Elections Bill

Lord Wallace of Saltaire Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Committee stage
Tuesday 15th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sentamu (CB)]

My Lords, I share the sentiment of what the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, has just said. The noble Lord, Lord Collins, is right to seek clarification of what “encouraged” means. However, why is the role given to the Secretary of State, and not the legislation itself, to define it? If we cannot define it, kick it out. Why should this responsibility be given to the Secretary of State, who “must by regulations define” what it means? It is a bit late in the day for that.

I also share the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, about how courts will define what “encouraged” means. I have a problem with it being defined by the Secretary of State “by regulations”. I am one of those who is always very suspicious of legislation, in a secondary way, allowing regulations to grow like Topsy as has been the case over the last so many years. The legislators are allowing it to go ahead. I would have thought that the Bill itself should define what it is. If it cannot define it, do not put it in.

After listening to noble Lords who defined what election agents do and their enthusiasm for the things that they do, I am glad that I could never be such a person, because I do not think that I am worthy of it.

I ask the Minister—because the Government have drafted the legislation and put it into the Bill—to explain to us what he means by “encouraged”. Will it stand up to the standards of the law courts? If it cannot, why is it not just taken out?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I am often grateful I was never an election agent. I fought five elections and was once approached and asked if I would work as an agent for an early election. I am eternally grateful that I did not accept, because I did not begin to understand the complications and responsibilities of the task then. I have learned some of them since, but life has got a great deal more complicated over the last 50 or 60 years as the technology of elections and the power of the national parties, compared with the local parties, have shifted quite radically.

When I read this clause, I was struck by the word “only”, which appears repeatedly. That was the word I wanted to challenge. For example, it says that

“facilities are made use of on behalf of a candidate only if their use on behalf of the candidate is directed”.

Why does “only” keep recurring in various different contexts? It is clearly intended to weaken the possibility that the candidate could, in any way, be regarded as responsible. That worries me. Any good lawyer would be able to unpick the candidate being responsible under most circumstances for what the national party had done within his or her constituency. We well know, from the case to which this clause relates, that the national parties as a whole have come to engage in specific constituencies to target them and to spend a great deal of money from the national level in them. I suspect that candidates are always aware of this, but they may not always have wished to encourage it.

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for this short debate. I will not enter into the discussions of election experiences, but I certainly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, that it is not always easy to find election agents. Anyone who has been involved in politics is mindful of the difficulties which sometimes arise in the course of elections.

What we are seeking to do in Clause 18—I will come on to “encouraged”, which has been suggested goes in the opposite direction—is to clarify the law on notional expenditure. A debate on Clause 18 stand part will follow this debate and it is probably the appropriate place for this. It makes it clear that candidates need to report only benefits in kind: property, goods, services and facilities provided for the use or benefit of a candidate at a discount or free which the candidate has used or which the candidate or their election agent has directed, authorised or encouraged someone else to use on their behalf.

This brings me to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Collins. I say to the noble and right reverend Lord that I do not think that he is suggesting that the Secretary of State should draft regulations. I accept that this is a probing amendment; it is not a proposition that the Government have put on the Marshalled List. The noble Lord is seeking clarification of the term “encouraged”. The wording in the Bill was chosen to cover as many scenarios as possible and to capture circumstances where the candidate or their agent encouraged a particular use of property, goods, services or facilities, without going as far as directing it or specifically authorising its use. There is an area of uncertainty here, as he acknowledged. However, if only formal authorisation is required, the risk is that the candidate could encourage someone to use a benefit in kind without having to not report it as they did not give authorisation for it to be used. Requiring further regulations to define this term would risk reducing the breadth of the scope of these new rules on notional expenditure and opening up potential loopholes that we are seeking to address. The language in this clause has been crafted to strike a balance between the status quo, where no form of authorisation is required, which has generated understandable concerns from candidates and agents, and the overly blunt alternative of formal authorisation, which could risk being circumvented in practice, as the noble Lord suggested.

This clarification of the law on notional spending is vital to ensure that candidates should not fear being responsible for benefits in kind of which they had no knowledge. I think we would agree with that; the Explanatory Notes say that. Encouragement in the context in which we understand it and in this Bill must be a positive act. It is not intended to capture situations where a candidate did not have knowledge of someone using a benefit in kind on their behalf.

As I said at the outset, as an experienced campaigner I acknowledge that it is not always easy readily to apply the rules on election spending practically to the day-to-day reality of a campaign. We will discuss guidance in greater detail later today, but I assure the Committee that we intend that the Electoral Commission will produce guidance for campaigners to help them understand specifically these concepts and to apply and comply with the rules on notional spending in so doing. In the past, the commission has made good use of illustrative examples to aid campaigners. Further to this, we are broadening the scope of the statutory codes of practice on election spending that can be prepared by the commission to ensure that the codes include guidance on notional spending.

Some Members of the Committee asked for some specific comments on legal meanings or for further detail on “encouraged”. We expect that this guidance and the codes of practice will come forward from not the Secretary of State but the Electoral Commission. I understand where the noble Lord is coming from and will reflect on what has been said, and if I can I will put further clarification to him in writing and submit it to the House before Report, because I appreciate the direction he is coming from.

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[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, a kind of fiction has prevailed over a very long period of election history that, somehow or other, the crucial electoral battleground is each individual constituency. It has long been recognised that there is a need for strict limits on expenditure by individual candidates in individual constituencies. On the other level, however, there is the national campaign, where limits on expenditure are so much looser.

I was very alarmed, as I had not heard it before, by the information from the noble Lord, Lord Rennard—he is usually reliable on these issues—that there is possibly a huge increase planned in the maximum expenditure allowed at the national level. This may not be a popular thing to say to candidates—I may be talking to myself—but it is clear to me that, although both levels of campaigning expenditure are clearly important, if you had to label the one that is the most important in determining the overall outcome of modern elections, it would be the national expenditure and national campaign. All candidates believe profoundly that it is what they do in their individual constituencies that is of crucial importance.

I have also noticed that all candidates—I have been one of them—tend to think that, when they win their local campaign, it is down to a particular level of skill and expertise in their campaign, and when they lose, it is generally someone else’s fault. The truth at general elections is that, for all the variance you can get in 650 different constituencies, the broad truth prevails: when the tide is out for your party, the tide is likely to be out everywhere, and vice versa. This whole issue of the balance between control over national expenditure and control over local expenditure is fundamental.

Of course, the irony is that, for years and years, there was control over local expenditure. It has long been recognised that there must be limits locally. However, it is relatively recently in our parliamentary history that we have seen the need for national limits; as we have said, they are so loose now as to be barely limits at all—certainly for one party in particular. This is a crucial area of debate and discussion but, most of all, the one headline I want to get out of this—perhaps the Minister will address it when he replies because he is on the inside track and we are not—is whether there really is a proposal that there should be a colossal increase in the level of expenditure allowed at the national level by political parties. If the Minister has any inside information on this, I would love him to share it with the Committee.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, one of the things on which there was consensus from all the various reports that fed into this Bill was that what we need most of all is a simplification of electoral law. This clause is a classic example of making things more complicated. I think we all recognise that this is the Conservative response to the Thanet case. The case for having this in the clause is extremely weak.

I was interested to hear the noble Lord, Lord Collins, talk about the 1970 election campaign. I am older than him. I worked at party headquarters during the 1966 campaign. Looking back, it was incredibly amateur. The Conservative campaign was not that much more professional than ours at the national level. Then, the largest department in the Conservative headquarters, as I remember it, was the research department. We did not have phone canvassing, of course. We did not use opinion polls much. At the time, I was otherwise working as a research assistant to Dr David Butler on the first major survey of electoral opinion in Britain. We were using punch cards to get at our data; it was such a slow process that you could not analyse during the campaign at speed. We did not have any digital campaigning, of course. In those days, the Conservative Party had a couple of million members and raised a lot of its money and did most of its activity at the local level.

We have shifted a long way since then, soo I want to talk about some of the principles; I hope that the Minister still recognises that they are important. They cover this clause and Part 4. The first principle is that we should retain a clear distinction between constituency campaigning and national campaigning. After all, it is one of the most tried and tested aspects of our democracy that Parliament consists of people who represent local communities in constituencies. They have not always been individual constituencies as there used to be multiple-member constituencies; the noble Lord will go back far enough, but never mind.

That is the principle. It has already been weakened by the tightening of limits between constituencies, which means that the new constituencies that are about to be redrawn will represent recognisable local communities much less than they have done so far. We hear people—Jacob Rees-Mogg, for example—say, “We have already moved from a parliamentary system to a presidential system. That is how our elections now go”. I regret that. As it happens, I am in favour of multiple-member constituencies and a much more open voting system, but that is part of the argument we should be having about the quality of our democracy. To erode the distinction between the constituency—that is, the election of an individual MP—and the national campaign would be a fundamental shift in our democracy larger than changing the nature of our voting system. I hope that the Minister recognises that.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

I agree so much about the importance of the close connection between individual candidates and individual constituencies but I am sure that the noble Lord would agree with me that that is much weakened under a system of proportional representation.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

We need not discuss the various alternative forms of voter registration. “Not necessarily” is the easy answer.

The second principle I want to focus on, mentioned by my noble friend Lord Stunell, is that there should as far as possible be a level playing field. We have seen what happened as that disappeared with the lifting of funding restrictions in the United States. The quality of American campaigning and the level of trust in American democracy have gone down, and that is partly because of the sheer weight of money that now deforms American politics. We have it here. I read in the Sunday Times the weekend before last that in the last three months of 2019, Ben Elliot, the chairman of the Conservative Party, raised just over £37 million for the Conservative Party, more than it was able to spend legally in the course of the campaign, and that it represented two-thirds of the money raised by all registered parties in that period. That takes the whole idea of a level playing field for democracy into deep and difficult trouble, and it strengthens the case for making sure that the regulation of expenditure, which is what Part 4 is about, is kept tight, clear and simple.

The third principle that I hope the Minister will agree on is that funding and expenditure should be as transparent as possible, both by registered parties and, as we shall come on to, by third parties, and that this clause does not help in that regard.

Clause 18 weakens regulation. It complicates and confuses it. I think we have seen from Second Reading and from our first day in Committee that noble Lords throughout the House generally agree on the need to strengthen regulation and the Electoral Commission. For these reasons, I suggest to the Minister that the clause as drafted and as intended does not match the Bill.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

My Lords, I come back to the comment I made on the earlier group of amendments: what is broken? What is this clause trying to put right, and does it solve it? I think we have heard from the debate on it that it does not really address the issue. Whatever happened in Thanet—and there may be other instances that were not subject to court cases—it has certainly gone through a proper legal process. As we have heard, both the Supreme Court and the Electoral Commission have addressed that issue.

