European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st February 2018 Lords Chamber

I look forward with interest to seeing what amendments may be brought forward, but providing a veto for the devolved parliaments is certainly not the way to preserve the single market.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

May I ask the noble Lord to cast his mind back to 26 January 2012, when I moved a Motion that the Scotland Bill be considered in Committee, and he moved an amendment that the House,

“declines to consider the Bill in Committee until Her Majesty’s Government have laid before Parliament a report on the results of the consultation they launched on 11 January on Scotland’s constitutional future and until the Scottish Parliament has passed a further Legislative Consent Motion in respect of the Bill”?—[Official Report, 26/1/12; col. 1161.]

He was going to deny a Committee stage on a Bill that contained measures supported in the Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Labour manifestos at the preceding general election. This amendment would still allow the Bill to go forward and become an Act. How does he describe his apparent lack of consistency?

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

I think I was behaving exactly like the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. I was using the procedures of the House to make an argument against what I thought at the time was a very bad Bill—and which only this week has meant that people like me are now the highest taxpayers in the United Kingdom, as we predicted would happen. If I may say so to the noble and learned Lord, his point is completely irrelevant to the amendment before us.

The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, talks about tensions being created in Edinburgh between this Parliament and the Scottish Parliament. There will always be tensions between this United Kingdom Parliament and the Scottish Parliament, as long as it is run by people who wish to destroy the United Kingdom. That is what they are about: using their powers to break the United Kingdom. The notion that we should move in a direction and get ourselves into a position where we need lots of legislative consent Motions simply provides more opportunities for everything to be turned into a constitutional crisis, which is the nature of the SNP. We will come to that later in our consideration of the Bill.

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The amendment gives the Government an opportunity to show in the Bill that they respect the devolved legislatures and, perhaps more importantly, to say how they will bring forward in due course their own amendments that will deal will this issue, which should never have boiled up to the level it is at now. It is the sort of thing that could have been resolved, but because of the lack of conversation and contact, it has become an issue that we are debating tonight.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I note what the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, said in response to my intervention. On the occasion to which I referred, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, actually supported him in trying to stop the Bill going forward to Committee stage.

I think that what my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford said about the sheer frustration that lies behind the amendment—and what the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said about the lack of conversation—is absolutely true. That has coloured the background to these discussions. It is worth reminding ourselves about the root of some of this frustration. I think it was in October 2016 when, in a plenary session chaired by the Prime Minister, the Joint Ministerial Committee established the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations, with the following terms of reference:

“Working together in EU Negotiations … Through the JMC(EN) the governments will work collaboratively to: discuss each government’s requirements of the future relationship with the EU; seek to agree a UK approach to, and objectives for, Article 50 negotiations; and … provide oversight of negotiations with the EU, to ensure, as far as possible, that outcomes agreed by all four governments are secured from these negotiations; and, discuss issues stemming from the negotiation process which may impact upon or have consequences for the UK Government, the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government or the Northern Ireland Executive”.


The fact that, tomorrow, the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations will meet for the second time in 12 months suggests that these terms of reference, agreed by the three devolved Administrations and the United Kingdom Government, have been more honoured in the breach than they have been in the actual implementation. That is at the source of much of the frustration that we have heard expressed. One hears it: when he was replying to the debate initiated on 25 January, the noble Lord, Lord Duncan of Springbank, said:

“The important thing is to stress that it is not for want of effort on our part”—


that is, the United Kingdom Government’s part—

“to secure a form of words that would allow the two devolved Administrations and the UK Government to reach a consensus on that point”.—[Official Report, 25/1/18; col. 1128.]

Yet, if you go to the devolved Administrations, they will say that they have had no communication. There is a lack of communication and there seems to be a complete mismatch with what has been said to us.

It would be interesting if the Minister could tell us yet whether the actual wording of any possible amendment to Clause 11—the Secretary of State for Scotland has accepted that Clause 11 has to be amended; he said that it would be done on Report in the House of Commons, but it was not—has been discussed at ministerial level between the United Kingdom Government and the devolved Administrations. If so, when was that discussed? When the Scottish and Welsh Governments addressed a briefing of Peers in late January they indicated that there had been no exchange of wording.

What is even more frustrating is that it does not seem that the parties are terribly far apart. In September last year, the Scottish Government acknowledged in their legislative consent memorandum that there were areas in which there would have to be common UK frameworks. The communiqué issued after the last Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations in October also set out the areas in which UK common frameworks were necessary and desirable. Both sides have agreed that that has to be done. Why in the world is more progress not being made, or at least why are we not able to see what progress, if any, is being made?

Perhaps the biggest problem here is the fact that it is done behind closed doors. If there were more transparency, we would see who was playing to the gallery and who was trying genuinely to seek a resolution to these matters. There are issues, such as agriculture, fisheries and the environment, where everybody acknowledges that there will have to be some kind of common framework. Let us identify what progress has been made.

We were told this week in newspaper reports that the United Kingdom Government have done a complete reversal. They now say that they will bring forward an amendment that will devolve everything back to the devolved Administrations, but, as it said in the Times report from yesterday,

“UK ministers are also adamant they would need to retain a veto over the use of some of these powers until ‘common frameworks’ are agreed”.

Again, in terms of public relations, it is like saying, “Here’s one hand; we’ll take away with the other”. What is the position? If we are to have to make decisions when we come to debate Clause 11, it is important that we know what the relationship is and what each side in these negotiations is saying.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

The noble and learned Lord is very clever and experienced at negotiations with different political parties in government. Perhaps I am too stupid, but I cannot think of a way—and I agree with a lot of what he said—to word an amendment that would deliver the result that he suggests is needed. Can he help me? What would an amendment actually say that ensured that there was the kind of continuing co-operation that is needed?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, if the noble Lord will allow me, there is certainly one attached to Clause 11 that has my name on it, as well as the names of a number of other noble Lords. He will find that Amendment 303 sets out a basis for having common frameworks. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, has one in very similar terms, Amendment 304, which certainly provides a basis for moving forward. We are in opposition. The onus is on the Government to come forward with this. Let us not kid ourselves. The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, makes a fair point, but it is the Secretary of State for Scotland who promised amendments on Report in the House of Commons. He has made the commitment to amendments, so the onus is not on the Opposition to come forward with these amendments but on the Government.

I hope that when the Minister replies he will tell us what the colour of the Government’s amendments will be. In the European Union negotiations, TF50 sets out where each of the parties is and gives us great transparency—where there is disagreement and where there are things that have to be clarified. This whole exercise would benefit from far greater transparency so that we can see what progress is or is not being made, who is holding things up and who is genuinely seeking to make progress. I appeal to the Minister to make a commitment when he replies that, following tomorrow’s JMC on the European negotiations, that transparency will become a reality.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I hope that an Englishman, albeit one with a Scottish name, may be allowed to add something to this debate, because it is depressing for someone who lives in the north of England to hear a debate about how much of a privileged relationship the devolved Administrations should have with the United Kingdom Government, when the north of England is likely to suffer very much from leaving the European Union in terms of the loss of European development funds, and at the moment lacks any sort of forum for negotiation or consultation with the very centralised government of England in order to make its case. I am very conscious that the poorer parts of northern England were among those that voted most heavily to leave and that recent studies have suggested that they are also the regions that are likely to lose most from Brexit.

Amendment 227, when we come to it, addresses the question of how far a new mechanism will be needed for the central government in London to consult with English local authorities. My understanding is that the Local Government Association has been in conversation with the Government on that and that the Government have not yet come to an agreed view. I just wish to give notice that this is a very important point, politically and constitutionally, and when we come to it I hope that it will be given sufficient weight.

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[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The Minister said there have been six meetings since the referendum. Given that at the first meeting of the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations the communiqué said that they would meet on a monthly basis and that was in November 2016, by my calculation there have been several more months than six since then. Can the Minister tell us how many official meetings took place between February and October 2017?

[Lord Callanan]

I do not have information about how many official meetings have taken place. I understand that officials are meeting extensively. They are in regular contact. I am told by my officials that contact with officials in the Scottish and Welsh Governments and discussions are extremely positive. That is not the same as getting political agreement, but we are endeavouring to do that. Proposals have been tabled, after extensive discussion, for the meeting tomorrow. We hope there will be agreement. I obviously cannot guarantee that, but we hope there will be. We remain committed to obtaining legislative consent Motions if possible, and we will continue that dialogue in an effort to do that. That is the responsible way to proceed, but I totally understand the frustration expressed from all parts of the Committee that we do not yet have that agreement. We want to get that agreement. We are endeavouring to get that agreement. We will do our best to get it, but we will table amendments for this Committee to consider before we get to Clause 11.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords—

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, may I speak to Amendment 63A?

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

I stood up before the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, sat down as I knew he was coming to an end. He mentioned, and I accept entirely, his position that the Government may have excluded the Charter of Fundamental Rights because of uncertainty. But for many people it is an indicator of something else: that Conservative Party manifestos over a number of years have promised that the Human Rights Act would be removed. On many occasions, we have heard leading Conservatives say that we should remove ourselves from the European Convention on Human Rights, too. The absence of the Charter of Fundamental Rights from the Bill suggests to many that this is part of a journey taking us out of any international arrangements dealing with the protection of human rights, and that that is the real purpose.

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[Lord Faulks]

No Parliament can bind its successor; one would expect every Government to consider human rights as an ongoing process, and how best to protect them.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 63A, which is in my name and has already been spoken to with great passion by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. He gave an excellent antidote to a debate that has otherwise been an important but nevertheless cerebral examination of the legal position of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

Because this is the only case in which we have identified that situation. There is no other reason for proceeding in this way except for that.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

If, as the noble and learned Lord said on numerous occasions in his reply, the rights established in the charter are already there in our domestic law, what is lost by keeping the charter? If those rights are already there, the Government cannot be worried about anything if they retain the charter.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I must compliment the noble and learned Lord on his second sight. As I was about to say, the next argument put to us is that if we say that the charter is not adding anything, what is the problem with keeping it? I hope that is a fair summary of the noble and learned Lord’s intervention. With respect, this argument simply fails to take account of how the charter applies at present. The charter and the rights that it reaffirmed have a limited application. They apply to the EU institutions all of the time, but apply only to member states acting within the scope of EU law. We will no longer be a member state and so we will be no longer be acting within the scope of EU law. Simply retaining the charter would not reflect the realities of leaving the EU. It cannot be right that a document called the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union could continue to be used as the justification to bring cases that would lead ultimately to the striking down of UK primary legislation after we leave the EU. Outside our membership of the EU, it is simply not appropriate to retain the charter.

There are also practical questions to consider. It would be no simple matter to say that we are keeping the charter. The amendments in this group all attempt, in various ways, to solve the riddle of how an instrument inherently linked to and constrained by our membership of the EU could apply purely domestically. They each highlight the complexity involved in such an exercise.

In Amendment 13A, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, requires the Government to lay a report on how the charter will continue to apply to retained EU law after we leave the EU. However, his other amendments are far from clear on precisely how he intends the charter to have effect domestically after exit. They would remove the exclusion of the charter provided for in Clause 5, presumably with the intention that it would now form part of retained EU law. I note that one of his amendments would excise the definition of what the charter is from the Bill, despite going on to say that this undefined, unclear thing will continue to have effect in relation to retained EU law under Clauses 2, 3 and 4. What would our courts make of that? Many articles of the charter set out principles, not rights, which can be relied on directly by individuals. How would these have effect after exit? Eight articles of the charter constitute rights intrinsically linked to EU citizenship—for example, the right to vote in an EU parliamentary election. Of course, they claw at the air—we appreciate that—but they do nothing.

Let us pause again on the fact that the charter applies to member states only when acting within the scope of EU law. Presumably, if retained under the Bill, the charter would then apply only when we were acting within the scope of retained EU law, which I believe is the elaboration that the noble and learned Lord made in response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. Over time, our domestic law will evolve and new laws will be made by this sovereign Parliament and the devolved legislatures that will start to replace and supersede this category of retained EU law. We would be retaining the charter, in whatever capacity the noble and learned Lord intends, only for an ever-diminishing proportion of our law. This further risks incorporating complexity and confusion into our domestic statute book.

We should not overstate the accessibility of the current rights regime, which relies on citizens knowing—

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

16: Clause 2, page 1, line 12, after “passed” insert “and commenced”

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, the amendment stands in my name and that of the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes, Lord Adonis and Lord Dykes. This is very much a probing amendment and I do not intend to detain the Committee long, as the issues are quite clear.

Clause 2 refers to EU-derived domestic legislation that has,

“effect in domestic law on and after exit day”,

and then goes on to explain what EU-derived domestic legislation means. If we then fast forward to Clause 14, we see that an enactment,

“means an enactment whenever passed or made”.

We are trying to get some certainty into what is meant by that—and I shall come on more specifically to enactments of the Scottish Parliament.

We are seeking to probe what is intended by this. For example, if an enactment has been made but the commencement of a particular provision is not until a date post exit day, what is the status of that? Is it intended to refer only to those enactments when an Act has been made but there has been a commencement before exit day?

Let us look specifically at Acts of the Scottish Parliament—Acts of the Welsh Assembly may well come into a similar category. Paragraph 100 of the Explanatory Notes, which refers to similar phraseology in Clause 5, states that,

“an Act is passed when it receives Royal Assent”.

The Scotland Act 1998, Section 28(2) states:

“Proposed Acts of the Scottish Parliament shall be known as Bills; and a Bill shall become an Act of the Scottish Parliament when it has been passed by the Parliament and has received Royal Assent”.


So there are two stages—passed by the Parliament and then receiving Royal Assent. Amendment 342, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, seeks to give clarity that this will be an enactment when it has received Royal Assent.

There is an argument that it should be an enactment when it is passed by the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly. I took the view that it was preferable to make it after Royal Assent because there are some reasons why between being passed by the Scottish Parliament and receiving Royal Assent it could be derailed. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, as Advocate-General for Scotland will know only too well, in whichever capacity he is appearing at the Dispatch Box, he has powers under Section 33 of the Scotland Act to refer to the Supreme Court a Bill or any provision of a Bill which he believes may not be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. He has to do that within four weeks of a Bill being passed by the Scottish Parliament, and then it would be a matter for the Supreme Court as to how long it took. So you may have an enactment, or a piece of legislation—let us put it neutrally like that— which has actually been passed but may go to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court may strike it down, so it may never actually become law. That is why I took the view that, in trying to determine when an enactment becomes an enactment, it should be in the case of Acts of the Scottish Parliament when it receives Royal Assent.

To some extent this is academic. If you were to challenge me and ask me to give an example, I probably could not—but I am sufficiently acquainted over many years with the laws of unintended consequences to know that something will happen. You can bet your life that this issue could well come up and, rather than have the matter taken through the courts, it would be preferable, for certainty purposes, to put in the Bill when an enactment of the Scottish Parliament actually becomes an Act. The preference would be for when it receives Royal Assent.

This is a probing amendment but, if it is the noble and learned Lord who replies, I hope that he will accept that there is an issue here. The wording of our amendments may not be the ones that the Government would prefer, but perhaps he will accept that there is an issue here and the Government will bring forward their own amendment to clarify the point so that, at some future date, we do not have a situation where our learned friends at the Scottish Bar make lots of money out of disputing this, and we can resolve this. It is not a major point but it is one that merits clarity, and I hope that we can get a positive response to these amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My Lords, I am really grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, himself a former Advocate-General, for moving this amendment. In the light of what he said, all I can say is that I agree with his every word.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord not only for explaining the amendment but for their endorsement of it.

In responding to Amendments 16, 17 and 342, I start by reaffirming our view that Clause 2 is an essential provision for providing certainty and continuity regarding our law after exit day. I think that that is plain to all noble Lords. I shall then say a little more about why Clause 2 must stand part of the Bill. This clause, along with Clauses 3 and 4, delivers one of the core purposes of this Bill: maximising certainty for individuals and businesses when we leave the EU by ensuring that, so far as is practical, the laws that we have now will continue to apply. In that respect, Clause 2 preserves the domestic law that we have made to implement our EU obligations; we have touched on that already.

