Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Barran Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for explaining these amendments. I do not think we are far apart in what we want to achieve in relation to deliveries to residential premises. I hope that I will be able to clarify our intentions and assuage any concerns that might remain.

Clause 17 makes it an offence for a remote seller of bladed products to send them to residential premises or a locker. When developing the offence, we were keen to ensure that it did not apply to the delivery of products to residential premises from which a business was run—the noble Baroness gave the example of a craftsperson in a shed. We heard during the consultation from builders, plumbers and others who ran businesses from their homes. These people sometimes needed to have tools and other bladed products delivered to them quickly to allow them to carry on their businesses. We were also keen to ensure that farms would not be affected by the prohibition on delivery to residential premises. This point was made on Monday by the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, and again today by the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose.

To achieve this, the definition of a residential premises at Clause 17(5) is limited to those that are,

“used solely for residential purposes”.

This means that anyone who runs a business from their home can continue to have bladed products delivered there. To put this beyond any doubt, Clause 17(6) explicitly states that, where a business is carried on from a premises, it is not to be regarded as a residential premises. I hope this addresses the example that the noble Baroness gave; her face suggests that she is not entirely convinced.

Amendments 43A, 43B and 43C would achieve the same effect but are unnecessary. Where a person runs a business from residential premises which they own or occupy, the Bill already ensures that they can have bladed products delivered to such premises. It will be for the seller to satisfy themselves that they are not sending the bladed products to an address that is used solely for residential purposes. The noble Baroness raised the earlier example from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, of UPS, the delivery company. The noble Lord is right that there is no fool-proof way of establishing whether a property is a genuine business address. However, we are creating in Clause 17 a new offence for the seller, and in Clause 18(1) we set out the defences to that offence. We hope that these together will motivate the seller to take “all reasonable precautions” in verifying the address, although we acknowledge that there is no fool-proof way of doing that.

There are various ways that a seller could ascertain whether a premises is used as a business. The buyer could provide evidence that the house was registered for business purposes or they could provide confirmation in writing of the business entity and confirmation that the business is run from home. In many cases the seller will also have a relationship with the buyer as a business, possibly having supplied them with bladed products over many years. I hope this provides the clarity sought on these provisions and that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendments.

[The Duke of Montrose]

Again, going back to my problem of sheep-clippers, or itinerant workers, do the business premises being delivered to have to be in the name of the person carrying out the business? If you happen to land with somebody who is running a business, could you have something delivered there?

[Baroness Barran]

There is no restriction on delivering to a business premises.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the Official Report has already recorded my response, as noted by the noble Baroness.

I think we will all want to spend some time after this stage of the Bill looking at the various provisions that together make up what can and cannot be done. I would add to the mix the point raised on Monday which arises under Clause 18—it is not only my noble friend’s campaign about offences and defences—about the terms “all reasonable precautions” and “all due diligence” and how “all” applies in this situation. I want to spend quite a lot of time understanding what we have been told, how it is reflected in the Bill and what we should pursue at the next stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Barran]

As the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has explained, this amendment would make it a criminal offence for a businessperson to display a bladed product. The amendment seeks to replicate for knives the legislation in place on the display of tobacco products.

As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has just pointed out, the prohibition on the display of tobacco products is to help reduce the major risk to public health that comes from smoking: it is to help reduce smoking uptake by those under 18 and to support adult smokers who want to quit by removing temptation from open display. We do not want to stop people buying knives, only to stop their sale to under-18s. Requiring businesses to remove all bladed products from open display and to have them hidden away could have significant cost implications in terms of staff to operate the secure displays and for fixtures and the layout of stores. Our estimate shows that the cost to business of a requirement to lock bladed products into cabinets would be very significant. The Government believe a legal requirement not to display knives for all sellers, regardless of whether knife crime is a problem in the area where the business is placed, is not a proportionate measure. We believe that voluntary action on a risk-based basis will achieve the same aim.

