Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th April 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Agnew of Oulton (Con)]

I support Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Stowell and the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell. I think there is a strong consensus—I will come to my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier’s point in a moment—that we should not just keep kicking this can down the road.

To give the Committee a little perspective, we are dragging our feet relative to the rest of the civilised world. The EU took steps a year ago to propose an anti-SLAPP directive and 34 US states already have anti-SLAPP laws in place. The need for reform is urgent. The figures put forward by the Foreign Policy Centre and members of the UK Anti-SLAPP Coalition show that SLAPPs are on the rise and that the UK is the number one originator of abusive legal actions. In fact, the UK has been identified as the legal source of SLAPPs. It is almost as frequent a source as all European Union countries and the US combined. That is the reality.

On journalists, obviously I defer to the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, who has been in the hot seat herself. They play an important role in transparency and in shining a light on bad behaviour. We have heard before in this debate and in other committees about the Azerbaijani laundromat, which was investigated by the NCA only following the light that journalists shone on it.

I think my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier is misled in that the vast majority of these cases never get to court. They are invisible, other than to the person who has been subjected to that action. I can speak with some passion on this because it happened to me only a year or so ago by an organisation that had received billions of pounds of public money. The implication in the letter I received was essentially a SLAPP, so I had to take a view. No lawyer ever heard about that, let alone a judge. That is happening on a far more regular basis than people are prepared to accept.

We come to the last part, which the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and others have talked about—that there is not enough room in the legislative calendar to get this done. But here we are: we have an economic crime Bill on the books, whose drafting work has been done by very clever people—at least as clever as parliamentary draftspeople. Surely, they and the Peers in this place can get together to get the right clauses and then we will have done it. I get so frustrated about this. The Government seem so feckless in not getting on with it. What is the excuse? It is crystal clear to any thinking person that we need to have some legislation on the statute book to contain this.

Of course, there must be safeguards against reckless accusations that damage the reputations of decent people and the right to recover costs where that happens. But, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, the reality is that there is an asymmetric warfare going on today which is completely different from anything that existed probably 20 years ago.

Here we have the chance for a clause that is well drafted—although I am a non-legal person—by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, with supporting clauses from my noble friend Lady Stowell and the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell. Why will the Government not sit down and have a proper, grown-up conversation about doing this? As the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, said, please do not just fob us off with, “No, we’re not going to do it. Withdraw your amendment”. I am prepared to have a fight about this on Report and to lead a Division in the House, because I am sick of it. It is time for this Government to wake up from their complacency and always looking to delay until we do not exist any more. I strongly support these amendments and I hope the Minister will have a credible answer to the question of why they are not getting on with it.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make one or two brief observations, because almost everything that could be said has been said.

First, it is important to distinguish between the threat of litigation and the use of litigation. If you look at the threat of litigation, the arguments so powerfully put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, go away. Going back more than 30 years, the late Captain Robert Maxwell MC was the past master in the use of threats. It was the courage of Bronwen Maddox of the Financial Times and her then editor that exposed him. She did not have to undergo an examination of what had happened because he died at almost exactly the same time. When people say, “This is very difficult. We need more time”, I say that we have had 30-plus years to deal with it.

Secondly, the problem of the use of litigation is, in a sense, a separate issue. As the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, makes clear, it is important that this is looked at separately. Most urgent is dealing with the threat. I very much hope that the Bill will also deal with use, but that involves different considerations because, by that stage, you will have involved a court and the balance between the actions of the court and the regulator is more difficult.

However, saying “This is all very difficult” is no excuse for delay. This is damaging to the UK, and things have got worse in 30 years for two reasons. First, most lawyers jealously guarded their reputation, but I am afraid that a number now take the view that any publicity is good publicity and they do not guard their reputations as carefully as they once did. That is not true of many, but a few take that view. Secondly, the cost of litigation has escalated out of all proportion to the position 30 years ago.

In response to, “This is all too difficult. We need more time”, I say that we have had 30 years. Even for the Ministry of Justice, that is a very long time. At times I felt that it could be said of the Ministry of Justice what was said of Philip II of Spain: if death came from Spain, we would all be immortal. Let us therefore hope that the ministry will engage with this and get on with the matter.

I want to make one final observation. There is always this very real problem of lawyers using funds. However, the fact that it is a real problem means that we should investigate it and not just put it in the “Too difficult” box. I am afraid that the Ministry of Justice has too many large “Too difficult” boxes as an excuse for inaction, and the time for inaction has ended. I am very glad that the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, has taken the view that this is something on which we must make progress.

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[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I ask the noble and learned Lord, as a little test of this commitment, is there is a draft Bill? If there is one, his assurance is really wonderful but, without one, is it not just a phrase for the long grass?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I can tell your Lordships that the Government have not been idle in preparing possible drafts to deal with this matter, and I am very happy to keep in close contact with noble Lords between now and Report on progress and to discuss as widely as we need to how we should approach this matter.

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In this context, it is necessary to emphasise that the legality of a potential course of action or advice is not necessarily clear-cut. There are degrees of risk. That is why cases go up to the Supreme Court and come down again and why different courts have different views. However, in a case where the lawyer acts in good faith and with integrity, they should be able to advise and litigate on the subject of the proceedings without any such fear as I have mentioned, which is in not just their interests but those of the client, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, pointed out. Amendment 183 is intended to address all those points. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

In supporting what the noble and learned Lord has said, I underline the importance of legal professional privilege; I recall it in many cases but one in particular, where a judge remarked that the worst thing he had ever done was to open up this subject in a particular case. We deal with this at our peril.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, it is with more than a little trepidation that I will speak on this group of amendments, with two noble and learned Lords sat behind me. In his opening observations, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, got the SLAPPs argument a bit back to front. My noble friend Lord Thomas worded the SLAPPs amendment in the way that he did so as not to include the non-economic crime aspects of SLAPPs. That was exactly to avoid the issue that I think the noble and learned Lord highlighted in saying that SLAPPs would drag other criminal definitions into the Bill. My noble friend’s careful wording was designed specifically to avoid that, but no matter.

