(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, has secured this important and timely debate. In the time available, I want to make two points. First, I very much endorse the recommendation of the Public Administration Select Committee for a commission on the Civil Service. That case is well made in its report. The Government’s Civil Service Reform Plan focuses on making the Civil Service more effective both in service delivery and in offering policy advice. As I said in evidence to the Public Administration Committee, it takes a narrow and one-dimensional view of the relationship between Ministers and civil servants.
Ministers depend on good civil servants. Conversely, civil servants rely on good Ministers, and Parliament relies on Ministers and officials who understand their responsibilities to Parliament. The system relies on an understanding of these relationships, but the basis on which this rests is being eroded. It is being eroded as a consequence of the turnover in senior civil servants and the lack of turnover in the party in government. Some politicians have become senior Ministers with no prior experience of government. Turnover in the senior Civil Service takes out the administrative experience and specialisation that offsets the fact that both civil servants and Ministers are generalists.
This makes the case for a major review and one that puts the Civil Service within the context of our system of government and not simply as some discrete managerial entity. Ministers see civil servants as part of the problem without acknowledging that they too are part of the problem. For that reason, the decision on how to address the problem should not be left to government.
That brings me to my second point. The Government have rejected the proposal for a commission. That, combined with my preceding point, means that it is up to Parliament to take ownership of the process. I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, and my noble friend Lord Waldegrave: on practical grounds we will not get an independent commission. If the Government decline to support a Joint Committee, it is up to this House to establish an ad hoc committee on the Civil Service. In response to my noble friend Lord Waldegrave, that would time limit the actual inquiry.
We are not short of expertise, as is so clearly demonstrated by this debate. My comments today are thus not addressed to the Minister but to the House. In my view, we should grasp the opportunity.
(12 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 65 I shall also speak to Amendments 67, 70, 71, 75, 76, 77 and 113, which are in the names of my noble friends Lady Royall and Lady Hayter. This is an extensive group of amendments but the main focus is to expand greatly the amount of information that the register holds. For example, one of the key amendments in the middle of this group concentrates on the detail of spending by lobbyists. This is important as, without these details, it is possible only to build up a very limited picture of the lobbying activity taking place because, as Unlock Democracy says in its briefing to noble Lords:
“A good faith estimate of what it being spent on lobbying would also show scale, disparities and trends in lobbying”.
Compare the current, limited proposals in the Bill with the level of transparency in place in the United States, where it is relatively easy to find out how much is being spent, and by which companies and sectors, using publicly available information. For example, the Senate record of spending shows that Boeing spent $15,440,000 on lobbying in the US in 2012. General Electric spent $21,200,000. These are very significant sums and they are spent by in-house lobbyists. As we know, this can have a marked effect on policy and the discussions around it. For example, an IMF working paper from 2009 draws a direct link between the amounts of money spent in lobbying by financial services firms and high-risk lending practices before the financial crisis. Ameriquest Mortgage and Countrywide Financial, both of which were at the heart of the crash, spent $20.5 million and $8.7 million respectively in political donations, campaign contributions and lobbying activities from 2002 to 2006. The IMF paper concludes that,
“the prevention of future crises might require weakening political influence of the financial industry or closer monitoring of lobbying activities to understand better the incentives”.
This is still pertinent here. As recently as 2 July, the head of the Prudential Regulation Authority was reported in the FT as saying that he was going to draw up rules to prevent the banks lobbying parliamentary officials against new requirements for leverage. Under the proposals in the Bill, we will not get any of the same transparency when it comes, for example, to lobbying by the big six energy companies. It has been reported that Ministers from the Department of Energy and Climate Change have met representatives from the energy giants on 128 occasions since 2010, yet have held talks with the main groups representing energy consumers only 26 times during the same period. We need much more information about what is going on here.
Amendment 65 would exclude the option of an individual residence being listed as the address of a lobbyist. Our concern is that this seems to represent a potential loophole, which we urge the Government to reconsider. The effect of the Bill, if passed in its current form, is that the level of transparency for the register is limited to the individual name and address of a main place of business or, if there is no such place, the individual’s residence. This is surely a loophole that would bar us from knowing who the individual works for. That concern fits into the wider point raised by our Amendment 67: that an increase in transparency should allow us to see who is lobbying on behalf of a company and which members of staff are engaged in that lobbying.
There are also a number of amendments in this group in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie. We should be very grateful for the way in which he has gone through the Bill with such forensic attention to detail. His amendments have similar intentions to ours and we support them. I beg to move.
My Lords, my Amendment 115 is in this group. From my point of view, it is the core amendment in terms of shifting the emphasis of the Bill. As I have drafted it, the clause is designed to be integrated in the Bill, but essentially it seeks to advance an alternative to what the Government propose. If the Government insist on the current provisions of the Bill then, as today has increasingly shown, it will achieve little by way of making lobbying of Government transparent; if anything, we are establishing that it may serve to obscure rather than enlighten.
As we have heard, the focus of Part 1 as it stands is on those who lobby. As I argued at Second Reading, a more comprehensive approach, achieving transparency without the need for a clunky bureaucratic framework, is to focus on those who are lobbied. That would shift the emphasis far more to the actual activity. My amendment is designed to give effect to what I argued at Second Reading.
If one placed a statutory requirement on Ministers when making statements of the sort enumerated in Clause 3 to publish at the same time details of those who lobbied them on the matter, that would ensure that the public were aware of all those who had lobbied the department. I stress the department because the amendment encompasses civil servants, special advisers and PPSs. Any representations made to anyone in the department would be shown. It would not matter who the lobbyists were: full-time independent lobbyists, in-house lobbyists, part-time lobbyists or individuals making representations on that particular issue—all would be caught. We would thus have true, comprehensive transparency. That is the key point, and it is important that we establish the principle.
I know what the Government’s response will be because the Minister kindly replied to my amendment earlier, before I had spoken to it. It is clear what the Government’s position is: “We believe in transparency as long as it’s not too much trouble”. That is essentially what was advanced. Yet we have already heard today a fair amount of material that suggests that it is doable. My noble friend Lord Tyler has made a powerful case for a database and has explained how it could be done—it is manageable. My amendment would take us somewhat further than that in terms of the amount of information that would be produced, and perhaps the time when it was produced because it would be drawn together at a particular point, but, as my noble friend has demonstrated, putting that material together is not that difficult.
At Second Reading I made the case, and I will revert to it, about what Select Committees do. The Minister was saying, “When a Minister brings forward a Bill, good heavens, he might receive lots of representations. If he had to produce and publish those, my goodness, the workload would be horrendous. How could it be achievable?”. Well, what would happen if a Select Committee received lots of representation, perhaps in three figures, when it was conducting an inquiry, and then when it was doing its report actually had to list those who had made representations and then publish the evidence? Oh, my goodness—it already does. Select Committees manage that sort of exercise on very lean resources, so the Government should be able to undertake a similar exercise with the resources at their disposal. As my noble friend Lord Tyler has indicated, it is no longer a case of putting together lots of papers from different sources; much can be done electronically, such as recording meetings for the database and publishing Ministers’ diaries the day after the event, so we are already getting there. That is not the obstacle that the Minister was suggesting, so it is not really credible now to argue that it is not doable; it is.
The problem is not the practicality but the political will. If the political will were there to achieve it then it could be done, and it would achieve the Government’s stated aim in a way that Part 1 simply does not do. As it is drafted, it would not achieve a great deal at all; it would create a burden of bureaucracy that would not add much by way of transparency. If we believe in the transparency of lobbying—in other words, if we actually want to give effect to the first words of the Short Title—then this is the route to go. I look forward to the Minister’s second response.
My Lords, I support wholeheartedly the amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, although I have slight reservations as it is debatable whether PPSs should be included.
I shall speak to Amendments 68 and 69, which stand in my name in this group. Amendment 68 is to press Ministers on whether they feel the Bill adequately covers the possibility that lobbyists may, for whatever reason, seek to hide the name of the recipient of the payment. There is a reference in Schedule 1, Part 2 to the beneficiaries of payments, but I do not think it is absolutely clear what the intention is there. A person lobbying may be acting on behalf of another whose identity as a lobbyist is not to be revealed, but where the person whose name or company name is not to be revealed is the recipient of the financial consideration. There may be circumstances where a lobbyist has been subcontracted by another lobbyist to carry out work where the subcontractor has an expertise which the main contractor lacks, but where the main contractor does not wish to lose their client account due to a lack of expertise. There may be circumstances where a lobbyist subcontracts the work for a particular client to avoid revealing to another client that the main contractor lobbyist has other clients in the same commercial sector. There may be circumstances where a lobbyist hires a subcontractor for Client A to avoid revealing to his or her client that he is also representing Client B, whose interests are diametrically opposed. These are but a few scenarios that could include the avoidance of registrar penalties, potential disqualification as a registered person or even matters relating to liability to the Inland Revenue.
Amendment 69 brings us to the heart of the legislation. It dominated debate in the Commons. It would require the name of the person lobbied and the subject of the lobbying, which we have been dealing with extensively this evening. It follows broadly the case made by Graham Allen MP, chair of Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, in his Amendment 100 during Report stage in the Commons. His committee had recommended:
“The information that the registrar requires to be listed should be expanded to include the subject matter and purpose of the lobbying, when this is not already clear from a company’s name. To be clear, this should not involve the disclosure of detailed information about the content of the meeting—just a broad outline of the subject matter and the intended outcome”.
The Government’s response to that recommendation is just not credible. It talks of the availability of information, which I raised on an earlier amendment on ministerial diaries. We know that that system does not work because it is a congested system. The truth is that we have a huge gap in transparency and, sadly, the Government are doing very little to bridge it. The register is useless if all it does is list a few names that are already on the lists of the professional bodies. We need real hard information on who is lobbying, when they lobby, on what issue and on whose account.
