Read Bill Ministerial Extracts
Offensive Weapons Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Minister mentioned the tragic stabbing to death of a father on a suburban train last week, and of course our thoughts are with all those affected by such a tragedy. However, the fact is that young people in our inner cities are dying from knife crime almost every day of the week, and that is the real tragedy that the Government should be highlighting.
This Bill has a familiar ring to it. Again, the Government, wanting to be seen to be responding to the crisis of violence on our streets, resort to legislation and imprisonment rather than investing to tackle violent crime, investing to bring about long-term changes in behaviour and taking immediate steps to save young people’s lives by properly investing in policing. And the reason? To avoid raising the taxes of those who can most afford to make a contribution.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. Violence stems from inequality and poverty, from failing to invest in children and young people, from creating a vacuum that used to be occupied by community policing and youth services and has now been filled by criminal gangs. The Government’s serious violence plan—it does not deserve the title “strategy”—is in fact a patchwork of unco-ordinated and underfunded initiatives, however well intentioned, that lack the real money and real leadership that could really make a difference, and this legislation is yet another piece of that inadequate and ineffective patchwork.
A very good piece of legislation that deals with offensive weapons is already on the statute book. The Prevention of Crime Act 1953 states:
“Any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offence”.
This was the staple of my days as a constable on the beat. There were two types of offensive weapon. There were items such as daggers that were made to cause injury to people—made offensive weapons—but the majority had more than one use; for example, a kitchen knife which, when carried to a fight, was an intended offensive weapon. It was therefore straightforward. The chef on his way to work did not commit an offence when carrying a kitchen knife, whereas the gang member on his way to confront a rival gang did.
In 1988, Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act shifted the burden against the innocent, introducing an offence of having in a public place any article which has a blade or is sharply pointed. From what I can see, this is the origin of the shift that we discussed at some length in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill: a shift away from whether someone commits an offence, subject to whether they have lawful authority or reasonable excuse, to an absolute offence where,
“it shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence to prove that he had good reason or lawful authority”.
This Bill creates new offences of, for example: selling a corrosive product to a person under the age of 18, having a corrosive substance in a public place and delivering a bladed product to residential premises or a locker—no matter whether every precaution has been taken to ensure dangerous items do not get into the hands of children. It is a defence for someone charged with any of these offences to prove that they took all reasonable steps to avoid this happening. However, unlike the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, there is no reference to Section 118 of the Terrorism Act, which noble Lords will recall places the burden of proof on the prosecution and says:
“If the person adduces evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter, the court or jury shall assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not”.
Presumably, this means that the man carrying his drain-unblocking fluid home from the supermarket commits an offence, for which he has a defence if charged; it is only then that he will have the opportunity to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he has a blocked drain at home. I do not want to get into arguments at this stage of the Bill around necessity and proportionality when the police use their powers of arrest. Suffice to say that I will again challenge this type of approach, particularly when we are confronted with cases such as that of the couple arrested over the recent drone incident at Gatwick Airport. Legislation should be worded so that, if someone has lawful authority or reasonable excuse, as in the 1953 Act, they do not commit an offence—not that they have a defence once they have been charged.
I understand that Acid Survivors Trust International blames lack of tight controls on acid sales or,
“legislation specific to acid attacks”,
for the rise in the number of attacks, but this needs to be put into perspective. Acid attacks have increased from 228 recorded crimes in 2012 to 601 attacks in 2016. In 2017 there were 39,598 offences involving a knife or pointed instrument; the number of acid-related offences is tiny. Corrosive substances carried with the intention of causing injury, for example in a spray or a squeezable washing-up liquid bottle, are offensive weapons under the 1953 Act and causing an injury using acid is clearly a serious assault. Notwithstanding ASTI’s concerns, one has to ask whether the Government are doing something that will be effective by introducing this legislation, or whether they just want to be seen to be doing something. In many other areas, the Government claim that self-regulation is preferable, that legislation is unnecessary, and one has to ask these questions here.
The Bill potentially puts further strain on an overcrowded and therefore ineffective prison service. Underage selling of corrosive products potentially carries a sentence of 51 weeks in prison, possession in a public place carries up to 12 months on a first offence and a compulsory four-month or six-month sentence for a second offence, removing the discretion of judges once again. There is only one thing worse than unnecessarily adding to an overcrowded prison system and that is short sentences that destroy social ties, take away people’s jobs and are not long enough to allow education, training and rehabilitation.
What happened in the other place? The only change, under pressure from Conservative Back-Benchers, was that the Government went against the advice of the police and caved in to the wealthy and privileged who wanted to keep their high-powered rifles.
We acknowledge that criminalising the sale of corrosive substances, making it a specific offence to carry corrosive substances in public and restricting online sales of knives sends a message, but messaging is the argument that the Government usually use to oppose the creation of new offences, not to create them. We on these Benches need a lot of convincing that this legislation as drafted has a useful part to play in containing the epidemic of violence on our streets. As the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has said, the Bill is a missed opportunity.
Offensive Weapons Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I will speak to the other amendments in the group in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. These amendments seek to change the offences in the Bill from those where there is a reasonable excuse defence only when charged to ones where, if someone has a reasonable excuse, they do not commit an offence. They seek consistency in approach between legislation where no offence is committed if someone has an offensive weapon in a public place because they have a reasonable excuse and legislation where, in exactly the same circumstances, a person does commit an offence and has to rely on a defence only once they have been charged. The amendments also seek consistency between offences where the burden lies on the prosecution to disprove a reasonable excuse defence and offences where the burden lies on the accused to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they have a reasonable excuse.
We return to an issue that I raised in discussion of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill and which is applicable here; namely, creating offences where a completely innocent person commits an offence and has to rely on a defence once charged, rather than someone with a reasonable excuse for his actions not being guilty of an offence in the first place. In the context of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, the Government acknowledged this problem in relation to the designated areas offence. In that Bill, the Government accepted that, rather than a person entering a designated area and having a defence once charged if they had good reason to be there, if they entered or remained in a designated area involuntarily or for a range of other reasons stipulated in the Bill, they did not commit an offence. The Government accepted that there could be legitimate reasons for visiting or remaining in a designated area and that it was more sensible to say that no offence was committed if they had good reason, rather than that they committed an offence but had a defence once charged.
In one part of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, the person does not commit an offence if they had good reason yet, in another part, a person has a defence once charged—a different approach in different parts of the same Bill. It is still a Bill, I think, and has not yet received Royal Assent—I am getting nods from the back, so that is good.
In Clause 1 of this Bill, a person commits an offence if they sell a corrosive product to a person who is under the age of 18. They have a defence, if charged, by proving that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of an offence, rather than it saying, “They do not commit an offence if they act reasonably”. In Clause 3, a person commits an offence if he delivers the corrosive product or arranges its delivery to residential premises. They too have a defence, if charged, if they prove that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of an offence, rather than it saying that if they act reasonably, they do not commit an offence. There is also an issue with Clause 4, but it slipped through the net and therefore there is no amendment in this group to address it.
In Clause 6, however, a person commits an offence if they have a corrosive substance with them in a public place. It is a defensive charge if they prove that they had good reason or lawful authority for having the corrosive substance with them in a public place, rather than the provision being that if they had good reason or lawful authority, they do not commit an offence. It will perhaps be clearer if I concentrate on the latter of these three offences.
If a 19-year-old young man has a corrosive substance with them in a public place with the intention of using it to attack someone else, they commit an offence under the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 of having an offensive weapon with them in a public place with the intention of causing injury to someone. It is an intended offensive weapon. However, if they have been sent out by their mother to buy drain cleaner in a squeezable bottle to unblock the kitchen sink—I speak with some experience having recently cleared one of my drains; drain cleaner does come in squeezable bottles—they do not commit an offence under the 1953 Act. They have a corrosive liquid with them in a public place, in a squeezable bottle that could be used to cause injury to someone, but have a reasonable excuse for possessing it. Were the police to stop and search the youngster, a quick phone call to the mother could establish the reasonable excuse.
Under the Bill, the 19 year-old running the errand for his mother commits a criminal offence because, under Clause 6(1):
“A person commits an offence if they have a corrosive substance with them in a public place”.
Under Clause 6(2), it is a defence for the youngster charged with an offence under subsection (1) to,
“prove that they had good reason or lawful authority for having the corrosive substance with them in a public place”,
but a police officer would be justified in arresting the youngster, because he is clearly committing a criminal offence.
When discussing the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, we also debated the principle of necessity in relation to arrests. One of the circumstances included in the reasons why an arrest might be necessary under Section 110 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 is to allow,
“the prompt and effective investigation of the offence or of the conduct of the person in question”.
It would be quite easy for a police officer to reason that the quickest and easiest way to determine whether the young man has a blocked drain is to arrest him and take him to his home address, to see whether the kitchen sink is blocked.
I am sure that the Minister will say that of course the police will act reasonably, but the police do not always act reasonably. Believe me, from 30 years’ experience in the police service, including four years as a bobby on the beat, I can say that sometimes police officers look for any reason to arrest someone. For those who might argue that my experience is not current, I point out that if you own a drone, live within a short distance of Gatwick Airport and have suspicious neighbours, apparently you can end up being arrested even when you can easily prove that you were miles away at work at the time the offence was committed.
There is another anomaly. In the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, in offences that remain of the “defence when charged” type, the burden is on the prosecution to disprove the reasonable excuse defence put forward by the accused, and to do so beyond reasonable doubt. Section 118 of the Terrorism Act 2000 states:
“If the person adduces evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter the court or jury shall assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not”.
Indeed, in Clause 3(10) of this Bill we find a similar provision, except that it applies only in Scotland. South of the border, not only is it only a defence once charged—as in subsection (8)—but the person charged has to,
“prove that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence”,
presumably beyond reasonable doubt. Noble Lords will recall that Section 118 of the Terrorism Act saved the Government from the accusation of reversing the burden of proof but, in these offences, the burden of proof is on the accused, presumably to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt, that they have a reasonable excuse. Why is the burden of proof reversed in this Bill, except in Scotland, but not in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, which passed through this House only recently?
Sending a message to the police that an offence is not committed if someone has lawful authority or reasonable excuse is preferable to saying that an offence is committed and that there is a defence once charged. Sending a message that you have nothing to fear by buying corrosive substances for illegitimate purposes and carrying the substance home through the streets or to a place of work is preferable to saying: “You are committing an offence and have to prove to a jury beyond reasonable doubt that you did so innocently”. The principle adopted in Section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, which deals with offensive weapons, is that you are innocent if you have a reasonable excuse. That legislation has not been repealed, nor have the Government sought to amend it. That is the principle adopted by the Government in recent weeks in relation to an offence under the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, and it is the principle that the Government should adopt in this Bill. I beg to move—
Not being familiar with police procedures, to me the essence of the argument seems to be about when the defence is deployed. Can the noble Lord explain what that means in practical terms?
My Lords, when the police are told that the offence is not committed if somebody has a reasonable excuse, the clear message sent to them is that they need to investigate the matter there and then to establish whether that reasonable excuse exists. If a Bill, as in this case, says that somebody who carries a corrosive substance in a public place commits an offence, it sends a message to the police that investigation of any reasonable excuse that the person may have can wait until later because, according to the legislation, the defence is available only once the person has been charged.
My Lords, I support the Bill. The issue of the misuse of corrosive substances and all other kinds of offensive weapons is too obviously something that has to be addressed. However, I want to raise an issue which is troublesome in the context of the amendment.
Unless an offence is absolute—and we take a strong stand against absolute offences—it is a long-standing principle of criminal justice that you are liable to conviction and sentence, or to go back earlier, to be arrested and charged if you have done something or acted in a way prohibited by the law. Fine—but the proviso to that is, “Provided that simultaneously your state of mind was itself similarly criminal”. You may have done it intentionally or recklessly. There are all sorts of ways in which your state of mind can be identified as criminal but it is of the essence that these two concepts stand or fall together.
This statute asserts that, where certain facts are proved, you have committed an offence—full stop. Without reference to your state of mind or any other circumstance, the offence is established and you are therefore liable to be arrested. It then says, “We shall graciously allow that, in certain circumstances, you may have a defence”, and if you prove them you would have a defence. Perhaps the most gracious of all the circumstances is to be found in Clause 2(6) to (9), where a whole series of them have to be established. You then have a defence, but you have been arrested and may have been charged. Nobody has to examine these two concepts together and say, “The evidence shows that he had a guilty mind”, or “He was reckless”, or whatever it might be.
What I really want to raise in Committee is that we should stick to the normal principles that have worked well for us: you are not guilty of anything and have not committed an offence unless your mental state was simultaneously as criminal as the actions you committed. That is what we believe. I do not want to be overportentous; I cannot see the Minister making any concessions about this. However, I would like to put down a marker. This way of legislating for criminal justice is inappropriate and we should avoid it. We should certainly be very careful not to allow it to happen without us spotting it and stopping it.
Could I assist the Committee? We will return to the problems of not allowing corrosive substances to be delivered to any residential address in an upcoming group. It might be more appropriate to discuss that matter then, if that assists the noble Earl.
Not at all.
I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate, particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. It is interesting that the Minister seems to have ignored the inconsistency in approach between the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Bill. In the Prevention of Crime Act, which is a piece of legislation specifically dealing with offensive weapons, you do not commit an offence if you have a reasonable excuse, which is inconsistent with the Criminal Justice Act and the Bill. The Minister says, “We worded it this way for things to be consistent”. It is not consistent.
On the point from the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, I do not want to get into the disproportionality of stop and search. What I would say is that I envisage certain circumstances where a 19-year-old young man who has a corrosive substance in their pocket, because that is the only thing they were sent out to the shop for, is stopped by the police very easily leading to arrest if the offence is worded in the way it is, whereas a police officer might be given cause to think twice if it were worded in the way I suggested it should be changed. The Minister and her officials are on slightly dodgy ground in suggesting to me what makes a practical difference to a police officer on the street or not about the way they implement the law.
That will give an indication that we are likely to return to this matter at the next stage. However, at this juncture, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendments 13, 14 and 15 in this group. I do not put any particular weight on the drafting of these amendments. What concerns me is that we are putting a lot of weight in this Bill on the shoulders of people whose occupations we consider so lowly that we will not let them be the subject of apprenticeships. You cannot get an apprenticeship as a shop worker or as a delivery driver. There is no established pattern of training for these people, but we are putting them in a situation where something that they sold is used very quickly in a horrific crime and all the weight of the media and public opinion comes down on their shoulders as to whether they erred in their action or not. The whole machinery of justice is impelled towards convicting them because it wants some victim to compensate for the crime that has been committed. This is all too regular and humiliating, and we owe it to these people to put them in a situation where they can have a set of rules and know that if they follow this set of rules they will be safe.
It is not satisfactory to have that set of rules be just invented by the small shopkeeper who happens to employ them. There has to be some way in which their employers can establish that what they are doing is proof against whatever accusations might come their way. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, the burden of proof rests on their shoulders: they have to show that they did what was necessary to avoid the liability in this Bill. The other side of that coin is that we have to do what is necessary to enable them to do that and to enable them to be sure that they have done that. There are plenty of available recording devices around: you can take a picture of the document that you saw or the person himself, but then you are running straight into GDPR. We cannot start doing that without there being a clear set of permissions and expectations at the back of it. We want this to happen: we want a delivery driver, turning up on a wet Sunday and poking something through a gate that somebody might not see too well in the early morning light or in the evening, knowing that what they are doing is right and sufficient. I do not mind what it is, but we must do something. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the amendments in this group in principle, but I will make one or two comments about them. First, there is an apparent contradiction between the pair of Amendments 3 and 13 on the one hand and the pair of Amendments 14 and 15 on the other. The first pair suggests that the police should design a scheme to ensure that corrosive substances are not delivered into the hands of those under 18. The second pair dictate to the police, at least in part, what that scheme should be. However, I understand the principle behind what the noble Lord is saying.
It is currently possible to order age-restricted products online and there are schemes in place designed to prevent age-restricted products being delivered to those under 18. Amazon’s instructions to the buyer say:
“By placing an order for one of these items you are declaring that you are 18 years of age or over. These items must be used responsibly and appropriately.
Delivery of age restricted items can only be delivered to the address on the shipping label, but this can include the reception of a commercial building. A signature of the recipient will be required upon delivery. Amazon adopts a ‘Challenge 25’ approach to delivery of age restricted products. Photo identification will be required if a person appears under 25, to prove that they are over 18 years old. An age restricted item can be delivered to another adult over the age of 18 at the same address. Delivery to a neighbour or nominated safe place location is not available for these items. If an adult over the age of 18 is not available at the address, or if an adult has not been able to show valid photo identification under the Challenge 25 approach, the item will be returned to Amazon”.
The acceptable photo identification is a passport or driving licence.
Would this scheme or something like it be sufficient to restrict the sale and delivery of corrosive substances—and knives for that matter—to those under 18, obviating the need for banning the delivery of such items to residential addresses?
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is absolutely on the right lines. One of the troubles is knowing what is permissible and what is not. In speaking to the amendments in his name, I will suggest something which takes it a bit further. I declare an interest as chair of the Digital Policy Alliance, which, among other things, worked for several years on age verification for the Digital Economy Act. This Bill has exactly the same problem as Section 3 of that Act: what systems are adequate for proving the age of someone in an online sale? We worked on such systems and if noble Lords want to see that it can be done properly and securely I recommend they go to the web portal dpatechgateway.co.uk, where there are several to play with. The challenge is that there is no official certification scheme in place, but those systems are compliant with BSI publicly available specification 1296. I chaired the steering group that produced that standard and it had a lot of different people on it—people from the industry, academics, legislators, lawyers, et cetera. It shows that it can be done securely.
This goes one stage further than the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, that the police can certify. Here is a system that you could trust. The technology also enables it to be on a mobile, so you can do point-of-delivery verification. You have got the person there: you can compare them with the device. Amendment 13 goes some way to solving the quandary for a seller, but what is “adequate”? Someone in the industry has suggested to me that it might be better to insert a new paragraph (c) after line 22 saying that: “The Secretary of State may lay regulations as to which bodies are recognised to provide standards against which age-verification schemes can be assessed”. In that way, a certification system could be set up. The BBFC and DCMS have been struggling with this for some time. They are getting there, but there is a lot to be learned from the fallout from that which could be imported into this Bill. Giving the Secretary of State the power to say what schemes can be certified against would go a long way to making life far simpler. We are moving into an online age. We cannot do all this offline and we should not pretend we can.
This is something we talked about earlier. If we are to put “all” in, it is not unreasonable to have some sort of guidance in the Bill to protect people, otherwise people are just left hanging.
Would it help the Committee to suggest that the Government have put in Clause 4 exactly the sort of things the delivery courier should be looking at to take reasonable precautions?
My Lords, that is where the guidance comes in. All roads are leading back to the guidance. I hope I can leave it there.
I support the words of my noble friend Lady Newlove. Much of what the Committee has heard this afternoon about corrosive substances has referred to the appalling use of them by young people. Statistics on this are more difficult to find than on some of the other offences that we will be discussing later. I have serious concerns about the connection with drugs. The threat of acid attack is regularly used on young people involved in county lines.
One thing we have not mentioned this afternoon is the terrible situation of violence against individuals in domestic abuse situations, which is less frequent and not often reported. Surely short-term sentences will not deal with that. This is not the same as the pressures on young people to conform to gangs and so on. This is something quite different and I would like to think that there are very serious responses to that in our system.
If I could assist the Committee at this stage, these amendments relate to the offences of selling and delivering to young people, not to the possession of corrosive substances by young people. We are talking about sending the owner of the corner shop or the Amazon delivery man to prison for delivering these substances into the hands of people who are under 18. I want to ensure that noble Lords are aware that that is what we are talking about in this group of amendments.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Views have been expressed here which I respect but do not share. The seller will be, or is likely to be, an adult, and certainly will not be a vulnerable child. The purchaser, or the person to whom the product is sold, may be a very young child. It may be a 17 year-old who lives in an area where there is an awful lot of violence and who has a bad record which is known to the seller. We have to be careful. I am implacably opposed to minimum terms—we may come to that at some stage—because minimum terms do not do justice. However, a person who sells to a vulnerable child, or to somebody who leads a gang or who has been given a community sentence first time round, with a condition that he is prohibited from selling corrosive products but continues to do so, merits a prison sentence as punishment. Prison is not just about rehabilitation. Short sentences do not do much good; indeed, the evidence suggests that some of them do a lot of harm. However, some short sentences do some good because they punish the offender. Therefore, I cannot support these amendments.