I regret that we have moved away from the requirement that fundamental changes be subject to consent across all parties. That has been an important element of maintaining our democracy. Of course, the Trade Union Act was the first part of that attack by the Conservative Party on one party, which broke that consensus on funding.

As I have said before, the Conservative Party likes a debate about spending limits— “We can have a limit here, and the national limit and so on”—but the real debate is not about spending but about income. When David Cameron was Prime Minister and we have had discussions about it, we have seen that it is the income side of our politics that brings it into disrepute. Very rarely is it the spending side. The income side is about who has given the money, how much they are giving and what they expect for it. Taking big money out of politics is the issue. I say to the Conservative Party that its time will come, because when it is in opposition there will be a strong focus on the income side of this debate, and it will not like the result. It will not be able to rely on a large number of very wealthy people; it will have to rely on a larger number of low-income people, because I strongly believe that caps on donations are far more important than limits on spending. That is a debate for another day, but it is important to set today’s debate in context.

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[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I suggest that the Government believe that it does clarify; that is exactly what it does, so we will have to disagree on that. We feel that Clauses 18 and 20 of the Bill do precisely what the Labour Party asked for and supported in PACAC.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, if I have understood the argument that the noble Baroness has been making, this clause would not in any sense change the outcome of the Thanet case. If it is clarifying things in that direction, the clause is not necessary.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

No, what I am saying is that it will clarify for candidates and agents what is required and what was not very clear at the time of that case.

We have sought input on these measures from the Parliamentary Parties Panel and we are confident that they will bring important clarity to the rules and support compliance. Indeed, Craig Mackinlay, the Member of Parliament for South Thanet, whom we have talked about a number of times, knows better than anyone the deficient nature of the current rules, and he welcomed and praised the clarity which this Bill brings to notional expenditure.

In this clause, we are also making an equivalent amendment to the notional expenditure rules for other types of campaigners, such as political parties and third-party campaigners, to ensure that all the rules are consistent. Together, these changes will bring much-needed reassurance and clarity to candidates and their agents on the rules that apply to notional expenditure for reserved elections. Alongside guidance from the Electoral Commission, with which we are working closely, this measure will support compliance with the rules and ensure that those wishing to participate in public life can feel safe doing so, clear in their legal obligations. It is for this reason that I urge that this clause should stand part of the Bill.

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[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, I just want to intervene, not about the substance of the matter we are debating but about the process. We have two very interesting parallel amendments which have what one might call different routes to market. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, said she did not really mind which was followed. I think she should worry, for reasons I shall explain. We tend to pass by—too easily, in my view—guidance, statutory codes, as just referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, regulations and rules. Who devises them, who decides what they are, who implements them and who enforces them? I think it is important that, at some point in the debate on the Bill, we take just a moment to think about the different ways this cat can be skinned.

In the debate on Clauses 14 and 15 in the last day in Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who is not in his place, led the charge, assisted by several other noble Lords from around the House, to give my noble friend the Minister a kicking. I think the idea behind those speakers was to buttress, protect and safeguard the independence of the Electoral Commission. The noble Lord, Lord Stunell, referred to this earlier. Well, up to a point. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and I are absolutely as one about the need to improve the way we scrutinise secondary legislation in this country; it is clearly deficient and no longer fit for purpose.

The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, under my noble friend Lord Blencathra and now under my noble friend Lord McLoughlin, produced a report at the end of last year about the democratic deficit. The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which I chair, produced a report on government by diktat. My noble friend the Minister will be fed up with me going on about this, but we are going to go on and on and talk to our colleagues in the Commons until we begin to get a better balance in the way we handle these things. That is, of course, a debate for another day, but in those two reports, we draw attention to the danger of what one might call tertiary legislation—that is, rules and regulations made by bodies that have little or no democratic control over their self-standing and no parliamentary control. It is important that I used the phrase parliamentary control, not government control. I am talking about control by the legislature, not by the Executive.

What I am saying is in no way a criticism of the Electoral Commission, but times change, commission members change just as Ministers change, and I am not convinced, as a matter of principle, that the Electoral Commission should be given too much independence in devising and implementing processes that go to the heart of our democratic system. We may feel that the system for scrutinising secondary legislation is not good enough, but we do at least have a chance to debate it and talk about it in public, here in your Lordships’ House and in the House of Commons. We cannot amend it, and I know that is a weakness, but we do provide a focal point for people who wish to comment on it, raise issues and express their support for it, discontent with it or opposition to it.

I see the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, in her place. The SLSC was very unhappy about some aspects of the procedure the Government followed about GMO and the new regulations, and therefore last night there was a lengthy debate. Could the regulations be amended? No, they could not, but there was a great deal of opportunity for people to express their concerns about that particular regulation. If the Electoral Commission produces a code, ex cathedra, there is no point at which that debate can take place. People can complain about it or write in, but there is no forum where Parliament—again, I say Parliament, both Houses of Parliament—can say its piece about whether it is fit for purpose. After all, it is Parliament that will be most concerned with and most expert in what is being proposed.

I favour Amendment 25, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, which says it should go through the Secretary of State. I assume that when she revises her amendment, she will say “by regulation”: he or she is not just going to write it, it will be by regulation that it would come into force. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, that if he were to amend his amendment to say that the Electoral Commission has to produce a code which will become a statutory code, I think that would also serve the purpose. At present, we need to be very clear that the Electoral Commission is not the answer to everything. There is a need for the democratic process to have some input into the way this is all moving forward, or else we will have a situation where a body may be moving away from the central ethos of what the two Houses of Parliament believe is the right way to conduct things.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

This is an important principle. The noble Lord and I have spent some time looking at the Charity Commission, on which he is much more expert than I am. I used to be able to quote CC9 and other bits of Charity Commission guidance by heart when I was a trustee of a charity. Does he think that the principle he is enunciating should apply to most of these commission regulatory bodies, or is the Electoral Commission a special case?

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

I think the Electoral Commission is a special case because we are talking about an elections Bill, but it goes wider than that. My noble friend Lord Blencathra is hot on this. He has a list of bodies that are, as he would say, running too free, but the Electoral Commission is a special case because of the nature of the Bill we are discussing. A subsidiary question is, do we need more codes elsewhere? I have some amendments down later on, which we shall get to on Thursday, which will provide a way of clarifying and giving third-party campaigners some security and safety about what they are doing— I think that is much more important. However, that is a discussion for Thursday.

My last point is to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, about his Amendment 30B. We have said again and again that we need to have our election law in one place. The fact we are having to discuss RPA 1983 in connection with this Bill in 2022 shows how urgent this is and how the points made across the Committee need to be taken on board by the Government, who at some point need to find time to pull this all together.

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[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a probing amendment, but it is highly topical. I am trying to see the relationship between the registration of parties and the sanctions legislation that we recently adopted. Following yesterday’s consideration of the fast-tracked Bill, Liz Truss plans to name even more people. It would certainly make it easier for Ministers to impose sanctions on those with Kremlin links. One of the things we addressed last night was the loopholes that have allowed oligarchs and kleptocrats to evade scrutiny. They have been quite successful in hiding their assets, certainly property—an issue we have discussed for quite a long time.

One of the things that I have been banging on about quite a bit is the Russia report and its recommendations on security risks to our democracy from interference from foreign powers and how we address that issue. We addressed this at Second Reading. It is not just some of the messaging and social network-type interference which we have seen, particularly in the US but also here, but about how our political parties are funded.

Boris Johnson told the House of Commons that

“it is very important for the House to understand that we do not raise money from Russian oligarchs.”—[Official Report, Commons, 23/2/22; col. 313.]

For many of us, it was very difficult to take that remark seriously when we look at some of the records that have been exposed. It is obviously impossible for someone with only Russian nationality, however rich, to donate legally to a United Kingdom political party, but what has undoubtedly happened is that a series of people with dual UK/Russian nationality, or with significant business links with Russia, have donated heavily to the Conservatives in recent years. Based on electoral information, Labour has estimated that donors who have made money from Russia or Russians have given £1.93 million to the Tory party or to constituency associations since Johnson became Prime Minister. In the other place, Ian Blackford of the SNP referred to the Conservatives having raised £2.3 million from Russian oligarchs.

I recognise that “oligarch” is a loose term associated with people who generally made their money from the financial free-for-all of the post-Soviet, Putin era, but those people often keep a very close link with the Russian President. One reason the legislation is so important is the connections. You can have a permissible donor who is linked very closely to someone who is not a permissible donor, and if the links to the assets and the finances are obscure it is difficult to follow the money, as Liz Truss said.

One of the biggest single donors to the Conservative Party is Lubov Chernukhin, who has donated £700,000. She has been a British national since 2011 and is married to Vladimir Chernukhin, a former deputy finance Minister under Putin. Documents published in the Pandora papers in October suggest that he was allowed to leave Russia in 2004 with assets worth about $500 million and to retain Russian business connections. Lawyers representing the couple say that none of the wealth was acquired in a corrupt manner and none of Vladimir Chernukhin’s wife’s donations was funded by improper means or affected by the influence of anyone else. That is extremely difficult to understand when you look at some of the documents in the Pandora papers published by the Guardian. Lubov Chernukhin is also notable for winning the prize of a game of tennis with Boris Johnson at the party’s 2020 fundraising ball. It is not clear whether she has managed to get that prize yet.

That shows us the extent of foreign money coming into our political process and our political parties. The reason I am raising that on this clause is that we have yet to see political parties being established for the purpose of undermining the political system we have. I anticipate all kinds of reactions from friends of Putin—to put it that way—that we have not seen before. If our sanctions legislation gets stronger and we have the economic crime Bill that we anticipate seeing in the next Session, we may see this hidden money going in different ways that will perhaps have less scrutiny but very strong connections. I am probing this to see what the Government have thought of in terms of transparency in the establishment of political parties and what they are going to do about the broad recommendations of the Russia report, which they have not really taken into account. We will certainly be returning to the question of donations to political parties later in consideration of the Bill, but I thought that this was an opportunity to look at whether there has been any risk assessment by the Government of how political parties that could fundamentally undermine our system may be established and funded. I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I am conscious that there are other democracies in Europe which have parties on the right that have admitted to receiving money from Russia as loans or as grants. Happily, this country is not in that position, but a number of shadows hang over our politics and we have got quite close to it on a number of occasions. It currently affects the Government because they refused to publish the evidence the Intelligence and Security Committee collected on foreign interference in British politics four years ago and they have not yet published the evidence on the suitability of those who came in on the golden visa scheme between 2000 and 2015. That report was commissioned four years ago. If one goes back to the referendum campaign, so far as I am aware, we still do not know where the largest donation to the Brexit campaign came from, although I had one very odd conversation with a senior member of the City of London who told me that everyone knew that it came from a particular foreign country. There are issues here. We shall return to them when we get on to donations.

