National Security Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to support my noble friend and have added my name to these amendments. I apologise to the Committee that I was not present at Second Reading. The Minister knows that I was in Malawi supporting the launch of a parliamentary programme and explaining to our colleagues in Malawi the benefit of line-by-line scrutiny of legislation, which I know the Minister will be relishing over these coming days in Committee. As my noble friends indicated at Second Reading, and as my noble friend has indicated today, we take threats to our country very seriously, and we will work constructively with the Government in the scrutiny of the Bill.

I was struck by the remarks of the former head of the SIS, Sir Alex Younger, when he gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the Commons and said that the need to address the changing threats was in front of us. He said:

“What I would call grey threats … often presented us with real challenges, particularly when actors or states felt themselves at war with us and we did not feel ourselves at war with them, for good reason. My career saw less emphasis on conventional threats and more on grey space. Most of my career was devoted to counter-terrorism, which was the dominant example, but subsequently we saw state actors working in sub-threshold space—operations short of conventional war—to harm us.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 7/7/22; cols. 11-12.]


In many respects, it is that grey space that we are seeking to address. I understand the Government’s challenge ahead but, as my noble friend indicated, casting the net so widely without a sharp mesh, I am not sure we will have the kind of security the Government are intending for us to have in this area.

This will be very apparent when we get to Part 3, when it comes to foreign interference in the registers, and other parts. I know the Minister will be in listening mode for a lot of Committee, but I hope he will consider pausing at that part of the Bill for further consultation, because what was apparent at Second Reading—many other noble Lords have, I am sure, received representations from a wide variety of groups, as I have—is that more consultation on that part of the Bill is necessary. Pausing that and bringing it back for the economic crime Bill may be an appropriate way forward. That is a debate we are yet to have, but I just wanted to give the Minister foresight of the case we are making.

As my noble friend indicated—and I defer to his legal knowledge and that of others with extensive legal knowledge who will be participating in Committee—I am struck that because of the Government’s choice not to reform the Official Secrets Act 1989, we will have two competing offences with two contradictory defences. Under this Bill, as my noble friend indicated, anyone who discloses protected information is committing an offence. In the 1989 Act, if an intelligence officer or former intelligence officer discloses any information relating to security or intelligence, they can be imprisoned for up to two years.

Under this Bill, anyone disclosing protected information to a foreign power or a body under the authority of a foreign power faces life imprisonment. However, as my noble friend indicated, in Section 1(5) of the Official Secrets Act 1989 there is a form of defence:

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that at the time of the alleged offence he did not know, and had no reasonable cause to believe, that the information, document or article in question related to security or intelligence or, in the case of an offence under subsection (3), that the disclosure would be damaging within the meaning of that subsection.”


There is no equivalent in this legislation, and I would be grateful if the Minister would outline in very clear terms why.

Part of the rationale given by the Minister in the House of Commons was that the difference between this and the Official Secrets Act is that with this, for any prosecution, three tests have to be met. I suspect we will hear quite a lot in Committee about the three tests. The Minister, Stephen McPartland, indicated that the three tests for someone to be prosecuted under this part of the Bill were,

“conducting harmful activity with regard to information that is protected effectively, knowingly prejudicing the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and acting in a way that benefits a foreign power.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 12/7/22; col. 80.]

But “harmful activity” and “protected effectively” are not specified in the Bill and “benefits a foreign power” is not necessary in Clause 29.

Because of the breadth of Clause 29, in some areas it is opaque. For example, does someone have to prove objectively that they did not know they were providing a service to a foreign power because they were providing it for an authority of a power? That means that the objective test, on a subjective element under this clause, is problematic.

The Minister in the Commons was not clear with regard to what the three tests are, and Clause 29 is broad. It would therefore be preferable for there to be a far more objective approach, as there is in the 1989 Act, rather than what is in this Bill. On that basis I support the amendments in my noble friend’s name.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Purvis, intend to tighten the scope of offences in Clauses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 15 and 29. This is achieved in these amendments by leaving out

“or ought reasonably to know”

from the relevant clauses, meaning that an offence is committed under these clauses only if the person

“knows … that to be the case.”

The practical effect of these amendments is therefore that offences are committed only when a person knows that their actions are damaging. Given that the offences in the Bill could carry significant sentences, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, the Committee is right to probe to what extent a person must know that they are committing such an offence, especially as it will otherwise be up to the courts to determine whether a person ought reasonably to have known that they were committing the offence.

However, it is not unusual for offences to be committed when a person ought reasonably to know. There is a recent example of this, which includes the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. I was recently googling it, and it seems that the Act was passed by the coalition Government.

Further to this, if an offence is committed only when a person knows it to be the case that their actions are damaging, it could be difficult to get a successful prosecution. None the less, it is right and helpful that the Committee should ask the Minister to expand on the points we have heard in this short debate.

As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, juries often decide on the state of somebody’s mind when an action is committed, and the decision as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty can easily turn on their perception of the state of the person’s mind. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, spoke about the difference between knowledge and imputed knowledge. As he said, it would indeed be helpful if the Minister could expand on the level of imputed knowledge that may be expected to secure a conviction.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, reminded us of the complexity of dealing with “grey space”, as he referred to it. This is an opportunity for the Minister to try to clarify the situation so that prosecutions can be appropriately brought and reasonably thought to have secured an appropriate conviction.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for that clarification. I do not think the clause is imputing that but I will read Hansard very carefully and, if I may, I will come back to him in writing on this point.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, will pick me up if I do not address the Official Secrets Act 1989, but that is due to be discussed in group 33 on a subsequent Committee day, so I ask if we can come back to that detail then, if that is acceptable.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Of course, as long as it is on the basis of the point that my noble friend raised—that we will have two pieces of legislation. The 1989 Act will cover serving or former members of the intelligence services, but this Bill means that there will now be two competing pieces of legislation. I do not know which the Government intend will trump the other.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I understand where the noble Lord is coming from. I commit to making sure that we explain that in considerable detail at the appropriate time, if that is acceptable.

For the reasons I have given, the Government cannot accept the tabled amendments and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw.

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[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, one of the considerations of the kind referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is, of course, a fairly familiar debate parallel to this one which is about the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. Many of the powers exercised by security services can be exercised to defend the United Kingdom from physical threat, but they can also be used to defend the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. I have always been worried about the potential growth of that term, not its actual use. It is very easy to think of things that perhaps ought not to attract intelligence activity but which affect the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. The achievement by a particular firm of a particular contract in competition with another firm is a simple example.

We have some experience of trying to deal with this, and to move to an even wider definition of United Kingdom interests seems to me to open the door to criminal cases being mounted with serious potential penalties in circumstances which Parliament will not have envisaged, except in this short debate, when the matter arises in real life. I can see the intelligence agencies being put at some disadvantage by there being a suspicion that they can do things to favour one group of people over another in the economic interests of the United Kingdom or, as in this case, in the wider interests of the United Kingdom. There is a problem, and I think it needs to be addressed by tighter wording.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s amendments. I respect the issue of the grey area of tactics, but I equally acknowledge that if we are seeking to secure convictions beyond reasonable doubt for life sentences and sentences of 14 years, then the burden has to be, in my view, on having the primary legislation as clear as it can be. I will come back to the wider areas of concern.

The Government have referenced that this is an update not a wholesale replacement of the 1911 Act, which states in Clause 1:

“safety or interests of the State”.

But that is a very specific reference to the penalties for spying. It does not go beyond that, so the reference for the understanding of the interests of the state with regard to that penalty and that part of the 1911 Act are very clear. The difficulty with this Bill, as my noble friend indicated, is that the Government are now using that across a series of different offences which are very broad in nature. We will no doubt come back to some of those within the Bill.

The Government have also said that we do not need to have it clarified in the Bill because they are relying on case law definition for this; they cite Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions—1964 AC 763—as far as that is concerned. I looked at that case, which was specifically about a decision that was made about protesters seeking to access a site where nuclear bombers were going to be taking off. The court found that it was not for the courts to decide what were national security interests; that was a responsibility of the Executive. That is very understandable.

That decision has also been looked at in other cases including Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman in 2001. In that case, with regard to Chandler v DPP on national security issues, Lord Steyn said:

“But not all the observations in Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions … can be regarded as authoritative in respect of the new statutory system.”


So purely relying on the definition of case law on a whole breadth of different offences under this Bill is not sufficient.

I was slightly concerned by what the Minister, Stephen McPartland, told the House of Commons in Committee. He seemed to imply that the real reason why the definition was so broad in this Bill was that the evidential threshold had to be low to secure prosecutions. He said of any further restrictions, as in my noble friend’s amendment:

“That would create a higher evidential threshold to secure prosecution in an area that is often difficult to evidence due to the sensitive nature of the information that may have been obtained or disclosed. Put simply, we would have to explain why it caused damage, which may require evidence that compounds the damage. That would provide challenges to our law enforcement agencies and courts”.—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 12/7/2022; cols. 81-2.]


I am not a lawyer, but I imagine that our courts are fairly well equipped to handle such cases, which are sensitive or relating to national security, as they have in the past. I was troubled to read that the Minister gave the argument that we needed to keep the definition so broad to create a lower evidential threshold, but the penalty is life imprisonment. That surely cannot be right.

More alarmingly—this goes to the noble Lord’s point about wider interests—the Minister referred to the wider elements, not just national security but economic interests. He also referred to public health interests, saying that these areas would be covered in the Bill, and not just when they are used to threaten national security. So it is not just the grey tactics that concern us with regard to national security grounds, but the greyness of how, potentially, Ministers and prosecutors will seek to define that wider national interest. On the public health interest, I can understand that a malign interest may wish to use such a tactic, as I understand the North Koreans tried to do with malware and the NHS. Those are all tactics but, ultimately, these are national security concerns and not public health concerns.

Fundamentally destabilising our economy should be a national security interest. The examples my noble friend Lord Beith gave of undermining certain sectors or competition are not sufficient to meet a trigger for national security. Therefore, I believe that that triggering should be in the Bill, which is why I support my noble friend’s amendment.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a very important group of amendments which in many ways goes to the heart of much of the debate that will take place on a number of amendments. It reminds the Committee that the heart of the issue is Clause 1(1)(b), which says that to commit an offence

“the person’s conduct is for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

Fundamental to that is that what we are discussing here, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, ably set out, is what we actually mean by the interests and safety of the United Kingdom. It is to the great credit of our country that we can debate that here to try to decide what it should be.

I agree with the majority of noble Lords who have said that it is important that we try to understand how to make sure that defending the interests and safety of our country is about national security and defence. The noble Lord, Lord Evans, reminded us that there are grey areas in that respect. That is not a criticism of having the debate, but it means that we have to decide where we want to draw the line. I have mentioned this to the noble and learned Lord Hope, and I pray him in aid. He mentioned it with respect to the Public Order Bill, and again with this one. It is an abrogation of this Parliament’s responsibility if it does not seek to answer these difficult questions and just leaves it to the courts, saying that it is for the courts to decide and determine. We ourselves should try to give greater clarity to what we as legislators think that phrase actually means.

It is incumbent on the Government to say what they will do to try to define this, as Amendment 2 moved by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my Amendment 3 seek to do. Either they should say “We don’t need to do that”, lay out why it is not necessary for Parliament to determine it and why they think we should leave it to the courts, or say how we will get some sort of definition that makes sense and gives greater clarity. To be frank, that is a real problem for the Bill.

As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, pointed out in his interesting and incisive remarks, along with other noble Lords, the Government say at paragraph 62 of the Explanatory Notes:

“The term safety or interests of the UK is not defined”.


They have already made up their mind that they do not need to define it. The basis of these amendments is that we think they do. We do not oppose the Bill or think it is not important that we protect the safety and interests of the United Kingdom, but somewhere along the line our Parliament should try to say what that means. The Government say in the Explanatory Notes that it is not defined and, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, mentioned,

“case-law has interpreted it as meaning, in summary, the objects of state policy determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers (see the Court’s view in Chandler v Director Public Prosecutions (1964)”.

I remind noble Lords that in that judgment, the House of Lords—constitutional arrangements were different then—essentially rejected the idea that it was for a jury to determine or decide whether something was in the interests of the state. As Lord Pearce’s judgment stated,

“the interests of the State must in my judgment mean the interests of the State according to the policies laid down for it by its recognised organs of government and authority, the policies of the State as they are, not as they ought, in the opinion of a jury, to be.”

I am not a lawyer—I have been a politician all my life—but I would argue with that. It may be quite correct from a legal point of view, but sometimes Parliament has not caught up with public opinion or where people are. Often, juries are an important way of determining what the public think, and they work.

We have seen recent examples of that. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, reminded us well of all the different issues that have arisen with protests. They are irrelevant to the Bill, but let me give another example: assisted dying. Time and again, juries have refused to convict on assisted dying, because they will not convict somebody in those terrible circumstances and do not believe that Parliament has caught up with the reality of where we are.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with the thrust of the noble Lord’s argument. I was just reflecting on the intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. Of course, the jury will have to reach beyond reasonable doubt whether the individual knew. The question is what the mechanisms are of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the person knew what those interests of the Government were, if those interests are not specific and linked to national security. If the Government have made a case that those interests are as broad as the Minister in the House of Commons indicated—that they were linked with public health or economy—that makes the task in the courts much harder, I would have thought. Therefore, it is in the interest of securing better prosecutions that those restrictions are on the face of the Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has indicated.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is quite right. As I said, the problem with the Bill is that there is no indication of what else may be covered by the “safety or interests” of the state, or what the limits of those terms might be. As I have been arguing, and as others have said, as well as the prevention of terrorism and espionage, they could extend to policies on energy, national infrastructure, the protection of water, power, food, health services, transport, law and order, organised crime and immigration controls. The extent of the powers that may be taken in the Bill could be used in relation to a wide range of state interests, not just state interests related to national security or to the defence of the realm. The interests of the state clearly are ensuring that we have enough energy, but should that be covered by a National Security Bill? These are questions that the Minister needs to answer, and it will be interesting to hear his answer.

I will make a couple of final remarks. Like many, I am somebody who has never read the Official Secrets Act 1911, but in preparation for Committee—and knowing the depth of knowledge, experience and wisdom that we have around—I thought it was necessary to make sure I was quoting. The Official Secrets Act 1911 says under “Penalties for spying”:

“If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State—”.


The Official Secrets Act 1911 says that it has to be for a purpose “prejudicial” to the interests of the state. Logically, should not defendants or people have the right also to argue that their act was not prejudicial to the state? The Act says that your act has to be prejudicial, so surely you have a right and a responsibility to prove that it was not prejudicial. That argument could take place within the courts or wherever. This argument about someone’s actions in relation to the safety or interests of the state, and whether they were prejudicial, needs some sort of definition. Without it, how on earth do we know whether somebody is going to commit an offence under this Act? It would be for somebody to interpret.

Can the Minister clarify what the Government mean by “safety or interests” of the state? Who determines what they are? How can anybody act against that in a way which does not break the law, whether it be through protests or actions? If I take action outside of an RAF base, protesting against it and trying to disrupt things going in or out, or if I am at the peace camp at Faslane, will that be classed as a protest? Where does it become something that falls foul of the Bill? In other words, where do you draw the line? That is an important question for the Government to answer.

My amendment and those put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others say to the Government that it is not good enough just to say the “safety and interests” of the state. What does that mean? People have challenged that over the decades. They have stood up and said that the safety and interests of the state are something that they challenge or do not agree with. Through history, that is how progress and reform have taken place. At the time, those protesting, taking action or conducting various activities have sometimes been accused of undermining national security or acting against the interests of the state.

We do not want to pass a law which leads to more confusion or a greater inability for Parliament to say that these are the sorts of actions we mean. That is the whole point of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which I support. It says that if it does not relate just to defence and national security, where is the grey zone that the noble Lord, Lord Evans, mentioned? Where do we draw the line? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, keeps reminding us, we should not abrogate our responsibility on that. It is our fundamental responsibility to try to answer that question.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, once again, this was a helpful debate, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I thank all those who participated. These amendments seek to limit the “interests” element of the “safety or interests of the United Kingdom” test which applies to many of the clauses in Part 1. As noted by many noble Lords, this concept was explored extensively in the other place.

The majority of these amendments change the “interests” element to cover only security or defence interests. This moves away from the safety or interests of the UK test that already exists and is understood in current espionage legislation. Indeed, the Law Commission noted its support of the Government’s decision to retain this term. At the oral evidence session to the Public Bill Committee, it noted that

“safety or interest of the state is consistent with a lot of the wording that already exists within the Official Secrets Act”—

those of 1911 and 1920—and

“avoids what might risk being an unduly narrow focus on national security”,—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 7/7/22; col. 52.]

as the noble Lord, Lord Evans, noted.

The experience of the Government and the Governments of allied states is that espionage is frequently targeted at and can result in significant damage to all sorts of national interests, some of which may fall outside the scope of security or defence interests. Indeed, any attempt to narrow or define the interests to the UK risks creating a test that is quickly outdated, as the UK’s interests naturally and properly evolve.

A number of noble Lords referred to the Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions case that was heard in this House in 1964. It concluded that the interests of the state meant the objects of state policy, determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers. That is noticeably distinct from protecting the particular interests of those in office. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and others said in relation to the 2001 case. However, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, the Government do not think it can be defined in legislation. It needs to retain flexibility for future threats as they evolve.

For this reason, it would also not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to attempt to define the UK’s interests in a Statement to Parliament, as in the proposed amendment to Clause 1. Notably, these amendments do not include economic interests, interests related to public health, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, noted, or interests related to preserving our democracy—to name just a few areas that would be overlooked by them. We know that these areas are targeted by hostile actors, and they should rightly be protected.

I was asked what safeguards are in place to prevent the Government using this legislation inappropriately—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I want to test the issue with regard to economic activity. If the Minister is saying that the Bill will be broad and go beyond national security economic activity, then presumably that brings into its remit all significant areas of major trade disputes where we have mechanisms for reciprocal action for penalising, having punitive tariff responses, et cetera, when effectively there is economic warfare. If the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and the Minister are correct, anyone involved in any trade competitor which is engaged in dumping or activity that may lead to reciprocal trade actions will now be under the remit of the Bill. It is criminalising an offence with potentially 14 years’ or life imprisonment, rather than going through the approach of what other economic trade activity is concerned. Part of the concern is that the Government will be able to decide that all these different areas would now come under the remit of the Bill.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

If noble Lords will bear with me, I am going to address that point.

I was saying what safeguards are in place to prevent the Government using the legislation inappropriately—for example, by deciding that someone is acting against government policy but where there is no national security impact. Each offence under this legislation includes tests that must be met in order for the offences to be committed. For example, for a person to commit the Clause 1 offence, they must obtain or disclose information that is “protected” for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and the activity must be conducted for, or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power. The limits to the type of conduct that is capable of being caught under this offence, in particular the foreign power condition, ensure that there is a state link. Designing the offence in this way clearly focuses the offence on harmful state threats activity.

Additionally, Attorney-General consent must also be obtained before prosecution can be pursued for the majority of offences under Part 1—in the case of Northern Ireland that is the Advocate-General for Northern Ireland—and the Crown Prosecution Service must apply the public interest test.

I understand the intention of these amendments. I would say to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that obviously individuals and groups might not agree with government policies, and the noble Baroness makes it very clear that she falls into that category on a regular basis, but they nevertheless represent the policy of the Government who have been elected to act for the country, and disclosing information to a foreign power can never be the right response to that.

As I say, I understand the intention of these amendments, but the Government cannot support them and respectfully ask for them not to be pressed.

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To be clear, meeting the definition of protected information is just one of three tests in Clause 1, all of which need to be met to bring a prosecution: a person must obtain or disclose protected information for a purpose that they know or ought reasonably to know is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK and the activity must be conducted for, or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The “foreign power” test, which we will come on to later in the Bill, is extremely broad. Under Clauses 29 and 30, the “foreign power” test can cover the public service broadcaster of Canada. So, if someone who believes that our Government are committing wrongdoing provides a document to the public broadcaster in Canada because they believe that our Government are doing wrong, which is in the global interest, would that be covered, with potential life imprisonment, under this Bill?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It would be the case only if those three tests that I have just described are met for the purposes of the offence in the Bill. So it would have to be that the information was protected, that the person ought reasonably to know that, and that its disclosure was prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. I imagine that will be the topic of some debate in the context of the hypothetical example that the noble Lord mentioned. It also has to be done with the intention to benefit a foreign power. I cannot see that, in the hypothetical situation the noble Lord mentioned, that issue realistically would arise because the combination of these tests means not only is the proposed offence proportionate but an appropriately high bar has to be met to bring a prosecution under this clause. The Government therefore consider that the definition of protected information is justified and cannot accept the proposed amendments. I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I find the hypothetical example that the noble Lord postulates hard to follow, because it seems difficult to envisage a situation where a prosecutor could conclude in those circumstances that there was a prejudice to the Government of the United Kingdom and a benefit to the Government of Canada, and that the other elements were present. It seems a most unlikely scenario.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I would just like to make sure the Minister is very clear with the Committee. All the decisions that would take place would have to have an objective view that that foreign power benefits. But in my reading, the Bill does not state that. It is simply that providing information to an authority of a foreign Government, which could be a public sector broadcaster such as CBC, is under this Bill. No one has to make the decision that that public broadcaster is then seeking to benefit the Canadian Government. That is not in this Bill.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is the intention to benefit that foreign power that is in this Bill, and it seems to me that that is a sufficiently clear and adequate definition to afford protection under the proposed section.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I was just looking up to see whether the words “intended to benefit a foreign power” were actually in the Bill, but I did not have time. In skimming through, I did not see them.