My Lords, I rise briefly to support the noble Viscount. This is an example of how complex this ban on delivering corrosive substances to residential premises is. That is an issue that I will return to in group 7; I shall keep my powder dry until then.
My Lords, I also rise briefly to support this amendment from my noble friend. He is absolutely right. It is not just cars and motorcycles; things such as uninterruptable power supplies for computers, in which I have a particular interest, have them and I do not know whether the fact that the battery is inside another bit of kit which can be unscrewed matters or not. If you have a heavy-duty burglar alarm panel, that will probably have a lead-acid battery behind it. There are lots of reasons why you might want to get replacement batteries. I personally find it very inconvenient, except for the fact that I am married to a farmer. If I was living in a normal place—like my son for instance, who lives in London—I would not be able to buy batteries like that. They are a damned sight cheaper online, I can tell you that.
My Lords, Amendment 9 is tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I shall speak also to my Amendments 10A and 10B, which are also in this group. I apologise to the Committee for the late arrival of those amendments.
Amendment 9 simply suggests that if the appropriate national authority amends Schedule 1—the list of corrosive products—for the purposes of Clause 1 by regulation, it should consult representatives of those likely to be affected. Amendments 10A and 10B probe the necessity for including 3% or more nitric acid and 15% or more sulphuric acid in Schedule 1 when they are already regulated explosives precursors listed in Schedule 1A to the Poisons Act 1972 as amended by the Deregulation Act 2015. These substances are already restricted for sale to the general public. If a member of the public wants to buy these substances, they need to apply to the Home Office for a licence to acquire, possess and use these substances. Will the Minister explain why these substances therefore need to be included in Schedule 1 to the Bill and why the existing restrictions are not sufficient? For those who are amazed at the depth of my knowledge of these issues, I am very grateful to the House of Lords Library for its excellent briefing on the Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendment 10 simply asks why not just list all these substances, since we know what they are and the list will not change. Substances have been left off, such as slaked lime, which are seriously corrosive to skin, might be used and are very easy to obtain, and there are others on the list that would be very difficult to obtain. None the less, if we are going to have a list, since the list is not going to grow over time but is a small collection of basic inorganic chemicals, why not have the lot? It really does not add a lot of weight to the Bill to complete the list.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and commend her on her mind-reading ability. Although Amendment 9 is in my name, she correctly identified its author. My noble friend and I are both grateful that the Government are considering their response to the amendment. I am still not quite clear why we need to ban the sale to under-18s and delivery to residential premises of nitric acid and sulphuric acid in the concentrations specified in Schedule 1. The point of the question was that people cannot acquire these substances unless they have a Home Office licence under the Poisons Act, so they are very unlikely to be sold to somebody aged under 18 or delivered to a residential address. The Government are normally keen not to have unnecessary legislation, and including those two substances in Schedule 1 to this Bill appears to be unnecessary, bearing in mind that they are listed in Schedule 1A to the Poisons Act 1972. We may come back to that at a later date, but at this point I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the purpose of opposing the Question that Clause 3 stand part of the Bill is to raise issues around the practicality of the operation of the clause and to ask the Minister why the scheme suggested in Clause 4—Delivery of corrosive products to persons under 18—cannot be extended to sellers inside the United Kingdom as well as outside, thus obviating the need to ban delivery to residential premises. The practicality of Clause 3 arises out of subsection (6) where premises are not considered residential premises when a person carries on a business from the premises. How does a courier know that the house he is delivering to is also used to conduct a business from? For example, I could be registered as a sole trader with Revenue & Customs, as I used to be before my introduction to your Lordships’ House. I was registered as a writer and public speaker and carried on my business from my home. Unless the courier was able to access— presumably confidential—information held by Revenue & Customs, how would he know? In any event, why should being a writer and public speaker carrying on a business from my home allow me to have corrosive substances delivered there, whereas now I cannot? The noble Viscount, Lord Craigavon, gave another practical example about the delivery of acid batteries.
Clause 4 applies to the sale of corrosive substances where the seller is outside the United Kingdom. It applies where the seller enters into an arrangement with a courier to deliver the substance. The courier commits an offence if they do not deliver the substance into the hands of a person aged 18 or over. The courier is deemed to have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of an offence if he is shown a passport, a photocard driving licence or other document specified by Scottish Ministers or something that looked like one of those documents and would have convinced a reasonable person that it was genuine. This seems to me to be the proof-of-age system that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, was looking for in Amendment 3. Why can this system not be modified or added to so that UK sellers can not only age verify as far as possible at the point of sale but, if they are delivering the substance, age verify at the point of hand-over? If there is age verification at hand-over, as set out in Clause 4, why does there need to be a total ban on the delivery of corrosive substances to residential addresses, assuming that that ban is designed to prevent under-18s getting their hands on corrosive substances?
I apologise for my earlier intervention that should have come under this clause. I can see that it is dealt with in Clause 3(6) about farmhouses, and so my earlier intervention was irrelevant. However, the noble Lord has a very good point about why we are banning delivery to residential premises if there is someone there who can prove that they are over 18. The ban is actually not about whether the substance goes to residential premises. There are many reasons why you might want something delivered. For instance, if you are cooking and things like that—I know that is a later section. There are cleaning products and stuff like that. I cannot see the purpose of the ban if the delivery is being accepted by someone who is over 18. As I said in my earlier intervention, it is easy to do now with modern technology; we can now age-verify people extremely accurately.
My Lords, as we have discussed, Clause 3 makes it an offence, where a sale is carried out remotely, for a seller to deliver, or arrange for the delivery of, a corrosive product to residential premises or to a locker. Given the concerns over the use of corrosive substances in violent attacks and other criminal acts, to restrict access effectively we believe that it is necessary to stop delivery to private residential addresses. This does not mean that corrosive products cannot be purchased online in the future, merely that individuals will be expected to collect the product from a collection point where their age can be verified before the product is handed over to them. This provision is important as it will ensure that checks are made and that the purchaser will need to prove that they are 18 or over in order to be able to purchase and collect a corrosive product. If the purchaser cannot collect the corrosive product in person, they would have to be able to send a representative who is also over the age of 18.
We have also included an exemption within the provision to ensure that deliveries to businesses that are run from home—such as a farm—would not be affected by the prohibition on delivery to a residential address, for example, where corrosive products are ordered by small family-run businesses, such as metal working, soap making or even farms, in the case of the noble Earl, Lord Erroll. We have also provided defences that are available in cases where the individual has taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, questioned why both Clause 3 and Clause 4 are needed. Clause 3 relates to the dispatch of corrosive products bought online in the UK to a residential premises or locker in the UK. We cannot apply the same restrictions on sellers who are based overseas without taking extraterritorial jurisdiction for this offence. Such a step would be inappropriate for a sales offence such as this and, in any event, there would be practical difficulties mounting a prosecution given that an overseas seller would not be within the jurisdiction of the UK courts. Clause 3 is therefore supported by Clause 4, which makes it a criminal offence for a delivery company in the UK to deliver a corrosive product to a person under the age of 18 where that corrosive product has been bought from a seller overseas and where the delivery company knows what it is delivering. The purpose of Clause 4 is to try to stop overseas sellers selling corrosives to under-18s in the UK and having them delivered to a person under the age of 18. There is no overlap between Clauses 3 and 4; we think that both are needed. Clause 3 deals with UK online sales and Clause 4 deals with online sales from overseas sellers.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, again brought up the use of home as a business, which he has mentioned to me before. It will be a matter for the seller under Clause 3 to satisfy themselves that the delivery address is being used for a purpose other than residential purposes. If they cannot satisfy themselves, they should not deliver to that address. Again, it is something that we can deal with in the planned guidance. He also mentioned to me previously his concerns about Amazon’s terms of trade in relation to the sale of alcohol. We are clear from evidence of test purchases of knives that we cannot rely on such terms of business to ensure that the law on age-related restrictions is properly adhered to in the case of online sales.
My Lords, I have to confess to being even more confused than I was before. Is the Minister saying that you can purchase corrosive substances from a seller overseas and have them delivered to your residential premises, but you cannot get corrosive substances delivered to your residential address if you order them from a UK seller? That appears to be the effect of Clauses 3 and 4.
My Lords, I think the point still stands. If you order online from an overseas supplier, you can have your corrosive substance delivered to your residential address and the courier, under Clause 4, is obliged to check the age of the person who it is handed over to, to ensure it is not delivered to somebody under the age of 18. Why on earth—
How can the courier know that there is a corrosive substance in the package? It will just say Amazon on the outside.
But this is an overseas seller. It is not subject to this law. It just sends a plain package.
Clause 4 says that if the courier knows it is a corrosive substance, they have to take these precautions. That is what Clause 4 says. It makes no sense to me at all. If age verification at the point of handover is effective in preventing under-18 year-olds getting hold of substances in the case of overseas sellers, why cannot age verification at the point of handover be effective in preventing them getting hold of corrosive substances delivered to residential premises from a UK supplier? It seems to make absolutely no sense whatever.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for reminding me of that but I am even more confused. She seems to be saying that, in the case of a UK online sale, somebody can pick up the substance from a pick-up point, where their age will be verified. What is the difference between that and a person at the front door of a residential premises having to prove to the courier that they are over the age of 18? I do not understand how picking up the substance at a collection point or picking it up at your front door makes a difference to the ability of the person handing it over to ensure that the person is over the age of 18.
I can see that this will also get more complicated because you can order a product from a supermarket located just across the channel and have it delivered to your residential premises, which presumably means that it is an international transaction. A particular supermarket was mentioned earlier. I do not think that any supermarkets want to lose their trade to people located just across the channel, but a ban is suddenly going to be put on a lot of local supermarket deliveries.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have Amendments 24 and 25 in this group. These amendments are designed to have the effect of extending the scope of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, to cover the sale of knives as well as sale of corrosive substances—or, should I say, to prevent the sale of these items to those under 18.
We had an Oral Question last week on this issue, and I suggested that shop workers were acting as law enforcers in the circumstances. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, suggested that shopkeepers were simply obeying the law in not selling age-restricted items and that we all have a duty to obey the law. I disagree. The circumstances in which this offence would take place are those where someone underage tries to buy an age-restricted item and is prevented from doing so by a shop worker, who in these circumstances is enforcing the law. They are compelling observance of or compliance with the law, which is the definition of “enforce”. As such, they deserve the protection of the law in carrying out this duty. I support Amendment 23.
We are devising a system which will impose considerable burdens on sellers. The arguments in favour of this amendment are absolutely obvious. May I make a completely separate point, though? The amendment is brilliant legislation too, unlike the rest of the Bill. Here we have a clear statement of what act you have committed—obstructing the seller—and simultaneously the state of mind you are in: you are acting intentionally. Intention to obstruct is a perfectly clear, simple piece of legislation that anybody could understand. There is an argument that there are various ways those who work in shops can be protected, against violence and so on, but this is very limited in what it is seeking to address: obstructing somebody. In these circumstances, when the burden is so heavy on the seller, they ought to be protected.
My Lord, if I may have a second go, until very recently I did not support particular protections for shop workers. Being from a policing background, I know we have taken the steps in the law to protect law enforcers, and recently there has been a Bill to protect all emergency workers in this way. But here we are talking about people who are intent on violence; they are looking to get their hands on knives or corrosive substances to commit violence. That is the sort of person that these shop workers are likely to confront, and that is why I am now convinced that this is the right thing to do.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said I would say that there is no problem. I am not going to say that, but I am very grateful to him for explaining his amendment. He attaches particular importance to affording greater protection for retail staff, and his noble kinsman, the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, raised this question last week. It was a very good opportunity to discuss the issue, which is of great concern. I understand the concerns of retailers and their staff about being threatened or attacked in the course of their duties, including as part of verifying a person’s age when selling a corrosive product. As my noble friend Lord Deben said, it may be those very people who want to buy these things who will be those who mete out the abuse on retail workers. Nobody should have to experience this sort of behaviour at their place of work, especially when providing a service to members of the public.
As I said at Second Reading, the Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability held a roundtable on 11 December with David Hanson MP, Richard Graham MP and representatives from the retail sector, including USDAW and the British Retail Consortium, to discuss what more we can do ensure greater protection for shop workers. Last week, I met USDAW to see what more we can do to ensure these greater protections. Following the discussion at the roundtable I am very happy to update the Committee. We will be taking forward the following actions: first, the call for evidence, which I spoke about last week and is intended to help us ensure that we fully understand this issue and look at all the options for addressing it; secondly, that we provide funding to the sector to run targeted communications activity to raise awareness of the existing legislation that is in place to protect shop workers; and thirdly, we are refreshing the work of the National Retail Crime Steering Group, co-chaired by the Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability and the British Retail Consortium. An extraordinary meeting of the group, focused exclusively on violence and abuse towards shop workers, will take place on 7 February. That discussion will help to shape the call for evidence.
In addition, the Sentencing Council is reviewing its guidelines on assault. A consultation on a revised guideline is anticipated to commence this summer. These measures are intended to complement existing work under way to tackle this issue. For example, the Home Office is providing funding of £1 million for the National Business Crime Centre over three years between 2016 and 2019. The centre was launched by the National Police Chiefs’ Council in October 2017 to improve communication between police forces on business crime, promote training and advice, and help to identify national and local trends.
In addition, through the national retail crime steering group, which includes representatives from across the retail sector, the police and others, we are taking forward a range of work to strengthen the collective response to these crimes, including: the creation of a “crib sheet” for retailers to use when reporting violent incidents to the police so that they get the information they need to support a timely and appropriate response; exploring options for improving consistency in the recording of business crime by the police, which will include a short pilot analysis of forces applying business crime flags; and the development of guidance on impact statements for businesses to increase their use. These statements give businesses the opportunity to set out the impact a crime has had and are taken into account by courts when determining sentences.
I know that there are concerns about the adequacy of the existing legislation for protecting those selling age-restricted products. The call for evidence is intended to help us understand better how the existing law is being applied and whether there is a case for reform, including in the context of the sale of age-restricted products. However, I want to provide some reassurance about the legislation we have in place, without dismissing noble Lords’ points. A wide range of offences may be used to address unacceptable behaviour towards shop staff—including those who sell age-restricted items—covering the full spectrum of unacceptable behaviour, from using abusive language to the most serious and violent crimes.
Some of the existing offences available include behaviour that causes another to fear the immediate infliction of unlawful violence, which is already an offence of common assault under Section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Where shop workers are threatened or experience abusive language, this may be captured by the offences under the Public Order Act 1986. There is also the Offences against the Person Act 1861, which means that assaults against shop workers could be considered as assault occasioning actual bodily harm under Section 47 of that Act. In addition, courts have a statutory duty to follow sentencing guidelines when considering any penalty to be imposed further to criminal conviction, unless it is not in the interests of justice to do so. In all cases, the fact that an offence has been committed against a person serving the public may be considered an aggravating factor for the purpose of passing sentence.
In answer to my noble friend Lord Deben and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the specific offence in Amendment 3 could be counterproductive and encourage prosecutions for the new obstruction offence with a maximum penalty of a fine—I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made that point as well—rather than a more serious offence, such as assault, which carries a higher penalty. That said, and going through the list of offences that this may capture, we understand retailers’ concerns about the risk of their staff being threatened or attacked—particularly, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said, for smaller retailers, such as corner shops. The call for evidence is intended to improve our understanding of the issue and identify potential solutions. We will seek to issue the call for evidence as soon as is practically possible.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether shop workers were law enforcers. It is a moot point on which I think we will agree to differ. I was trying to make the point that they are not policemen but they have to uphold the law. With that, I hope that I have given the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, enough to help him to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, the amendment is in my name and in those of my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. We are back to group 1 and the issue of completely innocent people having to prove their innocence beyond reasonable doubt.
We discussed this at considerable length on group 1 and I do not intend to rehearse those arguments again, save to say that people acting completely innocently commit an offence as the legislation is drafted, hence the need for the amendment. That having been said, if someone has a corrosive substance with them in a public place with the intention of causing injury to someone, they commit an offence under Section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, which defines an offensive weapon as:
“any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him”.
If they have a corrosive substance in a water pistol or a washing-up liquid bottle capable of squirting the corrosive liquid at someone, it is an article adapted for causing injury. If they have a corrosive liquid in the bottle it was sold in, intending to pour it over someone, it is intended by the person to cause injury, and an offence under the Prevention of Crime Act.
To quote from the briefing on the Bill from the Standing Committee for Youth Justice and the Prison Reform Trust, the clause,
“creates a very loose and ill-defined offence, that fails to satisfy the requirements of legal clarity and will lead to unjust prosecutions and custodial sentences”.
It continues:
“New legislation is unnecessary. Currently, someone found in possession of corrosive substances, where there is intent to cause injury, could clearly be prosecuted under existing offensive weapons legislation … Prosecutors should be required to prove intent to cause harm …The new offence puts the onus on the child”—
or adult—
“to show they have good reason for carrying the corrosive substance … Proving such a defence may be difficult”.
I beg to move.
My Lords, I put my name to this amendment purely to be consistent with what I said at Second Reading. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has pointed out, it could be that children are sent to collect corrosive substances from shops. They do not know that the substance is corrosive, as defined by the Act, and could be caught in possession by stop and search techniques, resulting in thoroughly unfortunate imprisonment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the rationale behind this amendment which would, as he has acknowledged, fundamentally change the nature of the offence provided for in Clause 6. As the noble Lord pointed out, we return in part to the arguments that he put forward in the first group of amendments. I appreciate the noble Lord’s concerns, but I will set out the reasons why we are seeking to introduce this new possession offence.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made reference at Second Reading to the existing legislation in this area, and I will explain why it is not sufficient to tackle the problem of individuals carrying corrosive substances in public. Under Section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, it is already the case that anyone who is in possession of a corrosive substance can be prosecuted for the offence of possession of an offensive weapon. However, for the accused to be guilty of the Section 1 offence, it is necessary to prove that they are carrying the corrosive substance with the intention of causing injury. Such intent can be proved, for example, in cases where an individual has decanted the corrosive substance into a different container for the purposes of making it easier to squirt or throw at another person and also to conceal it from the police. However, the intention of Clause 6 is to strengthen the powers available to the police and the Crown Prosecution Service. We want to remove the burden on the police and the prosecution to prove that the person was carrying the corrosive substance with the intention to cause injury.
This approach is not novel; it is consistent with the possession offence for knives and bladed articles. We have modelled the new offence on existing legislation in place for the possession of knives under Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. There is also a similar offence in place in Scotland. We have put in place suitable defences for members of the public to prove that they had good reason or lawful authority to be carrying the corrosive substance in a public place. These defences are also modelled on existing legislation for the possession of knives.
I know that noble Lords may be concerned about law-abiding members of the public being stopped by the police as they leave their local supermarket or tradespeople being stopped. However, I reiterate the points that my noble friend made at Second Reading about how we envisage the new offence being used by the police. This is not about the police criminalising tradespeople, children sent on an errand or law-abiding members of the public. We would fully expect the police to use this new offence in response to information or intelligence from the local community that someone was carrying a corrosive substance in public.
Furthermore, as my noble friend also indicated at Second Reading, with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, we have jointly commissioned the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory to develop a testing kit for the police to use to be able to identify corrosive substances in suspect containers. This work is well under way, and we want to have a testing kit in place before commencing the new possession offence.