More generally, there is a functionality in Schedule 9 which, if taken away, we will lose: the ability to put offences in and take them out using regulation. That is included in Clause 83 on page 165. If the noble and learned Lord is successful in his campaign, he needs to consider putting that back in, because in future we do not want to have to use primary legislation to achieve that objective. That is something to look at.

On the final amendment to Clause 183, Amendment 90 —with the names of the four riders of the apocalypse on it—again I take the noble and learned Lords’ points about client privilege. I have one question for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. If a solicitor is taken on and starts through their client privilege to find things that they do not like, I assume that they would be encouraged to walk away from that client. Not having been in that situation, I would like to understand what the professional advice is. Do they carry on and sit behind privilege or is a solicitor essentially encouraged to walk away from a client when they begin to uncover things through that privilege that they find to be illegal or immoral?

There is another debate to be had at the beginning of the next sitting, where we talk about failure to prevent. It is quite clear that the point raised here cuts into the failure to prevent debate. I encourage both noble and learned Lords to be present for that because their point here is absolutely relevant to the failure to prevent debate, and we have to have those two debates almost together. I hope that they will be able to make time on Thursday to join in that debate.

Coroners (Determination of Suicide) Bill [HL]

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 28th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I also welcome the Bill and wish it well. The reform of the coronial system in 2009 has transformed the way in which it operates. Much of this has been due to the leadership of the successive Chief Coroners, who have substantially improved the way the families of the deceased are treated and inquests conducted—they have improved the whole system. One of the important developments has been the creation and implementation under the Act of the prevention of future deaths reports.

I warmly congratulate the Chief Coroner on what he has done. I stress, for my third point, that the guidance the Chief Coroner has issued and the use of those reports—it is important to read them—show what can come out of the coronial system. This takes me to my first observation: is this requirement extending the jurisdiction and scope of an inquest? I do not think so; we are building on experience, in the way that the great system of our common law has always done. It is a modest step.

We could have a long debate about causation this morning. If you read some of the reports based on cases where suicide has occurred, there are recommendations in respect of ligature points: looking after people who are sent without proper advice on the dangers of mixing alcohol and drugs, or where there has been a lack of surveillance or co-ordination in supervision. All of these essentially extend to looking, in what comes out of the inquest, at the underlying causes of what has happened. I do not believe that one should read Section 5—

“how, when and where the deceased came by his or her death”—

as circumscribing what is proposed in this excellent Bill.

The two reports go beyond the points about ligature and the lack of surveillance; they look at the reports on the death of Jack Ritchie and, more recently—on 13 October this year—of Molly Rose, showing how valuable these reports have been. I reserve this for a future occasion, if it is challenged that this goes beyond the wording of Section 5. Looking forward to the philosophical debate about what is meant by causation, which I will not address at this hour of the morning and could not possibly do within the five minutes allocated, I challenge anyone who suggests that this is not permissible under the wording of the Act.

Secondly, it is said that there may be difficulty in respect of uniformity. My experience of dealing with statisticians and those who look at this area means that I do not believe that this is a practical barrier. This is a matter that the Chief Coroner and the statisticians can look at.

Thirdly—this is my only criticism of the Bill—I do not believe it right that the guidance should be issued by the Secretary of State. It would be much better if it were issued by the Chief Coroner, for two reasons. First, you can see that he is experienced in doing this. The guidance in respect of the prevention of future deaths report has been successively revised and kept up to date, and you can see the care and attention that he has brought to it, with his knowledge. Obviously, this would not be done by the Minister himself, but it is much better for it to be done by someone with the detailed knowledge the Chief Coroner has, rather than a civil servant. Secondly, as coroners are judges and judicial officers, I have the gravest reservations about the Executive giving them guidance about how they are to exercise their functions. That is contrary to the principles of our constitution.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Report stage
Thursday 31st March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I wish to speak very briefly to Amendment 17. As I think I said previously, there has been thought of moving sentencing powers up for some 15 to 20 years. It is of paramount importance that we have a proper analysis of the effect of this. The effect could be serious not only for the prison population but for the individuals concerned. I hope, therefore, even if the Minister cannot respond now, that officials in his department will come back with some reliable reporting mechanism so that the effect of this change can be analysed. I warmly support it, but if it goes wrong—and that has always been the worry—there must be proper data. Asking for it now, I hope, will ensure that it is thought through carefully and provided in due course.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will add very little to what the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said in moving his amendment. The House has been much assisted and considerably informed, as we frequently are, by his experience as a sitting magistrate and, in particular, by his experience of young people in court.

I do not propose to go through these amendments one by one. I said in Committee, and I repeat, that we are generally supportive of the measures in the Bill, which modernise our criminal procedures, make more use of online access and simplify guilty pleas in low-level cases. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in what I understand is a series of probing amendments, which he does not propose to put to a vote, spoke of what I might divide into a number of principal themes which we also consider important.

The first is a concern for protections and safeguards for young people in the context of the new procedures. The second is ensuring that all parties understand the new procedures and have full information about the consequences of decisions they have taken, in particular about the effect of guilty pleas, and indeed that they have access to legal advice. The next is a concern that increased sentencing powers for magistrates be monitored and kept under review. I fully endorse what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said in that regard. That is very important. We are entering relatively uncharted territory and, although many of us see those themes as significant, nevertheless it is important that they be monitored.

That said, we await the Minister’s response with interest and hope that the safeguards sought by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, will at least be introduced by the Ministry in considering how we go forward with these new procedures after the enactment of the Bill.