I think that that is unlikely, but this is obviously something on which we should perhaps consult informally with the industry, to see whether there are any serious concerns. I am not aware that there are and, as I have said, the current voluntary register is in the same league but slightly more expensive.
Amendment 113, from the Opposition, would amend the reference to the setting of the subscription charge from one that requires the Minister to seek to recover the full costs to one that would require the Minister to ensure that the charge is set so as to recover the full costs of the registrar’s activities. I recognise that it is intended to emphasise the importance of ensuring that the charge recoups completely the cost of the register, but assure the Opposition that the Government are very well aware of the importance of ensuring that the register is fully funded by the industry.
We expect that the register will cost around £200,000 a year to run and that that cost will be borne not by the taxpayer but by the lobbying industry. The register that the Opposition have suggested would cost a great deal more—possibly nearer the £3 million that it costs to operate the Canadian register. Perhaps they would like to consider how they would ensure that those costs were recovered from the much larger number of individuals and organisations that they intend to capture.
The Opposition’s Amendment 114A would remove subsection (2) from Clause 24, thereby affecting the regulation-making powers under that part. The Joint Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform has recently published a very thorough and thoughtful report on the delegated powers included in the Bill. The Government are giving the committee’s recommendations careful consideration and will respond formally shortly.
I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Norton, that I responded to his Amendment 115 before he had spoken to it. Rather too many meetings over the past day left me less well organised than ideally I should have been. I took him down as saying that the Government believe in transparency but not too far. I would say that the Government believe in transparency, but want to be proportionate in our approach. I fear that some of the amendments that have been floated today have suggested that we move from a situation of extremely moderate transparency to one in which there will be a very burdensome set of regulations, which would go further than we need to at this time.
My noble friend is now talking about moderate transparency rather than transparency, so he is already limiting it. He is very keen on “proportionate”, I have noticed; it has come up a number of times today. I am just wondering how proportionate it is to introduce a register of perhaps 350 companies when we have not established how many of them already publish their client list. If most of those who are going to be registered already publish their client list, it is proportionate at the wrong end, because there is no point, really, in doing it. It is not good enough just to establish how many would be covered by the register; we need to know whether it would actually add anything to our knowledge of what those companies are doing and who their clients are. There may not be any point in doing it.
My point is that, if you are going to do it, do it properly; if you want transparency for lobbying and you are going to be comprehensive, there will be a cost to it. If you are going to do it properly and have a register, I am afraid that you have to go down the Canadian route. My argument is that you can avoid doing that by going down my route, whereby you get transparency of lobbying, not simply listing lobbyists.
My Lords, I want to reinforce the contributions that have been made on these two amendments, particularly the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, about the relationship between a constituency Member of Parliament and any representatives of any interests in that constituency. As I understand it—as I recall, this was reinforced in the other place on Report—there is nothing in the Bill that in any way impedes the opportunity and the responsibility of representing the people of one’s constituency in any way that may be appropriate. It is very important that we reiterate that principle now. I am very pleased to hear the noble Lord, Lord Martin, make that point again.
My Lords, I will be very interested to see whether anyone reports the words of the noble Lord, Lord Martin, about the Press Gallery.
I rise to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, because he makes a very important point—I am surprised that it has not come up more in our discussions on the Bill—and that is this point about a kitemark for lobbying firms. Lobbying has always been a contentious activity. When I was writing about lobbying in the 1980s I made the point then that quite often the problem is not in the relationship between the lobbyist and the parliamentarian. Parliamentarians know perfectly well when they are being lobbied and essentially where it is coming from and can assess what is happening; if you like, they know the quality of the lobbying. The real problem, I argued, was between the client and the lobbyist, because clients would not necessarily know the quality of the firms they were employing to make representations. Lobbying firms are very good at making grand claims for their success rates.
Therefore, there is an issue of lobbying firms wanting to portray themselves in a certain way. My concern here is the one made by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours: you will get firms on the register using that to promote their interests to potential clients—putting on the notepaper something such as “Registered lobbyist, regulated by the Registrar of Lobbying Companies”, as a way of giving themselves the seal of approval. I fully endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, is trying to do in his amendment but I think that it raises that broader issue which he has touched on and which we need to be very much aware of. I am surprised that we have not considered that to a greater extent. It is just one of the problems if you go down this particular route of having a formal register, especially if there is no code attached to it.
Lord Hardie
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, and support the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for the same reasons. I also support the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Martin of Springburn but for a different reason from that given by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. The example the noble Lord gave of meeting the employer in the company of someone who was both a lobbyist and a newspaper reporter highlights the need for a code of conduct. What is there to stop the lobbyist in that situation from sitting in on a meeting and then rushing away and phoning his newspaper to tell them he has a scoop—or whatever it is called nowadays—that the factory in Springburn has or has not been saved. More subtly, he could tell one of his fellow reporters. Therefore it is important that the distinction is maintained. Of course, if there was a code of conduct I would hope that that would be contrary to the code and the lobbyist could be deregistered, or whatever the appropriate word is.
(12 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberI advise the Committee that if this amendment is agreed to I cannot call Amendment 2 due to pre-emption.
My Lords, I rise to speak to my amendments in this group which seek to achieve the same aim as Amendment 1 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie. I will keep my comments fairly brief as the noble and learned Lord has made the case that I would have made. However, I want to make a few points in support of the thrust of what these amendments seek to achieve. The Short Title of this Christmas tree Bill begins, “Transparency of Lobbying”. That is misleading because the Bill does not contribute to transparency of lobbying. The Bill may result in us knowing who engages in the activity of lobbying—in other words, lobbyists—but it contributes little to knowing what lobbying takes place on particular policies or measures. It could be argued that it is necessary to know who the lobbyists are in order to know what lobbying takes place, but it is certainly not sufficient, and I am not sure that it is even necessary.
The value of a register of lobbyists is far from clear. As I argued on Second Reading, I am not clear what the compelling argument is for introducing a register. The value of the register proposed in the Bill is especially unclear. It is not a register of lobbyists. It is not even a register of professional lobbyists; it is a register of some professional lobbyists. If one is to have a register of lobbyists and, as I say, I am not persuaded of the case for it, one should at least try to make it comprehensive. This entails broadening the class of lobbyists covered in the Bill as well as the class of those being lobbied. This group of amendments deals with the class of lobbyists. We will come shortly to the other aspect of the Bill and its limitations. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, powerfully made the case for the measure to be extended to encompass in-house lobbyists. As I argued at Second Reading, I see no case for distinguishing between those who are paid and are external to a company and those who are employed directly by a company.
It is no good saying that in-house lobbyists should be excluded as it is apparent on whose behalf they are lobbying. The fact that someone works for a company as a political lobbyist is not necessarily a matter of public record. They may have a title which masks their activity and may work in a public affairs division rather than a parliamentary affairs unit. If one is truly going to have a register of lobbyists for the purposes of transparency, one should aim, as I say, to be comprehensive and not go for an option that excludes more than nine out of every 10 lobbyists.
My amendments, like those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, are designed to encompass in-house lobbyists. That is the purpose of the whole grouping. I am not particularly wedded to the wording because the aim at this stage is to get the Government to concede that the Bill as drafted will not make any significant difference to transparency in respect of lobbying government. Indeed, Part 1 conflicts with what the Government seek to achieve because it establishes a new regulatory regime at public expense and for no clear purpose. The taxpayer will not get value for money. If my noble friend the Minister argues that extending the definition to in-house lobbyists is too complex or not practically feasible that, I fear, is not so much an argument for rejecting the amendments as it is for dropping this part of the Bill.
That is, again, a fair point, which the Government will look at. We are extending regulation into lobbying here and are reluctant to go too far too quickly. There may be a means of considering further extension on review. The noble Lord will know that we now have a regular practice of having a five-year review of legislation. If whichever Government are then in power decide that this is inadequate, we will see what can be done.
I come back to my noble friend’s point about who would be included in the register. He gave the figure of 350. Does he know how many of those would be caught who do not already reveal who their clients are?
My Lords, that stretches my expertise very considerably. I will have to consult and write to the noble Lord about that. It is a good academic question. The Government have been quite clear that there is no exemption from the requirement to register for large multidisciplinary firms that conduct consultant lobbying. We refined the exception provided in paragraph 1 by amendment in Committee in the other place to clarify that it will not be enjoyed by organisations such as, for example, law firms if they run consultant lobbying operations and lobby in a manner which is not incidental to their other activity—even if consultant lobbying is not their primary activity. As such, they will be required to register if they meet the other criteria outlined in the definition of consultant lobbying. The provisions outlined in paragraph 1 provide an important and effective exemption for those whose limited involvement in lobbying is in a manner which is merely incidental to their normal professional activity. However, it brings within its scope those that provide consultant lobbying as a major part of their activities and firms for which consultant lobbying is a significant part of their activity.
Opposition Amendment 39 provides a long list of exemptions from the Opposition’s definition of professional lobbying. Exemptions are provided for constituents contacting their Member of Parliament, persons making communications on their own behalf, persons responding to government consultations or an invitation to submit evidence to a parliamentary committee, persons acting on behalf of government, persons not receiving remuneration, and those responding to a court order. That is a very large and unwieldy list of exceptions partly because once one extends this to professional lobbying, the question of definition itself becomes much more difficult. That is, again, partly why we have stuck to consultant lobbying in our approach.
Finally, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, asked about sovereign powers and the Government of Taiwan. It is very helpful that he has raised Taiwan but it would probably be better, to be absolutely sure that I am correct, that I offer to write to him on that specific point. I would like to reassure him as far as I can.