The Minister’s response has not really reassured me. The lack of definition of “interests of the UK”, with a question mark over what that means and how you could conflate the interests of the country and the interests of the current Government, coupled with the potentially wide definition of “restricted”, suggests, to myself and my noble friends on these Benches at least, a lack of precision and an opportunity that is too wide, especially considering that the penalty that could be faced is life imprisonment. Surely, there is an onus on us to secure a tight definition of offences in this Bill.

The other missing element, which we will come to in further discussions, is the lack of a public interest defence or a whistleblowing defence. What we are facing here is considerable uncertainty about what the real scope of the offence could be. As my noble friend Lord Marks said, the term “restricted in any way” is so undefined, it could cover innocuous but controversial documents, which could be restricted to prevent embarrassment. That is the discussion we keep having on journalism and whistleblowing: we should not open the door to the criminalisation of obtaining or publishing material that could be embarrassing to the ruling party.

I scribbled some notes, but I am afraid I cannot remember which noble Lord made this point. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. How are we meant to know what non-classified information is protected? It could apply to anything, however innocent, that was not published. If the Government have a document that they regard as restricted, even though it is not classified, the fact that it has not been published would mean it was restricted, although it may not be damaging except possibly to the reputations of the Government or Ministers.

If I were to get hold of a document saying that a Bill—for the sake of plucking something out of the air, let us say the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill—is designed to assuage some elements of political opinion in the party in power but is highly damaging to the diplomatic and economic interests of the United Kingdom, would that fall within the terms of the offence under Clause 1? In those circumstances, what is the nature of the restriction? What is the harm committed and what is the test of UK interests?

We keep coming back to the considerable grey areas in this whole package around Clause 1 and other clauses. I think we will want to explore this matter further. Otherwise, we are driving a coach and horses through the exercise of freedom of expression and other rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, which for the time being the UK is still a party to.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I think my noble friend and I are reading the same version of the Bill, but I am not sure the Minister is. There is no reference to benefiting a foreign power with intent, so I hope that at some stage during Committee the Minister will be able to clarify this position.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I thank my noble friend very much for that extremely useful intervention. I think we will have further discussion on this whole lack of precision in definitions in the Bill, especially considering the nature of the potential penalty: life imprisonment. You cannot afford to be vague about definitions in that context. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

I am bound to say that I discussed that before the noble Lord came in. Since, in my opening speech on the first group of amendments, I quoted specifically from the Long Title of the Bill dealing with Part 1 offences, I do not accept the criticism that I have not read it. Nor do I accept the criticism that it is apposite to threats that have nothing to do with national security, because the Long Title—which starts by dealing with Part 1, as far as the first semi-colon—is about making provision about threats to national security. My point is that, if you protect trade secrets in these very wide terms, it may include threats to national security, but it is not limited to threats to national security and it may go far wider.

It is not satisfactory for trade secrets to qualify for protection just because the information in those secrets might be reasonably expected to be subject to measures to prevent them becoming known generally. What would the measures be? Would they be imposed by a court, by government or by regulation? That is undefined. Perhaps the Minister, in replying, would explain what those measures might be. How does it help to protect trade secrets that are not subject to any protective measures, as the Bill specifically envisages? The clause raises far more questions than it answers.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I will very briefly follow my noble friends to agree with that proposition. There has been reference to the foreign power condition, and I will refer to that too.

First, I take the opportunity to say that I am grateful to the Minister for what he said to me earlier by highlighting Clause 29(5). Yes, it does include that the foreign power condition can be met,

“if the person intends the conduct in question to benefit a foreign power”,

without necessarily identifying that foreign power. However, that is not an exclusive meeting of the test, as my noble friend Lord Marks has indicated. The test can be met, for example, if one of two business partners who has some intellectual property or something of commercial value is in negotiations with, say, a sovereign wealth fund in the Gulf and then there is a dispute between the two business partners. While one wants to sell that to the sovereign wealth fund in the Gulf, the other says, “You can’t do that, because that is now in breach of the National Security Bill, because I believe that this is a trade secret.” That is because a foreign power, under Clause 30(1)(c), is

“an agency or authority of a foreign government”,

so a sovereign wealth fund seeking investment could be within that definition. Therefore, I have sympathy for the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, but a counterpoint has been raised by asking whether the Bill is the most appropriate way for national security to cover those aspects—and, on balance, I do not think that it is.

However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret is unlawful where the acquisition, use or disclosure constitutes a breach of confidence in respect of confidential information. As I understand it, that was the thrust of his argument. That is also the law: we have transposed the Trade Secrets (Enforcement, etc.) Regulations 2018 into UK law, so we have that intellectual property legislation—including a nine-page trade secrets regulation. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord said, and all of it, I think, is covered within existing legislation. The question then arises as to what the intent would be if one is either selling a trade secret or giving a trade secret to a foreign power to advance that foreign power.

That could absolutely be included in the Bill. The concern is that, given the way the Bill is drafted, so many other aspects could also be. That is the point we are trying to tease out: whether the Government intend that trade secrets are, as the noble Baroness indicated, some form of economic warfare, espionage or tactic. That is where the interest of the Bill should lie. It should not be the mechanism whereby trade disputes, commercial disputes or intellectual property disputes are resolved. Ultimately, that is where the Bill could be used. I do not think there are any in this Committee, but I am certain there are creative lawyers who might look for the most appropriate vehicle for the less appropriate cause. I am worried that the Bill would become one of those.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group relate to the new offences of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets. We support these new offences and agree that the Government should safeguard against threats to the UK’s trade policy. We see them as important amendments. None the less, we have had an interesting and important debate today. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has outlined, Amendments 8, 9 and 10 are about trying to understand why the Government believe that the offences need to have such a wide scope and whether narrowing them down would really have the unintended or bad consequences that the Government believe they would.

I have a couple of specific questions for the Government. The Bill says that there has to be a direct link to a foreign power, but suppose somebody obtains information such as a trade secret and sells it not to a foreign power but to a competitor business. Is that covered under the legislation? Is it the case that, under the Bill, to prosecute there would need to be a link from the individual to a foreign power and not just to a competitor within the UK?

The measures in Clause 2(4) to (7)—I think the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, referred to this in his Amendment 11—are really quite important. Why can the offence take place only outside the UK if it is in respect to possession by a UK national, as opposed to a UK national and/or a UK resident, or any other description of persons? Having talked about a narrow definition, I wonder why the Government have restricted the measures in subsections (4) to (7) to a UK national. I would be interested to hear the Government’s answer to that.

An interesting discussion and debate has taken place within the Committee about the JCHR recommendation. It is an interesting point that we will all want the Government to clarify. What is the Minister actually saying to the points from the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford? The JCHR quite clearly states that:

“The theft of trade secrets that pose no risk to national security is more properly governed by the offence of theft (and other breach of confidence and intellectual property rules) than through new espionage offences.”


It would be interesting to understand whether the Government think the JCHR is wrong or whether it has a point. If the JCHR is wrong, why do the Government believe it is wrong? Maybe the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, have greater relevance with respect to this Bill. With those few remarks, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I will endeavour to make sure that that letter goes to the noble Lord as soon as it is prepared.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I have a genuine query. The Minister referenced a number of times, as I think was cited, that if a foreign intelligence body is operating in the UK unauthorised, it is now considered to be prejudicial to the safety and interests of the United Kingdom. Why is that activity not unlawful?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The activity itself is made unlawful in the provisions of the Bill. Is that the point that the noble Lord is making?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

So it is unlawful for a foreign intelligence service to carry out any activities within the UK if they have not been prior approved by UK intelligence services. Is that correct?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As the noble Lord is aware, it is the effect of Clause 2 to prohibit the offences of espionage and assisting a foreign intelligence service. Therefore, those offences in Clauses 1 and 3 of the Bill would have the effect of criminalising activity of the type described by the noble Lord.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister; I am purely seeking clarification for the benefit of my own ignorance. I am concerned that it is not very clear. If a friendly intelligence service is carrying out UK activities, which is not espionage against the United Kingdom, the Government are saying that this is prejudicial against the safety and interests of the United Kingdom but it is not unlawful, but a UK citizen advising on that basis is unlawful. Would it not be clearer to state that that activity is unlawful?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I note the noble Lord’s remarks. I am not entirely sure that I follow the logic, but I will study Hansard carefully and take it back to the department.

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We have proposed a modest amendment that it should be likely that there will be assistance. That is Amendment 13, and it is the minimum needed alongside our other amendments to the Clause 3 offence. We need to help to limit the ambit of the clause to fit the mischief at which it is aimed. I beg to move.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I too have a question to ask about this. I thank my noble friend for introducing these amendments so comprehensively. My question relates to Clause 3(2)(a) because it is so broadly scoped.

I am fully aware that there are many extremely professional UK-based organisations that provide training, support, advice and consultancy on security matters. In fact, it has become part of an industry for those who used to serve in some of our Special Forces and intelligence industry. By and large, it is done extremely professionally, which is to their credit. However, under the Bill, presumably, all that activity now needs to cease because it is criminalised. A person will commit an offence where

“it is reasonably possible their conduct may materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities”,

which would mean training within the UK. Therefore, any consultancy—for example, a privacy sector security concern that trains allies in the Gulf and carries out any of that activity here in the UK—presumably is now liable for 14 years in jail. Can the Minister clarify whether that is the case?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned, there should be a second amendment to go with Amendment 13. There is only one amendment in this group.

Clause 3 means that for the first time it will be a criminal offence to be a covert foreign agent and engage in activity that assists a foreign intelligence service. While the clause currently states that an offence is committed when a person engages in conduct that

“it is reasonably possible … may materially assist a foreign intelligence service”,

this amendment would mean instead that an offence is committed only if it is likely materially to assist a foreign intelligence service. The impact of the amendment is that it increases the threshold for the likelihood of whether an action assists a foreign intelligence service, reflecting concerns raised by the JCHR. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, this would be punishable by up to 14 years’ imprisonment, so we look forward to the Minister clarifying why the offence is not more tightly drawn.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, raised a very interesting question about the large group of consultants with experience of the security services and forces who provide training to any number of actors across the world, and how they may be caught by this provision. I look forward to the Minister’s answer.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 13 seeks to narrow the scope of the offence provided for in Clause 3(2). For brevity, I will refer to a foreign intelligence service as a FIS.

The Government reject this amendment because we do not consider it to be necessary. Clause 3(2) provides for an offence where a person engages in conduct which it is reasonably possible may materially assist a FIS in carrying out UK-related activities. Amendment 13 seeks to change this to “likely materially to” assist a FIS. We do not consider there to be a difference between the two terms. I recognise the spirit in which this amendment has been made, to raise the bar for this offence being conducted, but I assure noble Lords that for this offence to apply, a person not only needs to engage in the conduct that it is reasonably possible may assist a FIS but must know, or ought reasonably to know, that it will assist a FIS in carrying out UK-related activities.

To ensure that we do not capture legitimate activity, there are defences in Clause 3(7). Not only will we not criminalise activity conducted in accordance with an agreement to which we are a party—such as agreements with our Five Eyes partners based in the UK—but we will exclude law enforcement and others who are legally obliged under UK law to assist a FIS. That goes some way to answering the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. Additionally, where someone with public functions—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My reading of it is that, taking the defence in Clause 3(7)(b) as an example, if I was providing Special Forces training—unlikely though that might seem—because I have functions of a public nature, I would be fine, although I do not think anyone would wish to receive Special Forces training from me. I was asking specifically about UK private sector bodies—consultancies and those that carry out those functions. I am happy for the Minister to write to me if he does not have an answer now, but I do not think that private sector enterprises are covered by any of the defences in Clause 3(7).

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, my reading of it is not the same as the noble Lord’s, but I will seek clarification and happily write to him on that.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, raised a hypothetical about assisting foreign intelligence services. I am happy to provide a few more which may clarify the scope of this clause. Hypothetical examples of a person assisting a foreign intelligence service in carrying out its activities could include aiding intelligence-gathering operations or providing a financial benefit to a foreign intelligence service, or someone working for a foreign intelligence service to entice an individual into working for them. I hope that clarifies it to some extent.

It is important to note that the threat posed by espionage, as we have said in previous groupings, is constantly evolving. It is important that our legislative provisions withstand the test of time. We must safeguard against a rapidly changing and complex threat landscape in which foreign powers and their intelligence services use a whole-of-society approach to conduct hostile activity against the UK. That is why Clause 3 is such an important part of the Bill. We therefore reject this amendment and respectfully ask that it be withdrawn.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I have three amendments in this group. I suppose I should declare interests in relation to the amendments of my noble friend Lady Ludford. I have been stopped by the MoD police twice in my life: outside RAF Fylingdales when walking with a local Liberal Democrat councillor, and outside RAF Menwith Hill, where I had stopped to address a meeting of splendid Quaker women who constituted the Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases. We were watching American servicemen in the ceremony in which they took down the union jack. There are no British servicemen on the base most of the time.

I want to talk about the probing amendments I have put down on why the Crown dependencies and British Overseas Territories do not appear here. I explain my interest—and form—on this, which dates back to the Royal Commission on the Constitution of 1970-74, on which I was a very junior witness. I learned about the deep ambivalence surrounding the relationship between the Crown dependencies and the UK in particular, and about the British Overseas Territories.

I note that, in the Procurement Bill, which we have just passed through this House, the Crown dependencies are included under the definition of “a UK supplier”. However, under a number of other Acts that we have passed through this House in the last few years, they exclude themselves. They move in and out in various different ways.

In a number of these territories and dependencies, there are places of considerable concern to our security and interests: the Falkland Islands, the British Indian Ocean Territory, Ascension Island, Saint Helena, et cetera. The Crown dependencies I am much less sure about, although I know there is a Territorial Army base on Jersey. The last time I looked at the official Guernsey website, it still said that Guernsey’s contribution to British defence is the maintenance of the Alderney breakwater. That is a very interesting conceit. When, nearly 20 years ago, I asked the Ministry of Defence a Written Question on the importance of the Alderney breakwater, an official phoned me up to say, “We don’t understand your question”. On further investigation, he said that they had ceased to be concerned with the Alderney breakwater at the time of the Second World War.

There are many ambivalences here but surely, they should be part of this Bill. They are neither foreign nor entirely British. They are of importance to the UK, in financial terms and, when it came to the Falklands, in military terms. I am assured that there are some facilities on Ascension Island. There are certainly facilities on the British Indian Ocean Territory, although they are of course primarily American, and I think there are fewer than two dozen British servicemen there. However, they should be in the Bill and are not. I merely wish to ask why.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, anybody watching a wonderful BBC documentary series about Ordnance Survey maps a few years ago would have seen the rather amusing part about a gap in the centre of London on the Ordnance Survey map as result of the Official Secrets Act. That was because it was forbidden to have the Telecom Tower on the map because it was a prohibited place for national security, so none of our foes were able to know where it was by studying the Ordnance Survey map. I hope that we avoid such absurdities with this Bill.

In Committee in the Commons, the Minister stated that there is not, nor will there be, a register of prohibited places. I hope the Minister can provide some more clarity with regard to that today. The offences under the Bill are so significant and potentially draconian that some of the issues that my noble friend Lady Ludford indicated might well come about, because the Minister in the Commons was unable to state in clear terms how people will know where a prohibited place is. Some might be perfectly obvious, such as some of the bases which my noble friend Lord Wallace approached with a Liberal councillor, but others are not. I understand entirely that there will be some areas where the Government do not wish to promote the activities or make it clear where they are, but how will they approach inadvertent activity, given that someone statically observing a prohibited place through an iPhone lens or a binocular lens could inadvertently be committing a criminal offence? I simply do not know how the Government intend to ensure that people are aware that they are potentially falling foul of this legislation.

Not only that but the Bill allows Ministers to move quickly to extend prohibited places. It does so by general description, as the Minister said in the Commons. Prohibited places do not have to be specified, as I understand it. They can be categorised, so that all areas that meet the general specification will become prohibited places. Is there a mechanism so that local authorities or local police are informed, even if no local communities are going to be informed? The Minister in the Commons said

“some sites will not want people to know exactly where they are and what they are doing because they will become targets. Once again, there is a balance to be struck in relation to provision for the intelligence community”.—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 12/07/22; col. 107.]

Of course there needs to be a balance but, as with some other elements of the Bill, we see no other part of the balance. We see no mechanism that will protect the interests of people who are inadvertent.

The Government have also indicated that they might have to move very fast. There is of course merit in understanding that if there has been an alert about a threat, certain areas might need to be prohibited. I am not advocating it, but I am curious about the choice that has been made. The Government have not chosen to go down the route of the “made affirmative” procedure, which other legislation has if something has to be done urgently. They say that if there is a threat risk, to allow a prohibited place to be put in place they will bring it forward using the negative procedure and consult on it. It does not really ring true as far as how urgent a response that would be to a national security threat.

However, there are significant wider concerns when it comes to the powers that the Government are seeking. Where are the limits for the extension of prohibited places? Would it be, for example, that an immigration centre could not become a prohibited place under this Bill? Would it be that local government department buildings could not be prohibited places? What is the limit? Unless there is a limit, notwithstanding if there is an immediate threat—I think there are procedures anyway with regard to securing areas where the police think that offences are to be carried out, and for the safety of the public there are mechanisms that can secure places under existing legislation—how do we know how far Government want to extend those prohibited places? Unless we are clear, that raises the considerable concern that they can be used to prevent peaceful protest or concern.

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However, the Government are in agreement with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the Joint Committee on Human Rights that clear guidance is required for the police powers included within the prohibited places regime and in relation to the use of this cordon power. I would like to reassure the Committee again that my officials are working closely with the College of Policing to develop guidance for the police when exercising the powers under Clauses 6 and 11. Accordingly, I invite noble Lords not to press the amendments.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I have two quick questions for the Minister. I was grateful for his response to me with regard to local authorities. Can he clarify which lands will be categorised under the Crown interest? Under Clause 7(4)(b), they are

“an interest belonging to a government department or held in trust for His Majesty for the purposes of a government department”.

It is not singled out, so is my assumption correct that these government departments include devolved Administration departments—the Scottish Government, et cetera?

Similarly, I was grateful for the Minister’s reference to the College of Policing, which was also referenced in Committee by his counterpart in the House of Commons. I have heard no reference to the Government working with the Scottish Police College, which is the relevant body north of the border because the College of Policing is only for England and Wales. This is important, because many of these lands are north of the border, where I live. If the Government are consulting, they need to consult with the Scottish Police College as well. I would be grateful for that assurance.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Yes. My suspicion is that both answers are in the affirmative, but I am afraid I do not know for sure. I will find out from my officials and write to the noble Lord. I thank him for raising that.

National Security Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow two such clear and thought-provoking speeches. When this House has debated treason offences in recent years, it has generally been in the context of lending support to terrorist groups, particularly in foreign theatres such as Iraq and Syria. It has never seemed to me that there is much point in bringing treason into this. The bristling arsenal of counterterrorism law is already equal to any conceivable type of assistance to terrorism or adherence to a terrorist cause, whatever the nationality of the subject and regardless of the state, if any, against which terrorism is directed. As the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, put it, the boundaries are closely drawn and abundantly clear.

Prosecutions for treason in this area would certainly have the potential to raise the emotional temperature, both for us and for the terrorists themselves. I am against such prosecutions because they are exactly what the terrorists want: to elevate their squalid and immoral behaviour into some sort of noble cause. I remember this point being well made from the Government Front Bench by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, who is not in her place, shortly after I joined your Lordships’ House in 2018. She said that

“prosecuting terrorists for treason would risk giving their actions a credibility … glamour and political status that they do not deserve. It would indicate that we recognised terrorists as being in some formal sense at war with the state, rather than merely regarding them as dangerous criminals.”—[Official Report, 31/10/2018; col. 1382.]

No doubt this is why militant republicans in Northern Ireland were not given the platform of treason trials but rather prosecuted for murder, firearms and explosives offences and, more recently, catch-all offences such as the preparation of terrorist acts, which carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.

If we are looking for simple and effective ways to prosecute foreign terrorist fighters—particularly if they are suspected to have been active in a country where assistance from the authorities in gathering evidence is unlikely to be forthcoming—we would do better to concentrate on the offence of entering or remaining in a designated area, which was pioneered in Denmark and Australia, recommended for consideration in one of my own reports as independent reviewer, and introduced by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. However, I believe that no terrorist hotspot has ever been designated under that Act, so the provision remains unused.

This amendment moves the debate on, as the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, explained, in that it relates to aiding not terrorism, but hostile foreign powers. The clause would target those who assist the Governments of countries with which we are at war or which wish to attack the UK by unspecified means including, I assume, cyberattacks on our national infrastructure. Unlike its Australian equivalent, which was introduced after 9/11 but is still to be used for the first time, it would relate only to hostile state activity—indeed, hostile state belligerence.