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As to data, we already publish relevant data on GOV.UK. Each quarter, we publish data on custodial sentences and average sentence length in criminal courts. Annually, we publish separate data for magistrates’ courts and Crown Courts. We will continue to do that; we will take this data into account in our monitoring. We think it would be disproportionately burdensome—

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, when the Minister says “monitor” and “publish”, what we need to see is proper, in-depth analysis so that one can see what happened—or would have happened had it been dealt with in the Crown Court—and what is now happening. It is not enough to go on with what we already have.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I was just about to come to that point. I have heard what the noble and learned Lord has said. We will certainly consider what data we can publish that would go towards meeting that point. I would be happy to drop the noble and learned Lord a note on that. We have to think about how this new data fits in the with the current data sets, and we need to publish things in an accessible way. I absolutely understand the underlying point. It goes back to the point I was making in the previous group, which is that we should not just make changes and not then assess how they are working; equally, we do not want to be chasing our tails on data. There must be a way through that.

Let me now come to local justice areas, on which we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, with personal experience. Amendment 37 would require the Lord Chancellor to undertake a consultation with relevant stakeholders regarding the proposed removal of local justice areas. This provision will ensure that magistrates’ courts have the flexibility to assign cases and magistrates in a way that best meets local needs. Ultimately, it is up to the Lord Chief Justice to determine what new arrangements are to be put in place. He has a statutory duty to ascertain the views of lay magistrates on matters affecting them. Magistrates’ courts already work closely with local justice partners to manage court business. I confirm that they will be fully consulted, along with local magistrates, the Magistrates’ Leadership Executive and the Magistrates’ Association, before any changes are made.

I turn to the single justice procedure: Amendment 10 seeks to introduce a new clause which would require a review of that procedure, including its use to prosecute Covid-19 offences, and the transparency of the procedure. I have previously argued to the House that there is in fact greater transparency for cases under this procedure, rather than those that take place physically in court. The press receives a detailed list of pending single justice procedure cases, alongside the prosecution statement of facts and the defendant’s statement in mitigation. On the fairly rare occasions, these days, when the press turn up to a magistrates’ court hearing, they do not generally get that material, so they do get more material online than they do when they turn up.

I am afraid that there are errors in all courts; courts are run by humans and, while people do their best, errors occur. As far as Covid-19 offences are concerned, the majority of errors were detected by the single justice and their legal adviser, and dealt with appropriately by dismissing the case. There are other safeguards in place to address errors where they occur. I am not aware of any evidence to suggest that the error rate for prosecuting Covid-19 offences was higher under the single justice procedure than any other court procedure, or indeed that this procedure was the cause of the errors. We believe that the primary cause of the errors was not the process used; rather, it was the volume of regulations, combined—as noble Lords will remember—with the speed of introduction. Work was done quickly with police forces and court staff to reduce, and to try to eliminate, those errors. The single justice procedure is reviewed on a regular basis to ensure that it remains open and accessible.

There are some amendments in my name which are all minor and technical in nature. I note that there were no questions on these amendments, so I am not proposing to go through them in any detail, unless noble Lords want me to do so. In the absence of acclamation, I will take that as a “Please get on with it.” However, that means that, in my reluctance to spin it out any longer, my team have not been able to get back in time with the answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on guilty discounts. I will have to write to him on that, and I undertake to do so.

I hope that, for those reasons, I have set out the opposition to the noble Lord’s amendments. I invite the House to support the few government amendments in this group.

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I do not think that the Government should hide behind the fact that an inquest is inquisitorial in procedure and not adversarial—that is a myth. It is not the case that there are no adversarial proceedings at an inquest. I have been in many inquests for trade unions, insurers and families, and each side tries to put forward a particular view of the facts which may impact considerably on questions of liability arising in civil proceedings later. I have nothing more to say, except that this amendment is limited to public bodies. I wish it was extended to more than public bodies and to any situation where a coroner faces a heavily weaponised side arguing one way and the family on the other. At that point, legal aid should be easily available to those who are disadvantaged.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, as the Minister said a short while ago, this is a very ancient office, but the genius of our system, and of the coronial system, is that it has moved and adapted itself over the centuries. Over the last 20 or so years, inquests have changed beyond all recognition. The amount of money and resource now devoted to them, and what the public expect from them, is enormous. It cannot be right that, where the state is involved and has heavy representation, the bereaved family is not also provided for by the state. The coroner cannot remedy that. It is a myth to say that he can do this through his inquisitorial powers; that is simply not possible when you need expert and other evidence, and trained lawyers. I very much hope that the Government will seriously consider this. It is a very modest amendment and I warmly support it.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I rise not to add any contribution on the legal side of things but just to add a little moral outrage, because this is an injustice. We all understand, I think, that the lack of public funding for bereaved families at inquests and inquiries just compounds their suffering. It is also very inefficient, because the point of having competent lawyers in court is that they can assist the court in the administration of justice. They can navigate complex issues of fact and law, which means that a just decision can be reached. It also provides the public with a huge service, because we all have to have confidence in the state to keep us safe in its custody and control.

I admit that it is hard when we have a Government such as this, but even so, I think we all understand that every death in police custody, prisons, mental health institutions or any other setting must be fully exposed through the inquest system, and this cannot be done without legal representation for bereaved parties. Without public funding it is actually a tax on bereaved families. It is time for your Lordships’ House to end this injustice by convincing the Government that they have to allow this amendment through.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 21st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, on his Amendment 13. He rightly suspected that my Amendment 14 is a little more in the way of a probing amendment. I tabled it because of the concern I expressed earlier about the people not in the room when, by definition, a judicial review is brought by one party against a government department.

My Amendment 14 would be far less preferable to his Amendment 13 if we could clear up the problem with proposed subsection 29A(1)(b). As I said earlier, there is the question of whether that starts engaging the court with a more legislative function in deciding exactly who is and is not to benefit from the wider class of citizens not in the room.