I hope that I have managed to answer most of the points in these amendments. I have outlined why it is not necessary to extend the register to those who lobby on their own or their employer’s behalf, because it is clear whose interests are being represented. Our proposals will deliver a focused, problem-specific register and, as such, we believe that these amendments are not necessary. I urge the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, that is a very fair intervention. That is one of the reasons why we hesitate to include people whose main responsibilities within the charity or company for which they work is to contact government. The public affairs departments of major companies are the ones dealing with government, trying to interface between the company and the political process, and it would be the public affairs departments of many companies with which one would therefore logically deal. I know many people who have gone to work in the public affairs departments of companies—I am sure we all do. It is very often where people who have been involved in politics go afterwards to earn what they failed to earn in politics.
The noble and learned Lord is absolutely correct to say that in the exact definition of a professional lobbyist we are talking about people who are employed by a company, campaigning group or charity and pursue its interests in its relations with government. A consultant lobbyist is someone who lobbies on behalf of someone else apart from their own company. Theoretically, I suppose it is possible to imagine a consultant lobbyist all of whose income comes from one external client but the majority of consultant lobbying firms provide assistance, advice and lobbying for a large number of clients. That is the industry with which we are all familiar and with which those of us in government often interact. That is the distinction we make.
My Lords, before the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, responds, my noble friend has really not addressed the distinction between those who do the activity and the activity itself. The Government are supposed to be trying to provide transparency about the activity, not simply listing those who may engage in it—in this case, only some who engage in it.
The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, referred to what I said at Second Reading about what is in effect an alternative to this rather clunky mechanism being proposed by the Government. What I was proposing gets fairly comprehensively at the activity of who is lobbying on each measure that the Government bring forward. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, may wish to note that my Amendment 115 is intended to get at that. It is an alternative to what the Government are proposing and it would actually deal with that particular problem. My noble friend may wish to bear that in mind in responding to the amendments because I am not sure he has established that there is a need for this part of the Bill, certainly not compared with the alternative that I am putting forward, which actually gets at the nub of ensuring transparency of lobbying.
If I might add to that, particularly if there are only 350 registrations.
I referred specifically to the non-ministerial government departments, on which the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, made a very valid point, because they are not within the hierarchy of departments responsible to the Permanent Secretary, in the same way as other civil servants. So I do not accept that. The addition to which he specifically referred would have considerable merit. I would look at that very carefully, and I hope that my noble friend the Minister will, as well.
Unlike others, I accept that we are making a limited addition to the transparency of the whole process with the register. Far more important is to make sure that the meetings that take place with whoever is lobbying are as transparent, timely and accessible as we can make them. What surely should not be limited should be the encounter with such critical political decision-makers and their advisers as the special advisers attached to senior Ministers. Therefore, I hope that my amendment will find favour with the House and with my noble friend the Minister.
My Lords, I have amendments in the grouping as well. My amendments have similar aims to those of the noble Lords, Lord Hardie and Lord Rooker, and of the noble Baronesses, Lady Royall and Lady Hayter. I was very attracted by the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, because of the breadth of what it covers. However, I also noticed an omission; it does not encompass senior members of the Civil Service but confines itself to Permanent Secretaries. I think that there is a problem there.
When this Bill was considered in the other place, the point was well made that it appears to have been written by people who do not understand lobbying—clearly people who have not read the book by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. If it helps, I have a copy of his book on my shelf.
There are a number of problems but, as has been identified, Clause 2(3) is particularly problematic as it is so narrow. If you are going to lobby, the target is normally the Minister, and you therefore have to focus on the channels for reaching the Minister. The Permanent Secretary is not a significant channel for this purpose. Other officials will deal with that particular policy area—or a special adviser or the parliamentary private secretary. In saying that, I have nothing against special advisers; they play an extraordinarily valuable role from which Ministers and civil servants benefit. Parliamentary private secretaries also play a valuable role, so both should be included in the measure.
I know the objection as regards PPSs will be that they are private members, but increasingly they have been drawn within government. They are now mentioned in the Ministerial Code and are subject to certain requirements under it. Therefore, they are particularly good channels for reaching Ministers. We should encompass within the Bill’s remit all those who are being lobbied for the purposes of affecting public policy. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, does a valuable job in that regard, but one could add to it. I suspect that between now and Report we could come up with an amendment that brings together the various points that have been made and ensures that if we are to go down this route—and I am not persuaded that we should—those who are lobbied with a view to affecting public policy will be included in the Bill.
As it stands, Clause 2 is too narrow and, as I say, Permanent Secretaries should not feature significantly in it. I commend the various amendments that seek to widen the provision, so that if the Government go down this route at least they will do so effectively.
My Lords, I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, provided that “government” is defined not as it is in the Bill but as it is in the amendments standing in the names of the baronial opposition Front Bench, by which I mean Amendments 33 and 43.
I approach all this with a certain bemused detachment. I have to intervene because the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, appeared to imply that Permanent Secretaries are not important, although I am sure that he did not mean to do so. I say “bemused detachment” because none of this would ever have applied to me—not the Bill as it stands or with any of the amendments, even the wide-reaching, admirable amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. I was never a civil servant. I was a Permanent Under-Secretary but I was never a civil servant. The Diplomatic Service is a separate service. I apologise for making a rather pedantic—indeed, possibly, pompous—point, but there is something wrong in the drafting. I was a public servant but not a civil servant.
When I was a Permanent Secretary I never met a consultant lobbyist, thus proving the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Norton. They do not come to see Permanent Secretaries. If you are Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, the people who come to see you are CEOs or chairmen of companies that are in trouble and want the help of an embassy or high commission somewhere around the world. They do not send government affairs people, so widening the definition would not bring in Permanent Secretaries—they come themselves. They certainly do not send a professional consultant lobbyist to see the Permanent Secretary or, I think, the Minister. I think they do to see special advisers, so I think that is a very important addition which has to be brought in. They tend to see the relevant desk or the Under-Secretary. They do not come near the Permanent Secretary.
Perhaps we need to discuss between Committee and Report which definition of senior civil servants Ministers and various Members of the House wish to adopt. I was adopting my own understanding of the senior Civil Service, which is the 5,000 I mentioned.
I will be interested to hear from the Opposition whether they also need to be included in this. Again, that is something that perhaps the Opposition Front Bench and the Government should usefully discuss between Committee and Report. I come back to say that the best can be the enemy of the good in requiring too many people to be brought within the context of this Bill. I take the very powerful speech from the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, about non-ministerial departments to mind. I also take some of his other points about particular senior civil servants. We will consider all these points and, in that light, I trust that the noble Lord will be willing to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I do not understand my noble friend’s point about numbers. It is irrelevant in the sense that it is the consultants who are doing the lobbying to those people. It does not matter how many they are. It is merely the fact that they are engaging with some of them that requires them to register.
The register is of lobbyists. If we wish to include in the register every single Member of Parliament and others with whom they interact, we would get into a very complicated business. The question is who you wish to define as a consultant lobbying—as Amendment 3 says—to government.
My Lords, Amendments 54 and 74 are in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Royall. We support an independent registrar, which means independent of the industry as well as working independently of the Government. However, the matters over which the registrar must judge, the standards that he or she sets and the objectives set for the office have an importance to Parliament and to our standards and expectations. We believe that that requires an organic link to Parliament, not just to the Government of the day.
We think it appropriate that that link is to the elected House, which by its nature is responsive to the outside electorate and their concerns and interests. We recommend that the Minister, in making the appointment, should consult the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the other place and that, in similar mode, the registrar should report back to that committee on an annual basis.
We recognise the strength of the other amendments in this group, and we trust that the Minister will similarly do so and agree to take these away and bring back his own amendments on Report. I beg to move.
My Lords, the principle in Amendment 74 of the registrar reporting is important. In my view, though, rather than reporting to a particular committee, it would be more appropriate to oblige the registrar to produce an annual report to Parliament itself. If it were going to be confined, I would not just confine it to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the other place; I hear what the noble Baroness says, but there would also be a case for the Constitution Committee of you Lordships’ House being included as well. My preference would be for a report to Parliament, but I wholly support the principle that there ought to be a report. As the noble Baroness said, bringing the registrar within the scope of Parliament is entirely appropriate.
I add my support to my noble friend’s amendment, but it does not go far enough. Partly for the reason he just mentioned, I would be more ambitious, along the lines indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. There is no reason why you cannot have a rolling publication after the event excluding, following the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Martin, the venue because that is not really germane. It is the substance of the discussion that matters. I would be more ambitious than my noble friend Lord Tyler.
As the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours said, the amendment links to what I am arguing. It moves us in the right direction, so I am fully in support; it is just that I want to go further because this is a database of meetings between Ministers and external organisations and we need to extend it in terms of who is being seen. Just confining it to Ministers creates problems, so we need a larger database, or we certainly need to be able to identify those who are being lobbied.
My Lords, I am fascinated to hear this great outbreak of revolution in transparency. We thought that we were set out on a constructive step forward on transparency. I am not sure that I want all Ministers’ and civil servants’ diaries published the day after they meet anyone, which I think is what the noble Lord, Lord Norton, was beginning to suggest.
I will try to answer the various probing amendments. A number of them, starting with Amendment 54, are about stiffening the independence of the registrar. Amendment 54 would require the Minister to consult with the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee before appointing the registrar. I am not aware whether that has yet been requested by the committee itself, but it is an interesting proposal.
The amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, would prevent any person who had been a civil servant or a political adviser in the previous five years being appointed registrar. This is also thoughtful, and designed to provide assurance regarding the independence of the registrar which, of course, the Government are entirely committed to establishing and maintaining. Under the Bill, the registrar will be appointed according to the public appointment principles of open and fair competition and the Minister will be able to dismiss the registrar only where they are satisfied that there are reasonable grounds that he is unable, unwilling or unfit to perform the functions of his office. If thought unreasonable, any such decision by a Minister could be challenged in the usual way, by judicial review. The registrar will be independent of the lobbying industry and the Government, and will have a clear remit to operate independently of the lobbying industry and the Government.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, seeks to extend the positions that will not be eligible for appointment as registrar to capture those officials who would be required to submit information to him or her under his new clause. The Government are not persuaded of the case for the noble and learned Lord’s additions, and would therefore resist this amendment.
The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that the registrar is independent. We are confident that our proposals secure that, but are grateful for these suggestions and will of course consider whether they should be pursued further.
Amendment 63 has attracted a considerable amount of support. It would require that, in addition to the statutory register of consultant lobbyists, the registrar would be required to keep and publish a central database of ministerial meetings with external organisations.
The words “relevant select committee” could be used.
On that point, legislation does write in the name of committees or the equivalent, so it is quite possible to do that.
Not only does the noble Lord, Lord Norton, supply me with his wonderful Hull students to help me with my work, but he comes up with answers to my questions, for which I thank him.
What seems like a small amendment about writing the committee in is an important signal. I am sorry that we keep hearing the words “not persuaded” from that side. Having had the earlier discussion about Part 2 of the Bill, we very much hope that the Government will be persuaded by what they hear. I had hoped that some of that might have bled into Part 1 of the Bill and that the Government might have been persuaded by some of the things we said. However, we will leave it here, although we may want to come back to some of it at a later stage. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(12 years, 3 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I, too, congratulate my noble friend Lord Higgins on raising this important and timely question. For reasons of time, I turn to the memorandum by the Clerk of the Parliament, which provides some innovative suggestions, some more innovative than others. I commend the suggested amendment of Standing Order 22 as a helpful way of addressing the problem of those who do not attend. I will focus on a proposal designed to address the problem of those who do and place a strain on resources.
As we have heard, the Leader’s Group, chaired by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, raised the prospect of some Members being offered a modest payment upon retirement. The Clerk’s memorandum examines ways in which such a payment may be made, following the comments of the Leader’s Group, as we have heard, in a way that is compatible with a saving to the taxpayer. The memorandum is thorough in identifying how this may be achieved.
Since the memorandum was first published, the Leader of the House has stated that the Government, and other parties, do not support the idea. Speaking earlier this year, he said:
“I should make clear, as I have done before, that the Government do not support making taxpayers’ money available to Members of the House to encourage them to retire. That would be wrong, and it would be seen to be wrong. I am glad to hear that my view on this is shared by all groups and all parties.”.—[Official Report, 28/2/13; col. 81.]
I have two questions for the Minister based on this statement. First, if it is wrong for taxpayers’ money to encourage Members of this House to retire, why is it not considered wrong to use taxpayers’ money to encourage Members of the other House to retire? It used to be the case that some MPs sat well beyond retirement age because they could not afford to retire. The Government introduced financial packages that, for all intents and purposes, were designed to enable MPs to retire gracefully. Not only is there now a pension, but for the past 22 years there has also been a resettlement grant. Why is this use of public money deemed right, but something similar for this House is wrong?
Secondly, why do the Government find it wrong to use taxpayers’ money to facilitate Members leaving the House, but have no difficulty using taxpayers’ money to enable new Peers to be created? I have seen estimates of how much it will cost the public purse if the latest tranche of new Peers prove reasonably assiduous in attendance. The scheme embodied in the memorandum of the Clerk of the Parliaments is designed to save money in the long term, and help to reduce the size of the House, whereas the current practice of the Government in creating new Peers achieves precisely the opposite. I look forward to the Minister justifying this state of affairs.
The Government appear to have no qualms about creating more Peers, adding to the burden on the public purse, while making no real effort to address the problem of the size of the House. I see no principled reason for the stance taken by the Leader of the House. The Clerk’s suggested scheme is a valuable contribution to the debate, and if it is not to be pursued, we need a much more considered response from Ministers.
My Lords, retirement is essential to this because unless we are going to have a House that grows older gracefully and has very little renewal, we have to have a scheme that encourages retirement. The House has been getting older. After 17 years I have just passed the average age of the House. We need good new Members because we do not entirely want to be a House that represents the wisdom of 25 years ago, and therefore we need to address the question of retirement. I have had one or two conversations with older Peers who have suggested that a more dignified retirement arrangement, in which the House recognises the service of those Members who are retiring, would be of very considerable assistance to them. I am willing to take that back and, indeed, I have already discussed it with the Leader of the House. I think that it is something which we should all attempt to progress as best we can.
On a financial leaving package, let me simply say to the noble Lord, Lord Norton, that we receive allowances in this House; we are not paid. Most of us, the noble Lord, Lord Norton, and me included, have pensions. I think that I can guess what the size of his academic pension will be when he retires. I had a discussion with an older Labour Peer who said that I did not understand how working-class people like him would survive without their allowances. I reminded him sharply that I knew roughly what his academic pension was, and that if he could not survive on a professorial pension there was a real problem.
My point had nothing to do with pensions because there is no salary, so it was not premised on that—that was the analogy that I was drawing with House of Commons. The resettlement grant has absolutely nothing to do with pensions.
My Lords, let me simply say, because time is short, that service in this House is a privilege which we should not expect to have to be bought out of. That is the view which I and a number of others hold. The Government remain unconvinced that we should attempt to buy older Peers out. I recognise that there is a substantial problem which older Peers think about in terms of party balance. I think that it is also the recognition issue that we are concerned about and very much want to continue.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, asked whether the Government would respond to the PCRC’s proposals for all-party talks. We will certainly respond to that report.
Before my noble friend leaves his previous point, is he saying that service in the House of Commons is not a privilege?
My Lords, Members of the House of Commons earn their keep and are much more often in the prime of life. Most of us who come here have earned our salaries elsewhere and have pensions from elsewhere. That is part of the distinction that I am making.
(12 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I start with two general observations about the Bill. The first concerns process and the second concerns construction.
The Bill is the product of the “something must be done” response to a particular problem. There is a problem, not least in terms of public perception of illicit or unethical lobbying of policy-makers, but that problem requires a considered response, one that both addresses the problem and is seen to do so. This Bill, as I shall argue, fails on both grounds. My principal point here, following other noble Lords, is that the measure has been rushed. I share the concerns expressed by the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House in its report on the Bill. As it noted, the Government had announced that there would be a White Paper and a draft Bill. There has been neither. As has been said, this places a particular responsibility on your Lordships’ House in scrutinising the measure.
In terms of construction, this is a Christmas tree Bill. The previous Labour Government brought in Bills that were essentially two Bills in one and sometimes three Bills in one. This Government have continued the practice. The title of the Bill is something of a giveaway. The relationship between the three parts is tenuous, to say the least. This practice places particular strains on the other place in terms of detailed examination in Committee. This House can adapt its examination to the discrete parts of the Bill somewhat more effectively, but it is none the less a practice to be deprecated.
I turn to the substance of the Bill. Like my noble friend Lord Lang, I shall focus on Part 1. Much that I say will reinforce the points that he made. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, said, there is general acceptance that there should be more transparency in lobbying. This Bill, though, is too narrowly drawn to correct the mischief that has motivated its introduction. The Bill is concerned to identify those who engage in lobbying on a commercial basis, and do so as free-standing entities. I am not sure what that adds to our knowledge. The more one reads the exclusions in the Bill, the more one recognises the limitations of the exercise. It excludes small-scale commercial lobbyists, those for whom lobbying is not the principal purpose of their business and in-house lobbyists. Some companies have sizable lobbying teams. One suspects that their activities may at times be as much a concern to the public as are the activities of dedicated lobbying firms. Will the Minister tell us why the Government differentiate between lobbying of Ministers on, say, the duty on cigarettes by in-house lobbyists of tobacco companies and lobbying by commercial lobbyists bought in by tobacco companies for the purpose of lobbying Ministers? From the perspective of the exercise of lobbying, and how it is perceived by the public, what is the salient distinction?
That brings me to another crucial limitation of the Bill. The focus is one of status and, as I have explained, a rather narrow one. It is not directed at the actual activity, other than indirectly. It seeks to influence behaviour through making public who engages in commercial lobbying. There is no statutory code of conduct and no stipulation of principles that should govern the behaviour. In so far as the Bill influences behaviour, it may be to encourage lobbyists to avoid making representations in a way that brings them within the scope of the Bill but, as most are not presently caught within the ambit of the Bill, it will not make that much difference anyway. All that the Bill does is to introduce a new layer of regulation for no obvious public benefit. It tells us, at some cost, what is largely already known.
The Bill, in short, is fundamentally flawed. The point has been well made in the other place by Members on both sides that it is based on a lack of understanding of how lobbying actually works. It was expressed especially well by a former student of mine, Tracey Crouch, who spent several years as a lobbyist. As she pointed out, the lobbying industry today provides a very different service and is a very different industry from what it was 10 or 15 years ago. Consultant lobbyists are more likely to advise clients on how to undertake lobbying of government rather than undertake it themselves, and if they do undertake it, they are not likely to be lobbying Permanent Secretaries. The Government appear not to understand the industry as it now is, most of which will not be caught by the provisions of the Bill.
The Bill is neither one thing nor the other. Either it should go the whole way and introduce a comprehensive register of lobbyists or it should be abandoned and the Government should instead address the problem from a very different, and I believe more effective, perspective. The case for a comprehensive register has been made by others. I am not persuaded of the need for a register, comprehensive or otherwise; it may prove counterproductive with lobbyists using registration as a seal of approval. More importantly, I do not believe that it would assuage public concerns about the lobbying of government.