I look forward to hearing the Minister’s view on whether there is a gap in our law regarding assistance to the enemy—or will be one once the Bill, including Clauses 3 and 13, has become law. There might be a gap: I believe that Canada and New Zealand have their own laws against assisting the enemy, though I am not very familiar with them. Our own Foreign Enlistment Act 1870, introduced to restrict mercenary activity in the wake of the American Civil War and Franco-Prussian War, may not be as antiquated as the Treason Act 1351, but it was last used in the aftermath of the 1896 Jameson raid. It should certainly be reviewed if we are thinking of legislating in this area.

As we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, advocates of a treason law are often motivated by a sense that betrayal—in the words of the Policy Exchange report to which he referred, which was co-authored by the current Security Minister—

“is a specific crime against society and one that deserves punishment.”

I entirely understand that feeling, but betrayal is a regrettable fact of life, and one which we do not consider deserves special punishment in other contexts. The child who kills his parents betrays the family bond, but parricide and matricide are simply types of murder. Those who betray the most sacred bond of all—that of matrimony—may be called adulterers but are not criminalised at all. Can it be said that the bond of citizenship is of a wholly different nature, such that to break it must attract the most severe consequences? I think that is a difficult argument to make, particularly in circumstances where it is now so easy for the Home Secretary to break that bond by depriving people of their citizenship whenever she considers it

“conducive to the public good”.

Incidentally, that is something I hope we will look at some day: in the 15 years to 2020, there were 175 such deprivations on national security grounds alone.

This amendment, interestingly enough, does not follow the Policy Exchange model. Like its enacted but unused Australian equivalent, it has nothing whatever to say about betrayal. It applies to everyone, without limitation to British citizens or even to those who have been given leave to enter and remain in the United Kingdom. I assume it is not intended to apply extraterritorially, or it would criminalise the soldiers of foreign armies, contrary to the principle of combat immunity. But if the amendment is motivated by the desire to punish the betrayal of those who owe allegiance to the Crown, it does not succeed in that aim. Indeed, it is difficult to see why it flies under the banner of treason at all.

My position is simple. If there is a gap in the law as regards material assistance to the enemy, I would be in favour of filling it with an offence punishable by life imprisonment. That offence would be directed to our protection and would therefore apply to all persons within the jurisdiction. Betrayal of a bond of allegiance to the state would be an aggravating factor but not the basis for a separate treason offence, which is needed in neither the terrorism context nor the hostile state context.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Lord. I share his views and those laid out so well by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, for allowing us to pose some fundamental questions, but I share the concerns of others who have spoken about whether this amendment answers them. Who are the enemy, and what is an attack? These are not easy questions to answer. I respect those who have worked in our intelligence services and have grappled with these questions over many years. Framing legislation to neatly define who our enemy is at any given time is not easy, nor is it easy to define what an attack is.

From reading the notices provided by MI5 earlier this year and the speeches made by intelligence services leaders, in many respects, it seems that we are under perpetual attack. It is hard to define in the modern sense those grey areas that the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and I discussed on Monday. What is an attack and what is preparatory to an attack? Perpetual cyberactivity can be either an end in itself or preparatory to a bigger effect. In many respects, we are in a state of war with Russia, with hybrid and economic warfare. Our sanctions are not penalties for actions; they are meant deliberately to overtly change the behaviour of a foreign power. I understand the rationale behind the amendment, but it perhaps does not address that clearly. When the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, responds to the debate, I would be grateful if he could clarify the meaning of “an attack”.

I welcome proposed new subsection (2)(e), which references acts that

“prejudice the security and defence of the United Kingdom”.

This is along the lines of what we were arguing for on Monday—trying to sharpen these areas. So we have persuaded someone on this—if not the Minister.

I think this raises another question, which was also raised on Monday. If a foreign intelligence service carries out activity which is not authorised or approved by our intelligence services, the Minister said that that was prejudicial to the safety and interests of the United Kingdom, but he did not say it was unlawful. This now raises an issue that we have to debate further in Committee. Some of the activity which could be defined as attacks or activity against the security and defence of the United Kingdom is not currently unlawful. We need to tackle that.

I close by agreeing very strongly with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that either in further consideration of this Bill or separately, we must look at how we interact with the issue of mercenary groups and groups that we would categorise as terrorist groups but that other countries would categorise as civil society groups or NGOs, which are fully funded and equipped by foreign states and operate in other countries, but are threats to UK nationals and UK interests. I travelled to north Iraq many times during the time when Daesh had overtaken Mosul. I saw many groups that were fully funded by Iran operating, sometimes with our compliance, sometimes with our approval and sometimes with our co-operation. At other times, they were operating absolutely against those interests, as with the interaction between some of the terrorist forces and some of the rapid deployment forces. I have seen first-hand in Sudan and elsewhere the Wagner Group, which is fully funded and equipped by Russia. How we cover mercenary and other groups that are not neatly defined within the proscriptions of terrorist legislation is something we also need to tackle. While I do not think this amendment would enable us to tackle this, it has allowed us to raise some of these fundamental questions, so I am grateful.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I hesitate to intervene in a debate after speakers who know a great deal more about this subject than I do, but I wonder why “treason” has to go into the heading of this proposed new clause. It does not add anything to the meaning of the words that are there already:

“aiding a hostile foreign power”.

The problem is, if you use the word treason you raise the temperature of the debate, for the reasons mentioned already.

If there is a gap to be filled, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has suggested, I invite the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, to drop the word treason. It is unnecessary, as there is enough description in the headnote as it is. For all sorts of reasons, when you use the word treason people think of all sorts of other things. It is unnecessary to get into that debate if you can describe the offence in the remaining words as simply aiding a hostile foreign power. People may say it is treason but you should not label it as such for the purposes of the administration of justice.

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[Viscount Stansgate (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope that I can intervene briefly to ask two questions. I support Amendment 44, but the questions I want to ask relate to government Amendments 38 and 42. If I understand the Minister correctly, subsection 2(c) of Amendment 38 inserts the word “reckless” in order to fill a gap. If so, why does the word “reckless” not appear in his other two amendments, 41 and 42? My second question relates to spiritual injury. What would be the effect if you left out the bit in brackets in subsection 2(e) of Amendment 42? In other words, why is the bit in brackets so crucial?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I will begin by raising a question with the Minister regarding his amendments, and will then support my noble friend, as a member of a fairly virtuous party, and my noble “also-friend”, who is equally virtuous but not in the party.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, rightly raised the question of causing spiritual injury. I would be grateful for a lot more clarification as to what the Government’s background justification and intent is in this regard. I would be happy if the Minister wrote to us before Report, because my reading of the new amendment is that causing spiritual injury to any person is now prohibited conduct, in light of the wording in brackets. As I have indicated previously, I have the great privilege of being able to travel extensively and, as the party’s spokesman on foreign affairs, to engage in many discussions on freedom of religion and no belief, on which the greatly respected noble Lord, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, leads in this House. That means that we are engaged in many discussions on the sensitive nature of religion and politics.

My reading of the amendment is that it could make it an offence for someone to engage with me and seek to persuade me of the view on the abolition of apostasy legislation in the Gulf, for example. The death penalty applies in Malaysia, a Commonwealth country, and in Qatar and the UAE, for example, for apostasy. Lobby groups who are campaigning for the abolition of the death penalty or the decriminalisation of apostasy, which has taken place in other Muslim nations, could well be defined by others as causing spiritual injury. Unless the Government have a definition of this—we do not necessarily need to rely on the Australian case, which I too saw on the same search as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile—then those people will be able to say that you are doing them spiritual injury if you wish to undermine their belief in Hudud law, which supports apostasy.

These are extremely sensitive areas which those in our intelligence community have to grapple with, because they are at the heart of the motivation of many people to take forward their political views. The situation is similar with those who seek to reform blasphemy legislation. Blasphemy is a very complex area that interacts with different faiths and laws. My concern is that subsection 2(e) of this amendment could cause considerable difficulties with blasphemy legislation, which has been a fairly delicate legislative area in the past, and with our interactions. I therefore hope that the Minister can provide much greater clarity on this. I would like to know what input the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office has had into the amendment regarding the convention on freedom of religion and belief. As a consequence of the amendment, some of our activities could be in contravention of the convention, which refers to freedom of religion and no belief. Therefore, the convention provides for the freedom to challenge what some may hold to be an authentic political view of a religion, but which others may believe to constitute spiritual injury. If the Government intend to prohibit debating political faith—political Islam, political Christianity—then we are on a very dangerous path. I hope that the Minister can reassure me on that.

Turning to donations and Amendments 44 and 43, I support the argument of my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire. The Electoral Commission has been very clear in public statements that we have to make progress on tackling the lack of faith in politics. Lack of transparency in the funding of politics is key to that, which is why the Bill needs to be strengthened. There is now an overwhelming case for greatly enhanced due diligence on the part of political parties in working through the source of donations. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, there is a balance to be struck. There are those who seek to operate a healthy political system and engage in the political processes with those wishing to fund the parties; equally, we need transparency in those areas where undetermined income is the source of the donation. Importantly, this links to our previous discussions on “grey areas”.

At the moment, a political party could receive a donation from an individual through a bitcoin company which is operated by a national from another country—for example, it is based in the Cayman Islands but the donation comes through a UK national. That is perfectly legal, but there is no way of knowing where that income originated. That could be a live example: a Member of this House is on the global advisory board of a bitcoin company based in the Cayman Islands, so this is not theoretical. Looking at the interaction with the source of the income is important.

There is also a case to be made for enhanced diligence: asking whether companies have made enough money in the UK to fund that loan. I had a quick look at the Electoral Commission database for donations. Of the top 20 donations by companies to all political parties, a number have been through holding companies and there is simply a reference to a donation to the party. There is no mechanism to go beyond that: to state whether that company is solvent or making operating profits. Indeed, two of the companies in question made no operating profits for three years in a row but donated substantial sums to a political party. In other situations, having to investigate unexplained income would be important. We have other areas where due diligence applies—supply chain reforms, modern slavery statements and so on—and I do not see why there cannot be an equivalent regime when companies are interacting in the political realm.

Finally, one area where a very significant loophole needs to be addressed is for those countries which the Government themselves have said are at high risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. I took part in the debates on the money laundering, terrorist financing and transfer of funds regulations, which we have transposed into domestic legislation from the EU. In those regulations, we currently have a list of 25 countries for which it is the law that there is enhanced due diligence of any transactions because a company operates, through any business activities, within them. I remind the Committee that that list includes the Cayman Islands, Gibraltar and the United Arab Emirates.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, that is more properly a DLUHC area, in the light of the Act passed recently, but I will certainly have the conversation with my counterpart there and see what that Act says. I am not an expert on that Act, as the noble Lord will probably appreciate.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

We obviously have a difference of opinion as to whether the current system is stringent. I am curious why, if the trading arm of a political party was operating with a business that had any interest in one of the 26 countries in the money laundering and terrorist financing regulations, it would have to do due diligence, but if it received money that originated from such a country, it would not. Why does the Minister think that is acceptable?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I outlined in my answer earlier, I believe this is a stringent regime. I am afraid there is a significant difference of opinion. It specifies that only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations. Any donations that are not permissible and not reported will constitute an offence.

I am afraid I will not address the comments by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, about support for Mr Orbán over the Dutch and French; that certainly does not apply here. His Amendment 45A seeks to add requirements relating to proxy voting. It would be odd and somewhat undemocratic to seek to apply such measures solely to overseas electors, when the same issue could arise for domestic electors. In any event, proxy voters and those seeking to use a proxy are not in a position to determine whether someone is seeking to support a foreign power. It is an impossible ask of them. Adding such requirements risks disfranchising individuals by blocking their ability to find a proxy and undermining the very point of a proxy voting system.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think I have already answered in significant detail why that clause has gone into the Bill. I have also answered the specific points that the noble Viscount raised at the start of the debate.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

This is really important. As the noble Viscount pointed out, this is not about coercion of an individual but about putting into law “causing spiritual injury” to any person, ill-defined as that is, and not just the person to whom the effect of the interference relates. It is of significance that we would be putting in a very considerable offence of causing an undefined spiritual injury to any person. Can the Minister reflect on that and maybe come back to us in writing?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I have heard the feelings about this around the Committee, so of course I commit to do that.

National Security Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, I wanted to say something about Clause 23 when it was the right moment; I think this is the right moment, without breaking the rules, and I got a nod from the clerk, so I have that assurance.

I am afraid I have not yet been able to get into the details of the Bill, but as I told noble Lords, I have been out of the House for three months, and I am taking a bit of time to get back into the business. There seems to be some discontent on the Government Benches: am I offending somebody? Apparently not.

I received a brief from Reprieve, which says of Clause 23 that it could give Ministers and officials effective immunity for crimes such as targeted killing and torture, and would destroy the UK’s moral authority in condemning crimes such as Jamal Khashoggi’s murder by Saudi Arabia. Clause 23 would thwart accountability for Whitehall complicity in torture—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I wonder whether the noble Lord is considering Clause 28 rather than Clause 23.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

What was Clause 23 has now become Clause 28, because of various changes made by amendments to the Bill. So my noble friend’s remarks will be perfectly in order when we get to Clause 28, but we are not there yet.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 62 is a minor amendment to Schedule 6 which covers detention following an arrest for foreign power threat activity. Included in the schedule are powers for the police to take fingerprints and samples—biometric data—from an individual in detention. Biometric data can be retained for three years, with the police able to apply to the court for that period to be extended. The police and the individual can appeal the decision on extension to a relevant appeal court. This amendment corrects a reference to the relevant appeal court in Scotland, which is currently defined as the sheriff principal. Sections 109 and 110 of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 abolished appeals to the sheriff principal in civil proceedings, with appeals now made to the Sheriff Appeal Court. This amendment corrects this.

Amendment 73 is a consequential change to take account of the new offence at Clause 15: obtaining a material benefit from a foreign intelligence service. This was introduced in Committee in the other place, at which point the Committee had surpassed Clause 15. Clause 15(6) makes its own provision about when offences are committed outside the UK. I beg to move, thank you very much and wish you a happy Christmas.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I wish the Minister and all other members of the Committee a merry Christmas and, in keeping with this Bill, a safe new year.

National Security Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

63A: Clause 28, page 21, line 14, at end insert—
“6 Paragraph 5 does not apply in relation to an alleged offence under section 44, 45 or 46 that relates to conduct involving—(a) the intentional unlawful killing of a person,(b) torture or inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment or punishment, or(c) the violation of a person’s sexual integrity.7 Paragraph 6 does not prevent a decision not to prosecute in the public interest.”Member’s explanatory statement
This probing amendment would ensure that the immunity provided to Ministers and officials who assist or encourage crimes under the Serious Crime Act 2007 does not cover torture, murder or sexual offences.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, this debate concerns the intelligence agencies and what the appropriate procedures are within the rule of law where they authorise, are aware of, encourage or assist in the commissioning of an offence or are engaged, either at home or abroad, in relations with other agencies or bodies where the risk of breaches of the law arises. The Government’s intent seems to be to seek total immunity from any prospect of prosecution for actions at home or abroad; to widen the authorisation powers of the SIS and GCHQ under the Intelligence Services Act 1994; and to provide brand-new immunity to MI5 and all UK Armed Forces, thereby expanding the current practice to actions at home, which, up to now, have had no immunity.

At Second Reading in the Commons, the Government failed to make a convincing case. We continue to be concerned about such widespread immunity; this view is supported by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the ISC. At Second Reading in this House, the Minister said:

“Section 7 ISA authorisations are not available in all the circumstances in which the SCA”—


Serious Crime Act—

“risks arise. Those authorisations primarily apply to overseas activities, meaning that Section 7 could not generally be used to protect officers when carrying out activities in the UK. Section 7 authorisations may be sought only by SIS and GCHQ, and not by MI5 or the MoD.”

He also said:

“The Government believe that UKIC and the Armed Forces should have a targeted protection that provides far greater clarity and certainty”.—[Official Report, 6/12/22; col. 155.]


However, he did not say why class authorisations that exist under the ISA would not cover these areas. We know that there have been considerable discussions, both in the ISA and elsewhere, about class authorisations rather than those that are specific. If the Minister could state why class authorisations for the SIS are not working, I would be grateful, because this is a major change.

For domestic activities, for example for MI5, there are the Security Service’s Guidelines on the Use of Agents Who Participate in Criminality and the authorisations issued in accordance with them. The terms of the guidance were made public in a redacted form in March 2021 during a successful appeal by the Government in the Court of Appeal, where a case arguing—unsuccessfully—that there was de facto immunity for the Security Service’s activities was heard. I quote the guidance, which said that

“it may sometimes be necessary and proportionate for agents to participate in criminality to secure or maintain access to intelligence that can be used to save life or disrupt more serious criminality, or to ensure the agent’s continued safety, security and ability to pass such intelligence.”

It goes on to say that an officer is “empowered” under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

Paragraph 9 of the guidance is clear:

“An authorisation of the use of a participating agent has no legal effect and does not confer on either the agent or those involved in the authorisation process any immunity from prosecution. Rather, the authorisation will be the Service’s explanation and justification of its decisions should the criminal activity of the agent come under scrutiny by an external body, e.g. the police or prosecuting authorities.”


That is the current situation. The guidance goes on:

“In particular, the authorisation process and associated records may form the basis of representations by the Service to the prosecuting authorities that prosecution is not in the public interest.”


This is a scheme that up until March 2021 the Government said had been operating well. They have not made the case for why that needs to change significantly. The judgment also highlighted that the Security Service works under a memorandum of understanding between it, the police and the counterterrorism division of the Crown Prosecution Service. The judgment went on to tell us that there were corresponding protocols in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Clause 28 of this Bill now allows otherwise criminal actions here in the UK which encourage or assist crimes overseas to be carried out, setting aside previous guidance. This is extremely broad and changes dramatically the practice and the operation of that current guidance, with little justification. I went into a little detail about the domestic situation because it illustrates how a process operates which allows proper intelligence work to be carried out while retaining no immunity from the rule of law. This will now be abolished with Clause 28. For the UK and abroad, as I have indicated and as we discussed at Second Reading, the SAS has powers under the ISA and, as I indicated, there can be class authorisations as well as individually targeted authorisations.

In the Government’s response to the ISC’s report on privacy and security, they went into a little more detail about class authorisations, but it was very clear that such authorisations are under the statutory oversight of the Intelligence Services Commissioner. Under Clause 28, there would be no equivalent of this oversight, and that is a considerable diminution of the ability for there to be oversight of the operations of SIS and GCHQ.

One of the highlights of the Government’s annual human rights reports, the most recent of which was published in early December 2021, is the stress that they put on the human rights guidance on overseas security and justice assistance, or OSJA. It states that when the UK is working with other countries, primarily with their justice and security systems, on addressing threats such as terrorism, serious organised crime or conflict, a risk assessment process must be carried out prior to providing justice or security sector assistance. The institutions are relevant in this context, where the UK Armed Forces intelligence agencies are working with foreign bodies and their armed forces and the police, primarily their gendarmerie, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence and security services, coastguards and border guards—the list is fairly extensive.

The OSJA guidance sits alongside the Cabinet Office’s Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel on the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas, and on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees. Under OSJA guidance, before any work is undertaken with one of the foreign bodies, a risk identification process must be carried out on human rights concerns, specifically on whether assistance or co-operation might directly or significantly contribute to the use of the death penalty, unlawful or arbitrary arrest or detention, torture, unlawful killing, enforced disappearance, unfair trial, or denial of justice and unlawful interference with democratic rights. The checklist also states that there must be a risk system on violations of the right of the child, human trafficking, and persecution of an identifiable group. All these areas will now be swept away with a risk assessment process, because of this blanket immunity. If it is high-risk, Ministers must be consulted unless ministerial approval has already been given for the specific activity. This will include, for SIS, a 1994 authorisation, and under current law, Ministers must operate under the terms of the Serious Crime Act.

However, this guidance is now redundant, with the Bill removing a major component of the UK’s promotion of human rights by providing wide immunity to our Armed Forces. The Minister in the Commons, in making the case for this clause, stated that the current process created too much delay. He said:

“The impact of that approach is that vital and otherwise legal intelligence opportunities are currently being delayed or missed as the SCA risks are worked through”.—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 14/7/22; col. 181.]


He promised to provide examples to the ISC. I would be grateful if the Minister can confirm whether those examples have been provided and if I can be briefed on those examples as the Front-Bench spokesman of my party. I have not seen any examples, demonstrating that there has been considerable delay.

The consolidated guidance for intelligence agencies exists because they do not have the powers of detention, either in the UK or overseas, that the Armed Forces may have. There has been considerable concern about the wide extension of this clause to all of the Armed Forces. Paragraph 7 of the guidance states:

“When we work with countries whose practice raises questions about their compliance with international legal obligations, we ensure that our co-operation accords with our own international and domestic obligations.”


This is now being changed dramatically.

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[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, I just wonder whether he considers that there may be a difference between intentional killing, on the one hand, which may or may not be wrong, depending on the circumstances and context, and torture and sexual violation on the other, in respect of which it is very difficult to conceive that they could ever be right. Does he think that there may be a distinction?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I understand the case. The Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel does not make the distinction. It does make the distinction that there is a lack of clarity when it comes to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment. Our definitions of that may differ from those of some of our allies, or of others we are working with. For the other two areas, there is no distinction as provided for under the consolidated guidance. Indeed, the risk assessment criteria that all officers currently have to operate under—the checklist that exists within the guidance that they have to go through before entering into any of the security work with agencies—include all of these areas, including where senior personnel and legal advisers conclude that there is risk of torture or CIDT, and also lawful killing. This is in addition to what authorisations under the ISA may bring about.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I listened with great interest to the argument made by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed. I wonder whether I could ask the Minister, when he replies, to clarify the way in which the liabilities and immunities under this clause might impact, separately, the members of the intelligence services and the Armed Forces on the one hand, and, on the other hand, covert human intelligence sources, sometimes known as “agents” of the intelligence services, whose activities are authorised, I believe, under separate legislation. It does seem to me that it is very important that we should understand those two separate categories of action, and the way in which the proposed legislation would impact on those, because we are talking there about different legal regimes—although I speak as a lawyer and therefore I am willing to be corrected.