The Home Office voluntary agreement with retailers including Wilko, Morrisons, Tesco and Argos includes an agreement that retailers will ensure knives are displayed and packed securely as appropriate to minimise risk. This includes retailers taking practical and proportionate action to restrict accessibility, avoid immediate use, reduce the possibility of injury and prevent theft. Retailers are also looking at more technology-based measures to prevent theft and to ensure that age verification takes place consistently in every case. For instance, retailers tell us that the use of tagging and more advanced bar-coding have proven to be an active deterrent in relation to both theft and age verification.

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[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I apologise for missing the first few words of my noble friend’s introductory remarks on this amendment. I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said because I wonder whether the wording in the government amendment is as precise as it is intended to be. The Chartered Trading Standards Institute—I refer to my interests in terms of trading standards—says that a correct definition, if you mean just weights and measures authorities, would be,

“a local weights and measures authority”,

in Great Britain,

“within the meaning set out in section 69 of the Weights and Measures Act 1985”.

The Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland may enforce within its area, rather than simply talking in those terms. I wonder whether a broader definition would not make sense, given that in many local authorities now the trading standards function, which is so diminished, is often spread with other responsibilities. That may be something the Government want to take away and look at to make sure that what they are trying to achieve meets the obligation.

The second point about whether this should be made a duty is important as well. People I know very well in the Chartered Trading Standards Institute try to get this both ways: they complain constantly about all the statutory duties placed on local authorities, and therefore the inability of local authorities to take them seriously, but they also say, “Here is something which ought to be a statutory duty”. The psychological effect of making it clear that the Government wish to place a responsibility on local authorities to pursue their role in this matter would be extremely helpful and valuable. If the Government were to find some way of making the resources available, so that, rather than just placing the duty, they could also ensure that local authorities had the wherewithal to take effective action, that would be extremely helpful.

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, the amendments in this group are directed at a common end—namely, to support the effective enforcement of the provisions of the Bill by local authorities. Amendment 59 introduces a legal duty on local authorities to enforce the legislation in relation to the sale and delivery of bladed articles and corrosive substances.

Local authorities in England and Wales already regulate the sale of bladed articles using general powers in Section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972. Under that section, where a local authority considers it expedient for the promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants of its area, it may prosecute, defend or appear in legal proceedings and, in the case of civil proceedings, may institute them in its own name.

There is no reason why local authorities could not use the general powers under the Local Government Act 1972 to enforce the provisions in the Bill in relation to the sale of corrosive products. It is also possible for the legislation in relation to sales of bladed articles and corrosive products to be enforced by the police. Consistent with these existing powers, the Government do not believe that it is necessary to impose a duty on local authorities to enforce the legislation in relation to the sale of bladed articles and corrosive products.

That is not to say that local authorities’ enforcement powers in this area cannot be strengthened. This leads me to Amendment 60, which seeks to extend the application of the investigative powers provided for in the Consumer Rights Act 2015. These powers enable local authorities to: require information from sellers; observe the carrying on of business; enter premises without warrant; inspect products; test equipment; require the production of documents; or seize and detain goods.

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[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I am very slow today. The Minister has spent a lot of time agreeing with me and then she has not suggested that we should adopt the amendment. Is she suggesting that we should adopt the amendment or is she trying to persuade me that it is not necessary?

[Baroness Barran]

I am trying to persuade the noble Lord that the Government’s amendments will achieve the same aim.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

No change there.

[Baroness Barran]

Returning to the question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about weights and measures, I am advised that this approach goes with the grain of existing legislation. We believe that weights and measures authorities are in fact local authorities, but I will confirm that in writing.

[Baroness Hamwee]

When that is done, could examples —not a whole list of the grain to which the Minister refers—be given to us?

[Baroness Barran]

We will gladly do that.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked for more detail about the prosecution fund that was announced in the Government’s Serious Violence Strategy. The Government committed £500,000 in 2018-19 and another £500,000 in 2019-20 to support local authorities to bring prosecutions, where appropriate, in relation to age-restricted sales of knives. The prosecution fund is managed by National Trading Standards, which is the body that brings together trading standards representatives in England and Wales. The fund will be used by 11 local areas identified as having a knife crime problem to test compliance with sale of knives legislation. I think the noble Lord will be pleased to hear that Croydon is among the 11 areas since he referred to the good work that is going on there.

