Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord True
Main Page: Lord True (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord True's debates with the Cabinet Office
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this is the third time in your Lordships’ House that we have had a debate focused on this issue. At Second Reading, it was a key issue, as it was in Committee. It comes down to a fundamental point.
In the other place and, indeed, in your Lordships’ House, Ministers asserted from the beginning that bringing in this piece of legislation takes us back in some kind of parliamentary TARDIS to the status quo ante whereby we return to exactly the position that we were in before the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. However, in Clause 3, that argument is completely undermined by saying, “But just in case we haven’t got it right, we are going to have a clause that avoids any legal action”, and the so-called ouster clausem Clause 3. So the Government are not confident that the Bill without the ouster clause returns us to the position that we were in before.
The fundamental point, also made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, is that there is a choice. Do we accept on the calling of an election executive authority or parliamentary democracy? The huge flaw in the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Howard, is that he seems prepared to trust Parliament on every issue—matters of life and death, legislation and whether we go to war—but not on whether there can be a general election.
I heard the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, in exactly the same way as my noble friend Lord Reid. I wrote them down. He seemed to want to make a major constitutional change where power flowed from the ballot box to the Executive. The fundamental basis of our democracy is that power flows from the ballot box to the elected Chamber of Parliament, the House of Commons, and that the Government derive their authority from that House and are responsible to it.
On the point made by the noble Lord about denying the people a vote—that somehow, if the House of Commons were to vote not to have an election, we would be denying the public an opportunity to have their say—he is not correct, but is right on one point. In effect, there is a fixed or maximum term, in which it is not open to the House of Commons, the Prime Minister, or anyone else to never have an election. There is an end term to any Parliament, by which time an election must be held. It is not simply fixed in time. The argument is that previously the Prime Minister would be expected to go to the monarch. I doubt any of us wish to return to the situation where one puts the monarch in such controversy. We are all scarred by the unlawful Prorogation and how the Government behaved on that. It comes back to this point: do we have executive authority or parliamentary democracy in calling an election? There is nothing more basic for the House of Commons than that objective. Offering the other place an opportunity to vote on this issue avoids the need for Clause 3. The idea that the courts would involve themselves in a decision of Parliament to hold a general election is fanciful. This is an elegant and correct solution of this issue.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, referred to the issue of the former Leader of the House of Commons, Jacob Rees-Mogg, threatening MPs that if they failed to support the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister could call an election. If we are talking about hypothetical circumstances or crises that could occur again, that is certainly one, and should be guarded against at all costs, by not placing the power in the hands of just one person. We should not be surprised by such threats; noble Lords may recall that the current Leader of the House, early on in his parliamentary life, threatened your Lordships’ House with 1,000 extra peers if we failed to pass a piece of legislation he supported. Perhaps threats come quite easily to him.
We had a lengthy debate on this, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, summed up well at the beginning. When this was debated in the House of Commons, there was no lengthy debate, and there is an opportunity for them to reconsider this. When we debated it in Committee previously, my noble friend Lady Taylor said that she was surprised that the House of Commons gave away that power so easily. It may be because it did not discuss it in any great depth or with consideration. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, said, the Joint Committee was divided on the issue of whether it was appropriate or not. It is entirely appropriate that the House of Commons is given the opportunity to consider this again.
I come to one final point, which is that the noble Lord, Lord True, said at both Second Reading and in Committee that the Commons had not amended the Bill, so your Lordships’ House should not do so either. Last night, this House sat beyond 3 am, which is unusual. Today, to facilitate business, we are sitting at 11 am, on a much longer day. If it is not the duty of this House to pass amendments that the other end can consider, then what is the point? The amendment has our full support and I urge noble Lords to vote for it.
My Lords, the request for a dissolution is perhaps the ultimate act of humility by an Executive. It is placing all that has been lent, first by the electorate, and then by Parliament, in the hands of the British people. That is the underlying thought behind what my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley said, in what was a significant and important speech, as was the speech of my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne.
I am sure the Minister is aware that the House of Commons spent less than two hours in Committee, on Report and on the final stages of this Bill—so to say that it gave it considerable attention would I think be a slight exaggeration.
My Lords, your Lordships are required to deal with the Bills that are sent to us by the other place, and the other place has sent us a Bill with no such provision. Members of your Lordships’ House under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord McLoughlin on the Joint Committee, which reflected at length on these matters, did not propose such an amendment. None of those who have scrutinised the legislation formally have proposed what the noble and learned Lord has suggested.