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[Baroness Manningham-Buller (CB)]

My Lords, I had not intended to say anything on this part of the Bill, not least because all these lawyers at various levels of leading counsel, pupil-master and so on do so much better than me. It seems to me that it is wrong in principle for members of the security and intelligence services to have immunity from the law.

I think that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis—the Minister may deal with this in his summing up—has confused the authorisations that are approved for CHIS activity involving criminality with what this part of the Bill seeks to do. I hope that in his reply the Minister will acknowledge the wide concern within the Committee, including from people such as me who have spent a career in the Security Service, and will consider an amendment to address some of these problems.

I quite comprehend that it is not necessarily easy to explain what the problem is that we are trying to address without revealing secrets but, again, I endorse the view that it would be helpful to hear what the ISC has thought on these matters. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, at an earlier stage, that he and the ISC recognised that there was a problem that needed addressing. For my part, I am unable to support this as a solution.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness and of course defer to her very considerable expertise in this area. The point I am seeking to make is that, from my understanding of the CHIS authorisations under the 1994 legislation, some of those will now no longer be necessary because of the blanket immunity under this clause. In fact, many of them will not be, because the authorisations for SIS to act abroad will now be expanded by this clause, with SIS being able to act here for supporting acts that are unlawful abroad as well as officers operating abroad, which is unlawful. The point that I was trying to make is that this clause brings the two together.

[Baroness Manningham-Buller (CB)]

I will have a short word with the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, afterwards in the dinner break, if he does not mind.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Terrifying—please, no.

[Baroness Manningham-Buller (CB)]

The noble Lord may have confused covert intelligence sources as agents—I am sorry; this is terminology—and agents are not full members of the security and intelligence services. The Minister will answer this better than I can anyway; I am sorry to intrude again.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I do not have those figures to hand. I am not sure that I will be able to get them, but I will do my very best to find out and come back to the noble Lord on that question.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, and I look forward to that reply when it comes in writing. If I have this right, the Minister said that it makes no difference—there is no change—to the approach on unlawful killing, torture or cruel or inhuman treatment. Is he saying that this clause does not provide immunity in offering assistance to others who would be committing unlawful killing, torture or cruel or inhuman treatment?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I said earlier, I think this is confined very much to the intelligence support by the Armed Forces—is that what the noble Lord is referring to?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful. No, it is not. The Minister said that there was no change to the approach on unlawful killing and torture. My reading of this clause is that there would now be immunity for offering assistance to others to carry out unlawful killing or torture.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I do not believe that there is immunity for that, but I will clarify that if I am incorrect.

Moving on, caution when considering the legality of support to our partners is of course correct and will continue. However, the current impact of the SCA offences means that vital intelligence-sharing opportunities have been delayed or missed, even when UKIC and the Armed Forces are fully compliant with other legal and policy requirements, such as the Fulford principles and the overseas security and justice assistance guidance, which ensure, for example, that support to international partners is in line with our human rights obligations. I have the principles and guidance to hand. If anybody would like me to go through them in detail, I will, but they are long so it will delay proceedings. I will await an intervention, if any noble Lord wishes me to do that.

UKIC’s and the Armed Forces’ adherence to and compliance with the principles are monitored by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—IPCO—via regular inspections, and they are also routinely scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee. Ministers are directly accountable for the work of the agencies and the legality of their operations. When things go wrong, it is entirely right that there is scrutiny of and accountability for the organisations’ activities, and I commend the important work that the ISC and IPCO undertake in this space. Meanwhile, any individual found to be working beyond the proper functions of the security and intelligence agencies or the Armed Forces will remain personally liable for those actions. This is right and fair.

However, I have heard the views of the House about this clause. The Government are in close consultation with the Intelligence and Security Committee, UKIC and the Armed Forces, and we are carefully reflecting on the views expressed and considering whether a change in approach is appropriate. It is important to note that those who have seen the very sensitive information which is relevant to this issue have agreed that there is a problem to solve—including the ISC, which has seen specific examples—and I am committed to us reaching a consensus on this matter.

Turning directly to the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act allows the Secretary of State to give authorisations for acts outside the British Isles, provided that the acts are done as necessary for the proper function of SIS or GCHQ—though not MI5 or the Armed Forces—and that the nature and consequence of the acts will be reasonable. These authorisations are clearly not currently available in all the circumstances in which SCA risks arise. I understand that this amendment seeks to address that gap and provide a solution to the application of the SCA offences. It also seeks to utilise an existing power for ministerial authorisation which is overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. These are obviously legitimate and valuable objectives. Section 7 authorisations provide a carefully used route by which the agencies can seek ministerial approval in advance of planned activities. They require Ministers to consider, in relation to specific acts, whether they are necessary and whether the consequences are reasonable. Once authorised, they can remove criminal and civil liability for those acts.

There will invariably be instances where the SCA risk does not manifest itself initially and becomes apparent only much later. Where a risk is not identified in advance, a Section 7 authorisation would not be sought to cover it. In these cases, those acting for UKIC or the Armed Forces would not be adequately protected should concerns about SCA offences arise later. Further, this scenario could lead to an unintended consequence of seeking to use Section 7 authorisations for hypothetical risks, creating an unhealthy reality in which more conduct is approved than would be otherwise without providing meaningful consideration of those risks. I am sure the House shares our desire to find a targeted solution to that problem. It would be a perverse outcome indeed if this well-intended amendment were to lead to less consideration of the SCA risks rather than more. Whether it is a class authorisation or a targeted one, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, the reasons why Section 7 authorisations are inappropriate remain the same.

In short, the Government do not believe that Section 7 authorisation is the best solution to the specific operational issue and do not believe it would improve the clarity of the application of the SCA offences to all the complex operational scenarios that arise in ongoing, carefully considered but agile international collaboration. It is more desirable to remove this risk in a targeted way as per Clause 28, avoiding the burden of potentially missing, and/or the overuse of, Section 7 authorisations for SCA risks.

The noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Beith, talked about criminal conduct and authorisation of this for covert human intelligence sources. I think they may have conflated this with the issue at hand. No amendment is being proposed to the criminal conduct authorisation regime which governs the action of agents. We are concerned here with support for our international partners’ activities, so I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who articulated this point very well.

I now turn to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, which aims to table provisions which explicitly state that Clause 28 does not cover torture, murder or sexual offences. Again, it is a legitimate attempt to clarify Clause 28. However, it is one which the Government deem unnecessary for reasons that I have partly outlined already but will continue to set out.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am going to do it right now: there is no immunity for inciting or assisting others to kill or torture.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Could the Minister give a little more information as to why there is no immunity?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord does not want there to be immunity.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

No. Why, under this clause, would there continue to be no immunity?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Perhaps I could get to the end and then clarify this. As I said earlier in relation to the SCA, I can confirm that the examples that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked about have been provided to the ISC. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, pointed out, it has agreed that this is a problem that requires a solution.

It is vital to acknowledge that Clause 28 will not create blanket criminal law immunity or change the application of all other criminal law offences, including those criminalising torture anywhere in the world, as I have said a number of times. The UK remains committed and subject to international legal obligations, including under the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and international obligations on assisting an unlawful act under Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. The amendment to the SCA offences applies only when persons acting for UKIC or the Armed Forces are acting within the proper exercise of their functions. We do not consider that the activities that are of concern and the focus of this amendment would amount to the proper exercise of those functions. I hope that is clear.

I want to be clear that any individual found to be working outside the proper functions of the intelligence agencies or Armed Forces will remain personally liable for those actions under the SCA offences, as well as other applicable laws. Meanwhile, it will still be possible for legal challenges to be brought against the intelligence agencies and Armed Forces in relation to allegations of unlawful behaviour, whether in the form of judicial review, civil damages claims or through a referral to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. That is exactly as it should be.

In response to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, I say that the Government’s position is that this amendment is not intended to, nor would it have the effect of, removing the role of the relevant Secretary of State from the oversight of the intelligence and security services.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, spoke about the current reasonableness defence and effectively why it is not enough. There is an existing reasonableness defence in Section 50 of the SCA, as has been noted, which was included in recognition that there may be occasions when it could be shown that an individual’s actions were justified in the circumstances.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is what I am saying. I will come back to whether it should be on the face of the Bill in due course.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am very grateful for that last interaction between the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the Minister. I am also grateful for the Minister continuing to have a degree of open-mindedness. I do not know where I sit on the cascade of legal hierarchy, but I think it is lower order. I do not know if it is just me, but a frisson of nervousness went through my spine when the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, asked for a quick word outside. If I could avoid that, it would be better.

I am well aware of the distinction between SIS officers working under a CHIS authorisation and what is covered under the ISA. I am also well aware of MI5 officers running agents who carry out criminal activity. The point I was trying to make is that there are clear distinctions and that we have procedures with regard to MI5 officers running agents who carry out criminal activity, but there is no immunity for them to do so. The point I made in my opening remarks is that the processes that MI5 has are effectively the defence. The concern with the breadth of this immunity is that those processes will no longer be the case.

I am also well aware of our international obligations, but it is under domestic law that we would realise what those natures are. Because of the extraterritorial nature of the schedule in the SCA, I am still not convinced in the reading of it that our intelligence services and Armed Forces would be able to operate under domestic law in offering assistance to others carrying out criminal acts. Those criminal acts may well also be breaches of international law. I am grateful for what the Minister said, but I am also grateful for his willingness to engage further on that.

I hope the Minister took on board the consensus with regard to concerns about the Armed Forces. The point I made at the start of this debate is that, unique among the SIS and GCHQ included within this, the Armed Forces have powers of detention. Therefore, the processes under way under the MoD doctrine for risk assessments on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, extraordinary rendition or rendition, and unacceptable standards of arrest and detention are all areas of considerable concern, if there is immunity for our Armed Forces when working with others.

Of course, the guidance that exists also includes the receiving of unsolicited information or providing or sharing information on collaboration. These risk assessment processes are in place—they are in published principles and guidelines—and the considerable concern is that they will be washed away by the extent of the immunity.

I am grateful to the Minister for being open. I still think that he has not sufficiently addressed all the areas of concern, not least that there would be a considerable diminution of independent oversight in the operation of this. I will withdraw my amendment at this stage. I accept the Minister’s word that he will engage fully before Report, and I hope he will be able to put in writing responses to all the issues that have been raised on this so that we can study it carefully before Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 63A withdrawn.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I share the concerns which have been expressed in this debate about the breadth of Clauses 29 and 30, particularly in relation to public interest journalism, as expressed by the noble Lords, Lord Black and Lord Faulks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell.

One of the problems is that Clause 29(2)(c) ensures that the foreign power condition applies merely because there is

“other assistance provided by a foreign power”.

That is an incredibly broad definition. The provision of information would potentially fall within the scope of that definition. There is also the concern, which has been explained by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Wallace, that the foreign power definition in Clause 30(1)(e) extends to a political party—not just to political parties generally but, as Clause 30(2) makes clear, to any party which has any member of the Government in a coalition. So it extends very broadly, particularly in Europe, to any number of political parties.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, made the point that one of the mischiefs here is that there is no attempt to exclude governing parties in our allies—NATO countries, Australia, New Zealand and Five Eyes countries—which is quite extraordinary. The anomaly is even greater, because if the Committee looks at Clause 30(3)(a) there is a specific exclusion for any political party which is

“a governing political party of the government of the Republic of Ireland”.

I would be very grateful if the Minister could explain why there is that specific exclusion —not that I have anything against the Irish—but not for any political party that operates in our other allies, particularly NATO allies. The anomaly is even greater, because it is not beyond the realms of possibility that, in the next few years, Sinn Féin may be a political party that is part of the Government of the Republic of Ireland, possibly in a coalition.

None of this makes any sense. Could the Minister please clarify, explain and reflect on whether this is really a sensible way to proceed?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I wish very briefly to follow that excellent point, because the Government have not been clear in ironing out the anomalies in the definitions. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others are absolutely right in agreeing with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, who raised this point.

The reality is that a junior party in a coalition Government, which might be under some form of political arrangement that is different from ours and which could be one of our sister parties, could be considered to meet the “foreign power condition” in the Bill. A person’s conduct could then fall foul of Clause 29(5) if that person

“intends the conduct in question to benefit a foreign power.”

I would like to benefit my liberal sister parties’ prospects in other countries by working with them on a philosophical basis, and vice versa. That is why we exist as political parties. The Bill would consider that conduct to be intending to benefit a foreign power. That surely cannot be right for an open democracy when we want to encourage political parties.

Not only that: before the aid cuts, we were spending considerable sums of money through the Westminster Foundation for Democracy to develop political party links. So we have on the one hand the Government funding the WFD, encouraging and in fact paying and providing support to parliamentarians to work with sister parties, and on the other saying under the Bill, “By carrying out the work that we’re funding, you’re also aiding a foreign power”, which is nonsense. At the same time, there is a concern that, under the definition in Clause 30(1)(c), a foreign public sector broadcaster, for example, could be considered a foreign power under the Bill, so any journalists working with, say, CBC in Canada would fall foul of the Bill because that would be an “authority” of a foreign power, unless specific changes are made.

There is also the point that my noble friend Lord Marks made. Part of the anomaly is that the Bill creates too many difficulties for journalists of state broadcasters to operate and potentially has a chilling effect on sister party collaboration, which the Government themselves seem to promote and support, but at the same time it does not include private sector enterprises that, although they are not formally an agency or authority of a foreign Government and a foreign Government is not responsible for their affairs, could include a private sector sovereign wealth fund of a state, which might or might not be listed on a stock exchange and which may or may not, in effect, be a private sector arm of the interests of a foreign power. So any interaction we have through the strategic interests of a wealth fund of a Gulf state, or of a private sector enterprise that may or may not be established and fully operational in the private sector but which our intelligence agencies say is, in effect, an arm of or has some interaction with the Communist Party of China, is not covered.

The anomalies in the “foreign power condition” need to be ironed out. These amendments will help in that way. I hope the Government will be able to provide greater clarification.

National Security Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Yes, it was possibly a serious disruption.

We have all received a very large number of briefings calling for a public interest defence, and none of them has suggested that such a defence is a bad idea or that it would imperil national security. I record our thanks to all the organisations which have sent us these briefings, including the BBC, the NUJ, Index on Censorship, openDemocracy, Guardian News & Media Limited and Mishcon de Reya, among many others. The briefings have concentrated largely on the threat to investigative journalism posed by the criminal provisions in the Bill. We dwelled on these at Second Reading, in the first two days in Committee and, to some extent, earlier today, so I will not go into detail. Suffice it to say that the threat to investigative journalism of criminalisation and the accompanying very long sentences is real and chilling—chilling in that the threat will have a deterrent effect on investigative journalism and in that it represents a real and frightening, and not merely theoretical, threat to open democracy.

It seems to be generally agreed that these provisions risk breaching Article 10 of the ECHR, on freedom of expression, a concern that was expressed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its report on the Bill. The committee said, at paragraph 172:

“There seems to be a certain level of consensus that a whistleblowing or public interest defence is needed”.


It is also significant that a number of other countries, including our Five Eyes partners Canada, Australia and New Zealand, have some form of public interest defence to charges under similar legislation. However, it is not exclusively investigative journalism or even campaigning that is under threat. Those who expose wrongdoing by public servants or whistleblowing employees are equally at risk and may be equally deserving of an acquittal for an offence under this Bill after deploying a public interest defence.

It is for that reason that the public interest defence in our Amendment 75, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed, goes further than protecting journalists alone. In so doing, it is close to the Law Commission’s recommendation in its 2000 paper, Protection of Official Data, which recommended that there should be a statutory public interest defence to unauthorised disclosure offences which should be available to anyone, civilians as well as journalists.

Therefore, our amendment would apply to all prosecutions for offences under Clauses 1 to 5 of the Bill, not just unauthorised disclosure offences, with which the Law Commission was concerned, but we regard that as right. Disclosure of restricted material is just as capable of being in the public interest as it is of assisting a friendly country’s intelligence service to apprehend or expose wrongdoing, as is entering a prohibited place to photograph or record corrupt transactions involving public servants. All can give rise to prosecution under the Act, and in each case there ought to be a public interest defence.

The defence we advocate is based on reasonable belief, so it relies on a test that is, in part, subjective—“Did the defendant believe their conduct was in the public interest?”—and, in part, objective: “Was that belief reasonable?” Juries are well used to applying that type of test and I suggest it is the appropriate one. By contrast, a wholly objective test of whether or not conduct was in fact in the public interest would impose a burden on juries to make what is essentially a political judgment, no doubt on the basis of conflicting evidence, expert and factual. That would not be the best test of the criminality of a defendant.

We have also maintained the principle that, once the defence is raised, it is for the prosecution to rebut it to the criminal standard of proof. That is the way our criminal law responds to a number of defences, reasonable self-defence being one such. We suggest it is the appropriate response. It would perhaps be different if we were concerned here with unauthorised disclosure by a member of the security or defence services who was bound by an agreed and binding confidentiality requirement. However, we are legislating here for criminal charges against private citizens, who, I suggest, are entitled to the benefits of the usual protections inherent in our criminal law.

In applying the test we advocate, juries would have to consider a number of factors set out in proposed new subsection (3) of the amendment. In formulating them, we have relied loosely, but not exclusively, on the factors mentioned in the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, which amended the Employment Rights Act 1996 for the protection of whistleblowers. These factors are designed to steer juries towards a balance between confidentiality and the public interest in disclosure. But we do not argue that these are in final form; at this stage, they are designed to give shape to what we would like to see in a public interest defence.

I repeat what I said the other day in Committee: there is no genuine democratic protection in the requirement that the Attorney-General’s consent should be obtained for a prosecution to be brought. That is a welcome safeguard, but its point is to avoid unnecessary and unmeritorious prosecutions. What is needed for the determination of guilt or innocence on a public interest defence is a trial before a jury, where the defendant has a fair chance to put their case that they reasonably believe that the conduct of which they are accused and which is said to be criminal was in the public interest.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his amendment but, unlike him though it may be, we say it goes nothing like far enough. We need a defence when the Bill becomes law, not merely an assessment of its possible merits. I note that, in the other place, the amendment of Kevan Jones MP, the Labour Member for Durham and a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, was nothing like as diffident as that proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I also note that Tom Tugendhat, for the Government, promised to engage further with the Opposition on this issue. I sincerely hope that the Minister gives a similar promise to consider the public interest defence, not just because of what we say here but because of the wide interest and concern about the importance of this expressed across the nation. The incorporation of the public interest defence in the Bill would address many of the concerns that these Benches and others have expressed about the dangers to personal liberty in this legislation. I therefore beg to move.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I will add very briefly to the comprehensive introduction of the amendments. I thank my noble friend for drafting the amendment and allowing us to debate it in Committee. My remarks relate to the concerns raised by the BBC—just one of the organisations that has been in touch—which I think are extremely significant. I have been very fortunate in my work as the foreign affairs and development spokesman for my party in being able to travel, including to conflict-afflicted areas. Our journalists and our BBC around the world are one of the jewels in our country’s crown. When they raise significant concerns, I think that there is a duty on us to listen to them very carefully.

With our free and fearless press in this country, I think that there is a dichotomy. I am sure that those in the intelligence community know that our free press and our openness make us more at risk; in fact, many journalists doing their job are at risk themselves in many areas. But we are a safer and more open and democratic country because of the press, and we have a higher standing in the world in the long term. So when the BBC raises concerns, as my noble friend indicated, highlighting the Law Commission’s comments about whether we are considerably less likely to not be complying with Article 10 of the ECHR, it is of concern for those recommendations to be ignored.

With the Bill, it seems as if we are now going to be in stark contrast with comparable legislation in other countries, including our closest intelligence partners in the Five Eyes countries. I would like for the Minister, in responding to this, to state why we go far beyond our Five Eyes allies in this regard.

There are a couple of other areas that the BBC raised: one is the criminalisation of the publication of material that is already in the public domain. With sentences of potentially life and 14 years, the chilling effect on journalists could be marked. I hope that that will be responded to very clearly by the Government. Those powers go beyond the Police and Criminal Evidence Act with regards to protections provided for journalistic material.

In Committee so far, we have raised the breadth of the Bill, combined with the extensive sentences that are open to it, and I believe that the chilling effect on our media will have a negative impact on our country overall. If they do not accept my noble friend’s amendment today—which I suspect the Minister will not—I hope that the Government will engage with him and with others who want to see the Bill work, but work by protecting the essence of our country, which is what my noble friend outlined.

[Baroness Manningham-Buller (CB)]

My Lords, I think this amendment has substantial problems. If I may, I will remind the noble Lord, Lord Marks, of what Article 10 actually says—I have borrowed the iPad of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, which is still working, my iPhone having died. The second paragraph of Article 10, after talking about freedom of expression, says:

“The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security”,


and a string of other things are added to that. I just remind the noble Lord of that qualification.

