Financial Services Bill (Fourth sitting)
Pat McFadden ExcerptsThursday 19th November 2020
(3 years, 5 months ago)
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Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
Q
Hugh Savill: I should say that we are equally blunt when we see shortcomings in British regulation, as well as European regulation, but, yes, we have criticised some of the European rules. In effect, the Bill sets out the first step towards a UK regime for financial services, and there will be others that follow. Really, this needs to be tailored to the needs of the British market—first to the needs of British consumers and secondly to the needs of British providers of financial services. Now that we have left the European Union, we think that is the way to go forward, and that is what we are hoping our legislators and regulators will concentrate on.
Mr McFadden
Q
Hugh Savill: I would be surprised. Ideally, what the Gibraltar authorisation regime sets out is the same basis, whether you are doing business in the UK or from Gibraltar. It is quite an enterprise to move your business to Gibraltar, and I am not certain you would be able to take all your skilled people with you. It is expensive to shift domicile like that. I see no big advantage in firms that are servicing the UK market from the UK moving to Gibraltar. Most of the Gibraltarian firms that have moved into the UK market, particularly the motor market, have done so as new entrants.
Mr McFadden
Q
Hugh Savill: I will have to let you know on that point. I believe there is a small value added tax advantage, but I will let you know that in due course.
Mr McFadden
Q
Hugh Savill: They are all slightly different circumstances. I am by no means an expert on the relationship between, say, the Channel Islands and the UK, Gibraltar and the UK, and so on. What was unusual about Gibraltar was that it was part of the single market in a way that the Channel Islands were not, so you had an existing passporting arrangement between Gibraltar and the UK, which, for the sake of the smooth continuation of the motor market, would be helpful to continue.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Hugh Savill: Not at the moment, no.
Mr McFadden
Q
Hugh Savill: I am not aware of the corporation tax differences between the UK and Gibraltar, so, again, I am sorry but I will have to cover that in my reply later.
The Chair
Thank you. This letter is getting longer.
Hugh Savill: Do not worry—I will not make it too long.
The Chair
We have until half-past 3 for this session, so a good long time. Unusually, we are going to the two Opposition spokespeople first, and then to the Minister. We are shaking it up a bit. We will start with shadow Minister, Pat McFadden.
Mr McFadden
Q
Duncan Hames: There is much in the Bill that I am not qualified to comment on, but certainly in relation to regulatory duties around money laundering it is our contention that the challenge is as much about means of implementation and the expectations placed on the private sector in relation to supervision, which needs addressing. There is an analysis—in fact, it was probably our conclusion on seeing the Financial Action Task Force evaluation—that there are many good policy measures in place, but that they are yet to be fully implemented, and therein lies the nub of this problem.
Mr McFadden
Q
Duncan Hames: We have found with the UK Bribery Act 2010, which has been in force for 10 years now, that a “failure to prevent” offence within that legislation has served to enhance corporate governance. That is not just our view; it was the conclusion of the parliamentary post-legislative review into that legislation a year or two ago. Government Ministers have expressed their interest in seeing that model—which they have described when introducing it in other areas, such as failure to prevent tax evasion, as effective—applied more widely in areas of economic crime. That is certainly something we would consider there was an opportunity for in the Bill.
Mr McFadden
Q
Duncan Hames: Yes, we would. That is separate to the discussions about the identification doctrine, on which, as I am sure you will be aware, the director of the Serious Fraud Office has frequently shared views and on which now the Law Commission has been invited to bring forward its own options for reform. These are complementary measures.
We now have a “failure to prevent” offence in relation to two areas of offending: one, the Bribery Act and, two, failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion. Applying a “failure to prevent” offence more widely, while still considering reform of the identification doctrine in regard to the substantive offence, would be entirely complementary, rather than the House having to consider doing one or the other.
Mr McFadden
Q
Duncan Hames: If I were in the business of money laundering, I would be laughing at the glacial pace at which reform happens. So I would counsel against waiting. As I say, we have two “failure to prevent” offences, and it would be entirely possible to apply that more widely in economic crime. Sadly, it has taken the Government over three years to reach their conclusions in response to the call for evidence on failing to prevent economic crime, and Law Commissions are not generally considered to move more quickly than ministerial responses to consultations. I would not want to estimate quite how long we will have to wait before the conclusions of the Law Commission are enacted in law. I think that is plenty of time to put in other measures, which will help the corporate sector improve their corporate governance, as we have seen in the case of Bribery Act.
Mr McFadden
Q
Duncan Hames: I certainly think we need to look at the area of supervision. This is a regulatory function. We have private sector supervisory bodies tasked with helping the business sector to put in place the necessary preventive measures to prevent money laundering.
While we welcome the introduction of the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision a couple of years ago, its reports—these are not activist or campaigner reports; these are Government regulatory reports—have been very damning of the effectiveness of the supervisory bodies. It is very fragmented—I think there are 14 supervisory bodies for the accountancy sector alone.
OPBAS has identified conflicts of interest between the advocacy and supervisory functions of those bodies. The effectiveness of their enforcement activity is really inadequate. If we take Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs as one of the supervisory bodies, the fines imposed are barely a couple of thousand pounds and will quite possibly be less than the value of the commission or fee on any individual transaction. That is clearly an inadequate incentive for private sector actors to say no to handling illicit funds.
The quality of the money laundering defences in the private sector has also been found to be poor. The Solicitors Regulation Authority recently conducted reviews into about 60 companies. In nearly half of those cases, they are pursuing the findings they had for potential disciplinary action. A similar proportion of cases were found to be areas of weakness in money laundering defences in other sectors.
So we have a problem with supervision. The first line of defence against money laundering is tasked to the private sector, and yet the supervisory bodies that are meant to ensure that that is being done well, both in terms of guidance and in subsequent enforcement of regulations, are not effectively ensuring that those defences are good.
At the end of the day, the police estimate that the impact of money laundering on the UK economy is of the order of £100 billion a year. We can have lots of good measures and lots of good policies, which at times the Government will have been congratulated for, but the upshot is that we still have a big problem, which is not going away. That is why we think taking action where we can to improve the defences is urgent.
Mr McFadden
Q
Duncan Hames: We have to recognise that the FinCEN files were a leak; I would want us to be hearing about suspicious transactions as a result of enforcement having been taken by law enforcement agencies. It has been a concern of the now Secretary of State for Justice that too often we see enforcement, effectively, outsourced to the United States authorities. I do not think that is good for the corporate reputation of UK plc, and I do not think it is how we would want things to proceed as Britain defines a newly independent role in international commerce.
John Glen
Q
This Bill ensures that HMRC retains its ability to access information on the ownership and beneficiaries of UK-linked overseas trusts, building incrementally on things that have been done previously. Can you explain why this information is important? This is a key measure and, I would have thought, the most relevant.
Duncan Hames: It is certainly a welcome measure. We have found that some of the complexities of the structures and design of different corporate entities have proved difficult, in terms of the implementation of existing legislation. That was a feature of the recent Baker et al case in relation to appeal against an unexplained wealth order; there was a South American foundation, which was perhaps not the corporate structure that Members of this House had in mind when that legislation was being decided.
Addressing trustees and overseas entities, to strengthen and ensure there are no loopholes in existing legislation, is definitely to be welcomed. In the past, when the House has been considering legislation to address money-laundering risks—do not forget that another piece of legislation related to leaving the European Union is the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018—it has focused on what can be done about the transparency of ownership, and not just of UK limited companies but of overseas entities, too.
Mr McFadden
Q
The Bill, in schedules 2 and 3, sets out new accountability frameworks for the regulators. They are to abide by relevant international standards and to have regard to the relative standing of the UK as a place for internationally active investment firms to be based, or to other matters specified by the Treasury. I would like to ask whether you think it is appropriate for broader goals to be considered in that regulatory framework, and I am thinking particularly of environmental, social and governance goals. The UK wants to be a leader in that area. The Chancellor of the Exchequer set out an ambitious environmental agenda for our financial services industries in his statement about 10 days ago. Do you think that the Bill is an opportunity to put regulatory weight behind the ESG agenda?
Fran Boait: That is a really great question. It is definitely something that stood out for me when I first read through the Bill. The Bill sets the direction, and it needs to integrate the needs of the wider economy, social responsibility, the environment and thinking about how we set a direction that is different from the one that led to the global financial crash in 2008.
As you mentioned, there is clearly cross-party agreement, and we have had announcements from the Government this week and last week on wanting to be a leader in green finance, especially ahead of COP26. There is also pretty much cross-party agreement on issues such as the banking sector severely under-serving small and medium-sized businesses. In his speech yesterday, Andy Haldane, the chief economist at the Bank of England, mentioned that the funding gap is £20 billion. We know there is cross-party agreement on wanting more of our productive and manufacturing sectors to grow, and we need to level up. Some Conservative MPs, such as Kevin Hollinrake and Danny Kruger, have done reports on that and on the need for a different banking system. We have to recognise that that will all require quite a significant shift in the direction of financial regulation, yet there is not anything in the Bill that suggests that such a shift in direction is something that the Treasury is interested in at the moment.
We would certainly support the hardwiring of ESG considerations into the regulation. I looked this morning at the proposed amendments, and we would be very supportive of amendments 20 and 24, which have regard to climate and net zero in terms of investment firms and CRR—that is on climate and environmental. There are some other amendments on social practice and corporate governance that are really important, and there are potentially bigger amendments that we could be thinking about, which would embed sustainability in the regulatory framework of our regulators, such as the FCA and the PRA. That would involve further amending the Financial Services and Markets Act, which I know is being amended already in the Bill, but we could add an environmental sustainability objective, for example, to the FCA’s or PRA’s objectives.
It is worth noting that the UK’s financial institutions are among the worst culprits in Europe for fossil fuel financing. HSBC and Barclays alone have funnelled about £158 billion into fossil fuels since the signing of the Paris agreement. If the UK really wants to be a leader in green finance in a serious way, we need our regulators to be on board with that mission. Obviously, that starts with this piece of legislation and others. We would fully support the amendments to the Bill that have been put forward already, and we would potentially suggest further ones.
Jesse Griffiths: I think that the absolutely fundamental issue with regards to the Bill is that it is an opportunity to put social and environmental purpose at the heart of both the regulation and the duties of the regulators. I do not think it would take a huge change, or huge amendments to the Bill, to set that precedent and really kick-start what I agree is a cross-party consensus that we need to deal with the climate crisis and the rising problems —inequalities caused by covid and so on—and that the financial system is central to that. How it is regulated determines a lot about how it will react to those points.
I can give some examples. Of course, it would be helpful if the Bill required the FCA to refer to the Climate Change Act when preparing secondary legislation. If you wanted to be more ambitious, it would obviously be helpful if capital requirements for investment firms introduced weightings on environmental, social and governance issues—for example, by penalising assets that have climate risks.
I know the Bill covers legislation on PRIIPs—packaged retail and insurance-based investment products—which is a huge, €10 trillion market in the EU. One specific example we have suggested is that, if we could improve the key information document that investors receive when they are looking at PRIIPs to include disclosure on environmental, social and governance issues, and ask the FCA to ensure that that happens, that would be an important signal.
I think that there are real opportunities here to change the nature of the discussion and set the UK as a leader in this area. We know that the direction of travel is towards much greater ESG integration across the financial sector. Investors are pushing for it. We do a lot of work with the big four banks in the UK, and many of them are pushing a purpose-driven agenda. It is the way that we are going, and I think about this as a real signal that the UK wants to be the leader in this field and takes it very seriously.
Mr McFadden
Q
If we are giving the regulators these big new responsibilities, both at the prudential and the conduct level, how would a more active role for Parliament work? We have one Select Committee that is active in this area, which already has a really broad agenda of work—the Treasury Committee. We have members of it on this Bill Committee, and they all do a great job, but things are pretty thinly stretched. Could you tell us more about how you think Parliament could have a more active role after the onshoring of all this regulatory responsibility? Again, I will start with you, Fran.