The noble and learned Lord said that we could not return to an ancient system. There is perhaps a faint irony in advancing that argument in an unelected House with a tradition that dates back centuries. He said that we had to be 21st century. Well, we tried “21st century” in 2011 and, frankly, I rather prefer the experience of many decades in the long past which I believe served us well, and the proposition before your Lordships, supported by my party and the party opposite at the general election, was that we should do away with the failed 21st-century experiment.
We do not have to talk the talk about the problems that a Commons vote might cause. There has been a lot of speculation, to and fro, on this, but we lived it in 2017 to 2019; that Parliament refused three times to be dissolved and to meet the verdict of the people.
The repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act was in our manifesto and that of the party opposite. I found it fascinating to hear the throaty roar of approval from the Benches opposite when any noble Lord, starting with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said that we must not go back to the situation before the Act was passed. I remind the party opposite, as did my noble friend, of the Labour Party’s promise to the people:
“A Labour government will repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, which has stifled democracy and propped up weak governments”.
They wish to maintain an essential part of that Act in the form of a Commons vote.
Can the Minister give one example of a spokesman from this side saying that we wish to retain the Fixed-term Parliaments Act?
I fear I must say to the noble Lord, who I greatly respect and admire, that I simply stated a feature of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act that the party opposite wishes to retain: that there should be a Commons veto on Dissolution. That is what I said, and that is a fact. If the party opposite votes for this amendment, it will be voting for a House of Commons veto potentially on its own Dissolution—it is written there in the book.
If the Minister is going to give us a history lesson on how people have acted and voted, could he remind us how he and his colleagues voted on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act?
My Lords, I promised I would look up my personal record on that Bill. I have not done so, but I would be surprised if my name featured very heavily. Anyway, it is being done away with now, and I think the noble Lord and I agree that it should be done away with, whatever follows.
A vote in the House of Commons has created paralysis in a number of contexts and could create paralysis in many contexts. Some noble Lords have spoken on this, including my noble friends Lord Bridges and Lord Howard of Lympne, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown. There could be minority Governments or situations where parties, Parliament or the nation have divided.
The kernel of the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, and others is that their approach offers simplicity. In fact, it adds a complication to a Bill which is simple. Without going over the same ground, we saw that painfully in 2019, when the Labour Party was three times presented with the opportunity to force an election, and Mr Corbyn thrice denied the election to the Prime Minister and the British people by sitting on his hands. So do not tell me that there cannot be circumstances in which an Opposition would seek to prevent a general election. We have lived that system and I believe that my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, were absolutely right to warn that these circumstances could recur.
In Committee, I set out the negative consequences for the fundamental conventions on confidence. Simply put, the privilege to request that the sovereign exercise the Dissolution prerogative is an executive function enjoyed by virtue of the ability of the Government to command the confidence of the Commons. Our contention is that this simple process should not be unduly constrained by the type of process that the noble and learned Lord puts before us; it could be disruptive and unhelpful at times when expediency is essential.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He is talking about the use of executive powers. Is he concerned—I assume he is, because of Clause 3—that the courts might get involved in this and that that could cause serious constitutional conflict? Surely if the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was accepted, that would reduce the need for the ouster clause in Clause 3?
My Lords, I do not think it is an either/or question. If I may use a phrase that was once popular on the Benches opposite, there is third way, which is to have neither of those amendments and to return to the simple and proven practice of the past.
When we send an amendment to the other place, we are always adjured to be careful what we send and to show how we reflect and are thoughtful. I would like to consider some of the practical working of the proposition that the noble and learned Lord puts before us. There is little about that, despite its immense significance potentially for our constitution, and indeed its reversal of the Government’s manifesto commitment to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act.
For example, the noble and learned Lord proposes that there should be a Motion that
“this present Parliament will be dissolved.”
How would this parliamentary process be sequenced and when would it apply? How would it relate to confidence? Would it also apply following a loss of confidence? Would a Prime Minister have to go for a further Motion? Could anyone put before the House of Commons the Motion proposed by the noble and learned Lord, or would it be only the Prime Minister and the Treasury Bench? If the Motion is passed, is the Prime Minister bound to seek a Dissolution—for example, a sudden tactical alliance could trigger a general election—or could he seek to retain the confidence of the House of Commons? Even if there were such a Motion as the noble and learned Lord has proposed, when would the Prime Minister have to dissolve Parliament?