We need to strengthen the law to tackle the abhorrent use of corrosive substances as weapons. This amendment would effectively leave the criminal law as it currently is. I hope that, in these circumstances, the noble Lord is persuaded of the case for the new offence as currently formulated and would be content on reflection to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. I seek clarification, however, on Section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, about which the noble Earl said that in order for somebody to be guilty of an offence under that Act, intent had to be proved. However, if the person is in possession of a made offensive weapon—an offensive weapon that has no other purpose than to cause injury: a dagger, for example—then my understanding is that no intent is required. Indeed, if the article that the person has with them is adapted to cause injury—for example, a water pistol filled with a corrosive liquid—again, there is no need to prove intent. That would make the existing offence even stronger than this offence as amended by this amendment.
The noble Earl talks about consistency with Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 regarding bladed and pointed instruments. I accept that the offence as drafted is consistent with that Act, but, in my view, two wrongs do not make a right. The noble Earl and the noble Baroness earlier talked about how the Government envisage that the police will use this legislation. They fully expect the police to use it in response to intelligence. I go back to what I said on the first group: having been an operational police officer for more than 30 years, I do not share the confidence that the Government have about how, in every case, the police are going to use this legislation. This is the source not only of my concern but, as I have said, of the concern of the organisations I mentioned in proposing the amendment.
As far as the testing kit is concerned, that is something that we will return to in a successive group later on. However, having made those points, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Offensive Weapons Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeIn moving Amendment 40A in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I shall also speak to the other amendments in the group.
Amendment 40A is simply about the wording of the legislation, somewhat contrary to the Member’s explanatory statement. The other amendments are similar to those in our debate on Monday. Amendment 40A questions the way in which proposed new subsection (3) of new Section 141B is worded. It currently states:
“The seller is not to be regarded as having proved that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence unless, as a minimum, they prove that the following conditions are met”.
Surely it would be better to say that the seller is to be regarded as having taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of an offence if, as a minimum, they prove that the following conditions are met. That is effectively putting it positively rather than negatively.
Amendments 42A, 43F, 57B and 57C again turn the offences of delivering a bladed article to residential premises and delivery of bladed articles to persons under 18 from those for which there is an offence if charged into offences where, if the accused has taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence, they do not commit an offence. We debated this way of legislating at our last sitting. In criminal law, there are two elements—actus reus and mens rea: the guilty act and the guilty mind. The offences in this Bill are completely without any examination of the mens rea until after someone has been arrested, detained and potentially charged. As this legislation is drafted, only after arrest and charge is it necessary to consider the mens rea; it is a defence for a person charged with an offence to prove that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of an offence. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said on Monday,
“we should stick to the normal principles that have worked well for us: you are not guilty of anything and have not committed an offence unless your mental state was simultaneously as criminal as the actions you committed … This way of legislating for criminal justice is inappropriate and we should avoid it. We should certainly be very careful not to allow it to happen without us spotting it and stopping it”.—[Official Report, 28/1/19; GC 153.]
My Lords, we spotted it and we are trying to stop it. I beg to move.
My Lords, I agree—particularly with the last observation made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, says, these amendments return us to the debate we had on Monday about the proper construction of the offences in the Bill. We had a good discussion on Monday, and I will not cover the ground in the same detail as I did then.
Amendment 40A would alter the defence provided in relation to the sale of bladed articles. Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides that it is an offence to sell, with some exceptions, articles with a blade or point to persons under the age of 18. It is a defence for a person charged with an offence to prove that he or she took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence. Clause 14 modifies the operation of the defence in relation to remote sales to include a number of conditions that must be met as a minimum. Amendment 40A removes the post-charge element of the defence and instead requires the enforcing agency to make a judgment whether the seller took all reasonable precautions before a charge is made.
I understand the noble Lord’s intention, but the defence provided in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 has been in place for quite some time. I am not aware of any problems or concerns with how the police, prosecutors and the courts apply the legislation. It has been in place for over 30 years, so it cannot be said that we are introducing a new construct into the criminal law.
Amendments 42A and 43F provide that failure to take all reasonable precaution in relation to the offence of delivering a bladed product to a residential address would be criteria to be taken into account before a person is charged. This is in contrast to the defence provided under Clause 18, which can be invoked when a person is charged with the offence.
Amendments 57B and 57C apply the same principles to Clause 20, which is concerned with the delivery of bladed articles sold by sellers based outside the UK. Clause 20 applies to delivery companies that have entered into an arrangement with a seller based abroad and provides that it is a criminal offence for a delivery company to deliver a bladed article into the hands of a person under 18. It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under Clause 20 to prove that he or she took all reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid committing the offence.
In practice, the enforcing agency—the police, the CPS or local authorities—will always consider whether the seller or the person who delivers the article has taken reasonable steps and exercised due diligence before bringing a charge. It would not be in the public interest to bring a prosecution if the enforcing agency considers that it is very likely the court will find that the seller had taken all reasonable precautions to avoid committing the offence. As I said before, this type of defence has been in place for some considerable time in relation to the sale of articles with a blade or point, and we are not aware of any issues in its operation.
In short, the approach taken in the Bill both in relation to knives and corrosives is well precedented. The existing law has operated for 30 years without difficulties, and it would further complicate the law and lead to confusion if we now adopted a different approach in the Bill. I suspect—as in the discussion on Monday—noble Lords will want to return to this issue, but for now I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for his brief intervention and to the Minister for her response.
The fact that the defence is similar to that in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, but contrary to almost every other piece of legislation on the statute book, including the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 which specifically deals with offensive weapons—that is, you are not guilty if you have a reasonable excuse for your actions—does not persuade me, I am afraid, that the Government are right in this case and that we are wrong. The Minister mentioned that the prosecuting authorities would not bring a prosecution if the person had taken all reasonable steps, but that does not stop the person being arrested and detained before that charging decision is made. The problem is still there. It is contrary to most criminal law on the statute book and it is the current legislation, rather than the amendment, that adds to the confusion. We will return to this on Report, but at this juncture I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendments 41 and 43 in the name of my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe are intended to enable a trusted trader scheme and status to be set up for sellers of knives and other bladed products in the UK. As drafted, the Bill will prohibit the delivery of bladed objects and products to residential properties. The concern is that this will have a detrimental impact on the business of small and medium-sized knife manufacturers and retailers here in the UK. As more and more sales move online, consumers normally expect to receive their deliveries at home. My colleagues in the Opposition fully support the aims of the Bill, but have concerns that this is a legislative sledgehammer that will affect small and medium-sized businesses here in the UK, while having very little impact on knife crime. To achieve the objectives we all want to see delivered—a reduction in knife crime and violence, but at the same time not damaging or destroying businesses—I suggest that we need a greater enforcement of existing legislation that prohibits the sale of knives to under-18s and the carrying of a knife without good reason. The amendments we are debating will seek to enable good, well-run businesses to operate in a trusted trader scheme, while not causing difficulties or putting their businesses at risk.
I understand that the Home Office carried out a consultation between October and December 2017 on these issues, with more than 10,500 responses. On 25 July, the Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability, Victoria Atkins MP, wrote to my friend the Member for Sheffield Central in the other place, Mr Paul Blomfield MP. In her response, the Minister indicated that there were concerns over the delivery of knives purchased to residential premises, and concerns about the sale of knives online to under-18s—which, of course, is already illegal—but that some sellers were not doing enough to stop children buying knives.
My friend Paul Blomfield, Clive Betts and some Sheffield knife manufacturers met the Minister on 15 January. The department had looked at the trusted trader scheme, but seemed to rule it out on the basis that it would add more bureaucracy and burden to the businesses. They looked at placing the burden on delivery companies, and the measures in this Bill.
It is an offence under the Criminal Justice Act, as we know, to sell knives and other bladed products to a person under the age of 18. But there is a defence if the person can prove that they took steps to make all reasonable precautions and exercise due diligence to avoid committing an offence. The sellers will have to meet these conditions to rely upon that defence but the industry also agrees with the objectives of the Bill: to reduce knife crime and make it more difficult for people under the age of 18 to order knives. Many businesses already exercise robust age-verification checks and label their packets accordingly. Their concern is that the Bill’s prohibition on selling bladed products to residential premises will cause them particular damage.
This is about the damage to small and medium-sized businesses, with its knock-on effect on UK manufacturers. The larger retailers and a lot of companies often buy their knives from overseas, so there is really no issue for them. But these small producers are selling niche and often highly priced products, which are not sold anywhere by the large companies. The industry would like some evidence. What is the evidence of people purchasing knives online to commit crime? Apparently, there are roughly 424 million knives in the UK at the moment and there is little or no evidence that people buy knives online to go out and commit a crime. There are plenty of knives around everywhere. The Metropolitan Police and the Cutlery and Allied Trades Research Association have suggested that most knives used in violent crime are old knives, which people can get their hands on from a variety of sources.
The trusted trader scheme would in effect mirror what is presently in place for the delivery of alcohol. Such a scheme would help to drive up standards across the board while providing protection for responsible businesses. Coupled with better enforcement of existing legislation, the scheme would help and not impede small and medium-sized enterprises. The industry wants this, so the objection from the Government that it would mean more bureaucracy does not really hold water for me. If there is a choice between a ban—not being able to sell your products for delivery to homes—and having a scheme which ensured that you verify who you are selling to, this would be better for them. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, while I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, is trying to do with his amendment, if he is quoting the Government correctly then I agree that it would be an expensive, bureaucratic scheme and difficult to enforce. It would be impossible to enforce in relation to sellers outside the United Kingdom. It would be to the benefit of large retailers. Perhaps the amendment is trying to appeal to the Home Office’s usual approach to these things by saying that it should be self-financing. Membership of the scheme would clearly involve a fee; large retailers would easily find the money for that, whereas it would disadvantage small businesses.
As we discussed previously in relation to corrosive substances, we are again heading for a situation where UK sellers of bladed articles are unable to sell such products for delivery to residential premises, whereas overseas sellers will be able to sell bladed articles for delivery to home addresses. In the case of overseas sellers, the courier has to ensure age verification at handover but UK sellers are unable to use this scheme. The real solution to the problem that the noble Lord is trying to solve is to allow age verification at the handover of bladed articles at residential premises for all sellers, both UK and overseas, so that both corrosive substances and bladed products can be delivered to people’s homes.
As the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has just asked, what evidence is there that gang members, for example, are ordering ordinary kitchen knives, such as carving knives, online in order to use them in crime? I am not talking about prohibited knives, such as zombie knives or the type of knife that the Government seek to ban in the Bill. The evidence from the police is that most people carrying knives have got them from the kitchen where they live because they are there already. Why would a criminal who is looking to commit knife crime create an evidential trail by ordering online rather than going to a shop and paying cash to get their hands on a weapon? I seek the Government’s explanation as to why this provision is necessary.
We discussed on Monday whether a residential premises is used for carrying on business. I have had a communication from a company that deals with the sale of bladed items online. It says:
“Our information after consulting Royal Mail and UPS is that there are no means to quickly and robustly identify tradesmen who operate from home as opposed to individuals who might pose as tradesmen. These so-called defences are wish fulfilment from the Home Office and are unworkable in the real world”.
I agree.
My Lords, I sympathise with the request made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for some information from the Minister on why this clause will make anything better. I have been unable to find any evidence that knives delivered in this way are a measurable, let alone a serious, source of supply for knives used in offences. It seems entirely wrong to penalise ordinary people, particularly British traders, when no good will come out of it; it is mere virtue signalling by the Home Office. If this is a real danger, let us deal with it properly—my next group of amendments seeks to do that—but none of this is justified if it is not real. We have allowed age verification for sulphuric acid to be at the gate. What is the difference between that and a kitchen knife? They are equally dangerous items; it is exactly the same process that one is asked to go through, and you get a system that is completely sensible and useable by British traders. One can see the reasonableness of it. In other words, it is a small addition to the bureaucracy that people go through for a small addition to safety. I do not see that the Government have produced any evidence to justify the approach that they are taking in this clause.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for explaining the trusted trader scheme. I hope to set out the context of the provisions of the Bill. I agree with the Committee that evidence is important to this end.
It is already an offence to sell a knife to somebody under the age of 18, but we know that some sellers are not doing enough to stop children buying knives online. Evidence from online test purchase operations shows that a worrying number of online sellers sampled failed to have effective age-verification procedures in place. Trading standards conducted two online test purchase operations in 2008 and 2009. A test purchase operation commissioned by the Home Office conducted in 2014 showed that 69% of the retailers sampled failed the test. This was a slight improvement on the exercise five years previously but showed that a large majority of online test purchases failed and retailers were breaking the law.
A further test purchase operation was carried out in December 2016. The results showed that 72% of retailers tested failed to verify the age of the purchaser at the point of accepting the order and only 19% went on to require further evidence of age and refuse the sale when the evidence was not produced. Recent test purchases targeting online retailers conducted in late 2018 under the Government’s new prosecution fund show that 42% of the retailers sampled failed the test and sold knives to persons under the age of 18. We have evidence that online retailers are selling to people under the age of 18.
Can the Government give any evidence about how many under-18s are buying knives online other than those people masquerading as being under 18 and carrying out test purchase operations?
All the information I have is the test purchases. If test purchases show a failure in the system, that suggests to me that there is an ongoing failure in the system. It does not matter whether the person is actually 18 or is pretending to be; if the system is failing, the system is failing. If an online seller is selling to someone who says they are under 18, the system is failing and the Government are concerned by that. We know that test purchases show that under-18s are being sold knives. In most cases, it is not possible to determine whether the knife purchased is being used in crime, but we have evidence that young people say that buying a knife online is easy. That information was obtained when we were researching the knife-free campaign.
We know through the test purchases that the sellers are breaking the law and we hear the evidence from young people. With the provisions in the Bill, we are sending a clear signal to online sellers that their age- verification processes must improve. The fact that there is still a high rate of failure should be a matter of concern to noble Lords and tell us that the provisions in the Bill are needed. It is not enough for retailers selling remotely simply to ask the purchaser to tick a box to say that they are over 18. It is unacceptable when it comes to delivering the article simply to hand it over to a person without verifying their age or, worse, simply to push the package through the letter box or leave it on the doorstep without any checks about the age of the recipient. We know the tragic consequences of not having strong checks in place to prevent under-18s buying knives online, from the beginning of the transaction through to the end of the sale process.
I utterly understand the thinking behind the noble Lord’s amendment, but it would in effect transfer the responsibility for complying with the legislation and responsible sales from the seller to the Government, by requiring the Government to set out the details of the proposed trusted trader scheme, which would then allow for the delivery of bladed products to residential addresses. The scheme would require sellers to demonstrate that their age-verification systems and procedures, from the point when they receive the order to when their designated delivery company hands the item over at the point of delivery, are robust and that it is not possible that a knife will be handed to a person under 18. In the light of the results of recent test purchase operations, however, we are not persuaded that sellers can provide such reassurance in a systematic and consistent way. We believe that only by requiring age verification at the point where the item is physically handed to a person, at a dedicated collection point, is it possible to guarantee that a bladed product will not be handed over to a person under 18.
There is another point. Setting up, administering and overseeing a trusted trader scheme would create burdens of its own, although I accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it could be self-funding.
I am sorry—well, I would have accepted the point. In addition, simply being part of a scheme or being in possession of a seal of approval as a trusted trader does not guarantee compliance with the conditions in the scheme. I hope that I have been able to set out the Government’s explanations—
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. She repeated something that she mentioned on Monday, which I questioned but did not receive a response on. Why is age verification at the point of handover at a delivery point likely to be more thorough or more successful than age verification at the point of handover at the front door of a residential premises? The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, suggested a scheme whereby the delivery agent would take a photograph of the driving licence or passport to show proof of age at the front door. I accept from what the noble Baroness has said that the age-verification process that online retailers put in place must be thorough and rigorous and that there must be penalties for those who fail to comply, but I do not understand the blanket ban on delivery to residential premises when people have carte blanche to order online and collect from what could be a local newsagent. Last week, I ordered something from Amazon and collected it from a convenient store where the people are very busy. I do not see what advantage there is, when it comes to age verification, for such an article to be handed over at a collection point rather than at the front door of a residential premises.
My Lords, I do not want to be unhelpful to my noble friend the Minister, but can she point to any cases involving knife crime where the knife was acquired online?
I hope that I have outlined what the Government have found through these test purchase failings. They have improved over recent years, but there is undoubtedly a basic failure in the system of the online purchase. Regarding the sanction for current failures in the system, it is a criminal offence, although it has been shown not to be a terribly compliant environment. It is far easier to have robust arrangements in place at a central delivery point rather than on each and every doorstep. That is the thinking behind the delivery point rather than the residential address.
I am grateful to the Minister. There is no such thing as a central delivery point. When you ask for these articles to be delivered to a delivery point, they are all over the place. There are five within a mile of where I live—corner shops are the places where these items are being delivered. In support of that, does the Minister have any information on these test purchase operations? Specifically, how many of these knives were successfully delivered to somebody who appeared to be under the age of 18 at a residential premises, and in how many of the offences were the knives delivered to a collection point? This might provide the evidence that the Government seem to have that it is much safer for it to be delivered to a collection point than to the front door of a home.
My Lords, I am still at a loss as to why we have two systems in this Bill—Clause 4 and Clause 17 —applying to products which the Government say are equally dangerous. If we need Clause 17—prohibition of delivery to residential premises for knives—why are we not asking for that with corrosive products? What is the difference?
I think I may be able to help the Committee. The noble Lord is right that we are in a parallel situation, but you cannot order online from a UK company and have corrosive substances delivered to your home address. You can order corrosive substances from a company that is outside the UK and have them delivered to your home address. The parallel situation also applies with knives, which shows how absolutely ridiculous this whole thing is.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 42 I will also speak to Amendments 54 and 57. I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for educating me in the course of the last amendment. I apologise for my misreading of the Bill.
If we are going to take online purchase and delivery so seriously, we must deal with overseas purchases. While the noble Lord was speaking, I managed successfully to order a pretty nasty-looking knife online. There was no hint of age verification. It appeared to be a British company that I was ordering from but, actually, I happen to know that this company is based in Holland. The knife will be shipped from Holland by ordinary post. How will this be prevented? The company is a big, well-known retailer of knives online. It is an ordinary place that a lot of people know; it carries a good variety of knives and other things. Nothing in this Bill, as it is at the moment, prevents someone ordering in that way.
I am not saying that my amendments have any particular merit in the mechanisms they propose. But if the Government are serious about this, we need to tackle things that are obviously going to happen and make it possible for us to prevent—since the Government are convinced that this needs preventing—the delivery of knives that are ordered with great ease and facility from overseas suppliers.
First, we should deal with fulfilment in this country. Amazon has a very large fulfilment business. You appear to be purchasing goods from an overseas supplier, but actually they are sitting in an Amazon warehouse, where the instruction comes through and they dispatch. There are a number of independent people in the fulfilment business too; they know exactly what they are sending out. They are the ones who do the packing, and must be caught by this legislation. We cannot allow that obvious loophole—that is my purpose in Amendment 42.
When we are dealing with standard imports by post, we have systems to prevent people sending in guns. It is a fairly obvious thing, to make sure that if guns are coming in postal packages, you intercept them. People who are shipping them in bulk in engine blocks are a different kettle of fish, but wrapping one up and sending it as a parcel is something which we believe there are mechanisms to deal with. Those mechanisms will work for knives, but we need to empower the border authorities when they come to their notice to open the packages, confiscate the knives and not compensate anyone. It needs to be easy for our border security people to do, in the same way that it is not easy for someone to send guns through the post. That is what I am trying to do in Amendment 54: to replicate or allow for the replication of the system that we have for controlling guns sent through the post, and extend that to blades sent through the post.
In Amendment 57, I am merely trying to strengthen the contractual obligation that people are under when they are delivering these things; they cannot pretend, like the three monkeys, that they did not know that they should have taken sensible steps to know that they are dealing with a seller who deals in bladed products, and therefore need to take care. I beg to move.
I see what the noble Lord is trying to do with Amendment 42, but again I am not sure it is a practical solution. He talked about buying a knife from a company in Holland where it is going to be delivered by ordinary post. How does the post office know what is in the parcel? One can think of circumstances where they would not know what is being delivered.
