Mortgage Market
Neil Coyle Excerpts(1 year, 6 months ago)
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Andrew Griffith
I can absolutely reassure the hon. Gentleman that the Government are focused on his constituents, even if his colleagues find it useful to ask the same question again and again. We are focused on not making the sort of unfunded spending commitments—such as the £28 billion that the right hon. Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves) herself described as “reckless”—that would really cause difficulties for mortgage holders in Chesterfield and across the United Kingdom.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
Given the jump in mortgage arrears, and to help everyone who is struggling to pay the Tory surcharge on their mortgages since the disastrous mini-Budget, is the Minister considering increasing access to mortgage interest relief?
Andrew Griffith
There are no plans to change that. Those are matters for fiscal events and for the Chancellor.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Thirteenth sitting)
Neil Coyle Excerpts(3 years, 1 month ago)
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Craig Whittaker
I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. He is right that one of the key points in the process is that decision makers have the ability and the training to know what they are looking for to identify whether people are victims of modern slavery.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
I recognise that the hon. Gentleman is stepping in as Minister, but he just said that the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby was right in his assertion that many of those who claim to be asylum seekers are not. Could he remind us of the Home Office statistics on that issue?
Craig Whittaker
I thank the hon. Member for that question. Unfortunately, I do not have those statistics for him, but I will ensure that he gets them by the end of today. I will ask officials to bring forward those numbers.
It is essential that the provision that clarifies that the conclusive grounds threshold test is based on whether, on the balance of probabilities, an individual is a victim of modern slavery remains in the Bill to provide legislative clarity to that threshold. For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.
Craig Whittaker
I thank the hon. Member for his further intervention. I will take some advice on the technicalities in what he says, but that is not my understanding of what the clause says. I have already said that the decision to withhold recovery periods on public order grounds will be made on a case-by-case basis. That will balance the need to safeguard exploited individuals against public protection concerns and allow the Secretary of State to withhold the protections of the national referral mechanism, where the particular circumstances of an individual mean it is appropriate to do so.
Neil Coyle
In light of the fact that the Minister is asking for the amendment to be withdrawn and given his understanding that decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, can the Minister tell us if the guidance that goes with the legislation will set out the exemptions and the process by which cases will be decided on an individual basis, and if there will not be the blanket exemption that is the Opposition’s understanding?
Craig Whittaker
Of course we will fully assess the issues in policy guidance. The hon. Member is exactly right that it will be set out in policy guidance, to ensure that due account is taken of the circumstances, so that any permitted actions, including prosecutions, are proportionate and in the public interest. It is right that the Bill seeks to target ruthless criminal gangs who put lives at risk by smuggling people across the channel.
The changes are not intended to deter people from seeking help from the authorities when they are being exploited and abused. However, it is right that we should be able to withhold protections from serious criminals and people who pose a national security threat to the United Kingdom. Indeed, ECAT envisages that the recovery period should be withheld in such cases, and it does not specify an age limit either, in answer to the question asked by the hon. Member for Halifax. It is important that the UK maintains this scope, as set out in ECAT. I hope in light of this explanation, hon. Members will be content to withdraw the amendment.
Finally, amendment 3 seeks to stipulate the minimum length of time support is provided after a positive conclusive grounds decision. In contrast, our approach is to provide tailored support to victims following a recovery needs assessment through a tailored transition plan. The plan can be put in place for up to six months at a time, with no overall limit. This will enable us to deliver the most appropriate and effective needs-based support to victims.
Neil Coyle
The Minister said earlier that the tailored plan would support someone until they move back into the community. Can he confirm that that support will be provided whatever setting the person is living in, not only to those who happen to be in a detention centre or accommodation centre, for example?
Craig Whittaker
I think I have made it quite clear that the amendment would restrict the ability to assess on an individual, case-by-case basis, as the clause intends. I also went on to say that the time period for that is up to six months but is not limited. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question. Amendment 3 would go against that approach and would not increase benefits to victims. For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully invite the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.
Craig Whittaker
The Bill is groundbreaking in its provision of a specific grant of temporary leave to remain for confirmed victims of modern slavery by putting it in primary legislation. Clause 53 sets out the circumstances in which a confirmed victim may qualify for a grant of temporary modern slavery-specific leave. I think we all agree that this is a crucial provision that enhances the rights of the victims. Our approach is to set out the circumstances in which this new form of leave to remain will be provided, giving victims and decision makers clarity as to entitlements, in line with our international obligations.
In contrast to amendment 7, the clause does not seek to specify the length of the leave conferred on an individual, as that will be determined through an assessment of the specific circumstances of the individual. This approach is designed to provide flexibility based on an individual victim’s needs. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better—
Neil Coyle
The Minister is right: a huge number of organisations welcome the specific leave to remain on these grounds. Perhaps he could tell us the average length of time that it takes to prosecute gangs on these specific circumstances and whether it is the Government’s intention to protect anyone who has been trafficked for the entire period of the case in order to prevent them from being intimidated if they are outside the UK and in their country of origin, for want of a better term.
Craig Whittaker
The hon. Gentleman will know from his own experience that that is done through the criminal justice system in this country. If any victim or any person needs to be taken into any form of witness protection, that will be done via the courts. You may want to come back in.
Neil Coyle
But I am asking very specifically about the circumstances in clause 53(2)(c), where the Government are offering leave to remain on these specific grounds. Is it the Government’s intention that that leave to remain is extended for the period of any case involving the individual who is believed to have been trafficked?
Craig Whittaker
As I have said, each individual case will be considered on an individual, case-by-case basis. That is why the measure is written the way it is—so that decision makers can make individual decisions, based on individuals’ needs and support.
Neil Coyle
Let us try it the other way round. Can the Minister confirm that it is not the Government’s intention to end leave to remain during criminal proceedings if that could mean that someone is forced to leave the UK and could be at risk of intimidation in another country?
Craig Whittaker
As I clearly stated in my previous answer, each individual case will be treated on the merits of that case, so it will be the decision makers’ decision as to what action, care or support will be needed for the individual.
Let me go back to what I was saying about amendment 7. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better met through provision in guidance and flexibility for the decision makers to determine it.
With regard to amendment 5, I think we agree that the primary aim here is to provide clarity to victims on the circumstances in which they are eligible for a grant of temporary leave to remain. To support clarity of decision making, we have sought to define the circumstances in which victims are eligible for a grant of modern slavery-specific leave. By contrast, amendment 5 would reduce clarity by providing that leave should be granted where necessary to assist the individual in their “personal situation”, without actually defining the term “personal situation”. This is why we have chosen to define what we mean by “personal situation” in this clause, for domestic purposes, and have set out that temporary leave to remain will be provided where it is necessary to assist an individual
“in their recovery from any harm arising from the relevant exploitation to their physical and mental health and their social well-being”.
Craig Whittaker
The clause defines what personal circumstances mean. Amendment 5 does not do that and, in doing so, reduces clarity for victims. That is completely against the aim of the clause, which is to give clarity to victims.
Neil Coyle
Could the Minister provide some statistics to help us—I do not expect him to have this to hand, but perhaps he can respond in writing—on the average length of these cases, the number of people granted leave to remain who were believed to be victims of traffickers and the average length of the leave to remain they granted? Those would be useful statistics for the Committee and for the House ahead of Report.