More particularly, on the point raised by the noble and learned Lord in this regard, Amendment 342 seeks to clarify that Acts of the Scottish Parliament are included within the clause only if they have received Royal Assent before exit day. I suspect that Amendment 16 also seeks to provide clarity on that same point. I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify any uncertainty that there may be here. Clause 2(2) states that,

“‘EU-derived domestic legislation’ means any enactment”

that is described in that subsection. Clause 14 defines the term “enactment” to include an enactment contained in an Act of the Scottish Parliament. An Act of the Scottish Parliament must have received Royal Assent; until that time, it is a Bill. Section 28(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 provides for this. So an Act of the Scottish Parliament that has only been passed and not received Royal Assent does not fall within this definition, and would not be categorised as EU-derived domestic legislation for the purposes of this Bill. I believe that the noble and learned Lord rather suspected that this might be the case; his concern seemed to be one of certainty as regards the drafting.

The same applies in relation to Acts of the UK Parliament. The reference to “passed” in Clause 2(2)(b) is therefore a reference to the purpose for which the enactment was passed, not whether it was passed. In that context, I venture to suggest that Amendments 16 and 342 are unnecessary.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. He does get my point that it is for clarity; in Section 28 of the Scotland Act, there is a distinction made between being passed and Royal Assent. It is the word “passed” that appears in Clause 14(1) and the noble and learned Lord knows as well as anyone that, when statute uses the same word, it may—not unreasonably—have the same interpretation. Yet, a Bill “passed” by the Scottish Parliament is not the same as “enacted”. Simply, does it really go to the heart of this Bill that the Government could not bring forward an amendment just to make it clear beyond doubt and, therefore, not allow unnecessary litigation at some stage in the future? Because you can bet your life that something will come up when someone finds some clever point.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord. I do not have any red lines so far as Clause 2 is concerned in this context. It appears to me that if there is concern about a lack of certainty, we can take that into consideration, and we will do so in time for Report. I do not indicate that we will bring forward any amendment in regard to this; it seems to me, as the noble and learned Lord will appreciate, that context is everything. We have to read the provision and the use of “passed” in Clause 14 in the context of what is said in Clause 2(2), but I hear what he says. I am not seeking to strike it down, as it were, at this stage; I am merely seeking to explain the approach that we have taken to this issue and why we consider that, on the face of it, Amendments 16 and 342 are unnecessary.

Amendment 17 seeks to mirror the language of Clause 3 in terms of the cut-off point for inclusion within the scope of the clause. Clause 2 of course works in conjunction with Clause 3, which converts direct EU legislation into domestic law. Both clauses take a snapshot of the law that is in place immediately before exit day. EU-derived domestic law will fall into the scope of Clause 2 if it has been enacted before exit day—that is, if it can be said to be on the statute book at that time. There is of course a different test employed for direct EU legislation to be retained under Clause 3, because direct EU legislation must be operative within UK law “immediately before exit day”, as defined in Clause 3(3). That is why there is a distinction between the two clauses; they serve distinct purposes.

As I say, we are listening and we will consider further the point made by the noble and learned Lord and by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. Having given an explanation of the Government’s position, I hope that, at this stage, they will see fit to withdraw or not move these amendments.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his response and his willingness to look at this and take on board the comments made. A simple amendment could be made that in no way detracts from the purpose of this Bill; if anything, it would add to that purpose in terms of legal certainty. Using the word “passed”, which, from what the noble and learned Lord said, has a different meaning in two Acts, is not helpful. I do not think the amendment in any way departs from or mitigates what the Bill seeks to achieve and I therefore strongly encourage the noble and learned Lord and his colleagues to bring forward a simple amendment to provide legal certainty. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 16 withdrawn.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, also subscribed to by my noble friend Lady Bowles. The amendment is primarily a probing one, to seek clarification from the Government on what they are seeking to do here. Paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 states:

“No general principle of EU law is part of domestic law on or after exit day if it was not recognised as a general principle of EU law by the European Court in a case decided before exit day”.


So if one allows for the double negative, it rather suggests that, if it was a general principle of EU law that had been determined by the European Court in a case before exit day, it will continue to be part of domestic law. Having reached that point, the following paragraph says:

“There is no right of action in domestic law on or after exit day based on a failure to comply with any of the general principles of EU law”,


and that no,

“court or tribunal or other public authority may, on or after exit day … disapply or quash”—

and so forth.

I am intrigued about why, having apparently established that there is a general principle of EU law that becomes part of our domestic law, when what is given away with one hand is taken away with another, one is not allowed a remedy based on that general principle of EU law. It would be helpful if the Government could clarify that.

The matter was raised in the report of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, which at paragraph 117 of its report quotes Professor Alison Young, who wrote:

“Schedule 1 to the Bill makes it clear that ‘there is no right of action in domestic law on or after exit day based on failure to comply with any of the general principles of EU law’ … This prevents claims of the nature found in Benkharbouche, where the Charter was used independently from other provisions of EU law. … But claimants will still be able to rely on general principles of EU law, which protect fundamental rights. They will not be able to use these general principles on their own, but they will still be used to interpret EU-derived law, which then in turn could be used to disapply legislation. For the claimants in Benkharbouche, the stronger remedy currently found under EU law for the protection of fundamental rights will disappear”.


Again, I seek clarification from the Government as to why they believe that these protections should disappear as currently found in EU law. Indeed, the committee in paragraph 120 concludes:

“The effects of excluding the Charter rights, retaining the ‘general principles’, but excluding rights of action based on them, are unclear … We recommend that the Government provides greater clarity on how the Bill deals with the general principles and how they will operate post-Brexit”.


I sincerely hope that the noble and learned Lord will take the opportunity when replying to the debate to respond to that recommendation from the Constitution Committee and give us a clarification.

There was also one specific point, on which I would ask for a view from the Government Front Bench. The provision in paragraph 3 is:

“No court or tribunal … may, on or after exit day … disapply or quash any enactment … because it is incompatible with any of the general principles of EU law”.


I assume that that would mean to any enactment pre exit, which could of course include an Act of the Scottish Parliament. Therefore, would the provision in paragraph 3 prevent any challenge being made to an Act of the Scottish Parliament passed before the exit day on the grounds that it was outwith the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament because it was incompatible with those general principles, but not on the grounds that it was incompatible with any other pre-exit European Union law?

In other words, if other EU law had been satisfied but there was still a problem or it was still not compatible with EU principles, would an action that had been raised before exit day on the grounds that it was incompetent have to fall because no court could make a determination of it because of this paragraph? Some clarification on this point would be welcome. It would appear that a principle is established, but not the remedy that might go with it.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I have a similar question for the Minister. In paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 1, we are told:

“There is no right in domestic law on or after exit day to challenge any retained EU law on the basis that, immediately before exit day, an EU instrument was invalid”.


I understand why that should be so, by reference to EU law principles, because at the moment you cannot challenge, in our courts, the validity of an EU instrument; you have to go to the Court of Justice. I am not sure whether the provision in paragraph 1(1) prevents, after exit day, a challenge to a provision of retained EU law brought by reference not to EU law but to common law principles. For example, are challenges on the grounds of legal certainty, the presumption against retrospectivity, or proportionality, which has already been mentioned, prevented by paragraph 1(1)?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The noble Baroness is confusing two distinct issues. The Bill is about the retention in domestic law of EU retained law at the point of Brexit. The Prime Minister was addressing our future relationship with the other 27 members of the EU in the context of our seeking to align in some areas and not align in others. This will be the subject of negotiation which is about to commence and will apply in agreeing a transitional period, and then our post-transitional period relationship with the other EU 27. They are two distinct issues.

On the noble and learned Lord’s observation about the general principles, these are retained as an interpretive tool. It may impact upon the matter of remedies but not on the issue of rights. One has to bear in mind that distinction.

Reference was made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, to the case of Benkharbouche, which was a classic example of where the issue of rights had to be distinguished from the issue of remedies. There were rights arising under Article 6 of the convention but there was an also an issue as to whether or not certain principles arising by reference to the charter were also in play. I believe it was Article 46 of the charter that was referred to by Lord Sumption, who delivered the opinion of the court. The point was that while the rights could be identified by reference to the convention or the charter, the particular remedy there arose by reference to the charter. I acknowledge that that is the case.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Is that not part of the point? An expectation has been built up by what has been said—that, on Brexit date plus one, people will be in the same position. The noble and learned Lord is admitting that they will not be in the same position because they may have rights but they will no longer necessarily have remedies.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

They will have rights but they may not have the same remedy, but that is quite distinct. We are talking about maintaining rights at the point when we leave.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

No, I do not accept that. I certainly do not accept that that is the position under reference to the Walker case. However, I am content to come back to the noble and learned Lord on that question on the Walker case but I do not accept that it falls in the way he indicates.

Perhaps I can make some progress. We remain of the view that after we cease to be a member of the EU there is a real risk of allowing general principle challenges to continue indefinitely, which is what these amendments would allow. Simply put, this would not be in keeping with our undertaking—our promise—to return sovereignty to this Parliament.

Of course we are aware of the concerns that have been raised, particularly about the impact on those whose cause of action precedes exit but who are unable, for whatever reason, to issue proceedings before some change takes effect. That is why we brought forward amendments on Report in the other place to provide reassurance that where a breach of the general principles occurred or gave rise to a potential claim before exit day—that is the important point—individuals and businesses will still have the opportunity to make certain claims based on the breach of the general principles of EU law for a period of three months after exit date. That period of three months after exit date is taken to mirror the period normally allowed in the context of applications for judicial review. That strikes a balance between ensuring that, on the one hand, individuals and businesses will still have the opportunity to bring these challenges and, on the other hand, delivering the result of the referendum and maintaining our parliamentary sovereignty.

While we believe that the compromises we have already made on the general principles of EU law have improved the Bill, the Government are looking again at these issues to see whether this part of the Bill can be improved in keeping with some of the concerns that have been expressed. That is because we understand the complexities of the issues that arise in the context of Schedule 1 and we are looking at those at present.

With that, I hope that the noble Baroness will see fit to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

As the noble and learned Lord rises to his feet I am reminded of his reference to whether paragraph 3 includes Acts of the Scottish Parliament passed before Brexit day and not within competence. If they are not within competence, they are not law.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Perhaps I may explore that with the noble and learned Lord. The point I was making was that if the Acts were passed before Brexit day and they were challenged on the basis that the alleged incompetence was that they were not consistent with the general principles of EU law, would that challenge fail on Brexit day plus one, because it would mean that the court could no longer determine it?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

In the event that an Act of the Scottish Parliament was enacted beyond the competence of the Parliament, it would not and would never have been law. That is the position pursuant to Sections 28 and 29 of the Scotland Act 1998. I hope that that clarifies the point, but if I have misunderstood the noble and learned Lord—

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Let me see if I can make it a bit clearer.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am quite prepared to discuss the point with the noble and learned Lord because it may be that we will look more closely at those provisions in the Scotland Act in the very near future.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, I deeply regret and resent the fact that we are having to discuss this and waste the House’s time. We had an opportunity at the beginning of the day to make an unequivocal declaration that we would grant these rights to EU citizens. We voted in that sense, a number of us spoke in that sense and we had a large majority in that sense. Yet here we are, arguing. Frankly, I agree that the amendment is necessary, but we are now arguing unnecessarily about something we could have taken the moral high ground over and dealt with immediately after we had activated Article 50. It is indicative of the mess into which we have got ourselves, and we are taking up so much parliamentary time that should be devoted to other things. I bitterly resent it and wanted to get that on the record.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, as someone who is a co-signatory of the amendment that was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, I support what he said and also endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said. This should be a no-brainer.

The United Kingdom Government have agreed with the European Union; the terms of that agreement were set out in paragraph 38 of the document of 8 December 2017, and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, has spoken them into the record. If one goes back to paragraph 33 of the same document, it is interesting to read that:

“It is of paramount importance to both Parties to give as much certainty as possible to UK citizens living in the EU and EU citizens living in the UK about their future rights. The Parties have therefore reached agreement on the following specific set of arrangements to implement and enforce the citizens’ rights Part of the agreement”.


Admittedly, a later paragraph suggests that the bestowing of or guarantee of rights will come in the withdrawal agreement implementation Bill, but if one reads the paragraph on the consistent interpretation of citizens’ rights, one will see that there is no such commitment there with regard to a future Bill. It would not be right for this Parliament to pass a Bill which cuts off recourse to the Court of Justice of the European Union when we have already agreed that that avenue should be open in this specific case of ensuring consistency in determining the rights of EU citizens living in the United Kingdom and UK citizens living in the European Union.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that if at the end of the day there is no agreement and we go crashing out, surely he is not suggesting that we would not honour our commitment. We have made that commitment to European Union citizens living in the United Kingdom and United Kingdom citizens living in the European Union. It must send some very alarming signs to UK citizens living abroad if it is suggested that, should we go crashing out, nothing will be done to establish or secure the rights of those citizens—

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

Did the noble and learned Lord notice that in the Prime Minister’s Statement on Monday, she specifically mentioned that the United Kingdom might seek to achieve associate membership of certain European agencies? She said that,

“the UK would also have to respect the remit of the ECJ in that regard”.—[Official Report, Commons, 05/3/18; col. 26.]

Now that the Government themselves have recognised that there will be a continuing role for the European Court of Justice, is this not an absolutely appropriate further role that it should play?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

It is not only appropriate as a further role but one we have already agreed to. As the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said, on many occasions noble Lords from all sides of the House have spoken about securing the rights of EU citizens in the United Kingdom and UK citizens in the European Union. This amendment fleshes that out and it would be wrong to pass a Bill which denied something we have already agreed.

[Baroness Prosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Foulkes and I will speak to Amendment 54, which stands in my name. I will not detain noble Lords for long because much of what I intended to say has already been said and covered. Agreement on the wording of this amendment has been expressed by various Benches in this House, so this is not simply a one-sided argument. It seems to me that this country’s reputation globally will simply go down the Suwannee if we are prepared, at one moment, to say that we agree to certain protections for people who have become embroiled in this dreadful situation in which we find ourselves and then, a moment later, decide that, no, we do not agree with that and will not give those protections. What will people think of us as a nation if that is how the leadership of this country behaves?

My amendment would extend the requirement for certain persons to be able to refer their legal matters back to the European Court of Justice to a period of eight years. I trust that noble Lords will understand the need for such an extension. There is a statute of limitations existing for six years; if we do not include a period of coverage, people whose claims may well start quite late after the leaving date may well find themselves without that coverage, which I hope will be agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to intervene, following what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has said, and referring to the amendment that was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. One of the problems I have faced since looking at this Bill, is trying to find hard examples of situations in which the Supreme Court would wish to refer a matter to the European Court of Justice.

There is a very good example reported in Monday’s Times of a case called SM (Algeria) (Appellant) v Entry Clearance Officer. I will take a moment to explain what the case is about, because it is a good example of citizens’ rights. SM was a little girl, who was placed into the legal guardianship of EU citizens, who happened to be in Algeria. The question concerned her position in coming to the United Kingdom as a member of that family under the Immigration (European Economic Area Regulations) 2006. Merely referring to those regulations reminds us that they would become, as I understand the position, retained EU law under Clause 2 of the Bill.

The problem arose because the court saw that the regulation had been transposing wording from a directive, which is the normal way in which these things work, but the transposition was inaccurate. This is a situation I have encountered before—it happens from time to time. The question is how to deal with the inaccuracy. The inaccuracy was that while our regulation talked about “family member”—somebody who was put into the legal guardianship of a couple, would normally be regarded as a member of the family—the directive was talking about “direct descendants”, and she was not a direct descendant, because she was not actually related, in that sense, to the people who had become her guardians. In order to resolve that problem, the court found it necessary to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice—which it did on Monday. That was under the existing position.

In resolving the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, it may help to ask how that matter would be handled after exit day. I may be wrong, but my understanding is that it would be for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue itself. The directive would come into EU retained law under Clause 3, so we would have both pieces of legislation to look at. I think that the court, having regard particularly to the way in which we had translated the directive, would give great weight to our own language and regard this little girl as part of the family and therefore entitled to take the benefit of the regulation.