If the BBC and others are making such remarks, then of course we should take them seriously. I have not received all this briefing, but perhaps that is understandable. It is superficially attractive to have a defence of public interest, but let me explain to the Committee why it is really very difficult. From it, the risk of release of national security information is substantial. What does that mean? National security information includes information that can indirectly identify the sources of intelligence, whose lives may be at risk. It can identify sources and methods that are vulnerable and unable to be defended.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that my explanation has been helpful in explaining why it is the Government’s clear position that these offences are sufficiently tightly drawn so as to be targeted at harmful espionage activity—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The Minister knows that, on previous days in Committee, we have discussed the issue of how the interests of the United Kingdom are defined and how broad that is. Whom does he believe should be the final arbiter in defining what is in the interests of the country and in the public interest?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The noble Lord’s question as I understand it is whether the decision about public interest is one for the police or for the prosecutor because, in reality, that is where the decisions would lie. Ultimately, if both those bodies were satisfied and a prosecution were brought, the issue would be one for the court.

It is our position that a public interest defence is neither necessary nor appropriate. However, it is important to point out that, even if the Government were to accept the case that the offences risked criminalising such legitimate activity, a public interest defence would not be an appropriate way to address this issue. As crafted, the proposed defence puts the onus on the Government to prove “beyond reasonable doubt” that the defence did not apply. This defence would therefore act as an open invitation to those who seek to conduct espionage against the United Kingdom, and disproving this defence would likely require the disclosure of further sensitive material and only serve to compound the original harm.

The consequence of this is that those who intend to harm the United Kingdom will be able to exploit this defence to continue conducting harmful activities in the knowledge of the prosecution difficulties that would be faced by the authorities. This would limit the effectiveness of the legislation in enhancing our ability to deter and disrupt harmful activity.

Amendment 120B, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, would require the Minister to publish an assessment of the potential merits of introducing a public interest defence. As I have just laid out, the Government have extensively considered the merits, or otherwise, of such a defence, and this renders a review after the Bill’s passage unnecessary, for the reasons I have already set out. Thus, for all these reasons, the Government cannot accept the tabled amendments.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, I am conscious that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, mentioned, we will come on to the whistleblowing aspect, but the Minister was at pains to quote liberally from the Law Commission’s evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the Commons on this. I of course have read the evidence, as others will have done. I was interested when it came to the disclosure of information element, because Professor Penney Lewis told the Public Bill Committee:

“Indeed, we recommended a mechanism for authorised disclosures to an independent statutory commissioner, which would have appropriate investigatory powers to look into, for example, disclosures that might be embarrassing to the Government.”—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 7/7/22; col. 52.]


Why are we not legislating for that in the Bill? The Minister seemed to have accepted everything that the Law Commission had said, but not this.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

It is clear, in the view of the Government, that those issues relate to the provisions found in the 1989 Act, which are not addressed in the Bill. While I note that evidence, it is not relevant to this amendment. As I have already said, I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

National Security Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 80 and 81 propose having an independent reviewer to cover more than Part 2 of the Bill. The Government have committed to consider this idea in the other place, and the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, was compelling on this point.

The Government have been considering whether extending the oversight of the independent reviewer could be done in a way that does not duplicate or unhelpfully interfere with the responsibilities and functions of the existing oversight mechanisms governing both the UK intelligence agencies and the police. For example, we must consider how extending oversight of the Bill would interact with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s role in overseeing the powers referred to in Clause 27. Should we decide to extend oversight of the Bill beyond Part 2, it is important that we do not create any confusion or uncertainty as to the appropriate reviewer.

It is proposed that Part 4 of the Bill should be reviewed by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Of course, Part 4 contains measures to freeze civil damages awarded to claimants seen as representing a real risk of using their award to fund acts of terror, and measures to restrict access to civil legal aid for convicted terrorists. As a result, these matters are already in the IRTL’s remit to review. An explicit commitment to oversight of Part 4 of the Bill is therefore unnecessary and would duplicate the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation’s existing discretion to review and report on terrorism-related legislation.

As a point of clarification on a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, the Government are not extending the purview of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to cover Part 2 of the Bill—rather, they are creating a new independent reviewer role entirely.

With these points in mind, while the Government cannot accept these amendments, we are committed to making a decision on extending oversight of the Bill at the next stage of its passage.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

With a glance at the impact assessment on this part of the Bill, the Government’s estimate is that there will be between four and 12 cases a year for the independent reviewer. Just for the sake of efficiency alone, it would make sense to extend a structure which is already in existence and operating well, rather than creating a new system which would have potentially a miniscule role—especially since the impact assessment says that it would be down to the discretion of the reviewer

“how much time they spend reviewing the STPIMs”.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Obviously, the noble Lord makes a valid point, and I am sure it will feed into the department’s consideration about extending the oversight.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister, but it may assist the Committee to know what will happen next. It is welcome that the department will be thinking about this, but it would be good to have a bit of a steer as to what the Government intend to do before Report.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

We invite the proposers of the amendments not to press them; further information will follow.

--- Later in debate ---

The Minister spoke in his introduction of those with “malign intent”. That I understand, but the Bill is going far broader than that—at those with healthy intent that is good for society, people, this country and their own country; all are being caught. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, referred to, we hear of the Government wanting a global Britain that sees itself as a global player, growing our trade around the world and attracting good investment. If that is the aim, this is no way to seek to achieve it.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, would she perhaps give permission for us all to receive the Minister’s response to her letter? He is saying from a sedentary position that he will circulate it; if that is acceptable to her, it would be very helpful. He said at the outset that if we, as Members of this House, carry out activities for a foreign organisation of which we might be a member which receives direct support from a foreign principal—we could be a trustee of an organisation funded by the Gates foundation, for example, and there are many other examples—for us to engage with each other, we will now have to register. That is why I think the response to her letter could be so significant, as that is what I took from his comments.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

The Minister will understand that I cannot possibly answer this question because then we would have to record the conversation. To be serious, in fact, my letter to the Minister, which included a lot of questions, did ask that he circulate it to the Committee and not just to myself.

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[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, as we are in Committee, I think one can intervene a second time. I just want to ask the Minister about one of the questions I put about political parties; I think it also arises now, from what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said. It concerns the confidentiality of all these masses of reports. What privacy protections will be there if this measure goes ahead?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, the best estimate of cost is £47.8 million. The high estimate is £62.4 million. In addition:

“FIRS could discourage business activities if the costs of compliance are considered too high. There is a risk of negative reputational impacts from inclusion on a public register. Other countries may introduce reciprocal measures to regulate the overseas activities of government and businesses. Persons could be prosecuted if engaged in unregistered activity, even if the activity itself is legitimate.”


“Benefits were not monetised … While there are many entities which would fall within the definition of a ‘foreign principal’ or ‘foreign power’, it is difficult to determine how many people are being directed to undertake registerable activities on their behalf, or how many people would qualify for an exemption under the scheme … There is also a lack of understanding around how likely the positive and negative impacts are … it is not known how likely it is that the benefits or impacts will occur, or how significant they are likely to be. It is also important to note that much of this feedback was provided before the scope and exemptions within the scheme were finalised.”


“It is acknowledged that the number of people who would be affected by the scheme in terms of registration and familiarisation is unknown … Due to the offences and penalties associated with non-compliance with the scheme, organisations that are ultimately out of scope will still need to be aware of the FIRS regulations to ensure they are out of scope, both currently and for future activities … members of the public will need support in fulfilling their registration requirements.”


“There is a risk that the scheme may have a disproportionate impact on small or micro-businesses (SMBs). There is a risk that SMBs, without established regulatory compliance procedures, won’t register with the scheme and could then be prosecuted. It is not known how many SMBs will be in scope of FIRS … With more time, a more extensive commission could have been sent to departments.”


The high estimate is that more than 371,000 individuals will need to be familiarised with the scheme, but:

“Home Office anticipate that there will be a relatively small number of cases per year for FIRS (less than five).”


Those are all direct quotes from the Government’s impact assessment on this scheme from October 2022. That impact assessment is the least ringing endorsement of any piece of legislation that I have seen in this House for 10 years. More than 371,000 people will need to be familiarised with a scheme that will have five potential cases per year and, of course, the scheme was not consulted on. To be fair to the Home Office, I read the consultation document from 2021. The principle of a FIRS was in it, but this scheme was not. It is in many parts a direct lift from FARA in the United States, or the FIT scheme.

However, the Government have been very coy about the areas where they have not chosen to follow. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, indicated the commercial enterprises. The Government have not said why they chose not to follow the United States’ example of the exemption of bona fide commercial activity and other activity not serving predominantly a foreign interest. Therefore, the whole gamut of the points that she and others have made in this House will be covered by this scheme and not that scheme, but why is not indicated. In fact, the Government’s own impact assessment goes beyond that, saying that they do not know how many small businesses will be affected by it, yet the impact assessment of the overall Bill and of this scheme says that there will be 25 people in London operating the scheme at a cost of nearly £50 million. This spider’s web is a very expensive one, and not many hornets will be covered, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said.

The other exemption that the Government have not indicated having referenced before concerns the US exemption on religious, scholastic, academic, fine arts or scientific pursuits. There has been no indication as to why the Government have chosen not to follow that route. There is not a bishop on the Bench, but any Anglican community in or established church from another country interacting with one of our bishops will have to register on this scheme, because there is no religious exemption for it. Any community in this country carrying out what they believe the Pope has asked them to do for campaigning, on what they believe are humanitarian grounds, will have to register under the scheme. Any of us, or any MP, who is encouraging others to support a Ukrainian NGO charity, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, indicated, asking us to support Ukrainians for the resettlement scheme will have to register on the scheme.

This is likely to be a scheme that helps oppressors around the world far more than it helps our Government to secure national security. It is no surprise to me that both Hungary and El Salvador cited with great enthusiasm the US scheme as a mechanism to find out what those in other countries are doing to encourage human rights and civil liberties at home.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

There are a lot of them.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

There are a few, but 25 members of the Home Office are going to be monitoring this database, and a fair amount of their time might be taken up with David Cameron’s and Tony Blair’s international activities. What was the reason for differentiating from the Australian scheme?

We have heard concerns about the British Academy, universities, INGOs and NGOs, trade, and those seeking contact with FDI and the ABPI. It will render the work of our Prime Minister’s trade envoys that much harder when any interaction with an entity from a country with which we are seeking a better trading relationship now has to register in advance their contact with a trade envoy, not only for perfectly legitimate activities but for activities encouraged by the Government. We have also heard the concern from the ABPI that it will have to register the preparation and planning of meetings beforehand.

At the start of Committee, I indicated that our Benches did not see this part of the Bill as having been properly prepared. The details have not been consulted on and we believe that the Government should pause it. We said at the start of Committee that it may find a better home in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill, if it is being reworked. It may be that we move for this to go to a Select Committee for further consideration or to be taken out of the Bill. We do not want to disrupt the Government’s moves to improve national security or to weaken the ability of our country to have national security. We also do not want to weaken our interaction with trade, investment and human rights, or—I say this as someone with no faith—our proper interaction with many faith groups, which will now have to register all of this activity within the Bill.

I hope that the Minister will say today that the Government are going to think again, pause and come back, not just by saying that more information will follow but with a commitment to consult on the specific schemes and work with us to bring back workable solutions.

[Lord Cromwell (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise for not having participated in this debate earlier but, like other speakers, I have been provoked by listening to the contributions. The speeches tonight appear to be about either excluding certain categories or, in the case of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, trying to include a category in the scope of the Bill. The fact is that, if you start to specify organisations or types of organisations, you will include every organisation in the country, whether a business or arts organisation, a charity, a political party or any other group of people, because any organisation can host people who seek to bring influence of one form or another. It is the behaviour, not the organisation, that is the problem here. To suppose that registering organisations will defeat covert practitioners from seeking to exert influence is naive to the point of being dangerous. As many have suggested, the solution is to go away, redraft and come back with a shorter Bill that does not try to include every organisation, not only in this country but in every other country—any one of them could host a malign influence.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will come back to the noble Lord on that shortly.

I will go on to the commercial sensitivity aspects—in effect commercial confidentiality, mentioned just now by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. We believe that ensuring that information can be publicised where it relates to the carrying out of political influence activities will help to strengthen the resilience of the political system, but Clause 77(2) allows the Secretary of State to specify or describe information or material that is not to be published. We intend this to include where publishing the information would, for example, threaten the interests of national security, put an individual’s safety at risk, or result in the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. The registration system will allow a person to flag where they think they meet such an exemption, which will not be considered by the scheme management unit.

In accordance with our data protection obligations, we intend for the information to be published to be limited to what is necessary to achieve the transparency aims of the scheme, particularly where that information is personal. I have heard all the concerns and, as I said, the Government will give further consideration to these points ahead of Report.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

That commitment is welcome. The Minister referred to the lack of a regulatory burden; I am following the point that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, raised. However, the Government’s impact assessment says, in effect, that everybody needs to be familiarised with it because they will not know whether they are in scope. It says at paragraph 37, which I quoted earlier:

“Due to the offences and penalties associated with non-compliance with the scheme, organisations that are ultimately out of scope will still need to be aware of the FIRS”.


When it comes to domestic charities and NGOs, the impact assessment’s higher estimate of how many people will have to familiarise themselves with FIRS is 105,000 people. It will be an enormous regulatory burden on the domestic charity sector as to whether it knows to comply with it. Simply stating that it is a small online form is insufficient. On that point, I wonder why the Government have no estimate at all of how many small and medium-sized businesses will be captured by this.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord has pre-empted the remainder of my speech to some extent, which I am afraid goes on for rather a long time; I apologise in advance for that. I will come on to the charities aspect in a moment. On the regulatory burden, I think I have been reasonably clear as to the simplicity we intend when it comes to complying.

The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, would extend my noble friend Lady Noakes’s amendment to charitable activities, as was just described again by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. I once more thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for his scrutiny of the scheme. In essence, the question is: why is there not a charity exemption in the scheme and will this not make it harder for charities to carry out legitimate activity here in the United Kingdom? We believe that the ability of charities to campaign on issues relevant to their charitable mission is very important and crucial to our democracy. The scheme will not prevent this. It will ensure that the public are informed about the role played by overseas entities in this work, however.

We have also taken steps to minimise the potential burden on charities conducting legitimate activity as a result of FIRS. For example, making a public communication, campaign information or requests for support by a charity will be registerable only if it is not reasonably clear from the communication that it is made at the direction of a foreign power or entity. If such a communication is published for or on behalf of a foreign charity in its own name, it would not need to be registered. If it is published by a UK charity or PR firm at the direction of a foreign charity, it would not need to be registered if it is reasonably clear from the communication that it has been made at the direction of the foreign charity. I hope that is reasonably clear and has given some reassurance to the charitable sector.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I was about to attempt to address the question from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, but unfortunately he is not going to like the answer, which is that I do not know. I will have to look into this and come back to him.

I appreciate the concerns that have been expressed by all noble Lords, and I thank all those who participated in what was clearly a very healthy and important debate. We will reflect carefully on the comments raised prior to Report. For the moment, and to that end, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Since the Minister said he would go away and reflect on this debate, which may bring about substantial changes to what the Government are doing, what would be the point of his moving his amendments for the remainder of this part? It would save the Committee quite a bit of time if he did not move these amendments to the rest of the part that he said he is now going to consider.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am not sure it would save a huge amount of time, would it?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

It depends how long the Minister takes to move his own amendments. When he sums up his own amendments that he will be moving, he will be saying, “I am now going away to reflect on these and come back before Report”, so there is very little point in doing that.

Amendment 82 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

On the extent of the schedule of those to be included, unless I have misunderstood or misread, there does not appear to be any reference to senior members of the security and intelligence services, who I do not think fall into any of the other categories. Could the Minister explain whether I have misunderstood or if that is a deliberate exclusion, and what any reasoning might be?

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, it is an intriguing question. I like the idea, as a concept, that any of these organisations which plan to meet with leaders of our intelligence services have to put that on a public register. To assist in transparency, that might meet the Minister’s case. In fact, if we do that, it might mean that we do not need the whole scheme for the other 300,000 people. It is an intriguing point. My questions about who is not covered are far less exciting than whether the intelligence community comes into it.

The Minister said he responded to my point but, with respect, I do not know why the Mayor of London is included but the Lord Mayor of London is not. I do not know why The City of London Corporation would not be included. I would have thought, if this is to do with political influence on our country’s interests, the Lord Mayor and the corporation and City of London represent an absolutely prime area where political influence could be sought over policy. I do not know why that is not included.

I do not know why the mayors of Tees Valley and North of Tyne are included but the leader of Glasgow City Council is not. If it is to do with ensuring a sensible way of operating, then, with the greatest respect to the mayor of the 600,000 people in Tees Valley, to include them in this because they are susceptible to foreign influence seems a bit odd when the leader of the council in Edinburgh, the capital city of one of our four nations, is not. I do not know how long this schedule will last, since the Minister says he is thinking about it and coming back, but, in the meantime, if he can respond to that point I would be grateful.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

What about the corporation? I am grateful to the Minister, but there is a quite considerable amount of executive authority in the City of London Corporation when it comes to what could well interact with the interests of the United Kingdom. So perhaps the Minister might reflect on that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will absolutely reflect on that but, as I say, they are not politically elected persons, as the noble Lord will know. As regards his example of a foreign defence contractor talking to somebody of the rank of brigadier, having had our lengthy discussions earlier I would have thought that they would be captured under the corporate side of the Bill. The effect of this amendment would be that foreign principals, or those in arrangements with them, would be required to register communication with these postholders, as well as those in the existing list, if it were conducted for the purpose of influencing one of those persons listed in Clause 68.

In answer to the other question about senior members of the security services, I believe that is captured under “senior civil servants”, but I will confirm that and come back to the noble Lord. For now, I ask that the House agrees this amendment.

National Security Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to many of the amendments in these groups. I declare an interest as a practising barrister in public law cases, occasionally in cases concerning natural security.

I entirely agree with the powerful speech that the Committee just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Marks. The award of damages for civil wrongdoing is one of the primary means by which the court remedies the wrongdoing and deters future wrongdoing. That the award of damages is central to our system of justice is confirmed by Clause 83(6), which recognises that the court may not decide to reduce damages to a claimant under the Human Rights Act. By seeking to allow a reduction in damages for non-human rights cases, these clauses would introduce a lesser standard of justice.

I am very unclear why what is unacceptable for a human rights case should be thought acceptable for other civil litigation. That is especially so when the concerns which the Government have about paying damages when they are found to be liable are most likely to arise in cases which do concern human rights violations: cases where the allegation is made—and for the purpose of this clause we must assume is proved to the satisfaction of the court—that the state has been complicit in acts of torture or murder, perhaps by undercover officers. Such grave acts can be and are pleaded as human rights violations.

I appreciate that the Government are keen to remove legal liability, including human rights liability, for claims based, for example, on UK military action abroad, but if liability were to be excluded for such alleged conduct, there would be no need for provisions on damages. Why deal with this by reference to the remedy rather than to liability?

These clauses are not even concerned with a case where the terrorist’s wrongdoing had a causal connection with the Crown’s conduct, which forms the basis of the Crown’s liability for its wrongdoing. Clause 83(4)(a) makes it clear that there is no need for such a causal connection. In any event, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, correctly explained to the Committee, existing legal principles would apply in such circumstances. Therefore, I need to be persuaded by the Minister that there is any principled basis for these clauses.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend have comprehensively outlined why both these clauses are unnecessary in law but also go far beyond what is necessary and will be damaging in practice. I need not add very much other than to say that I have put my name to the amendments that my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness, who was unable to be with us today, has put down with regard to Clauses 82 to 86 stand part and, as my noble friend indicated, the other amendments that would seek to reduce the impact.

The clauses undermine considerably mechanisms for holding government to account, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, through civil claims. In addition to seeking a remedy, such claims have been positive in changing policy and practice. Therefore, the impact of the clauses, as Reprieve together with the other bodies referred to by my noble friend have indicated, could be to allow Ministers and officials to avoid paying damages to survivors of torture and other abuses overseas.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I can say that the principle is certainly not for the judge to be asking himself, “Should I be protecting the Government or the security services from actions for damages?” I am not drafting the Bill, and I will further consider the matter, but I would imagine that it is something like how far the claimant brought the situation on himself. That would be an ex turpi causa or contributory negligence type of consideration. However, I do not want to pre-empt the discussion any further, standing on my feet thinking aloud, because I hear what is being said: we want further precision as to how the courts are to go about this.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I think the Committee is now in a bit of a bind. The Minister stated a few moments ago that the Bill is now a clear code and explicit, but he is unwilling to tell the Committee even some basic elements of what guidance for a judge might exist. We do not know now how to proceed on the basis of this before Report, especially in the case of the specific question that I asked.

The Minister has also stated, exactly from the Government’s perspective, what the guidance for judges is. He talked at the opening of his remarks about demonstrating that

“the UK is not a soft touch for those involved in terrorist wrongdoing”.

It is very clear from what the Minister said at the Dispatch Box what the intent is. If the judge is not to take into consideration what the Minister stated, we are in a bit of difficulty.