So, we are back to the Minister’s saying that this is just about putting some extra discretionary tools in the judicial toolbox, to be used where appropriate. If that is the case and we could clear up the issue with paragraph (b), I would have no problem with allowing this extra tool, so that, in some cases, the quashing could not take effect until a future date, and the department could sort itself out and effect new regulations or, if necessary, even come to Parliament with emergency legislation. As a former government lawyer, I would have no problem with that possibility—but why all the rest of it?

On the one hand, the Minister talks about trusting the courts; on the other hand, we are all to be tied in knots with our various interpretations of all the various differently tilted tests that follow. That is probably the difference between me and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. I say that because I have genuinely changed my mind about various aspects of this during Committee. If it is just a tool in the toolbox, make it an open-textured discretion that allows the suspended quashing order, and leave the rest to the court.

I shall make two further points. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made an essential point that is worth repeating: central government is a party to most judicial reviews and certainly the ones that are going to cause concern to the Government. So the Government can relax a little at this stage, knowing that any crucial arguments about the effect of particular discretionary remedies on wider public administration will be put by government lawyers to the court. Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, talked about the risk of litigation with an overly complex provision. That has to be taken seriously. I hope it will not be said in response that that amounts to a threat. That has been said to me in the past when I have suggested that a convoluted provision will lead to litigation. It is not a threat; it is based on experience of what happens when discretion is tied in knots in that way. Inevitably, that leads to more litigation, not less.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely support the amendments put forward, for the reasons that have been given. I do not want to add to them. It seems odd to give judges discretion and say that we trust them, then immediately circumscribe what they can do.

That leads to my concern about new Section 29A(10). When listening to the Minister earlier, I asked myself why new Section 29A(8) was there because all the points are perfectly obvious. I wonder whether we are looking at a new technique here being laid down for future use. Do you list perfectly obvious things in new subsection (8) to bring in the killer in new subsection (10)? I hope the Minister can assure us that we are not going to see in any future legislation dealing with judicial review—who knows whether there will be any—the codification of perfectly obvious principles as a means of bringing in by the back door what one sees here in new subsection (10).

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

Perhaps I might briefly add to that point before the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, speaks. An absolutely classic example of legislating for discretion would be Section 33 of the Limitation Act, which courts are applying every single day of the week, which lists a large number of factors which the court may take into account and concludes by saying that it may take any other thing into account. Although I absolutely take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, there is nothing particularly unusual about setting out in detail the discretion and then, nevertheless, allowing the court to take into account other matters.

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[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, may I follow my noble friend Lord Pannick, who has referred to my Amendment 23, which would replace Clause 2 with what I have called a middle course? It is intended to be a middle course between, on the one hand, the provisions of Clause 2 which would abolish—subject to limited exceptions—the Cart supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court in England and Wales and the Court of Session in Scotland and, on the other hand, leaving the full Cart supervisory jurisdiction as it currently exists.

Amendment 23 is tabled on the basis that to abolish all Cart supervisory jurisdiction, subject only to the three limited categories of case specified in subsection (4), could give rise to injustice. On the other hand, it recognises, from my own experience as Master of the Rolls for over four years, that applications for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, from the High Court’s exercise of its Cart supervisory jurisdiction, are almost invariably utterly hopeless but nevertheless involve the Court of Appeal judge in question in a considerable amount of work ploughing through the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, the decision of the Upper Tribunal and the decision of the Administrative Court.

The middle course that I am proposing is to retain a supervisory jurisdiction at the level of the High Court, but to prohibit, first, an application to renew or appeal a refusal of permission to bring judicial review; secondly, to prohibit any appeal from a dismissal of the substantive judicial review application; and, thirdly, to prohibit any challenge to, or renewal of or appeal from, any other decision of the High Court such as, for example, in respect of interim relief.

In his reply at the Second Reading debate, the Minister said that he would consider this middle course but that the Ministry of Justice had calculated that abolishing the Cart supervisory jurisdiction would save 180 days of judicial resource in the Administrative Court. I have subsequently had a useful exchange of correspondence about that assertion, and I am extremely grateful to the Minister for answering a large number of questions that I have raised, probing that claim of 180-day savings. I hope the Minister will not take it amiss, but I regard it as perfectly clear that the Minister’s estimate of the saving of judicial time is greatly overstated.

The Ministry of Justice relies on a number of different sources, including a 2015 time and motion study from which it has extrapolated various assumptions. I am very doubtful about the accuracy of the statistics I have been provided with and the extrapolation provided by the ministry’s correspondence but, for what it is worth, the Minister’s response includes a breakdown of Cart cases from 2012 to 2020. It shows that over that nine-year period, 99% of Cart applications for permission to bring judicial review were dealt with on the papers and not at an oral hearing. The Minister’s letter allowed just over 1.3 hours for a judge to consider a paper application. In short, the figures supplied show that on average over the nine-year period, approximately 130 judicial days each year were spent on Cart applications in the Administrative Court.

At full complement and ignoring a substantial number of deputy judges, there are 71 full-time judges of the Queen’s Bench Division available to sit in the Administrative Court, which would mean just under two Cart applications each year per judge. Of course, there are plenty of people here, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, who has been Chief Justice, who will say that that is not how the world works because only a certain number of judges sit in the Administrative Court at any one time. On the other hand, it is not the way the world works having a single judge deal with all the Cart cases in a year. The truth is that they are spread among all the judges.

Furthermore, proposed new Section 11A(4) in Clause 2 provides three exemptions for the abolition of the Cart supervisory jurisdiction. I have been told by the Minister that there are no statistics to show how many of the Cart cases in the period 2012-20 fell within one or more of those three categories. In the absence of that information, it is not only utterly futile to suggest that Clause 2 would result in the saving of a specific amount of judicial time; it is clear that any saving would be less, perhaps far less, than even 130 days.