In relation to Amendment 54, I understand that there is a scheme for firearms and you need a licence before you can import them. But if you order a set of cutlery to use for Sunday lunch from a German manufacturer, which includes knives, do you need an import licence in order to buy it and have it delivered to your home? The problem here is that firearms are a very narrow type of good, whereas knives cover a whole spectrum—I think we get on to palette knives and butter knives later—through to zombie knives and very dangerous items.
I come back to the issue that if it is a foreign seller, the Bill has to provide that age verification has to happen at the front door of residential premises. If the Government are placing so much weight on preventing under-18s getting hold of knives generally, why that age verification at the front door of a residential premises can … not also apply to UK sellers as it does to overseas sellers?
Does the noble Lord agree that the Committee generally agrees with the laudable aims of the Bill but on all sides we are highlighting the large holes in it? It is easy to make a mockery of what is being set out here. I hope that the Government will listen carefully to this. We want to have discussions between now and Report so that we can get this legislation right. Where we are at the moment is honestly ridiculous. The more discussions I hear now, the worse things seem to me.
I echo the noble Lord’s comments. We want to do whatever it takes to reduce the availability of knives for use in knife crime. I hope that, in all our discussions, it has not gone unnoticed that we oppose this group of amendments and the previous group.
I will probably be disciplined by my party for saying so but, presumably, if you are buying from a supplier outside the customs union, there needs to be a customs declaration on the package as to what is contained in it. That is a legal requirement. It is not about trying to get a foreign supplier to comply with British law; rather, it is internationally accepted that you need to put a customs label on a package describing what is inside. I do not know whether that applies if the supplier is within the European Union, but certainly if you buy something from the United States of America, for example, there has to be a visible customs declaration on the outside to say what the product inside the parcel is. That would enable whoever is delivering the parcel to the end delivery point to take the appropriate action in accordance with Clause 20, if the label describes that it is a bladed product.
If noble Lords will allow me, rather than pointing out what might be missed by this legislation, I want to draw to the attention of the Committee places where people will be caught. One that strikes me, given my background of having been responsible for the sheep industry, is this. In the clipping of sheep, we use largely foreign clippers, often from New Zealand. They come here and stay in bed and breakfasts. As they move around, their blades have to be sharpened and replaced. I am sure that, in the current system, they just ask the company to supply it by post, but they do not have a residential address. They could probably work their way round it, but I want to highlight the problems that people will have.
My Lords, I will also speak to the other amendments in this group. Most of the amendments were tabled just to give me an opportunity to listen to the Minister on why the Bill contains two definitions of bladed items: “bladed article”, which is the current definition in legislation, and “bladed product”, which is introduced just for the purposes of Clauses 17 and 18. I would like to know the reason for the choice of application and the need for two definitions.
On the definition in Clause 19, why does a pointed article appear to be excluded? If I was to wander about the streets wanting to do people harm, a sharpened knitting needle would be a pretty good thing to take with me. It would be easy to shove through clothing and it has a nice little button on one end, so that it does not go into me. Under the clause as drafted, it appears to be exempt. Why is that?
If we are going to use such a wide definition, we need to help people who are in the business of selling products to understand that it has a wide application. As I read it, it would apply to a helicopter—not that many helicopters get delivered to residential premises—as a helicopter is a bladed article. It would also apply to fans, if not to Mr Dyson’s fans, and it would apply to lawnmowers and various other things that have blades. It ought to be clear to people who have to obey this law whether they will be caught by it. I do not object to how widely the Government draw it, but its extent should be made clear, as it should in respect of which items people are likely to have to apply it. I beg to move.
My Lords, I too look forward to the Government’s explanation of the difference between “bladed product” and “bladed article”, and of why there is a distinction between the offence of delivering of a bladed product to residential premises and that of delivering a bladed article to persons under 18. I thought the whole point—no pun intended—of banning delivery to residential premises was to prevent under-18s getting their hands on it. Why does it need to be a bladed article in one part and a bladed product in another?
In relation to Amendment 45, I agree with the noble Lord and would go further. In the course of my duties as a police officer, I have seen daggers with very sharp points, but with blades not necessarily sharp enough to cut—the dagger is specifically designed to stab people, but is not capable of cutting. It would be exempt from the definition as written in the Bill. I am not sure whether it is necessary to list examples of what are and are not bladed products, but we certainly need a much better idea of what we are trying to do here.
I was not intending to come in on this item, but the more I sit here listening to this Bill, the more concerned and confused I get. I support the intentions of the Government in trying to deal with knife crime and violence—they are absolutely right there—but, listening to this, I am not convinced we are on the right track.
Is the Minister aware of the Better Regulation Executive? It is part of BIS, or whatever the department is called now, and is in charge of regulatory reform across the British Government. Its policy is described in these terms:
“Some regulations are ineffective and unnecessary. Complying with them costs businesses time and money, and can restrict economic growth … Governments generally attempt to ensure regulations are fair and effective. The Better Regulation Executive's purpose is to effectively strike the right balance between protecting people’s rights, health and safety and freeing them from unnecessary bureaucracy”.
If it has not gone there already, the Bill needs to go there straightaway. Clearly, there is a lot of mess in this Bill. I say it should go there because we are affecting lots of British businesses and putting them at a competitive disadvantage to other businesses in Europe and around the world. We need to get our businesses up and working well, and I do not see how this is helping. Maybe it has gone there already and been improved by it. If it has not, I hope we can get the Bill off to it and maybe get something back before Report.
My Lords, would the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, agree that perhaps his trusted traders scheme would also need to go through that process?
I certainly would. I would be delighted for it to go through the process, because the scheme I have been keen we talk about has come not from me, but from the industry. They want the scheme, so I would be delighted for it to go there, since they are the people who make these niche products and are worried that the Government are putting them at a competitive disadvantage.
My Lords, this amendment in the name of my noble friend seeks to insert a new clause after Clause 20 to prohibit the display of bladed products in shops. The honourable Member for Lewisham Deptford, Vicky Foxcroft, the chair of the Youth Violence Commission, has done some excellent work on this matter. Members from all sides in the other place, along with academics, practitioners, youth service workers, the police and experts connected with youth violence have been very involved in the work of the commission. I commend the commission’s report, which was recently published—it should be read by all noble Lords. One of its important recommendations is the prohibition of knife displays in shops. During consideration in the other place, USDAW—the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers—was asked whether it believed that putting knives behind displays would be helpful. Doug Russell, representing USDAW, said:
“It would be. Obviously, now big retailers are increasingly going down the route of making it more difficult for customers to get their hand on the product until they have been age-checked”,—[Official Report, Commons, Offensive Weapons Bill Committee, 19/7/18; col. 98.]
and they have assured themselves that a transaction is safe. I want people’s ages to be checked properly when they seek to purchase knives.
We must also protect against the theft of knives. There are several restrictions in law relating to other products, most obviously the extremely restrictive provisions for the sale of tobacco, which prohibit the display of tobacco products in relevant shops and businesses in England. The Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act 2002 refers specifically to under-18s, so the principle already exists in law to protect under-18s from harm by prohibiting the open display of goods. I see no reason why this should not be extended to bladed products. I beg to move.
My Lords, if I understand this amendment correctly, I do not feel I can support it. Clearly bladed products should be displayed in a way that ensures they are safe and cannot easily be stolen, but I cannot agree with the suggestion that they need to be hidden in case they lead people into being tempted to use them for criminal purposes, if that is what the noble Lord is saying. The noble Lord mentioned cigarettes. They are now hidden from view and advertising them has been banned because they are always and in every circumstance bad for your health and addictive, but the same cannot be said for knives. We do not conceal alcohol or glue as they have legitimate uses, and we do not believe it is necessary to conceal knives.
My Lords, I begin by saying that I agree with Amendment 70. The amendment seeks to protect the tradition of the kirpan and those who possess it. It permits individuals to possess the kirpan for,
“religious, ceremonial, sporting or historical reasons”.
There is disquiet among those in the Sikh community, who feel that their right to possess a kirpan is being threatened, and they need assurances to be able to do so. There needs to be a comprehensive solution which is acceptable to the Sikh community.
I was born and brought up in east Africa, where there were people of different religions and racial backgrounds. I learned to speak several languages and developed an understanding and respect for all religions. I am actively involved in promoting harmony and peace between various racial and religious groups. Although I am a Muslim, I am a patron of non-Muslim associations, including the Sikh Forum and the British Sikh Association. I am also the chairman of Guru Nanak Worldwide, which promotes the teachings of Guru Nanak Dev Ji, the founder of the Sikh religion.
I have a strong connection with the Sikhs and have visited their temples, which are called gurdwaras, on numerous occasions. I have studied Sikhism and have written a book on the life and times of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. In this book, I have included some principles of the Sikh religion and also mentioned the teachings of the 10 Sikh gurus. The 10th and last human guru was Guru Gobind Singh Ji, who transformed the Sikh faith. In 1699, he created the Khalsa, a community of the faithful who wore visible symbols of his faith and trained as warriors. Today, the Khalsa community comprises a significant proportion of the Sikh community. As has been mentioned, Guru Gobind Singh Ji also proclaimed five kakars, which were kacha, karha, kesh, kanga and kirpan.
Sikhs are proud of the five Ks and therefore comply with what has been proclaimed. The kirpan represents the values of the Sikh faith and is an essential article of faith for the Khalsa Sikhs. The kirpan is curved, contained in a sheath. It is often made of steel or iron and can be of varying sizes. It is normally worn in a strap, which is called a gatra. In the Sikh community, the kirpan is used for ceremonial and cultural practices such as during weddings and processions. It is also used in martial arts and can be given as a gift. In fact, I was presented with a kirpan in Amritsar when I visited the Golden Temple. My family’s connection with Amritsar goes back nearly 200 years, so I was privileged to be presented with a kirpan, among other items, in the Golden Temple.
The UK as a whole has a long history with the Sikhs, stemming from colonial India and the World Wars. We recently celebrated the centenary of the Armistice ending the First World War, and I have spoken in your Lordships’ House on the contribution of the soldiers from the sub-continent of India. India raised an army of over 1 million soldiers, 20% of whom were Sikhs. We owe gratitude to the Sikhs for the sacrifices they have made to preserve our way of life. This amendment is an opportunity to provide a specific defence for those who possess—I emphasise “possess”, as they do not necessarily wear it—the kirpan.
I cannot recall any occasion where a Sikh possessing the kirpan has used it as an offensive weapon and caused physical harm to anyone. This afternoon, in fact, I spoke to an ex-commander of the Metropolitan Police who verified what I say; it has not been used as an offensive weapon by the Sikhs. I therefore feel that a kirpan should not be deemed an offensive weapon and provision must be made for that in this legislation. As has been mentioned, the Sikhs are law-abiding people. The kirpan needs to be exempted from the relevant sections of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
My Lords, I support this amendment, which is why I added my name to it. There is little that I can usefully add because, as members of the Sikh community, the noble Lord, Lord Singh, and the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, have already articulated exactly why this amendment should be accepted. I hope that the Government can accept it.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for setting out the case for exempting all kirpans from the relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. I can reassure him from the outset that both I and my noble friend Lady Williams would be delighted to meet representatives of the Sikh Council UK and other noble Lords as the noble Lord sees fit to discuss their concerns.
Before I go on, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Singh, and my noble friend—
This takes me back to those heady days when we had a Labour Government and I was a lowly Whip. That sounds like a very Treasury counterargument. One day when I was handling a particular clause, I was told that it was impossible to frame the legislation to meet the need. I said, from my lowly position in the massive meeting, “You’d better try because otherwise you will get the words that are in the amendment because it will pass at the next stage”. At that, there was a great writing of things and, lo and behold, the Government managed to find an amendment which was satisfactory. I strongly recommend that the Government make an intense effort to frame an amendment of their own which meets the across-the-board support for the spirit of this amendment.
Before the noble Lord withdraws his amendment, it should be said that concerns are being expressed at the impression being given by the Government of there being no room for negotiation on this issue. I hope that they will at least approach that meeting with an open mind rather than giving the impression, as might be inferred from what the Minister has said from the Dispatch Box, that there is no room for manoeuvre.
I can reassure the noble Lord that the Government will approach the meeting with an open mind. I tried to be clear that the key issue is achieving a specific definition for a kirpan, which we will obviously make every effort to work with. We will see whether that is possible.
Lord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I have given notice of our intention to oppose the question that this clause should stand part of the Bill. I will also speak to Amendments 71 and 72. Clause 28 would change current legislation in terms of the risk that must be present for an offence of threatening someone with an offensive weapon to be proved. Currently, the person threatening must do so in such a way that there is an immediate threat of serious physical harm. The Bill changes this level of risk to what a reasonable person would think was an immediate threat of physical harm, not serious physical harm—it is only a perceived threat and not an actual threat.
In their joint briefing, the Standing Committee for Youth Justice and the Prison Reform Trust point out that the new definition is a much lower threshold for conviction. The person being threatened does not have to be present or at actual risk of harm. Previously, there had to be an immediate threat of occasioning grievous bodily harm; now, it is an undefined level of physical harm, and the “reasonable person” test is vague.
Clause 28 relates to offences in public places and Clause 29 to offences on further education premises. I question why these offences are needed at all. Section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 states that a person is guilty of an offence,
“if he uses or threatens … violence towards another and his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety”.
An affray may be committed in private as well as in public, and a person guilty of affray is liable to a maximum sentence of three years in prison or a fine, or both. Can the Minister explain which parts of these new offences are not covered by the offence under Section 3 of the 1986 Act?
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for affording the Committee the opportunity to debate the provisions in the Bill updating the offences of threatening with an offensive weapon. It may assist the Committee if I briefly explain the provisions in Section 1A of the Protection of Crime Act 1953 and Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and then explain why we have brought forward changes to these provisions. I will also cover Section 3.
Section 1A of the 1953 Act provides for an aggravated possession offence where the person in possession of the weapon threatens another person with the weapon in a public place. Section 139AA of the 1988 Act similarly provides for an aggravated possession offence where the person in possession of an article with a blade or point threatens another person with the article in a public place or on school premises.
Unlike the offences in Section 1 of the 1953 Act and Section 139 of the 1988 Act, which are simple possession offences, where a person is convicted of an offence under Section 1A of the 1953 Act or Section 139AA of the 1988 Act, the court must, in the case of an adult, impose a custodial sentence of at least six months’ imprisonment, unless it would be unjust to do so. The power to make a community order is not available in circumstances where the mandatory minimum sentence condition is met.
It is an essential element of these aggravated offences that the defendant threatened the victim with the weapon,
“in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to the victim”,
as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, explained. However, the view of the Crown Prosecution Service is that the requirement that the defendant threatens with the weapon or article,
“in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person”,
sets too high a bar to prosecution and does not take proper account of the effect of the threat on the victim.
The noble Lord will be aware that in the 12 months to September 2018 there were just under 13,500 offences resulting in a caution or conviction for possession of an article with a blade or point and just under 7,000 for possession of an offensive weapon, but only 958 for threatening with a knife or offensive weapon. I hope the noble Lord will agree that fewer than 1,000 offences of threatening compared with more than 20,000 possession offences does not appear to be an accurate reflection of what is happening on our streets, where we are seeing one homicide a week in London as a result of knife crime. The noble Lord will be aware that this point was made by the Chief Crown Prosecutor for the north-east, Andrew Penhale, when giving evidence in another place.
The penalty for the offence of affray, which the noble Lord referred to, is three years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both. The penalty for threatening with an offensive weapon is four years. The Government consider that that reflects the seriousness of using an offensive weapon to threaten an individual. Importantly, the Government also believe that it is fairer to the victim that the test be based on how a reasonable person in the victim’s place would respond to such a threat, not on whether the victim was objectively at risk of immediate harm. The reference in Clause 28 to the effect on a reasonable person removes the element of subjectivity on the part of the person threatened. We believe that the replacement objective test is more appropriate in the context of these aggravated offences.
Striking out Clause 28 and amending Clause 29, as the noble Lord seeks to do, would maintain the current test of what constitutes risk of physical harm for these aggravated possession offences. However, I put it to the noble Lord that these offences were introduced to protect victims threatened with offensive weapons and ensure that offenders are appropriately punished. Clauses 28 and 29 will ensure that the victim’s point of view is put at the heart of these offences. I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Lord of the case for the new test and that he will support Clause 28 standing part of the Bill.
I thank my noble and learned friend for helpfully pointing out that detail.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation, most of which does not seem to hold water. She said that under the existing offence, someone can only get six months in prison, so they are unable to get a community sentence. However, an offence of affray carries a three-year sentence; therefore, you can give a community sentence to somebody convicted of affray.
The Minister also said that existing offences under the Prevention of Crime Act and the Criminal Justice Act set the bar too high, evidenced by only 958 offences of threatening and almost one homicide per week. If a knife makes contact with somebody, that is a substantive offence, probably of grievous bodily harm or wounding, possibly with intent. Inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent carries a maximum life sentence, so the number of instances where somebody threatens but does not make contact is likely to be small, but the number of offences where somebody is found in possession of a weapon—perhaps in their pocket—and is not threatening another person is likely to be high. The number of offences of GBH or, regrettably, homicide is likely to be high. That is the plausible explanation for why the number of offences of threatening is low, rather than the evidential bar being set too high for the existing offences.
However, the only reason why the offence of affray does not provide a legitimate and reasonable alternative to the Government’s proposals here is that one carries a sentence of three years and the other a sentence of four years. Of course, that could easily be amended by increasing the maximum sentence for the offence of affray. An objective test is included in the offence of affray under the Public Order Act. I am afraid that apart from the difference in the length of sentences, all the reasoning seems to fall away, bearing in mind that an offence of affray can be committed in private as well as in public so the offence would apply in FE colleges, schools and public places. However, I will not pursue the matter any further at this stage.
My Lords, I fully appreciate the intention behind the noble Lord’s proposed new clause. Personally, I have a concern about filling up our statute book with more and more criminal offences, particularly when they replicate existing crimes. It is already an offence to threaten violence. I take the point he makes about replica, fake or toy guns, but might not his better route be to invite the Government to amend the law to increase the penalties for this sort of behaviour or to allow this sort of offence to be dealt with—if it is not already—in the Crown Court, where the sentencing powers are greater, rather than as a summary offence? To fill up—for no doubt worthy purposes—the criminal law with more and more offences that just replicate existing offences strikes me as unfortunate. There may be a better route than the one the noble Lord is advocating.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for supporting what I said in the last group of amendments—albeit he has saved his comments for this group. My argument is that perfectly good legislation is on the statute book, and the additional offence concerning further education premises that the Government are creating in this Bill is unnecessary. To coin a phrase, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Would the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, not agree that Section 3 of the Public Order Act, which states that a person is guilty of an offence,
“if he uses or threatens … violence towards another and his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety”,
completely encapsulates the circumstances he is talking about in his proposed new offence? That offence, as I have said before, carries a maximum sentence of three years in prison, a fine, or both.
My Lords, the new clauses to be inserted into the Bill by Amendments 73A to 73U introduce knife crime prevention orders. These new civil preventative orders will provide the police with the powers they need to more effectively manage people engaged, or at risk of engaging, in knife crime and help steer them away from crime.
As noble Lords in the Committee will agree, knife crime is devastating for victims, their families and for our communities. We must do all that we can to combat this epidemic. The latest police recorded crime figures, published by the Office for National Statistics in January for the year ending September 2018, show that there were 39,818 knife-related offences—an 8% increase compared with the previous year. Noble Lords will not have failed to notice the headlines in the Evening Standard on Monday.
The number of homicides where a knife or sharp instrument was used has increased by 10% in the last year to 276 offences. Of all recorded homicides in the latest data, over four in 10 involved a knife or sharp instrument. That proportion is higher than the previous year when the figure was 37%. Police-recorded offences involving the,
“possession of an article with a blade or point” ,
rose by 18% to 19,644 in the year ending September 2018. That rise is consistent with increases seen over the last five years and is the highest figure since the series began in the year ending March 2009.
