks as rhetorical theatre, but in Nuuk they are experienced profoundly differently. Greenland is a self-governing Arctic society of 56,000 people. When the world’s most powerful country repeatedly discusses one’s homeland as though it were a strategic asset to be acquired, the effect is not abstract.

During my visit, we heard accounts of families stockpiling supplies. Some described moving savings abroad in case of financial disruption to their homeland and their lives. Others spoke of delaying vital, essential medical treatment in Denmark—treatment that many Greenlanders rely on—because they feared that further escalation would mean that they would not be able to return to their homeland afterwards.

Greenlandic commentators have described the psychological effect of the campaign from the United States as a form of “mental terror”. It is a striking phrase, but it captures an important truth: security in the Arctic is not solely about missiles, submarines and military installations; it is also about trust, stability and the ability of societies to live without fear.

There is also a profound strategic irony here. The United States already enjoys extensive rights in Greenland under the 1951 US-Denmark defence agreement, including the operation of the Pituffik space base—formerly, the Thule air base—and any other base that it may wish to re-establish in the present moment. Greenland sits inside NATO’s security architecture through Denmark and benefits from the protections of article 5. The idea that Greenland must somehow be owned to be defended simply does not withstand any scrutiny. What it challenges, however, is something far more fundamental: the principle that people are not property and that sovereignty cannot be negotiated away for strategic convenience.

Across Greenlandic politics, the response has therefore been consistent and unequivocal: Greenland is not for sale. For liberal democracies, that principle should not be negotiable. If western democracies cannot defend the idea that territories cannot be simply acquired by powerful states, then the rules-based order that we claim to uphold begins to look increasingly selective and fragile. Nowhere are those principles more important than in the wider strategic geography of the North Atlantic.

At the heart of that geography lies the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap: the naval corridor between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. During the cold war, NATO prioritised that corridor to detect and constrain the submarines of the Soviet northern fleet departing the Kola peninsula into the Atlantic. Today, it has again become central to NATO’s strategy. Russia’s northern fleet must transit through or around the GIUK gap to reach the north Atlantic.

Monitoring the corridor remains essential to tracking submarine activity and protecting the integrity of the north Atlantic. The corridor also safeguards the sealines of communication between North America and Europe. In any NATO contingency, the transatlantic reinforcement route would pass directly through those waters. If the GIUK gap were compromised, the United Kingdom’s western maritime flank would be exposed. Control and surveillance of the space are therefore fundamental to preventing adversaries from projecting power into the north Atlantic or threatening western Europe and North America.

Within the strategic geography, Greenland’s importance cannot be overstated. Its location makes it pivotal for missile early-warning systems, Arctic sea routes, access to the north Atlantic, and space-based infrastructure. Destabilising Greenland or undermining Danish sovereignty would fracture NATO cohesion, complicate security in the GIUK gap and weaken Arctic governance structures at precisely the moment when unity is most needed.

The Liberal Democrats are therefore clear: sovereignty and international law are not negotiable principles. I am deeply concerned that the Prime Minister has yet to state unequivocally that British soil, British bases and British facilities would never be used to propel American troops on to Greenlandic territory by force. The Government must put that matter beyond doubt.

Any suggestion that one NATO ally could coerce another would erode alliance cohesion, weaken deterrence and play directly into the hands of President Putin. Fragmentation in the Arctic theatre would directly benefit Russia’s northern fleet posture and its wider Arctic military strategy. Again, this is not about abstract diplomacy; it is about the credibility of collective defence. The UK must therefore deepen its commitment to Arctic security and north Atlantic resilience. That means strengthening anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness, investing further in north Atlantic patrol and surveillance capabilities, and reinforcing defence co-operation with our Nordic and Baltic partners.

Crucially, the Government should invest further in the Joint Expeditionary Force, and convene a summit of JEF leaders here in the United Kingdom to address the rapidly evolving security environment in the High North. The reality is simple: the Arctic is no longer a peripheral concern; it is at the frontline of strategic competition, alliance solidarity and international law.

I leave the Minister with three questions. First, what concrete steps have the Government taken to ensure that the UK is prepared for the reality that I have just outlined? How is the UK strengthening defence co-operation with our Arctic allies, including considering enhanced diplomatic presence in Greenland and perhaps the establishment of a permanent consulate in Nuuk?

Finally, the strategic defence review mentions the High North as a space of geopolitical and geostrategic interest, but does not offer a defence strategy per se. Do the Government intend to bring one forward? How does the Government’s future procurement reflect that strategic concern?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Veterans and People (Louise Sandher-Jones)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Halesowen (Alex Ballinger) for initiating this debate on the high Arctic and its increasing importance to our security—an incredibly important topic.

As my hon. and gallant Friend knows well from his time as a Royal Marine, the UK has a long and storied history in the High North, and for some 50 years the Royal Marines have practised Arctic warfare alongside our Norwegian allies. Indeed, he may have taken part in the rite of passage of plunging into the ice, as I believe the First Sea Lord did again when he visited troops there only last week.

As the threat from Russia has cast an increasingly long shadow over Europe, our High North capabilities have grown only more important, and today High North deployments of Royal Marines are up 40%, with year-round cold-weather operations. The reality is that we have a frontline with Russia in the North Atlantic, and the Russian threat is higher than it has been for decades. We have seen from the activities of the spy ship Yantar that Russia is an increasing threat to our critical underwater infrastructure. We see Putin rapidly re-establishing military presence in the region, including reopening old cold war bases. Last year, Russia and China conducted their first joint air patrol into the Arctic circle. China has declared itself a near-Arctic state and expanded its icebreaker and research vessel presence.