Amendment 86 would enable local authorities and companies to establish partnerships with the purpose of complying with the provisions in the Bill. The noble Lord will correct me if I am wrong, but I suspect that this amendment is aimed at extending the benefits of the primary authority scheme. The primary authority scheme was created in response to recommendations in the Hampton report published in 2005, which noted widespread inconsistencies of regulatory interpretation between different local authorities. It was introduced in April 2009. The Enterprise Act 2016 included measures to amend the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 to enable many more small businesses and pre-start-up enterprises to participate in primary authority.

The primary authority scheme provides greater regulatory consistency for businesses operating across a number of local authority areas. This is expected to improve compliance with the legislation. The scheme is based on the creation of a statutory partnership between a business and its primary authority. The primary authority acts as a key point of contact for a business that it partners with, in relation to the business’s interaction with local authorities that regulate it, known as enforcing authorities. The primary authority acts as co-ordinator of other local authority inspections of that business. The primary authority supports businesses in meeting their obligations by helping them to understand what needs to be done to achieve or maintain compliance: setting out a way of doing so, or providing information that the method of compliance chosen by the business is acceptable. For the benefit of noble Lords, I will mention that all the major supermarkets, Amazon and the Association of Convenience Stores—given that your Lordships have mentioned the importance of smaller retailers several times—are all part of the primary authority scheme. The scheme has been received positively and has had widespread uptake and support from businesses, professional bodies and local authorities. Government Amendment 82 therefore extends the scheme to the sale of bladed articles and corrosive products. Amendments 88 and 90 are consequential on the earlier amendments.

In short, the government amendments in this group achieve much the same end as the amendments in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Kennedy. On that basis I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw Amendment 59.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I shall read the Minister’s response with some care, but in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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We ought to look at the boundary in a sensible way and say that some of these objects are not of any practical worry to police forces or to us in general because they will never, in any sensible way, be the kind of knife people will chose to use in criminal activity. As an earlier speaker pointed out, there are many millions of knives in the UK. These objects are among the least likely to be used in crime. They are, to those who collect them, objects of significant value and interest. We should, I think, allow them to continue to be possessed. I beg to move.

[Baroness Barran]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his explanation of these amendments which relate to the provisions in Clause 22, updating the prohibition on flick and gravity knives. Amendment 64 seeks to widen the defences for those charged under the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 or the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 to cover conduct relating to a weapon for the purposes of functions carried out on behalf of the Crown or a visiting force, for the purposes of theatrical performance or filming, or in relation to a weapon of historical importance or which was manufactured before 1945. It may be helpful if I describe briefly the current legislation and the changes provided for in the Bill.

Section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 makes it a criminal offence to manufacture, sell, hire or lend a flick-knife or a gravity knife. The importation of such knives is prohibited by Section 1(2) of the Act. Clause 21 amends the 1959 Act to update the definition of a flick-knife. The current definition is quite old, and new designs are available that mimic the speed with which a flick-knife can be opened, but do not strictly fall under the existing definition. For example, in many models currently on the market, the mechanism that allows the blade to open at great speed may not be in the handle—as required by the current definition—but the knives nevertheless mimic a flick-knife.

Clause 22 extends the current offence of possession of a flick-knife or gravity knife in a public place to cover any possession, whether in a public or private place. These weapons have no legitimate use, and we believe that it is appropriate that they are prohibited both in public and in private. This will ensure that the police will be able to seize these weapons if they come across them.

Clause 22 provides a defence for a person charged with an offence under the 1959 Act if the person shows that they have the weapons in their possession for the purpose of making the knives available to a museum or gallery, or if the person is acting on behalf of a museum or gallery. We have included this defence following responses to the public consultation that informed the Bill. In relation to whether a defence should be provided for the purposes of functions carried out on behalf of the Crown or a visiting force, flick and gravity knives have been prohibited for a long time. As my noble friend would expect, we have consulted the Ministry of Defence about these provisions and it has advised us that there is no need for such a defence to cover the Armed Forces. In relation to a defence for the purpose of theatrical performance or filming, new subsection (2F) already allows the lending and hiring of flick-knives and gravity knives by museums or galleries for cultural, artistic or educational purposes.