The total number of homicides in London in 2018 was 134. The Metropolitan Police had the largest volume increase, accounting for 35% of the total increase. In 2017, there were a total of 116 homicides.
It is vital that the police have the powers they need to prevent knife crime and protect the public from the devastating effects of violent crime on our streets. It is already too late when we prosecute young people for knife crime. The police have asked for a new order which will help them to manage those at risk of knife crime in their communities.
Knife crime prevention orders will provide the police with the powers they need to steer people away from knife crime, where there is evidence that they carry a knife. The orders are aimed at those young people most at risk of engaging in knife crime, people the police call “habitual knife carriers” of any age, and those who have been convicted of a violent offence involving knives. Their simple purpose is to help protect the public, and to help respondents leave a dangerous lifestyle involving knife-related crime. In the case of young people, the police may have intelligence that a young person routinely carries a knife but, for a variety of reasons, they have been unable to charge them with a possession offence. Before risky behaviour escalates, a KCPO could be in place to divert a person away from a life of prolific offending.
People whom the police deem to be habitual knife carriers could also benefit from KCPOs. These are people who may have previous convictions for knife crime, or on whom the police have intelligence that they regularly carry knives. The KCPO would enable the police to manage the risk of future offending. This is the cohort that the police see as their main target for these orders. It is estimated that there are some 3,000 habitual knife carriers across England and Wales. The orders will enable the courts to place restrictions on individuals such as curfews and geographical restrictions, but also requirements such as engaging in positive interventions. KCPOs are not a punishment, but a means to support the individual who is subject to an order to stay away from crime.
It may be helpful if I explain how the order will work. KCPOs are available on application and on conviction. An application for a KCPO can be made by a relevant chief police officer to a magistrates’ court or, in the case of young people, the youth court. A court dealing with an application may make a KCPO only if two conditions are met. The first is that the court is satisfied to the civil standard—on the balance of probabilities—that the defendant had a bladed article, without good reason, in a public place or education premises, on at least two occasions in the preceding two years. The second condition is that the court considers the order necessary to protect the public or prevent the defendant committing an offence. An application can be made with or without notice, but it will be made without notice only on an exceptional basis. If an application is made without notice to the defendant, the court may only make an interim order, which will take effect on service and will last until a full hearing takes place.
A KCPO is also available on conviction following an application from the prosecution, and where two conditions are met. The first condition is that the defendant is convicted of a relevant offence. This means a violent offence, or an offence where a bladed article was used by the defendant or another in the commission of the offence, or the defendant or another had a bladed article with them when the offence was committed. The second condition is, again, that the court considers the order necessary to protect the public or prevent the defendant committing an offence.
A KCPO may require a defendant to do anything described in the order, and/or prohibit the defendant from doing anything described in the order. The KCPO can include any reasonable prohibition or requirement which the court is satisfied is necessary, proportionate and enforceable. A KCPO which imposes a requirement must specify a person who is responsible for supervising compliance with the requirement. For instance, if the requirement is attendance of a knife awareness intervention, the person designated to supervise compliance may be the youth worker providing the intervention.
KCPOs will have a maximum duration of two years and must be reviewed by the courts after 12 months. KCPOs issued to under-18s are expected to be subject to more regular reviews. There are provisions for variation, renewal or discharge of KCPOs on application by the defendant or the police. There are also provisions for appeal against the making of the order. A breach of the order without reasonable excuse is a criminal offence subject to a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.
KCPOs are closing a gap in the law that has hindered the police in taking an active rather than a reactive approach to diverting people away from knife crime and managing the risk of knife crime offending. They provide an opportunity to take a proactive and preventive approach, re-engaging with them at an early stage and helping to protect those most at risk of using knives and, of course, of falling victim to them.
There are other civil orders available, such as gang injunctions and criminal behaviour orders, but not all individuals in the targeted cohort are gang members. Criminal behaviour orders could be used in some cases, but such orders are available only when a court is sentencing a person for an offence. It is important that the police have the right tools for the right situations and can make use of them.
Of course, the police have a range of powers to deal with knife crime, including the existing offence of possessing a bladed article in public without good reason, and stop and search powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. However, given the unacceptable scale of knife crime, it is important that the police have a broad sweep of possible powers to use as circumstances dictate. KCPOs will be a valuable addition to the tools available to the police to disrupt harmful behaviours, while avoiding the premature criminalisation of individuals. We expect them to be targeted at a relatively small but high-risk cohort.
This Government are determined to do all that we can to protect the public and keep people safe. This is why we are redoubling our efforts to end this senseless crime. The introduction of KCPOs has been welcomed by the National Police Chiefs Council and the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners. On behalf of the NPCC, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Duncan Bell said:
“The introduction of knife crime prevention orders will provide us with further means to help deter young people from becoming involved in knife possession and knife crime”,
while West Yorkshire’s Labour PCC has said that he fully supports the new knife crime prevention orders.
I commend the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, who is not in his place, for his prescience in tabling Amendment 77, which also calls for the introduction of KCPOs. I hope one of the noble Lords on the Labour Front Bench will agree that we should grasp the opportunity provided by the Bill to legislate now for KCPOs, so that we can do everything in our power to stop the tragic loss of life and serious injury caused by knife crime that is all too evident on our streets. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for meeting me to discuss these amendments before today’s debate. It will come as no surprise to her that we vehemently oppose them and will object, should she insist on them at this stage.
Noble Lords will recall ASBOs, anti-social behaviour orders, introduced by the then Labour Government in the face of an epidemic of anti-social behaviour. They were opposed for many reasons. They were an order that could be made on the basis of the balance of probabilities against very young children with no previous convictions, yet the breach of one of those orders was a criminal offence with a custodial sentence attached. In effect, the criminal burden of proof—beyond reasonable doubt—was circumvented by making the order subject only to the civil burden of proof, while a breach of the order resulted in a criminal conviction. As a result, hundreds of young people acquired a criminal record through that unfair and unreasonable route. This was rightly seen as disproportionate, and the subsequent coalition Government—in a move championed by the then Home Secretary, Theresa May—removed ASBOs from the statute book.
Other reasons for scrapping ASBOs included their ineffectiveness in curbing anti-social behaviour, the high rate of breach of the conditions of the orders, the difficulty in monitoring compliance and the resources required to ensure their enforcement. In some communities, having an ASBO was seen as a badge of honour, and peers looked up to someone if he had acquired one.
My Lords, this has been an excellent debate. As I was sitting here listening to so many excellent and knowledgeable speakers, I thought that this debate should have been in the Chamber, but that is for another day. I fully accept that knife crime prevention orders put forward by the Government today are, as the noble Baroness says, to deal with habitual carriers of knives. In that sense, we can support them in principle but there need to be some changes.
I am also clear that the present Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, as well as the previous commissioner and the Mayor of London, support the idea of a prevention order as it could be a valuable tool in dealing with the epidemic of knife crime. It is always heart-breaking to see families destroyed when they have lost a loved one, but of course the perpetrator’s life is destroyed as well. There is a huge issue with young people carrying knives and so on. I have met one or two gang members; they can be very challenging individuals to meet. Some of the younger ones are certainly very frightened.
I was on the Wyndham estate some time ago, near where I went to school, to meet some of these young people and they offered me an escort off the estate. I said, “It’s all right, I don’t need an escort—I’ve lived round here”. I was fine. I walked off with no problem at all because I am a fairly big 56 year-old bloke; I am not a 15 or 16 year-old, and I am not black. If I had walked out of there in other circumstances, I would have had a problem getting to the bus stop but, in my situation, there was no problem at all. The young people thought that I would not be safe walking on the estate, which was not the case.
The noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Ramsbotham, made the point, as I think other noble Lords did, that it is a shame the way these amendments have arrived in this House. They have been tabled in Grand Committee and, as has been said, have not gone through the procedures in the House of Commons. My understanding of that House is that if these provisions had been in the Bill from the start there would have been an evidence session in the Commons with experts coming in to look at them. That has been lost and cannot happen now, which is a shame. I support the idea that they have come into the Bill very late. They were announced to the media, and here we are in Grand Committee, not the main Chamber. We will come back to them, or something like them, on Report. Having that at the end of the passage of the Bill is regrettable.
That is why we have tabled Amendment 77 in this group, which was put forward by my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe. It attempts to insert a new clause which would require the Government within three months of the Bill becoming an Act to publish a draft Bill to bring in knife crime prevention orders. It would mean there would have to be a Bill, which I hope would start in the Commons so that it could have evidence sessions. As it would be a draft Bill, even before that there would be a Joint Committee of both Houses to look at the stuff in detail. We want to get this right. On each side of the House, we can give examples of where we have passed measures and have got them right or wrong, but most of the things that were done wrong were done in haste. If we want to sort out an issue, we all charge off and do something, and months or years later, we find that we did not quite get it right. Amendment 77 in my noble friend’s name would ensure that we could do that and look at it in detail.
I am a big fan of draft Bills. When my noble kinsman Lady Kennedy of Cradley—I suppose I should refer to her as that—was on the Committee on the draft Modern Slavery Bill, I saw the work that she and other Members did. I remember the phone calls from the Home Office when the Minister talked to her—it was Karen Bradley—and a lot of detailed work went on to get that Bill right. I think we all accept that it is very good legislation. There were one or two issues—the noble Lord, Lord McColl, made efforts to improve some of the aftercare—but generally it is very good legislation. I would contrast that, as I often do, with the Housing and Planning Act, which is terrible legislation done on the back of a fag packet. It is absolute rubbish and most of the Government have quietly forgotten about it. It has been pushed to one side, so that no one ever mentions it again. I am a big fan of draft legislation, especially when it concerns sorting big issues out. The intention behind the amendment from my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe is to do that.
This might seem a bit over the top, but we have had reports of these poor people being killed and their families destroyed. Why is COBRA not meeting to discuss this? We have COBRA meetings when we have a flood or a problem with the trains. This is about young people dying, so why is the Prime Minister or the Home Secretary not convening COBRA and getting the right people in the room to ask them, “What’s going on here?”
There is an issue about youth workers, social workers and cuts to services because if we are going to have penalties to deal with the issue we need to deal with the causes as well. Why is COBRA not meeting? People are losing their lives, so I want a response on that. As I said, these are very important issues.
The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made some excellent points as did my noble friend Lord Ponsonby with his experience as a magistrate in youth courts. He has experience of dealing with these people when they get to court. A lot of them have form. That is an important point. The right reverend Prelate also made some good points about the work that she has done in Newcastle and in south-east London. I used to go to a youth club—the Crossed Swords youth club—which was run by St Paul’s, a Church of England church. Reverend Shaw used to run it. I am a Catholic, but I used to go there because it was a very good club. All the kids from the estate went there. It is important that we have those things. In many parts the country they have disappeared. Whether voluntary or local authority, they have all been lost, and the people are lost there. We need to get those things right.
The shame with this Bill is that it seeks to deal with the punishment of offenders but does not address any of the causes, which is one of the losses in this Bill. Generally speaking, I am not against the orders. They need to be looked at, refined and changed but in principle I am not against them. Noble Lords made valuable points and I hope that the Minister will take them on board.
My Lords, before the Minister responds, I did not address Amendment 77 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, which we totally support. I did not want to stifle the debate, but it might be helpful for the Committee to be aware of the advice that I have been given, which is that if the Government insist on moving these amendments in Grand Committee and there is an objection to that taking place, the amendments will be lost and cannot be brought back on Report. I am sure that the Minister will bear that in mind in her response.
My Lords, following what the noble Lord just said, I wonder whether my noble friend would consider this. If the amendment is likely to be defeated, she could withdraw it and return to Committee as the first part of Report—I remember doing that with a Home Office Bill—so that given the concerns around the Committee, we could have a proper Committee stage and then very soon after that, come back on Report. In Committee, we can talk twice, and that should give the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, a chance to put down something constructive rather than the constant destructive arguments.
My Lords, I have not found the comments destructive, although I thank my noble friend for the points that he made. I will not press the government amendments today. I take on board completely the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, about the timing of the amendments. We will bring the amendments back on Report when again we will have a full chance to discuss them. The practice of noble Lords speaking only once on Report has fallen slightly by the wayside because noble Lords seem to speak several times in Committee and on Report.
To sum up today’s debate, we all seek the same end, but the means by which we would get there differ. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, at the outset for clarifying a number of points that I did not know the answer to. He has saved me having to write to the Committee. I also thank my noble friend Lady Newlove for the very real-life experience with which she speaks and which we never fail to be moved by.
It is clear from the debate that some of the support for KCPOs is qualified. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick—and the theme was carried on by other noble Lords—said that KCPOs seek to criminalise children. As the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, their aim is quite the reverse. They are to prevent young people getting into criminality.
I never suggested that the aim of the orders is to criminalise young people. I said that young people being criminalised is the inevitable outcome of the orders.
My Lords, I will add a couple of points. It is very instructive to look up “sniper rifles” on Google because you get a huge list of them, the vast majority at 7.62 calibre not .50 calibre. It is also interesting to see that three of the most popular .50 calibre rifles are made in this country and well known globally as some of the most popular sniper rifles. There are currently believed to be 200 large- calibre rifles in the UK, which is not a very substantial number. The cost of acquiring one of these .50 calibre target rifles is also not cheap—about £20,000 for the whole package, so there are never going to be very many of them.
Another point, which has already been made, is that only one of these rifles has ever been stolen in this country and it was found shortly afterwards, dumped by the opportunist thief, who realised that there was absolutely nothing he could do with it. They weigh about 36 pounds, which means they are not exactly the easiest things to carry around, and are very substantial in length—a length from here to the end of the desk. So we are talking about a rare beast indeed.
My Lords, I hate guns, so I have no interest in promoting any cause. I do not want to trivialise firearms offences because they can be very serious, but they are relatively small in number compared with the number of knife crime offences, for example. Only 1% of non-air weapon firearms offences involve rifles. Bearing in mind the very low number of offences committed using rifles, can the Minister tell the Committee why the Government have set these hares running?
My Lords, Amendment 83 would insert a new clause into the Bill to make the owner of a website, be that an individual or a company, responsible for ensuring that weapons listed in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice Act are not advertised on their site. The Bill places responsibilities on shop workers, delivery people and others; making website owners responsible for their content should be welcomed by the Government. I asked a similar Question today about anonymous accounts and the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, made the point that when people are made responsible, things happen. If they are not responsible, they will do nothing. There should be consequences. In some ways, this is in a similar area.
Subsection (2) of the proposed new clause would provide for the owner to have committed no offence if, within 24 hours of being notified of the advertisement, they arrange for it to be removed. Then there would be no problems whatever. In some cases, there is a defence under Section 19 of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, but that depends on the facts of the case. I accept entirely that there can be jurisdictional issues if the provider is based overseas.
This is only a probing amendment to highlight an issue that is part of a much wider problem, which I asked a Question about today: how we control what is on the internet and how we deal with such issues. These are serious matters. I hope that the government White Paper will deal with some of them, but I seek to include a clause in the Bill to make owners responsible for the content on their site and the adverts they place. I beg to move.
My Lords, I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, is trying to do with the amendment. It raises again the issue of websites that are hosted overseas and the lack of territorial reach to apply the suggested offence to overseas website owners. That creates an imbalance, as we discussed on previous elements of the Bill, between UK and overseas sellers of knives and corrosive substances, for example. I see some practical difficulties with this but I understand what the noble Lord is trying to achieve.
I am grateful for the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, which seeks to make it a criminal offence when,
“a website … is used to advertise, list or otherwise facilitate the sale of any weapon listed in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 … or any offensive weapon capable of being disguised as something else”.
We can all agree on the spirit of the amendment. Indeed, in preparing my remarks, I spent five minutes googling what I could buy online. The noble Lord makes a good point: some very shocking weapons are easily accessible online. However, I hope to persuade him that his amendment is not needed.
We are satisfied that there is no gap in the law and that legislation addressing the criminal behaviour outlined in the amendment already exists. Indeed, the noble Lord alluded to that in his remarks. The Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability wrote to the Public Bill Committee in the other place to set out the legal position on online platforms that advertise or sell offensive weapons in contravention of Section 141 or Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. It may assist your Lordships if I set out the position.
Section 141 of the Act states that,
“any person who manufactures, sells or hires or offers for sale or hire, exposes or has in his possession for the purpose of sale or hire, or lends or gives to any other person, a weapon to which this section applies shall be guilty of an offence”.
A list of such weapons is set out in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988. Section 141A of the 1988 Act makes it an offence to sell certain articles with a blade or point to anyone aged under 18. Clause 1 of the Bill will make it an offence also to sell corrosive products to a person aged under 18. As is clear from these provisions, anyone who sells, hires, offers for sale or hire, exposes or has in their possession for the purpose of sale or hire any of the weapons to which the 1988 order applies—whether online or otherwise—is guilty of an offence. This would apply to individuals, but “a person” can include a body corporate or unincorporated, such as a company.
Where the user of a website places advertisements or listings for anything contained in the 1988 order on that website, the service provider may rely on the defence in relation to hosting under Regulation 19 of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. Whether Regulation 19 applies will depend on the facts of the case. As the noble Lord mentioned, there may also be jurisdictional issues if the service provider is based overseas. I assure noble Lords that the sites I found were all based overseas. Regulation 19 will not apply where the provider of the website is offering the items for sale directly and where the provider had actual knowledge of the unlawful activity and upon obtaining that knowledge did not act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the information.
We therefore consider that the provider of a website who sells items on it directly would likely be caught under the wording of the legislation. Where the provider of the website is enabling advertisements to be placed by others, the defence under Regulation 19 may be available. We have discussed the matter with the Crown Prosecution Service, which is of the view that these provisions can be used to prosecute where appropriate. In the light of this explanation of the existing law, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Offensive Weapons Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and at his request, I move Amendment 4 and shall speak also to Amendment 69 in this group.
Amendment 4 is intended to enable the Bill to encompass electronic systems of age verification such as Yoti, once those systems have passed scrutiny by the Home Office, as a way of addressing age verification challenges. With regard to Amendment 69, the Bill requires retailers to undertake age verification online and offline. In the absence of recognised standards against which online or offline age verification schemes can be audited and recognised, this amendment allows retailers to comply with the requirements of the Bill through any scheme they choose which is recognised by the Secretary of State. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendments 4 and 69, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, raise the issue of age verification. Our world is becoming more digital and, when age verification can be done digitally, it should obviously be done in that way. That might not be possible yet but it is becoming easier and, if it can be done, it certainly should be. I have to admit that I had never heard of Yoti. Perhaps I am showing my age but I had absolutely no idea what it was. However, I have learned something today. Amendment 69 would provide for schemes to be recognised by the Secretary of State as suitable for this purpose and would provide for the maintenance and updating of a list of those schemes. That seems sensible and I certainly support the amendments.
I thank the Minister for her explanation, although I am a little confused. My understanding is that, as part of compulsory age verification for access to online pornography, there is a list of age verification systems endorsed by the British Board of Film Classification on the Government’s behalf, and that these online pornography sites have to comply with the restrictions that the BBFC imposes in line with government instructions. Therefore, there is some age verification that relies on electronic systems, so a lot of what the Minister says seems to contradict what is happening in another part of the Government, the DCMS.
I thank other noble Lords for speaking to these amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, wanted the Government’s response on the record. We now have this, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 4 withdrawn.
Amendment 5
My Lords, Schedule 1 contains a list of corrosive products for the purposes of the offences in Clauses 1 to 4 that relate to the sale and delivery of corrosive products. The Bill includes a power by regulations to amend Schedule 1. In Committee, I undertook to consider an amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to require prior consultation before any such regulations are made. As I indicated in the debate, we would fully expect to consult affected persons in any event, but we are content to include an express requirement to this end in the Bill. These amendments do just that. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for these amendments. One of the main things that irked people in the police service was people taking credit for other people’s work. These amendments were originally spotted and drafted by my noble friend Lady Hamwee.