The changing military picture is fuelled by the changing climate and rising temperatures, and a number of Members rightly raised how pivotal it is to understand climate change and recognise the huge threat it poses to our security. It is vital to consider it in that way. The Arctic is warming up four times faster than the global average, and the strategic defence review projects the region to be ice-free each summer by 2040, opening new routes, trade dynamics and flash points. Our responses to those challenges were set out in the SDR: we need increased investment, new technologies and stronger alliances. We are prepared to meet those challenges.

Spearheading our capabilities is our littoral response group north, which is our specialised Royal Navy task group that deploys across the north Atlantic, the Baltic and the High North, with dedicated personnel, ships and helicopters to project power and respond to crises. We have also launched Atlantic Bastion, which is our groundbreaking programme to protect the UK from Russian undersea threats using an AI-powered network of sensors.

We are working ever more closely with our nine partner nations that make up the joint expeditionary force. We established Operation Nordic Warden with JEF allies, working together to track threats to undersea infrastructure from Russia’s shadow fleet—a responsibility now assumed by NATO. Last autumn, we conducted Exercise Tarassis, which was JEF’s largest ever military exercise, involving more than 1,700 British personnel, alongside air, land and naval forces from Scandinavian and Baltic nations.

On a visit to Norway last month, the Secretary of State went further still, announcing that Arctic and High North security will be strengthened against rising Russian threats as Britain steps up its presence in the region. He also announced a major joint expeditionary force, Exercise Lion Protector, which will see air, land and naval forces from JEF nations deployed across Iceland, the Danish straits and Norway, and trained to protect critical national infrastructure against attacks and sabotage, and enhance their joint command and control capabilities. The Secretary of State confirmed that the number of British troops deployed to Norway will double over three years, from 1,000 to 2,000 personnel.

Finland and Sweden’s accession has transformed NATO’s northern posture, meaning that seven of the eight Arctic states are now NATO allies. The whole alliance is consequently more focused on the threats and challenges to our north.

As can be expected from a Government who have put NATO first, NATO is at the heart of our response to growing threats and tensions in the region. The UK is playing a full part in NATO’s Arctic sentry mission, which is enhancing NATO’s posture in the Arctic and High North, and we currently have 1,500 commandos deployed across Norway, Finland and Sweden as part of Exercise Cold Response. Planning is at an advanced stage for Operation Firecrest, and the upcoming deployment will see our carrier strike group across the Atlantic and High North. Of course, we continually review threat levels and will change our policies accordingly. The thousands of personnel from the three services are spearheaded by HMS Prince of Wales, and parts of the deployment are under NATO command.

Our military co-operation in the Arctic is underpinned by key bilateral partnerships that have all been strengthened under this Government. Russia’s growing activity across the Arctic, High North and north Atlantic has changed the security picture for the region. The UK, with its 50-plus years of history operating in the Arctic, and through our deep partnerships with allies, including Norway, Sweden and Finland, will be at the centre of NATO’s northern response from day one.

In December, the Defence Secretary signed the historic Lunna House agreement with Norway, which will see the UK and Norway jointly operate a fleet of submarine-hunting Type 26 warships, expand joint Arctic training and pre-position British military equipment in Norway to be better prepared for future crises. We have stood resolutely with Denmark over Greenland, the future of which is for Greenlanders and Danes alone. I welcome the uplift in Danish Arctic defence spending, worth more than £10 billion.

We have also worked closely with the Finnish military, including through NATO’s Exercise Dynamic Front, with the British Army conducting its first live firing of our Archer mobile howitzer on Finnish soil—the Army is getting in on the High North joy. We currently have three P-8 Poseidon aircraft carrying out RAF NATO air policing from Keflavik in Iceland—the largest-ever P-8 overseas deployment.

Let me turn to a couple of questions that Members asked. We are working flat out to deliver the DIP. I am sure I do not need to stress to every Member here that it is important to get this hugely important piece of work right before we commit to it. We have ordered five Type 31 frigates, and HMS Venturer should be the first of those to deliver by the end of the decade.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) asked about Ireland. the Prime Minister is due to meet with the Taoiseach at the bilateral in just a few days’ time, and I know that the Secretary of State will call his counterpart and have discussions around some of the points the hon. Gentleman raised.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Amanda Martin) for her contribution. She has been to Norway; I have never made it there—I have only been as far as Denmark—but I am sure there is time to rectify that. She is a doughty campaigner for families, and as we say in the military, although personnel join the military, their families serve too. It is within my purview to do everything I can to support families through the very difficult challenges they face when their loved ones deploy. My hon. Friend rightly noted the importance of not only the larger pieces of shiny equipment that we must procure, but simple items such as gloves. Having worn military-issue gloves, I concur. We must make sure that we have a good standard of personal protective kit and equipment.

Real tribute has been paid to the mighty Royal Marines, who have been excellent guardians of our Arctic warfare capability. It is a very difficult operating environment, and I pay tribute to those who operate there on our behalf to keep us safe. The Royal Marines are a fantastic career choice for those considering starting their careers or who might be interested in joining the reserves. Other armed services are available, including the British Army, should anyone be interested.