The middle course in the amendment I have tabled would help to avoid injustice while providing a useful curtailment of the Cart supervisory jurisdiction. I suggest that this is a sensible and just solution.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

May I add a couple of observations? It seems to me that experience has shown that it was difficult for the Supreme Court to find the right balance. On the other hand, this Bill goes too far and, if I may respectfully agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, it is very easy for a judge to think in the particular circumstances of a case that a point of law is just nonsense. Therefore, having a check where points of law can be brought forward is essential.

I tend to feel that the suggestion made and the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, is probably the most pragmatic solution and I would support that. But one thing we cannot do is to leave out of the equation the ability to have a review where there has been a fundamental error of law. Experience has taught me that many people, when looking at the facts of a particular case, think that they are so against it that it is hopeless, but actually there is often something there, and we must preserve that. However, I commend, if I may, the solution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton.

[Lord Trevethin and Oaksey (CB)]

May I just ask a question about the middle way proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton? Would the bar he is proposing—which would, as it were, place a lid over the High Court so that matters could not travel from the High Court to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—operate even in a case where the High Court judge who had heard the point that arose in relation to the other tribunal’s refusal to grant permission to appeal considered that it raised an issue of general importance which ought, in fact, to travel upwards for consideration by the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court? Should there perhaps not be a proviso in the middle-way amendment that would permit the High Court judge, if he or she thought it appropriate, to grant permission so that the matter could go upwards?

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 12th January 2022 Lords Chamber

The Government seem to be set on a course that will increase the prison population and sentence inflation without concentrating significantly on cutting reoffending through helping offenders to avoid crime, thereby achieving an overall reduction in the levels of crime and its huge social and economic costs for society. That is why we need an independent and serious royal commission on criminal sentencing. Such a commission would focus government and public attention on the great deal of real, hard evidence that there is about the ineffectiveness of long prison sentences, and the need for a new, rebalanced, humane and evidence-based approach to using the criminal justice system to cut reoffending through rehabilitation and reform. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I will speak briefly in support of this amendment. There are five reasons for my support.

First, the debates on this Bill have shown the enormous disparity of views that can be expressed about sentencing. We have ranged from restorative justice, which I warmly support, to long prison sentences. We need to look at it in whole and strategically.

Secondly, the Sentencing Code shows how complicated the system we have devised is. It needs simplification so that people can understand the system better.

Thirdly—and this is a point on which I have found Her Majesty’s Treasury more enlightened than many—are we getting value for money? I doubt whether the present system is delivering value for money.

Fourthly, a royal commission in itself is value for money. It is certainly far better value for money than management consultants, who are often deployed to look at these issues.

Finally, the time is right. I see no reason why we cannot take a comprehensive and strategic view of where we are going. I have expressed no views on what the outcome should be; I am interested solely in the mechanism of getting a strategic approach that simplifies sentencing and delivers value for money.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Wednesday 15th December 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd]

66B: Clause 96, page 85, line 31, at end insert—
“(2A) The code must provide for reviews to be made or other measures taken by the Secretary of State on a regular basis to ensure—(a) compliance with the provisions in the code of practice as to the giving of discretionary and community cautions, and(b) the consistency of application of the code of practice as between different police forces or Crown Prosecution Areas.”Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of the amendment is to make provision for regular reviews or other measures to ensure compliance with the Code and consistency of practice across England and Wales.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, when the Bill seeks to put the cautions regime on to a statutory basis, it is plainly a very important step forward. Although I welcome it, it is unfortunate that this is being done largely by secondary legislation—an issue obviously addressed in many other contexts, about which I do not wish to speak today.

However, it is clear that even in this skeletal Bill, one critical issue is omitted—addressing the issue of lack of adherence to practice and lack of consistency. I outlined the powerful evidence of this in earlier debates and suggested a solution. That is needed because of the significant evidence that cautions can blight the lives of others and, as cautions are in effect part of the sentencing system, they must reflect transparency and command public confidence.

It was, however, evident from the speech of the Minister in Committee that the need to deal with this is recognised as an issue. He said that

“scrutiny and monitoring of out-of-court disposals is vital to successful implementation, accountability and public perception.—[Official Report, 8/11/21; col.1576.]

The Government did not like the way in which I suggested that this be done in the amendment that was before the Committee, but the Minister has very helpfully discussed the issue. The amendment now before the House very much leaves the means to ensure consistency and adherence to the code to the Secretary of State but reflects the principle of the necessity of scrutiny for consistency and adherence to principle. I look forward to the Minister explaining what Her Majesty’s Government intend to do in relation to consistency and how, in due course, the House can review the details of that.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 66C and 66D in this group and will speak to Amendment 66B, but I will take them in reverse order if noble Lords will bear with me.

Currently, first-time offenders can be given a fixed penalty notice—an on-the-spot fine—by the police for a range of offences of disorder including dropping litter, being drunk and disorderly, and the possession of cannabis or khat. This Bill removes fixed penalties for disorder, so if the police want to enforce the law they will have either to arrest those responsible, taking up valuable police resources that should be spent on more serious crimes, or to take no action, leading to an increase in anti-social behaviour. Amendment 66D would retain fixed penalties for disorder.

Currently, first-time offenders can be given a simple caution, where the salutary effect of being found out, arrested and taken to a police station is, in most cases, enough to ensure that they behave themselves in future. It is quick, simple and effective. This Bill removes simple cautions, so if the police want to enforce the law they will have to impose conditions on everyone they caution, including considering whether to impose restrictive conditions, unpaid work conditions, attendance conditions and/or a fine. The police must also consider the views of any victim, including imposing any conditions that the victim or victims suggest. Compliance with conditions must then be monitored and action taken for any breach.