Fran Boait: I think we agree that this is the critical part of the Bill. That is why I mentioned the suggestion that has been put forward of a new potential Joint Committee between the Commons and the Lords. That would be absolutely right. The direction of the financial services sector is fundamental to the direction of the UK. We are really at a crossroads. We have been a large financial sector in the world, and generally the Treasury would say that it has prioritised the international competitiveness of our financial sector in the global market. It has held that in greater reverence than domestic competition that serves the needs of the people—your constituents, your businesses and the productive UK economy.
I think it is in Parliament’s interests to think about how we set up processes for greater scrutiny and about engaging civil society actors in that as well. I would have thought that quite a few people sitting within those regulatory bodies would welcome that. They are under immense stress from the last 10 years of post-crash change. As I mentioned, they are subject to legal challenge from the industry.
Although, ideally, there would be greater scrutiny in Parliament, and I think that a Joint Committee would be good, some of the amendments that have been tabled on specifics, such as an annual review of capital regulation requirements, are really great additions—I hope the amendment on that will go through.
I also think that we need to ensure that the regulators are given the right direction for financial services, which is why I would also welcome the amendment that was put to us about this Government’s strategy for financial services. As I said, we are at a kind of crossroads, and understanding what direction the Government want to take it in is critical for the regulators. I support a lot of the amendments that have been put forward. Setting up a new Select Committee or some kind of Joint Committee is also a strong proposal.
Mr McFadden
Q
Jesse Griffiths: I think it is extremely important that there should be some Committee, whether it is a financial services Committee or some other way of doing it, that gives Parliament that role. That could be operationalised in a number of different ways, but it should be done in a way that makes sure that consideration is given to the way the Bill and, I presume, future legislation delegate a lot of power to the Treasury and the regulators to change, through secondary legislation, regulations that were previously agreed jointly between the European Parliament and the European Council. Some kind of check that that has been done in the correct way, and that it has been done with regard to the fundamental purposes of that legislation, is the role that the Committee would fulfil.
Obviously it would need more resources, which is a key lesson from the European experience. You are right to say that it is not an easy thing to do, nor is it something that can be done in addition to what is already being done by the Treasury Committee, for example. Resources is a key point.
The second key point, of course, is that such a Committee, and potentially the Bill and some of the amendments that have been referenced, can allow the regulators to report and explain more clearly why they are making certain changes, so that is a useful transparency and information point. The third point is that, without such parliamentary oversight, it becomes extremely difficult for civil society organisations such as ours, which are trying to ensure that the voice of the environment and social issues are raised in financial sector regulation, to be heard as effectively as other voices that are trying to influence that regulation. So it helps to create a better balance of lobbying, if you like, or of advocacy in this area.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Jesse Griffiths: One of the main issues that we would have loved to have seen in the Bill—I recognise that it would be outside the scope to introduce it now—is a proportionate regulatory regime for mutual banks. One thing that is important, or one problem that is very evident in the UK financial sector, is its lack of diversity of institutions. Across Europe, co-operative banks have an average of more than 25% of assets, and in the UK they were not even legal until 2014. The mutual banking movement is now trying to establish that vital part of the system that would help to improve services for customers, improve competitiveness and bring important countercyclical and social and environmental benefits. That would have been nice, given that the Bill recognises that there is a need for a different regime for investment firms from banks, for example. There is a huge unmet need for a more proportionate regime for those institutions. That would be my wish list of what might have been in the Bill. Perhaps as part of the Bill discussions, we might get a commitment to consult on such a proportionate regime.
Of course, the other point to make here—to repeat some of the points we have made about social and environmental purpose and accountability—is that the main issues with the Bill are the things that are missing that could make it much more ambitious and set a much better precedent for financial sector regulation going forward.
Finally, one issue that is worrying to us is the danger of a return to framing the purpose of financial regulation as being about the competitiveness of the UK financial sector globally. That appears in a few places in the Government’s explanatory notes to the Bill. The key point is to make a distinction between competition, which is good, and competitiveness, which can be dangerous when applied as a principle for regulation. Framing regulation within that competitiveness framework is widely recognised as one of the main contributors to the global financial crisis. It was easy to make the case for relaxing regulation to make any particular financial sector more competitive compared with others, when actually I think what we want to establish, through the Bill and other actions, is that the UK financial sector will seek to set high standards and to be the leader in that, not to introduce a competitiveness framing that raises the risk of standards being lowered.
Fran Boait: I can build on that. I agree with a lot of what Jesse has said. For us, the overarching areas are accountability and seeing more that it in the Bill, the environmental, social and governance aspects, and the purpose. On that last point, while we understand the Bill is onshoring and tidying up, as I have said before, it sets the direction, and that strategy for the financial services sector has not been laid out by the Government. I think that is key because, as Jesse has mentioned, it is concerning to see competition and competitiveness in there—in the run-up to the crash, that was shorthand for deregulation—at the same time as handing a lot of power to regulators. Again, it is worth noting that the FCA chief executive said himself that they would prefer high standards to the idea of competition, so there is support for that. Making the direction clear is critical.
On a few specifics that have been left out, over the last few years Positive Money has been working on things such as access to cash and the need to protect people’s right of payment in different ways—I noted that there were a few questions on that—and thinking about financial inclusion. Thinking more about the financial services’ role in the wider UK economy is absolutely critical at this time, and there is not too much in the Bill in terms of the direction of that.
Mr McFadden
Q
Albert Isola: The fundamental question for us is, do we continue to have market access? The answer to that, of course, as you know, is yes. As you have rightly pointed out, we lose single market access to the remainder of the European Union with the United Kingdom on 1 January, and this is where we will look for our future. If I can put it a slightly different way, some 90% of our financial services business before Brexit was with the United Kingdom, so that puts in focus how important this legislation is for all of us here. In each of the different areas in which we have worked, we have developed a niche—an area of specialisation and expertise—that has served those who work here with us well. We very much hope that that will continue into the future.
Mr McFadden
Q
Albert Isola: As the Minister with responsibility for financial services, I would love to see our businesses grow —of course I would—but responsibly and in a manner that matches the standards that we have with the United Kingdom in terms of the regulatory approach. The reason that we have been successful in motor insurance is because we have developed expertise and specialisations in the firms that have come here. It is not that we switched on one morning and had 20% of the United Kingdom motor market; that has grown over a 15-year period. As they have grown, so have we, in terms of the business we do with the UK. There are a number of other businesses that have tried in other areas of insurance, and they do well, but with nothing like the success that the motor insurers have enjoyed in working with the UK.
Mr McFadden
Q
Albert Isola: My experience, put quite simply, is that of all the firms that have come and set up here in the last seven years while I have been in this job, not one of them has ever said they are coming for tax purposes. There is a tax differential—I think the rate of the UK’s corporate tax, or profit tax, is 19%; in Gibraltar, it is 10%—but that has never been cited as one of the reasons for setting up in Gibraltar.
It is far more about our agility as a jurisdiction and the accessibility of the regulator. I can arrange to meet every single insurance company in Gibraltar in two weeks if there is something that I would like them to do or be more conscious of. That is just not possible in the United Kingdom. The accessibility of our regulator for all our insurance firms is the No. 1 point that they measure as to why Gibraltar has been so good to them. They have that access and they have that contact. Then you have the expertise we have developed: the lawyers, the accountants, the insurance managers, who are able to provide the services that they need. These are far more important to the firms than the corporate tax. I have to say, if I may—allow me this plug—the quality of life is obviously important too. The sun shines here for a little longer than it does in the City of London, and I think that is important too.
Mr McFadden
I am sure it is; your weather is certainly better. I have no further questions. Thank you very much, Minister.
DRAFT BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION (AMENDMENT) (EU EXIT) REGULATIONS 2020
DRAFT SECURITIES FINANCING TRANSACTIONS, SECURITISATION AND MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS (EU EXIT) REGULATIONS 2020
DRAFT FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES (APPROVAL ETC.) AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS (CAPITAL BUFFERS AND MACRO-PRUDENTIAL MEASURES) (AMENDMENT) (EU EXIT) REGULATIONS 2020
DRAFT BEARER CERTIFICATES (COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES) REGULATIONS 2020
Pat McFadden Excerpts(3 years, 5 months ago)
General CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David.
We have a lot before us this afternoon. These statutory instruments are the latest in a large-scale exercise on the part of the Treasury, and indeed other Departments, to onshore various parts of EU legislation. I make no criticism of the Minister personally; I am sure it was not his decision that that should all be done in this way, and he has been very straight with me in everything we have debated in the six months or so that we have been opposite each other. However, the volume of the provisions before us, which on a quick count amount to around 130 pages of complex legislation, and which we have to go through in a 90-minute process, creates the impression of a Department shovelling legislation out the door before the end of the year. If we are honest, it certainly does not make for a sensible scrutiny process, given that we are expected to debate and scrutinise all these instruments, relating to complex issues such as bank recovery and resolution, capital requirements, holding companies and securitisation, within a short time.
We have four instruments before us, although the bearer one is perhaps a bit different. However, we could almost pose the question: if we are going to do it like this, why not 40 or 400? It would make as much sense as doing these four together. The truth is that there may be items in these instruments that prove to be significant further down the line, but the manner in which they have been presented for debate makes that difficult to judge. If we are honest, this is the appearance of proper parliamentary scrutiny; it is not the reality. Presenting a volume of legislation such as this is Potemkin scrutiny. I repeat: I make no criticism of the Minister personally, and I am not having a go at him, but this is not the best way to debate and handle things, and doing so does not reflect well on Parliament. However, I have a few questions for him on the content.
Bank resolution and recovery became very important after the financial crisis. When banks failed, there was no adequate living will; there was no means of recovery that did not involve either desperate mergers and shotgun weddings between institutions or the state stepping in to bail institutions out. Where they were allowed to fail, the long tail of consequences often proved disastrous for the rest of the financial system, for contracts that had previously been agreed and so on. That experience produced this debate and this legislation about capital levels, leverage ratios and bail-in debt, which could be transferrable into equity if a bank got into trouble. The question really is: to what degree do the instruments before us herald any change from the approach that has been developed over the past decade or so since the financial crisis?
The same question applies to the capital requirements instruments. Over-leveraging was at the heart of the financial crisis. The esteemed former Governor of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker, gave evidence to a Committee in this House some years ago. He quoted a leading banker as saying that his bank did not need any capital at all—money could always be borrowed on the wholesale markets. When times are good and markets are very liquid, there may be circumstances where that is true, but we discovered to our cost that, when times are not good, taking the view that a bank does not need any capital can have horrendous consequences. To quote perhaps the most obvious UK example, RBS was leveraged to a ratio of around 50:1 just before the financial crash. Again, I ask the Minister: in what way will this capital buffers instrument make any difference to how we approach the crucial issue of what is, in the end, public insurance against bearing the costs of failure? That is really the question we could ask about all these instruments: do they make any difference one way or the other to the degree of public security against the failure of financial institutions?
My third question for the Minister relates to the draft Securities Financing Transactions, Securitisation and Miscellaneous Amendments (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, and I refer him to regulation 72 on cross-border payments. He will be aware of the long-standing problem of hidden charges in remittances, which can end up costing people a lot of money and depriving those to whom the money is intended of the full value of the transfer. This is a multibillion-pound industry, and many people living in the UK send remittances home to families in other countries every year. Will the Minister clarify that this instrument does what he said was the Government’s intention in a written answer released on 3 July to a question from the hon. Member for Altrincham and Sale West (Sir Graham Brady)? The Minister said that
“the full cost of any fees and charges”
must now be explicit and cannot be hidden in interest rates that are obscure to the person purchasing the service.