The other approach, which I commend to the House, is to shift the emphasis entirely and build on existing practice. In opening the debate, my noble friend Lord Younger made the point that there is now more transparency about policy-making meetings, with a quarterly publication on those meetings. My noble friend Lord Lang also referred to that. Why not build on that? When Select Committees produce reports, they publish the names of those who have given evidence, that is, who made representations to them. It is normal practice to publish the material submitted to them. Why not require Ministers, when making policy announcements or publishing Bills or draft Bills, to list the names of all those who have made representations to the department on the issue? Listing all those who have lobbied on the subject would be transparent and comprehensive. It would not matter whether it was an in-house lobbyist, a paid or unpaid lobbyist, or simply individuals writing in. It avoids the need to define lobbying, and we would know who had made representations.
There may be a case, building on existing practice, for publishing the notes of meetings and written representations, similar to the evidence volumes published by Select Committees. If this was routine practice, drawing material together on a particular measure, it would properly address the problem. There may also be a case for extending it to non-decision-making: that is, when a Minister decides not to pursue a particular policy under consideration. I appreciate that there may be, indeed no doubt are, flaws in this alternative proposal, but I have yet to find any that render it a less desirable approach than that embodied in the Bill. Perhaps the Minister can explain why my proposal is not to be preferred over that advanced by the Government. If he cannot, the Government may wish to reflect on the wisdom of continuing with a flawed Bill.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Tyler on raising this issue. It is one that we have variously discussed before, as he mentioned, although I am not sure that there has been that much said recently, here or in the other place, that has added much to our knowledge on the subject. On my noble friend’s point about a single election for which the election age was specifically lowered, I note that there is a precedent; it has happened before, in 1918.
Debate on the issue appears to stem from a false premise. Voting is a consequence of political interest, not a cause of it. Lowering the voting age is not likely to have a positive impact on turnout any more than it did when it was lowered to 18 in 1969. It did not promote participation in democracy, but rather served to demonstrate what we already knew: young people are among the groups least likely to vote. That is borne out by the data for recent general elections. One does not change that by further lowering the voting age.
Focusing on the voting age may be seen as a form of displacement activity, recommending change to process rather than addressing the real causes of distrust in the political system. The claim made in another place by one MP in an EDM that,
“lowering the voting age could play a huge role in helping young people feel more connected with political processes”,
is to misunderstand the root of the problem and is arguably a dangerous misunderstanding.
Our time today would be better spent getting to grips with the really important question of why young people are not willing to engage with the political process. As the Youth Citizenship Commission observed,
“while enfranchisement of 16 and 17 year olds is a valid issue for consideration, it is not the key component of any strategy for better engagement of young people”.
It is variously pointed out that more young people will vote for participants in television programmes such as “X Factor” and “Britain’s Got Talent” than vote for parties in a general election. However, that observation rather misses the key point, which is that nowadays political activity has to contend with a plethora of competing interests in a way that it did not have to 40 or 50 years ago. Political parties used to hold a more prominent role in social activity than they do today. Young people are now able to indulge their passions, which can be instant and transient, through social media. Political parties are not able to respond effectively. They cannot offer instant gratification. Neither, I fear, can elections. We need to be addressing this mismatch. There is no easy answer, which is all the more reason for addressing the problem. What we are discussing this afternoon does not get to grips with the real issue.
As to the voting age, what are the arguments for change? Those who favour lowering the voting age advance the argument that at 16 you can join the Army, marry and pay taxes. You cannot simply join the Army at 16. You can apply to join the Army, which is not the same thing at all. Having applied, you have to be selected. What this recognises is that only certain people in this category have the requisite ability. Even if you are selected, you are not sent to the front line. You can marry but only with parental consent. Very few 16 year-olds pay income tax.
As the previous Government’s Children and Young People’s Unit said in its Young People and Politics: A Report on the YVote/YNot? Project in 2002:
“As far as lowering the voting age is concerned, it is clearly necessary to decide at what minimum age most people are sufficiently politically aware, mature, and independent to make up their minds and choose between the various candidates standing for election. On balance, Government takes the view that there is more likely to be a higher percentage of people aged 18 who are able to do this than at 16”.
We live in a society where the road to becoming an adult is staggered. We grant rights to young people at different ages on their journey to adulthood. There has to be some age at which we grant the right to vote. No magical property attaches to it being at 18, but neither does it to being at 16. Most nations opt for 18. A number do not, and just because most nations follow one practice, it does not mean that we have to follow. However, given the lack of a compelling case for change, and with no clear public support for it, I am not persuaded by the case that my noble friend proposes. It would be more fruitful to address the much more difficult issues that confront us.
(13 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will not detain the House long as I made our position clear in Committee and it has not changed. As I said then, we believe that my noble friend Lord Lexden has hit on a very interesting and important issue about nationality and representation. There is clearly a strong case for some rationalisation and, indeed, for a careful look at the way in which our EU partners handle this issue, as was again said today. At the same time, we must note that the majority of them have a very different electoral system from our own. Here in the UK, we have a system of single-Member constituencies with a special link between an MP and his or her constituents. It is irrational to have people who used to live in my old constituency in north Cornwall, for example, still on the electoral roll 15 years or more after they have left for possibly sunnier climes.
Let me clear up any misunderstanding: every UK election, with the notable exception of European parliamentary elections, is in a sense a local election. Voters in a particular locality decide which local representative would in their judgment best represent their interests and those of that specific locality. It is also true that many local issues, from development threats in that locality to the level of council tax more generally, can be major factors even in a UK parliamentary election. For those who have left that locality 15 or more years ago to have a potentially decisive voice in such an election is illogical. I still remember the occasion when I was elected with a majority of nine. For all I know, that majority of nine came from many thousands of miles away and had no direct interest in that locality and that local parliamentary election.
Last week my noble friend Lord Deben, who is not in his usual place this afternoon, attacked me on this issue in a splendidly enjoyable diatribe. I make it clear: I do not defend or, indeed, reject the single-Member constituency that we have at present in the UK, but it is a fact of political life. Therefore, anything we do on this issue has to take that into the reckoning. If he or anybody else is now expecting a change to a multi-Member or list electoral system for the House of Commons, I am as surprised as I am delighted. However, I do not think that he is.
In the absence of any such reform, we urge my noble friend Lord Lexden to think again about his strategy. If he is to address the anomalies that he has rightly identified, he must take up the issue of an additional constituency for overseas voters. Several contributors to last week’s debate in Committee, including my noble friend Lord Lexden, referred to the French arrangement for overseas voters. Indeed, again, he made very important reference to the experience of French overseas voters. However, the significant point is that they have a separate constituency; they do not interfere with the individual constituencies in mainland France. In those circumstances, we believe that this amendment puts the cart before the horse. We believe that the creation of a separate constituency on the French model—or, indeed, constituencies, if the numbers justify something beyond one constituency—would be a much more appropriate way to make this injustice less of a problem in future. Surely that is the right and only way for the interests of former UK residents to be represented without diluting those of the people who still live in this country.
My Lords, I support the amendment moved so ably by my noble friend Lord Lexden. It is a novel amendment but a modest one. In Committee, there were essentially two objections to the proposal to extend the 15-year limit on British nationals who live abroad having the vote. A third objection was to the mechanism proposed by my noble friend, which is again before us today.
One objection to extending the 15-year limit was that citizens who have retired to live abroad and enjoy the sunshine of foreign climes had effectively fled the United Kingdom and therefore should not be able to vote—certainly not for any great length of time. My noble friend Lord Tyler referred in Committee to the fact that some people may deem them to have deserted these shores. That is to misunderstand the situation of British nationals living abroad. Most emigrants from this country live abroad for work-related purposes. Some will be moving around the globe for their companies, which may well be UK companies. The fact of living abroad for some years is no proof of leaving the UK on a permanent basis.
My noble friend Lord Tyler raised a second objection, to which he referred again today. He argued that citizens living abroad do not have a clear constituency link, and he queried how an MP could represent,
“people who live perhaps thousands of miles away in a very different economic and social context”.—[Official Report, 14/1/13; col. 481.]
Well, I presume that they can do it in the same way in which they currently represent those who live abroad but have not yet done so for 15 years and are registered to vote. It is perhaps also worth reminding ourselves that the MEPs for the south-west of England also represent Gibraltar, where people live some way away in a different economic and social context.
The other objection was raised by my noble friend Lord Gardiner of Kimble in respect of this particular amendment, on the grounds that it would be unusual to make such a change in secondary legislation. I note that he said “unusual” and not “unique”. In any event, what is involved here is not a new right but an extension of an existing right. Far greater changes affecting individuals are made through secondary legislation than is being envisaged here. What the amendment does is provide some flexibility. In Committee, my noble friend Lord Gardiner said that the question of extending the time limit,
“remains under consideration within government”.
The amendment provides the means to move forward, should that consideration result in recognition that the time limit should be extended.
The grounds for extending the time limit were made in Committee by my noble friend Lord Lexden. As I stressed in that debate, we need to recognise the contribution made to the United Kingdom by citizens living abroad. They are a major source of soft power for the United Kingdom. My noble friend Lord Gardiner acknowledged,
“the continuing loyalty to the United Kingdom of so many who have lived and worked overseas for many years”.—[Official Report, 14/1/13; col. 489.]
We should look upon our citizens around the globe as a continuing asset and not as a body of people to be cast aside and treated as having deserted these shores. If they wish to demonstrate a continuing commitment to the United Kingdom, they should be enabled to do so.