In even more extraordinary circumstances, given such an amendment, could a Government procure such a Motion on the first day after the end of the debate on the gracious Speech? Could they pass such a Motion
“that this present Parliament will be dissolved”,
and then wait for the rest of the Parliament? After all, it says “will”; it does not say “when”.
These questions are practical and unanswered. I submit that it is not a responsible role for a revising Chamber to send this amendment down to the elected Chamber with none of those issues worked through. They were carefully considered by the Joint Committee, which arrived at a conclusion. This is constitution-making on the hoof.
It is the launching of a ship of uncertainty in which many questions are unanswered.
I find the noble Lord’s comments quite offensive. He is suggesting that it is inappropriate for your Lordships’ House, having debated this issue for significantly longer than the other place, to suggest an alternative. That is perfectly reasonable and normal. The arrangements that he says should be in place are in the Bill. They are also untested, because it does not return us to the situation as before. I ask him to be a bit more careful in his choice of words and his attitude to the House discussing such issues.
My Lords, I reject those remarks—in a friendly manner, of course. I do not think it is in any way offensive for a Minister at the Dispatch Box, or any other Member of your Lordships’ House, to put to noble Lords that there may be practical difficulties and things that are lacking in amendments proposed before the House.
We are often told that we should proceed with the utmost care in constitutional change; I agree profoundly. “Further and mature reflection” was the phrase I noted from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge; I agree. The Bill had extensive pre-legislative scrutiny. This option was not recommended. The majority of the Joint Committee, on which your Lordships are represented, considered that it would be, as was quoted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, contrary to the public interest. With that advice, and with the utmost respect, I do not think that hasty ping-pong between the two Houses qualifies as utmost care for making a substantial constitutional provision, against what the Joint Committee recommended. I submit that that is not a prudent approach. For that reason, I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and others will reflect on the wisdom and practicality of the amendment.
There is a final fundamental point. The creation of statutory constraints would cut against and under- mine the flexibility that characterises the pre-FTPA arrangements that the Government want to reinstate, as they have promised. Generations of proven practice underlie those arrangements, but they were junked for what we all know was a short-term political expedient in 2011. I do not share the attitude of some to past experience—that we cannot return to the past and apply its wisdom again. Again, I submit that we can.
For all those reasons, I urge noble Lords not to press the amendment. It is defective in practice, leaves a host of very hard practical questions unanswered, and risks recreating the conditions of the very paralysis we all lived through so recently, about which we all told ourselves we would never want to see again. We should not risk returning to that. We should reflect on the wisdom of ages and take pride in our constitutional practice over generations before 2011, and reject the noble and learned Lord’s amendment.
My Lords, we have probably talked too long already, but I find it wonderful to think that my arguments have been described as “beguiling”—that was my old friend, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. He has reminded me of the days—our boy days—when we used to go round the county courts. He would always do it, every time: he would get up and say to the judge, “Mr Judge has made a very powerful argument,” or “a very remarkable piece of advocacy” or whatever it might be, and then he would punch me straight between the eyes and say, “But he is wrong”. Beguiling arguments have their strengths. They are beguiling because they are soundly based.
And then, I have just heard the noble Lord the Minister create a whole series of fences. It is like Becher’s Brook every time as we go around the course. The point of this amendment is for the issue to go to the other place and for the other place to consider it and decide whether those hurdles are ones that can be overcome or not—to decide which way it should go.
Does the noble and learned Lord set at naught the recommendation of the Joint Committee of your Lordships and the other place which considered this proposition, rejected it, and cited it as contrary to the public interest?
There was a majority in favour of the proposition that the noble Lord the Minister has put forward. I happen to think that the minority was right. I am inviting us to let the House of Commons have another look and make its own mind up. They will take into account the decisions, recommendations and all the papers that they are given, I hope, and come to their own conclusion.
What I did find slightly startling about the noble Lord the Minister’s response was the idea that when a Prime Minister seeks a general election, that is an act of deep humility. It is not. It is an act by an individual in power who is seeking the best possible way of retaining power. Elections are not sought in the public interest; they are sought for the advantage of the party in government. Humility has nothing whatever to do with it.