In explaining the situation, I hope I have not made it too complicated, but it is a good example of citizens’ rights, accorded by our own regulations, giving effect to EU law. There must be very many in the corpus of regulations which forms part of EU law. It comes back to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. The Supreme Court looks very carefully at the interests of children and would accord every weight to the normal rules about the priority given to the interests of the child in construing the regulation in a sense that fits with our own language. I should have thought that, after exit day, the question of referring the matter to the European Court of Justice simply would not arise because the court would be capable of resolving the issue itself without being bound by the problem of having to refer something which was not that clear. If I may use the English expression, it was not crystal clear; therefore they were bound to refer. Under the situation after exit day, any superior court will be fully able to resolve the problems of interpretation that arise. Will the Minister confirm that, in this situation, there would be no need for a reference because our courts would be able to deal with it perfectly properly, looking at the language of our own regulations, despite the problem that might have arisen in translating them from the directive into English?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, in moving this amendment— I referred to it myself—was that, as part of the agreement that was struck between the United Kingdom and the European institutions in December, provision was made to,

“establish a mechanism enabling UK courts or tribunals to decide, having had due regard to whether relevant case-law exists, to ask the CJEU questions of interpretation of those rights where they consider that a CJEU ruling on the question is necessary for the UK court or tribunal to be able to give judgment in a case before it”.

So it is not a case of questioning the ability of the Supreme Court. We have entered into an agreement which says that there must be an opportunity or a mechanism to refer to the Court of Justice of the European Union. How does the noble and learned Lord see the mechanism for giving effect to what the United Kingdom Government have agreed?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I have listened with great care to what the noble and learned Lord has said but I cannot look into the future. I do not know what is going to happen as a result. We just have to look at the present situation. There are two factors to bear in mind. As far as the UK is concerned, for people looking to come here, an immense amount of citizens’ rights are guaranteed already under the regulations which implement directives. We ought not to lose sight of that. Secondly, problems of interpretation because of conflicts between the wording of the directive and our transposition of it, give rise to some doubt. Under the existing position, there is an obligation to refer which will not be present after exit day. This is a different situation with which I believe our courts will be able to cope perfectly well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble Baroness, businesses affect individuals, so it is not appropriate to try to draw a distinction between citizens’ rights and businesses in that context. The right to work involves the right to maintain a business in various countries; you cannot simply draw them apart in that way. As regards regards timing, of course we are concerned to ensure that we achieve a withdrawal agreement sooner rather than later. That is why these negotiations are under way. If perchance no agreement is achieved—and I am not aware of anyone who wishes this, although others will perhaps assert the contrary—we will have to look at how we then deal with matters in the absence of that international agreement.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord and I hear what he is saying about the duality principle. Can he conceive of any circumstances in which the consensus reached between the United Kingdom and the European Union on the way in which we should treat EU citizens in the United Kingdom and United Kingdom citizens in the EU would not be taken forward or would fall apart? Can he see any circumstances where that might happen?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

At the present time, no, but we are only now undertaking the detailed negotiation of the withdrawal agreement. It may be, for example, that the situation of UK citizens in Europe will alter during the course of those negotiations. It may be that the European Parliament will take a different view on how the rights and interests of those UK citizens in Europe should be approached. The noble and learned Lord will recall that, at an earlier stage, there were some suggestions that the rights of UK citizens in Europe would be limited to the member state in which they were resident at the time of exit. There are all sorts of possibilities and I am not going to indulge in an analysis of those possibilities—we are concerned with achieving certainty. We have achieved, by way of the joint report in December, an expression of joint opinion about where we are going, with regard not only to the rights of EU citizens in the United Kingdom but also to the rights of UK citizens in the EU. Of course we want to bring that in to the final withdrawal agreement, in order that we can then draw it down and implement it in domestic law.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Adonis]

We will be debating Northern Ireland at greater length later. The Minister said in response to my noble friend Lord Judd that the Government would be bringing forward on Report amendments in respect of the Good Friday agreement—or at least that is what I took him to be saying; no doubt he will clarify his remarks when he rises to speak. Will he tell the Committee more about what those amendments will contain?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, I speak in support of the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, to which I have added my name. I shall try to confine myself to the actual amendments to Clauses 7, 8 and 9. Like the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, I have not yet had an opportunity to see the amendments to Clause 11 which were laid today, but I suspect that we will consider them in great detail before we come to debate them in Committee next week. Suffice it to say that it is helpful that some information has been forthcoming. I may not necessarily agree with it all but it will shed a helpful light by giving us an indication of the frameworks where the UK Government at least think that there should be a United Kingdom dimension, and hopefully some polish from outside stakeholders may help to inform our discussions when we come to them.

On the amendments moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, to Clauses 7, 8 and 9, I shall certainly consider with care what the Minister said at the outset of the debate and then again in response to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. I thought that perhaps he went slightly further when he responded to the noble Lord, but I shall read carefully what he has said just to see whether this particular part concession has substance. That is because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pointed out, the position with regard to Northern Ireland in Clause 7(7) is not absolute. There are qualifications to it and it will be interesting to see whether there are similar qualifications with regard to Scotland and Wales.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, also intervened on the noble Lord, Lord Empey, and said that the difference between what is there as regards Northern Ireland in Clause 7(7) as it stands and what we have proposed in our amendment is that Clause 7(7) does not make any provision for the consent of the relevant Scottish, Welsh—or in the case of my noble friend’s amendment—or Northern Irish devolved Assemblies or Parliaments. I do not know enough, and I know that it is dangerous to go into Northern Ireland politics without deep knowledge. However, I will say why our amendment, which gives the opportunity for consent, would be preferable, certainly with regard to Scotland and Wales. Ministers talk generally, and one of the concerns we have is with the breadth of the powers given to Ministers under these clauses, but we do not know whether there might be a genuine cause or reason for an amendment to be made to these founding pieces of legislation. It would therefore be helpful if there was a provision for consent so that it is not done unilaterally.

It might also be helpful looking forward. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, mentioned distrust. That cuts two ways. There is distrust among the Scottish and Welsh Governments as to what United Kingdom Ministers might get up to in using these very broad powers, and there is distrust—I can speak only for Scotland—among UK Ministers that the Scottish Government might well seek to veto something that they might otherwise think is perfectly reasonable. That is holding back quite a lot of the development of a pragmatic and reasonable solution to a lot of these issues. It might be that there will be something akin to the so-called Edinburgh agreement, which paved the way for the amendments to the Scotland Act that allowed the EU and independence referendums to take place, so that we can get some understanding between the Governments that consent would not unreasonably be withheld where a compelling case could be made for it.

The problem we have at the moment is that there is no scope for that at all. It is imposition. It could be a unilateral imposition in a change to the Scotland Act or the government of Wales Acts without any form of consultation or consent at all. As the noble and learned Lord pointed out, Clause 8, certainly in terms of Scotland, and Schedule 5 allow some limited powers for the Scottish Parliament relating to international obligations. Again, we think some provision should be made in Clause 9 for putting a brake on any amendment to, or modification of, the Scotland Act or the Government of Wales Act unless there is the consent of the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly.

[Lord Empey]

Will the noble and learned Lord elaborate on his suggestion for how a middle way could be established? We would all want to see consent if that is achievable, but the problem is that it is very difficult to design a situation in the legislation to say we will seek consent but we do not really need it. The second problem that we have in Northern Ireland is the absence of the Assembly. That creates an even more dramatic situation.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, taking that second point, as I indicated earlier, the absence of the Northern Ireland Assembly raises far more questions than those specific to these amendments. My noble friend Lady Suttie touched on that when she moved her amendment. It goes far further than these particular amendments.

I will say more about consent. If it is, in fact, fear that consent will be unreasonably withheld, surely it is not beyond the wit of those negotiating to come up with some kind of agreement that the various parties can sign up to, indicating that that consent would not be unreasonably withheld. I accept that the downside is that they could go back on their agreement. There would be a political consequence to that. Ultimately, we are dealing with issues that have a practical effect on people’s livelihoods and businesses. It is far more important to get some practical solution based on good faith, if it can be restored, rather than standing in corners, not wishing to engage.

If the Government accepted these amendments it might well be a step forward to trying to establish some of that atmosphere where trust can be created. What we currently have would not, as has already been said, trigger a legislative consent Motion in circumstances where, if it was primary legislation, it would have a legislative consent Motion.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

On the subject of trust, the noble and learned Lord mentioned the Edinburgh agreement, which the Scottish nationalists signed up to. No sooner was the ink dry on the paper than they were repudiating it. Does he remember the assertion that it would be a “once in a generation” referendum on independence? Surely we are dealing in Scotland with a nationalist Government determined to destroy the United Kingdom. Why on earth would one want to give them a veto over decisions taken by the United Kingdom Parliament?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I accept that, with regard to “once in a generation”, the Scottish National Party is guilty of not living up to what it said, but it is not right to say that, once the ink was dry on the paper, it totally forgot it. What was in that agreement informed both the Section 30 order that was passed and the legislation then passed by the Scottish Parliament in conformity with the agreement. A substantial part of that agreement was carried through in good faith by both parties.

The detailed wording of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act was important in getting the right balance in the devolution settlement. If in the normal course of events that were to change, it would require an order under Section 30 of the Scotland Act, which requires an affirmative vote not only by both Houses of this Parliament but by the Scottish Parliament. What we are proposing is consistent with what would happen in the normal course of events when the balance of the devolution settlement was changed. That is why I strongly encourage the Minister at least to show willingness to think about this matter and reassure us that the Government are sensitive to it. That could go some way towards establishing a better basis for trust as we look forward to our debates on Clause 11.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments introduced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, might be perfectly okay from the point of view of the UK Government. The only change likely under Clause 7 is to something where it says “EU law”; it would have to be changed to something else. The powers in Clause 7 are intended to enable the knitting together of existing UK law and existing EU law which is not already part of it. That is a difficult job. These descriptions are meant to cater for that. I do not see it as likely that much will be required in relation to Scotland in that respect.

The main question is what happens under Clause 11. The Government promised that it would be brought before the House of Commons and hoped that it would be agreed. Your Lordships may or may not remember that I was keen at Second Reading to stress the need for agreement, because it is the only answer. Intense negotiations have gone on at official level over the last while. It now appears sadly possible—I do not make it any stronger than that—that the Governments may not be able to reach agreement. Therefore, it is important before anything further happens that your Lordships get a chance to apply your great experience to the problems separating the two parties. I greatly regret that there is no proper representation for Northern Ireland. I had the responsibility of being a Minister in Northern Ireland for 10 years; I feel very sad that the present situation has been reached and only wish that it could be resolved. From what I hear, I fear that it may not be very easy until after Brexit. In any case, agreement is essential if it is possible. I do not want to say or do anything that would impede the reaching of such agreement.

As for Clause 7, to retain a power to amend the Scotland Act seems unimportant in this situation, although I think the number of amendments generated by a proposal of this kind would be very small and the Government may feel it worth while to forgo such a power in the interest of making peace and progress.

The Clause 11 procedure is much more difficult. It is important to bear in mind that the Scotland Act—this goes for the Wales Act as well—was set up and legislated within the European Union. Therefore, the only powers that were dealt with were the powers that existed in the Parliament of the United Kingdom when these Bills became law. That did not involve the powers that the EU had and therefore I think it is not determinative of how these powers should be distributed on return to look at what was decided in the original Acts setting up the devolved Administrations, because the powers are now wider. It is therefore very much a matter of trying to resolve the issues between the parties by agreement. If we can help in that respect, so be it: I very much hope that we can. Certainly, I hope we do not do anything to hinder it. So far as I am concerned, I am prepared to trust all the parties to do their best to reach an amicable solution.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Deben (Con)]

I wonder if I can be my usual emollient self at this point. I admit to being of Welsh extraction with a Welsh-speaking father. My noble friend Lord Forsyth spoke entirely from the point of view of someone who has been bruised—I would be on his side in this—by the activities, and sometimes more than that, of the Scottish nationalists. But the debate here is not about vetoes, although the amendment would confer them; rather it is a debate about trust. My noble friend says we can all work it out: this Government, the coalition Government and the Labour Government continued the utterly unfair system of the Barnett formula, which has done such damage to Wales, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, said, the Labour Government retained large sums of money, rather than pass it on in the system we previously had.

My noble friend knows very well that I believe in a single market. I do not have a view that narrows that single market to the United Kingdom. I look to a single market that continues through the whole of Europe, which is, of course, of great benefit to all of us and I am sad that he should try to remove us from it. But I do not think that it helps in this debate not to face the very considerable lack of trust in both Scotland and Wales, where there is a history of not getting a fair share except almost by force.

Scotland has managed to get itself into what many of us feel is the opposite position. That is how the Barnett formula works. It would be good for the Government of Scotland occasionally to recognise into what a favourable position history has put it. However, I should not like the Committee to fail to recognise, because of the way these amendments are drawn and have been put together, the specific position of Wales, not least because of the special position in which the north of Ireland has managed to get itself, for political reasons, and the historical position Scotland has been in. This is not to sow discord between the parts of the United Kingdom; it is merely to say to my noble friend the Minister, for whom I have enormous respect—his last speech summing up was an exemplary one to show how the Government can deal with issues in a way that at least makes the Committee feel that it is listened to; I thank him for that, because it was a very different touch—that there is a real feeling among people in Wales that the history does not help people believe that the United Kingdom Government will be entirely even-handed on this issue. Therefore, if, in the withdrawal Bill, Wales has its membership of the European Union, from which it has benefited very significantly, taken away, is there a way the Government can at least give greater confidence to Wales? If they do not, I fear the ability to come to a compromise will be made very considerably more difficult.

I feel my noble friend Lord Forsyth was partisan in the way he concentrated only on Scotland. He was kind enough to say that he did not know about Wales, but I do, so in these circumstances, will the Minister please give us a little more confidence? I should very much like my noble friend, whose own name reminds us of Aberystwyth, to give us a feeling that Government will, in some way, find a manner to give confidence in the Bill, since this is not appropriate.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, as a co-signatory to the amendment, I shall briefly make three points. My first is to correct something said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. He said that the smooth running of the early years of devolution was because we had a Labour Government in Westminster and a Labour Government in the Scottish Parliament. In fact, it was a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition in the Scottish Parliament. That is an important difference.

Secondly, I endorse what the noble and learned Lord said when he gave the example of orders under the European Communities Act 1972 and the memorandum of understanding between the Scottish Government and United Kingdom Government on consultation, and how these might be taken forward. My experience in the Scottish Executive at the time was that it worked. I can say that because I cannot remember an issue over which there was any major dispute. It is also fair to say that I cannot think of any major dispute on that kind of area, some of which was very technical, while the Scottish National Party was in either minority government after 2007 or majority government after 2011. It is possible on a whole range of technical issues to get some common- sense agreement. That is why we should persevere.

Thirdly, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said that underlying the amendments is an effort to have building blocks for trust. I shall not repeat the arguments I made in the previous debate other than to say to the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, that, like the noble Lord, Lord Deben, I appreciated his comprehensive response to it. He seemed to suggest that I had spoken about allowing a veto over areas that were non-devolved. Given that the previous amendments were about modifications to the Scotland Act, I do not think anything I said could have given that implication. Here, where we are talking explicitly about matters within the devolved competence of Scottish Ministers, that cannot be said either. I think there is something we can build on there.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

I share the admiration of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for the way in which the Minister summed up the previous debate. He was a rather brilliant performer of the work of the fire extinguisher. Foam was spread over all of us and calm ensued. It was a brilliant performance.

I am sorry that, this time, the Minister has to deal with pyrotechnics from a pyromaniac, in his colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean. It is rather a pity that the attacks of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, on the party now governing in Scotland are responded to only by a Welshman, the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. He responds very well, but, as a Scotsman who does not support the Scottish National Party, it seems to me rather an easy trick to score pyrotechnical victories against an opponent who is not in the room.

Trust is what this is all about. I can see nothing wrong with this amendment; I cannot see any reason why Ministers should not buy it now. If they cannot, a discussion needs to start. It does not help to insult the party in office in Edinburgh by implying motives. It may well have such motives, but they were not those it explained when it published a perfectly reasonable economic analysis at the end of last year which established clearly the damage that will accrue to Scotland from leaving the single market. The scale of the damage was almost exactly the same as what we have now seen in the Treasury analysis for the United Kingdom as a whole—eight, five, two: the same numbers pop up in both studies. The Scots are not being unreasonable or necessarily malicious when they say that they would prefer to remain in the single market. Of course, the market of the United Kingdom is more important to Scotland than the market of the rest of Europe, but that is not the point; they do not want to have to choose. That seems a perfectly reasonable position to adopt. It does not help establish trust to insult them.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 266, which is in my name, is in a series of groups dealing with devolution. It is in the first of five groups dealing with rather technical points arising out of Schedules 2 and 8. They precede a lot of government amendments which are in the group following my groups. I suggest that the main discussion about devolution and its consequences is best reserved for the government amendments which are focused on Clause 11 and other clauses. I am afraid my groups are rather boring, because I am dealing with a whole series of little technical points which need adjustment to some extent in the light of progress that is being made in discussions with the devolved authorities, among other points.