My noble friend’s amendment provides the means for doing so but, at this stage, without commitment. It enables the Government to complete their consideration of the issue. I therefore commend the amendment to the House.
My Lords, I intervene only briefly to ask a question, because the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, quite rightly drew the House’s attention to the sensitivity in very marginal seats to votes coming in from abroad. I want to know what happens in conditions of fraud. We have an individual registration system and the suggestion is that we should extend the right to vote to those who have been overseas for more than 15 years. What happens if a fraud takes place? Where are those involved to be prosecuted? Can they be prosecuted? Are they to be extradited? Does this not raise all kinds of problems in terms of prosecution? Perhaps the Minister can give the answer.
My Lords, in Committee I raised the issue of the edited version of the electoral register. I return to it in this amendment because of the Government’s unsatisfactory response. The edited version of the electoral register engages important principles regarding personal data. The edited version is generated as a by-product—essentially a commercial by-product—of a citizen’s duty to supply personal data in order to be registered to vote.
I made the case in Committee for the edited register to be abolished. I had argued the case before and, in making the case in Committee, I was able to pray in aid the Electoral Commission, the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the House of Commons and the Association of Electoral Administrators. Each has argued the case for abolition. In Committee, I quoted an editorial of the Guardian in December 2011, which argued that the edited register,
“lingers on, a travesty of the democratic process that sullies the relationship between voters and state, and illustrates just how casually politicians think about democracy”.
In its briefing for Committee stage, the Electoral Commission contended that prohibiting the publishing of the edited version was,
“particularly important, given the need to maintain people’s confidence in the security of their personal details”.
In responding, my noble friend the Minister said that, on balance, the Government had decided to retain the edited register because of what was seen as a greater principle—that of commercial gain. There was no engagement with the argument beyond that. The Government’s stance would presumably justify reverting to the sale of the full register to any organisation that wished to purchase it.
However, given that the Government have decided in favour of retaining the edited register—and we will doubtless return to that issue in the future—I have decided to pursue the issue of the opt-out. In Committee, I argued the case for electors to opt in to the edited version of the register, rather than—as now—opt out. This is, to my mind, crucial in the use of personal data. If electors are to have their personal data sold to third parties, then they should have to give their consent to it being sold in this way. As I said in Committee, consent must be given rather than assumed. That need for consent is reinforced by the Minister’s reminder in Committee that under individual electoral registration, an individual’s choice—or rather, in many cases, assumptions made about an individual’s choice—will automatically be carried forward.
The Electoral Commission, in its briefing on today’s amendments, has made clear that it supports this amendment. It states:
“We believe that, if individuals are required by law to provide personal information for the purpose of electoral administration, they should be asked clearly if they also want their personal information to be sold. Their personal information should only be sold if they have explicitly given their consent”.
In Committee, the Minister’s line of argument was essentially that the situation had improved since the days when the full register could be sold—rather ignoring the circumstances leading to the creation of an edited register—and that the existing situation provided appropriate protection and control. That was asserted rather than justified. Where personal data are concerned, we need to apply a higher threshold than that which is being applied. The present arrangements rest on assumptions about electors’ wishes rather than their explicit consent and what appears to be implicitly the view that changing to an opt-in provision would be too much trouble. Perhaps in reply my noble friend will explain what precisely the obstacle is to moving to an opt-in provision. Surely the principle of consent must outweigh the claim of convenience.
I will raise a general point deriving from this amendment and from others moved in Committee, not only by me but by other noble Lords. The Government appeared unwilling to engage with points of principle relating to the franchise and to the protection of personal data. Their response was couched essentially in terms of convenience and practicality. This bears out the concern expressed by the Constitution Committee in its report of the previous Session on the process of constitutional change. More than a decade ago, when I chaired it, the committee expressed concern at the lack of a culture within government of dealing with constitutional issues. As the committee noted in its report of last Session:
“The evidence we have received points to this lack of coherence remaining a serious problem”.
The Government need to demonstrate that they are able to engage in debate about the principles underpinning our constitution and the way in which we conduct elections. My amendment raises important questions that take us beyond matters of administrative convenience. If the Government are not willing to accept the amendment, they must give a compelling argument for their stance. We need to do whatever is necessary to protect personal data and the integrity of the registration process. I beg to move.
My Lords, as always, the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, made a compelling case. However, it would be wrong to suggest that the current situation is in place not because of a very long, very careful, very extensive and very thoughtful process. The edited register is the result not just of some quick legal judgment but of a long political process, started by the previous Labour Administration.
The electoral register has been available for sale in one form or another since 1832. In 1999, Labour rightly recognised—before the register was challenged in the courts—that there was a case for changing the Victorian arrangements. In 1999 a Home Office working group recommended, first, that electors should be allowed to decide whether their personal details should be included in a register that was made commercially available and, secondly, that the full register should continue to be available to electoral users, while a licensing arrangement should be agreed to ensure that its use was restricted to electoral purposes only.
As far as I am aware, that recommendation was by broad agreement across the parties. The situation resulted in Section 9 of the Representation of the People Act 2000, which created the so-called “edited register”. It was only when the Government consulted on how to implement the new principle that they were challenged in court about the old system. In 2001, Brian Robertson from Pontefract won his case when the judge concluded that the compulsory disclosure to commercial organisations of data given for electoral purposes was in breach of the Data Protection Act and of the newly passed Human Rights Act. He won the legal point in court, but it appears that the political and moral point had already been acknowledged by the Labour Government in 1999, and here in Parliament in 2000. The edited register was finally implemented in regulations in 2002. The problem that the amendment before your Lordships seeks to solve is one that has already been dealt with in the 2000 Act and the 2002 regulations.
Your Lordships’ House is always rightly concerned about the unintended consequences of legislation that we scrutinise. We should be particularly alert to the unintended consequences of this amendment. The edited register does not just have a commercial purpose; it is also used by a great many charitable organisations. The suggestion from my noble friend that it was only commercial reasons that the government Front Bench advanced last week may or may not be true, but those reasons certainly are not my concern. My concern is that a large number of highly reputable, very public-spirited actions by very public-spirited organisations could be impeded by the removal of the edited register, or by it becoming ineffective. For example, the Salvation Army is a particular advocate for its retention. Each year it finds and reunites some 3,000 families by using the edited register. That is as much an issue of principle as of practice. The edited register underpins efforts to locate and connect organ donors—which, again, is very important—and even bone marrow donors.
My Lords, I am grateful to those who have contributed, and especially to the noble Lord, Lord Wills, for his support on this amendment. I do not regard the responses that I have heard as particularly satisfactory. The Minister’s objection appears to be that electors are not bright enough to understand the difference between an opt-in and an opt-out. However, we do not know whether citizens are making an informed decision because they are not making that opt-in choice. It is notable, as happened in Committee, that neither my noble friend Lord Tyler nor the Minister addressed the core issue of principle that I raised. The objection was really practical—who benefits from the edited register—rather than on the core point about the use of personal data, how they are protected and whether people make an informed choice. In many respects, the points made by my noble friend Lord Tyler bore out the point I was making.
The fundamental point is that we place stress on the protection of personal data. As my noble friend Lord Tyler said, we had long discussions leading up to the Act in 2000. I took part in those discussions and made the case that what we did then did not go far enough in terms of the protection of personal data. It is definitely something we need to pursue and return to. As far as I am concerned, the Government need to think again. As the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, and the noble Lord, Lord Wills, have said, the Government need to engage in serious research on this. It is not something that is going to go away. It is something we will doubtless come back to; indeed, we will come back to it.
On this occasion, we are clearly not making much progress but at least we have put down a marker. We will return to it because the protection of personal data is extraordinarily important. There is a core principle: people must give their consent. If the edited version is going to collapse because they do not give their consent, then I am sorry, but they must give it. In my view, electors are sufficiently intelligent to understand clear instructions on the point of an opt-in and opt-out. If the benefits are clearly explained then at least they can make an informed choice. However, it really must be up to electors rather than the Government making assumptions on their behalf. As I say, we will return to this, but in the mean time I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there is a problem of trust in the process of registering and voting. I believe we should privilege the integrity of the ballot over convenience. We have leaned a little too far in recent years towards convenience. I therefore welcome the Bill—it is a step in the right direction. However, I very much agree with my noble friend Lord Rennard that we should aim for a full as well as an accurate register. They should be seen as compatible goals. We need to ensure that the resources are made available to deliver on those goals; it is a question of resources as well as rules.
I had intended to devote the first part of my speech to discussing individual electoral registration, but most of the points I wanted to make have already been made. I will therefore discard that part of the speech and not repeat what has already been said. Instead, I will focus on concerns not yet expressed by others. I have a concern about one particular provision of the Bill and then I wish to address what I see as two omissions—both were touched on in debate in the other place.
The first concern relates to Clause 21, repealing the provisions of the Electoral Administration Act 2006 for the creation of a,
“co-ordinated on-line record of electors”.
I recall the debates we had when the 2006 Bill was in Committee. The Government do not wish to pursue having such a database because, as the Minister, Mark Harper, said last year in a Written Ministerial Statement, establishing such a system would not be,
“proportionate, cost-effective or consistent with the Government’s policy on databases and reducing the number of non-departmental public bodies”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/7/11; col. 70WS.]
I understand all that. It may be an expensive way of getting rid of redundant entries as well as ensuring that people who are registered at more than one address do not vote more than once. Given that the Bill is designed to enhance the integrity of the register, it is incumbent on the Government to explain what they propose in place of the provisions for an online record of electors. I do not think that Clause 21, by itself, is sufficient. Therefore, I ask the Minister, what is the Government’s alternative? What plans do they have to take to prevent fraud in this respect? The introduction of individual electoral registration is necessary for that purpose, but it is not sufficient.