I mark in general that this is yet another reason why we should be lowering the limits on campaign spending at national and constituency level, not raising them, because money corrupts politics. I think that the Conservative Party has come close to corruption in the way it has very successfully expanded its fundraising, with the creation of a donors’ club. I have read on the front page of the Times that donors have said that they are unhappy about what the Prime Minister is doing on this, that and the other, and that clearly shows that donors influence politics to a considerable extent in the Conservative Party.

Yes, of course, we are all guilty. My party has also accepted one or two large and very welcome donations which were a little bit questionable. That is because we are so desperate for money for campaigning—and it is part of the reason why I agree that we should be lowering limits. So, I support the probing amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Collins. We will return to this on a later day in Committee. It is a fundamentally important issue for British politics, because part of what is corroding public trust in politics at present is the deep suspicion that money buys Ministers.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I in no way suggested that. I merely remarked that the question of where the largest donation to the Brexit campaign came from has not been explained, which is entirely different. I trust that the Minister is also concerned about that, rather than making jokes about it.

[Lord True (Con)]

I made no joke. I drew attention to the noble Lord’s remarks, and they will stand on the record. So far as this matter is concerned—and I have heard the cascade of innuendo ending with the remark that Ministers can be bought, which will also lie in Hansard—I move on to a serious response to a serious—

[Lord True (Con)]

I stand by the remarks I made in response to comments from the Front Bench of the Liberal Democrat party. I would like to—

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I do not know whether the noble Lord reads the Sunday Times—perhaps he only reads the Sunday Telegraph—but the Sunday Times in the last two weeks has included a good deal of evidence on the role of the donors, access to Ministers and what one of the Conservative Party’s largest donors has called “access capitalism”. Perhaps he has missed all that.

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I was working on my allotment on Sunday morning. I will come to the point that was raised by the noble Lord opposite, which I take extremely seriously. It is a probing amendment but an important subject. I have discussed it with the noble Baroness and the noble Lord. I look forward also to engaging in discussions when we come to her amendments, which are on an analogous subject.

What the noble Lord suggests is, obviously, on the face of it, a good idea: that the commission should reject the application of a political party if its declaration of assets and liabilities demonstrates assets designated under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. I absolutely recognise the importance of that regime, although a debate on its intricacies does not fall within the scope of this Bill. I do not make any complaints about that, however, and I am happy to address it because of the gravity and importance of the issue.

On the specific point the noble Lord raises—I will be brief—sanctions law is incredibly clear: all individuals and legal entities who are within, or undertake activities within, the United Kingdom’s territory must comply with UK financial sanctions that are in force. This includes not only political parties but candidates and other types of campaigners listed in the relevant areas of the legislation. Where a person or entity is designated as subject to financial sanctions, the nature of the resulting restrictions means that the person’s assets are frozen and consequently that person would be prohibited from using those assets for any purpose. This would include the funding of a political party.

While the Government entirely agree with the principle that sanctioned assets should not be used for the benefit of anyone—including prospective political parties, which we are discussing specifically on this amendment— we believe that the current sanctioning regime already provides for this and we remain to be convinced that an additional provision is required in this Bill. I am sympathetic to the noble Lord’s intentions here. I believe that his point is already acknowledged but, in the light of the importance of the matter that he has raised, I will make doubly sure that that is the case. With that assurance, I hope he feels able to withdraw his amendment. I am ready to discuss the matter with him further, as we have already engaged.

Elections Bill

Lord Wallace of Saltaire Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Tuesday 15th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

I would have to be advised on that matter. I understand where the noble Lord is coming from, because I agree that it is hard to believe that a group would want to proceed in that way. I shall share with the Committee what information is available on this.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

We on these Benches are totally unaware of this organisation, but I am glad to hear that it was staffed by Liberal Democrats. I am sure the Minister would expect it to be a dastardly Liberal Democrat plot, but I am completely unaware of it. Could his private office provide us with some information and background—there must be some—to inform us of the case, how serious it was and how it was dealt with? It somehow did not hit the Sunday Times on my Sunday morning, just before I got to my allotment.

[Lord True (Con)]

The noble Lord will be taken to task for not reading the Observer if he keeps coming out with his Sunday morning reading. I was not there and the Government were not there but, looking at the empirical record, we believe that this was a prima facie case. I can report only what information I have: that it was staffed by former Liberal Democrats and operated in five target Liberal Democrat constituencies, but I accept the noble Lord’s assurance that he knew nothing about it.

The clause that we have put in the Bill will prohibit recognised third-party campaigners registering as political parties and gaining access to a spending limit for each registration. The list of individuals and entities permitted to be on the third-party campaigner register will also be amended to remove political parties.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, in his amendments. I am acting as a kind of understudy for my noble friend Lord Blunkett, but I cannot say that what I shall say would be his lines, but in his absence, at least there is a Labour Back-Bencher speaking in favour of the amendments.

I should perhaps first declare my interest as vice-chair of Compass, which is a left-of-centre campaigning organisation that has been promoting a progressive alliance for some years, and as honorary president of the Child Poverty Action Group. I worked for CPAG for many years and, during that time, worked on trying to get child poverty raised as an issue in many general elections.

The question of the 365-day limit was raised in the Public Bill Committee: why is it so long? I think the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, made a strong case for it being too long. When questioned, the Minister in the Commons had three arguments. The first was that we all have a fairly good idea of when an election will be. Do we? There is already speculation that there could be an election next year. Indeed, those who have been lobbying about the Bill, sometimes groups in combination, could find that they are in the regulated period already. We simply do not know, now that we are outside fixed-term Parliaments. A prudent organisation would need to start taking steps very soon not to get caught out.

Secondly, the Minister argued that, in effect, we are all in it together: we all have the same amount of information, so it does not matter. I will not be affected by this legislation, but the kind of organisation that I am associated with could well be.

Thirdly, and most worryingly, the Minister said:

“People will need to take that into account when they are campaigning politically.”—[Official Report, Commons, Elections Bill Committee, 26/10/21; col. 314.]


Well, exactly. That is the problem: what is often called the chilling effect will take effect. If organisations involved in campaigning take account politically, that could stop them campaigning for large periods of the electoral cycle. That cannot be right. The noble Lord made helpful distinctions. Looking back, when I was at CPAG, there would have been big periods when we could not try to make child poverty an issue because we would have been caught by this legislation.

Perhaps the Minister will have stronger arguments for why 365 days is appropriate, but certainly the arguments put in the Commons were either weak or worrying. I am not clear why we need any retrospective regulated period. Why can it not just start when the election is called? However, in the spirit of compromise, I am happy to support one or other of these amendments and am very interested to hear what the Minister has to say about them.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, the scars are still on my back from having taken the transparency of lobbying Bill, now an Act, through this House. I remind the Minister that we paused it when we ran into waves of criticism from all sides and arguments that we had not entirely got our own arguments in line. It was not quite as messy as this Bill, but we did at least manage to sort out something which did not displease everyone too much.

I have read the very useful report by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, which I compliment him on. It does its best to strike the balance between a number of very difficult and different priorities. All of us who have been involved in politics know that there are many civil society organisations. Some are easily politically neutral—as the Church is, most of the time—while others are inherently a bit on the right. Those of us who are old enough to have fought campaigns that the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children was active in will remember how vigorous, to say the least, it could be in its campaigns and how biased it was. Development NGOs and poverty NGOs, being in favour of greater public sector spending and greater equality, tend naturally to be more on the left. The balance between advocacy and electoral campaigning, as the noble Lord has said, is a difficult one, which we must all strike. In debating this issue with some of the organisations concerned, there were those who felt that they were entitled to campaign entirely as they liked because they were morally right and therefore should not in any sense be controlled in an election campaign.

I agree strongly with the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, that 120 days is much better than 365 days. We no longer know when the election will be. It is one of the many bits of incoherence of this Government that putting through the abolition of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act in the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill has not sorted out entirely the knock-on effects of that for this Bill. If I recall correctly, in his report, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said that looking back on how various NGOs and civil society groups have spent on their advocacy and campaigning, the spending does come very much in the last few weeks and months before the election, rather than being spread evenly over the previous year.

Therefore, I strongly support Amendment 39 and hope that the Minister will accept that this is a reasonable adjustment in the Bill which the Government could accept, and which makes life simpler for those civil society groups which we all want to see engaging in campaigns and public debate. This tidying up would be a help to all concerned.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, for introducing these amendments at this stage. I know that we will have further debates but, like him, I think it is really important to set this in context. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Lister for doing so. She has an incredible record of promoting civil society and action groups focused on particular issues. I know from my own experience that civil society activity is really important; one of the most important groups I have participated in is one that my party, the Conservative Party and other political parties were a bit uncomfortable dealing with—LGBT rights. It took a civil society, cross-party campaign to change things and influence manifestos.

I said at Second Reading that a thriving democracy is not limited to Parliaments and parliamentarians. Countries that fail to protect their citizens force civil society to stand up for them and defend human rights. That is really important. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and my noble friend, who was more explicit, talked about that chilling effect. That is what we must look at. Perhaps it is even an unintended consequence. However, it is a simple fact that we do not know the date of the general election; it is in the gift of the Prime Minister to set, and sometimes it can be a long campaign and sometimes it can be short. We do not want those civil society organisations campaigning throughout a five-year period, raising issues such as child poverty, to stand back because they fear that they might be caught in this regulated period.

I agree with my noble friend that the simplest solution is to say that the regulated period should start when a general election officially starts, but I will compromise with the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, on four months. Importantly, in some of his later amendments we will come to issues such as defining what might reasonably be regarded as campaigning, which he rightly raised. I agree about a code of practice being brought before Parliament.

Even if the Minister cannot accept these amendments today—I have no doubt that he cannot—I hope he will take away that this will have an impact on civil society that will impact negatively on our democratic activity. I hope the Government will listen to both the noble Lord and my noble friend Lady Lister.