My Lords, in moving this amendment I will speak also to Amendment 13. The only purpose of revisiting these amendments which we tabled in Committee is to make a point—and I refer to a letter in relation to these matters from the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, dated 12 February—about the fact that two substances of the concentration specified in Schedule 1, sulphuric acid and nitric acid, are specified there as substances which should not be sold to people under the age of 18. This is despite the fact that you need a Home Office licence under the Poisons Act to buy these substances. Therefore, the chances of someone under 18 getting a Home Office licence to buy what are precursors for making explosives are diminishingly small. Indeed, in her letter the noble Baroness says that it is extremely unlikely that anyone under 18 will be able lawfully to acquire or purchase these acids. This goes to the point of a lot of this Bill—that it is there simply to send a message, which is not what we should be using legislation for. I beg to move.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, pointed out, these amendments return to the debate we had in Committee about the relationship between some of the substances we have listed in Schedule 1 to the Bill and the provisions of the Poisons Act 1972. The noble Lord is concerned that we have listed both nitric acid and sulphuric acid in Schedule 1, despite the fact that these are already regulated substances within the Poisons Act.
I reiterate the point I made in Committee, that both sulphuric and nitric acid were identified by our scientific advisers at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and the police as appropriate for inclusion in Schedule 1. This was because we know that sulphuric acid has been used in attacks, and that nitric acid is considered to be one of the most harmful corrosive substances. While I understand the noble Lord’s concerns about including these two poisons which are already regulated under the Poisons Act, our overriding concern in framing the Bill’s provisions relating to the sale and delivery of corrosive products is that we do all we can to prevent anyone under 18 getting hold of these substances. We therefore think it is appropriate that they are included in Schedule 1.
My Lords, the Minister has completely failed to address the point that I just raised—but in any event I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 14 I will speak also to the other amendments in this group.
As drafted, the Bill creates a ludicrous, verging on farcical, situation where corrosive substances and bladed articles cannot be delivered to a residential address unless they are ordered from an overseas company. If they are ordered from an overseas company and the UK delivery company does not know what the content of the parcel is, there are no restrictions whatever on these items being delivered to a residential address. At the same time, UK companies are prohibited from delivering both corrosive substances and bladed articles to residential addresses.
If, however, there is an agreement between the UK delivery company and the overseas company that the delivery company will be alerted to any corrosive substances or bladed articles which it will be asked to deliver to a UK residential address, the Government set out in this Bill the steps that the delivery company must take to ensure that the corrosive substance or bladed article is only delivered into the hands of someone 18 years of age or older on the doorstep of the residential address.
If overseas companies are allowed openly to sell and deliver corrosive substances and bladed articles to UK residential addresses, with a system of age verification at the point of handover, why on earth cannot UK companies do exactly the same thing? It is happening right now in the UK in relation to alcohol, so why not enshrine it in legislation and apply it here?
The Bill as drafted not only disadvantages UK companies compared with overseas competitors, but prevents companies like John Lewis delivering items such as food processors, because they have a blade, to people’s homes. It also creates the anomaly of self-employed plumbers and the like, who run their businesses from their home, being able to have these substances and items delivered to their residential address even though the seller and the delivery company may have no way of knowing beyond reasonable doubt that a business is carried on from that address. The Bill creates other anomalies where designer knives—ones made specifically for the purchaser, for example—can be delivered to residential premises.
The sole purpose of prohibiting the delivery of corrosive substances and bladed products to residential addresses is to keep them out of the hands of those under 18. All these anomalies and difficulties can be avoided if an age-verification system at point of handover—a system already set out in this legislation—is available to both overseas and UK businesses. That is what these amendments seek to do. I beg to move.
My Lords, these amendments, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, seek to allow the delivery of corrosive and bladed products to residential addresses where steps are taken to ensure that the recipient is over the age of 18. If we can get to a position where this is possible, I would be very happy to support these amendments. Getting the balance right between putting in place precautions to stop young people getting their hands on these products, and adequate offences, is something we should all support. If that can be done in a way that is not damaging to business, that is all the better.
I am, of course, very concerned about the situation regarding knife attacks in Sheffield, and we will come on to my amendments about that later. We had a very positive meeting earlier this week. I am happy to support these amendments if we can get that balance right. I still have an issue about putting restrictions on overseas companies as our jurisdiction ends here in the UK. If we can get a system whereby we ensure that British companies are not disadvantaged and, equally, have some restrictions, I will fully support that.
Turning to my noble friend’s question, if your home is also your registered business address, then clearly is it both. The noble Lord actually raised that point in Committee. The residential address can be either just a residential address or both a business and a residential address.
Returning to my other point about someone being prohibited from selling a product to a home address, we want to avoid any liability regarding checking age falling on the delivery company when the item is handed over. This is because delivery companies indicated in our discussions with them that they might simply refuse to deliver items on behalf of sellers if the legal responsibility for checking age falls to them. We are willing to accept this risk in relation to overseas sales because we are less concerned about the impact on overseas sellers, should their trade be affected, but for UK sales we do not want to place a liability on deliverers because there is a risk that they will then refuse to deliver any bladed items. The Government position is therefore that any liability for ensuring that any remotely sold corrosive and bladed products in the UK are not sold and delivered to under-18s should fall solely on the seller.
I have one final point to make, about a meeting that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and I had with the Sheffield knife manufacturers. As a result of that meeting, I want to satisfy myself of the position in relation to a couple of major delivery companies to ensure that that has not changed. Nothing in the meeting led me to doubt the position, but I just want to clarify that. In the meantime, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for his qualified support for these amendments. As far as the explanation from the Minister was concerned, however, if you are a sole trader, you could be considered to be conducting your business from your home address. The Inland Revenue would be the only ones who knew that, and that information would be confidential. Therefore, there is no way that a delivery company could establish beyond reasonable doubt whether your residential address was a business address or not. As with a lot of this Bill, it clearly has not been thought through. The Minister has completely avoided the fact that this significantly disadvantages UK businesses as opposed to overseas ones. If they do not inform the UK delivery company what is in the parcel, there is absolutely no comeback on the delivery company whatsoever. Anything can be delivered to a residential address, whether it is a bladed article or a very strong acid ordered from an overseas business.
The Government say they want to avoid putting a liability on delivery companies, but this legislation puts liability on delivery companies if they are delivering corrosive substances or bladed articles from overseas. The only difference concerns whether the company is from the UK or overseas. Again, the Minister failed to answer how age verification at a collection point is more secure than on the doorstep. She completely failed to address the issues I raised. However, there are far more important things to get on to so at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I raised this issue at Second Reading and in Grand Committee. I am grateful for the support I have received from across the House. We are placing shop workers at the forefront in the Bill. They risk a prison sentence or a lesser punishment if they get it wrong, as they will have committed a criminal offence in selling the products referred to in the Bill to a person under 18 years of age. I have no problem with that. These products cannot be sold to young people and we need a deterrent in place to make sure that this is adhered to.
My issue is that the Bill places additional responsibility on shop workers but gives them no additional protection. This issue has been raised many times in the House, not just in the context of the Bill. My noble friend Lady Kennedy of Cradley raised this matter in a recent Question to the Minister. When I was young—a long time ago—I was a shop worker. I enjoyed the work very much. As a young person, it got me talking to people, which gave me confidence. It was hard work and not without its risks, but it was enjoyable.
I know that the Government are looking at this issue; they are seeking further evidence, but the evidence is already there. Even if the Government decide to act at a later date, I worry that we will have moved on and in the weeks, months and years to come, I will be sitting here asking when the Government will introduce legislation, only to be told that they are waiting for a suitable Bill. There are always pressures on legislation—we all know that—but this time, the pressure is paramount. I am very worried that we will move no further forward.
No doubt the Minister will tell me shortly that there is no problem and there is a whole range of offences; for example, anyone who assaults a shop worker can be charged and, if found guilty, convicted. However, far too often, these offences are not prosecuted; that is a serious problem. Indeed, many offences are not even reported so they get nowhere near a police officer. In the Bill, we are placing duties for specific offences on shop workers but giving them no further protection. Let us imagine being in their position, refusing to sell knives or acids to angry young people who want these products. That is not a nice place to be. We expect shop workers to enforce the law in that situation but give them no protection to do so. We owe them a minimum additional protection, which my amendment seeks to provide. Approximately 280 shop workers are assaulted every single day. I was once a member of USDAW; it is a great trade union. It campaigns for shop workers and knows the industry its members work in. It regularly consults the Government and other agencies and puts forward its view. It has done a good job of finding evidence of the problem.
My amendment is different to the one I moved in Committee in one key respect: it goes beyond the imposition of a fine and introduces a maximum imprisonment term of six months. That is not because I want to increase the prison population—I support community sentences—but I want to give the court the power to look at the full suite of options available and impose a sentence that fits the crime. On reflection, limiting it to a fine was not the right thing to do—it is too restrictive—so I wanted to give the court the power to impose the penalty it thought was appropriate for the case. Perhaps I should have done that in the first place, but it is the right thing to do. I hope that the Minister will respond to this debate in detail and give me some good news. I beg to move.
My Lords, as I said in Committee, we support the amendment. Until last Friday, we were prepared to vote with the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, should he divide the House, for the reasons he clearly set out. However, at the end of last week, the noble Lord changed the amendment so that the penalty attached to the proposed new offence included a maximum term of imprisonment of six months. Noble Lords will know from the comments of my noble friend Lady Hamwee on the fourth group of amendments that we oppose short-term sentences, as does the right honourable David Gauke MP—the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Justice—and Rory Stewart, the Minister of State for the Ministry of Justice. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, is also opposed to short-term prison sentences but that this is the only way to secure a community sentence, as we discussed previously, which has to be an alternative to custody. If only there were some way of having the latter without the former. Of course, as I have explained to the noble Lord in correspondence, if the threat to, or the assault on, a shop worker were more serious, there are alternate offences with which someone could be charged and which carry a sentence of imprisonment.
We support the principle that shop workers expected to enforce the law on the selling of age-restricted items, in that they are being asked to prevent underage people making such purchases, should have some legal protections not afforded to other members of the public.
My Lords, I listened with interest as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, introduced his amendment. I am sure that all Members of the House are broadly sympathetic to what he seeks to achieve in terms of protecting shop workers. No one should be put in harm’s way through their employment if it can possibly be avoided. I understand what he is driving at with the thrust of the amendment.
I am interested in how the law copes with other circumstances where shop workers and other members of the hospitality trade, such as people in pubs and betting shops, have to make age-related decisions regarding their customers. For example, someone may want to buy a drink or glue, but such products are already age-restricted. I would have thought that similar circumstances to those described by the noble Lord of people being aggravated because they are not being sold those products could arise. It strikes me that there is nothing particularly new, per se, in the circumstances before us in the Bill. When my noble friend the Minister responds to the debate and the noble Lord has the opportunity to respond to her comments, perhaps both of them could consider how the current circumstances work; for example, what happens if a barman has to deny service to someone aged 17 because they have been asked for their identity documents and have produced a fake ID, which I understand is prevalent, and is any specific statutory protection applied to that worker? If not, why should this case be different?
The purpose of my intervention is to understand in rather more detail the current legislative circumstances surrounding people who have to make age-related decisions. My understanding is that younger people are used to being asked for ID; one has to look only in a tobacconist’s or an off-licence to see lots of signs saying that those aged under 21 should be prepared to justify their identity. It seldom happens to me, but it is possible. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, the government amendments in this group introduce knife crime prevention orders. Noble Lords will recall that these amendments were debated in Grand Committee on 6 February but were withdrawn because it was clear that they did not attract universal support, as the procedural rules in Grand Committee require. The government amendments before us today are the same as those debated in Grand Committee. Given that we have already had a substantial debate on these new civil orders, I do not intend to go through every aspect of them. However, it is worth stating again why the Government have brought forward these measures and to summarise how they will work.
All noble Lords will appreciate that we face a significant increase in knife crime at present, particularly in London but also in other major cities and across the country. It is sad to say that hardly a day goes by without further horrific examples of the devastation that such crimes cause, not only to individual families but to entire communities. We must do everything we can to stop this increase in violent crime.
The latest police recorded crime figures published by the Office for National Statistics in January for the year ending September 2018 show that there have been close to 40,000 knife-related offences. This is an 8% increase compared to the previous year. The number of homicides where a knife or sharp instrument has been used has increased by 10% in the last year to 276 offences. Of all recorded homicides in the latest data, more than four in 10 involved a knife or a sharp instrument. Police-recorded offences involving the possession of an article with a blade or point rose by 18% to approaching 20,000 offences in the year ending September 2018. This rise was consistent with increases seen over the past five years and is the highest figure since the series began in March 2009.
It is vital that the police have the powers they need to prevent knife crime and protect the public from the devastating effects of violent crime on our streets. When we prosecute young people for knife crime, it is already too late for families when their sons and daughters are lying in hospital or dead on the street. This is tearing some of our communities apart and if there are measures available that might help to tackle this issue, then we must not hesitate to put them in place.
These new civil prevention orders will enable the police to more effectively manage those at risk of being drawn into trouble and help steer them away from crime, and the Government make no apologies for bringing them forward. The orders are aimed at three groups of people: young people who have been carrying a knife; habitual knife carriers of any age; and those who have been convicted of violent offences involving knives.
In the case of young people, the police may have intelligence that a young person routinely carries a knife but for a variety of reasons they have been unable to charge them with a possession offence. Before risky behaviour escalates, a KCPO, as they are called, could be in place to divert the person away from a life of prolific offending.
As I have indicated, people who the police deem to be habitual knife carriers could also be subject to a KCPO. This would include people who may have previous convictions for knife crime or where the police have intelligence that they regularly carry knives. The KCPO would enable the police to manage the risk of future offending in the community. This is the cohort that the police see as their main target for these orders. They estimate that there are about 3,000 habitual knife carriers across England and Wales, although that is not to say that all that cohort would be made subject to a KCPO.
It may be helpful if I explain briefly how the orders will work. An application for a KCPO can be made by a relevant chief officer of police to a magistrates’ court or, in the case of young people, the youth court. A court may make an order only if it is satisfied that the defendant had a bladed article without good reason in a public place or education premises on at least two occasions in the preceding two years, and that the order is necessary to protect the public or prevent the defendant committing an offence involving knives. A KCPO can also be made on conviction where the defendant is convicted of a relevant offence and, again, the court thinks the order is necessary to protect the public or prevent the defendant committing an offence involving knives.
A KCPO may require a defendant to do anything described in the order and/or prohibit the defendant doing anything described in the order. The KCPO can include any reasonable prohibition or requirement which the court is satisfied is necessary, proportionate and enforceable. An order could therefore include things such as curfews or restrictions on going to a particular place.
A KCPO can also include positive requirements, and we think these are particularly important. A positive requirement could be attending some form of knife awareness training or a programme to move young people away from knife crime. Some of these programmes are already being funded under the serious violence strategy, and we are keen to build on the excellent work that is already under way to help divert young people from violent crime and is often provided by groups which have first-hand experience of dealing with knife crime in their communities. Where a KCPO imposes such a requirement it must specify a person who is responsible for supervising compliance with the requirement. For instance, if the requirement is attendance at a knife awareness intervention, the person designated to supervise compliance may be the youth worker providing the intervention.
KCPOs will have a maximum duration of two years and must be reviewed by the courts after 12 months. KCPOs issued to under-18s will be expected to be subject to more regular reviews, an issue which we will address in guidance. There are provisions for variation, renewal or discharge of KCPOs on application by the defendant or the police. There are also provisions for appeal against the order. Breach of the order, without reasonable excuse, is a criminal offence subject to a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.
Young people are clearly an area of great concern to a number of noble Lords. The police tell us that the age at which people carry knives is getting lower. We also know from hospital data and from the police that younger and younger children are involved in knife crime as both victims and perpetrators. If we are serious about tackling the epidemic of knife crime on our streets, the measures we take must apply to young people.
I must point out that the civil orders available for dealing with sex offending apply to children as young as 10 and last for up to five years rather than the maximum of two years available under KCPOs. Likewise, the maximum penalties are up to five years in prison rather than the two years we have with KCPOs. I know that noble Lords might argue that sex offending is different and somehow more serious. I am not sure that argument is true given the number of knife-related deaths that we are now witnessing in our cities.
I know that noble Lords will also argue that it would be better to go the anti-social behaviour injunction route, which of course applies to children as young as 10. The argument here is that having contempt of court rather than a criminal offence for breach would make the orders more palatable because it would mean that children would not get a criminal record. The advice that we have had from police, some of which we heard yesterday at the round table, is I think advice that we should listen to very carefully. It is that making it a criminal offence to breach an order is important if we want the order to be taken seriously. I do, however, understand concerns about the application of these orders to young people. That is why we set the minimum age of 12, and that is why youth offender teams will need to be consulted on any orders against defendants under the age of 18. It is why we have said we will consult publicly on the guidance with community groups and youth organisations and others before these orders are brought into force.
This Government are determined to do all they can to protect the public and keep people safe. We must seize every opportunity to end the senseless cycle of violent crime that is corroding our streets. Knife crime prevention orders are not the complete answer to violent crime, but they most certainly will help. I beg to move.
My Lords, I said a lot about knife crime prevention orders in Committee. Tonight I am going to focus on pre-conviction knife crime prevention orders. Despite the Government’s claims to the contrary, they will result in many young people being criminalised instead of being diverted away from the criminal justice system. How can we be so sure? Because they are almost a carbon copy of anti-social behaviour orders, which did exactly that—criminalised swathes of young people for breaching a civil order imposed on them on the balance of probabilities but where a breach of the order was a criminal offence, exactly the same as these provisions.
A court has to be satisfied only on the balance of probabilities that, on at least two occasions, the defendant had a bladed article with them without good reason or lawful authority in a public place on school or further education premises. If they were caught in possession of a knife, they could be prosecuted. This is not about young people being stopped and searched and being found with a knife. This is about hearsay evidence, information from informants, the police being tipped off that someone is a knife carrier. An interim order can even be imposed without the defendant’s having the chance to put his side of the story. Imposed on the balance of probabilities, a breach of the conditions can result in a criminal record and up to two years in prison.
These are anti-social behaviour orders reinvented. They are primarily aimed at young people, as young as 12. It may have been a long time ago, but we were all young once. Young people make mistakes; they can be reckless, forgetful, mischievous. The orders would impose, on people who are more chaotic than responsible adults, conditions such as: being at a particular place between particular times on particular days; being at a particular place between particular times on any day; presenting themselves to a particular person at a place where they are required to be; participating in particular activities between particular times on particular days; prohibiting them from being in a particular place with particular people; participating in particular activities; using particular articles or having those articles with them. An order that imposes prohibitions can include exemptions to those prohibitions. They have to tell the police within three days if they use a name which has not previously been notified to the police, or they decide to live away from their home address for more than a month. What does,
“uses a name which has not previously been notified to the police”,
even mean? What if their schoolmates give them a nickname that they have become known by? Do they breach the order if they use that name? The young person is going to need a PA and carry a list of conditions with them at all times which they have to constantly refer to, to make sure that they do not breach the order.
Children are children. These orders can be imposed on young people who have never been in trouble with the police and have never been convicted of a criminal offence, and they could be sentenced to custody because they did not turn up for football practice as the order required them to do or because they were told not to associate with certain people but those people kept following them around. It would be easy for me or other noble Lords, let alone a child, to breach some of these conditions if they were imposed on us, and these orders would last a minimum of six months and up to two years.
My Lords, I am moving this amendment on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and at his request. Part of the defence to the sale and delivery of knives to under-18s is that the package containing a knife is clearly marked to indicate its contents. The amendment is intended to probe the effect of labelling a package as containing a knife on the likelihood of the package being stolen during delivery. I beg to move.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining the amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lord Lucas, because it gives us the opportunity to consider the requirements that remote sellers need to meet if they are to rely on the defence that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid selling bladed articles to a person under 18.
Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes it an offence to sell a bladed article to a person under 18. It is a defence that the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence—for example, that they had asked to see proof of a person’s age.