Craig Whittaker
I have resisted saying these words, but I will make sure that we write to the Committee with those statistics if they are available.
The link to exploitation is an important one, and it is based on our Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings obligations to assist victims in their recovery. Given that the aim is to provide a clear framework to deliver certainty for victims and decision makers, I do not think that amendment 5 would enhance that at all. Turning to amendment 189, I recognise the importance, again, of bringing clarity to victims about the circumstances in which they are entitled to temporary leave to remain. That is exactly what clause 53 will do. I understand the particular vulnerabilities of children, and I can reassure the Committee that these are built into our consideration of how the clause will be applied.
Clause 53, in contrast to amendment 189, seeks to clarify our interpretation of our international obligations and it brings clarity for victims and decision makers, too. It purposefully does not use terms such as
“the person’s wishes and feelings”,
which are unclear and would not enable consistent decision making.
We are also clear that all these considerations must be based on an assessment of need stemming from the individual’s personal exploitation. Amendment 189 seeks to remove that link to exploitation, moving us away from the core tenets of our needs-based approach. It would not support victims in better understanding their rights; nor indeed would it help decision makers have clarity on the circumstances in which a grant of leave is necessary.
I want to be clear that clause 53 applies equally to adult and child confirmed victims of modern slavery. Crucially, through this clause, we have already placed our international legal obligations to providing leave for children in legislation—which I think we all agree is a milestone in itself.
I want to reassure the Committee that decision makers are fully trained in making all leave to remain decisions, including considering all information to assess the best interests of the child and to account for the needs to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children. All decision makers will receive training and up-to-date guidance on the policy outlined in clause 53.
For the reasons I have outlined, such changes do not add clarity and, in our view, are not required. I hope the hon. Member for Halifax will not press her amendments.
Craig Whittaker
I am a little surprised that the hon. Lady says “piecemeal approach”. I thought I was very clear throughout the process that it is a highly trained decision maker that will be looking at each individual on a case-by-case basis. They will have the ability to look at the individual person’s needs and extend. That approach is at the opposite end of the spectrum to the “piecemeal approach” mentioned by the hon. Lady.
Neil Coyle
I think the Minister is suggesting that there would be variation in the lengths of leave provided. Can he set out that it is the Government’s expectation that there would not be a minimum, bog standard six months that everyone is given, and that there will be quite considerable variation in the periods provided?
Craig Whittaker
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention asking for clarity. He is absolutely right; decisions will be made on the basis of individual needs. I can understand where the word “piecemeal” comes from, but the reality is that if an individual’s mental and physical health and wellbeing support needs mean that those periods need to be extended, the individual highly trained decision maker will have the ability to extend the period.
Neil Coyle
The Minister is again saying extend, rather than grant for the necessary period. Coming back to the criminal prosecution case, it is very unlikely that the case will be heard within six months. It will not even get to court within six months, let alone be heard. Is it the Government’s expectation that someone will be protected with a period of leave that covers a court case? Will the individual decision maker have access to the average statistics on the time it takes to hear a case of this nature?
Craig Whittaker
I do not think that the decision maker will need the statistics on the average timescale for a decision. What they will need to make a decision is the individual person’s history and needs, which is what they will use throughout the process. If they need six months, they will get six months. If they need longer than that—whether for a court case or other circumstances —that is intended to be allowed for the individual.
There was one more question on how we assess the victim’s needs to be met in another country. The policy will make it clear for the first time in legislation that confirmed victims with recovery needs stemming from their exploitation will be entitled to a grant of leave where it is necessary to assist them in their recovery. Decision makers will assess, in line with guidance and available country information, whether the support and assistance required by the victim to aid their recovery is readily available in their country of return. This will be carried out on a case-by-case basis, in line with individual assessments for each victim.
Amendment 72 agreed to.
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)
Neil Coyle Excerpts(3 years, 1 month ago)
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Bambos Charalambous
I will come on to that topic, but those powers already exist, and I do not think that further regulation of this type—forcing the tribunals committee to supply this information—is the correct way of going about this.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
We have just heard about the new special court, the new special tribunal and the new special advocate. We have new processes, new bureaucracy and new costs. Does my hon. Friend agree that this clause represents the veneer of the Home Office’s pretence to actually give a damn about value for money any more?
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Throughout this Bill, some crumbs of legal aid have been provided in different circumstances, yet the Bill makes it difficult for lawyers to assist those people for whom legal aid is provided, and now they seem to be penalised for not being able to put forward the best case they can.
It is a well-established fact that access to justice includes equal protection under the law. Solicitors are fundamentally obliged to act in their clients’ best interests, which may involve adjourning a case due to a change in circumstances that they are not at liberty to disclose. That principle admits of no distinction between British nationals and foreign nationals, and those who are subject to UK law are entitled to its protection. In the context of UK immigration tribunal hearings, through which people subject to immigration control—non-citizens who cannot exercise democratic rights to shape the legislation to which they are subject—seek to vindicate their position against the state, that principle ought to warn against bearing down on them and their lawyers through an extra costs order and charging order regime that is inapplicable to British nationals in the wider courts and tribunals system.
Immigration tribunals already have the powers that they need to regulate their own procedures—as I have mentioned, they have case management powers, a costs jurisdiction and referral powers. Taking each in turn, they have extensive case management powers, as set out in rules 4 to 6 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. Those tribunals already have a costs jurisdiction that enables them to make wasted costs orders against lawyers through the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007:
“(4) In any proceedings mentioned in subsection (1), the relevant Tribunal may—
(a) disallow, or
(b) (as the case may be) order the legal or other representative concerned to meet,
the whole of any wasted costs or such part of them as may be determined”.
Wasted costs are defined as
“any costs incurred by a party—
(a) as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or other representative or any employee of such a representative, or
(b) which, in the light of any such act or omission occurring after they were incurred, the relevant Tribunal considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to pay.”
That costs jurisdiction is given further effect by the rules of procedure set out in rule 9 of the 2014 rules. An order for wasted costs may be made
“where a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings. The Tribunal may make an order under this rule on an application or on its own initiative.”
In practice, tribunals have the power to regulate their own procedure to avoid its abuse. In the context of applications for judicial review in the High Court, it is recognised that the Court may refer a lawyer to their professional regulatory body, such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority, where their conduct warrants it, thus potentially leading to disciplinary proceedings. A legal representative may be asked to show why the conduct should not be considered for referral to the relevant body, or why they should not be admonished. An immigration tribunal might consider making such a referral in appropriate cases. Alternatively, it may decide that the conduct might not be so serious after all and restrain itself.
In clause 62, the Government seek to give immigration tribunals additional new powers, so that they may charge a participant an amount of money if it is considered that the participant
“has acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and
(b) as a result, the Tribunal’s resources have been wasted”.
The fine would be a separate matter from the costs incurred by a party, and it would be payable by the other party. The charge would be paid to the tribunal. In this context, participants who may be ordered to pay a charge in respect of immigration tribunal proceedings include
“(a) any person exercising a right of audience or right to conduct the proceedings on behalf of a party to proceedings,
(b) any employee of such a person, or
(c) where the Secretary of State is a party to proceedings and has not instructed a person mentioned in paragraph (a) to act on their behalf in the proceedings, the Secretary of State.