There is no evidence that the existing system of conditional cautions is any more effective than simple cautions, and conditional cautions, of which diversionary and community cautions are a more complex and complicated version, take far more police and other agencies’ time. Can the Minister explain why the Government are getting rid of simple cautions? If the answer is that, given the choice between the bureaucratic nightmare of imposing conditions and a simple caution, the police choose the latter, I have to tell the Minister that, faced with the bureaucratic nightmare of imposing conditions, the police will either release the accused with no further action being taken, allowing the accused to get away with it, or argue that the accused should be charged and sent to court. In fact, I wholeheartedly recommend to the police that, in every case where a diversionary or community caution is being considered, they refer the case to the CPS so that independent prosecutors can advise, not least on the sentence—or, as the Bill calls them, the conditions—the police intend to impose on the accused.

The police want to retain simple cautions. We want to retain simple cautions. Amendment 66C would retain simple cautions. I must say, the Minster has his work cut out to convince me not to divide the House on this issue.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, ably explained, the amendment in his name aims to try to ensure compliance with the code of practice and consistency of application of the code. Academic research into the existing system of conditional cautions is of mainly inappropriate and inconsistent conditions being imposed. I referred to this in detail in Committee. It was not challenged; the House can therefore take it as fact.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, I think we might now be in double figures for the times I have been asked that question. I have set out in my remarks, fairly I hope, what lies behind it. The work from the National Police Chiefs’ Council lies behind this; a third of police forces have gone there; and many more are considering it. Whether one calls that evidence or not, that is the basis on which these reforms are predicated. I have answered this question before, and I answered it in Committee. I appreciate my answers may not satisfy the noble Lord, but that is the basis on which we think this is a good idea; and quite a number of police forces already think this is a good idea.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all who participated in this debate. I will deal very briefly with the two points that have arisen.

First, the system to ensure consistency and compliance with the code will apply to whatever system is brought into effect, including the conditional cautions or fixed penalty notices. I am very grateful to the Minister for his statement, and it seems to me there is now a proper basis for going forward. I think it is fair to say that, when fixed penalty notices and cautions came to be used much more frequently, attempts were made by the judiciary from about 2005 onwards—therefore spanning both Governments—to try and put in place such a system. I am afraid we did not get very far, but it is encouraging to know the Minister is now behind this.

I hope for two things. One is for us to go forwards, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, has said, with the magistrates doing matters locally, and I hope the MA will positively engage. The other is for a national basis. National consistency is important, because to the man on the Clapham omnibus—or whatever the modern phrase is—whether you get required to do something by the court or by the police, it is still part of the same system and it is still the law that requires it. Therefore, I look forward very much to scrutinising, when this comes back, the proposals put forward by the Government in the code.

As to the second part, I am again grateful to all who have taken part. If I may respectfully say so, I think there is a certain lack of wisdom in getting rid, without an adequate evidence base, of something that has been as useful in the past as a simple caution. However, I beg leave to withdraw the first amendment.

Amendment 66B withdrawn.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 17th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly support this amendment, as I have supported the PMBs on this from the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, over recent years. The reasons for raising the age by the—goodness knows— modest enough margin of two years, from 10 to 12, are cumulative and compelling. If there is any objection to this amendment, it is that it does not go far enough, but I do not make that objection.

I have three reasons for supporting this. First, a 10 year-old’s mental capacities are not comparable to those of an older adolescent or adult. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has made these points about maturation, and I will not repeat them.

Secondly, criminalising these youngsters while they are still developing their identities and character and growing socially and emotionally is deeply damaging to their self-esteem and future prospects. Brand a child of 10 or 11 a criminal and that is how he will come to see and identify himself, and so he will behave in future. The subsequent criminal records of those who have been thus branded bear this out. Their records attest to it.

Thirdly, whatever their wrongdoing and however grave—to call it criminal is of course to beg the question—they will be dealt with in the same basic way whether they are convicted under the criminal justice system or dealt with through corrective welfare processes. If they need to be detained securely, they will be. The necessary measures can be imposed whichever route is taken, whether they are prosecuted as criminals or treated as however gravely miscreant children requiring correction. The public will not suffer if in future they are recognised as children who have done something dreadfully wrong rather than wicked criminals. On the contrary, the public will benefit. These children are more likely to lead law-abiding lives in future if we change our system at last.

It is high time to banish the long shadow of the tragic Bulger case—it has already been mentioned today—that, alas, is still cast and obscures the realities and common sense on this issue.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I also rise to support Amendment 220. When I was chairman of the Commission on Justice in Wales, we looked at this issue and had extensive evidence, including from the Children’s Commissioner for Wales. Without hesitation, we recommended that, were it free to do so, Wales should raise the age of criminal responsibility to 12, consistent with United Nations obligations it has untaken.

I agree completely with what has been said about the profound changes in the understanding of mental capacity that have taken place over the last 10 years in particular. I urge the Government not to delay any further a change to make our country no longer a laggard on this issue but one that is at least catching up. There are problems, such as knife crime, but the age of criminal responsibility is not the way to deal with them.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, it is very good to see the Committee refreshed and to have the opportunity to meet earlier in the day, so I thank the powers-that-be for making this possible.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 10th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

I support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for very much the same reasons advanced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. I very much favour the preservation of a judicial discretion; it is absolutely essential.

I worry very much indeed about sentencing inflation. When I was at the Home Office working as a Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the back end of the 1980s, I was a Prisons Minister. At that time, the prison population was around 40,000; it has now doubled—it is well into the 80,000s. Are the streets any safer? Does the community feel safer? The answer to that is manifestly that no, it does not.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, is utterly right when he says that longer sentences mean more people in custody. What is the consequence of that? If you pack people into prison, there is overcrowding and the chances for rehabilitation and retraining are greatly diminished. I know that from my personal experience: for three years or so, I was on the monitoring board of a local prison near me in Lincolnshire—actually, it was just over the border—and the chances of prisoners getting proper courses were very small, so the chances of rehabilitation were thereby much diminished.