My other concerns cover what is not in the Bill. There are two omissions. First, the Bill does not address the 15-year rule for those British nationals who live overseas. In the last Parliament, I raised the issue of British nationals working for international organisations. Here my concern is more general. It is an issue that was raised in the other place during the passage of the Bill by Geoffrey Clifton-Brown. As he noted, although there are 4.4 million British citizens of voting age living abroad, only just over 23,000 are registered as overseas voters. In response the Minister, David Heath, said that the Government would give the issue “serious consideration”. I appreciate the reasons for not wishing to rush to judgement. There are practical issues as well as the issue of principle raised by the Minister—the two come together in terms of ensuring the integrity of the ballot. However, there is a countervailing principle in respect of the rights of those who, while they may live abroad, retain British citizenship. It will be helpful if my noble friend gives some indication of the Government’s thinking in the light of the discussions in the other place.
The other omission is a provision dealing with the edited electoral register. This is something that I have raised on a number of occasions. An edited register is produced as a by-product of citizens fulfilling a statutory obligation. There is the option not to be included in the edited version, but it is an opt-out process and one exercised at the moment by the head of the household. The move to IER will at least ensure that individuals are exercising their right to opt out. None the less, the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the House of Commons as well as the Electoral Commission and the Association of Electoral Administrators have argued that the edited register should be abolished. A survey by the Local Government Association and the AEA found that almost 90% of electoral officers surveyed believed that the practice of selling the register discouraged people from registering to vote.
There are thus significant problems arising from the generation and publication of an edited register. I am familiar with the arguments for its retention. The magazine Parliamentary Brief has regularly rehearsed them, albeit ignoring the fundamental objection of principle adumbrated by the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, and one that I have previously advanced. The arguments for the edited version were also repeated at Second Reading of the Bill in the other place by Dan Rogerson.
The Government are seized of the issue and have undertaken a consultation on the future of the register. In response to the report of the Constitutional and Political Reform Committee, they said the arguments were “finely balanced”. During the Committee stage of the Bill in the Commons, Mark Harper reiterated the point in saying that the Government had decided to retain the register. That decision is one that we need to explore in some detail. There is the argument of principle. If the edited register is to be retained, then we need to address a number of changes that may be necessary. At present, the edited register can be sold to anyone. Direct marketing companies—generators of junk mail—are on a par with charities and other bodies pursuing functions that may be as meritorious as those of some of the bodies that are entitled to copies of the full register.
Inclusion in the edited version is automatic unless one makes the conscious decision to opt out. The information provided to electors as to the nature of the register and their right to opt out is not as clear as it could be—I gather practice varies. If the edited register is to be retained, then these are all points that need to be addressed. Again, it would be helpful if my noble friend could indicate the Government’s thinking.
I welcome the Bill. As we have heard, the principle of IER is compelling, but it is essential that its implementation is sound. We cannot afford to skimp in ensuring that a fundamental civil right is delivered.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Davies of Stamford
My Lords, this is a timely Bill which has been brought forward by a parliamentarian and colleague for whom we all have the highest regard. I think I am right in saying that the noble Lord has served in three legislatures, over one of which he has presided. On a memorable occasion he sought election to a fourth, the European Parliament. He has enormous experience and, most important, he is a man of great wisdom, integrity and, if I may say so, of humanity. I therefore come to any Bill drafted and presented by him with the greatest respect. But I hope he will forgive me for saying that, though I certainly hope the Bill makes rapid progress, I do not share the noble Lord’s hope that it will go through without any amendment and therefore without the need for a Committee or Report stage.
I will take the clauses of the Bill in turn. I entirely agree with Clause 1 on retirement. That is a necessary measure to introduce—no doubt it should have been brought in years ago—and I have no difficulty in supporting it. I also agree with Clause 2 on non-attendance. I take it that the reference there to our Standing Orders fully provides for the possibility that someone might need to take absence on medical grounds for a year or more but would then be able to come back and resume his or her responsibilities. On that basis, I am extremely happy with Clause 2.
My problems arise under Clause 3. Let me explain: first, I am mystified by the reference to “one year” as being the defining point beyond which a sentence of imprisonment would result in the automatic exclusion or expulsion of a Member. I heard a rumour or suggestion—I do not believe that it is true—that the reason the noble Lord had thought of one year was because it would have caught one individual and excluded another who he had in mind. I cannot believe that that is correct because that would of course be an ad hominem form of legislation. The law should be based on universal principles universally applied. The attempt to simply target one individual rather than another would amount to a Motion of impeachment, or non-declared impeachment. We would not even be able to consider the merits of an individual case or look at the evidence. That would involve the breach of a whole range of the rules of natural justice. I am sure that the noble Lord had not got that in mind. It may be the case, though I am not aware of it, that in sentencing people convicted of criminal offences courts distinguish very specially between sentences of, say, 12 and 15 months and there is generally regarded to be a great qualitative step between those two points. But I have never heard that to be the case and I do not know that it is. If it were, there would not be any assurance that it would remain so, so that would not be good grounds for making that distinction.
I am very worried about the 12 months. I would like to know the rationale for it. I totally understand that the noble Lord wanted to distinguish between a criminal offence and a serious criminal offence. After all, to drive at 65 miles an hour in a 60 mile-an-hour zone is a criminal offence. Even if you did not notice that there was a sign saying that the speed limit was going down from 70 to 60, it is still a criminal offence if you are driving at 65. If traffic violations of that kind were grounds for automatic expulsion, I think quite a lot of us might have an individual problem. So I quite see the need to find some particular criterion but this is not a very satisfactory approach, for the reasons I have mentioned. There is a better way, which I will come on to in a second.
My second problem is much more serious. I do not believe in the idea of automatic expulsion. Here I totally agree with my noble friend Lord Wills, who made exactly the point that I had in mind to make. He said that he could not think of any particular examples but that there could well be some anomalies and injustices involved in having an automatic mechanism of that kind. I can think of some notable examples, not going back to the Middle Ages or the 16th or 17th centuries but to the last 100 or 150 years, when parliamentarians—Members of the House of Commons, at least—have been sentenced to prison. Fortunately, they were not as a result excluded from Parliament or from standing again. Had they been so, in retrospect all of us would have regarded that as a national scandal.
Let me mention a few names that will be familiar to noble Lords. Jimmy Maxton was imprisoned for a speech he made in Glasgow in the middle of the First World War. Arthur Jenkins was imprisoned at the beginning of the 1920s for aiding and abetting an illegal strike. George Lansbury—I put it to noble Lords that there has been no finer human being or man of greater integrity in British politics over the centuries—went to jail in 1913, just before the First World War, for a speech in which he supported the suffragette movement. Look at the large number—I think dozens in all—of members of the Irish Parliamentary Party who went to jail under the Coercion Acts that we passed here in the 19th century, including Parnell and Redmond who are two enormous figures of Irish history. Indeed, Parnell is a dominating giant of Irish history. They were also two very great parliamentarians. I think there have been no greater in Westminster and the House of Commons than Parnell and Redmond—fine men who dominated that Chamber for decades. They went to jail under the Coercion Acts and would automatically have been excluded from Parliament for all time if we had had the automatic mechanism contained in the Bill, so I do not believe that it is the right way forward.
What is the right way forward? I think it is the one that the noble Lord, Lord Steel, has resorted to in Clause 3(5). There he has reserved it for Members of the House of Lords who might be convicted in a foreign court with a sentence of more than one year. Of course, I totally see the logic of his making that particular provision in the light of the other provisions of his Bill. Clearly, in some foreign courts, it would be an offence, perhaps imprisonable for 12 months or more, just to criticise the current dictator or the ruling party in a one-party state. It is quite natural that he has decided to make provision for that eventuality in Clause 3(5). By doing so, he has recognised that there might be circumstances in which we need to consider the merits of an individual case. If we can consider those merits when someone has been imprisoned for a criminal offence—or supposed criminal offence—in a foreign court, why can we not consider them when he or she might have been convicted and sentenced to prison in a court in the United Kingdom? The noble Lord has admitted the principle of this alternative approach. I put it to him that he has solved the two problems that I have set out. That particular approach would be the right one to adopt in all circumstances. We should use the opportunity of the Committee stage of the Bill to remove the automatic mechanism and replace it with one along the lines of that he anticipates in Clause 3(5).
I have one final point. I am not clear that the Bill as currently justified would not contain an element of retrospectivity. I am sure that it would not be the noble Lord’s intent that it could be retrospectively applied but it does not explicitly say that it should not be. I see from the gestures of the noble Lord that he totally agrees with me on that. It would therefore be desirable to introduce a new clause or provision into the Bill in the course of the Committee discussions making it absolutely clear that there is no retrospectivity. There may be many of us on both sides of the House—I put that in the subjunctive for obvious reasons—who regret that we did not have in place a provision for expulsion when one or two egregious breaches of the criminal law, and what we might all think of as rules of personal honour and morality, were breached by Members of this House recently. Yet we did not have that mechanism in place at the time and we cannot retrospectively apply a penalty that did not exist at the time that those actions were committed. Therefore, we must make it absolutely clear that we stand by that fundamental principle that the law must not be retrospective.
With those few comments and suggestions, and looking forward to the future stages of the Bill—which I hope will proceed as rapidly as possible—I congratulate the noble Lord on the initiative that he has taken. The whole House will be grateful for it.
Is the noble Lord aware that the purpose of Clause 3 is simply to bring this House into line with the House of Commons in terms of the triggering mechanism for expulsion? While I am on my feet I will just mention that the wording of subsection (5) is taken from the previous Government’s drafting of the original Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill in 2010.