Finally, I want to raise a serious point. I find the idea—it has been espoused by a number of noble Lords—that we should stop any risk of the elected House acting as zombies. What an insult that is being paid to the elected Chamber by this House. Of course, the House will get things wrong—every House, every institution, gets things wrong. But the idea that we are going to suddenly be frozen in a situation which is incapable of movement and the Government will be paralysed and things will not work and the electricity will be turned off, all because the Commons has decided to reject a Prime Minister’s desire for a dissolution is, with great respect, bunkum. I do not propose to withdraw this amendment. I seek the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords again for an interesting debate and their many contributions. Like others who have never been called to the high profession of the law, I bow to the expertise of so many of your Lordships in this matter. However, as a lay man, I notice the diverse opinions put forward by those eminent enough to have the title of noble and learned, and other learned speakers versed in the law.
The underlying point here is what a pleasure it is for me, after the previous debate, to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, and others who said a similar thing. There is an underlying political point here, and a point, which I will come to, regarding the degree to which the public would simply not understand what would happen if there were interventions by the courts—a point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown. It could not redound in any way to the credit of the courts for there to be an intervention.
I submit to your Lordships that the concerns of those who have them are misplaced. We believe that this clause is proportionate and required, considering the direction of case law—a point underlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, when he talked of the way in which the law had moved on. That is a matter that people in another place will want to notice when they consider the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, should your Lordships, to my regret, approve it. The Government are seeking to confirm the long-standing position that the Dissolution of Parliament should remain non-justiciable.
I explained the Government’s rationale behind the drafting of the clause in detail in a lengthy speech in Committee, which I promise not to repeat at length. However, I said to the Committee that I wanted to put the legal position on the record. I commented further in a letter, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, opposite for her interest in and reference to that. The letter has been laid in the Library and I hope it will be of assistance to your Lordships. I shall not repeat all the arguments but in the Government’s view, which I hope most noble Lords will agree with, it would be highly undesirable for the courts to be permitted to intervene in the Dissolution and calling of Parliament. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and my noble friend Lord Faulks made devastating interventions on this in Committee. We heard similar arguments repeated today.
Just imagine the scenario. A Prime Minister requests a Dissolution, which is granted. The BBC news starts—“dong, dong, dong”; I do not know what music it has these days, but it fades away to a dramatic headline: “There will be a general election on 7 July”. Up in Telford, workers in the Labour constituency office start the printing presses. The orange tabards come out wherever the Lib Dems are congregating. The poster sites are booked, the canvassers are out, the expenses begin to accumulate and the statutory election clock begins to run. Then the news flashes across social media. Two days later, the BBC headline is “The general election on 7 July may not now go ahead because of an application to the courts.”
Such a situation would be absolutely incredible to 70 million people in this country, even if it might be understandable to a couple of people trying to get a court case going. We really must avoid any risk of this happening in the interests of the country, of politics and of the courts. It would be inappropriate for them to become embroiled in what many have said is the inherently political matter of when an election is called. We must avoid the practical risk of the uncertainty concerning the general election that would follow. Even the possibility of such a court case would be disruptive, drag our judges into the political fray and frustrate the democratic process.
There are checks and balances, to which I referred in Committee. Ultimately, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, has said more than once, the check on any alleged abuse—whatever that might be—of calling an election is the decision of the people. The noble and learned Lord referred again today to Brenda from Bristol.
I understand everything that the noble Lord has said, but is there not a contradiction there? One wants to say that the matter should not be taken to court but, in that case, where is the confidence that something could not go badly wrong with the process? Scenarios ought to be spelled out. Is there not a scenario in which this could go badly wrong? People would say, “Well, it was not conducted in the right way.”
Once the general election genie is out of the bottle, it should stay out of the bottle. The decision lies with the electorate. There is no question of a dodgy scenario. It is then down to the electorate. The ultimate political reprimand is available to them, as my party discovered in 2017. You can go backwards, as well as forward.
I cannot accept the amendments of by my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth for the reasons I explained at length in Committee. He argued that this clause conflicted with the rule of law. The Independent Review of Administrative Law, chaired by my noble friend Lord Faulks, said that it was ultimately for Parliament to decide what the law on non-justiciability should be and for the courts to interpret what Parliament has said. The majority of the Joint Committee agreed that a non-justiciability clause was compatible with the rule of law in a case such as this, where the power is to enable the electorate to make a decision. As my noble friend Lord Faulks said in Committee, unless you reject the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, there is nothing constitutionally objectionable to the clause.
The Government see a strong argument for its principled and pragmatic case that the courts do not have a role to play in the issue of dissolution. That our sovereign Parliament should be able to make provision for this is entirely consistent with the rule of law. For the reasons I gave at length in Committee—and will not repeat here—we believe that the entire wording of Clause 3 is necessary to secure against the risk of an intervention by the courts.