Politically and environmentally, the Arctic is in flux. While the eyes of the world are currently focused on the middle east, we are clear that there can be no national or global security without security across the Arctic and northern Europe.

[Richard Foord]

In its negotiations with the United States, Denmark pledged to raise defence spending from 2.4% of GDP last year to 3% of GDP this year and next. Does the Minister think that the example Denmark is setting is a good one for the United Kingdom?

[Louise Sandher-Jones]

I am very proud of the steps that the Government have taken to raise defence spending, which are very welcome off the back of many years of underspend. In fact, this is my very next line: defence spending will rise to 2.6% in 2027, 3% in the next Parliament and 5% by 2035. Just as important as raising defence and security spending is making sure that we continue to pursue a NATO-first defence policy. We are a Government who are delivering the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the cold war, to keep Britain secure at home and strong abroad.

Defence Industry: Environmental, Social and Governance Requirements

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[Mr Luke Charters (York Outer) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey. I genuinely thank the hon. Member for Windsor (Jack Rankin) for securing this debate and for his kind words. We can work cross-party to change the culture across financial services with our voices from this place. May I also say what a pleasure it is to be here with my hon. Friend the Minister? I thank her for all her work on Op Courage and Op Ascend, and on veterans’ homelessness.

I want to be clear: ESG does not need to get in the way of lending to SMEs. It is important to say from the outset that many conflate ESG rules with broader ethical and commercial decisions that firms make; I will perhaps come back to that. I speak from some professional experience: I was acting head of compliance for a fintech where day in, day out, I had to make calls on whether to do business with some of these customers. ESG can, in limited circumstances, be interpreted as blocking lending to SMEs, something that is inconsistent and increasingly at odds with our national security, industrial strategy and economic resilience.

I will touch on what I believe is an artificial distinction between so-called dual-use military technology and single-use military equipment. I come across so many main high street lenders that find this difficult. British high street lenders have every right to put up their hands and say, “We do not want to lend to any company that is involved in chemical weapons or cluster munitions.” They have every right to look at some of the United Nations weapons conventions and say, “We do not want anything to do with them.” However, many lenders are not lending to dual-use military equipment makers.

I will give some examples. I met a fantastic company, Needles and Pins Aerospace, at Defence and Security Equipment International. The company has found banking, insurance and finance very difficult. It produces the insulation that goes on military helicopters—helicopters, by the way, engaged in humanitarian aid missions around the world. The insulation that goes in those helicopters is not an ordnance or a bomb; it is there to protect our British armed forces. It is worth bearing in mind that these lenders and their compliance departments—and I was from that parish—should really get to know the products and services that their customers want to seek finance for.

Another example from my constituency is Edmund Optics, which produces prisms and lenses. There are medical, aerospace, commercial satellite and civilian aircraft applications for those. However, some of those products and services have a dual use—there is also a military use to them. Again, lenders get caught up in a very binary distinction; they should be spending more time understanding the products and services that companies provide.

I want to give another shout-out, this time to 4GD, a data-driven defence training SME with which I have worked extensively, along with ADS, the industry trade body. I saw 4GD’s founder Rob yesterday, and he has told me countless stories about being debanked. His business is about training British armed forces to do what they do better, so that they are more equipped against our adversaries, safer and more resilient. There is nothing more ethical than that. The fact that high street lenders have closed their doors to that commercial opportunity shows the inherent laziness among some people in compliance departments, who refuse to understand the products and services for which their prospective customers are seeking finance.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Windsor for referencing the work I have done alongside my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Alex Baker). Last year, along with 100 Labour parliamentarians, we wrote to fund and bank managers about ESG. I was really pleased that two things came off the back of that. First, some funds marketed as sustainable said they were going to invest in defence companies, because they found nothing in the rules that inherently disbars sustainable funds from investing in defence—there is nothing in the regulator’s rulebook that does that. That is just a fact, and that fact was ultimately confirmed by my old employer, the Financial Conduct Authority. I am immensely grateful to its chief exec, Nikhil, for his speech last year on defence, and for the FCA’s statement. The FCA has been rock solid and clear that there is no tension between ESG regulatory rules and defence financing—none whatsoever. I say to the financial services practitioners who are listening: please take heed of that.

As I mentioned, there have been some good shifts, but ESG and broader ethical considerations are only part of the structural barriers facing defence firms. Recent work by colleagues across the House, including a report I co-authored, “Rewiring British Defence Financing”, makes the point clearly. That work shows that ESG considerations sit alongside and are outweighed by deeper, more persistent problems across access to capital, commercial lending risk, cash-flow pressures, contracting structures and compliance complexity. Defence SMEs are not failing to secure finance because they are somehow irresponsible actors, but because they operate in an ecosystem defined by long payment cycles, sometimes single dominant customers like the primes, uncertain procurement pipelines and fragmented support across Government.

On that last point, let me turn to the work of my hon. Friend the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, who cannot be here today. He has done some phenomenal work setting up the office for small business growth in the Ministry of Defence, which is designed to break down some of the contractual complexities and the fear factor that many defence SMEs face when trying to contract with the MOD. I am happy to confirm to the House that one company in my York Outer constituency, Flyby Technology, will be part of the new OSBG’s shaping cohort, to get into the nitty-gritty of how we can streamline the contracting processes for SMEs, in line with the Government’s mission to increase the direct spend in defence SMEs across the country.