My final question is, again, more about the process. What is the relationship between this onshoring process through these statutory instruments and what we are doing in the Financial Services Bill, which is currently in Committee? That, too, contains a lot of onshoring, so why are some things being onshored through statutory instruments, which are debated in this forum with all its constraints and lack of amendments, yet the ones in the Bill are going through the full legislative process, with a Committee stage at which amendments can be tabled and matters can be dived into more deeply and a Report stage and so on? I know the difference between the two processes, but why are there different approaches to some types of onshoring?
John Glen
I listened carefully to what the right hon. Gentleman had to say, and he is, as always, the model of courtesy and constructive opposition. The substantive challenge that he offered was about the value, legitimacy and appropriateness of a four-in-one SI debate. It is vital that we deliver each of these financial instruments before the end of the transition period both to ensure continuity and a fully functioning and effective legal and regulatory regime from 1 January 2021 and, in the case of the draft Bearer Certificates (Collective Investment Schemes) Regulations 2020, to ensure that the UK meets its international obligations.
Given the links across each of the financial services instruments and the importance of them coming into force before the end of the year, it is appropriate for the Committee to consider them together, and it is the most effective use of parliamentary time. It is also the case that the SIs could not have been brought forward sooner. Several of the provisions in the instruments fix deficiencies in changes to EU regulations that have only recently become applicable during the transition period.
The right hon. Gentleman asked three specific questions about the SIs and then one about the process. He first asked about the extent of the changes from the BRDD II resolution regime. Under the terms of the withdrawal agreement, the Government will implement EU legislation, such as this regime, that evolved during the transition period. In our transposition of BRDD II, we have considered which provisions would not be suitable for the UK resolution regime after leaving the EU, while still maintaining that prudential soundness and the other important regulatory outcomes, such as consumer protection and proportionality. We have also taken into account concerns raised in consultation responses about the potential risk to financial stability and consumers. Given the complexity of those considerations, I am happy to write to the right hon. Gentleman to set things out more clearly.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about the extent to which CRD V changes the capital requirements regime. The capital buffers instrument is being introduced partly to ensure that the current macroprudential flexibility is maintained. The purpose of the buffers is to allow the regulators to continue to be able to address financial stability risks, including those posed by large institutions.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about hidden charges in remittances and referenced an answer I gave on 3 July about their cost. I am sorry, but I will have to write to him on that matter as well. I am sorry that I cannot offer him a clear answer now. I do not want to busk it.
Mr McFadden
No, I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I would be grateful if he clarified the point. Let me be clear why. A clarification from him that the intention is to make transparent the full cost of fees and charges will help the regulators to police the charging of the instruments. If the Minister clarifies the matter in that way, that might help stop some of the practices that we have seen in the past whereby charges are hidden, to consumers’ cost. Clarification would therefore be helpful.
John Glen
I respect that point and I am happy to give that clarification at the earliest opportunity.
The final process point that the right hon. Gentleman set out is the relationship between the onshoring programme and the Financial Services Bill that is now in Committee. The EU exit legislative programme, known as the onshoring programme—I seem to have been engaged with it all my life—is about ensuring a fully functioning legal and regulatory financial services framework at the end of the transition period.
The Financial Services Bill is an important step in taking responsibility for our financial services regulation, ensuring that we maintain the highest regulatory standard and remain an open and dynamic global and financial centre now that we have left the EU. It will deliver several existing Government commitments and ensure that the UK maintains that world-leading standard. It goes beyond the simple process of onshoring what we have had to date and what has gone live this year. It looks forward and sets out, with a new accountability framework, how the regulators will act. It also enacts a number of other smaller measures. However, I concede that it is a complex process—I do not mean that to sound patronising—whereby we have been trying to onshore and then look forward. The Bill, which we will hopefully take through Parliament, is the first in a series of steps that will involve legislation in subsequent Sessions.
I hope that I have substantively, if not exhaustively, addressed the points that have been made. As ever, I thank the right hon. Gentleman for the constructive way that he has brought his points to the Committee. I hope that the Committee is sufficiently satisfied to support the regulations.
Question put and agreed to.
DRAFT SECURITIES FINANCING TRANSACTIONS, SECURITISATION AND MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS (EU EXIT) REGULATIONS 2020
Resolved,
That the Cttee has considered the draft Securities Financing Transactions, Securitisation and Miscellaneous Amendments (EU Exit) Regulations 2020.—(John Glen.)
DRAFT FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES (APPROVAL ETC.) AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS (CAPITAL BUFFERS AND MARCRO-PRUDENTIAL MEASURES) (AMENDMENT) (EU EXIT) REGULATIONS 2020
Resolved,
That the Committee has considered the draft Financial Holding Companies (Approval etc.) and Capital Requirements (Capital Buffers and Macro-prudential Measures) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020.—(John Glen.)
DRAFT BEARER CERTIFICATES (COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES) REGULATIONS 2020
Resolved,
That the Cttee has considered the draft Bearer Certificates (Collective Investment Schemes) Regulations 2020.—(John Glen.)
Financial Services Bill (First sitting)
Pat McFadden ExcerptsTuesday 17th November 2020
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 View all Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 17 November 2020 - (17 Nov 2020)
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
Before I begin, can I get some sense from you, Mr Davies, about whether we can have a few questions?
Mr McFadden
Q
Victoria Saporta: Yes, I am happy to do so. The way the EU tends to function in terms of regulations—particularly banking regulations, which are part of the provisions of the Bill that relate to the PRA—tends to be quite unique relative to other non-EU regulators. Essentially the Commission proposes very technical regulations, which in banking are often agreed by technocrats in the Basel environment—in the Basel committee—and then these are debated in the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, and become directly-applicable law. The reason for that way of doing it relates to the single market, so that every EU member state has exactly the same regulations. As I said, that is very unique. Every other member of the Basel committee, for example—all the G20 jurisdictions with the exception of Switzerland, which is another federal democracy—would have its regulators applying these technical rules that they have themselves negotiated internationally.
Pre the treaty of Lisbon and before the single market rulebook, this was the way that regulation was done in the UK through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Primary legislation set out the objectives, framework and constraints through which regulators would operate and the regulators would then go about implementing the rules for the purpose, so that they could achieve the objectives that Parliament would have set for them.
Traditionally, UK regulators have done that in the prudential sphere, which is my current sphere. To preserve safety and soundness and contribute to financial stability, the PRA currently has a secondary objective of facilitating competition, but with the remit that the Government give them and always with an eye to preserving responsible openness and dynamism.
Mr McFadden
Q
Victoria Saporta: There is a considerable body of empirical research that suggests that regulatory independence is strongly correlated with stronger financial stability. Particularly in the banking system, there are lower losses under stress. One of the reasons for that is because regulators—at least in theory, but I happen to believe from my experience that that is the practice—potentially have longer horizons than Governments, and therefore regulatory independence tends to be more robust to such lobbying in the longer term, subject, of course, to accountability and objectives set by Parliament.
Mr McFadden
Q
Sheldon Mills: It is a good question. The starting point is our statutory objectives. We set our priorities for the year and also over three years on the basis of our statutory objectives, which are consumer protection, competition and market integrity. We then work out whether, serving those objectives, certain types of activities will help protect consumers, and help us ensure market integrity or further competition.
If you take the example of net zero, it is quite clear, regardless of where Government’s ambitions are in relation to net zero, that the move towards net zero forms a part of the issues that we face globally in terms of climate change. Those are risks in the economy and therefore impact the firms that we regulate and in turn may impact the consumers that we seek to protect. In a sense, we have little choice but to consider and be cognisant of Government’s aims in relation to net zero, because if we are not thinking about those climate risks and challenges, which our firms face, we would not be doing our job and serving our statutory objectives.
Quite often, you find that the aims of Government are merely looking at some of the risks that are impacting markets, impacting the firms, and therefore it is right and proper that we have work in relation to those areas, and we do have work in relation to net zero and climate change.
Mr McFadden
Q
Edwin Schooling Latter: In answering that question, I think that an important starting point is to recognise that the UK regulators, including the FCA, played a very large role in designing a lot of that EU regulatory framework. So the overall picture is definitely one where we support the nature of that framework and the provisions within it. There are a few areas where compromises to span 28 countries perhaps do not suit as well as they might the particular circumstances of UK markets. I think that there are some areas, for example in the MiFID regime, where we could look at an approach that was better calibrated to the UK’s capital market infrastructure, but areas where we would diverge are the exception rather than the rule.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
Q
Sheldon Mills: We have an obligation under FSMA such that all authorised firms will sit on our financial services register, and that allows a sense of public transparency as to who is authorised and what they are authorised to do. As the Committee may or may not know, we regulate tens of thousands of firms, upwards of 60,000 firms, so the register is quite large. The current rules allow firms that are authorised on the register to maintain their registration even though their activities are, in effect, dormant and they are not actually carrying out certain financial services. We need to give them rights to be heard in order to remove them from the register, and that takes time. Therefore, having a different regime, whereby we can give notice to firms that their removal might be pending unless they prove to us that they are active, is going to be a much more efficient and effective way of operating the register. This is important because harms are occasioned by the presence on the register of dorman firms. There is the activity of cloning, whereby firms use dormant names on the register to practise certain fraudulent and scam activity, which is a significant problem that we are seeking to tackle. We are committed, of course, to removing people from the register as swiftly as possible, but the provisions in the Bill will really help to accelerate that for us.
Mr McFadden
Q
Simon Hills: I am not sure that we would want the UK Government and authorities to diverge significantly, if at all, from other standards. We are not sure yet what Europe will do in respect of Basel 3.1. We do not expect draft legislation from the Commission until around Easter next year. That said, from the way in which the Commission has implemented previous iterations of Basel, I would expect it to stick quite closely to that Basel 3.1 framework, for the same reasons I have mentioned: international coherence and harmonisation, and easing the comparison of different banks and jurisdictions.
Mr McFadden
Q
Simon Hill: Yes, I think there is likely to be work to be done there. Of course, one of the accountabilities the Financial Services Bill gives the PRA is to take financial services equivalence and international competitiveness into account, and, importantly, the banks’ ability to continue to provide finance to UK businesses and consumers on a sustainable basis. I think we will all want to understand how different regulators around the world—not just in Europe—look at the PRA’s implementation when it gets down to those technical standards, which is why it is important for both Parliament and UK Finance to make sure there is no inappropriate deviation from international standards. I can assure you that if UK Finance members see that there is, we will speak up about it.
Mr McFadden
Q
Daniel Cichocki: It is absolutely right to acknowledge the issues with conduct around LIBOR in the past and the reforms that have taken place to make sure that those things are prevented. That includes the FCA oversight of the LIBOR benchmark, the introduction of the benchmark regulations at a European Union level, and transcribed into UK law, and broader reforms since the financial crisis, including the senior managers regime to ensure that the issues with LIBOR are not repeated. As the Committee will be aware, the fundamental reason why it is important to move away from LIBOR is that the underlying markets on which the rate is based have largely dried up. Therefore it is right to move us on to robust reference rates based on markets that are highly liquid and not reliant on expert judgment.
Simon Hills: It is important to remember that individuals in banks who are responsible for benchmark submission and administration are classified as so-called certified persons under the senior manager certification regime and they have to be certified as fit and proper every year by their firm. If they are not certified as fit and proper, they will lose their job and will find it very difficult to find a role in financial services again.