--- Later in debate ---

It is the Government’s view that reducing the established period, notwithstanding the arguments I have heard from my noble friend—and I have the highest admiration for the care and concern he has put into studying these matters and his championing of the civil society sector and charities—would allow unregulated, uncapped spending and provide less transparency for the electorate than we have had over the past two decades.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

The Minister referred to the established 12-month period. I was not aware of it as an established principle. Perhaps now or in a letter, the Minister will tell us when it was established, how long it has been in effect and how it has been tried and tested, since he is so good at telling us that.

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I will stand corrected if it is not the case, but the principle of a 12-month regulatory period has been in place for more than 20 years. That is the advice I have and if I am wrong, I will gladly correct that; no doubt my noble friend behind me will correct me very fast.

The closely related Amendment 33A seeks to create an exemption from expenditure rules for third-party exempt campaigners where they could not reasonably be expected to be aware that they were campaigning during a regulated election period. One understands the arguments that were put, but regulated periods have been in place for years. Third parties engaging in election campaigning should be aware of the rules and of the existence of regulated periods. However, the Electoral Commission has produced extensive guidance to help third parties understand the rules. It states:

“Most campaign activity undertaken before an election is announced is unlikely to meet the purpose test”.


It is an important test that is specifically intended to protect civil society, because

“you are unlikely to be reasonably regarded as intending to influence people to vote in an election when you do not know or expect that the election is happening.”

I have heard arguments around the corner of that, but the basic principle of the purpose test is there, and therefore the Government do not accept the idea that regulated periods for third parties are overly burdensome. It is important that spending is regulated and transparent and it is right that spending that promotes a political party in the lead-up to an election is regulated, whether that is undertaken by the party itself or by a third-party campaigner. Therefore, with great respect, I fear that I cannot accept my noble friend’s amendment and ask him to withdraw it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I wish to speak in support of the probing Amendment 35 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman. We have to ask what my noble friend asked. What is this trying to solve? In the regulated period of one year and at a figure of £700, we are saying that an organisation that spends £1.91 a day for 12 months before a general election could be committing an offence. That is the amount that would have to be spent per day by the organisation or £13.46 a week or £58.33 a month. The very simple question I would like to ask the Minister is: how was that daily amount of £1.91 calculated? Why is it deemed to be illegal if an organisation exceeds that amount and exactly what problem does it solve?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, may I ask the Minister a question? I do not entirely understand this clause and the unincorporated association element is the least clear to me. I googled “unincorporated association” this morning and came away more confused than when I started. I think we would all be very grateful if the Minister’s office could circulate a letter explaining why this is there, what sort of organisations they have in mind, whether there is a history or problems with unincorporated associations and, if so, what they were, so that we have some idea of why this is necessary. I get a sense from others who have spoken that we are puzzled by where this clause is coming from, why it is there and what it is intended to do.

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I have to confess that I irritate my wonderful team in the Box when I say—and this of course plays straight into the attack—why is this not a consolidation Act? Of course, in the great scheme of things, consolidation Acts on all sorts of things would be wonderful. As I have said, this is intended to be a reforming Act dealing with some matters which are relatively urgent, but I agree that the way that it operates is relatively opaque and I understand why noble Lords have asked these questions.

Like others, I am not going to stray into Clause 25, although I realise there is an interrelation between the two. I know from the engagement I have had with colleagues on all Benches that Clause 25 is an issue which the House wants to consider in some detail, and I am fully ready for that. If the House will forgive me, I will not go into that except in so far as it deals with this matter.

Clause 24 is intended to do something that we would all like to do, which is to ensure that campaign spending comes only from UK-based or otherwise eligible sources. The clause is intended to address some of the concerns raised by the DCMS Select Committee in the other place in a 2019 report on disinformation—so-called fake news and foreign interference in UK elections.

--- Later in debate ---

While there may be issues in relation to Clause 25 that we will wish to address, I hope that, with that explanation, noble Lords will understand that we are seeking to restrict foreign campaigning.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

I am sorry to be obtuse. I do not entirely understand Clause 24(7), which defines the requisite UK connection of an unincorporated association. I think I understand it as meaning that there must be at least two people associated with it who, while they and anyone else in the unincorporated association may be living overseas, are at least on the register. Is it therefore envisaged that we will have more unincorporated associations which are based overseas but campaigning in Britain?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, it is required to have a UK connection. I will write to noble Lords to explain that clearly. In the two days that I have been listening in Committee, your Lordships have rightly—sometimes gently, sometimes aggressively—asked the Government to deal with foreign intervention. That is what this clause is intended to bear down on. We can have further discussion on the meaning of subsection (7) and I will undertake to write on that but I hope that, with those assurances—

Lobbying of Ministers

Lord Wallace of Saltaire Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

I would indeed; I am quite old fashioned and I greatly respect the trade union tradition. I also respect the freedom of politicians such as Mr Ed Davey, who became a lobbyist immediately after losing his ministerial job in 2015.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, the Sunday Times two weeks ago told us a lot about the donors board, which has unpublished, unremarked, unrecorded meetings with the Prime Minister and other senior Members, some of whom clearly have actively lobbied for their own interests, while some have received public contracts. If we are committed to transparency, can we not be assured that such meetings will be properly recorded and details of those who attend published afterwards?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, once again, I take note of what the noble Lord says. In the system that we have in this country, ministerial meetings are noted by officials; as we established earlier in this exchange and as my noble friend Lord Lansley said, data is regularly published thanks to his legislation.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Lord Wallace of Saltaire Excerpts

3rd reading
Thursday 24th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon, who is unable to be with us this morning as she is having a briefing at the moment, I thank the noble Lord for his usual courtesy in dealing with the House and for taking this Bill through it. I also thank the Bill team for the meetings that took place. As he said, we have had scrutinised the Bill well and made one change. We have sent that back to the other place, and we will wait for it to come back to us, and then we will have further debates on that. I know my noble friend is very grateful for the co-operation we have received on the Bill going through. I sat in on many of the debates, and the other Benches were fascinating to listen to. I think we have done our job well and properly, and we await the decision of the other place. I give our thanks to the noble Lord, other Members, the officials and the team in the Labour Whips’ Office for what they did.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I add my thanks. It is important that we conduct legislation in the House, and off the Floor in between the different stages, in the way we did on this Bill and I hope will do also on the Elections Bill—a much longer and more complex Bill. Indeed, we discovered on Second Reading of that Bill yesterday that abolishing the fixed terms for Parliament has knock-on effects for third-party campaigning—a point made in yesterday’s debate. We in this House often deal with the complex interdependence of different aspects of the rules that govern our democracy. There will be a rising tide of opinion inside and outside Parliament that we need to look at some of these things fairly soon together, rather than in one chunk after another. I regret to repeat—the Minister will hear it yet again—that I did agree with the part of the Conservative manifesto that said there should be a constitutional commission. I hope it will be in the next Conservative manifesto, and I hope it will be in the manifestos of other parties and that it will then happen. Having said that, I look forward with interest to how the Commons will respond to the Lords amendment, and perhaps it will return here.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I join in thanking everybody. I have two points, one serious and one less so. One is an entirely private thought, so nobody is listening to me saying this: I hope the Commons has enough time to look at the issues that arise in relation to this Bill. The other is of particular thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, who is not in his place, for reminding me of a lesson I learned when I did English language grammar—gosh, does that still exist? I was taught the auxiliary verbs “shall”, “should”, “will”, “would”, “may”, “can”, “must” and “do” and to appreciate the difference between “shall” and “must.”

Elections Bill

Lord Wallace of Saltaire Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 23rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, it is a very personal pleasure to welcome the noble Lord, Lord Moore, and say that I look forward to his maiden speech. When I was a student, the first by-election I worked in was the Cambridgeshire by-election of 1961 in which his father was a candidate. His father, as some Members of this House may already know, was a wonderful and inspiring speaker and would have been an adornment to this House. We hope very much that his son has inherited much of his fluency as a speaker and look forward to hearing more from him.

This Bill should never have reached Parliament in its current badly drafted and highly partisan form. The Ministers who presented it have made no attempt to build consensus on rules that are at the core of democracy. They have largely ignored four authoritative reports: first, the Law Commission report on the simplification of electoral law, published in March 2020; secondly, the Committee on Standards in Public Life—CSPL—review, Regulating Election Finance, published in July last year; thirdly, the Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee—PACAC—report on the Bill itself, published in December; and fourthly, the Intelligence and Security Committee—ISC—Russia report of 2018, which covered issues that this Bill addresses, making recommendations that the Government have also ignored. The Law Commission proposed to simplify and clarify the layers of legislation on electoral regulation. To the contrary, this 171-page Bill adds further layers of complexity. It is a major lost opportunity, as PACAC comments.

Part 4 of the Bill takes almost no account of the 47 recommendations for tightening controls on election donations and spending in the CSPL report. A Cabinet Office Minister told the Commons that there was insufficient time to include any of these in the current Bill. The Government nevertheless found time to introduce over 100 of their own amendments as the Bill as it moved through the Commons—strong evidence that the Bill had been insufficiently thought through beforehand. They even introduced a late amendment to narrow the voting system for mayors, without any prior notice to other parties. The Minister’s introduction suggested that the Government intend to return all elections to what he regards as the tried and tested first past the post system. I assume he is aware that the devolved nations use and prefer different systems.

The PACAC Committee Report is the most damning. It highlights

“potential gaps in the evidence base for the proposed measures”

and states that many witnesses considered that the Government did

“‘not have the evidence to understand the impact of their proposals’”.

It notes that the Elections Bill “does not adopt any” of the recommendations of the Law Commission’s 2020 report and says:

“Given the constitutional significance of the proposed changes to voting and the accountability mechanisms of the regulator of elections, the Committee is disappointed that a Joint Committee was not appointed to scrutinise this Bill in draft, to help ensure the legislation is fit for purpose.”


So a Commons Committee does not consider the Bill in its present state to be fit for purpose. It criticises the

“melange of delegated powers provided for in this Bill”,

and bluntly states:

“The Government should present the draft secondary legislation as early as possible,”


as the previous Commons Minister had pledged to do. The Government have failed to provide this before the Bill reached the Lords.

The report goes on:

“Introducing a compulsory voter ID requirement risks upsetting the balance of our current electoral system, making it more difficult to vote and removing an element of the trust inherent in the current system … Given the potential for a significant number of people not to vote as a consequence of the Voter ID requirement, the Government should not proceed with its proposals”


until further evidence has been provided. It then details the practicalities of implementation and the additional burden on polling station staff, which also need to be clarified.