The theme that runs through all my amendments is the need to respect the devolution settlements in Scotland and Wales. I am confident that the Government share that sentiment. It is all a question of how the matter is worked out in points of detail. The basic rule following our withdrawal from the EU, I suggest, is that returned EU competencies in the devolved areas should be distributed among the devolved authorities in accordance with the devolution statutes. That means that what falls within devolved competence should be treated as devolved, with all that that means, and what falls within reserved matters should be treated as reserved, with all that that means.

The statutes that form the foundation for the devolution settlements—the Scotland Act 1998 and Government of Wales Acts, the latest of which was in 2017—were all built on the foundation of our membership of the EU. In each of these statutes, it was taken as accepted that it would not be within the competence of the devolved Administrations to legislate on matters relating to EU law or indeed to take executive action in relation to these matters either.

What we have in the Bill, in place of EU law, is a new creature called “retained” EU law, which is the law that comes back to us either because it is already present in the United Kingdom or is direct EU law that is coming back to us and is not yet built into our laws but requires being built in using the mechanisms described in the Bill. In the original drafting of the Bill, retained EU law is treated as simply a mirror image of EU law, so that in that original drafting—which can be seen in Clauses 11(1) and (2)—the same restriction on competence which applied in relation to EU law is applied to retained EU law. I am delighted to see that, in developing their thinking on this matter, the Government recognise that this really is not acceptable within the devolved arrangements. A much more nuanced approach to that topic can be seen in the government amendments that we will come to later this afternoon.

What I seek to do in the preliminary groups is to draw attention to various other passages in the Bill that need to be corrected in order to be compatible with the devolution settlements. In some of the groups—but not in the first—it is already clear from the government amendments that they are in almost the same position as I am as to what needs to be done.

I turn to Amendment 266, in the first of these groups, and also mention amendments 278 and 292, which raise exactly the same point in relation to different parts of the Bill. Amendment 266 deals with the power to deal by regulation with deficiencies arising from the withdrawal from the EU, which is the subject of Clause 7. It appears in Part 1 of Schedule 2 in the form that is appropriate for the activities of the devolved institutions in carrying out the exercise to which Clause 7 refers.

Amendment 278 deals with the power by regulation to prevent breaches of international obligations, which is the subject of Clause 8. The devolution mechanism for this is dealt with in paragraph 13 of Schedule 2. Amendment 292 relates to the power by regulation to implement the withdrawal agreement and the mechanism for the devolved Administrations is set out in paragraph 21 of Schedule 2.

The point to which these three amendments draw attention is a qualification that is to be found in each of these contexts on the power of the devolved authority to make provision by regulations regarding these three matters. The particular provision that I am concerned about is found in paragraph 1(4) of Schedule 2:

“Regulations under this Part, so far as made by a devolved authority … (b) may not confer a power to legislate (other than a power to make rules of procedure for a court or tribunal)”.


At first sight that qualification cuts across the concept of devolution, the effect of which is that if a matter is within devolved competence, it is for the devolved authority to take its own decisions as to how to deal with that matter, in whatever way it regards as appropriate. Under the devolution statutes, the qualification that we find in this provision and its equivalents in paragraphs 13 and 21 is new: in my experience it has not been encountered before. To an extent, therefore, these three amendments are probing, to enable the Minister to explain why this qualification has been inserted in these paragraphs and, if no reasonable explanation is given, to suggest to her that maybe the qualification should be removed, on the ground that when it comes to exercising powers within the devolved area, it should not be there.

It is right to add that Part 1 of Schedule 2, for perfectly understandable reasons, contains qualifications. For example, paragraph 2 states that:

“No regulations may be made under this Part by a devolved authority unless every provision of them is within the devolved competence of the devolved authority”.


That is a perfectly sensible provision, and consistent with the devolution scheme. What troubles me is why the qualification that I have mentioned should be there. My question is: should it be there at all? And if it should not be there, should it not be taken out? I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, the Committee is indebted to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for his detailed analysis of the Bill as it originally stood, and the points arising. My name is on the amendment, but I would be happy to deal with the important issues of principle that prompted me to sign some of these amendments, in an attempt to honour the spirit of the original devolution settlement, when we deal with the group containing the government amendments. Obviously, however, I support the amendment that the noble and learned Lord has moved.

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I too support the noble and learned Lord’s amendment, and I entirely agree with his approach—that it is best to focus on a couple of larger debates rather than going through all the minutiae at this point. However, it is important to underline the principle—that matters coming back from Brussels that deal with devolved subjects should go to the devolved authorities. It is on that principle that I hope we shall concentrate as we move forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wigley]

Indeed—the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, was making earlier; I agree. Given the current role of EU law regulating action in all parts of the UK in such subjects, partly to facilitate a single market with a level playing field—the point that the noble Lord was making—and partly to ensure that in matters which by their nature cannot be constrained by political borders, there is a coherent common approach. I accept this. Indeed, last week I proposed an amendment to provide a framework agreement for environmental policy—which, quite amazingly, the Government rejected. However, if there are to be such frameworks, the devolved Administrations and the devolved legislatures, whose legislative competence is being constrained by such frameworks, must surely agree the proposed steps jointly with the UK Government. I have tabled an amendment to an amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, providing a mechanism to this end. That will be debated later so I will not anticipate that debate now.

Let us be clear: unless there is agreement between Westminster and the devolved Governments on these matters, the continuity Bill will be enacted by the Assembly and will take precedence in Wales. Surely it is time for the UK Government to reconsider what is seen as an obdurate stance and agree a sensible, balanced and respectful way forward.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak in this debate because in many respects government Amendment 302A answers the initial point of concern—that the current limitation on competence in the Scotland Act under European Union law would be replaced by a restriction on retained EU law. Of course, under the new amendment that has gone, but there is a wider point on which the Minister could perhaps assist the Committee, which arises from the draft agreement on the transitional period.

As I understand it, during the transitional period basically the acquis will still apply. I have looked at Articles 4 and 82 of the draft agreement. Article 4 says:

“Where this Agreement provides for the application of Union law in the United Kingdom, it shall produce in respect of and in the United Kingdom the same legal effects as those which it produces within the Union and its Member States”.


Article 82 says:

“The Court of Justice of the European Union shall continue to have jurisdiction for any proceedings brought before it by the United Kingdom or against the United Kingdom before the end of the transition period”.


We will have a lot of debates this afternoon about whether UK Ministers, Scottish Ministers or Welsh Ministers will be exercising powers after exit day, but can the Minister indicate how the United Kingdom Government see the position? If we are going to have to abide by European Union law having the same legal effect as it produces in the Union, is there any room for movement at all? How is effect going to be given to that if, under Clause 1 of the Bill, the European Communities Act 1972 has been repealed?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I cannot allow the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, to continue with his heresy that the Government are right in what they are doing. I noticed the shock that passed over the face of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. What I think the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, does not appreciate is that the proposal of the Government is to introduce frame- works into this country to save the internal market of the UK, whether or not the devolved Administrations consent. All they are prepared to do, as the noble Baroness the Minister said in response to something earlier, is to consult—they are not necessarily seeking agreement. That is where he has it wrong.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wigley]

Not only do I agree with my noble friend but I will surprise the Committee by reminding him that Penderyn whisky was in fact formulated as a result of devolution itself. It was on the evening of the setting-up of the National Assembly that people came together and thought, “Now we have to start doing something to help ourselves in Wales. What shall we do?” They concluded that a whisky would be one way forward. As they say, the rest is history—a very enjoyable and successful history. I thank my noble friend for reminding me of that.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, correctly said that the European Commission objected. But in fact the Court of Justice of the European Union found that the Scottish Government’s proposals were actually consistent with the rules of the single market, principally because the minimum unit price was based on health reasons.

[Lord Wigley]

Indeed—which shows the importance of the health and social agenda that underpinned the initiative.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 302BA, 312 and 318 in my name, but I shall start by speaking more to the generality by responding to the government amendments moved by the Minister. It is fair to acknowledge that much has happened since Second Reading when I and many others criticised the architecture of the original Clause 11, not least because it showed scant regard for the spirit and structure of the original devolution settlement. It had a system of conferred powers that was totally alien to how devolution had performed and been structured until this point.

However, I give credit to the Government for tabling these amendments. They have thought to recast Clause 11 and the related schedules, and I think it was acknowledged earlier that there is more work to be done. When you get legislation like this and new situations arise, it is amazing how new words come into the vocabulary. The Government have claimed that most of the powers at the so-called intersects will go directly to Cardiff, Edinburgh and Belfast on exit day, subject only to relatively few remaining—they emphasise that this will be temporary, though I shall return to that—to secure the UK single market until such time as that framework is put in place.

As has been acknowledged, that is a welcome step. It shows a lot of progress and, I think, a lot of good will towards seeking an agreement. However, it has clearly not yet been sufficient to allow the Scottish and Welsh Governments to recommend the Legislative Consent Motions to their respective Parliament and Assembly. Indeed, the letter from the First Ministers of Scotland and Wales to the Lord Speaker that was circulated to all Members of your Lordships’ House says:

“In being asked to give legislative consent to the EU (Withdrawal) Bill on this basis”—


that is, on the basis of the new amendments—

“the devolved legislatures would be being asked to agree to the creation of this power with no certainty about where frameworks will be established, how these will work, how they will be governed and how we will go from temporary restrictions to longer term solutions”.

It is also arguable that the amendments do not do precisely what the Government claim they are seeking to do. The Government have said—indeed, the Minister has said today—that the intention is that the vast majority of powers identified at the intersects will go directly to the devolved institutions. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, rightly said that that is the proper thing to do. However, if one looks at the amendments before us, while much has been said about a figure of 24, one sees that there is nothing in the Bill that restricts it to 24. Technically, and I think this was a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, all 158 could be subject to this freeze and this restriction. They could all be subject to regulations made under the powers in the revised Clause 11 and there would be no provision for consent from the Scottish or Welsh Ministers, let alone from the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly.

It would help considerably if, in the body of legislation, it was made clear in some way which powers would go directly, or if there was a schedule concerning which powers would be the subject of framework agreements. I do not doubt for one minute that there will be some negotiation about what should be in frameworks and what should or should not be a UK framework. That is perfectly proper for negotiation. I welcome what the Minister said earlier: agriculture is set out as a broad heading but he accepts that agriculture has to be subdivided and not all aspects of it would be the subject of frameworks. Indeed, it is worth noting that NFU Scotland identifies in a briefing paper animal welfare and traceability, public health, pesticides, regulation and food labelling as examples of overarching areas of regulation that would be best suited to being managed on a commonly agreed framework basis. There is lots of scope for talking to stakeholders about what the framework should be, but it would be very helpful if that could be in the Bill.

I do not underestimate for one moment that there will be work to do, but we should perhaps reflect that it will be at least four weeks until we come to deal with these issues on Report. It is worth reminding ourselves that the House of Commons Select Committee on Scottish Affairs recommended back in November that there should be clarity on this before the Bill reached Third Reading in the House of Commons. I do not take away from the work that has been done by officials, but if there is a will to get there, I am sure it could be done.

One other reflection on this point is that earlier today, in response to an intervention from me, the noble and learned Lord said that, given that we are now to have a transition period, we will have to accommodate that transition period in future legislation, a withdrawal and implementation Bill, so we may not need these frameworks until 31 December 2020 or 1 January 2021, which provides further time to sort out what should be in later legislation. But I would rather strike while the iron is hot and seek what can be done in this Bill.

It has also been said that these measures are temporary. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster went out of his way to emphasise that in the letter that he sent to all Peers. The Government have, to their credit, included several extra provisions to buttress their position that they should be temporary by reporting requirements, and these are all welcome, but, unlike some other parts of the Bill, there is no sunset clause. That is why, in Amendment 312, which was tabled before the new amendments, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and I recommended that there should be a sunset on the whole power after two years and, in Amendment 302BA, I suggest that any regulations brought forward under the new powers should themselves lapse after two years. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, said that it should be five years. We could have a debate about that but, again, the principle is trying to build confidence to get an agreement between the Scottish and Welsh Governments and the UK Government, and to have a sunset clause would go a considerable way to help that.

As we have heard in the previous three contributions, there could be dispute about the frameworks. Our Amendment 318 would put the Joint Ministerial Committee on European negotiations on a statutory footing. In October 2016, to much fanfare, we were told that this new committee had been set up,

“to ensure that the interests of all parts of the United Kingdom are protected and advanced, and to develop a UK approach and objectives for the forthcoming negotiations”.

That has probably been more honoured in the breach than it has in practice. We know that in recent weeks there have been more concerted efforts in the committee to try to gain agreement on what we are discussing tonight, but there might be a lot of advantage in putting it on a statutory basis so that there could not be any backsliding on when it meets, as has happened before.

I welcome the initiative taken by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and the amendments proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, because they constructively try to address how we resolve some of the difficulties. There clearly are difficulties and differences, and we must try to start thinking outside the box and creatively. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, picks up very well one difficulty: the United Kingdom Parliament is also the Parliament for England—England does not have a separate legislature, as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland do.

I was reminded of my colleague Mr Ross Finnie, Minister for the Environment and Rural Development in the first Scottish Administration. His experience of meeting counterparts from Wales, Northern Ireland and Defra was that some Secretaries of State saw their role as to be the UK chair of the meetings, with the English Minister of State arguing England’s case, whereas other Secretaries of State could not see the difference between an English position and a UK position. He said that, clearly, they made far more progress when they had a Secretary of State who saw him or herself as holding the ring as the UK Minister with an English Minister of State arguing the English position.

We must recognise that, as the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, said, it is asymmetrical.

[Lord Dykes (CB)]

I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way. He referred to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, who said in his speech that he hoped that one day there would be a federal constitution and, I think, implied that the noble and learned Lord supports the same idea. There are other Members, including Cross-Benchers, who feel that that is a very good idea.

The tragedy is that with the constant muddle we have, with our inability to have other than fairly chaotic governance for various reasons, including the lack of a written constitution—which most people would not agree with, of course, but I think is a growing field of thought—how does one get that without first having a constitutional convention to launch it, and how on earth would you get agreement on a constitutional convention in Britain?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

There are lots of questions there from the noble Lord, Lord Dykes. First, as a member of a party that has supported some form of federal United Kingdom since the days of Asquith, I have no difficulty in saying that I believe in federalism. Equally, I do not diminish the difficulties and challenges in getting there. I rather suspect that, with what we have at the moment, we do not have time for a constitutional convention. That is why, as with so many other aspects of our constitution, we must move incrementally.

A lot of this has hinged on consent. Interestingly, the report from your Lordships’ European Union Committee on Brexit and devolution states:

“Any durable solution will need the consent of all the nations of the United Kingdom, and of their elected representatives … A successful settlement cannot be imposed by the UK Government: it must be developed in partnership with the devolved Governments”.


The Scottish Affairs Committee also referred to the fact that it would require the consent of the devolved Administrations.

On the issue of legislative consent Motions, as the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland knows, there is concern that frozen areas of EU retained law might well be seen to be beyond the legislative or executive competence of the devolved institutions, and therefore no legislative consent Motion would be required, at least under the enunciation formulated by Lord Sewel in the Scotland Act. I accept that devolution guidance note 10 could kick in. I think that the Minister said something to the noble Lord, Lord McConnell, in a previous debate, but it would be very helpful if he could clarify that, in the event of subsequent primary legislation in pursuance of the common UK framework, legislative consent Motions would indeed be expected.