Mr McFadden
Q
Daniel Cichocki: LIBOR as it is formed today includes both elements of actual transactions and expert judgments of firms. These expert judgments, as a result of the issues in the past, are subject to those very high levels of governance control that I have talked about being introduced as a result of the benchmark regulation—absolutely appropriate as a result of the issues with LIBOR in the past. The underlying reason why we need to move away from it is that we want to be internationally on rates that do not require that expert judgment.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Simon Hills: Shall I go first and talk about the prudential regulation of banks? The Financial Services Bill achieves what it sets out to do: to implement a coherent version of Basel 3.1 in the UK. It is quite important to our members that we do Basel 3.1 the same in all the major financial centres in which firms operate. If a firm that is regulated by the UK operates in a different host country and the host country says, “That UK firm operating on our patch is supervised by the PRA and the PRA has introduced a watered-down version of Basel 3.1”, then they would add extra supervisory levels to bring it back up to the Basel 3.1 standard. That leads to a bifurcated approach with different regulatory standards in different countries, which makes life very difficult. A coherent approach, which is what the Bill seeks to achieve, is what we and our members want.
Mr McFadden
Q
Paul Richards: LIBOR was set by a panel of banks. As the market no longer uses the underlying information that it used to use for banks, it has now changed, or will change, with the admission of SONIA, to a different definition. SONIA is essentially an overnight rate. It is a robust rate, because it is used widely in the market, whereas LIBOR is no longer used in the market as it was 30 or 40 years ago. That is one difference. A second difference is that LIBOR is a term rate—it is expressed over one month, three months or six months—whereas the liquidity in the SONIA rate is focused on the overnight market, which is therefore a much more representative selection and does not require expert judgment, unlike LIBOR.
A third point, perhaps, is that it is not just a UK proposal to replace LIBOR with risk-free rates in SONIA. A similar change is taking place globally. In the US, USD LIBOR is being replaced by the secured overnight financing rate, which has a similar sort of construction, and the situation is similar around the world. Those are the main reasons for the change.
Mr McFadden
Q
Paul Richards: As you say, LIBOR depended on expert judgment in many cases, because the market was no longer using LIBOR in the way it had been constructed. With SONIA, it is a much more liquid market and there is no need for expert judgment at all. That is one of the reasons why it is being preferred as the replacement for sterling LIBOR, and similarly around the world in other currencies.
Mr McFadden
Q
Paul Richards: A significant difference between LIBOR and SONIA is what is called the credit adjustment spread, which takes account of the difference between LIBOR and SONIA. In the consumer market, the proposals are, at a general level, to treat customers fairly. In the wholesale market, the aim is to have continuity of contracts between the old definition of LIBOR and the new definition that will be used for legacy transactions. This will be determined under the Bill by the FCA. It is not specified how it will determine it. There are market assumptions about that, but it is not decided yet how they will determine it. It is thought that it will consult the market before making a decision, but the end result will be that the rate that arises under the new definition of LIBOR will take over from the old definition of LIBOR, and there will be continuity of contracts between them. If that is emphasised in the Bill, that will give legal protection for all those involved, which is one of the main reasons for providing it. It needs to be accompanied by a safe harbour provision, which would protect all the different market participants involved. I would like to be able to tell you that this will eliminate the risk of litigation, but I cannot tell you that. What I can tell you is that it will minimise the risk of disruption and litigation that might otherwise occur because of the huge volume and value of transactions.
Mr McFadden
Q
Paul Richards: They are both needed, I think. The FCA’s judgment about treating customers fairly relates primarily to consumers. The protection that a safe harbour would provide, so that parties would not sue each other as a result of the change from the old definition to the new definition, is essentially designed for the international markets. So they are both needed. The FCA is already making statements about treating customers fairly, but the Bill should include both the continuity of contracts provision and a safe harbour protection to accompany that. The broader the safe harbour protection is drafted in the Bill—the Treasury, I am sure, could help on this—the better and more effective it will be in minimising disruption and the risk of litigation.
Mr McFadden
Q
Paul Richards: These are points that law firms that work in the City are acutely aware of from their previous experience. The law firms have been looking at what needs to be done to ensure that there is continuity of contract and a safe harbour protection. Of course, I hope that the Treasury will take account of that, as your Committee will take account of it before reaching a final conclusion. We should do everything we can to minimise the risk of market disruption and litigation, within the context of the overriding point, which is that we do need to move away from LIBOR to risk-free rates. That is, of course, what we have done, with new issues in the bond markets and with the conversion of legacy contracts from LIBOR to SONIA. We have a tough legacy problem for the future, which needs to be dealt with. The Bill helps to deal with that.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Paul Richards: Sorry, I did not quite catch the last point.
Financial Services Bill (Second sitting)
Pat McFadden ExcerptsTuesday 17th November 2020
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 View all Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 17 November 2020 - (17 Nov 2020)
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
Q
The Bill does lots of different things, but I would like to mention two. First, it onshores or incorporates a significant body of EU law through different directives into UK law and gives the governance of those to the UK regulators. Secondly, it sets up this overseas fund regime, by which it grants equivalence on a country-by-country basis. It says that the Treasury will make these equivalence decisions as well. The Chancellor announced the direction of travel last Monday.
How do you see the relationship between these two different parts of the Bill? In theory, in future, having onshored the body of EU law and the directives, we are now at liberty to depart from them if we so choose. Do you see a relationship between that debate around divergence and the degree of divergence that the UK decides to opt for and the equivalence decision that we now need from the rest of the EU?
Chris Cummings: It is worth reflecting on the good work that has been done so far in trying to bring the different regimes together and match equivalence. Looking to the future, there is a strong argument for the UK to continue to bolster its presence in the international standard-setting fora, whether that is the Financial Stability Board, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, Basel, and so on. Our authorities can continue to play a very strong role in arguing for what our industry would prefer, which is global and international standards.
We continually push for international standards as a global industry because that allows us to operate with reduced bureaucracy and by taking costs out of the organisation so we can really focus on looking after client needs. The UK has an outstanding track record of having its policymakers and regulators taken seriously in those international fora, because of the scale of the market that we have in the UK and the sophistication of our capital market in particular. At that level, if we can push for international standards in an international environment, that reduces some of the potential friction between the EU and the UK or other jurisdictions about where divergence may or may not be happening. That is the first thing we would like to stress—the international nature.
Secondly, something that has become part of the discussion in terms of the future relationship of the UK and the EU, and which our industry thoroughly supports, is a much clearer focus on outcomes and outcome-based regulation. It is noticeable that across the EEA there are different approaches in different European jurisdictions, all of which have been judged equivalent so far. Recognising that different jurisdictions will walk up to the same issue from different directions, yet seeking to achieve the same thing, that is the material part.
The third area I would just point to, if I may, is the depth of relationship between the UK authorities and those across the EU, not just in ESMA, our European regulator, but in the national domestic regulatory authorities. It is still absolutely the case that the UK policy-making apparatus—the UK regulatory bodies—is seen to have considerable expertise to offer. So just because we start in different places, it does not mean that we should not see the UK taking a little leadership and the EU tacking towards us in terms of lessons learned because of the sophistication of the market that we can offer. That was one of the reasons why we in the IA, among many other organisations, through the Brexit process was keen to press for a regulator to regulate a dialogue, which could be technically oriented, focused on bringing market and regulatory understanding to bear and making sure that there was a no-surprises, keeping-markets-open focus through the process that we have been through.
So I do not see equivalence and divergence as axiomatically pulling in different directions. I think what we will undoubtedly see is a period where the definition of equivalence needs to be—we need to have a thoughtful discussion, actually, about the substance of equivalence, moving away from its ephemeral nature and the fact that it can be granted or dismissed within a 30-day notice period. We need to have a much more joined-up and mature discussion about how two major markets can keep on doing business together, particularly in investment management when, as I mentioned earlier, 37% of Europe’s assets are managed here in the UK and when, for certain member states, whether it is the Dutch pensions industry or something else, the quality of investment management conducted here in the UK is seen as a prized asset and something that they want to learn from and continue to enjoy the benefit of.
Mr McFadden
Q
Chris Cummings: We have been helping our members prepare for all shades of Brexit outcome over the last four years. Firms have taken the decisions that inevitably they would take, so they have set up extra offices, they have recruited further staff, they have gained the necessary permissions and licences from the national competence authorities. At the moment, even with, perhaps, no deal or a rather thin deal, we are as well prepared for that outcome as it is possible to be. We are giving much more thought to the companies that we invest in—everything from life sciences to technology, to transport and infrastructure, to make sure that those companies are well prepared for the Brexit outcomes, but from our industry’s point of view, recognising the equivalence decisions that have been made today, we are set as fair as any industry can be. I am trying not to over-promise, but suggesting to you that the industry has thought long and hard about potential outcomes, and we are as prepared as we can be for immediate issues.
Mr McFadden
Q
Chris Cummings: Thank you for the question. You have touched on such an important issue for our industry. Through the consultation on PRIIPs we highlighted to EU policy makers and regulators, to our own Financial Conduct Authority and others, the dangers that we saw in the PRIIPs key information document, the PRIIPs KID. Because of how the methodology for PRIIPs was created—taking a rather avant-garde view of the calculation basis—it meant that we could have negative transaction costs. Somebody could trade in the market and it would not only not cost them any money; they could actually lose money by making a trade. That led to some perverse outcomes that were pro-cyclical in the presentation of the information they gave.
Let me give you an example by reflecting back on a new fund that has had just two or three years’ experience. Imagine if, over the course of its life, that fund had had a very strong performance; it had done very well over a three or four year period. Because of the pro-cyclicality of how it had to report performance scenarios—looking to the future—it would have to present a potential investor with scenarios that were entirely positive and that generated levels of return that nobody in the industry would seriously put in front of a retail investor to suggest that this was what they could actually get. They were being forced to do it because of the methodology—the calculation basis—which reflected only that, if you had a few good years of performance, your fund would continue to have good years of performance. Similarly, if your fund had had a few bad years of performance, all you could project was that that bad performance would just continue and continue. That was because of the calculation basis and the way that the rules were written.
As an industry, we kept drawing this issue to the attention of the policy-making community in order to say that, if nothing else, when it comes to disclosure and investment, we have managed to convey the central message that past performance is no guarantee of future performance. Please let us keep on reminding people that past performance is no guarantee of future performance. Sadly, that requirement was taken away. The new calculation basis was introduced, which led to the industry ultimately being forced by its regulator to produce this pro-cyclical—and deeply misleading, in our view—information.
We continued to lobby against the wider introduction of the PRIIPs KID, arguing first that it should not be introduced. Secondly, having lost that argument and seen that that it was introduced only to closed-ended funds, we argued that it should be kept there until the wider implications were seen and not extended into the world of undertakings for the collective investment in transferable securities, because of the scale of UCITS and how many millions of people across the UK and Europe rely on them.
We were genuinely heartened when the Treasury announced that, post Brexit, it would be undertaking a review of the PRIIPs KID. What we hope to see, actually, is a wider-scale review of disclosure, whereby we can start from a different position. Given the technologically advanced world that we are living in today—the greater use of mobile phones, applications and computers, and just understanding that people engage with financial services in a very different way—could we have a rounder discussion about how we can do the thing that we want to do as an industry? We want to have a more engaged client base and to help them understand the different funds that are available and the different risk profiles of those funds, so that they can invest with more confidence, and certainly with more clarity about likely outcomes, rather than having to give false performance scenarios that simply nobody trusted in the industry.
Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)
Q
Chris Cummings: I think this is a “two ends of the telescope” question, if you pardon the analogy. We tend to think a lot about the UK changing rules and changing approaches, and there are one or two examples of that in the Bill—we have just mentioned PRIIPs KID. There always seems to be a sense that it would be the UK moving away from the central European view of regulation. Of course, that need not be the case. There are a number of regulatory reviews that are timetabled to be considered by the European Commission. There is the alternative investment fund managers directive. There is the review of PRIIPs and so on. Looking two or three years out, there are quite a few opportunities where, actually, the UK may stay still because the rules work in practice and it could be the European Commission that is drifting away from the central scenario that we are in today. That is perhaps almost inevitable, looking 10 years out; there are bound to be changes to the regulatory architecture and the regulatory regime, because the UK will need to modernise its approach to regulation, and not only here and across Europe, but more globally, every economy is thinking about growth-oriented policies as a result of the covid crisis.