The report is equally scathing about the further complications the Bill proposes about who can vote in UK elections and who cannot. It recommends giving the vote to all who have settled status on a residency basis, rather than extending the historical anomalies we have inherited. The practicalities of extending the rights of overseas voters have also not been explored. Its potential addition of several thousand extra voters to some constituencies—mainly urban—would negate the Government’s aim to reduce the variation in voter numbers from one constituency to another. Checks on their status and claims will be minimal, in contrast to the additional checks on those who vote in person.

I will leave it to others to discuss the complexities of regulating third-party campaigns and of electronic campaign material—both important issues to which the Committee should devote considerable time. I want to flag up the constitutional importance of maintaining and strengthening the role of the Electoral Commission, and of tighter regulation of campaign finance.

The Conservative Party says that it has lost confidence in the Electoral Commission. The CSPL could not find anyone—any witness—outside the Conservative Party who had lost confidence in the Electoral Commission. The PACAC report concludes,

“The Government has not provided sufficient evidence to justify why the proposed measures are both necessary and proportionate. We therefore recommend that Clauses 13 to 15 of the Bill are removed, pending a public consultation”.


I hope the House will follow that advice. The proposals, the PACAC remarks,

“risk undermining public confidence in electoral outcomes”.

Again, it notes that

“there was no formal or public consultation … and that there is a lack of supporting evidence to demonstrate that the proposed measures are both necessary and proportionate”.

The ISC Russia Report calls for the Electoral Commission to be strengthened, not weakened, saying that

“we have already questioned whether the Electoral Commission has sufficient powers to ensure the security of democratic processes where hostile state threats are involved; if it is to tackle foreign interference, then it must be given the necessary … powers”.

The Government’s response to the ISC’s call for them to publish the evidence they had gathered on foreign influence over campaigns was simply to state:

“We have seen no evidence of successful interference”.


They refused to publish while carefully not denying that such interference has been attempted and that there is evidence of it. We are entitled to know about attempts to corrupt our political processes, particularly when they focus on the party in government.

Part 4 loosens, rather than tightens, the control of expenditure. Britain has a party system in which one party can raise far more money than others, in increasingly large sums from a small number of wealthy donors. The United States is the only other democracy in which controls on party finance are so lax. The Bill aims to enable the Conservatives to entrench that advantage by loosening controls on how those funds are spent.

The Government published their response to the PACAC report quietly last week. It failed to address most of the committee’s powerful criticisms.

This is a constitutional Bill. It reshapes the rules of political campaigning and elections—central elements in a constitutional democracy. I hope the Minister will not try to push it through unchanged, stonewalling in overlong speeches into late-night sittings, as he did on the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill. He used to be a constitutional, one-nation Conservative. He has now become a Johnsonian populist, contemptuous of parliamentary scrutiny challenging the Prime Minister’s interpretation of the people’s will, as he has told us on several occasions.

I remind the Minister of two very different speeches about freedom and democracy in the last two weeks, representing incompatible understandings of Conservative values. The chairman of the Conservative Party, Oliver Dowden, made an extraordinary speech in Washington to the Heritage Foundation about threats to freedom. He asserted that these threats are now centred in our universities and schools—in intellectual elites questioning established values. He said nothing, to a Trump Republican audience, about the threats to freedom from those who refuse to accept the outcome of elections, encourage mobs to attack the legislature, erect barriers to voting by disadvantaged groups, and redraw the boundaries of electoral districts to favour one party against others. His silence suggests that he does not think that constitutional rules matter in democratic politics. This Bill arrives in the Lords with worrying echoes of American Republican ambivalence about democracy as such.

In contrast, Sir John Major, when speaking to the Institute for Government, warned:

“Our democracy is a fragile structure: it is not an impenetrable fortress. It can fall if no-one challenges what is wrong, or does not fight for what is right. The protection of democracy depends upon Parliament and the Government upholding the values we have as individuals, and the trust we inspire as a nation.”


I wish I could be confident that the Minister agrees with Sir John, rather than Mr Dowden.

This Bill aims to tilt the rules of campaigning further in favour of the Conservative Party. It would be a contempt of Parliament for the Government to push it through without careful examination of its half-digested proposals. If it becomes necessary to carry it over into the next Session, that would be better than rushing through democratically dangerous regulations. If the House considers that some clauses require more detailed examination in a Select Committee, following the Commons committee’s criticisms, then so much the better. Constitutional Bills deserve and require far more examination than this Bill has received so far.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Lord Wallace of Saltaire Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 9th February 2022 Lords Chamber

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said he wanted the other place to think again, and other noble Lords made the same point. It is of course the right of noble Lords, when they wish, to ask the House of Commons to think again—but the House of Commons has thought about this and sent us a Bill with no such provision as your Lordships propose to insert in it. The Bill has also been considered by the Joint Committee, which has reflected on it.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

I am sure the Minister is aware that the House of Commons spent less than two hours in Committee, on Report and on the final stages of this Bill—so to say that it gave it considerable attention would I think be a slight exaggeration.

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, your Lordships are required to deal with the Bills that are sent to us by the other place, and the other place has sent us a Bill with no such provision. Members of your Lordships’ House under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord McLoughlin on the Joint Committee, which reflected at length on these matters, did not propose such an amendment. None of those who have scrutinised the legislation formally have proposed what the noble and learned Lord has suggested.

The noble and learned Lord said that we could not return to an ancient system. There is perhaps a faint irony in advancing that argument in an unelected House with a tradition that dates back centuries. He said that we had to be 21st century. Well, we tried “21st century” in 2011 and, frankly, I rather prefer the experience of many decades in the long past which I believe served us well, and the proposition before your Lordships, supported by my party and the party opposite at the general election, was that we should do away with the failed 21st-century experiment.

We do not have to talk the talk about the problems that a Commons vote might cause. There has been a lot of speculation, to and fro, on this, but we lived it in 2017 to 2019; that Parliament refused three times to be dissolved and to meet the verdict of the people.

The repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act was in our manifesto and that of the party opposite. I found it fascinating to hear the throaty roar of approval from the Benches opposite when any noble Lord, starting with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said that we must not go back to the situation before the Act was passed. I remind the party opposite, as did my noble friend, of the Labour Party’s promise to the people:

“A Labour government will repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, which has stifled democracy and propped up weak governments”.


They wish to maintain an essential part of that Act in the form of a Commons vote.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

6: Clause 6, page 2, line 13, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
“(3) This Act comes into force when a Cabinet Manual revised in relation to the dissolution and calling of Parliament has been laid before Parliament.(3A) Prior to revising the Cabinet Manual the Minister must consult the relevant select committees in the House of Commons and the House of Lords.”Member’s explanatory statement
The current Cabinet Manual references the Fixed-term Parliaments Act and has not been revised for 10 years. As a consequence of the repeal of that Act under this Bill, the Cabinet Manual should be revised in relation to the dissolution and calling of Parliament.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I tabled this amendment last week and received a letter on Monday evening from the Minister that answers a number of my points. Therefore, I mainly wish to stress the usefulness of the Cabinet Manual and to encourage the Minister to repeat what he said in my letter on the Floor of the House.

Paragraph 227 of the Joint Committee report points out that:

“legislation—by definition—does not create or restore conventions … If the old conventions on dissolving and summoning Parliaments are to be restored, or indeed if they are to be replaced by new ones, there needs to be a political process to identify, and to articulate, what those conventions are.”

I have heard the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, make two speeches in different debates over the last two weeks about the importance of due process and the political process and of not just rushing things through or allowing Prime Ministers to decide them. The Constitution Committee report on the revision of the Cabinet Manual stresses not only the importance and usefulness of that manual, but the need for there to be consultation with Parliament about the revision of the manual, because it relates to the relationship between the Executive and Parliament.

The Minister’s letter, which I thank him for, stresses that conventions

“can only operate effectively when they are commonly understood and where there is tacit agreement that they should be respected, irrespective of the particular political challenges and circumstances of the day”.

This has not been entirely true of our current Prime Minister over the last two years. We need to get back to that. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

My Lords, I remind the Minister that there was a Constitution Committee report on the Cabinet Manual and I think the Government have yet to respond. Could he give an update on when a response is likely to be? As it would cover these issues, it would be helpful when we have the opportunity for a longer debate in your Lordships’ House, given that we do not have the time today.

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, for his thoughts on the Cabinet Manual. It is important. I am pleased to say that, of course, the Government agree on the fundamental importance of the Cabinet Manual, and I can confirm to the House, as I have indicated privately to the noble Lord, that the Government intend to publish an updated version of the Cabinet Manual within this Parliament. In response to the noble Baroness opposite, I can also add that I have written to the newly appointed chair of the Constitution Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, to set out the Government’s intentions on this topic.

There have been a number of developments that render the current version out of date, not least—if we ever get to the end of it—this legislation going through now, which will have to be taken into account. As a result, this amendment, which would prevent the Bill coming into force until after a revised version of the Cabinet Manual has been published, is not needed and would be unhelpful. It would delay the commencement of legislation, which, one would infer, our Parliament will pass shortly, and we would be left carrying on under the terms of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. I hope, for that technical reason, but also on the basis of the assurance that I have given the House, that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

I thank the Minister for repeating that statement. I stress that the revision of the manual should ideally come well before the timing of the next election, and I strongly support the opposition suggestion that there should be a debate, ideally in both Houses, on the conventions that will have been restated. On that basis, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.

Ministerial Code

Lord Wallace of Saltaire Excerpts

Thursday 27th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, as I said in my original Answer, Ministers are personally responsible for deciding how to act and conduct themselves in the light of the code, and for justifying their actions and conduct to Parliament and the public. I refer the noble Lord opposite to the statement that my noble friend Lord Goldsmith put out yesterday, in which he said:

“I did not authorise & do not support anything that would have put animals’ lives ahead of people’s … I never discussed the … charity or their efforts to evacuate animals with the”


Prime Minister.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, did the Minister by any chance see the strapline comment by Guido Fawkes over the video of the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, leaving the Chamber, which read, “We have now reached the point where Ministers have to explain which scandal of the Government’s they are resigning over”? We have another scandal here—an apparent contradiction between what one Minister has said and what it appears from the official record—which needs to be cleared up. We have a Ministerial Code which is effectively policed by a Prime Minister who has now lost public trust. Could not the Government begin to regain public trust by accepting recommendations from the Committee on Standards in Public Life that the Ministerial Code should be placed on a firmer statutory basis?