I want to touch on the role of primes when it comes to SMEs in particular. Sometimes the cash-flow challenges created by defence primes are not acceptable. The primes are great employers in this country. I have been to Barrow-in-Furness and seen at first hand how BAE Systems is transforming the fortunes of that town. The primes have a great understanding of their tier 2, 3 and 4 suppliers, but they need to make sure that they pay SMEs on time and quickly.

This is not a mundane point. Were Members to sit down with the chief financial officers of these SMEs and look at their cash flows, it would be clear: a 90-day payment term with a prime, or even a 120-day payment term, increases working capital requirements. The company then has to go out to lenders to try to get financing to cover the shortfall, because the primes are really slow. In turn, that means that when defence SMEs try to get loans for inventory or asset financing, they are often offered worse terms. Primes have a duty to start paying the wonderful SMEs of Britain quickly, because improving their payment terms will create a cyclical effect. Some great primes are better at it. Overall, the result is a system in which highly capable, export-ready firms struggle with the basics—securing bank accounts, insurance and working capital—not at the margins but as a matter of course.

I am worried that some insurers are becoming increasingly hesitant about insuring defence companies because of the risk of political violence. I have worked with Aviva and others on this issue. It is interesting to note that some of the protesters who target the insurers may well themselves have insurance policies with them, or their defined-contribution workplace pensions may well be held in one of these insurer’s accounts. There is a degree of hypocrisy there. Insurers should have every confidence from Members in this place that they are doing right by the defence sector in supporting its growth and development.

Why do all these complexities matter? As the hon. Member for Windsor touched on, they create serious consequences, because if challenges mount up, they could undermine our sovereign defence capability. If British firms cannot raise capital here, what will they do? They may choose to scale abroad or sell to overseas buyers rather than to the British base, or fail altogether. We could become more dependent on foreign supply chains for critical technologies. The Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade, my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North (Chris McDonald), has done some really strong work on critical minerals and our sovereign capability in that respect. We have to ensure that there is a sovereign financial base to support our sovereign defence industry.

The challenges we have talked about in procurement, ESG and access to finance hit SMEs the hardest. They do not have big teams of financial experts, and the larger primes can navigate the challenges more easily as they have access to wider capital pools that the smaller firms do not. There is a risk of strategic contradiction, because on the one hand we are asking defence firms to scale, innovate and deliver at pace, but on the other hand we seem to be tolerating a financial system that treats some firms as a reputational liability. That is not sustainable, to borrow a term. The issue is not necessarily ESG principles themselves, but the absence of clarity in how lenders apply their risk tolerance to defence. ESG concerns are only one part of the financing challenge facing defence firms, alongside credit risk, contracting structures and cash flow, but they are the tip of the iceberg. Because these issues are often poorly defined, they create uncertainty that deters lending.

What is missing is a shared understanding across Government, regulators and financial institutions that defence, when conducted lawfully, in line with UN weapons conventions and in support of democratic security, is not a problem but a public good to be enabled. The hon. Member for Windsor touched on the theme of their being nothing more ethical than lending to defence companies that are equipping our Ukrainian friends. Other countries around the world understand that. The US has been much more explicit in aligning its financial system with its national security priorities, particularly in terms of single-use and lethal military equipment.

What needs to change? There is an overwhelming case for a multilateral defence bank—such as the proposed defence, security and resilience bank—that would meet some of the financing challenges. We cannot just look at incremental fixes. I do not want to take up too much time on that, but there is a role for multilateral development finance.

As the report I wrote sets out, private capital alone is not filling the gap, particularly for SMEs in the dual-use space, and where finance does flow, it can be short term. I do not want to get into the details, but we need to make sure that the institutions of the state, be that the NSSIF—the national security strategic investment fund, an arm’s length body that is part of the British Business Bank—or the National Wealth Fund or UK Defence Innovation, sing together and make sure that their finance comes into innovative technologies.

We need to learn the lessons from the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency in the US. I heard that a significant proportion of US GDP growth comes from the DARPA investments of the 1980s—of course, that agency invented the internet, the smartphone and so many other underlying technologies. Let us learn from the leadership role of DARPA.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

The hon. Gentleman plainly knows a great deal about this subject and is educating a few of us on it. He talks about the US example; could he also reflect on the European Union regulatory regime around ESG, given that the EU is about to start investing considerably more in defence?

[Mr Charters]

When it comes to our European friends, we have to have cross-border financing. I have met some of the main German commercial lenders that want to come in; likewise, British financial services are investing in success stories such as Rheinmetall and some of the great European defence brands. We have to come together, not just with our European friends, but with Canada and other allied nations around the world, to approach defence financing on a multilateral basis. That is the real lesson.

Let me touch on what our adversaries are doing. They know that they need to innovate quickly when it comes to building up their own financing capabilities. Russia is moving towards more off-balance-sheet lending to a lot of its defence sector. Russian advance manufacturing companies are increasingly gaining access to the Chinese bond market. In general, the Russian war economy is mobilising at pace. Clearly, when it comes to some of our adversaries’ financing mechanisms, they are daring to do things differently—according, of course, to the rule books and ethics of their particular countries. We need to be agile enough to reform our own financing capabilities at pace, too. I am very concerned that we risk forcing British defence SMEs to seek foreign ownership, to offshore their operations or to seek finance overseas simply to survive. That is strategic self-harm when it comes to our sovereign defence capabilities.