That is why, for us, we approach the discussion around equivalence very much from a point of view of saying, “Okay, even if the words on the page change, how can we make sure that the bandwidth is agreed by all sides, so that minor degrees of divergence from equivalence are not the straw that breaks the camel’s back?” That is why I come back to the point I was making just a moment ago about having a regulator to regulate a dialogue—a set, established forum where the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority can meet the European Securities and Markets Authority and the European Central Bank and so on, in order that information can be shared, regulatory approaches can be discussed and data can be shared as well, on a “no suprises” policy, so that we can make sure that in the UK and Europe there is a commonality of view, or a commonality of outcome certainly, that is being laboured towards.
I am confident that that would make sure that any discussions on equivalence are structurally much more sound and that we remove the political overlay. Across the industry, there is a concern that equivalence could be used as a political process rather than a regulatory one, which perhaps does not really lead to an outcome that is in the interests of savers and investors.
Every time a new rule is introduced that is different in the European Union from the UK, that adds costs to the industry, because we have to navigate our way through two sets of rules, which might not contradict, but simply do not join up. There are different reporting deadlines for data and so on. That is why we would really like to make sure we move to an outcome-based approach, rather than to a prescriptive, words on the page, exact phraseology, which will simply prove a headache for all.
Mr McFadden
Q
The Bill does lots of different things but two big things are that it transposes, or onshores, lots of different parts of EU regulation from many different directives. It gives powers to the UK regulators to govern all that. In doing that, as we come to the end of the transition process, there is greater freedom for either the Treasury or the regulators to diverge from that body of EU law. The Bill does that, but it also has this overseas markets vision, which is granting equivalence on a country-by-country basis, to the 9,000 funds that are domiciled overseas but which operate in the UK. I want to talk a bit about these two different parts of the Bill. Starting with you, Emma, what do you think your members’ attitude is to onshoring this body of EU law? Do they broadly regard it as something that they would like to stick with or are there areas that they would quite quickly want to diverge from and, if so, what would be the most prominent areas?
Emma Reynolds: We were delighted that the Government took the unilateral decision last week to grant the EU equivalence in a number of different areas. We are still hopeful that the EU might follow suit. We have been calling for a technical outcome-based approach to equivalence for some time now. Within that, you could have different rules but the same outcomes. Even if there are pinch points around Solvency II—only some elements of Solvency II—you could have different rules in the UK that achieve the same objective.
From now until 1 January, we will remain technically equivalent. Inevitably, over time, there will be some changes in regulation, both on our side in the UK and in the EU. The EU is currently reviewing some of its own directives, MiFID being a case in point, but there are others too. We do not want to see divergence for divergence’s sake. We would like to encourage a strong dialogue between regulators in the UK and the EU. There already is that dialogue, but we would like to see a framework for that plan. If you are a member of ours who trades across borders, you want similar or the same rules.
Mr McFadden
Q
Emma Reynolds: We are still hopeful that the EU might take a similar decision to what we saw last week. We would not like to see divergence for divergence’s sake. There is no immediate appetite for great divergence from EU rules from our members. Does that answer your question?
Mr McFadden
Q
Catherine McGuinness: First of all, I do think the regulators can handle this, but I think it is important that we look at the right degree of scrutiny. Yes, when we speak to practitioners with the International Regulatory Strategy Group, it is their view that a joint Select Committee on financial regulation, which could look in detail at pieces of financial services regulation, would be a useful way of enhancing and embodying that scrutiny.
The Chair
For the Scottish National party, first of all, their spokesperson, Alison Thewliss.
John Glen
Q
Adam Farkas: That is a difficult question to answer because we have not speculated on different outcomes, but certainly the path that the Bill is taking is something that we can very strongly support.
Mr McFadden
Q
Adam Farkas: Very briefly, equivalence determinations provide the major legal framework for different jurisdictions to provide access to service providers that are licensed and supervised in each other’s markets. To answer your question, if equivalence determinations by the EU are not forthcoming, or not brought forward at pace or with the width that is expected, that will put limitations on the access of service providers—financial services companies and firms—to the EU market. This is really an issue of market access.
Mr McFadden
Q
Adam Farkas: In very simple terms, if a company is licensed in the United Kingdom and does not have access, or loses access, to the EU—of course, that is completely free under passporting regimes—it will find limitations in serving clients or trading with counterparts in respect of the financial services that it provides in the other jurisdiction, which would be across the channel in this case. A lack of equivalence has been a risk throughout the process of the negotiations, so authorities have made significant efforts to prepare regulated entities—financial firms—and to force them to prepare for all eventualities. In other words, everyone is hoping for the best but preparing for the worst.
AFME members—of course, our membership is tilted towards the large players—have made extensive preparations over the years to get ready for the worst outcome, which would limit direct market access from the United Kingdom to the EU, by way of setting up entities, moving activities across the border and making all necessary arrangements to allow them to continue to serve their clients across the European market. Of course, if equivalence is granted and access is provided on that basis, it would improve the general situation of market access between the EU and the UK, so we welcome the Chancellor’s announcement and the UK Government’s determination last week to grant equivalence within a certain scope to third countries, including EU countries.
Mr McFadden
Q
Adam Farkas: With a lack of equivalence. If no market access is provided on another basis, the main mechanism is to establish entities that are licensed, capitalised and supervised in the other jurisdiction, meaning that that entity can have access to the market, but that involves costs and operational implications.
Mr McFadden
Q
Adam Farkas: It is a very difficult question. We all know the history of what happened. What is important is what happened afterwards and how the authorities decided to move away from the possibility of manipulating these rates. There is a global co-ordination effort and a long-standing global discussion on transitioning out of the old way of setting different financial benchmarks.
Regulations were put in place, changes to methodologies were put in place and public institutions took a stronger role to make sure that benchmarks are more robust and not prone to manipulation or potential distortions. I think, in that sense, this issue of reputation and the credibility of these benchmarks has been very strongly addressed by the authorities globally, and also in the UK by the authorities. I believe strongly that this will lead to a much sounder and more credible framework once the transition is completed.
Mr McFadden
Q
What is your view of what will happen on the EU side, absent a British influence, as financial services regulation inevitably evolves and develops? We no longer have one table, if you like. We have two tables—a British one and a European one. Does that mean, inevitably, that the two sets of regulations gradually spin off in different directions, or is that not the case?
Adam Farkas: Before I answer the bilateral question, I think that there are other forms of international co-ordination of financial services policy. One is multilateral in the form of the FSB, IOSCO—that is on market rules—and the Basel committee, which deals with prudential rules. Both the EU and the UK are significant players and participants in this global co-ordination. In the interest of having open, transparent, and well-functioning financial markets and maintaining international flow in capital movement, allowing both banks and corporates to manage their risks cross-border, these multilateral engagements are extremely important. They actually provide a very good platform to co-ordinate the major direction of financial regulation globally.
Now, the bilateral co-ordination will change, because it will take the form of the so-called bilateral regulatory dialogue—or whatever similar term the EU uses—with third countries, which provide a platform. Inevitably, if two jurisdictions take a separate course in legislation, there will be some divergence between the rules. What is very important is that if that happens, it is transparent to this multilateral setting as well as in the bilateral context; it is well-explained and co-ordinated as much as possible; and it is only done if there is a real justification for it.
Mr McFadden
Thank you. Constance, do you want to add anything?
Constance Usherwood: I would add that in the context of the Basel framework, that does allow for some adjustments or tailoring for jurisdictions when it comes to implementing that in law. That is certainly something that we would expect the PRA to look at, going forward—such things as mortgages and trade finance. There are little aspects of the Basel framework that already allow for some consideration of how that is best tailored to the market in which it is being implemented.
Mr McFadden
Q
Gurpreet Manku: No, actually they will be holding more. The bulk of the members most affected are in that category known as exempt CAD. It is an odd category that exists in UK legislation. At the moment, that broad category of firms is required to hold a level of capital set at €50,000. Under the new regime, the calculation methodology will change to a quarter of their fixed annual overheads. For many firms, that will lead to an increase in capital requirements, which is why I referenced the need for a transitional period. A few years ago, we recognised that this was coming, and the transitionals were always going to be a feature of this regulation. In terms of what it means in practice, for some firms, there would have been a fixed requirement of €50,000, and that will move to several million pounds; for others, it might not be much of a jump. There is a wide variety of firms out there in the UK market. Those that might not be in my constituency could also be significantly affected.
Mr McFadden
Q
Gurpreet Manku: What I have seen in recent years is that other jurisdictions have tried to emulate what we have here. That is because the UK has always been an attractive jurisdiction, because of its highly regarded legal and regulatory framework, as well as the quality and depth of the financial and broader professional services ecosystem. In practice, that means that global institutional capital can be raised from here. So when it comes to the onshoring and the development of regulation in the future, we would be looking for continued high standards, but clear and effective regulation.
Mr McFadden
Q
Gurpreet Manku: Sorry, I had not thought about that for this session. Interestingly, one of the regulations that probably caused the most concern was referred to earlier—the PRIIPs regulation. Most of our members will market to professional institutional investors rather than to retail ones, but where that particular regulation is relevant, it has led to information that many have felt is misleading. Seeing that changed and the changes being introduced in the Bill is welcome.
The investment firms regime is probably one of the biggest changes to come—we are implementing that now. If we are looking ahead a few years, we want to look at how the alternative investment fund managers directive changes. The way it was implemented in the UK historically—through the work that our authorities and regulators have done—has meant that it was implemented in a proportionate and sensible way. We want that to continue.
Mr McFadden
Q
Gurpreet Manku: Throughout the past few years, we have continued to work with both the Treasury and the regulators. Given the body of legislation that has come to the UK’s shores and the work that we have done historically, it makes sense for the policy-making and rule-setting process to sit within the regulator, and there is an appropriate accountability framework around it.
Alison Thewliss
Q
Gurpreet Manku: I think that what will be important to see over the next year and in future is sufficient time for consultation, because that leads to further transparency. The documents that the FCA publishes are generally quite good and detailed, but I have seen some cases in recent years, and not just domestically, where there were very short windows to respond to quite technical consultations. Ensuring that there is sufficient time to review and digest any changes and to sit down and speak to the regulator about them will be helpful, and will also support the transparency objectives.
Mr McFadden
Q
Peter Tutton: In an ideal world, we would like the breathing space period to be longer. We can understand why it has been set up as it has. It is very good that it includes, for instance, Government debt; it is a new thing that people will have protection from Government and local government debt; things like council tax are a very big problem for our clients. We can see that the Government may be nervous about a longer scheme. Perhaps if there was a way of looking again soon, once we are satisfied that it works okay, we could give that breathing space a bit more time. There are two things that the breathing space can do. There is what it does at the moment, which is largely about allowing people to get advice and get into a debt solution, but there is also time during which people need to recover.
As I said earlier, when people come to us they are often still in quite a degree of difficulty and their circumstances have not resolved themselves. We cannot always instantly put them into a stable long-term solution. One of the things that might help that would be a longer period of breathing space while they are recovering. In lots of cases, there is an obvious solution to put people into; if their circumstances are not going to improve and debt relief is the right solution, we will put them into that. We may be able to deal with that by articulating the statutory debt repayment plan and the breathing space such that there is a gap in the middle. Ideally, a longer period would be good. There may be a way of effecting that just by making sure those two things align, so that people whose circumstances are still recovering—they come to us and have a very small amount of money, but we believe that they will back into work, and for a lot of our clients that is what happens—can keep that protection going through until their circumstances improve and they can get back on the track of repaying their debts. That would be the one thing, instantly, that we would think about changing.