Lord Davies of Stamford
When we consider legislation, we really must consider it on its merits and look at the general principles to which we in this House are attached and which we believe should guide and inspire legislation. It is not a good excuse—if I may say so—for bringing in bad or inadequate legislation or legislation that conflicts with those general principles that one was at some point in the past a member of a Government who in one particular, peculiar situation may have done something that creates a precedent for the bad proposal that is before us. I stick by the comments I made just now, and I do not believe that, whatever may be the case in relation to precedent that the noble Lord cites, we should do other than look at the merits of the case.
Is the noble Lord therefore saying that the House of Commons is wrong in its provisions for expulsion?
Lord Davies of Stamford
I do not wish to repeat the speech that I have just made, but I have explained that I think that the Bill as currently drafted is not correct and could be improved. I hope it will be improved along the lines that I have suggested.
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon
I am sorry; noble Lords may not like this—
My Lords, I have the figures in front of me. There are 15 wholly appointed second Chambers in the world—16 if you include the United Kingdom—but they do not include the legislatures just referred to by the noble Lord.
Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon
I am happy to put the advice provided to me by the Library into the public domain if noble Lords wish, but I have the advice here and it is very clear. The other seven appointed bicameral Chambers include the nations that I have just talked about. If the noble Lord wishes to contend that, I shall be happy to exchange with him following the debate the Library research paper on which I base what I say.
This situation cannot be sustained. Noble Lords know that. Some people are using every argument to delay or obstruct reform and are coming forward with arguments that, frankly, do not hold water. Sooner or later, in some way, this House will have to become connected to the democracy of our country. Democracy cannot be kept out of this Chamber; it cannot be kept on the other side of those great brass doors. Sooner or later it will come here, and the longer noble Lords sustain this opposition to it, the more ridiculous this House will look. We now have an opportunity to put that right. Let us take it.
Lord Lloyd of Berwick
There are always too many lawyers, but I maintain that we could do with fewer former MPs and perhaps more elected Peers in the way that the royal commission suggested.
I accept that the Wakeham proposals, which I support, rested on a compromise—of course they did—but you will never, ever reach consensus on a disputed issue unless there is compromise on both sides. Therefore, I beg the Government to think again about the Wakeham proposals before introducing a further Bill, as I hope they will do. A 20% elected House would of course fall far short of what the Deputy Prime Minister wants but it would at least represent a step in the right direction and as such should, I suggest, be accepted by the Labour Party in the House of Commons. As the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, mentioned, it would make the House of Lords more representative but without challenging the primacy of the House of Commons.
If a Bill along those lines were introduced in the House of Commons, I would expect it to get through and, if it did, I hope that it would be accepted by your Lordships in this House. Surely that would be far better than forcing the present Bill down our throats by having resort to the Parliament Acts. Let us do something now and something more than what is contained in the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Steel. Above all, let us not defer the decision by appointing another royal commission under a different name.
My Lords, the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords was precisely that—the clue is in the title. Since then, there have been significant changes to the constitution of the United Kingdom. A constitutional convention would address the constitution holistically and not one particular part looking outwards.
Lord Lloyd of Berwick
I should be grateful if the noble Lord would indicate what changes there have been since 2012. The only one that I can think of is the progress of devolution. The fundamental questions relating to primacy which we have been discussing are still exactly the same as they were.
In addition to devolution, we have had the implementation of the Human Rights Act and significant changes in relation to the European Union, to name but three.
Lord Lloyd of Berwick
I am entirely unable to see how the Human Rights Act could affect the position. Surely, if anything, it favours an elected House rather than an appointed one.
My Lords, in the debate on the gracious Speech two years ago, I made the mistake of beginning by discussing the fixed-term Parliaments proposals, only to find to my great surprise that a principle that had been in the Labour Party manifesto had suddenly become the subject of such passionate opposition from the Labour Front Bench that I was intervened on some six or seven times in as many minutes. I may be about to repeat that mistake by attempting to respond to some of the points made in this debate about the future of your Lordships’ House. I hope then to make a few remarks about electoral registration.
There has been much debate about the future of this House since the much quoted Parliament Act 1911, which followed the controversy over this House blocking what became known as the “People’s Budget” when a Liberal Government, with Lloyd George as Chancellor, first introduced the old-age pension in the face of great opposition from the largely Conservative hereditary Peers who were of course Members of the House at that time. It has been said many times in this House that the House of Lords merely revises legislation and invites the other place to think again. Many of those most opposed to reform frequently say that this House does not block the will of the elected House. However, in many ways, the current controversy about the future of this House goes back all that time to the attempts to block the introduction of national insurance and the old-age pension. These came not long after Gladstone’s attempts to introduce home rule for Ireland.
I defer to the perhaps greater knowledge in this respect of the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. However, I recall seeing the paintings of the debates in 1893 that hang outside the Bishops’ Bar. I thought that it was at that point that the House of Lords was blocking home rule for Ireland.
The first home rule Bill was blocked in the House of Commons, not the House of Lords. The House of Lords under the Liberal Government had let through such matters as old-age pensions. Those matters which were clearly popular outside, it let through.
I think that Lloyd George in his many arguments against the hereditary basis of the House of Lords felt otherwise as he tried to introduce radical legislation.
Turning to more recent times, I would dare to suggest that opposition to the Government’s legislative programme in the past two years has often gone well beyond polite exhortations to the Commons to reconsider. This House has real purpose and real power, even if limited today to the significant power to delay non-financial matters. The power to delay can in practice often be the power to prevent.
The issue of legitimacy for this House to exercise its powers has been debated for more than 100 years. It is frequently suggested that we may now be moving too rapidly to conclude that debate. As I have said previously, it is probably only in this place that a Government intent on proceeding with a principle contained in all major party manifestos and introducing a phased programme of democratic reform over about 15 years could be accused of acting with “undue haste” with only a mere century of deliberation so far.
Proposals for reform appear to have shocked many noble friends to my left in this Chamber—I do not mean to my political left, of course—as well as a few around me. Some of those around me should recall that we have two words in our party title. The first word is “Liberal”, which takes us back to the party of Lloyd George and Asquith and that fight to end the hereditary principle and, at least in Asquith’s case, to replace it with the popular principle for membership of the House.
With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, there was absolutely no promise of a referendum on the issue of Lords reform in the Liberal Democrat manifesto in 2010. I believe in representative democracy. I think there are many problems with referendums, as I shall elaborate. The Liberal Democrats did not promise any such thing in 2010.
In answer to the noble Lord’s basic premise that the Liberal Democrats are acting out of pure self-interest in this matter, I point out the major flaw in his argument. In common consensus around the Chamber tonight, we have talked about there being perhaps 400 or 450 Members of this House who are particularly active. I draw noble Lords’ attention to the fact that there are now 90 Liberal Democrat Peers. That is not far off some 23% of the active membership of this House. I also point out to noble Lords that many people who talk about the effectiveness and work of this House have said that it is effective because no one party has an overall majority. No one party has an overall majority if you have a system of proportional representation.
I will give way to the noble Lord in a moment. It is not inconsistent for the Liberal Democrats to argue that there should be a system of proportional representation for electing Members of your Lordships’ House to prevent there being a majority for one party in both Houses at any one time.
I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend again but, on a point of detail, there is a system of proportional representation in Scotland and Scotland now has a majority Government.
Indeed it has. That is because the Scottish National Party secured almost a majority of the votes. My noble friend serves also to remind me of the other flaw in the argument advanced by some noble Lords during this debate that proportional representation would mean that the Liberal Democrats were permanently in government. That was suggested a few moments ago. As the noble Lord, Lord Norton, said, we have PR in Scotland and Wales and the Liberal Democrats are not in government there. That does not follow.
It does if you look at the proportion of votes that the party gets in the whole of the United Kingdom, focusing on England.
I simply think that PR is a matter of democracy and we need democracy within this House.
Given the Labour Party’s recent history on House of Lords reform, I am surprised by this new-found enthusiasm for a referendum on the issue. I note that that was in the Labour Party’s manifesto in 2010 but not previously. In the 1996-97 period, leading Liberal Democrats such as my noble friend Lord Maclennan of Rogart, together with the late Robin Cook and other noble Lords and Baronesses—some of them present in the House tonight—agreed a fundamental reform of the House of Lords in the event of the Conservatives losing the 1997 general election. There was no suggestion that there should be a referendum on the proposals. It seems that if there is to be a referendum on the issue it would be because parliamentarians in the other place have failed to do the job that they were elected to do.
I would like to refer briefly back to the report on referendums—
My Lords, there is room for a discussion and a concordat between the two Houses. We have also seen in the evidence that there is some resistance to putting into statute a further codification of the relationship between the two Houses because, as I have heard many noble Lords say, the jurisdiction of the courts and litigation would not necessarily be desirable. The Government did notice and will consider the recommendations of the Joint Committee with regard to initiating preliminary work on a concordat between the two Houses, but such work ultimately would be the responsibility of the two Houses rather than of the Government, as it would be concerned with constitutional conventions.
I want to make one other brief point. I was puzzled to hear a number of noble Lords say that this Chamber is not part of the legislature. Erskine May has been quoted on several occasions. On the first page, chapter 1, page 1, paragraph 1 states:
“Parliament is composed of the Sovereign, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Collectively they form the legislature”.
I think that my noble friend is confusing a point. People are not saying that the House of Lords is not a part of the legislature; they are saying that it is not a legislature.
I will return to those speeches that I have read. I admit that I have never taken the MA in legislative studies at the University of Hull, but I referred back to my views. This House is clearly part of the legislature; this is a two-Chamber legislature.