On precedent, I am happy to repeat the reassurance I gave in Committee that we do not see this as setting a wider precedent. Speaking at this Dispatch Box, I repeat that this clause is very specific and has been drafted with a particular purpose in mind, namely, to confirm a widely shared view of the nature of the prerogative powers to dissolve and call Parliament. In this case, it is seeking to ensure the non-justiciability of the prerogative powers for the Dissolution and calling of Parliament, which traditionally the courts have had no role in reviewing—nothing more. It is a bespoke exclusion to address this precise task. I stress again that we are asking Parliament to consider these arguments and endorse this clause in this Bill—nothing more.
In conclusion, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, whom I consider my noble friend, that he cannot have his cake and eat it. He tells us that there is no chance that the courts would intervene, but then puts before us an amendment that would enable them to do so. I am not sure which is his argument. My noble friend Lord Norton of Louth made the same argument: that it is unlikely that the courts would intervene. In that case, why are we having this argument, with this point put forward?
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, told us explicitly that such a challenge might come. So the purported, or in fact actual, intention of this amendment, were it to be passed, would be to procure the circumstances that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, envisaged: namely, that the courts might one day intervene on a Dissolution. That is what I assume the noble Lord, Lord Butler, is wanting: that the courts should have that opportunity—although at the start he said he did not really envisage or like the idea.
I agree very much with the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Trevethin and Oaksey: it is vital that we maintain this clause. Deleting or altering it, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth, would be, in my submission, like building a fence around a field only to leave the gate open—or having an umbrella with holes in it. It would not be completely effective in the light of past judgments by the courts. Desiring to avoid the involvement of the courts and to secure absolute certainty on this point, and on the basis that this does not provide a precedent for the future, I sincerely hope that noble Lords will withdraw or not move their amendments and join with the other place in supporting this clause.
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken. This has been a very valuable debate which indeed shows the value of the House of Lords. I am especially grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, as well as the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Pannick, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, for their comments.
My noble friend Lord True will not be surprised to hear that he has not persuaded me. For the reasons I have given, I regard the amendment as necessary to remove the words that are either redundant or constitutionally objectionable. This is not about keeping the courts out but about the use of certain constitutionally objectionable words within the clause. My noble friend did not address adequately—indeed, did not address at all—the point that, if we are dealing with a personal prerogative power of the monarch, there is no advice to challenge. I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and my noble friend Lady Noakes did not pick up on the distinction between the prerogative powers that are exercised on advice and those that are exercised not on advice. That is the fundamental distinction that has not been recognised or addressed.
I normally agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, but on this occasion I think he is totally wrong. He argued that he was seeking to protect future members of the Supreme Court. I regard it the other way round and consider that we would be protecting future members by removing the provisions in this clause because, although my noble friend Lord True said that this was not intended to set a precedent, the point is that it will be on the statute book. It will be available to parliamentary draftsmen in the future when other measures come along and they will think, “Oh, let’s keep the courts out. There’s a remote chance they might get involved”. Therefore, there are dangers in this.
My Lords, I remind the Minister that there was a Constitution Committee report on the Cabinet Manual and I think the Government have yet to respond. Could he give an update on when a response is likely to be? As it would cover these issues, it would be helpful when we have the opportunity for a longer debate in your Lordships’ House, given that we do not have the time today.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, for his thoughts on the Cabinet Manual. It is important. I am pleased to say that, of course, the Government agree on the fundamental importance of the Cabinet Manual, and I can confirm to the House, as I have indicated privately to the noble Lord, that the Government intend to publish an updated version of the Cabinet Manual within this Parliament. In response to the noble Baroness opposite, I can also add that I have written to the newly appointed chair of the Constitution Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, to set out the Government’s intentions on this topic.
There have been a number of developments that render the current version out of date, not least—if we ever get to the end of it—this legislation going through now, which will have to be taken into account. As a result, this amendment, which would prevent the Bill coming into force until after a revised version of the Cabinet Manual has been published, is not needed and would be unhelpful. It would delay the commencement of legislation, which, one would infer, our Parliament will pass shortly, and we would be left carrying on under the terms of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. I hope, for that technical reason, but also on the basis of the assurance that I have given the House, that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister for repeating that statement. I stress that the revision of the manual should ideally come well before the timing of the next election, and I strongly support the opposition suggestion that there should be a debate, ideally in both Houses, on the conventions that will have been restated. On that basis, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw my amendment.