You will be pleased to hear, Ms McVey, that I am about to close. In an era of renewed geopolitical competition, the question is not whether the state should play a role in defence finance, but whether we are prepared to act now in order to do so with the seriousness that our security environment demands. I believe that a strong defence financing sector acts as a deterrent to some of our adversaries and means that, where we need to scale industrial capability much quicker, we are ready to do so, if we have a defence financing revolution. This is not a choice between values and security; it is about recognising that, in the world we live in, the two are inseparable.

I hope the Minister will take this opportunity to set out how the Government can encourage lenders to turn on the taps for some of the innovative defence SMEs, no matter whether they are producing prisms, training our special forces or insulating our helicopters. There is nothing more ethical, in our modern world, than supporting the defence SMEs that are maintaining our collective security.

Armed Forces Bill

Richard Foord Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 26th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alex Baker (Aldershot) (Lab)]

I am proud to speak in support of the Armed Forces Bill on Second Reading, and I do so as the Member of Parliament for Aldershot, the home of the British Army. In my constituency, service is not an abstract concept. It is lived, every day, by families who accept unique pressures on their time, their family life, their careers, their children’s education and their health. Our duty in return is clear: fairness, respect, and practical support that works in real life.

I will begin with housing. The last Government left defence housing in an absolute mess, with satisfaction levels for service family accommodation hitting the lowest level on record. I hugely welcome the creation of the new Defence Housing Service and the direction of travel the Bill sets. My patch will be one of the biggest recipients of these changes, as there are more than 1,800 service family homes in Aldershot. That is thousands of families who should never have had to put up with the basics being a battle.

For too long, I have had conversation after conversation with service personnel and their spouses about housing that is not fit for purpose, and a repairs system that feels like a maze. People have described the nightmare of trying to get even straightforward repairs done, and the frustration of being treated like the problem rather than the customer. Again and again, families say to me that they miss the days when there was an estate manager on site who could fix problems quickly and take responsibility. I am delighted to see the Bill deliver that, restoring a service that is accountable, visible and on the side of forces families.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

I agree with everything that the hon. Member has said about service family accommodation, but the investment in single living accommodation is unlikely to keep up. As we have heard, that is the responsibility of frontline commands that are unlikely to prioritise it. Does she think that there could be the unintended consequence that people want to move out of the block and even enter relationships in order to move into the much better quality service family accommodation?

[Alex Baker]

That is a fair point. I know that the Defence Committee will be holding Ministers to account on single living accommodation as much as we are on SFA. They both need to improve very quickly.

The second and central point that I want to focus on is the covenant. It is absolutely right that it is strengthened and put on a clear legal footing. The covenant is the nation’s promise that those who serve and their families should not be disadvantaged because of service life. If that principle means anything, it must apply consistently across the whole of Government and the whole of the United Kingdom.

The Defence Committee has heard powerful evidence of how inconsistent the covenant can be in practice and how families often feel they are left to fight their corner alone. I will give just one example. We heard evidence from someone serving who moved from Scotland to the south of England while waiting for an NHS specialist appointment. They had been told that their place on the waiting list would transfer under the covenant, but instead they were put to the end of the queue, with the local trust stating that it did not recognise or follow the covenant. That is just one story among hundreds.

The Committee heard that significant proportions of serving personnel feel disadvantaged when trying to access healthcare, education and housing, and that challenge is not limited to service personnel themselves. We also heard how service life affects spouses and partners, from difficulties transferring professional roles to families being denied remote working arrangements when posted abroad.

The most worrying conclusion the Defence Committee reached was not simply that disadvantage exists, but that there is no clear single shared understanding of what the covenant actually means on the ground, either among providers or within parts of our armed forces community itself. That gap in understanding is exactly where good intentions go to die.

While I strongly support putting the covenant into law, I urge the Government to go a few steps further. If we are creating a stronger legal covenant, we should take the opportunity to set out a clear, positive, public commitment: what the armed forces community can expect, what “no disadvantage” actually means in practice, and what will be delivered consistently across the UK. It should include clear standards, practical guidance for those delivering services and proper mechanisms for accountability and learning so that best practice is shared and poor practice is tackled quickly. Legislation alone will not fix inconsistency if the people responsible for implementation do not know what is being asked of them or if families cannot see a straightforward route to challenge decisions that plainly ignore the covenant.

Lastly, we should set out a clear vision for how the armed forces covenant is made real in communities across the UK. This really relates to our commitment to a total society approach to defence, particularly within the strategic defence review. That is why I am campaigning for Aldershot to be officially recognised as an armed forces covenant town. I want to create a national movement of covenant towns, cities and villages committed to delivering the covenant consistently across local services and organisations. I am working with the Royal British Legion on what that looks like. Towns like Aldershot, where civilian and military life are inseparable, already understand what it means in practice. By establishing places like ours as covenant towns, cities and villages, we can kick-start a national effort to ensure that respect and fairness for the armed forces community are not just a box-ticking exercise, but embedded in the beating heart of our communities.

In Aldershot and Farnborough, families do not ask for special treatment. They ask for fair treatment and for a system that recognises the reality of service life. This Bill, with a renewed approach to housing and a stronger covenant, is a major step in the right direction. I welcome and support it and will keep pushing to ensure that its promise is felt by forces families not just in speeches this evening, but in their everyday lives.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Foord]

The hon. Member comes at this not only from having served, but from now serving on the Defence Committee. On that point about the age limit for recall liability, does he know whether any modelling has been done on what impact it might have on recruitment?