(4) A person may be found to have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently…by reason of having failed to act in a particular way.”
However, we are not told what that “particular way” is.
Clause 62 provides that rules may be made and may include the “scales of amounts” to be charged, and it is wrong that no framework has been provided for the scales of amounts to be charged. As a rationale for this innovation, it is said that:
“High levels of poor practice around compliance with tribunal directions, which disrupts or prevents the proper preparation of an appeal, can lead to cases being adjourned at a late stage.”
No actual evidence is adduced to support that proposition or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers and powers of referral are inadequate to deal with such matters.
Clause 62 seeks to amend the cost provisions in the 2007 Act in order to put greater emphasis on making an order on grounds of unreasonable behaviour. A tribunal may make an order in respect of costs in any proceedings if it considers that a party, or its legal or other representative, has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings. This is a power to make a costs order against a party and/or their lawyer. Unlike in considering wasted costs, the behaviour identified is solely that which is unreasonable, not behaviour that is improper or negligent. In carving out unreasonable behaviour in this way, there is a risk that the high threshold that applies in the wasted costs jurisdiction is lowered, and that such orders are made where the ordinary difficulties of running an immigration case have impeded its progress. It is unclear why additional regulatory measures are thought to be needed, indicating that the proposal is unnecessary. The tribunal procedure rules already have provisions for wasted costs, and tribunals have the power to refer cases of improper behaviour to the regulator.
Clause 63 provides that:
“Tribunal Procedure Rules must prescribe conduct that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is to be treated as—
(a) improper, unreasonable or negligent for the purposes of”
a charge in respect of wasted resources. Where the prescribed conduct occurs, the person in question will be treated as having acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently unless they can show evidence to the contrary, so there is a rebuttal presumption in relation to this. Here too there is a risk that conduct that does not meet the test for being unreasonable allows a wasted costs order to sneak back in. It is also not clear how wasted resources will be defined or quantified, which may lead to satellite litigation challenging the fine itself or the amount imposed, further increasing the burdens on a system already under immense pressure. The rules make provisions to the effect that if the tribunal is satisfied that the conduct has taken place, it must consider whether to impose a charge or make a costs order, though it is not compelled to do so.
According to the Home Office, in immigration tribunals,
“A range of conduct on the part of legal and other representatives…in the way proceedings are conducted or pursued”
is
“disrupting or preventing the proper preparation and progress of an appeal”,
but once again, no evidence is adduced to support that proposition, or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers, and the power to refer are inadequate to deal with such matters.
Introducing further overlapping and potentially duplicative regulatory requirements may have the perverse impact of undermining the effectiveness of all relevant regimes, and increase complexity and bureaucracy. If solicitors are held personally liable for costs that arise for reasons outside their control, it could risk driving a wedge between them and their clients by creating a conflict of interest. The immigration tribunals already have all the case management cost and referral powers that they need to control their procedures. Adding new powers for immigration tribunals without establishing a basis for them in evidence is not necessary and is counterproductive. For the reasons I have outlined, we oppose clauses 62 and 63.
Craig Whittaker
I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we have been engaging with the devolved Administrations, including at ministerial level, over the course of the Bill. I want to reiterate our commitment to continuing to work with the devolved Administrations as we look to operationalise the measures to ensure the policies work for the whole of the UK. Contrary to the spirit of working together across the UK, amendment 186 could lead to the scenario where decisions in reserved areas would operate differently across the UK, thereby reducing the clarity the Bill seeks to provide for victims and decision makers. In line with the devolved memorandum of understanding, the UK Government will continue to engage with the devolved Administrations both at ministerial and official level to ensure that we have time to fully understand any implications and adhere to our priority to safeguard victims. I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
On clause 69, I begin by setting out the devolution position. Almost all of the Bill is about nationality, immigration and asylum, which are reserved matters to the UK Parliament. Almost all of the Bill, therefore, extends UK wide.
Craig Whittaker
It is very kind of the hon. Gentleman to interject before I had finished my sentence. Some provisions will apply only to England and Wales. Those provisions are about matters that are devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but are reserved to the UK Parliament in England and Wales. They are civil legal aid, support for victims of modern slavery offences and the early release scheme.
Turning to the extent outside the UK, part 1— nationality provisions—will also extend to the Crown dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, and also the British overseas territories. That follows discussions between the UK Government, the devolved Administrations, the Crown dependencies and the British overseas territories. I want to clarify that we intend to table a further amendment to add a permissive extent clause on Report. That will enable the Crown dependencies to adopt other parts of the Bill that are relevant to them.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Thirteenth sitting)
Neil Coyle ExcerptsTuesday 2nd November 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Nationality and Borders Act 2022 View all Nationality and Borders Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 2 November 2021 - (2 Nov 2021)
Craig Whittaker
I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. He is right that one of the key points in the process is that decision makers have the ability and the training to know what they are looking for to identify whether people are victims of modern slavery.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
I recognise that the hon. Gentleman is stepping in as Minister, but he just said that the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby was right in his assertion that many of those who claim to be asylum seekers are not. Could he remind us of the Home Office statistics on that issue?
Craig Whittaker
I thank the hon. Member for that question. Unfortunately, I do not have those statistics for him, but I will ensure that he gets them by the end of today. I will ask officials to bring forward those numbers.
It is essential that the provision that clarifies that the conclusive grounds threshold test is based on whether, on the balance of probabilities, an individual is a victim of modern slavery remains in the Bill to provide legislative clarity to that threshold. For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully ask the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.
Neil Coyle
In light of the fact that the Minister is asking for the amendment to be withdrawn and given his understanding that decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, can the Minister tell us if the guidance that goes with the legislation will set out the exemptions and the process by which cases will be decided on an individual basis, and if there will not be the blanket exemption that is the Opposition’s understanding?
Craig Whittaker
Of course we will fully assess the issues in policy guidance. The hon. Member is exactly right that it will be set out in policy guidance, to ensure that due account is taken of the circumstances, so that any permitted actions, including prosecutions, are proportionate and in the public interest. It is right that the Bill seeks to target ruthless criminal gangs who put lives at risk by smuggling people across the channel.
The changes are not intended to deter people from seeking help from the authorities when they are being exploited and abused. However, it is right that we should be able to withhold protections from serious criminals and people who pose a national security threat to the United Kingdom. Indeed, ECAT envisages that the recovery period should be withheld in such cases, and it does not specify an age limit either, in answer to the question asked by the hon. Member for Halifax. It is important that the UK maintains this scope, as set out in ECAT. I hope in light of this explanation, hon. Members will be content to withdraw the amendment.
Neil Coyle
The Minister said earlier that the tailored plan would support someone until they move back into the community. Can he confirm that that support will be provided whatever setting the person is living in, not only to those who happen to be in a detention centre or accommodation centre, for example?
Craig Whittaker
I think I have made it quite clear that the amendment would restrict the ability to assess on an individual, case-by-case basis, as the clause intends. I also went on to say that the time period for that is up to six months but is not limited. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question. Amendment 3 would go against that approach and would not increase benefits to victims. For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully invite the hon. Member for Halifax to withdraw the amendment.