[Lord True (Con)]

The noble Lord started off with “scandal” and retreated to “apparent contradiction”. I would advise him and others to refer both to the statement put out by my noble friend Lord Goldsmith and the official statements put out by No. 10 Downing Street and the Defence Secretary at the Foreign Affairs Select Committee yesterday.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Lord Wallace of Saltaire Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

2: Clause 2, page 1, line 9, at end insert “subject to subsection (1A).
(1A) The Prime Minister may not request Her Majesty to exercise Her prerogative to dissolve Parliament if Parliament has been prorogued, unless Parliament is first recalled and the House of Commons agrees that the Prime Minister should request Her Majesty to exercise Her prerogative to dissolve Parliament.”

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, quite a lot of what we will discuss this evening is how far we need to put into statute the sort of things the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, has been thinking about, or whether a revised version of the Cabinet Manual would be sufficient to set out the conventions agreed by the parties. We will come back to that later.

Looking through the 2004 report of the Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Taming the Prerogative: Strengthening Ministerial Accountability to Parliament, I note that there was a memorandum from the Treasury Solicitor’s Department on the royal prerogative, which listed as one of the prerogatives

“the summoning, prorogation and dissolution of Parliament”

as a single interconnected power.

The Government have said that Prorogation is outside the scope of the Bill and is an entirely separate car. The reasons, going back to why in 2010-11 Prorogation was taken out, seem relatively clear. The Lords Constitution Committee then said that

“the risk of abuse of the power of prorogation is very small”.

The Government said in the debates on the Bill that

“The conventions of this House are sufficiently strong”—[Official Report, Commons, 18/1/11; col. 768.]


to make inclusion of the power of Prorogation on a statutory footing unwise and unnecessary. Opinions would now differ. As the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, pointed out, no Prime Minister has asked improperly for a Dissolution, but the question of whether a Prime Minister has asked improperly for a Prorogation is very much open.

The noble Lord, Lord True, and other Ministers have enjoyed referring to our tried and tested constitutional system. If one looks back at arguments over Prorogation, there were riots throughout the country in 1820 against Prorogation. In 1831, when the Lords were about to debate whether there should be a Motion to prevent Prorogation, William IV jumped into a rather inferior carriage and came down personally to prorogue Parliament. In 1854, an MP proposed an address to the Queen against Prorogation, which Lord Aberdeen as Prime Minister made a matter of confidence in order to prevent. “Tried and tested” is, perhaps, a little strong.

I ask the Minister in general terms for an assurance that a revised edition of the Cabinet Manual, which I hope is now well under way, will clarify that there is now a well-established convention—tried and tested, even—over the last century that Prorogation is now a prerogative power available for use only in marking the short recess period between parliamentary Sessions, and that this should not be used as a prelude to a request for Dissolution that has not been communicated to nor approved by Parliament. Nor should it be used, as it has not been for the past century, as a means of avoiding parliamentary scrutiny, proposals or decisions over any extended period.

Perhaps I may be permitted to say a little about the broader issues behind this debate since my amendment is linked to the broader amendment which follows. The desirability of reaching as wide a consensus as possible has been stated in a range of reports relating to this Bill. The 2004 committee report said that the case for the reform of ministerial executive power is “unanswerable”. Indeed, opposition Conservatives including William Hague gave evidence to that committee in support of further limits on executive power. Perhaps the young Nicholas True wrote some of the evidence which he gave; I do not know.

The Minister’s response to the Constitution Committee last December said, rather more weakly, I thought:

“Political consensus is of course valuable when possible”


without, so far as I am aware, promoting any active cross-party consultations on the constitutional issue. I regret that. This is a major constitutional Bill; therefore there needs to be as much consensus as we can achieve.

The fact is that, week by week, we begin to approach the idea that this Government might not necessarily be in power beyond the next election, which could conceivably produce a Parliament in which no single party has a majority. We are concerned not just with addressing the flaws in the 2011 Act but with future-proofing, as various committees have talked about, so that we are prepared for a situation that we might face with the outcome of the next election.

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The careful scrutiny that your Lordships rightly expect has been provided. To construct this novel constitutional scheme which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is suggesting, building on the remnants of a piece of legislation that did not stand up in the political turmoil of the previous Parliament, would perhaps be to act with a little haste. That is not the way to ensure that our constitutional arrangements will stand the test of time as the previous arrangements did. This Bill returns our country to its best constitutional traditions, and I urge your Lordships to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I briefly point out that the definition of “Prorogation” that the Minister has just given does not cover the meaning of what the Prime Minister did in 2019. He might perhaps like to reconsider that definition if he wants to argue that the Prime Minister was behaving within the constitution. A lot of this debate has been about the lack of clarity in constitutional conventions at present and the need for greater clarity. I would be very happy to discuss further with him the revision of the Cabinet Manual to set out clearer definitions of what our conventions are, agreed among the parties and consulting with the committees in both Houses, which is what we need. We lack trust in politics at present and the public has a low opinion of politics and politicians. That is part of the reason why, as the noble Lord, Lord Desai, said, we need to put conventions down on paper. I hope that we will come back to the Cabinet Manual later.

I say rapidly to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that we are a parliamentary democracy, and one of the planks on which the 2016 referendum was fought was to restore parliamentary sovereignty. When Parliament began afterwards to divide up into factions within both the major parties—which, after all, was the cause of our difficulties between 2017 and 2019—the Government moved towards an idea of popular sovereignty. If we were to move towards a system of popular sovereignty, as she suggests, we would be moving towards the Swiss model. We would have a much more local democracy, with local as well as national referenda and a Government who were much less able to control anything much from the centre; Switzerland does not have much of a foreign policy as a result. That is a popular democracy. It would be a very different model from our constitutional democracy based on checks and balances between judiciary, Parliament and Executive.

What we risk having is a populist democracy with highly centralised government and a leader with a good deal of financial support behind him—occasionally her, but almost always him—who says that he speaks for the public without actually asking them what they say, who does his best to denigrate any sort of critical or independent media and who thus undermines the whole idea of a constitutional democracy. We have seen that happen in a number of countries in recent years and we do not want it to happen here. That is why we need greater clarity in our constitutional conventions, which is part of what we are concerned with in this Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 2 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

We have it because it is just possible that the courts could find a way in. We have seen them getting involved in areas that we never thought they would get involved in before. That is a fact of the way the judiciary has moved in recent years, and it is why the clause is there.

I do not accept that the clause sets a dangerous precedent. It is about this one very narrow issue. It is not about an ouster clause that would be put in every statute that came before Parliament. Of course, Parliament must decide at the end of the day how it wants to frame its laws. It has the right to do that, and the courts can then interpret those laws, but I do not believe that this will be seen as a precedent for a more general use of ouster clauses. If it is, I am fairly sure that Parliament would not accept them. We should see this clause in the narrow concept in which it is drafted and not try to extend it beyond that.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, if we are talking about our tried and tested constitution, we should remember that in the 17th century it was Chief Justice Coke and his defence of the rule of law against the extent of the royal prerogative which led to the development of some of the ideas of constitutional democracy at least as much as Parliament. The rule of law is an essential part of the way we work.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that we all know that this clause is in the Bill because of the judgment on Prorogation in 2019. I was interested to hear that the Minister’s definition of Prorogation did not in any sense suggest that that use of the power came within an accepted definition. Perhaps he will change his definition next time he comes.

The Minister has said that the importance of the Bill is to restore the status quo, but this ouster clause is not the restoration of the status quo. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that it opens a window to its use on other occasions, which would be highly undesirable. It is much more radical than Clause 2 in changing our customs and practices. If we want to maintain the status quo while changing it a little—

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

The noble Lord says that the clause does not restore the status quo. Does it follow that, in his view, the power to dissolve would have been justiciable at common law by virtue of the conventions?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

I find it hard to imagine a situation in which the power of Dissolution would be used in the way that the power of Prorogation was used in 2019, so I do not think it likely that the case would arise. That is my instant opinion.

The radical dimension of this is that it disturbs the balance between the judiciary and the rule of law, and Parliament and the checks that Parliament has on executive power and the Government. The conclusion of The Independent Review of Administrative Law says, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, will remember:

“The Panel consider that the independence of our judiciary and the high reputation in which it is held internationally should cause the government to think long and hard before seeking to curtail its powers … It is inevitable that the relationship between the judiciary, the executive and Parliament will from time to time give rise to tensions … a degree of conflict shows that the checks and balances in our constitution are working well.”


I strongly agree with those sentiments. It is part of the proper process of constitutional democracy that each of those elements of our constitution should have a degree of tension with each other and hold each other in balance.

That is why I am in favour of amending this Bill to provide the simpler process of powers of Dissolution that Clause 2 provides—thus making Clause 3 unnecessary —and supplementing the desire for clarity of conventions by revising the Cabinet Manual to have a more fluent definition of Dissolution principles. If we do all three of those, we will substantially improve the constitutional value of this Bill.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I would like to think that the Minister will find this argument conclusive. If he had accepted the amendment on Clause 2 that so many noble Lords thought was valuable—to have parliamentary resolution for a general election—we would not have needed this debate on the ouster clause and could have got home much earlier. But he has rejected it and that brings us to the debate about the ouster clause itself.

In normal circumstances, when eminent lawyers pronounce on issues of law and legality, those of us who are not lawyers intervene with some trepidation. I am relaxed on this issue, however, because the ghost in the room is the debate on Prorogation, not Dissolution, and that it went to the Supreme Court. We all know the debates surrounding that and those of us who are not lawyers are emboldened by the defence that the Divisional Court thought 100% in one direction and the Supreme Court thought 100% in the other. Whichever argument you pick, you will have a few top lawyers on your side.

In my view, that whole episode relates to that dreadful Parliament I keep referring to between 2017 and 2019. All that debate, which went to the Supreme Court, derived from the background of a dysfunctional Parliament—a bad case, if you like. So much of the debate we are having now is with that and the judgments that were made hanging over us. The list of dysfunctionalities of that Parliament knows no bounds. I mention one obvious point: there was a Speaker who, on the biggest debate of the day—the referendum result and its consequences—was highly partisan on one side of the argument. In those circumstances, all sorts of other undesirable things follow.

I, for one, very much regret that the Supreme Court decided to get involved in politics at the highest level. I know there are all sorts of disclaimers that it was not doing that, but that is precisely what happened. It is difficult to imagine a more dramatic, higher-profile political issue than that of leaving or not leaving the EU, and the Supreme Court came down decisively on one side of the argument, in practical terms. As soon as the courts are involved in these kinds of highly charged political areas, we are in trouble.

I can certainly see the need for this ouster clause, but I regret the need for it because we should have dealt with this in the simple way of a parliamentary majority. We keep hearing about the three pillars of the constitution: the judiciary, the Executive and the legislature. In my book, and perhaps I am biased, one of those is greater than the other two—a first among equals—and that is Parliament, which is answerable to the public in a way the other two are not.