[Mr Bailey]

I do not know, but perhaps the Minister could expand on that in his response. However, I do have experience of people such as Flight Lieutenant Mark Raymond, who served under me on the airdrop team that delivered lifesaving aid to the Yazidi people. He was eventually retired at the age of 64, but only after having to apply for annual extensions each year after turning 60. That was not because his capability had diminished, but because the system would not allow otherwise. It was probably also because the Conservatives deleted the C-130, which was a very bad mistake. Reservists and planners have long argued for a more individualised approach to service, recognising experiences and skill rather than forcing people out at an arbitrary age. When war comes, it does not discriminate, and it will require the contribution of the whole of society, so our armed forces must be structured to draw on all the talent we have.

I welcome the fact that this Bill makes it easier for people to move between regular service careers and the reserves. A zig-zag model of service reflects modern careers and helps us retain invaluable experience, rather than losing it altogether. This Bill provides a platform for an armed forces model fit for the future, and one that rewards service, supports families and ensures that the covenant is real across Government. Our service people deserve nothing less, and I commend this Bill to the House.

I hope some of the issues I have spoken about, particularly those about the support of other Departments and the changes those Departments must take on board, are acknowledged by all Members in the House this evening, and that they champion them, and go out and do the work necessary to highlight such cases, particularly the examples I have mentioned. I look forward to hearing how extensions under medical capacity could benefit our service families, particularly for dental health, and how this support can be extended into parts of our nation where service numbers are high but the local populations are low.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Francois]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind intervention. It is true that we have sparred in this Chamber—famously, on one occasion—but I utterly agree with the spirit of his intervention, which I am sure carries the support of the entire House tonight.

There are a number of measures in the Bill to improve reserve service, which was mentioned by multiple Members, including the hon. Member for Bracknell (Peter Swallow), my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Steve Barclay), and the hon. Member for North Devon (Ian Roome). The measures cover the potential transition to war and the regularising of call-up liabilities across all three services. We think that the proposals largely make sense—though I have to confess that I recently turned 60, and seeing that the Minister wants to extend the call-up liability to 65, I had best dust off my old set of webbing at the back of the garage somewhere just in case.

[Richard Foord]

Will the right hon. Member give way?

[Mr Francois]

I want to make a bit of progress, but perhaps later if I have time.

Turning to housing, I should declare a different interest, as this was an area I cared about very much when I served as an MOD Minister. When I left ministerial office in 2016, the then Prime Minister Theresa May commissioned me and a small team to write a report about military recruitment, including terms of service such as service housing. We eventually entitled it “Filling the Ranks”, and it was submitted to the Prime Minister, with a copy to the Defence Secretary, in 2017. The report made 20 recommendations for improving recruitment, ranging from better advertising and further expansion of cadet units through to taking a more realistic approach to minor medical ailments such as mild eczema and temporary childhood asthma. Nineteen of the recommendations were accepted and actioned, to varying degrees, but unfortunately the one that was not was to consider sacking Capita—or according to Private Eye “Crapita”. Unfortunately, I never managed to persuade our Ministers to do that, despite the company’s truly awful record on Army recruitment.

The peer review of “Filling the Ranks” was positive. However, as we were making visits to military establishments and interviewing everyone from privates to very senior officers, including on many of the issues contained in the Bill, in nearly every case within 15 minutes of talking about recruitment, we found ourselves involved in a related conversation about retention. In simple terms, we learned very quickly that there was no point widening the aperture of the recruitment tap if we could not put a retention plug in the sink.

We were, therefore, delighted to be recommissioned to undertake a second report specifically into retention, which we subsequently entitled “Stick or Twist?”, as we thought that that encapsulated the serviceman’s dilemma, and which was eventually submitted to the new Prime Minister—one Boris Johnson—in February 2020, a month before the country went into lockdown. This report touched on a number of facets of the armed forces covenant, which are also part of the Bill. I have copies of both reports here with me.

Quite a few of the recommendations in “Stick or Twist?” were adopted, and the then Defence Secretary Ben Wallace used it to persuade the Treasury to provide some extra tens of millions of pounds to improve childcare facilities at a number of bases around the country. It was worth doing the report if only for that. I should like to pay tribute to the small team that helped me to compile the two reports: Colonel—now Brigadier—Simon Goldstein, himself a former distinguished reservist; and my two researchers Mrs Sophie Doward-Jones and Mr Rory Boden, who worked tirelessly to produce two documents written in a Select Committee style, with all the work that that entails, for the attention of the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary.

Again, however, the most controversial suggestion in “Stick or Twist?” was not adopted. It was a proposal to form a forces housing association and thus bring in expertise from the registered social landlord sector to better manage service families accommodation—SFA. Frankly, at the time this was simply too much for the vested interests in the MOD’s Defence Infrastructure Organisation to accept. Nevertheless, I was delighted that my hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge), the shadow Defence Secretary, announced a few months ago our intention to introduce such a body if we return to government. The Armed Forces Bill has much to say on this topic—as indeed have many Members this evening—especially in clause 3, which heralds the creation of a defence housing service. This is conceptually similar in some ways to what was first recommended in “Stick or Twist?” six years ago, but with some important differences. I genuinely look forward to debating the respective merits of the two approaches with the Minister in Committee.