Another thing is that in the Treasury policy statement, including this legislation, there is a provision for funding the statutory debt repayment plan. The Treasury policy statement talks about that funding for debt advice providers being around 9% if you distribute funds as well. That is something that may need to be looked at again—not a lot, but a bit. That 9% is a bit less than the funding that we currently get from what is called fair share funding, which is [Inaudible] funding we get for helping clients with debt management plans. That funding actually allows us to do a lot of things.
One of the things that we are not yet sure about and are not able to model is what the additional costs of the statutory debt repayment plan will be. For instance, there is a provision in there for creditors to have a vote as a safeguard before a plan can be accepted. If we have to administer that vote in some way, for instance, it would mean an extra cost. There are some bits and pieces around that that may need looking at a bit more once the precise details of the debt repayment plan scheme are better understood.
Mr McFadden
Q
Peter Tutton: That is a really good question. I agree that that is what we are seeing—we put a report out last week. We see a growing number of households struggling because of covid—those who have lost their jobs. Furlough may be picking up 80% of their wages, but if you are on low pay, that is a big jump and a big cut can put people into difficulty.
You are absolutely right: this is growing. In an ideal world, it would be great if we had those breathing space protections tomorrow so that people had a safe place to go and we could start getting them back on the road towards control of their finances and stopping their debts growing. For practical reasons, I do not think that it will be possible to put that in place tomorrow. For the scheme to work and for us to be able to do it at the scale that we think it would need, it needs to work as an online remedy.
It also needs to work for advisers, to make sure that where we capture information or when someone inputs information into our online system debt help tools, for example, we do not then have to copy that again into the Insolvency Services portal, which is incredibly expensive. That is something that happens with DROs and can be very expensive. The software and APIs need to be developed so that there is a seamless process and the cost is minimised for the scale that we need to get people into this. I do not think it is possible to do that or for us, as debt advice providers, to be organised to do it on the scale that we would need to, much before the implementation date.
Bringing the scheme forward, for practical, implementation and software reasons—all that kind of stuff—is going to be hard, but I think there are things that the Government can do, in the areas that we are really worried about at the moment, to bring forward the protections, if not the breathing space scheme. One of the things that our polling estimates, and other people have said the same thing, is that a large number of people have fallen into rent arrears. Those people [Inaudible] in the private rented sector have relatively little protection against eviction for rent arrears. There are longer notice periods, but that will start unfolding quite soon—it probably already is—so are there protections? Similarly with council tax, there are people falling behind who may be subject to enforcement by bailiffs, which we know can be intimidating and expensive and can make people’s problems worse.
It seems to me that the Government and Parliament supported breathing space. There was cross-party support for the idea that people in financial difficulty need protection from unaffordable collections and enforcement that make their problems worse, so I think there is something the Government can do. That may not be through the breathing space scheme itself now, but it is in the spirit of those protections, particularly for key debts: things like rent arrears and council tax, and maybe other types of debt enforcement that will have lasting, harmful consequences if they are not addressed. That is something that the Government should be looking at now, to make sure that in the coming months people are not worrying more and more about what will happen to their house if their incomes do not recover, or worrying about a bailiff for council tax. Those are things that can be done by Government without the whole breathing space scheme, so I agree: with covid, there is a pressing need to look at the different things that Government may be able to do to help people through this period. Otherwise, we are likely to see some of those harsh enforcement actions starting to happen, and people experiencing harm because of covid. No one really wants to see that.
Support for SMEs: Covid-19
Pat McFadden Excerpts(3 years, 5 months ago)
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Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
Thank you for your chairmanship this afternoon, Sir Edward. I congratulate the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Elliot Colburn) on tabling this debate and thank all Members who have contributed to a thoughtful and varied debate. I will not mention everyone, but I was particularly struck by some of the points made, for example, by my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch) who raised the difficult issue of local markets; my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle (Emma Hardy) who talked about family owned coach companies; the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle (Huw Merriman) who talked about local shops; and my hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall (Florence Eshalomi) on the issue of high rateable value properties in central London. The indefatigable hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake) quite rightly described this period as a great acceleration; we do not have time today to explore that idea fully, but it is a crucial feature of the experience that we are going through. My hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) talked about leaseholders and self-employed people. And of course our great friend the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) talked about the crucial wedding industry. I can tell him that in my part of the country—the Black Country—we have an enormous wedding industry, including an Asian wedding industry that is a huge business, and it has suffered all the knock-on effects that he talked about.
The covid pandemic has forced Governments around the world to make major and unprecedented interventions in the economy. In this country, those interventions have included some of the measures that we have heard about this afternoon: the furlough scheme; the grants to small businesses; state-guaranteed lending schemes; tax deferrals; and a lot more. These interventions have been large-scale; indeed, they have been on a larger scale than in previous recessions, because the experience is different to that of a normal recession. They have been necessary, although some people have been missed out by them, as we have heard.
To have stood back and simply let business and workers take the full hit from this pandemic would have caused economic carnage and long-term damage on a scale unseen in living memory: it simply would not have been a feasible option for the Government to choose. In many cases, the grants and other support for small businesses that have been provided have been the difference between survival and going under—there is no doubt about that. They have provided vital revenue to businesses when there has been none from normal trading, because there has simply been no possibility of conducting business.
Of course the interventions are costly, but stepping up in a once-in-a-century situation such as this is what government is for. I am old enough to remember the last time that we had real mass unemployment in this country, when I was growing up in the 1980s, and the social and economic consequences of that were felt for many years afterwards, in terms of the impact both on individual families and on areas such as the Black Country, part of which I represent, and many other parts of the country, too.
A lot of the interventions this time have enjoyed cross-party support. We called for the furlough scheme and we supported it. That was particularly true in the early days of the pandemic. But after that period, things have become both more disjointed and more contested, and there is a reason for that.
I think that we have had four different versions of an economic plan in the last six weeks, with different levels of business support, various percentages of support for self-employed people, and at one point the withdrawal and then the reinstatement of furlough over one weekend. Trying to keep track of all those changes reminded me of what was said about the legendary Celtic winger, Jimmy Johnstone, and his effect on defenders; it was said that he gave them “twisted blood”. It would give any small business person twisted blood trying to follow all the twists and turns of what has been announced in recent weeks, only for us to end up pretty much back where we started in March.
I make that point not to engage in a bit of political knockabout or to take a partisan swing; it is to make a more serious and deeper point, because I think the story of recent weeks betrays a deeper problem within the Government. We are led to believe that there has been a debate or a disagreement in Government between those who have championed public health on the one hand and those who have championed the opening up of the economy on the other. We might say it is a debate between hawks and doves, with the Chancellor portrayed in this debate as a hawk.
Any Chancellor will rightly be concerned with the state of the economy—that is their job—but the mistake in this situation, and the real point that I want to make today, is to regard it as a choice between getting the virus under control and getting the economy moving again. We should have learned by now that any economic plan that does not have at its forefront getting the virus under control will not work, because when infections, hospitalisations and death rates are increasing, by definition the economy cannot be opened up and cannot operate properly. It cannot simply be decided that we open up the economy, because it would by definition mean—when people cannot see their relatives and weddings and all sorts of gatherings cannot take place without resulting in a new outbreak of the virus after a few weeks—going into a period of opening up and lockdown, and opening up and lockdown, particularly when the testing and tracking system is not working properly.
Mr McFadden
With the time constraints, I apologise but I am going to keep going.
Yesterday’s announcement about a vaccine is potentially exciting news and an amazing triumph for science, if it works in the timescale, but of course we are not certain and we have to wait to see what happens. For the moment, we must manage the situation as it is. My point is that good virus control is good economics. They are not in competition with one another, and I believe that the view that they are has led to some of the missteps of recent weeks.
Now that we are many months in, questions have been raised about some of the schemes, in the light of experience. I will end by putting some of those questions to the Minister. The bounce back loans were meant for genuine small businesses—the people that we all want to help to stay on their feet. The issue of fraud in the process has been raised. What does the Minister estimate the degree of fraud in bounce back loans has been, and how will he work with lenders and regulators to combat that? Nothing will annoy genuine small business people more than people setting up fake companies, or whatever scams have been done to try to get the loans.
It is inevitable, even with the best efforts, that a proportion of the loans will falter, and it will not be possible to pay them back. I appreciate that the Government have extended the repayment period from six to 10 years, but that postpones the problem, it does not fully eliminate it. Of the various options that have been canvassed for dealing with the problem of default, what has been ruled in and what has been ruled out? Have the Government ruled out writing off a proportion of the loans? Have they ruled out turning any of that into longer-term tax liability for firms, or into equity stakes in firms, if it cannot be paid back?
As for payment or leasing holidays for coach companies and similar businesses that we heard about in the debate, can the Government do anything to extend the six-month grace period that, for many small businesses, has either been used up or is coming to an end soon?
I have talked about the light of experience, and my final question to the Minister is what the Government can do for those who have so far been excluded from any kind of support. A large number of people have for one reason or another fallen between the cracks of the different support schemes that have been announced. As the pandemic goes on—and, while we are hopeful about the vaccine, we know it will continue into next year—those people’s situation becomes ever more difficult. Is there anything that the Government can do at this stage to help them?
Financial Services Bill
Pat McFadden ExcerptsMonday 9th November 2020
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Financial Services Bill 2019-21 View all Financial Services Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
I thank the Minister and his officials for the information they have shared about the measures in the Bill over the past couple of weeks. I have, of course, been riveted by the Bill in recent days, but I confess that I had to put it down for a while at 5 o’clock on Saturday to watch CNN when something more exciting than the Bill came through on the news.
Harriett Baldwin (West Worcestershire) (Con)
Will the right hon. Gentleman clarify whether that is where all his colleagues are this evening? I note that he does not have many behind him. In fact, his Benches are empty.
Mr McFadden
There is a phrase: I am not my brother or my sister’s keeper. They will have to answer for themselves.
The backdrop to these measures is formed by two significant events in recent years. The first of those is not Brexit but the financial crash of 2007 and 2008, which exposed the risks being run in the financial services industry and the huge knock-on effects for the rest of the economy when those risks go wrong. That experience prompted a global rethink about banking regulation, the capital levels that banks and other financial institutions are expected to hold, resolution measures in the event of banking failure, and the balance of obligations between the industry and the state. Much of that rethinking was expressed in the series of directives with which the Bill deals and in the Basel process on capital rules.
For all the complexity in the detail of these things, at root the questions are quite basic. First, how much capital should institutions hold as insurance against things going wrong? Secondly, who should be on the hook if things do go wrong? And thirdly, how do we insulate the wider economy from the consequences of instability in financial services? It is on these questions that much financial services regulation has focused over the past decade. The UK has been a key player in this process at both a European and a more global level. These are not things that have been imposed on us; we have played a significant role in the design of the measures that we are onshoring through the Bill.
The second event is, of course, Brexit and the consequent withdrawal from the European regulatory institutions responsible for the oversight and implementation of these directives. By definition, the process requires a recasting of regulatory responsibilities in the UK, and much of the Bill is concerned with that. The key question, then, is not so much the onshoring of the regulations themselves, but what happens next. Do the Government intend to diverge significantly from the rulebook, and in which direction will they go?
Jonathan Edwards
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for setting the scene. Many of us are concerned that the Basel III regulations did not go far enough—that is, they did not really solve the “too big to fail” issue. We need to be very careful that we do not water down the proposals. Does he agree with that position?
Mr McFadden
I do, and I will talk later about the Basel III regulations; certainly Basel II did not prove to be any kind of protection against what happened in 2007 and 2008.
The other issue that we will have to consider is the role of Parliament in debating and deciding these matters. The approach that we will take is to ask at each stage what these measures will mean for the UK financial services industry, for the wider economy and for consumers. Do they guarantee robust regulation in the public interest, or do they expose the consumer to greater risk?