Finally, we are moving into uncharted waters. Arguably, if we had not been in the European Union in 1998, the Scotland Act would have been constructed differently. The single market of the United Kingdom, which I certainly value and numerous other Members of your Lordships’ House have said they value, has been maintained since 1999 by the single market of the European Union. We are now into new territory with, for example, trade agreements. Negotiating international agreements is a function of the United Kingdom Government, but the detail of these trade agreements could well impact on devolved competences. How will that be accommodated? Canada, for example, when it negotiated its agreement with the European Union, had representatives of the provinces and territories in the room at the table during those negotiations. It would be very welcome if the Government were to make a similar commitment. That, again, would be a confidence-building measure.

At a later date, we will no doubt have to consider how frameworks operate when we have them. I welcome the suggestion of the Welsh Government of a council of UK Ministers with qualified majority voting to operate the frameworks. That would take us much further down the road towards federalism. In the meantime, the challenge is to find workable arrangements in the interim.

We do not really have a concept of shared competence. Perhaps that is something that we should work up. It was something which we discussed in the Calman commission back in 2008-09. It did not have much traction then, but we are in a new situation.

There is also the question of consent and trust. It has been said that constitutional propriety does not really allow for anything like consent. Those of us who argue for a written constitution are often told of the benefits of having a flexible, unwritten constitution. We are in a new situation. The Government responded to the campaign for English votes for English laws by bringing out a new device which, arguably, undermined the sovereignty of Parliament, because the House of Commons and the House of Lords can vote for an amendment, but if English MPs, a subset of one House of Parliament, say no, it does not become law. That is a move away from the sovereignty of Parliament.

Those who were in the Chamber earlier today heard my noble friend Lord Alderdice talk about the Good Friday agreement. He talked about the need to be adventurous and creative and suggested that if that process had involved some of what we have been hearing in the EU debate—people not willing even to entertain the idea of any differences or of how you work with sovereignty—we would never have had the Good Friday agreement. I would encourage the Government to be adventurous and creative; to be willing to think outside the box; to be willing to compromise; and to be willing to seek pragmatic solutions, even at the expense of 100% constitutional purity. What we are discussing, at the end of the day, is not about institutions. It is about people, businesses and the certainty they want in the law and their rights when we move out of the European Union. We should keep that firmly in our minds. In that spirit, I hope that the Government can come to successful negotiation with the devolved Administrations and that, by the time we come to Report, we can have amendments that we can all support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hain]

I completely agree with my noble friend; he spelled it out very clearly.

At the same time, this approach would provide transparency about the areas in which devolved competence would be affected, which is sadly lacking in the approach embodied, until now at least, in the Government’s amendments. It would also enable the Scottish Parliament and the Assembly to agree to the list of retained powers—reinforcing my noble friend’s point—through the very act of providing legislative consent to the Bill. Such an approach would thus reassure the devolved institutions that the regulation-making power proposed by the Government could not be used to specify areas of retained EU law not requiring frameworks. That is a very important point.

If the schedule idea is potentially a magic bullet, why might the Government resist it? I am informed that the first argument is that it cannot be done in time for Report. I am not sure that I buy this argument; Report does not take place until well after Easter, which is many weeks away. We are told that significant work has been done on potential framework areas and the list published recently by the Government—though not agreed with the devolved Administrations, I understand—comes fairly close to defining legally which current EU law restrictions may need to be continued while frameworks are negotiated. Surely if the Government need to specify these areas in regulations, they will need to do so sooner rather than later in any event.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Perhaps I may reinforce what the noble Lord said. He said that Report stage was still some time away. I am sure that it would be possible for the Government, if the will was there, to put down a marker at that stage and, if it needed another two weeks, to come back at Third Reading and fill in the gaps. I support him in saying that in those areas where they want a UK framework a schedule could be a constructive way forward and give reassurances.

[Lord Hain]

I welcome what the noble and learned Lord has said. If it really is not possible to work up such a schedule before Report—for the reasons that he has explained, I do not see why it should be the case—might not the Government find another legislative opportunity to do so? We know that in the autumn we are likely to have to consider a withdrawal agreement implementation Bill. That might provide an opportunity, although it would be better to do it in this Bill.

The second objection that the Government might make is the need to account for unforeseen circumstances. Since Brexit appears to be a process where every stone turned over reveals yet another problem lurking beneath it, there is some validity to this argument. But if, exceptionally, a new area where a framework is required is identified even after the passage of this Bill with the proposed schedule, there is an easy solution that is wholly consistent with the approach to devolution adopted to date—namely, a power to amend the schedule by Order in Council with the express agreement of Parliament and those devolved legislatures affected. That could be included in the Bill as well.

In reality, if the Government resist this proposal, we would be right to suspect that they have an ulterior motive in wishing to press ahead with such a wide regulation-making power as that encapsulated in the current amendment, although I accept that it is about to be withdrawn. I commend to the Government the idea of putting in the Bill a list of areas agreed with the devolved Administrations—I stress, agreed—where the constraint on devolved competence will apply and ask them to consider bringing forward an amendment that does that at Report stage.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Committee: 10th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 26th March 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

311: Clause 11, page 8, line 41, at end insert—
“( ) This section and Part 1 of Schedule 3 will cease to have effect after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day.”

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, at the request and with the consent of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, I shall move Amendment 311. For clarification, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, did not wish me to move Amendment 310 because he felt it had been superseded by our discussions last week. I shall be brief in moving Amendment 311 because a number of amendments were grouped for our wider debate on Brexit and devolution issues last Wednesday that related to sunset clauses, and this is another example.

It appears that here, as in a number of other areas of the Bill, particularly when powers are to be conferred on United Kingdom Ministers, a sunset clause is attached to them. However, for those in relation to devolution and the exercise of powers by UK Ministers in respect of making orders on the devolved settlement, there is no such sunset clause. As has been said by others, not only in regard to this Bill but on other occasions, there is nothing as permanent as a transitory provision. Although this is intended to be just a temporary move pending the solution of the arrangement between the powers that will go directly to Cardiff, Edinburgh and Belfast and those where we may wish to follow up on what was debated last week with regard to the UK frameworks, it nevertheless appears that there should be some incentive to get on with it and have a time limit.

We debated these issues last week, particularly whether the period should be two, three, four or five years, which is a matter for further discussion, and it is fair to say that this is more about the principle of having a sunset clause. When we debated it last week, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, helpfully indicated in his reply that the Government’s mind was not closed on this matter and there could be an opportunity to put in some form of sunset clause in relation to this and the other amendments that we look forward to seeing on Report. I hope this amendment allows the Government to give further thought to what was said in our debate last week, and I would certainly encourage that positive thinking with regard to a sunset clause. I beg to move.

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 313 in this group, which is in my name. The amendment again returns to the question of making progress by consent. The words in the amendment in the context of Wales provide that the relevant provisions will not come into effect until,

“the National Assembly for Wales has passed a resolution approving the provisions in subsection (2)”.

The convention of gaining legislative consent is of course flawed since it is held to be just that—a convention and no more. This amendment attempts to rectify that flaw, albeit just for one clause of what is in so many ways a problematic Bill. None the less, given our debates earlier this afternoon and last week, it appears that the Government are starting to become a little more sensitive to these issues and may be thinking of finding a way to bring people together on them.

As I say, the proposed new subsection would require the UK Government to seek consent from the devolved legislatures before implementing Clause 11, which may help to break the negotiations deadlock. It may help the devolved legislatures to regain some trust, and this is very much a question of trust. It could go a long way towards proving to Wales and Scotland that their voices matter in these issues.

There are clear constitutional problems with the Bill, which over recent months have been raised vociferously by both the Scottish and Welsh Governments. The UK Government have conceded that the Bill inevitably overrides the devolution settlement. I understand that in the conceptual context, but it is only right that the sitting devolved legislatures are given a statutory legislative opportunity to sign off the final product. The UK Government have rationalised our leaving the EU with the unforgettable soundbite “Taking back control”. Surely to deny the sitting devolved legislatures their fair say on Clause 11 goes against that very reasoning.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie]

My understanding is that that legislation has been enacted by the devolved Administrations for what they perceive as a necessary protection of their positions. The Government hope that we can supersede that legislation by coming to good sense around the table and hammering this out—which I think is what all parts of the United Kingdom want.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank all who have taken part in this short but important debate, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, for responding. I think it fair to say that in all our debates that have touched on devolution, reference has been made to the importance of securing the agreement not just of Ministers but of the devolved legislatures in Scotland and Wales. One prays for the time when it will be the case also in Northern Ireland. That was reflected in the first report of the Scottish Affairs Select Committee of this Session, which recommended that,

“the UK and Scottish governments continue their efforts to secure agreement on those clauses of the Bill which affect devolved areas of responsibility”.

It is important that we reiterate the importance of that. The Minister has indicated that the Government are seized of that, but there is no harm in reinforcing it. She referred to the import of the Sewel convention into both the Wales Act 2017 and the Scotland Act 2016. As we know from the decision in the Miller case in the Supreme Court, the convention is just that: it is a convention and does not have the force of the law. It is important that we reiterate the need to get agreement.

On the proposed sunset clause to which I spoke on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, the Minister seemed to suggest that, once the new proposals come through, this might not be necessary. I tabled a very similar amendment last week, which I had thought of attaching to the amendment brought forward by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. When I discussed it, I was assured that it was not necessary because, due to the way in which the Bill was set out, it would not have been superseded by pre-emption even if the noble Lord’s amendment had been accepted, so such a clause is still pertinent. It is important that some time limit be set, even for establishing the frameworks. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, made some interesting and constructive proposals as to how the frameworks might be achieved. While the return of many of the powers at the so-called intersects would be pretty imminent on exit day, a number would still have to be resolved. Therefore, I encourage some positive thinking with regard to a timeframe within which that might be done. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 311 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

To follow on from what the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, has said, I am tempted by the reverse approach of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and the mechanism that he has described. I have just one point to add to the debate: I am worried about the emphasis on the single market—the internal UK market. There was a debate in Europe, following the Cockfield White Paper 30 years ago, about how much uniformity was needed in a single market; how much you could rely on mutual recognition; how much you did not need to standardise at all and how much you could harmonise. Noble Lords will remember that that debate became quite controversial at times. Some of us argued that the Commission took a more expansive view of the need to harmonise and standardise, rather than to recognise diversity. In my view, devolution inherently means a recognition of diversity. I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Morgan, that the Government have an evil, malign intent here. However, the way that this dossier has been handled has created suspicions in Scotland and Wales of such an intent.

Looking at the criteria set out in the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, there is no difficulty with a common framework in areas necessary to,

“safeguard the security of the UK”,

or,

“provide access to justice”,

or,

“enable the management of common resources”,

or,

“ensure compliance with international obligations”,

obviously. I pause on,

“new trade agreements and international treaties”,

because there are suspicions that the fox might get into the hen house. The real suspicion arises over the first item:

“enable the functioning of the UK internal market”.

I do not think “enable” is a transitive verb. As all noble Lords recognise, “ennoble” is, but “enable” is intransitive. However, that is not the main reason that I object to this section of the amendment. The phrase,

“the functioning of the UK internal market”,

could be interpreted very widely, and there are those in Scotland and, presumably, in Wales who assume that the Government might want to interpret it widely.

We do not have a single market in the UK now; it is variegated, as are the views on the extent to which it needs to be further harmonised or advanced. I wonder whether it would not be better if the Government could drop from their presentation on this dossier, on Brexit and devolution, the references to the UK internal market. There would be very few areas where it needed to be used and they would all be covered by one of the other criteria in the noble and learned Lord’s amendment.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I will pick up what the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, has just said. The criteria set out in this amendment—and in one tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, to which the noble Lord and I both put our names but which was not moved—reflect a set of principles for common UK frameworks agreed at a Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations last October. They are certainly a basis for moving forward and already have a buy-in from the United Kingdom Government and the devolved Administrations in Scotland and Wales.

When creating United Kingdom frameworks, we do not want to find a situation where, when we come out of the European Union, there is something which impedes a Scottish beef producer freely selling their beef in Wales or a Welsh sheep producer selling lamb in Belfast. These benefits predate our entry into the European Common Market. It is also important to remind ourselves that the restrictions on the Scottish Parliament relate not only to reserved matters or EU law, but to what is in Schedule 4 to the Scotland Act. That specifically constrains the Scottish Parliament from doing anything which modifies Articles IV and VI of the Union with Scotland Act 1706 and the Union with England Act 1707. If one reads these two articles of the Acts of Union, drafted 280 years before the Cockfield report, one finds not a bad model, in the language of its time, for a customs union and a single market which have served us well over three centuries.

I also note that as well as the criteria that have been agreed, the Scottish Government themselves, in their legislative consent memorandum to the Scottish Parliament in September last year, said at paragraph 19:

“The Scottish Government has made clear, repeatedly, its willingness to negotiate UK frameworks in certain areas previously covered by EU law. This could be, for example, to support the functioning of UK markets, or to facilitate the management of common environmental resources”.


Therefore, I believe there is a basis for reaching agreements here, but it is important that these are not imposed.

In giving evidence to the Scottish Affairs Committee in the other place last year, the Secretary of State for Scotland, Mr Mundell, stated at paragraph 21 of that committee’s first report of Session 2017-19:

“The Secretary of State for Scotland agreed that any common frameworks should be agreed with the devolved administrations, stating:


A UK framework is not a framework that the UK Government imposes; it is a framework that is agreed across the United Kingdom”.


It is important that we approach this issue with that in mind. That is why I think the amendment suggested and spoken to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, is helpful. Indeed, that Select Committee went on to recommend that:

“Any common framework must require the consent of the governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, where relevant”.


It is important to have a dispute resolution mechanism, as referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, because there is potential for some disagreement in setting up these frameworks—I hope not as much as is sometimes thought—for which a dispute resolution mechanism is required. One assumes that once these frameworks are established—that goes beyond the ambit of this Bill—they will not be static but will develop. It might be useful at some stage—not in this debate or in this Bill—to get an indication from the United Kingdom Government as to how they see these frameworks working after they have been established. Do they want to see common standards apply across the United Kingdom, but have diversity within that as to how they are implemented in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, or in England through the United Kingdom Parliament? That too will require some form of dispute resolution mechanism. The Select Committee, to which I have referred, recommends that,

“the UK Government and the devolved administrations agree a mechanism by which disputes can be resolved in the event that common frameworks cannot be agreed”.

I think that that is a two-stage process. First, there is the establishment of the common frameworks, where the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, is very pertinent, and, as we move forward, there is the issue of how we look at the operation of the common frameworks, which I believe will also need some form of dispute resolution mechanism. However, it is important that we move forward with the common frameworks. The amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, certainly reflects agreements that have already been reached between the United Kingdom Government and the devolved Administrations.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, I wish to add a couple of points. First, are discussions progressing on the possible inclusion in the Bill of a schedule detailing these areas of concern? Secondly, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, said that a solution should be agreed, not imposed. We should heed those words. I again ask the Minister: as regards reaching agreement on these issues, to what extent does he have in mind involving the legislatures rather than just the devolved Governments?

The Minister has had notice of my next point. I would like to correct something that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said in the House last week. He said that there were,

“about 153 areas in which, upon our leaving the EU, competences will return and touch upon areas of devolved competence. These are areas that the devolved parliaments and assemblies previously had no engagement with because they lay in Brussels”.—[Official Report, 21/3/18; col. 334.]

I have since written to him because that it not completely the case. As it works, the memorandum of understanding provides that, in matters of devolved competence, the UK Government consult the devolved Administrations to agree a common UK position on matters before the Council of Ministers, and then defend that position in the Council. Indeed, as we just heard, occasionally devolved Ministers will do that and represent the UK. However, whether it is a UK Minister or a devolved Minister there, they speak in this case for an agreed UK position, not just a UK government position. It may therefore be helpful if the Minister confirms that understanding, which is undoubtedly how the devolved Governments see it. What has been said is right: the spirit to reach accord is there. However, perhaps for clarity, it would be good if that could be confirmed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

What the Minister is saying is encouraging. For the sake of argument, let us take fishing. Have any of these meetings between UK officials and officials from the devolved Administrations involved members of the Scottish Fishermen’s Federation? Stakeholders obviously have a practical view on where some common arrangements are useful and where they are not.