The purpose of this clause is to ensure that, in the generality of cases, a prison sentence is the starting point. That is what is intended by using the phrase “exceptional circumstances” as the proviso. That is to say that it will be disapplied in a small minority of cases. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made a very important point that we need to keep a grip on: exceptional circumstances may not exist, but the sentence could be unjust. So the noble and learned Lord is in fact saying to this Committee—and he is absolutely right—that the impact of the Government’s proposals is to drive the judiciary in particular cases to impose a sentence that they know to be unjust, because they cannot find exceptional circumstances. I find that wholly deplorable.

The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, enlarges judicial discretion to make it more in accordance with the principles of natural justice. I very much favour that, and I hope that the Committee will do so as well.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, in the light of what my predecessor as Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has said, I can be very brief.

First, I wholeheartedly agree with him. Secondly, I do not think that we should beat about the bush at all about the change to the word “exceptional”. Any lawyer knows that the intention is to raise the bar significantly. You use that word only when you want to try to minimise the discretion or ambit of when it is to happen. I hope that the Minister will accept the clear intention of the change and answer the question posed in the earlier debate by the noble Lord, Lord German, about the difference. There is a clear and obvious difference.

Thirdly, having had a little less time as a judge and coming to the job a bit later, I can see an argument, which one has to accept, for saying that, by setting a minimum term, Parliament is giving an indication of what it thinks is appropriate. Perhaps that was not the right road to go down, but we have gone down it. But where this Government are wholly wrong—I do not think that we should mince our words about that—is in saying that a judge should impose a sentence that is not just. In refusing this amendment, the Government are saying, “We don’t care if injustice results: you must look at the circumstances, and if they are not exceptional” —a high bar—“you must impose an unjust sentence”. Have we really sunk so low as to require our judges not to do justice?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. I agree with the points that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has made, but I want to give a different perspective that partly undermines the argument put by him and all the other noble, and noble and learned, Lords who have spoken. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said that, ultimately, it is for judges to pass a sentence that is just. He pinned his argument on that single point.

We talked about youths in the previous group. For youth justice, the overarching purpose when sentencing is to reduce reoffending. That purpose supersedes the overall position of needing to be just in the sentence. That is why there is a minimum sentence in youth courts of four months. The reason is that, when you go to youth offender institutions or things like that, you are invariably told by the prison offers and teachers dealing with the young people that they need to be there for a duration of time to get their education. That is the justification for having a minimum sentence of four months in youth cases.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 10th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

It was a privilege to add my name to this amendment, which has been so ably moved by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, speaking the words of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester. I associate myself with everything that has been said and particularly with the work being done by Revolving Doors and the Centre for Justice Innovation.

This particular amendment raises a problem with this part of the Bill. One can understand why putting in a condition or requirement in relation to the victims might appeal to a certain type of politician, but they forget that, if you are legislating, you need balance. Why put something in about victims without putting something in about the whole point of this, which is to try to deal with offending?

The reason that I put my name to this amendment goes to the way that the Bill has been structured. I apologise again for not being in my place last Wednesday. I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for moving the amendment that I put in. This point raises exactly the same problem: we have a framework Bill. We do not have the draft regulations or, more importantly, the draft code of practice.

I entirely support this reform, but I do not think that many people realise what a critical role cautions play in the operation of the criminal justice system and, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has said in relation to an earlier amendment—I did not rise then because I thought that I could make the point now—the incredibly important constitutional and rule-of-law issues, which I underline. These relate to the relationship between the legislature, and how much detail it should go into on this, and the Executive—because the police are part of the Executive branch of government—and to what extent they should be allowed to punish, which has generally been the province of the courts.

I welcome these reforms because this is an important part of the sentencing regime—and it is part of it, whatever epithet one wishes to apply. But it seems to me that a much better approach to the Bill would be if this was brought together as a whole, so that we could say, “This bit ought to go into the Bill. That is dealt with in regulations. This should be dealt with in the code of practice”. We should have it all before us, so that we can make a sensible decision. I do not understand why this has not been done, but I hope that, before the Bill comes back on Report, we see draft regulations and a draft code of practice. Otherwise, we will all be plagued on Report with this type of really serious concern.

There are many more issues—the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has raised some of them this morning—such as the point that the Minister made very eloquently this morning about being able to alter levels of fines. Of course, in an age where we are perhaps going to see a lot of inflation, that is important, but why alter the number of hours? The gravity of the sentence with which a particular person should deal ought to be fixed.

Therefore, I hope that the Minister will look at, first, putting this amendment into the Bill and, much more seriously and importantly, at bringing the draft code of practice and the draft regulations, so that we could review the whole thing and do a proper job, as Parliament, consistent with the rule of law.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am very glad to support the right reverend Prelate and the noble and learned Lord who has just spoken. The right reverend Prelate gave us a very careful analysis of the reasons that such an amendment would improve Clause 88 of the Bill, and the noble and learned Lord, the former Lord Chief Justice, reminded us of the constitutional context and the fact that the way that the Bill is structured, and the sheer complexity of it, are not really very satisfactory, especially when so much related material is not available to us at this stage. I hope that note will be taken of what he said on that latter point.

My feeling was that, as drafted, Clause 88 does not cover the ground properly, and that the inclusion of the requirement in this amendment—that consideration should be given to what provisions can be made for the “offender to desist” from crime in the future—would give the clause a necessary balance; a phrase that the noble and learned Lord used. The clause’s emphasis is very much on finding the victim’s views, which is entirely appropriate but limited in scope.

It is of course relevant to remember that, very often, one of the strongest views that victims have is that no one else should have to suffer what they have and that something should be done to make sure that the person who has done it does not do anything like that again and cause that sort of harm in the future. So these two things are not in opposition to each other: it is a complementary requirement for the clause to include a direct reference to measures to try to make it possible for the individual to desist from crime. There is a wide range of measures, but, in the context of this clause, the right reverend Prelate mentioned drugs and drug treatment. Of course, alcohol is also a very significant factor in many of the sorts of crimes that we are talking about.