There is a particular onus on the UK to get this right, because we are a medium-sized economy with a globally significant financial sector. There are obviously crucial benefits of that to the UK: the huge number of jobs generated around the country by financial services; the investment that comes into the country through being a world leader in the sector; and, of course, the tax revenue that goes towards supporting our public services. But, as we have also learned, there are risks if things go wrong, and it is in no one’s interest for the post-Brexit regulatory system to result in a race to the bottom, where the public are exposed to greater risk in the name of increased competitiveness.
We know that parts of the financial services sector will be knocking on the Minister’s door. They will not put it in terms of watering things down; they will tell the Minister that they could be so much more competitive if only he changed this rule or that rule, or gave them this or that exemption. Of course, we do not argue that any rulebook should be frozen in time. Regulation must adapt to circumstances and innovation, but these things are there for a reason. Capital has to be held against lending and other products for a reason. These rules are the public’s insurance policy against the risks involved in the enormous capital flows that go across countries and between financial institutions. They are the as yet untested firewall against a repeat of what happened across the globe a decade ago.
Bim Afolami
What is the right hon. Gentleman’s view on an expanding, ever more complex set of measures obscuring good supervision and prudential management of the financial services sector? To what extent would he welcome any efforts—whether cross-party or by the Government—to simplify regulatory standards while also ensuring that they continue to be robust? There is a danger for many in different parts of the industry not of watering things down, but of such complexity making it very difficult to manage a business on an ongoing basis.
Mr McFadden
Nobody should be wedded to complexity for complexity’s sake. As I said, beneath the complexity, the issues are actually not that complicated. They are about the safety of insurance and resilience when things go wrong, and that is what we are focused on, rather than defending complexity for complexity’s sake.
The second thing that we will have in mind as we debate the Bill is the broad question of what financial services are for. The Chancellor set out green goals for the UK financial services industry in his statement today, and we welcome, for example, what he said on green gilts. But those green goals are not mentioned in the accountability framework set out in the Bill. Indeed, in schedule 3, the accountability framework states that the regulator must have regard to
“relevant standards recommended by the Basel Committee”.
The hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr (Jonathan Edwards) was right to say that that should be a minimum, not a maximum, given the importance of resilience and robust regulation. The regulator must also have regard to
“the likely effect of the rules on the relative standing of the United Kingdom as a place for internationally active credit institutions and investment firms to be based or to carry on activities”
and
“the likely effect of the rules on the ability of…firms to continue to provide finance to businesses and consumers”.
Nothing there speaks of the green goals. Do the Government intend to amend the Bill as it progresses, to reflect the statement made by the Chancellor today? There is an opportunity here to put regulatory power behind the goal of net zero and, indeed, broader social and governance considerations for the greater public good. As it stands, the Bill is silent on that—it does not do that yet. When will the Bill be reconciled with the statement that we heard this afternoon?
Thirdly, we will want to ensure that the UK maintains the highest standards when it comes to transparency, money laundering and corruption. We have already had the report from the Intelligence and Security Committee referring to the “London laundromat”, where illicit funds can be washed and corrupt financing rendered more obscure. The UK’s globally significant financial services sector must not be tainted with any sense that this is an easy place for illicit or corruptly obtained finance to be washed through different institutions. As the Bill progresses, we will seek to ensure the highest possible standards with regard to these issues. Of course we want a successful, globally competitive financial services sector, but it has to be based on clean money, honest endeavour and socially responsible goals.
I turn to some of the individual measures in the Bill. As the Minister said, clauses 1 to 7 deal with new prudential regulation requirements, the implementation of the Basel rules and the new accountability framework, which I quoted from a moment ago. As I said, the schedule on the accountability framework states that, when making these new rules, the regulator must have regard to the likely effect on the “relative standing” of the UK as a place for firms to be based or carry on activities. I want to explore that with the Minister. Does that clause about the relative standing of the UK mean that, every time a regulated entity says, “We don’t want you to do that because it will affect our competitiveness in relation to other countries”—and they are liable to say that quite a lot when regulatory proposals are put forward—the regulators have to keel over and give in? How does this point to the UK being a leading player in the kind of environmental or social regulation that can help to ensure that the power of our financial services sector is a force for good? What is the guarantee that the provision does not, in fact, become a deregulator’s charter, on the basis that we should not do things that some in the industry could claim put us at a competitive disadvantage relative to other countries? The wording is crucial. The accountability frameworks, Parliament’s role in them and what they should cover will be the subject of significant debate as the Bill progresses.
On capital ratios, the FCA has estimated that total pillar 1 capital requirements will decrease by 5%. What is the justification for decreasing the capital requirements when we know that over-leveraging was a key cause of the financial crisis? How can the Government ensure that the onshoring of these powers does not result in a chipping away of the public’s insurance policy on financial risk? Similarly, in relation to Basel reforms, the Bill’s impact assessment talks of
“flexibility to tailor the actual detail of these subject areas to the UK.”
Given the weakness of the Basel rules in the past, it is clear that they should be seen as a floor, not a ceiling. Adherence to international standards is a minimum, not a maximum to be wriggled out of when we get the chance, so what exactly is the flexibility to be used for?
Clauses 8 to 19 deal with LIBOR and the governance of benchmarks. For my sins, a few years ago I served on the cross-party Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which was established in the wake of the LIBOR scandal, which exposed manipulation, mutual favours and price setting based on conjecture rather than actual trades. The benchmark was abused to benefit traders, rather than markets or the end consumers of those trades, so it is right that it goes, but so many contracts around the world have been based on it that the Bill has to put in place a system for dealing with such so-called tough legacy contracts. The principles behind benchmarks should be clear: they should be based on actual trades and costs and should be insulated against manipulation for personal gain by those who submit the information to the benchmark in the first place. That will be the task of the FCA.
Clauses 22 and 23 establish the new Gibraltar authorisation regime. I share the warmth towards Gibraltar that is felt in all parts of the House. The measures could be described as a necessary consolation prize for taking Gibraltar out of the EU, by ensuring continued market access on a free basis between Gibraltar and the UK.
Clauses 24 to 26 give us a picture of how equivalence will work from the UK point of view, at least in part, by establishing the overseas fund regime, which negates the need for fund-by-fund approval and will instead be based on country-by-country approval and extending the time period for such funds to trade in the meantime. In his statement earlier this afternoon, the Chancellor had more to say about how we will grant equivalence recognition to others, but of course he could not say what would happen to UK companies that sell services overseas, because over that he has no control.
What was announced today dealt with one end of the telescope, because that is the position we are now in. Whatever this can be described as, it certainly cannot be described as taking back control, for we are now dependent on a response from others in respect of the crucial UK companies in the overseas markets in which they want to trade. There is also the question of how equivalence decisions are to be granted. Are such decisions a matter of economic policy or foreign policy—or both? I would be grateful if the Minister addressed that when he responds.
Jonathan Edwards
Considering the amount of work that needs to be done on this issue before the end of the transition period, is not the reality that the best we can hope for for the financial sector is some sort of base deal? The negotiations on what the situation may be down the line will then take many, many months, if not years.
Mr McFadden
If we read the political declaration, we can see that this was all supposed to be wrapped up by June. We are now approaching mid-November. The hon. Gentleman is certainly right to suggest that the time has slipped.
Subsequent clauses in the Bill go through a number of other EU directives and the onshoring process. They cover the markets and financial instruments regulation, the market abuse regulation, European markets infrastructure regulation dealing with over-the-counter derivatives, and the EU financial collateral directive. I have no doubt we will have a lot of fun with all of them in Committee. On money laundering, we will want to see as strong a system as possible to ensure that the UK is no safe harbour for anyone who wants to wash dirty money, avoid taxes or evade accountability. Again, I am sure the Minister is expecting more discussion of this as the Bill progresses. He and I debated the statutory debt repayment plan a few weeks ago, and Labour supports moves to create this system. It will be particularly important in the light of the increasing debt burden on many families due to the covid pandemic, and the sooner it is in place, the better.
On PRIIPS, the Government propose to remove the performance scenarios. The question, of course, is what they will be replaced with, how useful and accessible the information for consumers will be and what protections will be in place against the mis-selling of products or fraudulent claims. The imbalance of information is always a challenge in financial products because, in most cases, the seller knows more than the purchaser. Regulators have an important duty to be on the side of the consumer when it comes to the marketing of such products, so if the current performance scenarios are to go, they must be replaced with something better that will genuinely help the consumer. Other measures, including the fixed term for the FCA chief executive, have finally found the legislative home for which they have been waiting in the Treasury for some time.
That is, broadly speaking, what the Bill legislates for, but there are important areas, as the Minister said, that are not included. The most obvious is access to cash. Cash use has declined markedly this year, as people have moved to more online shopping and many businesses have moved to card-only payments, but this is not a trend that falls evenly on the population. Most of the population might need less cash or, in some cases, no cash in the future, but we have a duty to ensure access to cash for those who still need it, including many on low incomes for whom cash budgeting is a vital way of making ends meet. If we do not do that, inequality will be sharpened and there is a real danger that cash-dependent consumers will be cut off from important areas of economic activity. The Government have said—the Minister repeated it tonight—that they want to ensure access to cash, but if that cannot be done through this Bill, we urge the Minister to come forward with appropriate measures as soon as possible.
Standing back and looking at all this, I get an overwhelming feeling of it being all deckchairs and no iceberg. The Government can, of course, rearrange the regulatory furniture, and in many areas that is a necessary consequence of leaving the EU, but the bigger policy decision to downgrade financial services in the negotiations was taken a long time ago. The Chancellor talked today about the economic and employment importance of this industry, and he was absolutely right to emphasise that, but the more he emphasises it, the more it begs the question why market access for this crucial sector, and indeed services in general, has not been a negotiating priority for the Government. The truth is that, in this negotiation, services have been thrown under the bus.
On manufacturing, we have also moved further and further away from the earlier promises of frictionless trade, exact same benefits and all the rest. The fact that these things are not front and centre of the final round of talks is not because agreement on them has already been reached, but because the Government have decided not even to prioritise them. That is a louder testament to where we have ended up in this process than anything in the Bill. This is a series of measures that are trying to compensate for much bigger decisions. This will create more trading friction and more market barriers for our crucial financial services, and for our broader services industry and manufacturing. In the end, no amount of cutting and pasting of EU directives or last-minute vision statements can change that bigger picture.
Mr McFadden
With the leave of the House, I should like to respond to the debate and pick up on a few of the contributions made over the last couple of hours. The hon. Member for West Worcestershire (Harriett Baldwin) spoke of historic turning points, citing the change of presidency and the potentially huge announcement today on a workable vaccine. She is right about those, but I thought it was a bit of a stretch to include this Bill in the same bracket, as a historic turning point.
The hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine) spoke of the importance of financial services jobs in her constituency and in many other parts of the country. The hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Kevin Hollinrake), as chair of the all-party group on fair business banking, spoke of some of the past banking scandals, mistreatment of small businesses and so on. The hon. Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond) told us that this might be the first of several such Bills, which gives us all something to look forward to in these long winter nights. He gently and right reminded us of the contrast between where we are and what was promised. He and the hon. Member for Hitchin and Harpenden (Bim Afolami) focused on the issue of accountability frameworks and the role of Parliament. That is very important because—let us be honest—that is what the discussion will be like in the Treasury. We have this big increase in regulatory focus in the UK. We have these existing regulators. We are going to pass a lot of this new power to the regulators through the onshoring of these directives and MPs will be standing up in Parliament saying, “Well, what about our role in this?” I suspect there is some scepticism about giving Members of this House a very active role in these regulations.