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

I wish I could answer that question in the affirmative, but the answer is no. Before each meeting the devolved Administrations, with the UK Government, have engaged in direct consultation with stakeholders. However, the stakeholders have not been inside the room. None the less, what they bring to the table is very much understood. I develop upon these parts because, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, pointed out, it is important that when we consider the question of agriculture there is no suggestion that, although agriculture itself is one of the headings, everything in agriculture will remain part of that. To some degree, what noble Lords had in their in-boxes, which was simply entitled “Agricultural funding”, was a little unhelpful. Underneath that rests each of the areas where there is expected to be a necessary common framework, and indeed a whole range of areas where there would not need to be a common framework because it would be fully devolved from the get-go. To some degree, there can be a result of some misunderstanding contained in that approach. Again, that is why it is imperative that we examine every single aspect when we have these deep dives, which are ongoing; they have not finished yet.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, it was obvious from contributions at Second Reading and in Committee that this was a particularly thorny and sensitive issue. It is to the credit of the Government and not least to that of the Minister that they have been in listening mode and that a sensible arrangement has been reached. I heard what he said in response to the questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, not least his affirmation of the independence of the judiciary. We have reached a satisfactory point. There is nothing I can usefully add. I will prove the point by not continuing to speak but by resuming my seat.

[Lord Spicer (Con)]

My Lords, I shall give a brief lay man’s perspective. Being brief, I shall follow the advice of the late Cecil Parkinson, who said to after-dinner speakers, “Get up, say you’re very proud to stand before them and sit down”. I shall be a little longer than that, but not very long.

I think that we can all agree on one thing: that pretty well all of us had a fixed view on Brexit before this Bill even reached this House. Tactics is a different matter. I am very interested in the remain tactics so far as the generality of the Bill is concerned; I shall come to the specifics in a moment. They seem to be along the lines of: “We absolutely agree that we are coming out—no, we’re serious; we agree we’re coming out—but we’re coming out to a new single market backed by a strengthened court in such a way that it is quite indiscernible that we have come out in the first place”. This debate is about the court and what part it is going to play in all this. I think that it is generally accepted that the court is not only very powerful but foreign—my noble and learned friend brilliantly summed up the foreignness of the law being introduced—and different. It is based on politics rather than on precedent in law.

I first came to this in 1992. On 3 June of that year, I tabled an Early Day Motion which started the rebellion against the Maastricht treaty, so I have some form. What is the relationship between a debate which was then concerned with the single currency and today’s debate and amendment? There is a close relationship with matters to do with the currency. As Henry VIII recognised, the currency is immensely important. “This Realm of England as an Empire” was all about changing our currency back to gain control over it. The currency is vital, and the question is what the relationship between it and today’s debate is. If we did not come out of the European Union, I would not rely on us retaining our currency and our control over it. It is unimaginable that the European court would decide to run a competitive trading arrangement with the one country left to manage its own economy. It is therefore of enormous importance not only to the future of this country but to this amendment.

We debated earlier whether it counts for anything that we have become so deeply embroiled in foreign law. I suppose that where I differ from lawyers is that I believe that there are things in politics that matter as symbols, even if the lawyers can prove otherwise. It is therefore vital that we kick out Amendment 21 today.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

30A: After Clause 6, insert the following new Clause—
“Equality and discrimination
(1) The purpose of this section is to ensure that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU does not diminish protection for equality in domestic law.(2) Rights under equalities legislation are not to be removed or diminished.(3) In this section “equalities legislation” means the Equality Act 2006, the Equality Act 2010 and subordinate legislation made under either of those Acts.(4) In any proceedings in which a court determines whether a provision of primary legislation is compatible with subsection (2), if the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible it may make a declaration to that effect.(5) Subordinate legislation is not law if and to the extent that it is incompatible with subsection (2).(6) Subsection (5) does not apply to a provision of subordinate legislation if made in the exercise of a power conferred by primary legislation which prevents avoidance or removal of the incompatibility.(7) In any proceedings in which a court determines whether a provision of subordinate legislation is compatible with subsection (2), if the court is satisfied that subsection (6) applies the court may make a declaration of the incompatibility.(8) Section 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (power to take remedial action) applies in relation to a declaration of incompatibility under subsection (4) or (7) of this section as it applies in relation to a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of that Act.(9) Section 19 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (statements of compatibility) applies in relation to compatibility with subsection (2) of this section as it applies in relation to compatibility with the Convention rights.”

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 30A in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett. I know it also enjoys the support of the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. Today’s proceedings on the Report stage of the Bill started with a debate on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and we finish with a debate on equality and rights of a slightly different nature but no less important, albeit that the number of Peers in the Chamber does not quite reflect that. However, that is more likely to do with the time of day.

I put on record my thanks and those of the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, who took time last week to meet us together with an official from the Equality and Human Rights Commission regarding the protection of equality rights after we leave the European Union. It was a constructive meeting but we nevertheless feel that this amendment remains necessary. It is often said that one of the three great promises is, “I am from the Government and I am here to help”. This is the other way around; although we are in opposition, we are here to help the Government. The Government themselves said in last year’s White Paper about what was then referred to as the great repeal Bill, but which has rather diminished in its title since then, that all the protections covered by the Equality Act 2006, the Equality Act 2010 and the equivalent legislation in Northern Ireland will continue to apply once the United Kingdom has left the European Union.

That is what we seek to secure by way of this amendment. The first subsection of the proposed new clause states:

“The purpose of this section is to ensure that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU does not diminish protection for equality in domestic law”.


The equality directives currently provide a set of minimum standards in relation to equality rights, and the requirements of these directives are reflected in the Equality Act 2010. It is fair to say that over the years there have been occasions when the European Union has set minimum standards and UK Governments of various descriptions have gone further than those standards, while on other occasions we have required the European Union, as it were, to push us along in securing equality rights. However, the primacy, as we have it today, of European Union law means that domestic laws implementing EU rights-enhancing directives, including those in the Equality Act 2010, cannot be removed while the UK remains bound by EU law, except by agreement at the EU level.

Those equality directives include the race directive of 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. The framework directive 2000/78 established a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. The gender goods and services directive of 2004 implemented the principle of equal treatment between men and women in access to and supply of goods and services, while the recast gender directive of 2006 saw the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation. In addition to these specific equality directives, also relevant is Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which establishes the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, something that has not been far from the headlines in recent weeks. The directives to which I have referred, together with Article 157, collectively provide a set of minimum standards of protection against discrimination at work on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, sex, religion or belief, age, disability and sexual orientation. The race and gender goods and services directives provide protection against discrimination on the grounds of race and sex in accessing goods and services, while the race directive also extends to social protection and healthcare, social advantages and education. As I have said, the requirements of these directives are reflected in the Equality Act 2010.

However, despite the Government’s political commitment not to reduce these protections after the United Kingdom leaves the European Union, there is nevertheless a risk that without embedding the principle of non-regression within the Bill, these rights could be undermined in the future once the minimum standards set by EU law are no longer binding on the United Kingdom. For example, while the right to equal pay for work of equal value and many of our protections from discrimination cannot be removed while the United Kingdom remains part of the EU, they could be removed after we leave.

This matter was addressed by the Women and Equalities Select Committee in the other place. In its report published last February, the committee concluded that,

“ensuring protections are maintained is not simply a matter of transposing existing EU law. In order to protect rights, the Government needs to take active steps to embed equality into domestic law and policy. The steps we recommend would entrench equality into the UK legal and policy framework and would ensure that the UK retains a strong, undiminished record of equality after it leaves the EU”.

What we see in the Bill is a transposition of existing EU law. The Select Committee said that we had to go further than doing simply that and entrench equality in the United Kingdom legal and policy framework. This amendment was prepared in consultation with the Equality and Human Rights Commission and we believe it does just that by providing that existing rights under the Equality Acts 2006 and 2010 will not be removed or diminished. It sets out two mechanisms to do so, mirroring those in the Human Rights Act 1998, by requiring a Minister to state when new legislation is introduced to Parliament whether it is compatible with the requirement not to reduce existing protections, as well as by allowing UK courts to assess the compatibility of new laws with this requirement. We believe that this is in line with the recommendation in the Women and Equalities Committee’s report that there is a need to empower Parliament and the courts to declare whether legislation is compatible with UK principles of equality.

The proposed new clause would provide equivalent protections for equality rights after exit day as before because it replaces the foundation of the rights currently provided by EU law with an equivalent domestic underpinning. I assure the House that, in drafting the new clause, attention was paid to concerns raised by the Government in Committee about an earlier proposal to create a new, free-standing right to equality. In response to that debate, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, stated:

“The bottom line is that substantive new rights are not consistent with the intended purpose of the Bill, which is about maintaining the same level of protection on the day after exit as before”.—[Official Report, 7/3/18; col. 1168.]


The proposed new clause would maintain equivalent protection for equality rights after exit day by simply replacing the foundation for our equality rights currently provided by EU law with an equivalent underpinning in our domestic law. In doing so, we respect the United Kingdom’s constitutional position by applying the same approach as the Human Rights Act and we respect parliamentary sovereignty because the proposed new clause would limit the role of the court in relation to primary legislation to making a declaration of incompatibility, rather than invalidating or striking down primary legislation, as is currently the case under EU law. In that sense, it is a somewhat weaker underpinning than the current level of protection, but we believe that this approach would strike an appropriate balance between ensuring non-regression of equality rights after we leave the EU and returning control to Parliament to have the final say on our laws after exit day.

Having been a Minister in both the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government, I know that there has to be compatibility in the United Kingdom with the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights; in fact, it is wider in Scotland in that there has to be a declaration of compatibility and being within competence. That focuses Ministers’ minds and, very often, things are changed. No one is saying that a deliberate attempt would be made to undermine what in that case would be human rights but in this case would be equality, but when the tests are applied and people are obliged to look at them, they may find things there that would reduce rights. Therefore, it is a very good test because it ensures that equality rights are not eroded, even through the unintended consequence of a particular provision.

I do not believe that this is fanciful. As a member of the coalition Government between 2010 and 2015, I put my hands up: concerns were expressed that parts of the Red Tape Challenge could have eroded some equality rights during that period. Indeed, in its January review of sex discrimination law, the Fawcett Society stated:

“Without the backstop of the EU … There are good reasons to believe that this presents a real risk to equality legislation. For example, the 2011 Beecroft report, commissioned as part of the ‘Red Tape Challenge’, included proposals to cap discrimination damages awards. This was prevented by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which had ruled in 1993 that damages for sex discrimination could not be limited. That report also proposed a number of other retrograde steps, including opt-outs of equalities requirements for small businesses”.


I commend this proposed new clause to the House. It will send a positive signal that we still wish to be at the forefront of protecting equality rights once we have left the European Union. We seek here a robust underpinning of these equality rights, as currently guaranteed by the European Union. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan]

I thank noble Lords for their time and consideration on the important issue of how we maintain our equality protections as and after we leave the EU. There really is no difference between us in our commitments to these important issues. Amendment 30A, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, follows on from the debate we had in Committee in that it seeks to reflect in statute the political commitment that the Government have already made in this area—that is, that we will maintain the existing protections in and under the Equality Acts 2006 and 2010 after our exit from the EU.

I must, however, be clear with the noble and learned Lord that we have three concerns about his suggested approach. First, there is the issue of language, context and potential for conflicting rights. Put simply, the language of a political commitment does not translate to the statute book. Therefore, let me say to my good noble friend Lord Cashman that while our commitment to existing equality protections works perfectly well politically—we are committed to them here and in the wider world outside this place—it must be noted that terms such as “protection” and “diminish” do not have a sufficiently clear and precise meaning for the purposes of statute. As a consequence, the amendment runs a very real risk of creating tensions for real people, with real interests that may be difficult to resolve between existing and potential future rights that we may wish to legislate for.

To give an example, noble Lords may be familiar with the experiences on buses of some passengers who use wheelchairs, and the difficulty that they have sometimes had in accessing the space theoretically available to them when it has been taken by people, often parents with young children in pushchairs. The question arises as to whose rights take priority, especially as, arguably, both parties are covered by “protected characteristics” provided for in the Equality Act 2010. This particular example of potentially conflicting rights is being resolved, following a court judgment that passengers who use wheelchairs have priority. However, I trust this helps illustrate the risk of future developments in equality law being, in effect, struck down in the courts because, while they might benefit certain groups, these benefits might come at the expense of rights in retained EU law secured under this Bill. As has been noted, the Equality Act 2010 is lengthy, detailed and specific in order to avoid questions of competing or conflicting rights. Setting it in stone against any future equality issues we or future Governments may wish to provide for runs fundamentally against the grain of the Act and our developing and dynamic approach to equality rights in this country.

Our second concern is closely related in that we fear this new clause would create considerable legal uncertainty. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord has recognised this by including proposed subsections (4) and (7) which describe what a court may do when faced with an issue of the compatibility or otherwise of new provisions and existing equality rights. I hope he will understand when I say that, especially in the context of our exit from the EU, we think it is vital to keep to an absolute minimum any legal uncertainties that may arise for the good of businesses and individuals, so a new clause that seems positively to embrace such uncertainty is not an attractive prospect. It is not at all clear what businesses or individuals are supposed to make of any rights and obligations that might apply to them pending the emergence of the case law that the new clause anticipates.

Finally, there is the relationship between the proposed new clause and the Human Rights Act 1998, the architecture of which reflects the existence of the European convention. The noble and learned Lord’s text uses key concepts from the HRA, notably declarations of incompatibility and their consequences, and proposed subsections (8) and (9) directly cross-refer to sections of the HRA. This simply is not appropriate. Indeed, at the risk of echoing my earlier point, we believe these linkages would lead to uncertainty and confusion. There is, for example, no explanation of what the effect of declaration of incompatibility would be in this context. Would the primary legislation continue to have effect or not? There is clearly potential for gaps and contradictions to develop between challenges and actions based on the new clause as opposed to the HRA and its existing reference to the prohibition of discrimination under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

I have already alluded to our clear public commitment to maintaining existing equality protections, and I am very happy to repeat that commitment now. While I understand the noble and learned Lord’s best intentions in this area, I must gently suggest to him that the interests of equality rights on our statute book are not well served by his proposed new clause and I hope that he will feel able to withdraw it. For the avoidance of any doubt, the Government will not be reflecting further on this matter, so if he wishes to do so, he should test the opinion of the House this evening.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The Minister should not tempt me. I am grateful to him for his reply, which was probably a bit more substantive than ministerial replies to the previous two debates, although it was, equally predictably, negative.

I do not think that the Minister’s arguments bear too much scrutiny. He complained about the language used in my amendment and said that it is difficult to put a political commitment on to a statutory basis. He was challenged by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. If the wording here is not right, what are the Government proposing to do to give underpinning? I do not think that at any point in reply to this debate did the Minister indicate that there is no need for a proper underpinning of the equality rights we have. Indeed, given the Government’s commitment to maintaining them, one assumes that the Government believe that they should continue and be underpinned. If the wording proposed is not right, there is a deafening silence from the Government’s side about what words they would use. The Minister raised the declaration of incompatibility and whether that meant striking down. I think I made it clear, as did the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, that we do not mean striking down. What we seek in this amendment is to make it consistent with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty after we leave the European Union.

It is said that the clause conflicts with the Human Rights Act. I confess that my party and I have argued many times for a written constitution for the United Kingdom, but we are always told that one of the benefits of the unwritten constitution is its flexibility. So we introduced into our constitution a Human Rights Act with some very good provisions; the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, indicated some of the focus of attention and consideration that that Act places upon Ministers when they consider compatibility. If we have that, what is wrong? What is the constitutional fault in using that good practice to extend into another area where we are talking about something fundamental?

That is the concluding point because this is a fundamental question. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, reflected on what kind of country we want to be. The Government set out in their White Paper last March that they want to respect and cherish equality rights. There is common ground on that. What we have not seen from the Government is a way in which they can ensure that that is underpinned as we go forward, so that we can ensure that that characteristic of what kind of country we want to be can be maintained without threat. I find it very regrettable but the night is a bit too late to test the opinion of the House, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 30A withdrawn.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Report: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd May 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, we are dealing here with truly technical amendments to ensure that the provisions of the Bill deliver the intended policy. They achieve two things. The first is to clarify how the requirement for regulations made by devolved Ministers under Schedule 2 to be within devolved competence interacts with the principle of severance applied by the courts.