Craig Whittaker
The Bill is groundbreaking in its provision of a specific grant of temporary leave to remain for confirmed victims of modern slavery by putting it in primary legislation. Clause 53 sets out the circumstances in which a confirmed victim may qualify for a grant of temporary modern slavery-specific leave. I think we all agree that this is a crucial provision that enhances the rights of the victims. Our approach is to set out the circumstances in which this new form of leave to remain will be provided, giving victims and decision makers clarity as to entitlements, in line with our international obligations.
In contrast to amendment 7, the clause does not seek to specify the length of the leave conferred on an individual, as that will be determined through an assessment of the specific circumstances of the individual. This approach is designed to provide flexibility based on an individual victim’s needs. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better—
Neil Coyle
The Minister is right: a huge number of organisations welcome the specific leave to remain on these grounds. Perhaps he could tell us the average length of time that it takes to prosecute gangs on these specific circumstances and whether it is the Government’s intention to protect anyone who has been trafficked for the entire period of the case in order to prevent them from being intimidated if they are outside the UK and in their country of origin, for want of a better term.
Craig Whittaker
The hon. Gentleman will know from his own experience that that is done through the criminal justice system in this country. If any victim or any person needs to be taken into any form of witness protection, that will be done via the courts. You may want to come back in.
Neil Coyle
But I am asking very specifically about the circumstances in clause 53(2)(c), where the Government are offering leave to remain on these specific grounds. Is it the Government’s intention that that leave to remain is extended for the period of any case involving the individual who is believed to have been trafficked?
Craig Whittaker
As I have said, each individual case will be considered on an individual, case-by-case basis. That is why the measure is written the way it is—so that decision makers can make individual decisions, based on individuals’ needs and support.
Neil Coyle
Let us try it the other way round. Can the Minister confirm that it is not the Government’s intention to end leave to remain during criminal proceedings if that could mean that someone is forced to leave the UK and could be at risk of intimidation in another country?
Craig Whittaker
As I clearly stated in my previous answer, each individual case will be treated on the merits of that case, so it will be the decision makers’ decision as to what action, care or support will be needed for the individual.
Let me go back to what I was saying about amendment 7. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better met through provision in guidance and flexibility for the decision makers to determine it.
With regard to amendment 5, I think we agree that the primary aim here is to provide clarity to victims on the circumstances in which they are eligible for a grant of temporary leave to remain. To support clarity of decision making, we have sought to define the circumstances in which victims are eligible for a grant of modern slavery-specific leave. By contrast, amendment 5 would reduce clarity by providing that leave should be granted where necessary to assist the individual in their “personal situation”, without actually defining the term “personal situation”. This is why we have chosen to define what we mean by “personal situation” in this clause, for domestic purposes, and have set out that temporary leave to remain will be provided where it is necessary to assist an individual
“in their recovery from any harm arising from the relevant exploitation to their physical and mental health and their social well-being”.
Craig Whittaker
The clause defines what personal circumstances mean. Amendment 5 does not do that and, in doing so, reduces clarity for victims. That is completely against the aim of the clause, which is to give clarity to victims.
Neil Coyle
Could the Minister provide some statistics to help us—I do not expect him to have this to hand, but perhaps he can respond in writing—on the average length of these cases, the number of people granted leave to remain who were believed to be victims of traffickers and the average length of the leave to remain they granted? Those would be useful statistics for the Committee and for the House ahead of Report.
Craig Whittaker
I have resisted saying these words, but I will make sure that we write to the Committee with those statistics if they are available.
The link to exploitation is an important one, and it is based on our Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings obligations to assist victims in their recovery. Given that the aim is to provide a clear framework to deliver certainty for victims and decision makers, I do not think that amendment 5 would enhance that at all. Turning to amendment 189, I recognise the importance, again, of bringing clarity to victims about the circumstances in which they are entitled to temporary leave to remain. That is exactly what clause 53 will do. I understand the particular vulnerabilities of children, and I can reassure the Committee that these are built into our consideration of how the clause will be applied.
Clause 53, in contrast to amendment 189, seeks to clarify our interpretation of our international obligations and it brings clarity for victims and decision makers, too. It purposefully does not use terms such as
“the person’s wishes and feelings”,
which are unclear and would not enable consistent decision making.
We are also clear that all these considerations must be based on an assessment of need stemming from the individual’s personal exploitation. Amendment 189 seeks to remove that link to exploitation, moving us away from the core tenets of our needs-based approach. It would not support victims in better understanding their rights; nor indeed would it help decision makers have clarity on the circumstances in which a grant of leave is necessary.
I want to be clear that clause 53 applies equally to adult and child confirmed victims of modern slavery. Crucially, through this clause, we have already placed our international legal obligations to providing leave for children in legislation—which I think we all agree is a milestone in itself.
I want to reassure the Committee that decision makers are fully trained in making all leave to remain decisions, including considering all information to assess the best interests of the child and to account for the needs to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children. All decision makers will receive training and up-to-date guidance on the policy outlined in clause 53.
For the reasons I have outlined, such changes do not add clarity and, in our view, are not required. I hope the hon. Member for Halifax will not press her amendments.
Craig Whittaker
I am a little surprised that the hon. Lady says “piecemeal approach”. I thought I was very clear throughout the process that it is a highly trained decision maker that will be looking at each individual on a case-by-case basis. They will have the ability to look at the individual person’s needs and extend. That approach is at the opposite end of the spectrum to the “piecemeal approach” mentioned by the hon. Lady.
Neil Coyle
I think the Minister is suggesting that there would be variation in the lengths of leave provided. Can he set out that it is the Government’s expectation that there would not be a minimum, bog standard six months that everyone is given, and that there will be quite considerable variation in the periods provided?
Craig Whittaker
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention asking for clarity. He is absolutely right; decisions will be made on the basis of individual needs. I can understand where the word “piecemeal” comes from, but the reality is that if an individual’s mental and physical health and wellbeing support needs mean that those periods need to be extended, the individual highly trained decision maker will have the ability to extend the period.
Neil Coyle
The Minister is again saying extend, rather than grant for the necessary period. Coming back to the criminal prosecution case, it is very unlikely that the case will be heard within six months. It will not even get to court within six months, let alone be heard. Is it the Government’s expectation that someone will be protected with a period of leave that covers a court case? Will the individual decision maker have access to the average statistics on the time it takes to hear a case of this nature?
Craig Whittaker
I do not think that the decision maker will need the statistics on the average timescale for a decision. What they will need to make a decision is the individual person’s history and needs, which is what they will use throughout the process. If they need six months, they will get six months. If they need longer than that—whether for a court case or other circumstances —that is intended to be allowed for the individual.
There was one more question on how we assess the victim’s needs to be met in another country. The policy will make it clear for the first time in legislation that confirmed victims with recovery needs stemming from their exploitation will be entitled to a grant of leave where it is necessary to assist them in their recovery. Decision makers will assess, in line with guidance and available country information, whether the support and assistance required by the victim to aid their recovery is readily available in their country of return. This will be carried out on a case-by-case basis, in line with individual assessments for each victim.
Amendment 72 agreed to.
Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)
Neil Coyle ExcerptsTuesday 2nd November 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
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Bambos Charalambous
I will come on to that topic, but those powers already exist, and I do not think that further regulation of this type—forcing the tribunals committee to supply this information—is the correct way of going about this.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
We have just heard about the new special court, the new special tribunal and the new special advocate. We have new processes, new bureaucracy and new costs. Does my hon. Friend agree that this clause represents the veneer of the Home Office’s pretence to actually give a damn about value for money any more?
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Throughout this Bill, some crumbs of legal aid have been provided in different circumstances, yet the Bill makes it difficult for lawyers to assist those people for whom legal aid is provided, and now they seem to be penalised for not being able to put forward the best case they can.
It is a well-established fact that access to justice includes equal protection under the law. Solicitors are fundamentally obliged to act in their clients’ best interests, which may involve adjourning a case due to a change in circumstances that they are not at liberty to disclose. That principle admits of no distinction between British nationals and foreign nationals, and those who are subject to UK law are entitled to its protection. In the context of UK immigration tribunal hearings, through which people subject to immigration control—non-citizens who cannot exercise democratic rights to shape the legislation to which they are subject—seek to vindicate their position against the state, that principle ought to warn against bearing down on them and their lawyers through an extra costs order and charging order regime that is inapplicable to British nationals in the wider courts and tribunals system.
Immigration tribunals already have the powers that they need to regulate their own procedures—as I have mentioned, they have case management powers, a costs jurisdiction and referral powers. Taking each in turn, they have extensive case management powers, as set out in rules 4 to 6 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. Those tribunals already have a costs jurisdiction that enables them to make wasted costs orders against lawyers through the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007:
“(4) In any proceedings mentioned in subsection (1), the relevant Tribunal may—
(a) disallow, or
(b) (as the case may be) order the legal or other representative concerned to meet,
the whole of any wasted costs or such part of them as may be determined”.
Wasted costs are defined as
“any costs incurred by a party—
(a) as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or other representative or any employee of such a representative, or
(b) which, in the light of any such act or omission occurring after they were incurred, the relevant Tribunal considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to pay.”
That costs jurisdiction is given further effect by the rules of procedure set out in rule 9 of the 2014 rules. An order for wasted costs may be made
“where a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings. The Tribunal may make an order under this rule on an application or on its own initiative.”
In practice, tribunals have the power to regulate their own procedure to avoid its abuse. In the context of applications for judicial review in the High Court, it is recognised that the Court may refer a lawyer to their professional regulatory body, such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority, where their conduct warrants it, thus potentially leading to disciplinary proceedings. A legal representative may be asked to show why the conduct should not be considered for referral to the relevant body, or why they should not be admonished. An immigration tribunal might consider making such a referral in appropriate cases. Alternatively, it may decide that the conduct might not be so serious after all and restrain itself.
In clause 62, the Government seek to give immigration tribunals additional new powers, so that they may charge a participant an amount of money if it is considered that the participant
“has acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and
(b) as a result, the Tribunal’s resources have been wasted”.
The fine would be a separate matter from the costs incurred by a party, and it would be payable by the other party. The charge would be paid to the tribunal. In this context, participants who may be ordered to pay a charge in respect of immigration tribunal proceedings include
“(a) any person exercising a right of audience or right to conduct the proceedings on behalf of a party to proceedings,
(b) any employee of such a person, or
(c) where the Secretary of State is a party to proceedings and has not instructed a person mentioned in paragraph (a) to act on their behalf in the proceedings, the Secretary of State.
(4) A person may be found to have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently…by reason of having failed to act in a particular way.”
However, we are not told what that “particular way” is.
Clause 62 provides that rules may be made and may include the “scales of amounts” to be charged, and it is wrong that no framework has been provided for the scales of amounts to be charged. As a rationale for this innovation, it is said that:
“High levels of poor practice around compliance with tribunal directions, which disrupts or prevents the proper preparation of an appeal, can lead to cases being adjourned at a late stage.”
No actual evidence is adduced to support that proposition or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers and powers of referral are inadequate to deal with such matters.
Clause 62 seeks to amend the cost provisions in the 2007 Act in order to put greater emphasis on making an order on grounds of unreasonable behaviour. A tribunal may make an order in respect of costs in any proceedings if it considers that a party, or its legal or other representative, has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings. This is a power to make a costs order against a party and/or their lawyer. Unlike in considering wasted costs, the behaviour identified is solely that which is unreasonable, not behaviour that is improper or negligent. In carving out unreasonable behaviour in this way, there is a risk that the high threshold that applies in the wasted costs jurisdiction is lowered, and that such orders are made where the ordinary difficulties of running an immigration case have impeded its progress. It is unclear why additional regulatory measures are thought to be needed, indicating that the proposal is unnecessary. The tribunal procedure rules already have provisions for wasted costs, and tribunals have the power to refer cases of improper behaviour to the regulator.
Clause 63 provides that:
“Tribunal Procedure Rules must prescribe conduct that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is to be treated as—
(a) improper, unreasonable or negligent for the purposes of”
a charge in respect of wasted resources. Where the prescribed conduct occurs, the person in question will be treated as having acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently unless they can show evidence to the contrary, so there is a rebuttal presumption in relation to this. Here too there is a risk that conduct that does not meet the test for being unreasonable allows a wasted costs order to sneak back in. It is also not clear how wasted resources will be defined or quantified, which may lead to satellite litigation challenging the fine itself or the amount imposed, further increasing the burdens on a system already under immense pressure. The rules make provisions to the effect that if the tribunal is satisfied that the conduct has taken place, it must consider whether to impose a charge or make a costs order, though it is not compelled to do so.
According to the Home Office, in immigration tribunals,
“A range of conduct on the part of legal and other representatives…in the way proceedings are conducted or pursued”
is
“disrupting or preventing the proper preparation and progress of an appeal”,
but once again, no evidence is adduced to support that proposition, or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers, and the power to refer are inadequate to deal with such matters.
Introducing further overlapping and potentially duplicative regulatory requirements may have the perverse impact of undermining the effectiveness of all relevant regimes, and increase complexity and bureaucracy. If solicitors are held personally liable for costs that arise for reasons outside their control, it could risk driving a wedge between them and their clients by creating a conflict of interest. The immigration tribunals already have all the case management cost and referral powers that they need to control their procedures. Adding new powers for immigration tribunals without establishing a basis for them in evidence is not necessary and is counterproductive. For the reasons I have outlined, we oppose clauses 62 and 63.
Craig Whittaker
I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we have been engaging with the devolved Administrations, including at ministerial level, over the course of the Bill. I want to reiterate our commitment to continuing to work with the devolved Administrations as we look to operationalise the measures to ensure the policies work for the whole of the UK. Contrary to the spirit of working together across the UK, amendment 186 could lead to the scenario where decisions in reserved areas would operate differently across the UK, thereby reducing the clarity the Bill seeks to provide for victims and decision makers. In line with the devolved memorandum of understanding, the UK Government will continue to engage with the devolved Administrations both at ministerial and official level to ensure that we have time to fully understand any implications and adhere to our priority to safeguard victims. I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
On clause 69, I begin by setting out the devolution position. Almost all of the Bill is about nationality, immigration and asylum, which are reserved matters to the UK Parliament. Almost all of the Bill, therefore, extends UK wide.
Neil Coyle
The Minister says “almost all” the provisions. Can he outline which are not?