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Moved by

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

7: Clause 4, page 2, line 2, leave out “If it has not been dissolved earlier,”
Member’s explanatory statement
This is a probing amendment aimed at debating the expectation of how long a Parliament should be in normal circumstances.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, before I speak to Amendments 7 and 9, I want to say one or two things about the conditions for Report. Here we are, late at night. We have just listened to the Minister make what I think is the longest speech I have ever heard to sum up in Committee, at 30 minutes, and there are still some important issues to debate. I appreciate that the length of his speech reflected the complexity and importance of the issues in a constitutional Bill; that being the case, we will need the time on Report, with a full House and without the enforcement of unusually short speeches, to discuss them further.

The House of Commons went through the Committee, Report and Third Reading stages of this Bill in less than two hours—not good for a constitutional Bill. This House is going through its Committee stage in a few hours, stretching late into the night. I very much hope that, when we come to Report, the usual channels will ensure that we start in prime time and address the very important issues, particularly in Clauses 2 and 3, at length and with the House listening.

Amendments 7 and 9 are probing amendments on the balance between frequent elections and regular elections and, secondly, about what time of the year they should be held if possible. I speak as someone with experience of having fought two elections in one year, the first in February and the second in late October. Yesterday, I talked to a former Conservative MP who said that he remembered having the impression of being damp for an entire month during a winter election. It is good for democracy if we have elections on a regular basis and in good weather in the summer; that is why I suggest that, where possible, we should have elections in June.

It is also good because regular elections allow for a longer period to know when controlled expenditure should be imposed and when the Opposition are entitled to talk to the Civil Service to prepare for a potential change of government. The prime ministerial prerogative to jump elections when they think is most to their advantage—we have not yet talked about incumbency advantage—deprives the Opposition of the advantage to prepare properly for governance afterwards. Good governance matters to an effective constitutional democracy.

I am also concerned about the effective monitoring and administration of campaigns. I go and talk to my local electoral registration team from time to time; my ear has been bent on the difficulties of running election campaigns at short notice. I heard anger in Bradford some months ago about Conservative MPs saying, “There is no problem—all it requires is for staff to work harder if it comes to it”.

I tabled the amendments to test the question: how often do we want to have elections, and do we wish to leave it entirely open as to whether they are in December, January or June? In my opinion, the default should be June, not coinciding with the May elections or devolved national elections. The exceptions should be at times of the year not including winter. That is the purpose of my amendments.

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[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I thank noble Lords; I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Rooker, for tabling these amendments, which have initiated what has been an interesting short debate, if not necessarily always on the amendments. In 1974, I remember pushing a pushchair and delivering literature, though not necessarily for the Labour Party of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker.

If noble Lords do not mind, I will stick to the amendments and not answer any further questions. The Bill makes express provision for Parliament to automatically dissolve five years after it has first met. This is the most straightforward way to calculate the five-year term. It also remains the case that your Lordships’ House has an absolute veto on legislation to extend the life of any Parliament.

I first turn to the question of the length of parliamentary terms. I have heard the argument for a four-year term, and I heard from the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, that he does not necessarily agree with the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, on this. However, the Government remain of the very strong view that five years is the right maximum length for any Parliament.

A maximum five-year term allows the Government time to undertake and implement their programme without having to start any electioneering. This is an important issue that I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, took into account as he did not mention it. Any Government have to deliver on the programme that is in their manifesto. Five years is a maximum period which I and the Government believe balances sensible, long-term government with ensuring that a Government and Parliament are accountable to the electorate in a timely manner.

In fact, we can that see parliamentary terms have developed their own effective and flexible rhythm. A strong Government seeking a fresh mandate might seek a Dissolution after four years. Anything less than four years is usually a sign of some political crisis or emergency. Often, Parliaments are dissolved for political necessity rather than choice, to put a policy or political question to the electorate or to resolve a political crisis. Moreover, shorter maximum terms invariably mean earlier speculation about whether a Parliament will see out its full term. This speculation does not serve Parliament, the public or businesses well. The former Cabinet Secretary noted in evidence at PACAC that longer-term Parliaments and longer-term tenures for both senior civil servants and Ministers would all be very good for Governments, who are increasingly having to face up to very long-term issues, as we have seen recently.

Finally, this question was reviewed by the Joint Committee, which did not question the starting premise that five years is the appropriate duration for parliamentary terms and the life cycle of a Parliament.

I will now address the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, on the timing of elections. The noble Lord has reflected on the experience of the electorate in December 2019 and observed that winter elections are not desirable. I hope your Lordships will allow me to relate Stanley Baldwin’s comments on the impossibility of finding a time for an election that suits everyone. On 23 October 1935, when seeking a Dissolution, Mr Baldwin observed on the timing of elections:

“Therefore I have long come to the conclusion that you must rule out the spring and summer months because of financial business. You must rule out August and September because of the holidays. You are left with the autumn, but in no circumstances must you run into any interference with the Christmas trade.”—[Official Report, Commons, 23/10/1935; col. 154.]


Those light-hearted remarks contain an important kernel of truth.

Certainly, outside times of political tumult when exceptional elections are necessary, it may well be the case that a Prime Minister would prefer not to call on the public to venture out to cast their vote in the depths of winter. I share the noble Lord’s sentiment that winter elections do not provide the most ideal conditions for queuing at a polling station or canvassing from door to door. The election in 2019 was, of course, exceptional and was called to bring an end to a period of extended parliamentary deadlock.

Nevertheless, the purpose of the Bill is to provide for a system that will serve successive Governments. As the 2011 Act has taught us, we should not draft our constitutional arrangements in response to one event. There is no guarantee that, in the future, an election will not again be required in December—or February, as in 1974, which we have heard about. So it would not be wise to legislate in the long term for an event that was an exception to the rule. Our arrangements need to be adaptable. That is the important point.

The challenge of the approach set out in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is that it prevents the flexibility necessary for a Government to respond to particular circumstances. As such, I suggest to the noble Lord that to subject the timing of elections to this particular constraint—even if Parliaments do not normally run their full term—would run counter to that objective.

The purpose of the Bill is to revive arrangements that have stood, and will continue to stand, the test of time. I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Rooker, for stimulating this fascinating discussion but I hope that your Lordships’ Committee will agree with me that Clause 4, unamended, is the most suitable approach to achieve that aim. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, noting that we may return on at least one of these amendments on Report. That remains to be discussed.

Amendment 7 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

10: Clause 6, page 2, line 13, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
“(3) This Act comes into force when a revised Dissolution Principles document has been laid before Parliament and—(a) the revised Dissolution Principles document has been approved by a resolution of the House of Commons; and(b) the House of Lords has debated a motion to take note of the revised Dissolution Principles document. (3A) The Dissolution Principles document under subsection (3) must be revised to refer to a “request” from the Prime Minister to the Sovereign to dissolve Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to implement a recommendation from the Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act to revise the Dissolution Principles document.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, the purpose of the two amendments in this group is to draw attention to recommendations made in the Joint Committee report and in a number of other parliamentary reports to which the Government have responded weakly and inadequately.

Paragraph 15 of the Joint Committee report states:

“The move to reduce executive dominance in key parts of the UK constitutional arrangements … was accompanied by a desire to clarify and make public the understanding of constitutional conventions.”


It then references the White Paper, The Governance of Britain, of 2007, and the drafting of the Cabinet Manual. The Constitution Committee’s report, Revision of the Cabinet Manual, published last July, stated at paragraph 35:

“We recommend that a draft update of the Cabinet Manual should be produced as soon as possible, and not later than 12 months from the date of this report.”


Paragraph 44 states:

“We note the open and constructive engagement which took place between the then Government and parliamentary committees on the first draft of the Cabinet Manual in 2010–11.”


Paragraph 45 goes on:

“We recommend that future drafts, including draft individual chapters, should be shared with our Committee and the relevant committee in the House of Commons for comment. This can help to achieve consensus”—


a word the Government do not seem fully to understand—

“on the text.”

It added that the next draft should commit to regular revision at the beginning of each Parliament—a summary of conventions, so that there is clarity and these things are understood.

On Dissolution principles, the Joint Committee at paragraphs 227 and 228 says that

“legislation—by definition—does not create or restore conventions … there needs to be a political process to identify, and to articulate, what those conventions are … The overwhelming consensus of those who gave evidence to the Committee is that the Dissolution Principles document falls short.”

Given that the Dissolution document as produced by the Government has received fairly universal criticism and very little approbation, it is quite remarkable that the Government have not yet provided a draft. I hope that the Minister will be able to say that a draft is now well under way and will shortly be provided. I say this with particular emphasis because we may well come out of the next election without a single-party majority. It is quite likely that there will be at least four parties which have two dozen MPs and another two parties which have perhaps a dozen, so there could be a very complicated outcome. At that point, we will need some clear guidance, understood by all those likely to be involved, about how government will be formed in a difficult situation.

The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee in July 2021 pressed the Minister to issue a revised Dissolution principles document, which has not yet been provided, and the Minister in the other place, Chloe Smith, told the Commons on 13 September that there was

“ongoing dialogue to be had”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/9/21; col. 751.]

on Dissolution conventions. I hope the Minister will be able to tell us how that dialogue is going on, when it might conclude and whether he thinks it is appropriate for this Bill to become an Act before those necessary documents to mark and clarify our conventions, which should accompany it, have been published and agreed with Parliament. I beg to move.

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[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, has frequently looked forward to that fabled day when the Liberal Democrats will again have, as he sees it, a balance of power in government. Perhaps a manual could be published on what would be the likely behaviour of the Liberal Democrats in the event they had such constitutional authority.

Jokes apart, I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising these points. They are two fundamentally important documents, which, as my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, pointed out, are government documents. We published a Dissolution Principles document because we are aware that principles can operate effectively only when they are commonly understood and, yes, when there is tacit agreement that they should be respected, irrespective of the particular political challenges and circumstances of the day. There has been substantial discussion and scrutiny of the principles, including by the Joint Committee chaired by my noble friend Lord McLoughlin, by PACAC in the other place, and in dialogue back and forth.

As others have said, Amendment 10 proposes that there should be a process for Parliament to scrutinise a restatement of the principles in the form of a vote in both Houses, which has the difficulties that my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth and others referred to. The Government have reservations that this would be a step towards a codification of principles and conventions, just as we saw that the 2011 Act, which we have discussed, was not necessarily helpful because of the need for flexibility. In fact, Lord Sumption recognised in principle the challenges of codification when he gave evidence to the Joint Committee. He argued:

“One should be careful not to start codifying conventions, because their practical value is that they represent experience and practice … what is required to make Parliament work is not necessarily the same today as it was half a century ago.”