The normal practice would be that when a Minister makes regulations that include, for instance, 10 different provisions, should one of those provisions be outwith the scope of the power, the courts would not strike down the regulations as a whole, they would simply sever the offending provision and allow the remaining nine provisions to stand as law. Some concerns were raised that the requirements in the Bill might imply that this standard practice should not occur. The amendments therefore make it clear that when a provision is outside devolved competence, only that provision would be ultra vires and not the whole instrument in which the provision is included.

The second purpose of the amendments is to allow for a devolved Minister and a UK Minister acting jointly to make provision that would not be in the competence of the devolved Minister acting alone. It has always been the Government’s intention that the Schedule 2 powers can be exercised jointly to allow us to work together in areas where we may need to make the same or related changes to retained EU law and so that, where appropriate, those changes can be subject to formal scrutiny and approval in both this Parliament and the relevant devolved legislature.

We believe it is right that, for instance, where a UK Minister and a Welsh Minister jointly make regulations in relation to a matter that concerns the England/Wales border, those regulations can include both the provision for England and the provision for Wales, even though it would not be within the Welsh Minister’s competence to make the provision in relation to England if they were acting alone.

We will also be bringing forward at Third Reading a number of further drafting changes to permit combinations of instruments beyond what is normally possible, reflecting the level of joint working that will be needed in relation to these powers. I will be speaking to the Government’s Clause 11 amendments shortly, when we reach the group beginning Amendment 89DA. I am sure noble Lords will appreciate that we have a number of further groups to get through on other parts of the devolution provisions before we reach that debate. The amendments provide what I hope to be welcome legal clarity. They reflect standard practice and the mechanisms for good, collaborative joint working between the Administrations. I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his explanation of these technical amendments. Can he say whether there is agreement among the devolved Administrations and the UK Government on these amendments?

[Lord Griffiths of Burry Port (Lab)]

My Lords, at last we have reached this stage, although I find it a little off-putting that we are coming to consequential, technical matters before we look at the meaty issue; but that will come, as was said.

I would like to pay the respects of those on our Benches to the serious way in which the Government have contributed through the joint ministerial group to the success of the proposals, and thank them for bringing them to us now. I would also like to thank Mark Drakeford from the Welsh Government and Mike Russell from the Scottish Government for the part they played, even if the latter has thus far been unable formally to sign up to the inter-governmental process. As the Minister said, we are going to discuss Clause 11 and neither of us can wait for that. It is coming in more detail later this evening. However, we on these Benches recognise and appreciate the progress that has been made. We have come a long way since the Bill was published and it is against that backdrop that this and subsequent groups of amendments should be considered.

The Labour Party has always been the party of devolution. While we will be watching the Government’s treatment of the devolved Administrations very closely throughout the Brexit process—that is our job—we recognise the genuine progress that has been made and welcome the amendments in this group. They allow United Kingdom and devolved Ministers jointly to exercise powers in Schedule 2 in order to make provisions that could not be made by a devolved Minister acting alone. This clarifies the use of so-called composite instruments, as the Minister said, and we hope paves the way for collaborative working between the devolved Administrations and the UK Government.

Other amendments in the group improve the position regarding ultra vires provision within instruments made under Schedule 2. I believe that the devolved Administrations previously raised concerns with the Government as to whether the courts would permit those parts of an instrument that were within competence to remain law. We are glad that Ministers and officials have responded positively to the appeals from the devolved bodies and that the amendments provide greater clarity for all involved. The group amounts to just one piece in the jigsaw puzzle. I usually start my jigsaws with the edge pieces. This looks like putting a piece in the middle and working around it in due course. It is a piece that these Benches are happy to support.

--- Later in debate ---

Tabled by

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

89: Schedule 2, page 17, line 35, at end insert—
“( ) No regulations may be made under this Part after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day.”

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, since submitting this amendment, I note that Clause 7(8) covers the point and therefore I do not wish to move it.

A89 not moved.

--- Later in debate ---

It would be a great help if the Minister could say, if he is able, that we are dealing with a one-off, special situation that lies outside the structure of those sections, and that for that reason he is taking the line that it is a type A and not a type C case. Perhaps he could give an assurance that if we are dealing with something that is precisely covered by Section 30 and the other sections I have mentioned, the system laid down by the Scotland Act 1998 will be adhered to. An assurance of that kind will, I hope, give some comfort to those on the other side of the discussion and reassure them that they are talking about a special situation, which need not in any way cast doubt on the future relationship between the devolved system and the Westminster Government when we come to other debates on how the systems that were set up by the 1998 Act might be modified. Against that background, which I hope has set the scene sufficiently, I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I will return to the points on the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, but first I endorse what has been said by everyone who has contributed to this debate so far—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—in expressing gratitude, if that is the right word, to those who have laboured hard to try to move forward and get an agreement on the kind of structure we need for when EU law is, as it were, repatriated. I think there is common ground that the original Clause 11 proposals were not fit for purpose; that has been said on many occasions, and I will not rehearse all the arguments for that now. It is to the credit of the Government that they recognise that and have sought to address it —unfortunately, some valuable time was lost, but nevertheless they have done that in a constructive way. Indeed, I am grateful to both Mark Drakeford of the Welsh Government and Mike Russell of the Scottish Government for their efforts. What has been brought before us represents a considerable advance with much better arrangements for dealing with retained EU law after exit day. It is regrettable that the Scottish Government did not feel able to sign up, notwithstanding the considerable advances that had been made. One or two people have speculated that, if one is not satisfied with what the Government are doing, there may be an argument for voting it down. I pointed out that if you did that, we would be left with Clause 11, which no one seems to think we should give any house room to any longer. However, the progress made is welcome.

I listened carefully to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said when he moved his amendment. I have been trying to work through it, because something about it was not quite right. It may be just my approach. He quite rightly drew attention to the fact that the “type A” Order in Council procedure is deployed when changes are to be made in the competence of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Ministers, and specifically where there is a change to Schedule 5, which defines what is reserved, and to the restrictions which are currently set out in Schedule 4. Where I possibly have a difficulty is that of course these are not the only two restrictions; the noble and learned Lord himself pointed out that EU law, and for that matter the European Convention on Human Rights, is another restriction, as indeed is territoriality. As he acknowledged, we are dealing with a situation that was never foreseen when the Scotland Act was being drafted and taken through both Houses back in 1998, and that is a situation where, potentially, the restriction on the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament —namely, that it must abide by European Union law —will fly off, and we will be in what might be described as a sui generis situation. The question is whether the procedure which is for modification of Schedule 4 or 5 is appropriate for this one-off situation.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Duke of Montrose (Con)]

My Lords, there is a provision in Section 29 of the Scotland Act that covers the thing that worries the noble and learned Lord. Section 29(2)(a) provides that it is outside the competence of the Scottish Government to apply,

“part of the law of a country or territory other than Scotland, or confer or remove functions exercisable otherwise than in or as regards Scotland”.

So this raises a great problem in the area he is talking about.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, if an Act of Parliament gives the Scottish Parliament power to say no and refuse its consent, what I am asking is whether that affects what might happen in other parts of the United Kingdom, so that you would not be able to get the common UK framework which people might otherwise think is necessary and desirable to be able to sustain a single market within these islands. At the moment, we have to some extent a form of competence at a different level—the European level—which is being brought back down to the United Kingdom. I ask these questions because it possibly means that there is a difference between the procedure which has been used if you wish to modify Schedule 5 or change Schedule 4 and one where we are returning the laws which hitherto have been subject to the European Union.

The amendments in my name, which I know are supported by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, are Amendment 89DAF in respect of Scotland, Amendment 89DAJ in respect of Wales and Amendment 89 DAK in respect of Northern Ireland. These amendments would, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, indicated, change the sunset—although it is not really a sunset in this respect—overall from seven years to five years, and they do that by changing the period during which the frameworks must be established from five years to three years. I did not seek to change the two-year period during which these orders have to be made, because that is consistent with other provisions in the Bill.

If my understanding of the situation is correct, if an order is not made that would identify the area for a framework and freeze, the power would automatically flow back to, let us say in this case, Edinburgh. Is it therefore to be expected that all these orders will be made, identifying the areas for freezing to establish common frameworks by the time we leave the European Union? Otherwise, it might appear that, within a period of days, weeks or months between our leaving the European Union and the order being made, there could be divergence between the different parts of the United Kingdom. After the order is made, I suggest that there should be a three-year period for the frameworks to be established rather than a five-year period.

I welcome the fact that time limits have been put in at all—that was a step forward, and the Government have obviously been listening on that. But I have not heard why it should be five years rather than three. That figure may have been plucked out of the air. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, is not in his place, but he did have an amendment in Committee in which five was suggested. It may be that that commended itself to the Government because it came from the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. I would like to hear a rationale as to why five years is to be preferred to three. The noble and learned Lord said that they had agreement from the Welsh Government on this. It would be interesting to hear the Minister’s views on whether the Welsh Government thought that a shorter period of time would be ideal but they were prepared to accept this.

No one disputes the amount of work to be done but we are potentially in a Parkinson’s law situation, where work expands to fill the time available for its completion. If we say five years, it could take up to five years; if we say three years, it would focus the mind and we could possibly do it in three. That is not least because we are dealing with dynamic issues, and if we are to freeze retained EU law in areas where there might be need to update the law—I assume that in these circumstances we would seek to do so by agreement—three years would allow progress to be made faster.

Also in this group is Amendment 90, which again provides a sunset. However, I think it is superseded by what we are debating and so I will not seek to press it. But it is important that the Government give us a rationale as to why they have chosen this period of time.

On a very specific point, Amendment 92AD—on page 19 of the Marshalled List—talks about the reporting that is to be made by Ministers to Parliament:

“After the end of each reporting period, a Minister of the Crown must lay before each House of Parliament a report which … (b) explains how principles … (i) agreed between Her Majesty’s Government and any of the appropriate authorities, and (ii) relating to implementing any arrangements which are to replace any relevant powers or retained EU law restrictions, have been taken into account”.

I rather suspect that these are the principles that were agreed at the Joint Ministerial Committee back in October or November, which have certainly been discussed before. However, it is slightly odd to have reference to “principles” which, as far as I can see, will not actually appear in the Bill. Because we have debated this often enough, we perhaps know what the principles are, or at least know where they can be found, but to anyone coming to this fresh it would not necessarily indicate where these principles are. Will the Minister confirm that these are the principles that are being referred to—the ones agreed at the Joint Ministerial Committee—and explain whether there is any reason that they should not be added as an annexe to the Bill?

In conclusion, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, quoted a letter from the First Minister, which was very measured in its terms—slightly more measured than her writings in last week’s Sunday Herald, in which she said that the Tories would “completely demolish” Scottish devolution. I immediately thought of the many debates we had during the passage of the Scotland Act 2016, in which the Conservative Government extended devolution to cover almost all of income tax and a substantial amount of social security. This could be a very cunning plan, if they assume that the Scottish Government will—I was going to say “screw it up”, but I am not sure whether that is parliamentary—act in such a way that it would end devolution, but I do not think that that was the plan. This Government have shown a very strong commitment—and I say this from the opposition Benches—through the number of things that they have devolved to the Scottish Parliament. Take one example from the 24:

“EU regulations on the classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (CLP); the placing on the market and use of biocidal products (e.g. rodenticides); the export and import of hazardous chemicals; the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH); and plant protection products (e.g. pesticides)”.


I cannot honestly believe that trying to establish a common framework on that somehow undermines devolution, given that the Government transferred, almost entirely, income tax to the Scottish Parliament. It is a degree of hype that does not serve the debate well.

I rather hope that, as we go forward, we can recognise that what we are trying to do is seek a position so that, when we are no longer part of the European Union, we can in many important areas where it is thought necessary—indeed, the Scottish Government have accepted that in some areas it is necessary—establish a common framework throughout the United Kingdom. There will be further arguments as to the content of these frameworks, but for the moment we need to identify what they are. I would welcome a response to the points that I have made.

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, in addressing Amendment 89DA, I will, as did the Minister, cover the broader ground contained in the amendments in the group. Some of my misgivings with the new proposed settlement dealt with in this group will arise in later amendments, 91 and 92, which for some reason have not been coupled with these.

While I welcome the progress that was made in the joint discussions on resolving some of the difficulties between Westminster and the devolved Governments—a welcome that has been expressed by both Mike Russell of the Scottish Government and Mark Drakeford, Wales’ Brexit Minister—I am acutely aware that not all the difficulties were resolved, and I beg the indulgence of the House for a few minutes in setting these issues in their context. I realise that some of my points may seem to be Second Reading ones, but in these amendments—there are 21 in this group alone—we have matters before us which were not in the Bill at Second Reading. I noted in particular the Minister’s invitation in his speech for us to contribute positive ideas in this context.

The adjustments before us tonight are in the context of what many people in Cardiff and Edinburgh, across party lines, regarded as a power grab—to use the term that was used then—by Westminster, in taking unto themselves powers returning from Brussels, including powers in what had previously been regarded as devolved functions such as agriculture. The fact that the Labour Government in Cardiff held out so long before agreeing reflected that fear; as did the fact that members of all parties in the Assembly—including initially Tory and UKIP AMs—supported having a continuity Bill to withstand that perceived power grab. The recent debate in Edinburgh reflected similar cross-party support for its continuity Bill. Rather than just scream “power grab” and hurl abuse at those we see as the authors of our difficulties, I will try to put forward what I see as a considered case and implore, even at this late stage in the Bill’s passage, that noble Lords appreciate the complexity of these issues—some of which have already emerged tonight—and rise to the challenge of finding a positive way forward, if not in this Bill then in some parallel or future legislation.

There have been calls from all sides for greater mutual respect in this process—for a mutuality that is not reflected by one side having a veto but other partners being denied that facility. The difficulty, repeated time after time by those involved in the recent negotiations over several months, is that there seems to be a basic lack of trust between Westminster and the devolved regimes. That is not so much a personal lack of trust but rather a lack of trust in the respective institutions.

Part of the lack of trust felt in Wales arises, perhaps, from different social values and from historic experience. There has been a growing lack of trust in Wales during my lifetime, emanating from difficult issues such as the Tryweryn Valley flooding in the 1960s, the S4C debacle of 1980 and, more recently, the Barnett formula. Devolution was meant to help avoid at least some such difficulties, but power devolved is power retained—a truism of which we have become acutely aware in these recent experiences. The underlying issues, which recent difficulties in the context of Brexit have highlighted, are not going to go away. They will continue to plague us until a proper constitutional settlement is reached. I suggest that the sunset clauses define a timescale within which this has to be sorted out.

In the wake of Brexit, the sorts of issues that will arise, and which will strain our constitutional settlement, perhaps to breaking point, include for Wales state aid for threatened industries like steel, the establishment in place of the CAP of a viable sheep-meat regime, and an acceptance that procurement rules can be used to ensure maximum community benefit from public expenditure. Sheep meat is an excellent example of the different perspectives of Westminster and Cardiff. Westminster tends to see it in terms of consumer needs; the Assembly sees it as the cornerstone of our rural economy and of local communities and their attendant culture. Quite frankly, I do not begin to see such considerations being addressed, and if Westminster insists on having a veto over such policies as agriculture, it will be seen as a constraint on devolved ambitions. There has to be give and take or the whole edifice will crumble under the strain of its own self-inflicted tensions. We are in fact trying to constrain the needs of a quasi-federal system within the straitjacket of a unitary state, and it just will not work; four into one will not go.

--- Later in debate ---

Of course, there may be a situation in which, after exit, regulations have not been made, in which case powers will then—

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

It seems that we have an explanation. Were officials of the Scottish Government involved in that and, if in-depth work has been done, would the Minister help the House by publishing it?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not in a position to say that such work would be published, because of course it has been on the basis of engagement between officials dealing with this. I do not believe that there is any official report to that effect; it is just a matter of the product of engagement between officials negotiating these matters. Therefore I cannot indicate that we will publish anything in that regard. That is to try to explain the position with regard to the sunset clauses in the regulations. I turn to the question—

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

Report: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I am pleased to move this group of amendments as the final piece—to use the analogy of the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths—of the devolution jigsaw puzzle in this Bill. The amendments in this group all relate, in different ways, to the scrutiny that the devolved legislatures will apply to the delegated powers for devolved Ministers in Schedules 2 and 4 to the Bill.