My specific question here, and I hope the Minister can be specific in an answer now, relates to the concern that was raised that the national security factor in Clause 83(3) is broad, and that a foreign power can state that the claimant was involved in terrorist activities in a foreign country. If that is used by a party under the national security factor, my reading of that is that the judge must now take that into consideration. Surely that cannot be right.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I can briefly explain, first, the Government’s view of the principle behind the provision, then come later to the detail of how it operates. In the Government’s view, looking at it as a matter of principle, through their actions individuals who commit acts of terrorism seek to threaten and undermine the very democratic institutions that are at the heart of our democracy in this country. It is right that persons who have committed acts of terrorism against democracy should be subject to a different approach when it comes to granting civil legal aid. The different approach is, in this case, that these provisions do not entirely deprive a “terrorist” of civil legal aid, because exceptional case funding remains available. That is granted in around 75% of the cases in which it is applied for, so we have a safety net there. The practical effect of what is proposed is that those with the relevant terrorist convictions follow a different route from others. In other words, the automaticity of legal aid is somewhat different if you have committed a terrorist offence.

Apart from the question of principle—and that is the principle that the Government are advancing—the questions that have arisen in this debate essentially focus on two issues, or sub-issues. First, have we drawn the definition of terrorist offence too widely, catching very minor incidents, such as the graffiti incident put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, or the relatively minor terrorist offences to which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, drew attention? Secondly, are there particular circumstances, of which domestic abuse is one, where there should be some exception to be made, and where it is going too far to have this blanket restriction, and there are obvious cases where there could be a fully justified grant of legal aid on the normal procedure, rather than forcing someone to go for exceptional case funding? On both those points, I shall undertake to reflect and to look at the underlying impact of these provisions—but the general principle is as I have outlined.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The Minister makes his case as to the general principle but, if that is so strong from the Government’s position, why does it relate only to England and Wales?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

The noble Lord, from a Scottish perspective, asks a relevant question. I shall have to take that under advisement and see, but I suspect that it is because there is a different legal regime in Scotland.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I look forward to the Minister’s letter. This Bill applies to everywhere—but, of course, there is separate legal aid legislation in Scotland, which I scrutinised when I was on the Justice Committee in the Scottish Parliament. If the case is so strong for the whole United Kingdom, I am not sure why this is. If he is writing to me, could he add something on the concern about whether this provision is consistent with the commitments in the Good Friday agreement? Does this provision also apply to Northern Ireland, with regard to the permanent removal for all those who previously were beyond the restrictions before the convictions were made, as in the Bill?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

As far as I know, it is not the intention to apply this measure to Northern Ireland, but I shall write to the noble Lord to confirm the Government’s position.

National Security Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th January 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

112: After Clause 89, insert the following new Clause—
“Report on actions taken in response to the ISC report on RussiaWithin six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on the effect of the action taken by the Government in response to the recommendations of the report of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament on Russia (HC 632 of Session 2019–21).”Member's explanatory statement
This new Clause requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the actions the Government has taken in response to the report of the Intelligence and Security Committee on Russia.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I move Amendment 112 and will also speak to Amendment 118. I will introduce the amendments, but my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire will also speak on this group. Amendment 118 is a probing amendment designed to be helpful for the Government and to allow the Minister to inform the Committee about what their views are on the interaction of the Bill—what will be the National Security Act—and the work of the highly regarded Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. In many respects, it makes absolute sense for the provisions under the Bill to fall within the oversight and scrutiny of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Obviously, as it is a parliamentary committee, and because of its remit, there are ways that it will interact with the Bill, but I would be grateful to know whether the Government would support that.

Amendment 112 links to what was a remarkably prescient report from 2020. When I re-read the recommendations of the Intelligence and Security Committee report on Russia before Committee, I found that it highlighted in an almost spooky way many of the practices and approaches of Russia that have come to bear, a year on since the aggression against Ukraine. The amendment seeks for there to be an update from the Government, not just as a response to the recommendations of the committee, which were provided in July 2020 and which I read with interest, but on the ongoing actions as a result. The report had a mixture of seeking clarifications and seeking action, so I would be grateful to know where the Government are with some of the recommendations.

It was interesting to note that the committee report sought clarity on the overseeing of the strategic direction and co-ordination by the National Security Council. It has been re-shaped twice in recent months: Liz Truss got rid of it and changed its operation into a standardised Cabinet sub-committee; I understand that Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has now restored it to what it was previously, but this is an opportunity on the record for the Minister to state exactly what the National Security Council is, how it is composed, and how it will interact with the implementation of the Bill. If he wishes to write to me on that point rather than respond today, I would be very happy.

The committee report highlighted in particular some issues directly linked with the Bill on the powers of the Electoral Commission, as we have discussed previously in Committee. We still believe very strongly that the committee’s recommendations on enhancing the powers of the Electoral Commission are valid, and an update on the Government’s position on that would be helpful. The committee also asked for action to be taken on election material and digital imprints; there has been considerable debate about this, but it would be useful to know how that will be operational. The committee also asked for protocol on social media providers, when it comes to hostile state acts. That was one of the areas where the Government noted the recommendations, but I would be grateful to know what action has been taken.

Finally—I know that my noble friend will be referencing this—the committee went into some detail scrutinising illicit finance and the fact that London has been a laundromat. It highlighted some areas that would be needed for action, notwithstanding that it was positive that the Government, in some respects, have brought forward this legislation in response to the ISC’s report. But there are still unanswered questions with regard to how we are operationalising the need to reduce the scope for illicit finance. Now we have economic crime Bill No. 2: the Government dragged their feet somewhat in bringing the first economic crime Bill to us, but we have the first and the second.

I want give one statistic which is illustrative of what I and certainly my noble friend have been highlighting for a number of years regarding the scale of the issue in London. All along the way, the Government said that we were overestimating the impact of illicit finance, not just from Russia but particularly from Russia. I have debated with the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, all the Russian sanctions that were put forward. I have welcomed them all, and in some respects they have not gone fast enough, but we have worked together collegiately across all Benches, including the Labour Party. The statistic that I have seen, which the Government published in their anti-corruption work, was that the amount of Russian money in September 2021 that was frozen— not seized—was £44.5 million. That is a substantial sum of course, but we felt that there was more illicit finance operating through London. The most recent figures, since sanctions have been put in place against Russia over the last year, show that that figure is now £18 billion. The gap between £44.5 million and £18 billion highlights the scale of the issue that we were warning against; the Government say that those warnings were unnecessary.

I do not expect the Minister to have any of the details to hand, and I would be grateful if he would write to me giving more information and a breakdown of the difference between the £44.5 million and the £18 billion. That is a colossal sum of money. The Government have found a reason to freeze, as a result of the Russian aggression, assets in London, but that is a very clear example of why there is more to know about the extent of illicit finance through London, and I will be grateful if the Minister will provide more information about that. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

For all the reasons I have outlined, the Government cannot accept the proposed amendments.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s thorough reply, notwithstanding some of his responses, which he prefaced by saying that he knew they would disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

There’s nothing new there. I am joking.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The noble Lord is a very cheerful person for someone who is disappointed. One of the telling facts he highlighted was the difficulty of the committee having an annual meeting since 2014—that speaks for itself. I am grateful to the Minister for saying that he is going to take that message back.

I am also grateful that the Minister has committed to provide some more information, which is quite helpful. On the issue of the tier 1 visas and golden visas, we are in a slightly ridiculous position where we have a discrepancy between what should be on the public record as to who received them and what is on the public record as to who is sanctioned. However, the Government are refusing to put the two together and to say who they are, which means we will have difficulty learning lessons as to how this came about, why they were able to secure the visas and what they have done. If the Minister is writing to me with more information, I would be grateful if he could state who is currently under sanction by the UK and has received a tier 1 visa. That would be very helpful information to receive.

I am grateful for the information on the co-ordination and the security council, and for the other information that the Minister provided. With Amendment 120A from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and my amendment, I think we are aiming for the same destination but with a different route. I think that the Minister said that the ISC would be able to scrutinise the implementation of all national security aspects of this Bill. If I have taken that incorrectly from the Minister, I am happy for him to correct me on the record. However, I think that we will pursue that aspect. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and my noble friend, said, we want national security to work and, for that to be done, proper scrutiny by the committee of Parliament needs to be facilitated, with no gaps across the whole panoply. National security is complex and multi-departmental, and a whole-government function, as the Government say—and I respect that—between BEIS, DCMS, the Cabinet Office, the Treasury and FCDO. This is a complex area, and the committee is best placed to do it, but it must be equipped to do it. We may want to return to this issue after we have reflected on the Minister’s responses. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 112 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

114: After Clause 89, insert the following Clause—
“Ministerial appointments: official advice(1) The Cabinet Secretary must publish a memorandum in respect of any ministerial appointments made by the Prime Minister, where advice or concerns were communicated to the Prime Minister by civil servants that the appointment may be counter to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom including because of potential influence from a foreign power.(2) A memorandum under this section must set out that advice or concerns were communicated to the Prime Minister by civil servants, and in respect of which ministerial appointments. (3) A memorandum under this section may not include details of the advice or concerns, where the Cabinet Secretary considers that inclusion of those details may be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”Member's explanatory statement
This new Clause requires the Cabinet Secretary to publish a memorandum in circumstances where the Prime Minister made a ministerial appointment and where advice was that the appointment may be counter to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, this is an amendment which I really did not think it should be necessary to debate, on ministerial appointments by a Prime Minister, where that appointment may raise issues to do with the safety, security and interests of the United Kingdom. The amendment seeks clarification from the Government on the ability for there to be transparency in the operation of the Ministerial Code, but also where there is concern about ministerial appointments.

This is not a partisan point, because we know as a matter of fact that a Home Secretary was sacked because of a significant security breach. The guidance on security of government business was breached considerably, and Liz Truss sacked Suella Braverman, who admitted a breach of government security guidelines. I recognise that none of the material that was shared on a private email system was marked “secret”, so with regard to national security considerations, on the face of what was sent to an incorrect recipient but also what was intended to be sent, it was not secret or top secret. They were not classified documents, and I respect that fact. However, the recipient’s employer—because one of the emails was sent to a member of staff of an MP—replied to Suella Braverman saying:

“Simply asking my team to delete this email and ignore it is not an acceptable response to what appears, on the face of it, to be a potentially serious breach of security … You are nominally in charge of the security of this nation, we have received many warnings even as lowly backbenchers about cyber security.”


The fact that that Minister was then reappointed for political purposes within a matter of days has been well rehearsed. The Minister has responded to this issue in Questions in the Chamber, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, also responded, saying:

“Everyone deserves a second chance.”—[Official Report, 22/10/22; col. 1558.]


I know for a fact that not everybody who will fall foul of some of the significant offences under this Bill will receive a second chance—or that some officials will receive it. But it would be useful to know whether there are security concerns about the appointments of Ministers.

The second thing I say concerns something that did not happen but could easily have happened. A Member of this House, the noble Lord, Lord Lebedev, was appointed under considerable concern about security situations. He was appointed to Parliament by Boris Johnson. He could very easily have been asked to be a Government Whip or a Minister: that is not a stretch of the imagination. What is the situation then, when security concerns have been raised about the appointment of a Member to Parliament but there is no mechanism for transparency about concerns about ministerial appointments? I do not besmirch any existing Ministers: these are two factual situations; one is regrettable, of course; and the other has not happened but could easily have happened. Therefore, my amendment seeks clarification as to what mechanisms are in place for it to be transparent when there have been concerns about an individual being appointed to a ministerial position, so that those concerns can be made public. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for speaking to Amendment 114, which seeks to require the Cabinet Secretary to publish information concerning ministerial appointments in scenarios where officials have indicated that the appointment of a particular individual

“may be counter to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom including because of potential influence from a foreign power”.

The Government cannot accept this amendment because the appointment of Ministers is a matter solely for the Prime Minister, in line with his role as the sovereign’s principal adviser. It is critical to the functioning of government that any conversations that occur around appointments are able to take place in confidence. There is a long-standing practice to protect that confidentiality. Without the ability to speak freely on matters that will be personal and sometimes sensitive, particularly where they may include matters of security, the ability of officials to provide meaningful advice ahead of an appointment will be critically undermined. The National Security Bill is concerned principally with the conduct of state actors working for foreign powers or with an intention to benefit a foreign power. Not only is the Bill not the appropriate vehicle for such a change but the Government also firmly believe that any information relating to ministerial appointments and procedures is not appropriate for publication. The Government therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister, and I am not entirely surprised by his response. I think the Government’s concerns regarding confidentiality and protecting Civil Service advice were addressed in the amendment. In fact, it explicitly states that information would not be provided within the memorandum, but that security considerations had been raised should be in the public domain. I hear what the Minister said; we will explore this in the other avenues. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 114 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

As we discussed on the previous occasion in Committee, there are already a number of existing internal and external authorised routes in government through which individuals can raise such concerns. The number of routes has increased since 1989 and the Government consider them to be safe and effective. Many were outlined in the powerful speech given by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, during the debate last week on the public interest defence. With great respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, I find the testimony given by the former director-general of MI5 to be persuasive on what the view of an intelligence officer might be. That appears to have been confirmed in the contribution we just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale—in particular, his assessment of the culture in the intelligence services being one of honesty and integrity.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister. He is aware of the point I raised earlier in Committee, which, as he correctly pointed out, pertained more to the Official Secrets Act in respect of the authorised disclosure of information. The Law Commission’s recommendation is clear—that there should be an independent statutory commissioner, to which individuals can go, who has investigatory powers—but the Minister says that there are no plans to reform the 1989 legislation.

We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and earlier from the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, that they do not recognise this culture, but the Law Commission came to its own view and its own recommendation. Do the Government accept that recommendation but then say that they are not going to do anything about it, or will we have to find a way to bring together the disclosure of information and the points that my noble friend raised? The Law Commission’s recommendation was perfectly clear, and it was not besmirching the culture within the agencies. It was a very clear recommendation.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

Indeed, the Law Commission made a recommendation about a potential reform to the 1989 Act. As I have already said, that is not the purpose of this Bill and will be a matter for a future reform, which will not be conducted immediately, as I already explained in answer to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. The Law Commission’s recommendation will have considerable weight but, at this stage, I cannot prejudge any government decision in relation to the 1989 Act.

In last week’s debate, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the Government’s plans to update internal whistleblowing guidance. I can confirm that the Government regularly keep this guidance under review and, last year, they updated it to include specific reference to how to raise an issue that would require disclosure without breaching the Official Secrets Act 1989. The updated internal guidance has been shared across departments and agencies, with confirmation from all Whitehall departments that a review of their own processes and procedures has been undertaken or is planned.

Across government, organisations have also continued to undertake activities further to develop a safe and supportive culture for raising concerns. Over the last year, the majority, including all 17 Whitehall departments, have undertaken communications through awareness-raising events and campaigns, including an annual “Speak Up” campaign.

We of course understand that journalists have a specific and important role to play in holding government to account in our democratic society. We also understand that responsible journalists do not want unwittingly to put lives at risk or compromise national security. That is why we have robust processes in place which enable journalists to mitigate the harm caused when considering the publication of potentially damaging information.

For example, during the Government’s public consultation on the Bill, several media stakeholders commented on the value of the Defence and Security Media Advisory Committee—the DSMA—which alerts the media to the consequences of disclosing certain types of information and provides advice on how to mitigate damage, while leaving editors to judge whether to publish or broadcast. A number of editors already engage with this valuable process when considering the publication of sensitive information, and we encourage them, and others, to continue to do so.

The Government are committed to ensuring that these channels are safe, effective, and accessible. Accordingly, for the reasons I have just set out, the Government, with regret, cannot accept the tabled amendments and invite their withdrawal.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 124 creates the power to extend any provision in the Bill with or without modification to the sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus by way of Order in Council. The provisions of the Official Secrets Acts 1911 and 1920 extend to the sovereign base areas, and this amendment will allow provisions of the Bill to be extended to the law of the sovereign base areas. This would ensure that harmful activity that the Bill addresses can be prosecuted in sovereign base areas when conducted there.

Clause 20, which provides for the aggravating factor to apply to some service offences in the Armed Forces Act 2006, has been excluded from this power given that it is already being extended to the sovereign base areas though Clause 95(1)(b).

I end by putting on record that the Government consider that any references in this Bill to the sovereign base areas will not in any way undermine the provisions of the 1960 treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. I therefore ask the Committee to support the inclusion of this amendment.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I have very little to say with regard to the government amendment. I recognise the Government’s sensitivity to the ongoing issue of the politics within Cyprus.

As this is the last group in Committee, I thank the Ministers today, the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Murray, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, for their willingness to engage. As my noble friend Lord Wallace indicated, there is a lot of work to be done in persuading the Committee that the measures in the Bill will meet the Government’s intent. There are some key areas of the Bill where we are looking for more information. I think the noble Lord, Lord Murray, indicated on an earlier group that he is reflecting and that there is more to follow. We await the correspondence from the Ministers. We are very happy to meet Ministers before Report. I say from these Benches that it might be advisable for the Government not to be in a rush to schedule Report, so that there can be proper thinking on the many aspects of the Bill about which we have highlighted problems.

Amendment 124 agreed.

National Security Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 1st March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as the chairman of the Independent Press Standards Organisation. I have also added my name to Amendment 18. I have very little to add to what has already been said by those who have spoken in the debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, has given a very good summary of the ruling of Pepper v Hart, although there first has to be ambiguity for the Minister’s words to have particular effect. None the less, I entirely agree with her that we will listen with great interest, as indeed will the media in general, to what the Minister has to say, to see whether he can give the assurance that is genuinely needed.

All I will add to what noble Lords have said already is that public interest journalism is genuinely under threat. It is very expensive to undertake, and editors can easily be deterred by the possibility of a wild goose chase. It would be an additional impediment to their encouraging proper journalism if they felt that one of their journalists or their publication was in some danger of finding themselves contravening the provisions of this very important Bill, which I also support in all respects. That is why this is a very significant group of amendments. As the noble Lord, Lord Black, said, citing Roosevelt, freedom of expression is fundamental. The press and the recognised publishers reflected in this amendment represent a very significant part of that freedom, and I hope that, in the Minister’s response to this group of amendments, we will get the reassurance that is so badly needed.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name in support of my noble friend’s amendments seeking further clarity on

“the interests of the United Kingdom”.

I remind the House of the very significant penalties that are associated with these offences. Since this is my first opportunity on Report, after speaking in Committee, I thank the Minister and his team for listening, and not just listening but acting, engaging with us on these Benches and bringing forward amendments that we believe will make the Bill fundamentally better. Ministers have been true to their word in acting, and I appreciate that. The way the Minister and his officials have conducted themselves is to be commended, and I put that on the record so that it is perfectly clear.

The area that is outstanding, however, as my noble friend indicated, is that we still retain a concern that simply referring to “interests” and relying purely on the judgment within the 1964 Chandler case is insufficiently wide. As I stated in Committee, I am in a significant minority in not being a lawyer but, from reading the judgment in Chandler, which I remind the House also related to nuclear and defence policy, the only reference the Government have given to highlight what the case law definition would be of

“the interests of the United Kingdom”

is a defence and security interest. That is the only reference to the only case the Government have referred to. Therefore, it is not a significant leap to simply state in the Bill that this legislation is linked to security and defence interests. Without that, as my noble friend indicated, there is a concern that any government policy of the day that is not associated with defence interests, but is nevertheless activity that is directed by a foreign power, could be covered within this. Therefore, we still believe that there is a case for that to be defined.

I hope the Minister will respond to that point and say whether the Government are open to having further clarification of how “interests” are going to be defined, rather than just relying on that individual case. The reason I believe that that will now be necessary is because of one of the welcome concessions by the Government, which is to have an independent reviewer. We will come to government Amendment 85 later, but there will be a reviewer of this part of the legislation. For that reviewer to do their job properly—and we have noted reviewers and former reviewers in the House today—clarity on the Government’s intent regarding these interests will be important for the reviewer to look at the proper functioning of the legislation. I hope there will not be a grey area where there needs to be clarity, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, indicated.

My second point is that I welcome the Government seeking to narrow the area of information known to someone who is likely to fall foul of this legislation. Journalism is incredibly important. Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, I do not have friends at the Telegraph or the Sun to message me—we on these Benches do not often receive friendly messages from those journals—but I defer to her contacts with the Sun. Of course, she raises an important point in the context of what we debated last week in Grand Committee, the situation in Iran. We know that not only, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, indicated, is free, fair, impartial and independent journalism under threat around the world, but journalism is under threat in this country. There are countries that are persecuting journalists for operating within this country; therefore, the strongest defences for journalism are important. We believe very strongly that my noble friend’s Amendment 79, on a public interest defence, will provide a very sound defence for journalists carrying out their activities.

I have a question for the noble Lord, Lord Black. My understanding of the way that his Amendment 18 is written is that it would also cover whistleblowers. We have made the case for there to be protection for whistleblowers but, as I read his amendment, the defence is for a person who is not necessarily a journalist, but the intent is that the action will be for

“publication of material by a recognised news publisher”.

As I read it, Amendment 18 is therefore not limited to journalists. There may be unintended consequences that we may consider positive but the Government may not. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Black, will an opportunity to respond, so I ask the Minister whether his interpretation of Amendment 18 is that it could include whistleblowers. The main result may be to protect those who have a public interest defence in operating within all these parts. We will debate this in the next group on Amendment 79. I hope that will be our opportunity to draw the ditch—if not die in it—fight our case and divide the House on ensuring that there is a defence for journalists and a proper public interest defence for those carrying out legitimate activities not to be captured by this Bill.