That will be so in the future. The Government believe that a careful balance needs to be struck between ensuring that there is a tacit agreement that these principles should be upheld—I acknowledge the duty to be mindful of the views of people inside and outside politics—and leaving space for these conventions to move in line with the political context.

In practical terms, on this and the next amendment, the Government would be concerned that this amendment means that the provisions of the Bill would only come into effect once both Houses had considered and voted on a Dissolutions principle. That risks creating uncertainty around the coming into force of the Act and, therefore, the arrangements for calling any election, which we have all agreed today should be avoided.

The same applies to Amendment 11. As noble Lords have emphasised throughout the debates today, constitutional conventions have a vital role to play in our parliamentary democracy. I am conscious that the separate tradition of the Liberal Democrats, which I respect, is that they wish more and more to be written down. The Cabinet Manual, alongside other authoritative texts such as Erskine May, is an important point of reference and reflection for how conventions are understood—but iterations enable evolution.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is quite right to say that it will be necessary to revisit these sections of the Cabinet Manual once the 2011 Act is repealed. The Cabinet Manual recognises that conventions continue to evolve, and the Government will in due course respond to the report of the Constitution Committee and set out their intentions with regard to updating the Cabinet Manual. We are grateful to the committee for its considered review of the manual and its thoughtful identification of the key issues that ought to be considered in terms of any update. I am acutely aware that the Government’s response is long overdue, and I have humbly apologised for this to the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor. We are carefully considering those recommendations and will respond in due course.

To continue on the amendment, the Government agree that the Cabinet Manual should be an accurate reflection of our constitutional arrangements, but we are of the view that this amendment for a parliamentary vote is unnecessarily restrictive, for the reasons given by my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth and others. But the Government are particularly concerned that the provisions of the Bill would only come into force once a revised version of the Cabinet Manual has been published. Such an undertaking would necessarily require a considerable amount of work. Tying the provisions of the Bill to such a project risks creating uncertainty, which, again, we wish to avoid.

Both these amendments would run the risk of fixing our understanding of these conventions at a point in time—that is point one—undermining the flexibility that is essential to our constitutional arrangements. On the matter of the Cabinet Manual, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment, which would add complications because of the Catch-22 situation: the Cabinet Manual draws its authority from its ability to accurately reflect our arrangements, but we have not yet determined in Parliament what the successor arrangements to FTPA should be.

While obviously accepting the importance of both the principles and the manual as well as their relevance across party, beyond party and beyond this Parliament, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, the question really is: where are these documents and when are they going to be published? There were some very critical comments from various committees of both Houses, including the Joint Committee, about the lack of quality in what is currently provided in the Dissolution Principles and about the outdatedness of the Cabinet Manual, particularly the part of it that deals with Government formation.

There may be an overall majority for one party at the next election, which would be easier, but we need to future-proof the Bill as we take it through and to prepare for other eventualities. The Joint Committee marks that we are more likely to have non-majoritarian outcomes from elections in the coming years than we have had in the last 50. Perhaps the Minister will be prepared to talk between now and Report about being able to provide some statement on Report about a rather more definite timespan than “in due course”, which, as we know, means “kicked into the long grass for the next year or two”.

We need to have, as far as we can, some shared assumptions, some cross-party agreement, about these crucial conventions in our constitution. That requires trust. Trust is currently in very short supply; trust in this Government and this Prime Minister, if the opinion polls are correct, is currently going through the floor. Where trust is lacking, one needs written rules. Where written rules are challenged, we end up requiring statute. Yes, we would perhaps prefer the flexibility of shared assumptions, but in that case we need to talk about what they are and make sure that we all share similar assumptions, before we slide into a situation that could be another critical outcome or contested set of procedures around the next election.

I look forward to talking further with the Minister, and I may or may not wish to bring these amendments back in some form on Report. For the moment, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment, and I wish all your Lordships a very pleasant evening.

Amendment 10 withdrawn.

House of Lords: Appointments

Lord Wallace of Saltaire Excerpts

Monday 24th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, pending any further constructive and radical reform of the House, can the Government not at least agree that the appointments body should become a statutory body and that a set of principles, comparable to the Dissolution principles we will discuss tomorrow, could be drawn up by the Government in co-operation with all other parties represented in the House of Commons to form the basis for a common understanding of the principles by which appointments to this House should be made?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, the House of Lords Appointments Commission performs an important role but, as I have told the House before, there are no current plans to alter its remit. Following the opening Question from the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, one thing I think we could agree on is that the Liberal Democrats are at least very well represented in this House—I do not use the term “overrepresented”, preferred by my noble friend behind me.

Legislation: Skeleton Bills and Delegated Powers

Lord Wallace of Saltaire Excerpts

Thursday 6th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, this has been an excellent debate and well worth all of us postponing our journeys home—I wish more noble Lords had been here. I hope the Minister will respond, after reflection, in writing to all those who have taken part in the debate about some of the important issues which we have been discussing, as well as, of course, responding to the two committee reports which we are discussing.

We have been talking about both the balance of power between Parliament and government and the quality of policy-making. The noble Lord, Lord Bridges of Headley, remarked that we are facing a good deal of half-baked Bills at the moment. I have certainly read through two half-baked Bills over my recess—the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill, which is a real mess, and the Elections Bill. I also read the highly critical report of the Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee on the Elections Bill, which was published on 7 December. In paragraphs 48 and 49 it states:

“The melange of delegated powers provided for in this Bill serves to highlight, and potentially adds to, the complexity of an already disparate body of electoral law …The Government should present the draft secondary legislation as early as possible, as committed to by then responsible Minister, Chloe Smith MP, to enable due consideration by both Houses and stakeholders of the proposed secondary legislation that will provide further detail on the purpose and implementation of the Bill prior to that legislation being laid or made.”


As an example of the style of the Bill, I quote from Schedule 6, paragraph 18:

“The Minister may take whatever steps the Minister considers appropriate to promote awareness among qualifying people of the changes made by section 11 to the overseas elector franchise.”


That is the sort of thing that surely has to come out, and I hope the Minister will accept that.

In winding up, the Minister might like to tell us whether the Government will publish this draft secondary legislation before the Elections Bill receives its Second Reading in the Lords, and whether they will also publish their response to this highly critical PACAC report, which concludes in effect that the Bill in its current state is not fit for purpose. If the Government provide neither of these before the Bill reaches us, it will be appropriate, I suggest, for the Lords to rule that the Bill be paused until they have been received. The strength of these Commons criticisms means that there is a case for withdrawing the Bill in its present form and radically redrafting it. I suggest it might even amount to contempt of Parliament to attempt to push such a Bill through as it stands without taking such criticisms into account.

I say to the Minister that I have hard experience of Bills being paused when I was in his position in the Cabinet Office in the Lords. A Bill was paused for several months for extra consultations and it came back considerably improved. I note that at paragraph 39 the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee recommends precisely that for skeleton Bills, saying that departments should be

“pressed into providing illustrative draft statutory instruments before second reading, to show how the powers were intended to be used.”

That, I suggest, should become a general principle: a draft of secondary legislation proposed under a Bill before Parliament should be published before either House concludes its scrutiny on it.

One of the basic rules, which has been quoted already, that any democratic Government should follow is to refrain from pushing through powers for Ministers which they would object to if they found themselves in opposition, with another party in power. Since the last election, this Government have been behaving as if they expect to be in power for a very long time and can therefore afford to reinforce executive power and sweep away parliamentary objections.

The polls now suggest that this is a less likely outcome of the next election than it seemed six months ago. Wise Conservatives should remember that limited government used to be a sound Conservative principle, and that if and when they again find themselves in opposition, they might deeply regret tipping the balance between Parliament and the Executive so far in favour of executive power. I can almost hear the weighty speech that the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, would then make about the importance of a strong Opposition and the wisdom of the Government giving way to constitutional objections and reasoned criticisms.

There are contradictions in the Government’s attitude at the present moment in calling for cuts in the policy-making ranks of the Civil Service while pressing forward with a heavy legislative agenda and on centralised legislative powers. That is a recipe for poorer-quality legislation and policy outcomes—of course, so is the increasing frequency with which senior and junior Ministers change positions. There is hardly time for a Minister to learn his or her brief before they move on again, leaving frustrated and bewildered officials to greet their successors.

I mention in passing that both these reports talk about the need to ensure that there are adequate resources for parliamentary scrutiny. That is a point that we should not lose, and I hope that the relevant committees will look into that.

The question of how we get down from the temporary surge of both post-Brexit legislation and the response to Covid is another important matter that we all need to look at. We should be returning to the normal pace of legislative change after this, not allowing the rush of each new Minister deciding that he or she wants a Bill and is going to compete to push it through, with the consequences that the noble Lord, Lord Norton, suggests.

It has been said by several Members—including the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, and others—that Parliament should now assert its right to amend secondary legislation or, at least to start with, to send it back more regularly to the Government to ensure that the quality of that legislation is more carefully examined before it is submitted.

Of course, the concentration of power in London and the weakening of local government in England has increased the pressure on government policy-making and the congestion in parliamentary scrutiny. I note that Ministers now issue detailed guidance to local authorities and parcel out funds to local government in multiple small packages; according to one figure I saw recently, less than £250,000 is being sent out in small packages to various local authorities in some cases. Whitehall and Westminster would be much less choked if more decisions were taken by locally elected bodies, as in other democratic states. Sadly, we have a Government that seem fundamentally to distrust local government.

The House of Lords, in turn, would be less heavily burdened with scrutiny if the Commons was more conscientious in its legislative tasks. I note, for example, that the Commons went through the entire Committee, Report and Third Reading stages of the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill in 100 minutes—scarcely time for any serious debate. We are all familiar with Bills which arrive in the Lords with many of their clauses unexamined in the Commons.

The respective roles of the first and second Chambers of Parliament come into play here, and the importance of the scrutiny and revising role the second Chamber plays in our overcentralised state raises broader issues than we can touch on now. That is a matter for a broader discussion of parliamentary and constitutional reform which our Government promised to launch in their 2019 manifesto but have sadly backed out of. However, we need to tackle those issues, and I suggest that one of our key committees—probably the Constitution Committee—needs to therefore return to the question of the role of the second Chamber, how it should be expanded, and how, as the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, and others said, we persuade the new generation of Members of Parliament at the other end that we play a necessary, useful and increasingly important role here.