Exactly the same discussion took place during the financial crisis. Here, in the United States and in other countries, emergency measures had to be introduced and decisions had to be taken quickly by Executives, and the discussion was: what role for elected politicians? Hon. Members can be sure that there will be significant resistance to giving MPs in this House a big role in things such as capital ratios or whatever else is being discussed.
We will continue to debate these issues. To recap, our approach will be to protect consumers and the wider economy as these measures go through; and to focus on accountability frameworks and try to bring them closer to the policy aims of finance and what it can really do. We have broadened our understanding of that. The Chancellor, whether he meant to or not, has opened the door for us to discuss that through his statement this afternoon on the importance of green finance. Thirdly, our approach will be to try to ensure that this globally significant industry operates on the basis of finance that is clean, that is not a place for illicit funding and stops any race to the bottom on standards.
I look forward to debating these things with the Minister in Committee, but it is impossible not to contrast what is before us with what was promised all the way through and what was said earlier. The announcement today on equivalence is not taking back control; it is the opposite of taking back control. It was a symbol of our lack of control. It was, in fact, an act of unilateral financial disarmament. We decided to give companies operating here, for reasons of market continuity, the right to continue to practise. I understand why that was done, but the fact that we have no guarantee of what the response will be is a symbol of where we have ended up. It is certainly not taking back control. I fervently hope that that move is reciprocated, because that is in the interests of UK companies that are trading abroad, jobs here and this very important industry, but the fact that we cannot guarantee it and have no control over it speaks volumes about where we have ended up in this process.
The announcements on green finance were welcome, but they are not in the Bill. We have to ask why not, given that the Chancellor chose today to make his announcements, just an hour or so before we started debating the Bill. I am sure we will discuss that as we go forward.
To repeat, we have to have a UK-based system as a consequence of leaving the EU, and we will not oppose the Bill because we understand that reality, but that does not balance out or make up for the significant downgrading of our globally important financial services sector in the Brexit negotiations that are taking place at the moment. The fact that it is not front and centre in what we are trying to negotiate speaks volumes about where we have ended up.
Oral Answers to Questions
Pat McFadden Excerpts(3 years, 6 months ago)
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Kemi Badenoch
I congratulate Newcastle College and all it is doing to support learners to develop the skills they need to thrive. We know that apprenticeships are proven: 91% of apprentices in 2016-17 remained in employment or went on to further training afterwards. In recognition of the importance of apprenticeships and the disruption caused by covid-19, the Government have introduced payments to incentivise hiring new apprentices and flexibilities to support existing ones through their programmes.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
Let us look at the record. Capital investment in further education is running at less than half the level put in by Labour 10 years ago. Apprenticeship starts are down 43,000 this year, with the biggest drop among under-19s, and yesterday we learned about the short-sighted, vindictive move to scrap the union learning fund. Why is it that, when the need is for help now with new skills and retraining, this Government have done so much to kick the ladder of opportunity away from working people?
Kemi Badenoch
I think that it is probably a good time to remind the right hon. Gentleman that in the Budget we actually increased significantly the amount of money spent on further education. On the union learning grants, I refer him to the Department for Education Ministers who made this decision; I am sure they can write to him again on this. But the Government remain committed to investing in adult skills and retraining: in addition to the plan for jobs, at the comprehensive spending review we will be allocating our new £2.5 billion national skills fund to help more young people learn new skills and prepare for jobs for the future.
Draft Debt Respite Scheme (Breathing Space Moratorium and Mental health Crisis Moratorium) (England and Wales) Regulations 2020
Pat McFadden Excerpts(3 years, 6 months ago)
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Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I am grateful to the Minister and thank him for his explanation of the regulations. I should make clear at the outset that we support the idea of a breathing space for indebted households and businesses. I am grateful to charities such as StepChange, the Children’s Society, Citizens Advice and others, with whom we have discussed the matter or who have provided information about it.
This idea has been some time in the making. A similar scheme already exists in Scotland. The hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Kelly Tolhurst) introduced a private Member’s Bill on this issue in 2016. There was a consultation and a response between 2018 and 2019, all leading to the regulations before us today.
Although the regulations themselves are quite detailed, the basis of the scheme is simple: those seeking approved debt advice will be given a breathing space of 60 days, during which they can reach a sustainable repayment plan. That 60-day duration can be longer for people undergoing mental health treatment. During the breathing space, debtors will be protected from fees, charges and enforcement action. The overall aim is that repayment plans will be reached that make returns to creditors and that stop debtors from being financially crushed by the weight incurred.
The regulations are important not only because of the ongoing problems of debt but because a lot of households are under increased financial pressure because of covid, as the Minister said. Those effects are likely to become worse in the coming months as unemployment rises. In the wider context, the Minister might be aware, for example, of the Reset the Debt campaign, organised by a number of UK Churches, that draws attention to the problem of increased debt due to covid and calls for a jubilee fund to help with repayment.
Any help that people can get in coping with such debt is, of course, urgent and important. I have a few questions for the Minister, and I would be grateful if he addressed them. The regulations say that the breathing space should be of 60 days’ duration. For many people, that might be enough time to agree a repayment plan, but for some it might not, particularly if a major event—the death or serious illness of a family member, for example—occurs within that 60 days. Extra covid-induced debt may also make it harder to agree a repayment plan within 60 days. Although the regulations say 60 days at the moment, will the Minister undertake to review the 60-day period at some point in case it needs to be lengthened?
Secondly, the regulations stipulate that there can be only one breathing space within a 12-month period for the non-mental-health part of this. I appreciate that that is designed to stop people from gaming the system by entering repeated breathing spaces over and over, but again there can be drastic changes in circumstances within a 12-month period. Will the Minister keep that aspect of the regulations under review?
Thirdly, there is the question of which kinds of debt qualify for protection under the regulations and which fall outside it. One area raised with us is the question of advance payments under universal credit, which currently fall outside the scope of the regulations and are therefore not protected by the breathing space. Citizens Advice has reported that in 2018, for example, deductions for advance payments were taken from 41% of universal credit payments, and those deductions can be high—they can go up to 30% of a claimant’s standard weekly allowance. Given that everyone expects universal credit claims to grow in the coming months and that, therefore, it is also highly likely that the number of advance payments will grow, will the Minister review the decision to place advance payments from universal credit outside the scope of the breathing space?
Finally, I would like to ask the Minister about the cost-benefit analysis in the impact assessment before us today. There are some sizeable figures here, with an estimated overall benefit to society of some £9.2 billion. Can the Minister tell us how that is calculated and how confident the Government are in that estimate?
This is a welcome measure, which we will support, but it is also one measure coming in after several years of debate and consultation, and it does not come into force until May next year. There is no doubt that on both the household and business debt fronts the issue will grow in importance and it is likely to require further Government action in the coming months.
We saw in the early days of the pandemic what can be done where there is a will and additional resources—on homelessness, for example. As we approve the regulations today, I hope that the Minister can give some indication that the action we are taking today will not stop just with these breathing space provisions and that the Government will also consider what further help can be given to indebted households and businesses in the months ahead.
Draft International Monetary Fund (Limit on Lending) Order 2020
Pat McFadden Excerpts(3 years, 7 months ago)
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Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
As the Minister explained, the order authorises an increase in the UK’s contingent contribution to the IMF of just under £5 billion, and it does so at an important time. The increase was agreed by Finance Ministers and central bank governors in December last year, before it was known how big a challenge the pandemic would become. The question we are faced with is whether what we are doing internationally is anywhere near enough.
The pandemic has produced drastic economic effects across the world. Of course, many of the lowest income countries lack the medical resources to fight it, to treat patients, to test on a large scale or to support workers who have lost their jobs as a result of lockdowns or a decrease in economic activity. The International Labour Organisation estimates that 400 million full-time equivalent jobs were lost in the second quarter of this year. The World Bank projects that an additional 71 million people will fall into extreme poverty.
The race is on to devise an effective vaccine to help the world to recover. We should be proud that British science is at the forefront of that effort, but even if it is successful, there will be a huge logistical and healthcare challenge to make sure that a vaccine can be administered to the world’s population. Many countries will need economic help to make sure that that can happen. If ever there were a situation where we are all in it together, this is it.
Our chief medical officer reminded us yesterday that no one can think of just themselves in this situation; the actions that we take affect others. What goes for individuals goes for countries too. In a world as connected as ours, it is in all our interests to make sure that every country is as equipped as possible to fight the virus. As the managing director of the IMF, Kristalina Georgieva, wrote earlier this month:
“An uneven rollout might improve economic conditions in countries that secured the vaccine first but would not shield them from weak demand from trade partners struggling to recover without a vaccine.”
There are also the damaging social effects of what is already happening. She continued:
“young children, especially those from poor households, may suffer permanent losses…from a lack of schooling, adequate nutrition, and medical access.”
In the face of such challenges, it is striking how little international co-ordination there has been. Country by country, we have fought the virus, but the world has lacked the leadership to bring different countries together and co-ordinate a truly global economic or health response. We approve the increased funding for the IMF, but the real question is why more has not been done globally to co-ordinate the fight against the pandemic that we are in the midst of.
Draft Equivalence Determinations for Financial Services (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020
Pat McFadden Excerpts(3 years, 7 months ago)
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Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. The regulations are intended to put in place an equivalence regime for financial services during and at the end of the transition period. They mirror the equivalence regulations put in place last year in case we left the EU without a withdrawal agreement. As the old saying goes, it is déjà vu all over again.
The aim is to ensure minimal disruption at the end of the transition period and a suitable UK regime for functions currently carried out by EU bodies such as the Commission or the European Securities and Markets Authority. In most cases, those functions will transfer to the Treasury or regulators such as the Financial Conduct Authority. The Minister might confirm my understanding that the aim of the regulations is not to change policy other than that necessary to recognise the legal fact of the UK’s having left the European Union.
To put the Committee’s mind at rest, I will say that we do not intend to divide the Committee on this matter today. It is clearly in the national interest to have a robust regulatory system in place and to have a mechanism for making equivalence determinations for the financial services industries and the regulatory systems in EEA countries, and that is what the regulations aim to achieve.
However, I do have a couple of questions for the Minister, and I would be grateful if he addressed them in his summing-up speech. Determining equivalence is of course a two-way street. It is of just as much relevance to our financial services industry—and all the jobs, investment and tax revenue associated with it—to know what the situation is with equivalence determinations in EEA countries for our financial services industry as it is to design our own regulatory system for theirs.
The Minister will be aware that paragraph 36 of the political declaration that we signed last year said that the UK and EU should endeavour
“to conclude these assessments before the end of June 2020.”
We are well beyond that now, in mid-September, and perhaps it is a bit much to expect the Government to stick to the non-legally binding political declaration when they do not even intend to stick to the withdrawal agreement, but could the Minister give an update on how the process of determining equivalence with EEA countries is going? That has of course become a more serious and urgent question with the controversy about the United Kingdom Internal Market Bill, currently being debated in the House.
Let us say that no free trade agreement is reached in the coming weeks. What is the Minister’s assessment of the impact of that on our financial services industries? The regulations—they say it throughout—are all about co-operation arrangements, but what if there is not much co-operation in place? What will that mean for this important sector of the UK economy? What will it mean for jobs? And what will it mean for associated industries such as law, consultancy, accountancy, insurance and so on? What does the Minister think are the prospects for equivalence agreements if the good will is being destroyed in the way that we have seen in the last couple of weeks? What representations, if any, has the Minister received from the financial services industry on this question in recent weeks, since the Government’s intentions on the internal market Bill became clear?
We can replicate the regulations currently in place; we can transfer responsibility for these determinations to UK bodies, and that is what the regulations before us today do, but what we cannot do is replicate the market access that we currently have, because the Government have chosen their direction in the negotiations in a way that inevitably lessens market access for these UK-based firms. Of course, quite what the full implications of that are only time will tell, but particularly in the light of the last couple of weeks, I would be interested in the Minister’s assessment of that before we conclude.