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[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

My Lords, I acknowledge the changes that have been made to Amendment 79 since it was introduced in Committee, but I still do not feel that it would be appropriate and right for us to accept it. The noble Lord, Lord West, has pointed out a number of the reasons why, but I emphasise that we are being invited to introduce a public interest defence for what is, straightforwardly, espionage on behalf of a foreign service. I do not believe that we need to provide a public interest defence when an individual obtains and provides protected information on behalf of a foreign power while recognising that this is prejudicial to the safety of the United Kingdom.

I also recognise that the amendment extends to the Official Secrets Act 1989 but, again in support of the noble Lord, Lord West, I say that, if we are to change that, we must do so in a careful and deliberate fashion and bring forward legislation to do so. The 1989 Act does not deal with espionage on behalf of a foreign intelligence service. It is drawn up for different purposes. Therefore, it is separate from the issues that we are considering regarding the Bill. More broadly, it remains extremely dangerous to encourage or to lead individuals to believe that there is a public interest defence to the disclosure of highly sensitive information. Any one individual is unlikely to be able to make an accurate assessment themselves of whether their declaration and their disclosure is damaging to national security. That must be considered carefully, and it is not something for an individual official, however senior, to take on themselves. Therefore, any legislation and any amendment that might encourage them to do so is misguided.

Also, once a disclosure has been made, it cannot be withdrawn. Even though there may be benefit in prosecuting an individual for having done it, that does not stop the damage that has already been done. Therefore, we must have care not to lead people into believing they will be able to defend themselves having already made a disclosure, because the damage will have occurred.

Finally, on the question of evidencing damage, I recognise that the change in the burden of proof is a significant change to the amendment. Nevertheless, we are then faced with a situation where a person who has been accused of this offence will be trying to argue that they did not cause damage. In so doing, they are likely to adduce more evidence and more contextual material which might itself be damaging. It is not clear that this makes it easier in terms of the evidence or that it makes the prospect of prosecuting people for harmful activity any easier. For these reasons, I do not support this amendment. I hope that the House agrees.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I have a question on a point of clarification. I understand the point that the noble Lord makes regarding those offences which may be at the direction of a foreign power, as in espionage. However, the Bill contains offences that are not necessarily at the direction of a foreign power. His point would mean that my noble friend’s amendment would offer no public interest defence for those offences in this Bill which are not under the direction of a foreign power—as in, not espionage offences.

[Lord Evans of Weardale (CB)]

If I am being invited to comment on whether I would support a different amendment, I say that might well be the case. However, I do not support the amendment that is before us.

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[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

The Government take the view that it is necessary to have the matter protected in UK law in addition to SBA law, and that, I am afraid, is the answer.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The Minister was careful when he said that the SBAs and the FCDO were consulted by the Home Office on bringing forward this decision. I would assume that one department would consult another in its own Government with regards to a Bill—I think we can take it as read that the Home Office should have consulted the FCDO. The point that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made was that there was no consultation with the Government of Cyprus, which is embedded in the principles of the establishment treaty in 1960. That is why there is a problem with it.

With regards to the further point from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, if it is only a UK constable, and only within UK domestic law, who enforces it within the SBA area? Who enforces it within the adjacent area to the SBAs, given that the measures are much wider than simply activities here in the UK? Who enforces it there?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

As I hope I have already made clear, it is only Clause 4 that applies. Clause 6 does not apply in this context.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly, I hope, to say that, first, I agree with everything that my noble friend just said and will not repeat it. Secondly, I regard Amendment 66 to be a considerable improvement on what we were faced with before we started the Bill. Indeed, it is not a provision that provides immunity, it is evidence-based, it has a strong public interest element, but it is not perfect. One of the complaints I have received—only anecdotally but from authoritative sources—is a lack of understanding, among fairly senior public servants, of why the Secretary of State no longer carries any responsibility for the sort of decisions referred to in Amendment 66. The requirement in its subsection (5) that the Defence Council must ensure that the Armed Forces must have various arrangements in place is welcome as far as it goes, by why are Secretaries of State being eased out of any level of responsibility for decisions of this kind? I am not sure there is total confidence, among the kind of officials I have referred to, in the Defence Council to be as definable a source of responsibility as the Secretary of State.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I understand that our order of business has been changed today. The Government Whip did not consult our Front Bench and, for those of us who had engagements during the dinner-break business, I think it is a discourtesy not to have at least consulted the Front Benches of other parties about changing the order of business.

That said, I welcome the government’s amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is absolutely right. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, had indicated her hope that there would be government amendment in this area, and I thank the Minister for listening during Committee and for bringing forward these amendments. In Committee, I went to some lengths to outline what domestic procedures are in this area. The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, asked something I thought was rather threatening: if she could have a quiet word with me outside the Chamber during the hour for other business we had then. I am glad to say now that I will accept that and bring the Minister with me, because there may be an element of consensus on a more sensible way of dealing with concerns raised about immunity for, potentially, very serious crimes committed overseas.

I am grateful that the domestic practices will now be considered similar to extraterritorial processes, acknowledging that there have been distinct differences. My questions, to some extent, are linked with those raised by the noble Lord, Lord West, on how this will be operated. In Committee, I highlighted the Government’s Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel on the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas, and on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees. I referenced the Ministry of Defence joint doctrine publications, and I highlighted the Security Service guidelines that had been released in a trial, and we now know more about them. There are a number of existing sets of guidance for the Cabinet Office, from the MoD and within the security services themselves on how, as the amendment states,

“arrangements designed to ensure that acts of a member of the service to which a provision of Schedule 4 applies are necessary”.

I would be grateful if the Minister could outline how guidance will be put together that will be for both domestic activities and now those in regard to defence under this part, whether that will be made public, and how it will interact with MoD guidance to address the similar concerns of my noble friend Lord Beith and the noble Lord, Lord West.

We know what MoD joint doctrine says regarding detainees overseas, but we do not know the principles that will apply to these new areas. Therefore, we need clarification on what they will be. I welcome the Government’s move. There needs to be further illustration of how it will be operable, and I hope the Minister will be able to provide that and give an indication of when guidance will be put together and will be published.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a really important debate. Government Amendment 66 is a considerable improvement on what we had before, with respect to Clause 30. We have heard from noble Lords about their belief in that and their pleasure that we now see Amendment 66 before us. As my noble friend Lord West—I will come back to him—the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, and others have mentioned, there are still questions that the Government need to answer. I very much look forward to the Minister’s response, particularly to my noble friend Lord West, who very effectively laid out the fact that although the ISC welcomes the new clause proposed by Amendment 66, there are still some important questions for the Government. It is extremely important that the Government put their answers on the record, so they are there as testimony of what the Government expect of how the new Clause 30—as it will be—will operate.

The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, about the inclusion of the Armed Forces in this deserves a proper answer from the Minister. It is good to see the Armed Forces Minister here to have heard the noble Lord.

My noble friend Lord West laid before us how we got here, the relationship between the Home Office and the ISC, and the lack of a speedy response to some of the requests, which have led to some of the difficulties we have seen. If people had attended the committee, spoken to the committee and discussed with the committee —even if some of those discussions may have been difficult—some of these problems would have been resolved. Yet we have debate in the other place, debate here, and now it is only on Report that we get to a position where we seem to be on the verge of achieving what we all want.

I go back to a point I find quite astonishing, referring to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s annual report. My noble friend Lord West pointed to the lack of Home Office response. I lay this before each and every one of you: when do noble Lords think was the last time the Prime Minister went along? Do not answer that—there is no need to shout out. It is quite astonishing to read in the annual report that, despite repeated requests, no Prime Minister has been to the Intelligence and Security Committee since 2014. That is absolutely disgraceful. The committee was set up by this Parliament to oversee intelligence and security matters and to receive intelligence at a level we cannot be briefed on—quite rightly—and, despite repeated requests, the Prime Minister has not gone. How can a Prime Minister not go to the committee set up by Parliament to discuss matters of intelligence? I find it incredible.

A few weeks ago, I asked the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, why this has not happened. The Government say, “The Prime Minister has been very busy over the last few weeks”, and he has been; he has been not just to Belfast but to numerous other places, including Parliament, to meet various groups. Why has it not been possible to meet the Intelligence and Security Committee? This is incredibly serious.

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The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked about publishing guidance. The Government have no plans to publish specific arrangements, but relevant published policy documents are already available, such as the Fulford principles and the OSJA Guidance. In addition, UKIC’s activities are scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee, and challenge can be brought to the UK intelligence community or the Armed Forces on their activities—for example, through judicial review, a civil damages claim or a complaint to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in relation to the use of intrusive powers. We will continue to work with UKIC to consider how we can be forward-leaning in showing appropriate partners how we consider risks internally while protecting operational security.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

The Minister knows that, in Committee, I quoted quite a lot from the OSJA human rights guidance, which I have before me. It also addresses the fundamental point of my noble friend Lord Beith. Both the security service guidelines—which are not published, but about which we know because of judicial processes—which categorise the means by which authorisations have to be secured, and the OSJA Guidance outline the risk assessments that officers must go through. They conclude that, if there is high risk, ministerial approval is necessary. The Government’s amendments do not state categorically that authorisations and ministerial approvals will be necessary for breaches of the SCA offences. Can the Minister confirm that it will be the case that, if there are breaches of the SCA which are forecast through risk assessments and during the processes, ministerial authorisations will have to be provided?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I cannot confirm that from the Dispatch Box, but I will write to the noble Lord with the appropriate clarification. I do not actually have a copy of the OSJA Guidance in front of me, but I appreciate the points he is making.

I return to the third concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord West. I can confirm that, where a member of the intelligence services or the Armed Forces conducted activity that did not comply with the arrangements—namely, the rigorous safeguards, standards and internal processes that I described earlier—this breach of the arrangements could be scrutinised by the proper oversight mechanisms; for example, an error would be reported to IPCO for a breach of the Fulford principles. It could be considered by the prosecution and would impact the availability of the defence. I also assure the noble Lord that the introduction of this new defence, in and of itself, will not lead to fewer ministerial authorisations sought by the intelligence services or to less daily oversight from Ministers and/or judicial commissioners over intelligence activity. I know that he asked me for an explicit reassurance on that point.

I conclude by saying that, for the reasons I have outlined, the Government cannot support the amendments tabled by noble Lords against Clause 30, and therefore ask noble Lords not to press their amendments. I also ask the House to support the new SCA defence amendment tabled by the Government.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his clear explanation. There remains a slight degree of uncertainty. Presumably the Government will issue guidance to be put in place before the scheme is operational. We raised this at our meeting with him.

I wonder whether, in advance of us considering FIRS next week, we could have more information about what the draft guidance will look like as part of the engagement that the Minister has committed to, which is welcome. We have seen some elements of the draft regulations and heard some explanations from the Government but, if he could expand on what the draft guidance might be, that would provide some reassurance to the Stiftungen and other organisations that are hurriedly trying to find out where they fit in this area around what a foreign power will be and the interaction with either intermediaries or those who are funded by them. It is hard to outline that in the Bill but, if the Minister could provide that information in advance of next week, it would inform us very well.

[Lord Balfe (Con)]

My Lords, before the Minister comes back, could either he or a representative of the Government talk to the German ambassador and clear up this difficulty because the Germans are quite convinced that they are caught by this? It would be good if he could come back here and say, “I’ve spoken to the German ambassador or the First Secretary and we have agreed this”. Otherwise, the confusion will carry on.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I am not sure whether the noble Lord will seek to test the opinion of the House—he is nodding from a sedentary position. If he does, we will support him. However, that is not to disregard that the Government have listened and responded positively to the points made in Committee on the need for independent oversight.

Therefore, I will support what the Government say, with just with one question regarding oversight and their intention. We have two former independent reviewers in the House at the moment. I am not sure what normal practice is, but the Government’s amendment, regarding the independent reviewer providing a report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State then laying that before Parliament, gives no indication of a timeframe for laying the report before Parliament after it has been received from the independent reviewer. Given the earlier comments from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, regarding Governments not providing information to Parliament in a timely manner, could this unfortunately be a wee loophole in the independent reviewing? It seems that the amendment gives Ministers complete discretion on when they may present reports to Parliament. Therefore, reports could be received from an independent reviewer but not presented to Parliament for a considerable period or at all.

I hope that is not the case and that this can be clarified by the Minister, but it is an omission within the Government’s amendment, which is otherwise welcome. As I say, the Government have moved, but I hope that the Minister can respond on the areas of omission.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, hits on a sore point for independent reviewers past and present. At the instigation of my noble friend Lord Carlile, the Australians copied the job of independent reviewer—I think they call him or her the independent national security legislation monitor, which is even more indigestible. In doing so, they provided in their statute that reports be laid before Parliament within, I think, 15 sitting days of receipt by the Minister, an excellent discipline which I rather wish this amendment had followed.

I do not wish to seem ungracious. The independent review of powers, whose exercise is attended by secrecy, is a token of good faith on the part of government. It has proved its worth since the 1970s in this country in the context of counterterrorism law. I never doubted the good faith of the Government where this Bill is concerned. This amendment will make that good faith evident to others. It will help to dampen down the conspiracy theories that are so prevalent in this area and allow us to keep pace with Australia—and shortly, I hope, Ireland—in providing for independent oversight of almost the full range of national security laws.

However, gratitude has its limits. On first inspection, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, looks even better, so if he divides the House, I shall vote for it.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for those contributions. There has been plenty of discussion throughout the passage of this Bill about the need for oversight of the state threats provisions in the Bill. The Government have welcomed this debate and agree on the need for the Bill to go further in this regard. The new provisions proposed by the Government do just that. I am very grateful for the remarks made by the noble Lords, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Purvis, on the Government’s movements in that regard.

I will not spend too long on this group but will set out briefly the provisions and how we expect the government provisions to work in practice. The amendments made by the Government create a single reviewer of state threats legislation to oversee the operation of the measures in Parts 1 and 2 of the Bill. This means that the reviewer will oversee not just the STPIM regime but the criminal offences and the exercise of police powers to ensure that their use is appropriate and proportionate.

The Government are also bringing oversight of the provisions of the state threats port stops power—Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019—within the remit of the new reviewer, meaning that all dedicated state threats legislation will be considered as part of a single reviewer’s role.

The Government have heard the argument that this role should in practice be carried out by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and can see the potential benefits this could bring. However, the Government are also conscious that the role will be of public interest and will therefore run an open competition for it, rather than appointing someone directly. Given the synergy between the roles, the Government will align the appointment cycle of this post with that of the terrorism reviewer. This will allow the role-holders to work closely together, but also provide the option of having one individual fill both roles, should that be beneficial.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his proposed amendment on this topic, which would achieve the same effect but also add Parts 4 and 5 to the remit of the reviewer. As mentioned in previous debates on this topic, an explicit commitment to oversight of Part 4 in the Bill is unnecessary, given it is already in the remit of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. I therefore suggest that there is nothing lacking from the present proposal. The provisions in Part 5 are supplementary to the rest of the Bill. The reviewer will be able to look at how Parts 1 and 2 operate in terms of commencement, regulation-making powers and territorial extent without the need explicitly to mention Part 5 in the powers for the reviewer. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept Amendment 80 as tabled by Labour, and hope that colleagues across the House will welcome the government amendments.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, I wonder if he might be able to address my point—which I remind him is the only point that I made?

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I certainly addressed the point which he generously made praising the Government for our amendments. The point that he raised in relation to the Labour amendment, on the basis that there is no timeframe in the present amendments, is not valid in the Government’s submission, because the Labour amendment itself does not contain any binding requirement on the laying of reports. In our submission, that would remove a level of flexibility. In the area of national security, it is important not to hedge about these kinds of provisions with time requirements. For those reasons, we do not believe that the amendment is necessary. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s question.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I know that this is Report and we do not have to and fro, but I was making the point that it was an omission in the Government’s amendment. It is utterly open-ended as to whether the Secretary of State will lay the report from the independent reviewer before Parliament. I was seeking clarification from the Minister that that would not be the case.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, it was me who moved Amendment 80, which is the first amendment in this group. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Anderson, for supporting it. Regarding Part 5, which is covered by my amendment, the Minister described it as supplementary. Well, it may be supplementary, but it is very consequential, because it provides that the Government can make any consequential provision that is a result of this Act, and that consequential amendment can apply both within and outside the UK. It is very significant, even though the Minister may describe it as supplementary.

For that reason, and to provide a more comprehensive view of the Act, as it will be in due course, I wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 80.

National Security Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I speak to Amendments 91 and 106, which the Minister has mentioned. In this case, I speak very much on behalf of the academic and policy research communities, with which I was professionally engaged for some 40 or more years.

We are concerned not to impose too great a burden on those who are engaged in international research. The Minister will be very well aware of the commitments that have already been made for researchers engaged in international co-operation to provide information to the Government, and the concerns that there have already been, particularly about collaboration with countries such as China and Russia. That information is provided to government, and I remind the Minister that, as a member of a Government who are strongly against adding to bureaucracy and red tape, it should be possible for government departments to share information, rather than require it to be given twice to different departments.

I am conscious that the Home Office has a poor record in this regard; indeed, the entire Windrush affair happened because the Home Office refused to ask other departments for information on whether or not the people concerned had been in this country. This was clearly available at the DVLA, the Department of Health, the national insurance scheme, et cetera. There is a real problem in government about asking for the same information twice. The information asked for indeed overlaps, and I ask the Minister to assure us that the Government will look at this matter again and do their best to make sure that it does not add to the burdens to which those of us who are concerned with international co-operation have to relate.

The Minister will be well aware that the Government are also negotiating to rejoin the Horizon European international collaboration scheme for science, probably the most impressive and important network for international co-operation in the world. All the members of the European Union and the various other countries associated with it are listed as foreign powers, with the exception of Ireland, so this is a live question. I declare an interest: my son, a scientist at the University of Edinburgh, is currently engaged in international co-operation with universities and research institutes—one or two of them government-sponsored and financed—in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States. That is a small snapshot of the extent of that collaboration, if one were to go merely to the biology faculty at the University of Edinburgh. I suspect that there are some 30 or 40 other countries with which 100 scientists at the university are involved in various collaborative activities.

The purpose of Amendment 106 is to gain the strongest assurances from the Government that they will look at whether additional burdens are being imposed by the legislation on those who are unavoidably and actively—and desirably—engaged in international collaboration with institutes, universities and other bodies that are part of, or dependent on, foreign Governments in one way or another. We need active assurance on that. If the Minister is able to give that, we will not press these amendments further but I emphasise that it is important that this legislation does not over-add to the requirements to report normal activities. I remind the Minister that we are talking about a country that is determined to become a science international superpower, and that needs to be sure that it does not put obstacles in its own way that deter those in other counties from collaborating as it ensures its security.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s response to the amendments I tabled, supported by my noble friend, on the need for the publication of timely guidance on how the schemes will operate. He has been true to his word from the first day of Report and taken away many of the issues raised in Committee and come back with a number of amendments to address them. They relate mainly to the next group and the political tier but, given that my amendments fall within this group, I wish to put on record how grateful I am to him for the way in which he has engaged and responded.

The government amendments have addressed many of the significant concerns of those seeking legitimate activity—I see that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who raised the issue of economic activity, is in her place—and those concerned about human rights. The areas where some questions remain include those we raised on the first day of Report, such as the German Stiftungen and other organisations that will not fall within the scope of the FIR schemes but are nevertheless concerned that they may do so. Much of that will be resolved in the guidance provided to them and therefore, the timeliness of that is of utmost importance.

In Committee I quoted at length from the Government’s impact assessment of the Bill, which suggested that the initial scheme could cost up to £48 million and many thousands of people would have to be informed about the scheme’s operation. Given that it is to be welcomed that the Government have reduced the scope of that, I am not sure what status the impact assessment now has. I should therefore be grateful if the Minister told us whether the guidance to be provided will also be informed by some revision of the impact assessment.

There will be businesses wanting to carry out legitimate activity that have to operate under a set of rules in the current regulations on countries at risk of money laundering or financing terrorism—we have a list of over 30 such countries—and there may now be an enhanced tier under FIRS. There will also be others, making it quite a complex environment for businesses operating in the political sphere.

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[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I think I failed to hear something the Minister said earlier relating to Amendment 110A. I raise it because the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich and Lord Carlile of Berriew, are both unable to be in the House this afternoon for various compelling reasons. The amendment helpfully tidies up part of the provision by ensuring that the reference to arrangements entered into before the clause comes into force does not apply to arrangements that have ceased to have effect. I think the Minister indicated that he was going to accept it and therefore, I presume, move it at the appropriate stage.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, raised valid areas with regard to the sometimes complex relationships between political parties and the Governments of states, which I hope the Minister, who referred to foreign Governments, can go a little further and point to. It is absolutely right that that is one of a number of criteria set down earlier in the Bill, in Clause 32, and that the meaning of a foreign power includes

“a political party which is a governing political party”.