Craig Whittaker
It is very kind of the hon. Gentleman to interject before I had finished my sentence. Some provisions will apply only to England and Wales. Those provisions are about matters that are devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but are reserved to the UK Parliament in England and Wales. They are civil legal aid, support for victims of modern slavery offences and the early release scheme.
Turning to the extent outside the UK, part 1— nationality provisions—will also extend to the Crown dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, and also the British overseas territories. That follows discussions between the UK Government, the devolved Administrations, the Crown dependencies and the British overseas territories. I want to clarify that we intend to table a further amendment to add a permissive extent clause on Report. That will enable the Crown dependencies to adopt other parts of the Bill that are relevant to them.
0.7% Official Development Assistance Target
Neil Coyle Excerpts(3 years, 6 months ago)
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Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
I refer the House my declaration of interests.
The UK is at a crossroads. Our citizens and the international community wait to see which way the Government will take. However, it is not that Ministers cannot pick a route; it is that they have chosen, in the words of the brilliant speech by the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell), to go backwards—and, I would add, have too frequently chosen to go back on their own word. This Government were elected on a manifesto commitment to retain aid spending. Ministers now seek to break that promise, despite their massive majority and despite the global pandemic, just when we are needed more than ever and when global Britain could mean something to the countries and people we are in a position to help.
As we have heard, no other G7 country is taking this approach—Germany and the US are increasing their help—and the outcome is also known. Ministers back- tracking and breaking their promise will mean avoidable loss of life and the preventable spread of disease, and in one case—the failure to provide clean water in a Yemeni refugee camp—could even mean more refugees trying to reach the UK.
The broken promise also contradicts the great British tradition of not ignoring problems and not walking on by. We are the good Samaritan—we pitch in; we help. We do so because it is the right thing to do, but it is not just altruism. We also do it because covid has proved more than ever that no one is safe until everyone is safe. Our aid prevents other diseases, such as HIV, spreading to our shores, can help to prevent conflict involving UK armed forces and the creation of refugees seeking further help from the UK, and can help to facilitate trade benefiting British business. Ministers seem ready to stand by and abandon all that.
“Global Britain” means nothing to most people, but it will mean even less without the agencies needed to deliver it—all those international aid organisations, which currently have so little faith in Ministers after the deceitful claim that they were consulted on the abolition of the Department for International Development and the devastating £4 billion cut in the help they deliver on the front line.
We all recognise that covid affects things, but the Government need to be more ambitious for our international reach and for our country. Let us compare how this country has recovered from previous crises. The post-war Labour Government achieved house building on a scale never seen before, created a social security system that the whole country has benefited from ever since and delivered an NHS still proving its worth in the face of covid today—a post-crisis Labour legacy that the whole country remains proud of. By contrast, this Government seem to seek no positive post-covid legacy. Ministers are abandoning even their own manifesto promises to the British people, despite the massive majority—promises on aid and cuts to the armed forces, as well as the pledges to overhaul social care and even on free TV licences for some pensioners. It is a truly pathetic agenda.
That said, I respect the noble aims of the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield and other Government Back Benchers, including the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May). I genuinely hope they are successful in overturning the Government’s betrayal of their own manifesto and their wider betrayal of the British people who voted for them.
Leaving the EU: Impact on the UK
Neil Coyle Excerpts(3 years, 9 months ago)
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Penny Mordaunt
That goes to the heart of it. I do not think that Scottish National party Members are interested in practical benefits for the people they represent. What they are interested in is causing division and chaos.
Let me turn briefly to the fishing sector. I have already spoken about securing the uplift in quota for Scotland. We also recognise the critical role that the Scottish fleet plays. It is for that reason that we have secured £14 million in the spending review to support Scotland’s domestic fishery priorities; that is in addition to the £100 million, and goes way beyond our manifesto commitment to maintain funding. This investment will modernise and rejuvenate the industry, and strengthen the long-term sustainability of the catching and processing sectors.
The hon. Member for Glasgow Central also mentioned Erasmus. We changed our negotiating position at the start to incorporate the asks of the devolved Administrations regarding Erasmus, and we fought very hard to get a good deal from the EU, but that was not on offer. Instead, we have developed the Turing scheme, which will benefit more students and students from a wider variety of backgrounds than previously enjoyed the Erasmus programme.
An SNP Opposition day debate does not happen every day, so the topic chosen and the content of the speeches tell us much about the focus of a particular political party. There is a clear theme to both debates today, and, alas, it has been a predictable one: to unpick democratic votes, and to ignore and undermine referendums. Nothing about business results; everything about overturning results. I look forward to seeing whether SNP speakers this afternoon offer one practical suggestion to any of the unresolved issues affecting businesses, or offer any help to persuade the EU of initiatives that will benefit all parties. The SNP, through its fanaticism and now its emerging conduct, is losing the fragments of credibility that it once may have held. Today, we have again seen its Members’ contempt for democracy.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
I think the Minister is doing the SNP a disservice. Do the Government not owe it a debt of gratitude for enabling the premature election that resulted in their 80-seat majority and Brexit happening in the first place?
Penny Mordaunt
There was, I am sure, an electoral dividend, as the citizens of the United Kingdom were fed up and wanted to get Brexit done, but I wish we had not had to go through quite the gymnastics that we have over the last few years.
The SNP’s relentless mission to stir up hatred, division and mistrust—
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
Happy St Patrick’s Day, Mr Deputy Speaker.
My Irish surname is from ancestors who arrived from Ireland in Bellshill in Scotland before only later moving to England. That is not just a tenuous way of explaining why, as a central London MP, I am joining today’s debate. I am joining it because I share a lot of the anger over Brexit. I voted with SNP Members so many times to oppose it, including against triggering article 50. I share concerns about Brexit and how we got here. My constituents, like Scotland, voted massively to remain and rejected the atrocious lies of Dominic Cummings’ campaign in 2016, like saying it would be “the easiest deal in human history”, now so brutally exposed for exporters and importers alike, despite the Minister’s claims about opportunities opening up. All those lies included the £350 million a week extra for the NHS when nurses have been slapped in the face and given a pay cut after their heroic efforts against covid.
But those who attack the dishonesty in campaigns by prominent Conservatives should also reflect on the fact that the last referendum campaign in Scotland was based on the dishonesty that staying in the EU was possible. The irony is that the SNP could have taken Scotland out of the EU before the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) and others were having wet dreams about the whole of the UK leaving. Let us not double down on that previous deceit or pretend that independence is the solution to today’s problems. My constituents in Bermondsey face the same problems today as those in Bellshill. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs admits that businesses face £7.5 billion in extra costs this year because of the Government’s pitiful trade deal—a deal that has already led to an export slump of £5.6 billion. I am seeing two more businesses from my constituency affected this week—Selfmade Candle and Gisela Graham Ltd, who just this year have already seen new costs of 20 grand between them as a result of this deal. What will not help them, though, is what the SNP offers, because they know that the answer to Brexit and the devastation of trade barriers with the EU is not the further devastation of Scexit and more barriers for people and businesses within the UK.