Nor am I persuaded that a defence should be provided for items of historical importance or which were manufactured before 1945. I am concerned that this defence may be used by people who want to use these weapons in crime. Such a person may deliberately seek to acquire a knife made before 1945, or they may argue that the knife belonged to their parents or grandparents and that the weapons were manufactured before 1945. I believe that we need to be cautious and should not provide defences under this legislation that could be easily abused. I hope that my noble friend agrees with me on this point.

Amendment 65 also seeks to exclude from the ambit of the law flick and gravity knives manufactured before 1945. As I understand it, my noble friend’s intention is also to future-proof the legislation to ensure that, irrespective of the passage of time, a flick or gravity knife manufactured after 1945 can never acquire the status of an antique. Again, I hope I can persuade my noble friend that this amendment is not needed. The 1959 Act does not provide an exemption for antique flick and gravity knives. The antique exclusion applies only to weapons to which Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies, which brings me to the beginning of my noble friend’s earlier words. I accept that there is a disparity between these two provisions, but it is one that has been in place since 1988. Moreover, the prohibition on flick and gravity knives has now been in place for 60 years and has operated successfully without an exception for antique knives. That being the case, I am unpersuaded that we should now alter this approach by merging the regimes under the 1959 and 1988 Acts as the amendment seeks to do. I hope I have been able to persuade my noble friend that these amendments are unnecessary and that he will be content to withdraw them.

[The Duke of Montrose]

The question of exception for use for theatrical purposes was included in the 1988 Act under Section 141. Is it necessary to repeat it here?

[Baroness Barran]

The advice I am getting is that it is necessary because they are subject to different legislation. If that is not entirely clear I am happy to write to my noble friend.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I hope that I will have the opportunity to pursue some details of this with my noble friend afterwards. I am particularly interested in what the Government propose to do about the major item to be prohibited under this legislation, which is World War II German paratroopers’ knives. Since these are of no conceivable use—they are gravity knives but without a point—they are not something that can sensibly be used in knife crime. I do not know whether the Government intend to compensate people who are currently legal owners of these objects and let themselves in for a large bill or whether they are to be turned in without compensation, but I am happy to cover those matters in conversations between Committee and Report. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Barran]

66: Clause 25, page 28, line 10, at end insert—
“(2A) In paragraph 1, after paragraph (s) insert—“(t) the weapon sometimes known as a “cyclone knife” or “spiral knife” being a weapon with—(i) a handle,(ii) a blade with two or more cutting edges, each of which forms a helix, and (iii) a sharp point at the end of the blade.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would make it an offence under section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to manufacture, supply or possess a weapon known as a “cyclone knife” or “spiral knife” in England and Wales or Northern Ireland.

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, these amendments add a knife often referred to as a “cyclone knife” or “spiral knife” to the list of offensive weapons prohibited under Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The prohibition will apply in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Sections 141(1) and (1A) of the 1988 Act prohibit the manufacture, sale or hire, and possession in private of those offensive weapons specified in an order made under Section 141(2). Currently 19 weapons are prohibited in England, Wales and Northern Ireland under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988, with separate legislation applying in Scotland.

So-called cyclone knives are designed and manufactured in a way that has no purpose other than to cause injury. We have not been able to identify any legitimate alternative uses for such knives. The way they are marketed in the USA is purely in terms of their ability to inflict significant harm to individuals and cause maximum injury. We have also seen videos on several platforms where the weapon is promoted for its ability to pierce police armour and to leave a wound which is “difficult to stitch up”.

Although there is no evidence that these weapons are being marketed in the UK in the same way, we believe that there are no reasons why they should be on sale. There is no evidence, as yet, that cyclone knives have been used in criminal activity in the UK, although a cyclone knife was discovered by Metropolitan Police officers in a dawn raid in Lewisham in August, along with class A and class B drugs. We believe that it is right to act pre-emptively and prohibit these knives now.

In defining a cyclone knife, the most important elements are that it has a twisted blade, a point and a handle. The handle is important because we want to avoid capturing large screws and drill bits in the definition. Certain types of drill bits will have sharp edges along the length of the bit, but it is the presence of a handle that would make any item useful as a weapon. An implement with twisted blades but a blunt point would also be limited in its utility as a weapon. Finally, what distinguishes a cyclone knife from others is that it has more than one cutting edge along the length of the helix. I am sure noble Lords would agree that there is no place for such knives where their only conceivable use is as a weapon. I beg to move.