This brings back memories of an incident that occurred during my time in the House of Commons, when some teenagers pulled down and stole the union flag from outside my office. They then made the mistake of exhibiting it around the pubs of the town, which led to the police catching them pretty quickly. The sergeant rang me up and said, “I do not really want to issue a formal caution because one of them wants to go into the Army, and that may prevent him doing so. I suggest that they club together, pay for its replacement and all write to you to apologise”. That was the kind of practical policing that, nowadays, is so surrounded by rules and requirements that it is often more difficult to do. But it was the right solution. I had some delightful letters, most of them insisting that their families had always voted for me. But it made a sufficient impact on the individuals—it was just a minor thing—making them less likely to commit crimes in the future. That is the emphasis that we need to add into this clause—an emphasis on trying to ensure that that individual commits no further crimes in the future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

Well, we did have that exchange. I went through the way that it has been piloted in various police forces, and we had an interesting exchange. I am happy to look again at the record and see whether there is anything else that I can add, but I am not sure that will necessarily persuade the noble Lord in any event. Again, I am not sure it is helpful to go through those fundamental points each and every time we come to one of these amendments.

I hope I have responded substantively—and, I hope, substantially—to the amendments tabled by the right reverend Prelate. For the reasons that I have set out, I ask him to withdraw them.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, and to go back to the fundamental point about the code of practice and the regulations, is there not even a framework or some outline that we can look at so we could work out what is necessary in primary legislation and what is necessary in a code of practice? I must say that it is wholly contrary to the rule of law for a democratically elected body—I include the whole of Parliament in that—to pass legislation that has not been properly gone into.

Here we are dealing with the liberty of the subject. I think that most people do not appreciate the seriousness of a caution. When I was Lord Chief Justice, we had a number of cases where people found out years later the problem with having accepted a caution. In one case, for example, a person who was young and had no convictions of any kind could not go to America. There are other cases where a caution for a minor offence makes you into a “person of bad character”. These are matters that go to the liberty of the subject and they are of fundamental importance.

It is quite contrary to the rule of law to ask us to pass legislation for which there is no urgency. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby said, this is a long-standing problem. Could the Minister not reconsider? I entirely sympathise with the civil servants at the MoJ because they are hard-working. Of course, they have to work hard because of all the Government’s cuts to the Ministry of Justice; they are not responsible for that and nor is the Minister, who I am sure would like as much money as possible. Could we not, in this vital area of the liberty of the subject, do some proper work on it rather than wasting a lot of time debating principles? It would be so much more efficient, on an issue that is not urgent, if we could have a draft, a framework or something to look at.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, of course I understand the point made by the noble and learned Lord. We could have an interesting debate about whether that is properly encompassed in the phrase “rule of law”, but I take the underlying point that he makes. I have sought to set out where the code of practice would be relevant, where the Act ends and the code of practice begins. I am happy to have a further discussion with him on that point.

I agree that cautions are an important part of the criminal justice system. They can have consequences, as the noble and learned Lord set out, and not being able to go to America is just one of them. That is why in a later part of the Bill, which we will come to, the question of when a caution is spent is so important. We have sought to build that into the Bill, which I hope meets, at least in part, the point that he makes. I am happy to discuss this point with him further.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, support these amendments. The statutory duty of candour is vital not just to affect the culture of the police and enhance public confidence in policing but to give confidence to those police officers who face enormous internal pressures from their colleagues not to be candid. They need support; they need a statutory regime they can point to in order to justify to their colleagues what is required.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, quoted some of what the Home Secretary said in answering questions in the House of Commons on 15 June, and I will quote one other statement she made. She was specifically asked by Yvette Cooper about the duty of candour, and her response was that

“there is absolutely more to do here.”—[Official Report, Commons, 15/6/21; col. 132.]

I very much hope the Government will accept the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, but, if they do not, what more are they going to do in this area?

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

I rise briefly to support both amendments. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, looks at this from the position of the victim. It is, of course, right to acknowledge the huge progress that has been made over the last 20 or so years in improving the position of the victim—but we have not got to the end of the road. The important point of his amendment is that it gives further protection to the victim at two important stages: first, where things have gone wrong and there is an inquiry, and secondly and much more importantly, in the victim exercising the right of review where there has been a failure to prosecute. It seems to me, therefore, that the duty of candour is yet another step in putting the victim—as is so often said by politicians on both sides—at the heart of the criminal justice system.

The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, looks at this from a broader perspective, which encompasses the position of the defendant and the greater public interest. We should think of experiences over the years. One can go back, for example, to a problem that arose in Tiger Bay in Cardiff over 30 years ago, where the inquiry into the Lynette White murder investigation went on and on. One cannot help feeling that, if there had been a duty of candour, it would have brought that very damaging case to an end.

I say nothing about the undercover policing inquiry as it is still ongoing, but it seems that there is ample evidence that we need to enshrine this duty of candour to protect the position of the defendant and the wider public interest by making it absolutely clear that the police owe that duty—and they should be grateful to have that duty imposed on them, because we need to restore, above all, confidence in our constabularies.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I support these amendments as well. I look at the situation from an unusual perspective and with the unusual experience of sitting as the senior judge in Scotland in a criminal appeal. It was a case of murder, and I was not able—because I was sitting in a court where all the evidence was already out—to develop what was at the back of my mind, which was that the police had identified the wrong individual, who was then accused and convicted. I will not go into the facts of the case for obvious reasons, but it struck me that the court at that late stage was powerless to deal with what I thought had not been a frank and fair police investigation. I make that point simply because stages are reached where the situation is beyond recall, but I was deeply disturbed by what had happened in that case and could not do anything about it. So I welcome the steps that are being taken to improve the standard of candour among the police at all stages in the investigation of crime and its aftermath.