I share the SNP’s concern at the petty nationalism that has taken over the Tory party, cannibalised by UKIP, and I share everyone’s concern that Tories have become scared of their own members—scared to the extent that they are no longer a genuinely Unionist party, and no longer working in the UK national or security interest, as this horrendous deal has exposed. But I do not know how the SNP has reached the idea that the solution to all those problems is to be more like Dominic Cummings and more like the Tory party. The solution to division is not more division. The solution to toxic nationalism is not more toxic nationalism. The solution to economic destruction is not more damage, job losses and heartache. Our shared solution to this petty, populist, Trumpesque Tory party is not to enable it or ape it—it is to beat it, together, with our more positive vision of what the UK can be and what our shared values are. I hope we can work on that, stronger and better together, going forward in the interests of all the people across the United Kingdom to fix the damage that this Government’s downgraded betrayal of a deal has done to our international standing, to our security, to our economy and to people’s opportunities.
UK-EU Future Relationship Negotiations and Transition Period
Neil Coyle Excerpts(4 years ago)
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Urgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Penny Mordaunt
I am not hinting at that, although it would be jolly nice. In my opening response, I outlined what I am expecting to happen this afternoon in terms of the Prime Minister’s speaking to the Commission President. I am not raising that hope, but these negotiations are continuing because a deal is still possible, and we will continue to negotiate until that ceases to be the case.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
Brexit has already cost our country billions, and we have seen investments slump in crucial sectors, a rise in unemployment, and some businesses leave our shores before we even reach the artificial, self-imposed deadline at the end of this year. How many more jobs will be lost? How much more economic damage will we suffer, and what further undermining of our international influence and national security will it take, before those who peddled the false promises of 2016 admit that they are simply undeliverable, in these negotiations or anywhere else?
Penny Mordaunt
I would ask the hon. Gentleman to reflect on why he thinks that our nation, collectively and together, voted to leave the EU. I am sure there was a range of issues. Some were economic, because people may not have wanted to be tied to the eurozone, but there were many other reasons. For many, it was about sovereignty, and being able to shape our own future. The policies that we are carrying out and doing our best to secure a deal for, are what we have a mandate to do from the British people. We put the question to them, they gave us their response, and it is incumbent on all of us in this place to act on their wishes.
Treasury
Neil Coyle Excerpts(4 years, 1 month ago)
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Neil Coyle
I just want a clarification on the waiver process. Do the Government intend to make it the case that a local authority has to seek permission from a Minister in the Department to honour a legally decided case of discrimination and make the payment that a court has ordered? Is that the process that local authorities and other public bodies will have to follow?
Steve Barclay
That is a very valid question. In a whistleblower case, for example, there is no requirement on the local authority to submit a business case for approval. There are mandatory causes for exemption. However, where a discretionary exemption is sought, such as on a restructuring, it is necessary to submit a business case.
[Official Report, 21 September 2020, Third Delegated Legislation Committee , c. 7.]
Letter of correction from the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, the right hon. Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Steve Barclay):
An error has been identified in my response to the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Neil Coyle).
The correct response should have been:
Draft Restriction of Public Sector Exit Payments Regulations 2020
Neil Coyle Excerpts(4 years, 3 months ago)
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The Chief Secretary to the Treasury (Steve Barclay)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Restriction of Public Sector Exit Payments Regulations 2020.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Christopher. I know that you have a long-standing interest in the topic of the draft regulations, and I am pleased that you will oversee the debate.
Each year, hundreds of millions of pounds are spent on exit payments to public sector workers that exceed £100,000. The money funding these payments comes from taxpayers. The draft instrument will fulfil the Government’s 2015 manifesto commitment to end six-figure pay-offs by capping public sector exit payments at £95,000.
The concern over high exit payments is shared by many across the House. For example, the right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar), an Opposition Member, said in the House as recently as 13 March 2020:
“The hon. Gentleman is rightly drawing attention to a significant problem. Is there not another aspect to it, which is that many of these individuals, quite frankly, should not be being given any payments, because they should actually be being sacked for failure to perform their jobs? They are taking sums of money and then transferring to other parts of the public sector, where they will have a repeated pattern of failure. Is there not a need for a real change in culture”.—[Official Report, 13 March 2020; Vol. 673, c. 622.]
I am sure that view, expressed by an Opposition Member, is shared by many other colleagues in the House.
Public sector workers play a vital role in the running of our economy. Earlier this year, we accepted the recommendations of the independent pay review bodies and announced a significant real-terms pay increase for around 900,000 public sector workers. However, we must ensure that all aspects of public sector pay and remuneration deliver value for money for the taxpayer. There are many recent examples of employees leaving their role and receiving six-figure packages funded by the taxpayer, and it is our view that these large exit payments do not deliver that aim, not least given the wider economic impact of coronavirus.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
Although I do not think there is disagreement on the need to tackle excessive exit payments, why are the Government choosing to include harassment and discrimination payments in the scope of what they seek to do?
Steve Barclay
I will come on to the distinction between those on large payments, where I think there is a degree of consensus in the House, and how the waivers will address some of the concerns that the hon. Gentleman and other Opposition Members expressed in the previous debate on this issue. I will come on to that if he gives me a moment, and if he then wants to come back with an intervention, I will be very happy to accept it.
Exit payments are important to an employer’s ability to reform and to react to new circumstances. They are also an important source of support for individuals as they find new employment or as a bridge to retirement age. That is why the Government are taking forward these important regulations to cap public sector exit payments at £95,000. The level of the cap amounts to almost six times the maximum statutory redundancy payment. On an average salary of £24,897, the average person would have to work almost four years to earn £95,000, while someone working 35 hours a week on the national living wage would have to work around six years to earn £95,000—and that ignores the fact that the first £30,000 is paid tax-free. As such, it is clear that a £95,000 cap will still offer a significant level of compensation while ensuring value for money for the public finances. In fact, I think that the majority of our constituents would regard it as a generous amount.
Steve Barclay
I very much welcome that intervention, because that concern was raised by a number of Opposition Members when we debated this issue in the House previously. We have agreed a waiver that will apply to nuclear decommissioning as part of the draft regulations. I will come on to the wider point about how the waiver will apply, but the exemption that applies to nuclear decommissioning illustrates that we have taken on board some of the concerns that Opposition Members have raised.
I am grateful to all members of the public, employers, unions and others who submitted their views as part of the consultation process. The consultation in April 2019 received more than 600 responses, which helped inform the final regulations following the earlier consultation in 2015, which had more than 4,000 responses. I am also grateful to many of my right hon. and hon. Friends for their representations during the development of the policies.
The Government’s intention was made clear at the start, which was to apply the cap to all public sector workers. As the 2015 consultation stated, it would apply to
“all bodies classified within central and local government and non-financial public corporation sectors as determined by the Office for National Statistics for National Account purposes, with a small number of exceptions.”
The 2019 consultation stated:
“The government is proposing a staged process of implementation across the public sector. The first stage will capture most public sector employees, before extending the cap to the rest of the public sector in the second stage. Prioritising in this way will ensure most exit payments in the public sector are limited to £95,000 without further delay, while work continues on expanding the scope of the regulations.”
To ensure fairness and consistency and to give taxpayers confidence that their money is being spent properly, it is right that all public sector bodies are immediately in scope, with limited exceptions, such as the one I just referred to. The consultation in 2019 proposed capturing public sector bodies in two stages. Many of the responses objected to that proposal. We have therefore revised the proposal and reverted to applying the cap to all public sector bodies at once. The Government’s intention to cap exit payments has now been in the public domain for more than five years, providing public sector bodies and employees with sufficient time to communicate their views, including through the consultation process, and to prepare for the implementation of the cap.