Amendment 66 agreed.

Moved by

[Baroness Barran]

67: Clause 25, page 28, line 40, leave out from beginning to “, after” in line 41 and insert—
“(8) The Schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons)(Scotland) Order 2005 (SSI 2005/483) is amended as follows.(8A) In paragraph 1, after paragraph (q) insert— “(r) the weapon sometimes known as a “cyclone knife” or “spiral knife” being a weapon with—(i) a handle,(ii) a blade with two or more cutting edges, each of which forms a helix, and(iii) a sharp point at the end of the blade.”(8B) In paragraph 2”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would make it an offence under section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to manufacture, supply or possess a weapon known as a “cyclone knife” or “spiral knife” in Scotland.

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[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I support this amendment, which is why I added my name to it. There is little that I can usefully add because, as members of the Sikh community, the noble Lord, Lord Singh, and the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, have already articulated exactly why this amendment should be accepted. I hope that the Government can accept it.

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for setting out the case for exempting all kirpans from the relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. I can reassure him from the outset that both I and my noble friend Lady Williams would be delighted to meet representatives of the Sikh Council UK and other noble Lords as the noble Lord sees fit to discuss their concerns.

Before I go on, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Singh, and my noble friend—

[Lord Singh of Wimbledon]

Could I just correct that to the Network of Sikh Organisations, not the Sikh Council?

[Baroness Barran]

I thank the noble Lord for the correction. The spirit of my comment is that we will respect whoever he feels it is appropriate for the Minister and me to meet. I also thank him for his very helpful introduction, which gave us a sense of the historical context of the discrimination that Sikhs have faced over the years, despite their values, which he outlined for us. I thank also my noble friend Lady Verma for her explanation of the importance of the kirpan to the cultural identity of the Sikh community.

While I have great sympathy for the issue raised by noble Lords, a key difficulty with this amendment is how to define a kirpan in legislation in a way that does not open up a glaring loophole that could be readily exploited. A kirpan is only a kirpan in relation to Sikh culture and faith, otherwise it is simply a knife or a sword. In our discussions with the Sikh community, it was made clear that there is no such thing as a standard kirpan. They can come in all forms: some have curved blades and some do not; some have long blades, while others have short blades. The fundamental problem with the noble Lord’s amendment is that it depends on a legally sound definition of a kirpan which until now simply does not exist. The only thing that distinguishes a kirpan from other swords and knives is its use for religious purposes.

Under Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 it is already a defence to possess a bladed article, including a kirpan, in a public place with good reason or lawful authority. The legislation is clear that good reason includes religious reasons. Similarly, Section 139A of the 1988 Act, which prohibits possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon on school premises, includes a good reason defence which again includes religious reasons. As the noble Lord is aware, Clause 25 amends the Criminal Justice Act (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 to provide a religious reasons defence for the possession in private of weapons covered by Section 141 of the 1988 Act, which can include large ceremonial kirpans where they have a curved blade of more than 50 centimetres.

The possession of kirpans for religious reasons is therefore covered under all of the possession offences. In addition to religious reasons, the offences include other defences—for example, for re-enactment activities and sporting purposes, as was mentioned by the noble Lord, and for items of historic importance—but these are not just aimed at kirpans.

Finally, we should be clear that when a kirpan is possessed for non-religious reasons it should be treated like any other bladed article. Crime is unfortunately committed by all parts of our society including, sadly, the Sikh community. Just because something is claimed to be a kirpan does not mean it cannot be used as a weapon, and it is quite right, for example, that the police might want to question why someone is carrying a ceremonial kirpan at three in the morning if they are hanging around a former partner’s home. Clearly Sikhs should be able to own and carry kirpans in public and use them in Sikh martial arts where this is part of their faith. The law already provides for that.