The Bill also touches on the issue of the armed forces covenant, which is a matter that we have discussed in this House on many occasions. In essence, the intention is to spread the authority of the covenant to cover other Government Departments, including Education and the NHS. We have a number of suggestions for how this process might be improved—for instance, in special needs education, which we hope to explore in Committee. I would like to pay tribute to the hon. Member for Birmingham Edgbaston (Preet Kaur Gill) for what she said about the Queen Elizabeth hospital in Birmingham. I had the privilege of visiting the military unit there on two occasions—once in the company of His Royal Highness, the then Prince of Wales, now His Majesty the King—and I echo everything she said about the excellence of that department at that hospital in caring for those who have served their country.

The Bill goes into some detail about potential improvements in the service justice system. This touches in part on a number of quite sensitive areas, not least those highlighted by my former Defence Committee colleague Sarah Atherton in what became known as the Atherton report. We shall again attempt to explore the merits and details of those proposals in Committee.

Before I conclude, I want to refer to the remarks of President Trump about the brave soldiers who fought alongside the United States and other allies in Afghanistan. Would that he had not said such things, especially as our troops also fought with the Americans in Iraq and in the caves of Bora Bora in 2001 after the United States invoked article 5 after 9/11—the only nation ever to do that. We traditionally avoid discussing royal matters in this House, but if it is true that President Trump’s volte face on this was in some way due to royal intervention, all I can say is: God save the King.

We should endeavour to take a broadly positive attitude to the Bill, but I must caution that there are two areas where the traditional consensus might struggle. First, the Government claim to be fully committed to the two principles of the armed forces covenant—namely, that no members of the wider armed forces family, be they regulars, reservists, veterans or their loved ones, should suffer any disadvantage as a result of their military service, and that special treatment may in some cases be appropriate, especially for the wounded or bereaved. All that rings hollow, however, when we see what the Government are currently doing to our brave Northern Ireland veterans—a matter we were debating in the House just last Wednesday evening over Labour’s remedial order to undermine the Conservative legacy Act, which protects our veterans. Over 100 Labour MPs failed to back that order on the night, including, interestingly, the Prime Minister himself, who abstained, as did over half the Cabinet, including the Defence Secretary and even the Armed Forces Minister. The Government have performed 13 U-turns in the past few months alone, and we very much hope for a 14th U-turn over two-tier justice and facilitating lawfare, especially against our own vital special forces, allowing our brave Northern Ireland veterans to live out their lives in peace instead.

Arctic and High North

Richard Foord Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2026 Westminster Hall

[Graeme Downie]

I thank my hon. Friend for that excellent intervention. Those are two points I will come on to, as to why the UK must act independently but also with our European allies in the High North and the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap in particular.

We must always remember that Putin will respond to actions, not words, and we cannot afford to sleepwalk unprepared into a geopolitical High North and Arctic. Secondly, as with any bully, Putin will feel the need to retaliate after the actions last week, but it might not be against the big kid of the USA; he could act against the UK. That is not something that should make us scared, but it should highlight that we must be ready for a response from Russia in one domain or another and make sure that we are able to respond and defend ourselves effectively.

I commend Ministers for initiatives to strengthen our armed forces, including raising the service pay, bringing housing back under public control and strengthening industrial partnerships across the UK. As my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr Bailey) mentioned, we have also increased investment in the joint expeditionary force working with High North allies. In both visits to Estonia and the US, that was mentioned as something that the UK should continue to do to implement effective security measures as actions, not merely words.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

The hon. Gentleman talks about our High North allies. I have just been next door with Naaja Nathanielsen, Greenland’s Minister responsible for energy and mineral resources. Given that Greenland is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, and Denmark is a founding member of NATO, does the hon. Gentleman agree that the security of Greenland is a matter for all of NATO and not a matter for unilateral action from the United States?

[Graeme Downie]

I could not agree more. The UK’s position should be very clear: Greenland’s future is to be determined by people in Greenland and absolutely no one else.

Initiatives in the UK must be matched with urgency and sustained funding. We must see a clear path to the 3.5%, plus the 1.5%, of defence spending agreed at the NATO summit in The Hague. We need a defence investment plan as quickly as possible, and one that commits the UK to force development that will truly give Vladimir Putin a moment of pause. Failure to do both those things will leave the UK and our people at risk.

New Medium Helicopter Contract

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 12th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to talk about small businesses and the wider supply chain. A large component part of the defence industrial strategy talks about those things as well; I am sure he has read that strategy, so he will be familiar with it. We want to see our suppliers in the UK expand. We also want to see more of them selling to the UK military; indeed, lots of our small companies sell to foreign militaries, but not yet to the UK military. We are launching the office for small business growth later this month. That will enable an easier route for UK SMEs to sell their products and services into the UK military—something that, time and again, they have said has been hard in the past. We are making it easier for the future.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

I, too, am concerned about the potential loss of jobs in Yeovil and the wider south-west if we do not see a positive decision on the production of the new medium helicopter at Yeovil. Late last year, we learned that the Government had failed to negotiate access to Security Action for Europe, a €150 billion defence fund. Leonardo is an Anglo-Italian company, and was also supportive of UK access to SAFE. Can the Minister reassure us that this lack of a decision on the new medium helicopter is completely divorced from access to SAFE?