Neil Coyle
The Minister raised the point about fairness, and he says this matter has been in the public domain since 2015. Why, then, has no equality impact assessment been undertaken? How many people are affected and when will the Government provide the EQIA?
Steve Barclay
It depends on different circumstances as to how many people will be affected. A key issue is that the proposals do not affect individuals’ accrued pension rights. A concern was raised in the previous debate about the impact on pension rights. Again, that is one of the issues we have listened to and taken on board. It is important to note that accrued pension rights are not affected by the regulations. In the vast majority of cases, the cap will have no effect on the exit package of an individual, because individuals retain any right to receive an unreduced pension, provided their overall exit payment falls below the cap of £95,000, which applies in most cases.
However, the Government believe it is right to include all payments related to exit within the scope of the cap. The option of an employer-funded early retirement, known as pension top-up payments, is often the most costly element of an exit payment. It is ultimately funded by the taxpayer, so it is right that it is included.
Neil Coyle
The Minister is being very generous in giving way. The measure states that all payments will be taken into scope. A very practical example is the case of the Birmingham women who received unequal pay for many years. The 174 women took the case to the Supreme Court and won. For some full-time care workers, the payments would have been more than £100,000 just to catch up on the unequal pay they had experienced for many decades of service in a difficult job. Why are the Government including that in these regulations?
Steve Barclay
I agree with the hon. Gentleman. I took that point away from the previous debate and was concerned to show the House that we had listened. In fact, it echoes the next line of my speech: I do accept that in some circumstances it will be appropriate for employees to receive an exit payment of more than £95,000.
Steve Barclay
If the hon. Lady will allow me to answer the question, I was going to read out the exact legal prose. Sometimes we are accused of not being precise enough, so I was going to go straight to the legal text for her. It says:
“made to or on behalf of an employee…who is employed…by a company or other body holding a site licence granted under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 for one or more nuclear-licenced sites…and on a site that is subject of a decommissioning programme agreed between the NDA and the BEIS Secretary of State, and…whose employment is terminated”—
details follow accordingly. So there is an exemption there.
I will come back to the point made by the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark. In fact, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne North, who has not as yet spoken, said in the previous debate that she accepted the wider principle of exit payment caps, but had some concerns. We have sought to look at, and listen to, the concerns that Opposition Members have raised. I accept that there are some circumstances in which it is appropriate for employees to receive an exit payment over £95,000, including where imposing the cap would cause genuine hardship. We are committed to ending taxpayer-funded six-figure payouts for the best-paid public sector workers, but it is appropriate that the waiver system can be exercised with ministerial discretion if it is felt that implementing the cap would go against the original principles and result in hardship.
Steve Barclay
Let me just finish the point. The waiver may also be used to give effect to urgent workplace reforms. It applies where a payment is made as a result of the application of TUPE regulations, or where the payment is made to settle a grievance related to whistleblowing, discrimination, or health and safety-related dismissal. This mechanism is very important in allowing us to review how the cap is being applied and to ensure that we remain consistent with our original aims for the regulations. I hope that this system will address many of the questions that hon. Members have.
Does the hon. Gentleman want to come in one final time?
Neil Coyle
I just want a clarification on the waiver process. Do the Government intend to make it the case that a local authority has to seek permission from a Minister in the Department to honour a legally decided case of discrimination and make the payment that a court has ordered? Is that the process that local authorities and other public bodies will have to follow?
Steve Barclay
That is a very valid question. In a whistleblower case, for example, there is no requirement on the local authority to submit a business case for approval. There are mandatory causes for exemption. However, where a discretionary exemption is sought, such as on a restructuring, it is necessary to submit a business case.[Official Report, 2 November 2020, Vol. 683, c. 1MC.]
Steve Barclay
The hon. Gentleman shakes his head, but I simply remind him that as a Minister, I constantly get requests when bodies want to exceed the £150,000 payment. They are quite happy to submit business requests for that, so I do not see why it is onerous to say that the same applies to seeking consent when looking to restructure, and to exempt in that way.
In other parts of the United Kingdom, devolved Administrations have already acted to implement their own policy on severance payments. The Scottish Government have implemented a £95,000 cap on payments made by devolved bodies by updating the Scottish public finance manual. It is right that this Parliament does the same by approving these regulations. As we respond to the financial impacts of covid-19, the inappropriateness of large exit payments is reinforced. Ensuring that rewards are proportionate and taxpayer money is spent fairly must be prioritised. The regulations are carefully designed to end excessive exit payments, and will come into force 21 days after they are made. I commend them to the Committee.
Steve Barclay
I thank colleagues for their engagement in the debate. As I have already remarked, the Government are strongly of the view that the regulations are important in delivering value for money. It is right that the cap on public sector exit payments comes into force without further delay to stop the excessive payouts that are, unfortunately, all too common.
The hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran asked me to clarify the position on nuclear decommissioning, which has been a much-debated issue. Indeed, there was extensive debate during the passage of the primary legislation about the inclusion of nuclear decommissioning workers in the scope of the regulations. As we have set out many times—most recently by ensuring that the cap covers all of the public sector at once—the cap should apply to all public sector organisations with very limited exemptions. The defining feature of that is what is set by the Office for National Statistics.
We are able to exercise our own judgment, but for the most part, the scope has been guided by the ONS, which makes objective judgments, independent of Government and the regulations. The ONS classification is what means that the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority and its site-licensed companies are in the scope of the regulations, but we have a mechanism to waive certain pension-related payments upon redundancy, and that is what has been decided—I read that out for the benefit of the hon. Lady. In short, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority has a waiver, but the organisation is classified by the ONS, which is why it is within the scope of the cap—that is the interaction between the two.
The hon. Member for Ilford North started by generously acknowledging that we have listened and addressed some issues of concern. There are some areas of misunderstanding: an equalities impact assessment was issued with the primary legislation. He then said that on the one hand, we do not need the regulations, but that on the other, he was against excessive payments. I would argue that the whole purpose of the regulations is to curb the excessive payments that he, I and a number of colleagues across the House agree are not value for money.
The hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark—
Steve Barclay
I will take his intervention before I address his question and then I can answer them both at the same time.
Neil Coyle
I appreciate that. If the Chief Secretary believes that the issues are resolved, why has the British Medical Association—the organisation that represents the health workers that he clapped on Thursdays—already sought a judicial review against the regulations because they extend the scope of the enabling statute? How does he square the circle when the regulations mean preventing some contractually agreed payments and tribunal award, and which the BMA says represents an unlawful extension of the primary legislation?
Steve Barclay
The reality, without wanting to stray into the issue of litigation, is that this is a cap on payments, so a body representing members may have concerns about that. The issue before the Committee is what constitutes value for money for the taxpayer. I remind the Committee of the fact that payments can be more than six times the national living wage and four times the average earnings. During the time of coronavirus, those are very substantial payments. You will be familiar with, Sir Christopher, some of the payments that were read out on the Floor of the House—those of NHS managers for example, who receive very large payments and then reappear elsewhere in the NHS very shortly.