There will still be issues when it comes to relationships such as demand and supply and other kinds of relations, but I hope that the Minister will provide clarity and proper consultations so that, when we come to the finalised guidance and regulations, those issues will be very clear. The Minister will not be surprised to hear that, as in the earlier group, we are still hoping for that bit of clarification on the German Stiftungen and others represented by the kinds of organisations that the Stiftungen are—those that operate within a public policy and political sphere but are not directly linked to the Government or governing political parties although they are, by definition, political in their nature. I am sure that the Minister will respond to that when he winds up.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, we have a number of scars on our back from legislation where we have tried to do heavy lifting in this Chamber to improve Bills. I tabled a number of amendments in Committee highlighting the concern that what had been brought forward was an unworkable scheme; I think we are now looking at a workable scheme. That is important for the security of our country.

I particularly welcome the draft registration forms, about which I had raised concerns in Committee. I am very pleased that the Minister will be having an active consultation. I am delighted that there will be an updated impact assessment. While the Minister said that that is required of the Government, in previous Bills some excuses have been made for impact assessments not to be updated, so I am very pleased about that. And on the draft regulations, as I said, I am delighted.

As I said on the earlier group, the Minister has been true to his word. I have just one final favour to ask of him. Given that I have been rather successful with colleagues in securing some concessions on this Bill, could he have a word with other Ministers, just to say that “Purvis is not always wrong”? Sometimes, we can do our job in this place; we can make the Government’s job a bit better and make unworkable schemes workable. I commend the Minister for how he has approached this so far.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, there seems to be a new approach to Ministers by buttering them up. I noticed my noble friend buttering up the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, the other day, which seemed to cause amusement in the House. Nevertheless, I too thank the Minister for his response to the earlier concerns raised. The primary tier of FIRS requires the registration of

“arrangements to carry out political influence activities within the UK”,

or to arrange for such activities to be carried out in the UK,

“at the direction of a foreign principal”.

Registration of political influence activity is also required

“where the activity is being carried out by the foreign principal itself. The foreign principal will be responsible for registering political influence activities”.

As I said, concerns were raised that this could impair international co-operation through political parties and similar organisations. It was previously reported that the Government might withdraw the primary tier entirely, but, instead, the Minister has removed the most controversial features of this and accepted Amendment 110A in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile—and the name of the Minister himself is also on that amendment.

I also mention the contacts from the German embassy in relation to the same points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Balfe, at an earlier stage of Report: the concerns of political foundations such as the centre-left Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the centre-right Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and whether they would have a duty to register. If the Minister could repeat what he said earlier, I hope that the minds of the representatives of those organisations will be put at rest.

I welcome what has been said. I hope that this is indeed a workable scheme. I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who described a “radical overhaul”, which it is not usual to get on such an important Bill as this. I think that everybody accepts that this is a very important Bill and I hope that it will emerge from your Lordships’ House a better Bill than when it arrived.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

We need a review because we do not know what the impact is unless we have looked at the data. It seems to be as simple as that.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am grateful and the noble Lord is being patient on these points. He referred to only the most serious cases and said that there was a separate issue with regard to cases that are less serious. In Committee, he used as an example a personal one: someone being convicted of the offence of graffiti. That woman—if indeed it was a woman—would no longer be able to get any legal aid support if she had been a victim of human trafficking or sexual attack. That cannot be right. Does the noble Lord agree that that is what he is supporting today?

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

As the noble Lord knows, the amendment is calling for a review to look at the practical impact of the proposed legislation. We have yet to hear from the Minister on whether the Government accept that a review is necessary.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I remind noble Lords that this is Report and not an opportunity to further debate the matter.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

It is perfectly within the rules of the Companion for noble Lords to seek points of clarification or elucidation from those who are speaking.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

I am again extremely grateful to noble Lords for their interventions and, in particular, for the support for the principle behind Clause 89 expressed by the Official Opposition, subject to the point about minor offences, which I will come to in a moment.

As a quick reminder, Clause 89 narrows the range of circumstances in which individuals convicted of specific terrorism offences can automatically receive civil legal aid services. This includes individuals convicted of terrorism offences punishable with imprisonment for two years or more as well as other offences where a judge has found a terrorism connection. It is important to note that this clause modifies but does not exclude legal aid, because there is still the route of exceptional case funding, particularly if convention rights are in issue. One of the fundamental convention rights— I think this at least partially answers the point raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—is the necessity for a fair trial, in Article 6. The exceptional case funding route is still available in that regard. Phrases such as “excludes”, “denies”, “debars” and “no legal aid support” are not an accurate summary of what this clause achieves.

--- Later in debate ---

So our answer to this is that the Government—when I say this, I mean not the party in power but any British Government—would take seriously a problem of that sort and would undoubtedly conduct a proper review, even if it is not provided in statute that it should do so. That is the Government’s position on the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify a point from his earlier comments on exceptional case funding. The guidance on this on GOV.UK says:

“You could get legal aid for cases that would not usually be eligible if your human rights are at risk. This is known as exceptional case funding”.


Can the Minister clarify: under the Bill, will anybody who receives any sentence for any terrorism offence now automatically be eligible for exceptional case funding?

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

No, that is not the Government’s position. There is a mechanism by way of exceptional case funding to ensure access to justice in an appropriate case.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

Then the point that the Minister referred to about the Bill is irrelevant, because the eligibility for exceptional case funding is regardless of whether the Bill is in place.

[Lord Bellamy (Con)]

It is not entirely irrelevant that exceptional case funding is always available for access to justice. That fact changes some of the comments that have been made about the restrictive nature of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 195, I will not speak at great length. The amendment requires the Secretary of State to propose a new proscription process for actors engaged in hostile state activity on behalf of other states, or indeed non- state organisations acting for a state or those who may act on their behalf.

I am moving this amendment to enable the Government to deal with any legislative problem in proscribing, among others, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, known as the IRGC. The Government will tell the Chamber and me that existing legislation can deal with it, so it is not a problem. So why is there a delay in proscribing the IRGC? If there is no problem with existing legislation, why are Foreign Office officials questioning, as reported in the Times and many other media outlets, how the IRGC can be defined as a terrorist organisation under existing legislation, given that it is a government agency, unlike most of the other groups on the list? Foreign Office officials are being reported in the media as saying that there is a problem with the legislation. The Home Office is saying—I presume this is what the Minister will say—that there is not. Where has that come from? Why is the Foreign Office briefing the media that the reason it is resisting the proscription of the IRGC is that it is not sure that existing legislation will be adequate to define the IRGC as a terrorist organisation because it is a government agency.

There is a problem here at the heart of government. My Amendment 195 seeks to say to the Government, “Here is a legislative vehicle by which you can plug a gap so that the concerns raised by the Foreign Office can be alleviated”. The Home Office and the Foreign Office cannot both be right. So we should pass the legislation as I have laid it out here. I have read—I was advised that this was the way to give the Government a vehicle to deal with any legislative problem in the proscription of the IRGC, as laid out by the Foreign Office—the various parts of the 2000 Act and the 2019 Schedule in front of me and, as much as I can read and understand them, I will have to take the Foreign Office’s word that it is because it is a government agency that there is a problem.

As I said, something is the matter here. It is the will of Parliament, as expressed time and again in this place and in the other place, that the IRGC should be proscribed, but the Government are unable to do it. Therefore, all of us should pass this amendment to get rid of the legislative barrier that the Foreign Office says stays in the way. I am not a legislative expert, but, if the Foreign Office says there is a problem, if I were in the Home Office, I would pass this amendment and call out the Foreign Office if I wanted to proscribe the IRGC. Perhaps the Minister can tell us whether the Government wish to proscribe the IRGC and whether there is a problem with the Foreign Office. Clearly there is; the Minister will not say there is, but there is.

We have seen an Iranian TV station in the UK forced to shut down because of activity from Iran. Numerous plots have been foiled, thanks to our security services. The noble Lord, Lord Evans, is here, and the noble Baroness, both former heads of MI5, so we thank them. But the Government are prevaricating on the proscription of the IRGC. My amendment, as I said, seeks to help the Home Office in its disagreement with the Foreign Office by allowing the creation of an improved and clearer process for proscribing hostile state actors.

The Government are divided in the face of this worrying issue. The Government will say they are not, so I was looking for evidence to show that they were. What did I find? In Hansard, Bob Blackman MP—not me trying to create trouble in the Lords but a Conservative MP—said:

“Clearly, the threat from the IRGC to people in this country—be they opposition journalists reporting on what is going on in Iran at the moment or UK citizens—is paramount. Foreign Office Ministers have responded to all the urgent questions the Speaker has granted and the debates we have had, but will my right hon. Friend now take the obvious step, which is supported by all political parties in the Chamber, and proscribe the IRGC in its entirety?”


Tom Tugendhat, Minister, Home Office, responds with this direct quote:

“My hon. Friend will know that it is not me”—


I am quoting this—

“he has to persuade in this matter and that there are many areas where I would like to go. I can assure him that the Government are absolutely listening to exactly what he is saying. The Home Secretary and I are as one on this”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/2/23; col. 639.]

I am not a genius at working out what that means, but I think anybody who has been in the other Chamber or in this Chamber and has listened to the debate knows that the National Security Minister is telling Bob Blackman MP that the Home Secretary and he agree that the IRGC should be proscribed, but they have a problem with other parts of government, and those other parts of government are the Foreign Office, which believes that it should keep open communication with Iran and that proscribing the IRGC will cause all sorts of other problems, presumably around the nuclear treaty and so on and so forth.

All I am saying to the Minister is that the Foreign Office is clearly blocking the proscription of the IRGC, which is what the majority of people in this Chamber and the other think should happen, and my amendment seeks to take away from it the excuse it is using: namely, that there is a legislative problem, because the IRGC is a government agency and it would therefore be difficult under existing legislation to define it as a terrorist organisation.

Amendment 195 is extremely important, because it will allow the proscription of the IRGC and will take away from the Foreign Office the excuse that it is using to block that proscription. It is in the national security interests of this country for the IRGC to be proscribed as soon as possible. From what I just quoted, it is obvious that the Government, defined as the Home Office, agree, but the Foreign Office is stopping it. This Chamber has the opportunity, in the vote on my Amendment 195, to take away the excuse that the Foreign Office is using to stop that proscription. I hope that noble Lords will take it.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for bringing this issue to the Chamber on Report. He asked very pertinent questions. If he seeks to test the opinion of the House, we shall abstain on this point, but that is not because we do not wish to hear the Minister’s answer—it is because, if we are reforming the Terrorism Act 2000 and the means by which we proscribe organisations, there are perhaps better places for a full and more fundamental review.

I have been on record as supporting the proscription of the IRGC, and I have said that this should not be done without considering the knock-on effects within Iraq and Lebanon. The Terrorism Act 2000 states that it is the Home Secretary who has the specific power to proscribe, so the questions that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked are valid. If this is a Home Office Minister stating that to the House of Commons and it is the Home Secretary’s decision, what is the process by which government will now make decisions on this? I have also repeatedly called for the proscription of the Wagner Group, which is a non-government organisation but clearly has direct links with the Russian Government.

There are, of course, some grey areas. Before we reached this group, I reviewed the whole list of those proscribed organisations, and we have recently proscribed some that are clearly not linked with a Government but are organisations designed to destabilise that country’s Government. However, over the years, there have been other organisations where the lines are more blurred as to whether they are within the framework of aliases or associated organisations, which can be proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000, even if they are not directly part of the Government of that nation. It is obviously a large step if we proscribe part of a Government, but, in the past, we have seen that, in many areas, it has not been clear who the Government of a country are. Therefore, the statutory tests that are used, and that need to be satisfied, need to be robust.

I have raised the issue of the Wagner Group since 25 April last year, and I have seen it operating with my own eyes in Sudan—some noble Lords have heard me make this case before—and it is palpably the case that its operations are terrorist in purpose and in nature and that they are directly against the national security interests of the United Kingdom and pose a threat to British nationals and our allies. I called for its proscription last year on 25 April, 23 May, 9 June, 7 July, 15 November and 21 December, and on 26 January this year.

National Security Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 21st June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, these Benches will support Motion C1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, if he tests the opinion of the House. He made the case very adequately, and I need not add anything. These Benches will also support the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, if he seeks to test the opinion of the House on Motion A1.

The coming year is likely to be the most expensive year in British politics—let us be honest about it—so the time to act is now, rather than having regrets after the next election if there are difficulties with some of the sources of the donations. Therefore, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, is right: it is no longer good enough simply to verify the donor and not the source of the funds.

I used to give tours of the House of Commons when I worked for David Steel—and I also thought that was a toilet behind the Speaker’s chair, after the Speaker no longer used the toilet under his chair with the curtains around it—so I learned something about the Reasons Committee. I do not think it would have taken the committee an hour and 45 minutes to come up with Reason 22A:

“Because the law already makes sufficient provision in relation to donations to political parties”.


That was the reason given before the current situation for reporting mechanisms was put in place. It is a reason that has been given by the Government each time there has been a proposal for change. The question is not whether we agree with that reason—which, of course, we should not—but what the merits of the case for seeking extra information about the sources of funding are.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I thank the Minister for the way he has engaged on the Bill. If he does not mind me saying so, it has been a model of how Ministers can operate. But there are these two outstanding issues on which he can use his good counsel with his colleagues in the House of Commons.

I know the Minister made the point that this will potentially delay the Bill a little longer. He will forgive me for saying so, but the Bill was delayed because of the Government bringing forward the foreign influence registration scheme without notice in Committee in the Commons, dumping on us and then having to bring 150 concession amendments. We have done our job and we continue to do it—that is the point of us being here. The time to act is now.

The Minister also mentioned that one of the deficiencies of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is that political parties had not been consulted. That is a bit rich. The Government have not asked the Electoral Commission to ask political parties for their view about it, but then they say that is a problem with the amendment because there was no consultation. That is not really relevant, if the Minister does not mind me saying so.

We have to move to a situation in which we check not just the status of the donor, as the noble Baroness said, but the status of the source of funds. We would do it if a donor was buying property and HMRC was uncertain about the source of the funds—that is why we have unexplained wealth orders. It seems odd, as it seems to be the Government’s and the Minister’s position that the very same person who could be liable for an unexplained wealth order from HMRC if they were buying a property would be able to donate considerable funds to a political party and there would be no questions asked. It does not match. We also have a list of countries where extra checks have to be made by law because of the list of countries in the anti-money laundering and terrorism financing regulations that the Minister’s department puts forward.

In that regard, I will ask a couple of questions of the Minister. I hope he is able to answer them today but, if he is not, I will be grateful if he writes to me. In support of my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire, I note that we seem to be in a position in which, over the last seven years, if you are a Conservative treasurer and you donate more than £3 million, you have a unique set of characteristics and skills that will mean that you have a 100% chance of being elevated to this House. If you donate more than £3 million and coincidentally then become the treasurer of the governing party, that governing party elevates you to be a Member of Parliament to hold that governing party to account. This is Britain in the 21st century. I understand that the current treasurer has given £600,000 through Unatrac Ltd and that he has also given personal donations. He is a joint national—I do not cast any aspersions on him whatever. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that he does not have a non-dom status. I would also be grateful if the Minister could state where his permanent residency is: London or Cairo. I would be grateful for a simple, straightforward clarification.

I would also be grateful if the Minister could state when Unatrac stopped trading with Russian oil and gas enterprises. Another Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, is here—he and I have debated Russian sanctions and trying to clamp down on economic activities with Russia for a long time in this House. Apparently, Unatrac has made a statement that over the last few weeks it has suspended trading with Russian oil and gas. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell me when that ceased permanently.

I ask that because, according to the accounts of Unatrac, its immediate parent company is Unatrac Subco Ltd, which is incorporated in Dubai. Unatrac’s ultimate parent undertaking is Unatrac Holding Ltd, based in the UAE. The UAE is on the list of the anti-money laundering and terrorism financing regulations; extra requirements have to be made when businesses are carrying out activities from the UAE. The Minister says that political parties that receive millions of pounds in donations do not have to do that. The context we are facing is that over the coming year, as many noble Lords have said, money and politics will affect all political parties. The time to act is now. We must amend the Bill to make sure that we do not regret it in 2025.

National Security Bill

Lord Purvis of Tweed Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 4th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

To follow my noble friend to conclude from these Benches on this part of the Bill, I wish to commend the Minister for listening and taking back to the department a very strong view from this House that more needed to be done in this area. I also commend the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for his persistence on this area. I respectfully disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley. Of course, we all know that there is a distinction between the small donors—those who give small sums of money either as a member or as a supporter of a political party: in my case, in my former constituency, there were all too small numbers of small donors, regrettably, but there were those who would bake a cake for a raffle—and individuals who give really quite enormous sums to political parties. On the one hand, I understand the argument that there should not be a distinction between the two groups, if someone is of wealth and means and they believe in the same thing as someone without wealth and means. However, as my noble friend indicated, with regret I share more the view of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, in this regard.

We would not be where we are in pursuing and being persistent with this issue if we did not know that the Electoral Commission was in effect asking us to do it. I have met the Electoral Commission frequently, and I do not think that it is relevant to highlight its resources when it has been very clear to us in saying that it does not have the powers to carry out what, ultimately, I believe it should be able to carry out—to ask political parties for due diligence as to the source of large donations. I hope that the government review will take us on that journey and provide an evidence base, on which I believe there will be a degree of consensus.

I thank the Government for their response and look forward to the review taking place, especially as it will start with the competent authorities that will have the information available to them. The Government are taking through the economic crime Bill, reforming and updating the mechanisms through unexplained wealth orders. It strikes me that that is a very good opportunity to look at some of the processes around UWOs, which are designed to be streamlined and not burdensome on authorities, to see whether they can be the model by which we would look at the requirements on political parties. On this issue, I have previously talked about the jarring position that, if a politically exposed person who is open to unexplained wealth order mechanisms, instead of giving to a political party used that money to buy a property, the relevant competent authorities would have to go through a process of due diligence for that property. However, as my noble friend said, on the concern about buying influence rather than buying a property, there is no mechanism that is open. I hope that that loophole will be closed. The Government have been clear in their guidance on the duties on the public and competent authorities to access data for unexplained wealth orders, so we should be in a better position.

Finally, as I said in the previous debate, this is likely to be the most expensive year coming up in British politics. I hope that we will have cleaner hands, but they will not be empty. Therefore, it is how we ensure that with the source of that money going into British politics, especially in the lead-up to election campaigns, the transparency is not just around the donor but around where that money is from for substantial donations. I hope very much that we have started the process of rectifying this deficiency in the British system, and I thank the Minister for starting it.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by saying how much we support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I am glad that the Government have listened and come to an amicable agreement with the noble Lord which takes us forward. I thank the Minister for the way he has done that and for the concession that the Government have made on the updating of the memorandum of understanding, although clearly issues remain between the ISC and the Government, hence Motion B1 tabled by my noble friend Lord West, which we support. Aside from the Motion itself, it will allow continuing discussions, and indeed perhaps negotiations, around how the memorandum of understanding can be revised or replaced, including by negotiation, hence its importance.

I think it is really significant that still, even at this late stage of the Bill, my noble friend Lord West, speaking on behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which gives parliamentary oversight of the activities of the security services, is not happy with where we have arrived at. I think it is incumbent on the Government to reach an agreement with the ISC. Clearly, as we have heard from my noble friend Lord West this afternoon, we are not in a situation where that has occurred. There are all sorts of issues that remain between the Government and the ISC, as has been evidenced by various things that have happened today, and the Government need to respond to those.

I will add just a couple of other points. One is that the Government gave a commitment during the passage of the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the Minister gave assurances to Parliament that the memorandum of understanding was a live document that would be regularly reviewed and updated. Are the Government of today completely ignoring that commitment that was made to Parliament? If so, we are in a really difficult situation, because it means that parliamentary oversight is undermined by the fact that Ministers making pledges to Parliament can just be ignored in the future by the Government. I say—we often say, all of us say—that we will not press an amendment, on the basis that the Minister, speaking from the Dispatch Box, makes commitments that are read into the record. That is an important part of parliamentary scrutiny. Ministers are asked to do that and Members of Parliament in the other place and noble Lords withdraw amendments. But here we have an example of where the Intelligence and Security Committee is saying that pledges and commitments were made to Parliament that the memorandum of understanding would be regularly updated and the Government have not done that or are still not in agreement with the ISC. I think that is a really important point.

For the avoidance of doubt, I remind your Lordships again that I do not seek to compel the Prime Minister to go to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I shall just say what I believe, and your Lordships will have to make up their own minds. Given that the Intelligence and Security Committee is the oversight body for this Parliament, I would have thought that if the ISC were regularly asking the Prime Minister to attend, the Prime Minister would go—not because he is compelled to go but because it is an important part of that parliamentary oversight and the Prime Minister of our country negotiating and liaising personally with the Intelligence and Security Committee is of real importance. So I say to noble Lords, as others have heard me say before, that all of us would be surprised by the fact that no Prime Minister has been since 2014; nearly 10 years. It has been nine years, in case I am quoted as not being accurate, since a Prime Minister has been. So I gently say that, while I do not seek to compel the Prime Minister, I politely ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, whether the Home Office has suggested to the Prime Minister that, in his diary, he might consider going to see the Intelligence and Security Committee when he can.

My noble friend Lord West’s amendment raises several important issues, but the most significant is that we need to send a message through supporting it that the ISC is still not at one with the Government. That is a serious issue and needs somehow to be resolved. I believe that supporting my noble friend’s amendment will continue to put pressure on the Government to ensure that they come to an arrangement with the ISC in the end, such is its importance. If my noble friend chooses to test the opinion of the House, we will be happy to support his Motion B1.