Clause 15 provides that, in relation to remote sales—for example, online sales—of bladed articles, the seller can rely on the defence only if they can prove they have met certain conditions. These conditions are: that they have systems in place at the point of sale for verifying the age of buyers; that they clearly mark the package containing the article when it is dispatched, and have taken steps to ensure that the package is finally delivered is delivered to someone over 18; and that they did not arrange for the article to be delivered to a locker.
The amendment concerns the second of those conditions, which is that that when the package is dispatched it must be clearly marked to indicate that it contains a bladed or sharply pointed article, and that when finally delivered it should be into the hands of someone over 18. The amendment would remove the first part of this condition, so the package would need to be labelled to say that it must be handed to a person over 18, but it would not need to say it contained a bladed or sharply pointed article.
Before I turn to the amendment itself, it might be worth saying a bit about the purpose of Clause 15, which is to drive a change in behaviour by remote sellers. It sets out the minimum requirements we would expect sellers to meet if they wanted to be confident that they were not selling to under-18s, but it is mainly aimed at individual transactions—young people trying to buy knives online—rather than large business transactions. It is not aimed, for example, at a seller of kitchenware that deals exclusively with restaurants and hotels.
The requirements under Clause 15 are therefore the minimum requirements that a seller has to meet if they want to rely on the defence that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence, should they ever be prosecuted for selling to an under-18. Where a seller knows their customers, they may decide not to comply with the conditions under Clause 15 because they are sure they will never be prosecuted. Examples would be: where a seller sells only to a wholesaler; where a seller has traded with the same customer for years; or where a seller knows the individual they are selling to—for instance, where they make hand-made items for particular customers, they will know the buyer is over 18 and may decide that complying with the conditions is unnecessary.
Turning to the amendment, our discussions with delivery companies and those who provide collection point services indicate that they want any packages that they are going to handle to be clearly marked by the seller so that the risk that they inadvertently hand them over to a person aged under 18 is reduced. You cannot expect staff working for a delivery company or at a collection point to ensure that the package is handed over to an adult unless it is clear from the packaging what it contains and what the restriction is on delivery. It makes sense that those working for delivery companies and at collection points know what they are handling. This will enable them to treat the package with due caution. This is particularly the case where the package contains sharp objects or corrosive substances.
Finally, the amendment applies only to Clause 15 and not to Clauses 16 and 17, which deal with the same matter in Scotland and Northern Ireland, or to Clause 2, which sets the same conditions in relation to corrosive products where these are sold remotely.
I hope I have provided the noble Lord with sufficient explanation around the purpose of Clause 15 and the labelling requirement and that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
I will write to my noble friend with an accurate answer on that. I am confident that there is a tight definition of this but at this hour I cannot recall it exactly.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, wanted the Government’s response to the amendment on the record and that is what we have achieved. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Offensive Weapons Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendments 74 and 77 in my name seek to establish a “trusted trader” scheme to enable bladed products to be delivered to home addresses. This is an issue that I raised in Committee. The Bill as drafted prohibits the delivery of bladed objects to residential properties, and there are serious concerns among small and medium-sized knife manufacturers and retailers that this will have a detrimental impact on their businesses.
As more sales move online, consumers expect to be able to receive deliveries directly to their home. I fully support the aims of the Bill but I think this is a legislative sledgehammer that will affect small and medium-sized businesses based in the UK while having little impact on knife crime. There is no evidence that these high-quality knives sold online are being bought with criminal intent; if there were any evidence, it would have already been presented. I think we all accept that if you bought a knife online with criminal intent, you would be creating a very easy evidence trail for the police to follow.
We all want to achieve the objective of the Bill, which is to reduce knife crime, but at the same time we do not want to destroy UK-based businesses. There is a need for greater enforcement of existing legislation prohibiting the sale of knives to under-18s and the carrying of a knife without good reason, and these amendments would enable a trusted trader scheme to come into force. All that I am seeking to achieve is protection for British businesses, whether with the scheme in these amendments, with the scheme suggested last week by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, or with some other form of approved deliverer scheme, which we discussed when we had a very positive meeting last week with the noble Baronesses, Lady Williams of Trafford and Lady Barran, and representatives of the business community from Sheffield—who, in my opinion, put a very convincing case to the Minister—along with the honourable Members for Sheffield Central and Sheffield South East.
I am aware that a trusted trader scheme has been ruled out by the Home Office, which claims that it would add more bureaucracy and would cost businesses to establish, but I point out that the scheme is being suggested by the very businesses that would be affected. I make clear that I am not fixed on any scheme; I just want to find a solution for what I think the Minister accepts is a real issue that could have damaging consequences for British businesses. I know that is not the Government’s intention—in fact, I support their actual intentions—but we have a problem here. I beg to move.
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, that this legislation is seriously to the detriment of UK companies versus overseas companies, in that if you order a bladed instrument or knife from an overseas company or website it can be delivered to your home, but if you order one from a UK company it cannot. However, I am not sure the trusted trader scheme that he has outlined in the amendments is the answer. Obviously, overseas companies would not have to be members of a trusted trader scheme and therefore the bureaucracy, expense, fees payable and so forth would still disadvantage UK companies.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for mentioning that I have already suggested a solution to this problem: to extend to UK companies the age-verification scheme at handover on the doorstep, which the Government have set out in the legislation and which currently applies only to overseas companies. I believe that is the solution to this problem, rather than the trusted trader scheme that the noble Lord suggested.
My Lords, I add to this unanimity of voice. I entirely agree with what both noble Lords have said. The scheme that the Bill sets out enables people to buy knives from foreign websites. A lot of the time you will not know that it is foreign website as it will appear to be in the UK and it will deal in sterling; it is just posted from France, the Netherlands or wherever it might be. It comes through the post in an unmarked packet and is delivered to whoever ordered it. We apparently think this is a reasonable thing to do and that people should be allowed to do this. This is a way in which your average 16 year-old can obtain a knife quite legally under the Bill.
We are imposing much more stringent arrangements on our own internet traders, which will appear exactly the same to customers. All it means is that we will be disadvantaging our own traders to the advantage of overseas traders and we are not achieving anything in terms of safety. I absolutely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said. I support the aims of the Bill. We want to prevent knives getting into the hands of people under 18. Let us have an effective way of doing it that does not disadvantage our own people. Several alternatives have been offered. I very much hope my noble friend will indicate that she is prepared to pick up one of them.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for these amendments. I am particularly grateful to him and the Sheffield knife manufacturers for coming to meet me the other week for what I thought was a very helpful and constructive meeting.
We are returning to something we debated in Committee: whether trusted traders should be exempt from the prohibition in the Bill of arranging delivery of bladed products to residential premises or a locker. When we considered these amendments previously, I said that test purchases continue to show that a significant number of online sellers fail to undertake adequate checks to ensure that knives are not sold to under-18s. The most recent test purchases of online retailers, conducted in late 2018, showed that 42% of the retailers sampled failed the test and sold knives to persons under 18.
As the noble Lord has explained, his amendments seek to address this problem by saying that where we know someone is a responsible retailer they should be able to continue to send their products to a person’s home address or a locker. This would apply only to the dispatch of bladed products under Clause 18 and not to the sending of corrosive products to a residential premise under Clause 3—presumably on the basis that the noble Lord is content that corrosives should not be sent to a person’s home.
These amendments would transfer the responsibility for complying with the legislation, and for ensuring that all sales are handled properly, from the seller to the Government. They would do this by requiring the Government to set out the details of the proposed trusted trader scheme, which would then allow for the delivery of bladed products to residential premises. A trusted trader scheme would require sellers to demonstrate that their age-verification systems and procedures, from the point when they receive the order to the point that their designated delivery company hands the item over, are robust and that they can guarantee that the knife will not be handed over to a person under 18.
The Government are not persuaded, in the light of the results of recent test purchase operations, that sellers can provide such reassurance in a systematic and consistent way. Only by requiring age verification at the point where the item is physically handed to a person at a dedicated collection point is it possible to guarantee that a bladed product will not be handed over to a person under 18. Setting up, administering and overseeing a trusted trader scheme would create a further burden on the Government or local authorities, with inevitable cost implications. Simply being part of a scheme, or being in possession of a seal of approval as a trusted trader, does not guarantee compliance with the conditions of the scheme. Many of us know this to our cost, having hired a plumber or builder accredited by a trusted trader scheme. Such a scheme would impose regulatory burdens on participating businesses. In addition, it would need to be administered by an independent regulatory body or by local authorities, albeit with the expectation that participating businesses would be required to meet the cost of running it.
I hope that I have provided a clear explanation of why the Government do not consider that the noble Lord’s amendments would provide the necessary assurance that young people under 18 cannot get hold of knives using online sellers. In coming to this view, I have reflected on the recent helpful meeting with Sheffield knife retailers—which I am very grateful to the noble Lord for arranging—in which something was said about Amazon’s view on the issues this amendment raises. He knows that I cannot promise anything, and we are yet to have a definitive statement on it, but I hope that this being the case, he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Before the noble Baroness sits down, could she just qualify what she said about the test purchase results? Was this a failure in age verification at the point of purchase or at the point of handover?
The noble Baroness also talked about a burden on the Government to design an age verification scheme, but is that not exactly what this Bill does with knives that are bought overseas and that are handed over at residential premises?
Thirdly, could the Minister again tell me why age verification at handover point is likely to be better than age verification on the doorstep?
Such a scheme would impose an additional burden. The noble Lord talks about other burdens; I am not denying that there will be burdens on various people from the introduction of whatever scheme comes in, but this would very much pass on that burden to local government.
As I understand it, the failures in online test purchases have lain at the point of sale.
My Lords, I have some sympathy with the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, on this issue but again suggest that the answer is to have a system of age verification at handover, as there is for overseas sellers.
On the issue of whether a business is carried out at a residential address, the Government accept that overseas companies cannot be expected to know whether that is the case. Again, UK companies are being disadvantaged compared with overseas companies.
I do not know whether the noble Duke can explain why Amendment 75 talks about a product that,
“is for an agricultural or forestry management purpose”,
Amendment 80,
“exclusively designed for an agricultural or forestry management purpose”,
Amendment 83,
“specifically to be used for agricultural or forestry management purposes”,
and if those differences are deliberate and explicable.
My Lords, I rise briefly to support the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, as he raises valid points. Again, we do not want anything in the Bill that disadvantages UK business.
It comes back to the noble Baroness’s point about consultation. In developing the guidance, we must and will engage with business and organisations such as the BRC. The intention is that it will be developed with them. We could have a circular argument here about whether things should be directly specified in the Bill or how helpful the guidance will be in helping retailers and the criminal justice system, but guidance generally will help the Government keep pace with developments.
Amendment 86 is similar to Amendment 81 and again seeks to require the Secretary of State to issue guidance. We have already debated government Amendment 106, which will enable the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Justice Department to issue statutory guidance on certain parts of the Bill, including those dealing with offences of remote sale and delivery of knives. We intend that there should be guidance to retailers on what items are prohibited from dispatch to residential premises or a locker under Clause 18. I think the government amendment is adequate to cover this.
I apologise for persisting but the Minister referred to table knives being excluded from this prohibition. The table knife that I was given to eat my roast beef with in a restaurant yesterday could cause serious harm to an individual by cutting. Is it or is it not therefore a table knife? This will inevitably lead to a decision by major retailers such as John Lewis not to deliver any knife of any description to residential premises for fear, as the Minister said, that if there is a prosecution the supplier will have to provide a defence in court to the offence. Not many suppliers will be prepared to take that risk.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lucas for returning us to this difficult issue about what we do in relation to overseas sellers of knives. Noble Lords will recall that the issue is that while we can place requirements, such as those under Clause 18, on remote sellers based in the UK, we cannot do the same in relation to overseas sellers. This is because we cannot practically take extraterritorial jurisdiction over sellers based abroad. We have tried to address this through the provisions in Clause 21. These provisions make it an offence for delivery companies in the UK, which are operating under specific arrangements to deliver bladed articles on behalf of overseas sellers, to deliver those articles into the hands of a person under the age of 18.
We accept that this is not the complete answer to the problem because overseas sellers can simply send the items unmarked through the international mail. This is exactly the situation that my noble friend’s amendment seeks to address. It would provide a power to confiscate bladed articles that are sent from overseas to a UK residential address and which are, first, not subject to specific arrangements between the delivery company in the UK and the overseas seller and, secondly, not labelled to show that age must be verified on delivery.
Although it is not clear from the amendment, the power is presumably to be exercised by Border Force because the amendments refer to detecting the articles in transit from overseas. The amendment would mean, in effect, that only bladed articles sold overseas which are subject to specific delivery arrangements in the UK would be allowed. I can therefore sympathise with the intention behind this amendment.
However, there are a number of problems with the amendment. At present, Border Force can seize two types of bladed articles. It can seize weapons prohibited under Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, such as zombie knives and death stars, and Section 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959, which covers flick knives and gravity knives, because the importation of these weapons is banned. It can also seize any weapon which it believes is evidence in relation to a criminal offence.
This amendment would mean that Border Force would have a power to seize items which are not prohibited by law and where they are not evidence in relation to a criminal offence. This would mean that a wide range of items which are going to a residential address in the UK from overseas could be seized and handed to the police to be destroyed. The amendment is not limited to overseas sales, so it would mean that bladed articles sent from a relative overseas to someone in the UK could also be seized. It would mean that someone bringing back a bladed article from their holiday, such as a souvenir, could have it seized or that a fencer returning from a competition overseas with their swords could have them confiscated by Border Force. It would mean that articles which have been legally sold overseas and legally bought by someone in the UK could be seized.
Secondly, the amendment assumes that there is some way of detecting such articles. Not all items coming into the UK are scanned, so unless Border Force happens to come across bladed articles as part of routine searches, they are unlikely to be detected. Even if such items were detected, Border Force would need to ascertain whether they were being sent to a residential address. For example, it would need to decide whether 12 High Street is a residential or business address. Finally, it would need to establish whether they were subject to specific arrangements between a delivery company and the overseas seller. It would then have to have arrangements for handing the articles to the police for destruction. This would all have significant resource implications for Border Force. It is for all these reasons that I am afraid I cannot support my noble friend’s amendment. I hope that in these circumstances he will withdraw it.
Before the Minister sits down, will she explain why the Government cannot exert extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign websites when they are doing exactly that when it comes to online pornography on overseas websites? In that case the BBFC, acting on behalf of the Government, gets in touch with the online pornography website and threatens them that unless and until they have approved age verification on their sites, BBFC will instruct UK internet service providers to block access to those websites from the UK. Why cannot a similar system be used to block overseas companies which are known to be selling prohibited weapons to the UK?
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is absolutely correct, as Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act provides. In her response, the Minister said that the sender would not know whether they were sending to a residential address. A UK business has exactly the same problem, yet she was using this to justify blocking UK sales. I do not see how she can apply one rule to UK companies and another to foreign companies. We need to be even-handed.
As I understand it, we cannot. We have had the example of pornography. The system I am referring to relates to online sales. Am I right in thinking that the system referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, relates to streaming? He will correct me if I am wrong.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. These are paid-for websites. People are paying for a service—there is an exchange. There is another option—I am grateful to the Minister for reminding me. Most financial transactions involving foreign websites are processed by UK credit card companies and so forth. The other way of ensuring that these transactions do not take place even though the company is beyond the UK’s jurisdiction is to ask UK card companies not to process payments to those particular companies. That is the second string to the BBFC bow in order to stop under-18s in the UK from, effectively, buying pornography from overseas websites. Similarly, the Government could put pressure on UK card companies to not process payments to overseas companies which are selling prohibited weapons to under-18s in the UK.
The noble Lord will agree that not all their sales would be of prohibited items.
To assist the Minister further, I can assure her that there are more websites worldwide providing pornography than there are providing offensive weapons, yet that has not prevented the Government taking action.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his intervention. I was not making a glib comment about a trawl; regarding the examples of card companies and delivery companies, we are taking action where we can, but I acknowledge, as I have all the way through the Bill, that we are trying to find the right balance. It is not absolutely perfect, but we are using everything in our armoury to help us guard against the sale of knives to those aged under 18.
My Lords, Amendment 91, tabled in my name and with the support of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, seeks to place on the face of the Bill a provision to exempt the kirpan from the provisions relating to the possession of offences weapons under the Criminal Justice Act 1988. I raised this issue in Committee, and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, for meeting me and a number of other noble Lords from all sides of the House, along with representatives of the Sikh community, including the noble Lord, Lord Singh. It was very much appreciated by everybody present.
There is no question but that the Sikh community is fully behind the intention of the Bill to tighten the law on offensive weapons. We are all appalled by the toll that knife crime is taking on young lives; even today we are seeing more tragic events on the news. The Government have responded to the very reasonable requests of the Sikh community on an issue in the Commons, but my intention with this amendment is to go further. The noble Lord, Lord Singh, raised the issue at Second Reading, and I supported him. It came up again in Committee, and many noble Lords spoke then.
For practising Sikhs, observance of their faith requires adherence to the “five Ks”, one of which is to wear a kirpan. Larger kirpans are used on many religious occasions, such as Sikh wedding ceremonies. I think it is fair to say that noble Lords in all parties, and on the Cross Benches, would be concerned if restrictions in this Bill had unintended consequences for the Sikh community as they observe and practise their faith, or caused upset or concern when a member of the community used a kirpan for ceremonial, sporting or historical reasons. The status quo is not adequate, as it provides a defence of religious reasons only if a person is charged with a criminal offence. It does not cover other reasons such as ceremonial, historical or sporting events, where kirpans are offered as gifts to dignitaries.
The status quo provides a defence only if a person is charged. My amendment will provide an exemption for the possession of a kirpan. It will provide a specific reference in the law, which Sikhs have been calling for. Sikhs are members of a law-abiding community that makes a wonderful contribution to the United Kingdom. The community still faces difficulties in workplaces, education and leisure with the issue of kirpans. This amendment will provide great assistance to Sikhs and will educate all of us about the kirpan. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment, which I fully support. One of the Minister’s main arguments against granting exemption to the Sikh community was that the Government could not single out one particular community—the Sikhs—for an exemption. In that case, I ask the Minister: what other communities have made representations to the Home Office for exemption under the Act?
My Lords, we return to the argument that the Bill is full of unnecessary new legislation that has clearly not been thought through and which is already adequately covered by existing legislation. The Bill is being used simply to send a message that the Government are taking the issues of knife crime and corrosive liquids seriously, instead of investing in those things that really make a difference, such as youth services and community policing.
In Committee I raised the fact that the offence of affray was almost identical to the proposed changes to the existing offences of threatening with an article with a blade, a pointed article or an offensive weapon. Section 1A(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 states that:
“A person is guilty of an offence if that person … has an offensive weapon with him or her in a public place … unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person with the weapon, and … does so in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person”.
Subsection (2) says:
“For the purposes of this section physical harm is serious if it amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861”.
Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 states:
“A person is guilty of an offence if that person … has an article to which this section applies with him or her in a public place or on school premises … unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person with the article, and … does so in such a way that there is an immediate risk of serious physical harm to that other person”.
Again, serious physical harm means grievous bodily harm under the Offences against the Person Act 1861.
The main differences proposed by the Bill concern the nature of the risk, which is changed from,
“immediate risk of serious physical harm”—
GBH—
to the person threatened, to a much wider definition of,
“a reasonable person (“B”) who was exposed to the same threat as A”,
that is, the person being threatened,
“would think that there was an immediate risk of physical harm to B”,
that is, the reasonable person.
So we go from an immediate risk of GBH to the person being threatened to a much vaguer concept of a reasonable person—is that a reasonable martial arts expert or a reasonable old-age pensioner—thinking that there was an immediate risk of physical harm. Does that mean common assault, ABH or GBH?
In Committee, the Minister and I engaged in an intellectual and legalistic argument over the technical differences between the offence of affray—in Section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986—and the proposed new offences. That section states:
“A person is guilty of affray if he uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another and his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety”.
So in affray we have,
“uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another”,
instead of,
“unlawfully and intentionally threatens another person”.