[Luke Pollard]

Yes, I can. We were very clear that we wanted to explore the options for the UK participating in SAFE, but we were also clear that we would not join at any price. Unfortunately, we were not able to make the value for the UK taxpayer and for UK industry match in those discussions with SAFE. We continue to co-operate very closely with not just the European Union, but our European allies—that can be seen from the new agreements we have signed, such as the Trinity House agreement with Germany and more collaboration and co-operation with Poland—and there is more to come.

Ukraine and Wider Operational Update

Richard Foord Excerpts

Wednesday 7th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

I think my hon. Friend would not expect me to be able to, or to be prepared to, answer hypothetical questions. What I can say to her is that if the US, as our closest defence and security ally, asks for UK assistance, we will always be willing to respond. We will ensure that any support we do offer, whether it is support or a combined operation, will have a strong legal basis, as indeed this one today, which has been mounted so effectively and—early indications—successfully, has had.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

The Secretary of State said in relation to Ukraine:

“we will continue to work with the United States towards security guarantees”.

I regret that President Trump has continued to undermine NATO this afternoon, writing:

“I doubt NATO would be there for us if we really needed them.”

That flies in the face of the experience post-9/11, when Brits and Danes fought alongside Americans in Afghanistan. How would the announcements from Paris yesterday differ if there was no prospect of a US backstop?

[John Healey]

With respect to the hon. Gentleman, things have moved beyond that point. Jared Kushner yesterday confirmed the readiness of the US to provide a backstop, and special envoy Witkoff said that the President “strongly stands” behind the security protocols that are being agreed. So I would first say to the hon. Gentleman: catch up. Secondly, he is right, of course, that the only time that article 5 has been triggered was when NATO responded to the US’s request following 9/11. We were proud to be a part of that and we are now proud to be a leading part of a 32-nation-strong NATO.

Northern Ireland Troubles Bill: Armed Forces Recruitment and Retention

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 5th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Al Carns]

I have worked very closely with those in the Northern Ireland Office on this issue, and I will allow them to come up with the answer, but from our perspective the legacy commission as a whole has the most powers to review the evidence that has gone through. It will get to truth, reconciliation and justice better than any other organisation, which is why we are promoting pushing as much as we can through it to ensure that those three different groups of people in Northern Ireland get to that truth and reconciliation in the first place.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

I carried out court martial duty while serving, and it gave me greater confidence in justice for accused serving personnel. Last week we learned that, as Prime Minister, Tony Blair supported the trial of British soldiers by court martial rather than by a civil court. When it was suggested that the case should go to a civil court, he annotated the proposal with the words, “It must not!” Can the Minister reassure civilians who are thinking about joining the armed forces that justice from a jury of a service person’s peers is worthy of their confidence?

[Al Carns]

In my last role, I had considerable dealings with the service justice system. I have been to visit the Defence Serious Crime Command and had a look at the victim support units that it has established, and I can say that since 2021 there has been a huge amount of revamping and rebuilding of the service justice system. It is fully fit for purpose, and it has my utter confidence.

Ukraine

Richard Foord Excerpts

Thursday 18th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

Children should never be pawns of war. May I place on record my thanks to my hon. Friend for championing this issue? There is not a Ukraine debate that goes by without her raising the issue of Ukrainian children. It is absolutely vital, and it is why, as a country, we have said that a lasting and just peace in Ukraine must include the return of all the Ukrainian children stolen by Russia. We have committed more than £2.8 million to support Ukrainian efforts to facilitate the return and reintegration of children deported by Russia. We will continue to support that effort and to make the case that stealing children is not the sign of a strong nation. It is the sign of a weak nation, and it is not something that we will support or that any decent nation around the world should back.

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

I welcome what the Minister said about introducing a maritime services ban on Russian liquefied natural gas; I was a little less welcoming of what he said about it being phased in over the next year. It was reported this week that UK-insured ships have transported almost half the Russian diesel exports since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Those exports are thought to have been worth more than £24 billion pounds, and UK-owned or UK-insured vessels are reported to have enabled the export of £45 billion-worth of Russian gas. Why can the Government not get on with the UK maritime services ban today?

[Luke Pollard]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. We have announced that we intend to introduce the maritime services ban on Russian LNG, which will restrict Russia’s ability to export globally. The reason it is being phased in is so that it can be done in lockstep with our EU friends, who are introducing equivalent restrictions. He is right to identify the issue, and the Government are right to take steps to address it. I am an impatient so-and-so, and I know that the efforts that we are making across Government are based on a similar impatience to get it done fast, but it must be done well.

Oral Answers to Questions

Richard Foord Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Richard Foord (Honiton and Sidmouth) (LD)]

There is a mismatch between the rhetoric that we are hearing and the funding for defence in this Parliament. The NATO Secretary-General talks about preparing for war on the scale that our grandparents endured, while the US national security strategy states that it is a “core interest” of the United States to “re-establish strategic stability” with Russia. In that context, will the Government urge a lowering of the temperature of statements by the likes of the Chief of the Defence Staff and the First Sea Lord, or will they increase defence spending closer to 3.5% of GDP in this Parliament?

[Al Carns]

Let us be really clear, for 14 years—[Interruption.] For 14 years, we have not seen defence spending going up. As shadow Ministers sit on the polished Opposition Front Bench criticising the individual Ministers speaking on behalf of the Government, I am the one who, collectively with others, had to put up with poor recruitment targets, terrible morale, and poor equipment and capability. For the first time in a generation, this Government are increasing defence spending for a long time, so that everybody in uniform will be able to look forward for the next 10 years and see that defence spending is going up. Well done.