It is right that in conferring powers on devolved Ministers, the Bill should also provide for how they will be scrutinised. It would be irresponsible not to do that. We cannot confer powers and then make no provision for legislative scrutiny whatever. However, the Government recognise that the scrutiny of powers is ultimately a question for the legislature undertaking that scrutiny and the Administration being scrutinised. That is why the Bill consciously preserves the competence of the devolved legislatures, under the respective devolution statutes, to amend those parts of the Bill that make provision for scrutiny of devolved delegated powers. It is why we have sought the views of the legislatures and the devolved Administrations on the appropriate scrutiny arrangements, and these amendments reflect that engagement.

Amendments 69D, 72ZC, 78C and 115A allow for the “made affirmative” urgent scrutiny procedure to be used by devolved Ministers making regulations under their Schedule 2 powers. This was not included in the Bill as originally drafted because it is not a standard procedure in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. However, we have confirmed with the devolved institutions that this procedure is acceptable and that it should be available to devolved Ministers for the same reasons of urgency as it will be available to UK Ministers. These amendments will achieve that.

Amendments 69C, 70C and 77E provide for the “sifting committee” procedure to apply for negative procedure instruments laid by Welsh Ministers under their Schedule 2 powers. The National Assembly for Wales and the Welsh Government have both confirmed that this procedure should apply to the Welsh Ministers. These amendments would therefore apply the same procedure as currently applies in the Bill to UK Ministers.

Noble Lords will appreciate that there are very specific arrangements for committees in the Northern Ireland Assembly and this relates to the structures of power-sharing within the Northern Ireland devolution settlement. In that context it would not be appropriate for this procedure to apply, so we have not included it in the Bill. The Scottish Government have informed us that they and the Scottish Parliament wish to apply some form of sifting arrangement to the Schedule 2 power. However, their intention is to undertake this by means of their own legislation. As I have said, the Bill preserves the competence of the Scottish Parliament to legislate on this matter.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, I want to clarify what the Minister has just said. When she said that the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament wish to do it by their own legislation, is that their Continuity Bill, which is currently before the Supreme Court? If it is, what happens if the Supreme Court strikes it down, or maybe some other piece of legislation they bring forward?

[Baroness Goldie]

That is a reference to this Bill preserving the competence of the Scottish Parliament to legislate on that matter. I understand that it would have to make legislation within the competence of the Parliament. As the noble and learned Lord will be aware, the UK Government question the competence of the continuity legislation. That, therefore, as far as I am aware, is a completely separate issue and not what I was referring to.

Amendments 83KA, 83P, 83LA, 83MA and 112B require the Scottish Ministers to make the same explanatory statements when exercising the powers, under this Bill or when amending regulations made under Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act, that UK Ministers must make when exercising their powers. I will not stray into greater detail on each of these statements, as we have debated them at length already. I will, for the sake of clarity, remind noble Lords that this obligation to explain comprises seven elements. The first is a “good reasons” statement; the second is an equalities statement; the third is a statement explaining the purpose and effect on retained EU law of the instrument; the fourth is a statement of urgency when using the made affirmative procedure; the fifth is a “good reasons” statement when using any delegated powers to amend ECA Section 2(2) regulations; the sixth is, where appropriate, a statement of the “good reasons” for creating a criminal offence, and of the sentence attached; and the final one is, where appropriate, a statement to explain why sub-delegation of the power is appropriate. As is the case where a UK Minister sub-delegates the powers, there will also be a duty on the authority to which the power is delegated to then lay before the Scottish Parliament an annual report on the exercise of the sub-delegated power, if exercised that year.

Finally, Amendment 83AC makes a straightforward provision to clarify that the duties on UK Ministers to make explanatory statements when exercising powers under the Bill will apply when exercising the Schedule 2 powers jointly with a devolved Minister. A purpose of joint exercise will allow greater scrutiny by requiring instruments to be considered by this Parliament and the relevant devolved legislature. It would not, therefore, be correct for Parliament to receive less information in relation to the instrument than it would have received if the UK Minister had been acting alone, and this amendment clarifies that this will not be the case. The duty will not extend to devolved Ministers, but the statements, as with the instrument, will be the joint product of both Administrations. The statements, in being made available to Parliament, will also therefore be available to the devolved legislatures, and the relevant devolved Administration can choose whether to lay this alongside the joint instrument.

I hope that noble Lords will recognise these amendments for what they are: they are positively the product of our continued and sincere engagement with the devolved institutions. I also hope that your Lordships will welcome the steps this takes to respond to calls in this House and in other places for greater scrutiny of delegated powers. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I support the amendments moved and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Low. He set out the case extensively as to why these amendments should be made. I also echo his thanks to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, for discussing them with us in what I found to be a useful and constructive meeting.

The first point I wish to raise is in relation to Amendment 83A, which seeks to take out the reference to,

“section 7(1), 8 or 9”,

and insert “this Act”. Can the Minister clarify in responding whether the Government’s Amendments 83AA, 83AB and 83AC will meet the purpose of that amendment? Our main concern had been that the original Bill, as it stood, put requirements on the Government with regard to what would have been Sections 7(1), 8 or 9—although Clause 8 has now been dropped from the Bill—but we were also concerned that Clause 17 had wide powers, to which the requirements under this part of Schedule 7 did not apply. It would appear that Amendment 83AB extends to Clause 17(1), which I think would go a long way, and Amendment 83AC to other parts in Schedule 2. I seek confirmation that that would now include all parts of the Bill when it becomes an Act, as in our amendment, which might be relevant to the requirements made under paragraph 22 of Schedule 7.

I make a further point in relation to Amendment 83E, which would require the Government—or the Minister in tabling regulations—to be,

“satisfied that it does not remove or diminish any protection provided by or under equalities legislation”.

As the noble Lord, Lord Low, indicated, the origin of much of this is a report from the Women and Equalities Select Committee in the other place which recommended that the Bill should explicitly commit to maintaining current levels of equality protection. In response, the Government tabled amendments in the Commons, the effect of which is that the Minister has to make a statement that,

“so far as required to do so by equalities legislation”,

the Minister had,

“had due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under the Equality Act 2010”.

That merely repeated what was already a matter of law, so it did not take us much further. This amendment would require the Minister to make a much wider statement that the proposed regulation,

“does not remove or diminish any protection provided by or under equalities legislation”.

I understand that that is the Government’s intention. It is their politically declared intention, and this amendment makes that a requirement.

When we discussed this with the Minister we agreed that the fact that Ministers are required to make statements under Section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act focuses ministerial minds on whether a provision is compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights. We are saying here that, in terms of equalities legislation, ministerial minds should be focused when regulations are being brought forward so there is no diminution in any protection that it provides. That does not mean that there is a deliberate intent by the Government to diminish equalities legislation but means that people have to think about equality protection in bringing forward regulations, check right through and make sure that what is being done lives up to commitments that have been made. I cannot see any reason why Governments should be afraid of or concerned about this amendment. It merely seeks to give effect to the commitment that has already been made.

As the noble Lord, Lord Low, indicated, when we debated my Amendment 30, one of the objections of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, was that the word “protection” did not have any statutory basis and therefore was not appropriate. He was possibly not aware that the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 provides as one of the preconditions for the exercise of delegated powers under that Act that a provision,

“does not remove any necessary protection”,

so there is already a statutory basis for what we are proposing in this amendment, and therefore I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Low.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased to be able to speak in support of these amendments, to which I have added my name, especially as I was unable to speak in support of similar amendments in Committee because of another commitment. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, for his perseverance on this important issue. When I read the report of the Committee’s proceedings, I was pleased to note the warm words from the Minister, including his acknowledgment that the amendment looks very much like stated government policy, although he qualified that by arguing that the language of political commitment does not necessarily lend itself to the equalities statute book.

I am sure that no one would quarrel with that as a general proposition, but the body charged by Parliament with advising the Government on the equality and human rights implications of proposed legislation has drafted this amendment carefully to guard against such a weakness. I repeat the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness—that in particular the Minister objected to the use of the term “protection”, yet the EHRC points out that the term can be found in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 with regard to the use of delegated powers under that Act. It requires that a Minister must be satisfied that a provision,

“does not remove any necessary protection”.

Does that sound familiar? I imagine that is why the EHRC drafted this amendment in those terms.

The Minister also promised to take away for further consideration the point about the scope of the public sector equality duty, raised by the noble Lord, Lord Low, and also mentioned earlier today. The Minister described it as a constructive suggestion in order to bring further clarity to these parts of the Bill. It was thus very disappointing not to find the government amendment that would have brought this clarity, and I trust the Minister will explain why. I hope he will respond in particular to the EHRC’s injunction that:

“This must be rectified to ensure clarity and compliance with existing statutory duties”,


as the noble Lord, Lord Low, quoted earlier.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Callanan]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Low, for his time and consideration on the important issue of how we maintain our equality protections as and after we leave the EU. I appreciate the discussions on this topic that he has had with the Bill officials and my ministerial colleagues. Before addressing the noble Lord’s Amendments 83A and 83E, the Government have reflected on our conversations with him, and today tabled amendments that will extend the statements regarding the Equality Act under Schedule 7 to SIs made under the consequential power in Clause 17(1).

This and other amendments we debated in Committee have sought to reflect in statute the political commitment that the Government have already made in this area—we will maintain the existing protections in and under the Equality Acts 2006 and 2010 after our exit from the EU. Following requests for assurances on this point in the debate in the other place, we tabled an amendment that will secure transparency in this area by requiring ministerial Statements about the amendment made to the Equality Acts by every piece of secondary legislation made under key delegated powers in this Bill.

The statements will, in effect, flag up any amendments made to the Equality Acts, and secondary legislation made under those Acts, while ensuring that Ministers confirm in developing their draft legislation that they have had due regard for the need to eliminate discrimination and other conduct prohibited under the 2010 Act.

As previously stated, the language of a political commitment does not translate to the statute book. So while our commitment to existing equality protections works perfectly well politically, and indeed in the wider world outside this place, these terms do not and could not have a sufficiently clear and precise meaning for the purposes of statute. These statements as tabled in the other place—

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The Minister is repeating what he said in response to my Amendment 30. It was pointed out by me and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, that the word “protection” has a statutory basis in the 2006 legislation.

[Lord Callanan]

I heard the point that the noble and learned Lord makes, but we are talking about the statements generally.

These statements, as tabled in the other place, applied only to Clauses 7(1), 8 and 9. The Government did not include other powers in this Bill because they are much more tightly constrained than those powers, and their exercise should not give rise to any amendments to the Equality Acts or any harassment, discrimination or other conduct prohibited under the Equality Act 2010. However, we have, as I said, reflected on this, and held discussions with the noble Lord, and we are happy to extend these statements to the consequential power in Clause 17(1). I hope that this will satisfy the noble Lord and that it will enable him to withdraw his amendment. However, this is not a matter on which we will be reflecting further before Third Reading. If he wishes to test the opinion of the House, he should do so now.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Wallace of Tankerness Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 9 in my name. The Bill was substantially amended on Report with regard to the devolution dimension. Among other things, what one might describe as confidence-building measures were put in to ensure that Ministers, having given certain undertakings with regard to how they would exercise their powers to make regulations, would do that and would regularly report to Parliament to ensure that it was being done in good faith.

The reports have to be done on a three-monthly basis: the first report certainly has to be done three months after the date when the Act is passed and:

“Each successive period of three months after the first reporting period is a reporting period”.


That report must explain how,

“principles …agreed between Her Majesty’s Government and any of the appropriate authorities, and … relating to implementing any arrangements which are to replace any relevant powers or retained EU law restrictions, have been taken into account during the reporting period”.

That is fair enough as far as it goes, but it does not give much colour or substance as to what these principles are.

My concern, which I raised on Report, was that there was insufficient detail as to the principles. However, I asked whether the principles referred to were those agreed at the Joint Ministerial Committee,

“back in October or November, which have certainly been discussed before. However, it is slightly odd to have reference to ‘principles’ which, as far as I can see, will not actually appear in the Bill. Because we have debated this often enough, we perhaps know what the principles are, or at least know where they can be found, but to anyone coming to this fresh it would not necessarily indicate where these principles are”.—[Official Report, 2/5/18; col. 2141.]

I asked the Minister if he would confirm that the principles were indeed those agreed in the communique of the Joint Ministerial Committee.

The noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland said in his response:

“Noble Lords will recollect that, at the Joint Ministerial Committee in October last year, the principles to be applied were agreed by all those attending: the Welsh Government, the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government. I just add in response to a point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, that where he finds reference in the amendments to ‘principles’, that refers to the principles that were agreed at that stage and are carried over in the agreements”.—[Official Report, 2/5/18; col. 2164.]


I hope we have established common ground that the principles referred to are indeed those agreed and set out in the communique of 16 October 2017 from the Joint Ministerial Committee on European Negotiations. I am very grateful that the Printed Paper Office has made available copies of that communique for noble Lords to read.

I will not read it all out ad longum but it is worth noting that they are principles that relate to where common frameworks need to be established. They have to do so to,

“enable the functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy divergence … ensure compliance with international obligations … ensure the UK can negotiate, enter into and implement new trade agreements and international treaties … enable the management of common resources … administer and provide access to justice in cases with a cross-border element”,

and

“safeguard the security of the UK”.

It also says that when frameworks are to be established they,

“will respect the devolution settlements and the democratic accountability of the devolved legislatures, and will therefore … be based on established conventions and practices … maintain as a minimum, equivalent flexibility for tailoring policies to the specific needs of each territory as is afforded by current EU rules … lead to a significant increase in decision-making powers for the devolved administrations”.

In addition, and this has occupied many hours of debate in your Lordships’ House as this Bill has gone through:

“Frameworks will ensure recognition of the economic and social linkages between Northern Ireland and Ireland and that Northern Ireland will be the only part of the UK that shares a land frontier with the EU. They will also adhere to the Belfast Agreement”.


These are not insignificant principles. In fact, I think they are very important. If the Bill is going to be complete —people coming to the Bill should not necessarily have to try to work out where these principles are to be found—in the interests of having a tidy statute book these principles should at least be there by reference. I cannot readily see an objection to that, given that there is an understanding what these principles are. They are not to the exclusion of other things that might be agreed by the UK Government and the devolved Governments but at least they are a starting point. I hope the amendment will commend itself to the Government because it is entirely consistent with their policy.

In passing, I refer to the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and wonder if that were accepted for Wales, it would help find an agreement in Scotland, if it was also applied to Scotland. I suspect it might not go as far as the Scottish Government want because it does not give them the requirement for consent. It says:

“A Minister of the Crown will not normally lay a draft,”


unless such consent had been given. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord will respond to this. Unlike Section 28(8) of the Scotland Act 1998 and the equivalent provision in the Government of Wales Act which says that Parliament will not normally legislate in primary legislation, here we are dealing with Ministers. I assume that if Ministers are laying regulations, they could be subject to judicial review in a way in which a decision of Parliament would not be. That might give further encouragement to the Scottish Parliament that its concerns have been listened to. In responding, the Minister might also just take the opportunity to indicate the Government’s position in relation to the vote of the Scottish Parliament yesterday.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, to follow what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, has just said, the Minister may remember that I raised how to deal with the Sewel convention in relation to delegated legislation on several occasions in Committee, in dealing with what is now to be found in Clauses 9 and 11 of the Bill as it is printed for this stage of the proceedings. My recollection is that my points were dealt with by assurances from Ministers that the Sewel convention principles would apply to the making of delegated legislation in the context of both Clauses 9 and 11.

I do not have down an amendment in the same terms as that proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in relation to Wales because I can assume, I think, that the same principle would apply to the corresponding provision for Scotland earlier in the same clause, and no doubt to Northern Ireland as well. For my part, I would be content if an assurance could be given specifically in relation to the mechanism in this clause that means the Sewel convention would be respected in the way the amendment describes. That would be consistent with the assurances I have had in relation to the earlier provisions and would avoid writing the Sewel convention into the Bill, which I understand Ministers are anxious not to do because, in the case of Miller, it was described as merely a convention—important though it may be. I would be grateful if the Minister, when he comes to reply, would give an assurance in relation to both Wales—which has been sought—and Scotland, and no doubt to Northern Ireland as well, although it is not represented here today.