[Baroness Verma]

I hope I can be helpful to my noble friend. The kirpan is worn as part of the five Ks. We do not carry the kirpan in any other form. It is worn. Where the difficulty will lie is that it is always worn for religious purposes. People who are practising Sikhs have to have it as part of their five Ks. I am looking to the noble Lord, Lord Singh, who is much more experienced in this than I am, as I do not know how we would be able to differentiate the carrying from the wearing for religious purposes. I understand what my noble friend says about gifting it to a non-practising Sikh when it could be seen as a weapon, but in worship through the Sikh faith the kirpan is worn as a religious item. I hope that clarifies this rather than muddying the waters.

[Baroness Barran]

I thank my noble friend for her helpful explanation. I hope we can explore these things in detail when we meet, before too long, I hope.

The Sikh Federation (UK) and the Sikh Council UK raised concerns via the All-Party Parliamentary Group on British Sikhs about the provisions.

[Lord Singh of Wimbledon]

I wish to put in context that the Sikh Federation (UK) is not a representative body of the Sikh community. Concerns have been raised by the Network of Sikh Organisations. They are trying to capitalise and muddy the waters. It would be helpful if the Government dealt with the Network of Sikh Organisations, which represents the vast part of the Sikh community.

[Baroness Barran]

I thank the noble Lord for his advice. As I mentioned earlier, the spirit of our meeting is that we will take his steer on who we should talk to about this. The point I raised simply reflected the fact that those organisations raised concerned with the All-Party Parliamentary Group on UK Sikhs about the provisions in the Bill.

[Lord Singh of Wimbledon]

The All-Party Parliamentary Group and the Sikh Federation are one and the same thing. They are exactly the same, and everyone knows it.

[Baroness Barran]

I thank the noble Lord for clarifying that point. Concerns were raised on the possession of long kirpans. As a result, the Government amended the Bill to include a defence for religious reasons rather than religious ceremonies, which is narrower. No concerns were raised in relation to any other provisions of the Criminal justice Act. Moreover, members of the Sikh community have been able to carry kirpans in public, including long kirpans, in religious parades—I am not sure whether that addresses my noble friend’s earlier point—and the Bill will not change that. I am therefore not persuaded that a wholesale exemption for kirpans from the provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is needed. I fully understand the importance the Sikh community attaches to this issue. Indeed, I understand it better thanks to the interventions of noble Lords. With the reassurance of a future meeting, I hope I have been able to persuade the noble Lord that we have the balance right and that he will be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

This takes me back to those heady days when we had a Labour Government and I was a lowly Whip. That sounds like a very Treasury counterargument. One day when I was handling a particular clause, I was told that it was impossible to frame the legislation to meet the need. I said, from my lowly position in the massive meeting, “You’d better try because otherwise you will get the words that are in the amendment because it will pass at the next stage”. At that, there was a great writing of things and, lo and behold, the Government managed to find an amendment which was satisfactory. I strongly recommend that the Government make an intense effort to frame an amendment of their own which meets the across-the-board support for the spirit of this amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

Before the noble Lord withdraws his amendment, it should be said that concerns are being expressed at the impression being given by the Government of there being no room for negotiation on this issue. I hope that they will at least approach that meeting with an open mind rather than giving the impression, as might be inferred from what the Minister has said from the Dispatch Box, that there is no room for manoeuvre.

[Baroness Barran]

I can reassure the noble Lord that the Government will approach the meeting with an open mind. I tried to be clear that the key issue is achieving a specific definition for a kirpan, which we will obviously make every effort to work with. We will see whether that is possible.

[Lord Sheikh]

I have had representations from various Sikhs in the past few days—not members of the association but ordinary Sikhs—asking me to speak on this subject. They feel very strongly about it. What is being asked for is reasonable. As I said, there is great disquiet among Sikhs that this is happening. I therefore suggest to my noble friend that she enter dialogue and not close the door. That would be greatly appreciated by the community—I do not necessarily mean the association; the noble Lord, Lord Singh, has already alluded to that. Let us have a discussion with the community to see whether an amicable settlement can be reached that is acceptable to it. I speak as a Muslim and not as a Sikh.

[Baroness Barran]

I hear the concerns of several noble Lords. I reassure them again that we will enter the conversation with a very open mind.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

I cannot remember the last time I had such broad-based support. I feel that I need to bask in it for a few seconds, but enough is enough. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.