In affray we have,
“his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety”,
instead of,
“a reasonable person (“B”) who was exposed to the same threat as A would think there was an immediate risk of physical harm to B”.
Can the Minister really tell the House that there is a practical difference between a “person of reasonable firmness” fearing for their personal safety and a “reasonable person” thinking there was an immediate risk of physical harm? I would be grateful for an example. Indeed, the affray definition does not rely on the extremely vague concept of a “reasonable person” but instead refers to,
“a person of reasonable firmness”—
not a reasonable martial arts expert or a reasonable old-age pensioner but what we are really talking about: a person of reasonable firmness.
This legislation also adds further education premises to school premises in the 1988 offence, but affray can be committed in private as well as in public, so all premises are covered. Therefore, the only substantive difference between affray and the new offences is the maximum sentence on indictment: three years for affray and four years for the 1988 offence. This amendment addresses the one outstanding issue by increasing the maximum penalty for affray to four years for an offence in which a corrosive substance or bladed article has been used. I beg to move.
My Lords, this amendment returns, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, just said, to an issue that he raised in Committee about the differences between the revised offence of threatening with an offensive weapon in public in Clause 29 of the Bill and the offence of affray under Section 3 of the Public Order Act 1986. I wrote to him on this matter on 21 February. I will try to clarify the difference to your Lordships’ satisfaction and give an example of how it will work in practice. The difference between the two offences is not simply a matter of different maximum penalties, as Amendment 94 implies.
The offence of affray deals with circumstances where a bystander observes someone threatening another person and where the bystander feels threatened. The offences of threatening with an offensive weapon in public under Section 1A of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 and of threatening with an article with a blade or point or offensive weapons under Section 139AA of the Criminal Justice Act 1998 deal with circumstances where a person is themselves being threatened. Indeed, in practice it is possible to commit both offences at the same time, as the noble Lord will be aware and as the CPS charging advice sets out. An example would be where someone is holding person A by the throat in the road, screaming and shouting, but also waving a knife around in the air so that person B thinks that the defendant might also come for them—that would be an offence of affray—or someone might start a fight in a pub in such a way that people nearby think that the person might also start on them, as opposed to cases where there is not that perception that a bystander would be affected. Case law examples include driving a car at another occupied vehicle or setting dogs on the police with the words, “Go on! Go on!”—only in case law does such language get used.
Therefore, affray concerns a reasonable bystander who witnesses someone else being threatened and fears for their own personal safety. This is a different test from that under the offences amended by the Bill, which ask whether a reasonable person exposed to the same threat as the victim would think that there is an immediate risk of physical harm to that victim. Under the offences in the Bill it is therefore what a reasonable person in the victim’s shoes would be likely to feel when threatened, rather than whether a person witnessing a threat against someone else also feels threatened. Amendment 94 therefore fails to address the fact that these offences deal with different things. As I have indicated, it is not just about penalties, although I fully accept that I highlighted this as a key difference in Committee. Affray is a public order offence and therefore focuses on the weapon and the threat to the wider public, rather than the impact on the victim. The offences of threatening in public deal with the victim being threatened.
I hope, in the light of this further explanation, that the noble Lord is persuaded that we are not creating unnecessary duplication in the criminal law and, on that basis, will be content to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. I do not think that it does away with my general comments about the legislation as a whole but on this occasion, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I think we are all agreed that this is an important issue which needs to be debated. As my noble friend said, he is simply moving in his amendment what the Government put in their original legislation, so one would have thought that it would be uncontroversial. My noble friend has read out what the Home Secretary said in the debate at Second Reading in the other place. I think it is legitimate for us to ask the question and be given an answer as to why the Home Secretary has chosen to ignore the advice of the agencies concerned when he withdrew the amendment to the Bill. However, having said that, the Government have promised a consultation on this matter, which is an important statement on their part, and therefore it would be wise not to press the amendment to a vote today.
In the consultation that is to take place, I expect that the agencies quoted by the Home Secretary will want to tell Members of both Houses what their view is of the dangers of these weapons. As the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has outlined, officials have given a view about these pretty dreadful weapons. A .50 calibre rifle sounds almost innocuous, but they are basically sniper rifles that can take out a vehicle and human beings at a mile’s distance. These are formidable weapons in war. They are highly prized and valued in conflict given their accuracy and lethality.
I recall as Defence Secretary going to Bosnia and watching Operation Harvest involving members of the Royal Highland Fusiliers in Banja Luka. One of them, with a broad Glasgow accent, came back from one of the houses in the village with a sniper rifle. Since he did not have an interpreter with him, I wondered how he had managed to persuade the individual in the house to hand over such a prized instrument of the conflict. I think it was the nature of his accent that persuaded the inhabitant of the house that he was not a friendly force and they should therefore hand it over. It was regarded as enormously significant that day that he had managed to persuade them to hand over what was regarded as one of the key instruments of the conflict there.
It is quite legitimate for Members of the House to listen to the words of the Home Secretary read out by my noble friend. The Home Secretary said that he based these measures on,
“evidence that we received from intelligence sources, police and other security experts”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/6/18; col. 918.]
That is pretty all-embracing. This is not just a handful of individuals putting this forward. We are talking here about representatives of 43 police forces in the United Kingdom, the Secret Intelligence Service, the Security Service, GCHQ and the National Crime Agency. Their distilled view and wisdom was that if these weapons were to fall into the hands of criminals or others with malign intent, they would have particularly dangerous effects. The Home Secretary did not underestimate it. He said:
“According to the information that we have, weapons of this type have, sadly, been used in the troubles in Northern Ireland”—
the noble Earl said they had never been used in the United Kingdom, but we are told by the Home Secretary that they have—
“and, according to intelligence provided by police and security services, have been possessed by criminals who have clearly intended to use them”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/6/18; col. 919.]
We have had a discussion about knife crime, a huge issue affecting us at present. One can only imagine what would happen if the Home Secretary were right and criminal elements got their hands on .50 calibre rifles, and what damage they could do.
The noble Earl, Lord Erroll, poured scorn on advice given by officials. I was a Secretary of State and had officials who gave me advice in NATO as well. It is the role of Ministers to listen to advice and to make decisions, but the Home Secretary presumably would not come to Parliament not having given careful attention to the advice offered to him on that occasion. There must have been something pretty radical to change his mind—not just the assembled Members of Parliament who argued vociferously against it.
I went through the great debate about handguns in 1997-98, and I have heard all the arguments before. Yes, they will be safe if we have safeguards and the police are satisfied. I remember the number of people who had these handguns, some of them large numbers of handguns, and being assured that they were all safe—yet we saw the two major incidents in Hungerford and Dunblane caused by the private ownership of handguns.
I am not reassured by some of the statements that have been made. I would prefer to follow the course of action laid down by the Home Secretary in his opening speech at Second Reading. I hope that during the consultation we will be able to make that case and that the Home Secretary will return to his original view.
My Lords, I understand why the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy of Southwark and Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, are saying what they say. I am not as surprised as the noble Lords, in that my experience is that Governments argue until they are blue in the face that they could not possibly adopt an opposition amendment, only to adopt it at the next stage. Such a change of view is not without precedent when it comes to these matters.
I am more warmly disposed to the calls of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, for a compromise, if you will, of increased security. However, I hope to be even more convinced by the Minister that the right way forward is further consultation.
My Lords, I join this debate for a couple of reasons, having listened to it in Grand Committee in the Moses Room. I was disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, did not try to copy the accent of the HLI Jock. Your Lordships would have understood why the rifle was handed over.
I hope my noble friend on the Front Bench will solve an argument that I had at the weekend about how easy it is to modify a rifle that is constructed above 13,600 joules to below 13,600 joules. If that could be on the record it would be helpful. Also, could he not introduce the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Attlee under Section 63 of the 1968 Act?
Offensive Weapons Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 8 in my name would enable bladed products to still be delivered to home addresses by establishing a scheme whereby the product is delivered by a trusted courier. This is an issue that I have raised in all the Bill’s stages in this noble House. Initially, I thought a trusted trader scheme would be the best option but I concluded that this trusted courier scheme is a better way forward.
The Bill would prohibit the delivery of bladed objects to residential properties, and the concern of small and medium-sized knife manufacturers and retailers is about the detrimental impact this ban will have on their businesses. As more and more sales move online, consumers expect to be able to receive deliveries directly to their home.
I have said at each stage that I support the aims of the Bill but I am concerned that it is a legislative sledgehammer that will affect small and medium-sized businesses based in the UK while having no impact on knife crime whatever. There is no shred of evidence that these high-quality knives being sold online are being bought for criminal intent. If there were, it would have been presented.
I think we all accept that if you bought a knife online with the intent to stab someone, you would create a very easy evidence trail for the police to follow. We all want to achieve the Bill’s objective and reduce knife crime, but at the same time not destroy or damage UK-based businesses. All I seek is to achieve protection for British business in the form of an approved deliverer.
Representatives of the industry met me, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, and the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, a few weeks ago, when the industry put what I thought was a very convincing case to the Minister, along with the honourable Members for Sheffield Central and Sheffield South East. I want to find a solution that does not harm business, and I think this is the way forward. I beg to move.
My Lords, I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, in principle, although I have concerns about it. Noble Lords will recall that the Bill as drafted would mean that someone could order a knife from an overseas website and have it delivered to their home address, but could not order the same knife from a UK supplier and have it delivered to their home address. The noble Lord is attempting to remedy that situation. The difficulty I have with it—perhaps he can assist the House in this degree—is that the Bill also covers delivery to a locker. Would his amendment enable a trusted courier to deliver a bladed product to a locker as well as to residential premises, which in my view would be undesirable?
The second issue is that the amendment does not apply to Clause 41, which relates to the delivery of a bladed product to someone under 18 from an overseas website. The legislation sets down rules whereby, if the courier knows that the consignment contains a bladed product, they have to verify the age of the person to whom the bladed product is being delivered. I wonder whether it would be sensible, were the Government to accept that a trusted courier system is necessary, to extend that to Clause 41. Having said that, were the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, to divide the House, we would support his amendment.
My Lords, my noble friend will know how unhappy I am with the state of the Bill as it is. We are greatly disadvantaging British sellers of knives and doing almost nothing to control foreign sellers of knives. If we are after stopping knives getting into the hands of young people, sending them down a domestic route, where we know the person who has sold them and the courier who has delivered them and everything has been done in the open and properly, must be better than encouraging anyone buying knives to buy them abroad—indeed, making it almost essential—because only that way can they have them delivered to their homes.
If we were achieving something by the Bill as it is—if it was actually going to make things safer—I and, I suspect, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, would support the Government. But, as it is, we are just disadvantaging British business without making anything safer for anyone. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, is a step in the right direction—I am sure the drafting will be improved—but the main thing is that I would really like to see the Government accept that they need to improve the Bill in this area and to undertake to do so in the course of ping-pong.
My Lords, I will now speak to the amendments regarding kirpans, and in doing so express my gratitude to the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and Lord Singh, and my noble friend Lady Verma. They have all been tireless in their promotion of this issue; I hope that the amendments will provide an outcome satisfactory to everyone. In particular, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Singh, for his advice and to the organisation Sikhs in Politics, which has engaged positively with officials on the development of these amendments.
As noble Lords will recall, we held a round table on the issue of kirpans following the debate on these clauses in Grand Committee. This identified a gap in the current defences in that the cultural practice of gifting large ceremonial kirpans by Sikhs to eminent non-Sikhs was not covered by the “religious reasons” defence. These amendments will therefore create a defence for a person of Sikh faith to present another person with a curved sword in a religious ceremony or other ceremonial event, as covered by Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
These amendments will also create a defence for Sikhs of possessing such swords for the purposes of presenting them to others at a ceremony and for the recipients of such a gift to possess swords that have been presented to them. The amendments also ensure a defence is available for the ancillary acts, such as manufacture, sale, hire or importation, where those acts are for the purpose only of making the sword available for such presentation. Finally, the amendments enable the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to commence the provision in relation to Northern Ireland, other than in relation to importation, which is a reserved matter.
As noble Lords will be aware, the amendments do not mention the word “kirpan”. Kirpans vary considerably in their size and shape, with the only common factor being their association with the Sikh faith. It would not be possible to include a defence for kirpans without defining them legally. However, we are clear that these defences are specifically aimed at kirpans and we will include a reference to kirpans in the final Explanatory Notes for the Bill. We will also make it clear in the statutory guidance that defences of “religious reasons” and gifting by ceremonial presentation include, in particular, the possession, supply and gifting of kirpans for those purposes. We will certainly continue to engage with Sikh organisations, including Sikhs in Politics, when we develop the statutory guidance. I hope that, given what I have said, noble Lords will be able to support these amendments. I forgot to mention the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in my thanks, so I do that now.
I turn to the amendments on compensation arrangements. Amendment 10 will amend Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, so that any future order made under this section which has the effect of banning possession in private of an offensive weapon may also make provision for the surrender and payment of compensation for such weapons. This amendment therefore provides statutory authority to introduce surrender and compensation arrangements for any future orders bringing additional offensive weapons into full prohibition. Without this amendment and the authority it provides, there could be doubt as to whether compensation could be paid for any future prohibited offensive weapons.
I should point out that this amendment differs slightly from the existing provisions found under Clause 48, which allow for compensation payments to be made for offensive weapons which the Bill prohibits private possession of. Clause 48 requires the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers or the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to provide for such payments by regulations. However, this amendment provides that the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers or the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland may make provision for surrender arrangements and the subsequent payment of compensation.
This is an important difference as it allows the authority discretion in deciding whether or not to pay compensation for future items that become prohibited by way of an order. There may be exceptional circumstances in which it is considered that payment is not required under Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. However, it is anticipated that in most circumstances, a payment would be appropriate, as is the case for weapons the possession of which is prohibited under this Bill. None the less, providing this discretion to pay or not to pay compensation for future items is important.
Amendments 14 to 19 will ensure that cyclone knives fall within the compensation and surrender arrangements as they stand in the Bill. Noble Lords will recall that cyclone knives were prohibited by virtue of the Bill through a government amendment in Committee in this House. This minor amendment will allow for compensation to be paid to owners of these knives, in the same way that the compensation arrangements apply to the other offensive weapons which the Bill provides private possession of.
Amendment 20 then amends the date by which a person needed to have owned or contracted to acquire a cyclone knife in order to claim compensation. The date, 20 June 2018, is already set out in the Bill, and continues to apply to these weapons, private possession of which was prohibited by the Bill on introduction. The date of 22 January 2019 will apply to cyclone knives. This will allow anyone who owned or contracted to acquire a cyclone knife, up until the date that the government amendment prohibiting them was introduced, to claim for compensation.
Amendments 21 and 22 are consequential. Amendments 26 and 27 relate to Northern Ireland. Clauses 47 and 48 will come into force upon Royal Assent. However, these amendments allow the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to commence these provisions locally.
I remind noble Lords that the compensation regulations which we have published in draft are subject to the affirmative procedure following assent to the Bill. Accordingly, they will need to be debated and approved by both Houses before they can come into force. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for the amendments relating to kirpans—even though the legislation does not refer to kirpans as such—because of the importance to the Sikh community of presenting the ceremonial curved sword as a mark of esteem.
Representatives from the Sikh community have also pointed out the difficulties that some Sikhs have in carrying a kirpan on their person as part of their religious observance. Although it is accepted that it has not been a problem in terms of prosecution, the fact that possession of a bladed article or pointed instrument is an offence—without the need for any criminal intent—has created difficulties for Sikhs when visiting attractions such as Madame Tussauds and the London Eye. Sikhs have been barred from going into those attractions because of having a kirpan on them. The security guards are working on the basis that the law states that possession of a pointed instrument or a bladed article is an offence, and therefore a person is not allowed to bring it in. I do not know whether there is any scope here. The Minister has already mentioned the Explanatory Notes for the final legislation, including instructions about what is and is not a kirpan. Could anything be mentioned in those notes regarding the issue that some Sikhs have with regard to entry to those sorts of premises?
My Lords, before I begin, I refer to the discussion in Grand Committee when I referred to the Network of Sikh Organisations, the NSO. I should have mentioned that I am a member of the NSO. I make it clear that in the discussions on this Bill, and indeed, in all my contributions in this House, I speak as a member of the wider Sikh community. On behalf of all Sikhs, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and the Government for moving this amendment, and the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and Lord Tunnicliffe, for initiating an earlier amendment, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, with wider cross- party support.
I have heard it asked whether there is such a thing as an inoffensive weapon. The Sikh kirpan comes close, in that its use is limited to defence and the protection of the vulnerable. Again, I thank all in this House and in the other place for recognising and supporting the religious and cultural significance of the kirpan.
I thank the noble Baroness for the way she has conducted the Bill through the House. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe. I appreciate the constructive way they have engaged with the House, as they always do. I also place on record my thanks to my noble friends Lord Rosser and Lord Tunnicliffe for the help that they have given me, as well as to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I was grateful, too, for the contributions of many other noble Lords from around the House, particularly those of the noble Lords, Lord Lucas and Lord Singh, and the noble Earl, Lord Erroll.
We are certainly sending the Bill back in a better state than that in which it arrived. I am not sure that it will quite achieve all the things that it wants to do, but I certainly support its aims. We have done a good job. I also thank the Bill team at the Home Office, who have always been very courteous and happy to engage with me and other colleagues. I also put on record my thanks to Ben Wood, who works in the Opposition office here in the House of Lords and has kept me armed with briefing notes, amendments and everything else.
My Lords, I add my thanks to those expressed to the noble Baronesses, Lady Williams of Trafford and Lady Barran, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for the way they have conducted the Bill. As the noble Baroness mentioned, there has not really been a consensus on knife crime prevention orders and delivery of bladed articles. I think that my colleagues in the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Knife Crime will discuss knife crime prevention orders with their colleagues before the Commons has an opportunity to consider the amendments put forward by the Government that place knife crime prevention orders in the Bill. I hope that the Government will reflect on the delivery of bladed articles in the light of the amendment passed today. I am grateful to officials and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for the co-operation that we have had during the passage of the Bill.
My Lords, I too am grateful to my noble friends for the help that I have had in the course of the Bill and for the time that the Bill team have given me. I regret some of the decisions that we have taken. I think that we have hurt people needlessly and let ourselves in for compensation that we need not have paid, but there we are.
Offensive Weapons Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Paddick
Main Page: Lord Paddick (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Paddick's debates with the Department for International Development
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for explaining these amendments. I was going to say that, from the first day of this Bill, I pointed out that treating UK companies differently from overseas companies on delivery of bladed articles to residential premises was not sustainable. However, it was not on the first day but on the first day in Committee that I first raised the issue—and on the first day of Report and at Third Reading. Finally, the message has got through.
We supported the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, relating to the trusted courier scheme to ensure that the Government thought again about this issue. I am glad that, at last, they have agreed that it was not fair to say that overseas companies could deliver knives to residential premises but UK companies could not. These amendments address this issue and we therefore support them.
My Lords, I have spoken on this before, so I just want to say how much I welcome the movement by the Government on this Bill. It is very sensible and will go a long way. I make only two little points.
First, it is a pity we do not treat all items in this way. This could be a template for the delivery to a home of any age-restricted items. They may be age-restricted at various different levels: for some, the age restriction is 16; for others, it is 18. We could have had a template in a law somewhere which could be used and referred to by all other Acts of Parliament which place an age restriction on goods. It is a good opportunity. From that point of view, it seems a bit funny that we have this provision for knives, but not corrosive liquids, but that is as it is. I do not think corrosive liquids are such a big problem, because they tend to be delivered to commercial premises, as they are not household goods on the whole. This is very much to be welcomed. I think it is a good start.
Secondly, I am not sure whether to feel sorry for the Scots. The defence in England is worded generally enough that it could cover electronic means if, for instance, they complied with the British standard specification PAS 1296. That would be a good defence in court that you had verified things properly. However, I see that in Scotland it has to be a document, and I do not know whether that includes something electronic or not. I am not worried about that at the moment; it is a point for the future. I am not quite sure whether the Scots are being a little old-fashioned about it.