Recall of MPs Bill
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(11 years ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth
“Review
(1) The Prime Minister must make arrangements—
(a) for a committee to carry out a review of the operation of this Act and, if appropriate in consequence of its findings, to make recommendations for the repeal or amendment of this Act, and(b) for the publication of the committee’s findings and recommendations (if any).(2) A majority of the members of the committee are to be members of the House of Commons.
(3) Arrangements under this section are to be made at least five years after the day on which this Act is passed and no later than six years after the day on which this Act is passed.”
Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, this amendment provides for a review of the Act five to six years after enactment. It follows debate in Committee when the noble Lord, Lord Soley, proposed a sunset clause, but raised as an alternative a review of the Act. I favour review. Debate on the Bill has demonstrated uncertainty about its effect. Throughout today’s debate on Report, most of the discussion on amendments made the case for this review. There is a clear degree of lack of knowledge of what the effect will be. It has not been thought through. We are totally unclear about what impact the Bill will have.
To reiterate what I have said on a number of occasions, the purpose of the Bill is to restore, or at least to enhance, trust in politics, so let us see after the experience of a whole Parliament whether it has made any difference. It may be that no recall petitions are started in the period. That does not mean that an MP has not become eligible for a petition to be raised. Even if there have been no MPs who have acted in such a way as to trigger eligibility for a recall petition, it would still be useful to review the situation. If no MPs have acted in such a way as to render themselves liable, it would be useful to examine whether that is a result of the provisions of the Bill. Has it had a deterrent effect, or does it appear to have been irrelevant? If one or more MPs have been eligible for a recall petition, have petitions been raised and, if so, with what effect? If they have been eligible but no petitions have been raised, what does that tell us about the Bill?
There is clearly a case for review. It may be that there is not that much to review, but that in itself is important to know, and it is important to examine why that is the case. The Bill will be subject to post-legislative review anyway but, given the nature of the measure, a formal review is necessary, not least given the degree of uncertainty demonstrated by our deliberations on the Bill. I think it will be helpful for Parliament, but it should be especially for the benefit of electors. It is designed for their benefit. Has it had the desired effect?
The Minister will recognise the wording of the amendment. It is taken in large part from the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. Parliament accepted the case for review of that Act. I think there is an equally compelling case for a review of this measure. I beg to move.
Lord Gardiner of Kimble
My Lords, the Government are fully persuaded of the merits of post-legislative scrutiny as a general principle. There are frequently valuable lessons to be learnt for the future, and the Government are always happy to listen to and consider recommendations arising from such reviews.
As noble Lords have said, the Government have included review clauses in several of their Acts this Parliament, including ones affecting constitutional or electoral matters. However, the Government have some reservations in this case. My noble friend’s amendment commits to a review after five years. That is a reasonable period in some respects, but it is of course by no means certain that there will have been a recall petition by that point. In fact, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, was getting very close to that. A review of an Act which has not had the opportunity to operate as intended would be severely limited in its usefulness. It would be unable to consider the operation of the recall process, and its conclusions would have to be to some extent hypothetical.
Recall does not have to be regularly used for the power to be a good addition to democracy. Indeed, as I have said before—and I hope noble Lords will understand my good intent—the Government fervently hope that no petition is triggered because Members’ conduct is of the highest standard expected. I am sure that noble Lords would not suggest that Parliament’s disciplinary powers should lapse simply because Members’ behaviour does not cause them to be used.
It is, of course, open to Parliament and to the Government of the day to review legislation on their own initiative, without a statutory requirement to do so. It would be entirely appropriate for a parliamentary committee to conduct its own post-legislative scrutiny at such a point as it felt that it would be useful to do so. I am sure that the Government of the day would be more than happy to reflect on any considerations that might be brought forward in that case.
I hope that we will not have a recall because the standards of Members of Parliament are very high, so will not need a review. The Government are not happy about my noble friend’s amendment and we ask him to withdraw it, because in this case we are not convinced that it would be of the use that we know he intends. If there has not been a trigger, it would not be the sort of valuable review that we would like were we to have reviews. I hope that he feels able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is clearly not familiar with my reputation. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, may find himself rather busy in five to six years because this will probably coincide with the review of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. I suspect he will be only too happy to volunteer to serve on that review as well and to reach similar conclusions on both. I may be able to allay the fears of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, on the content of the amendment in terms of how the review would take place. This also relates to what my noble friend the Minister said. It stipulates a review but there will not necessarily be any action in the light of the committee’s investigation. It may find that it has had a deterrent effect and there is not too much to be done, which might be worth celebrating. It would not be in the scope of the amendment to cause more problems or give an opening to those who want to pursue a more radical measure. It would only be if the committee came up with recommendations for repeal or amendment of the Act as it stands. It does not necessarily open it up for everybody to come forward with alternatives.
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that the underlying principle is the important point. The content of the amendment is not set in stone. I put it in its current form because the Government had already accepted it for the Fixed-term Parliaments Act and I thought this would make it a bit more difficult for them to say no to this. The arguments on both measures are identical. If you accept the arguments for the review of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act—which might be working wonderfully, so why do we need to review it?—those same arguments apply to this Bill. You either have some provision for both or neither. That was the reason I drafted it the way I did: to entice the Government in this direction rather than setting something in stone. I would be quite amenable, if it was felt appropriate, to coming back to this with a differently worded amendment to achieve review.
This will clearly be subject to post-legislative review by the relevant department after five or six years. It needed to be a wider review and be on record as more formal, as is the case with the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. I have made the case for it and I hope the Government might reflect on it, even at this late stage. It does not undermine the principle of the Bill; it just makes a sensible provision that we should look at these things in terms of how they work out. They may not be working as intended but that does not mean they have gone completely belly up—which is when we tend to do something about it—but they might merit modification. However, I do not intend to pursue it further at this late stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Recall of MPs Bill
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(11 years ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, I support Amendments 2 and 3, to which, as my noble friend said, I am a signatory. They are designed to remove discretion by judges and politicians. I appreciate the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. I understand the case he is making, but I think the arguments for Amendments 2 and 3 are more persuasive.
It is important to remember, as my noble friend mentioned in moving the amendment, what the Bill is designed to achieve—it is to restore, or at least create, confidence in Parliament. I cannot see how the existing provisions of the Bill achieve that. A judge or members of the Standards Committee may be conscious that what they decide may render an MP eligible for a recall petition. It may or may not be a factor. However, the crucial point is not whether it is a factor but that members of the public may believe that it has been.
If an MP is suspended for eight or nine sitting days, there may be a good reason for selecting that period, but it may well give rise to suspicion that the number was chosen in order to avoid the MP being eligible for a recall petition. A judge torn between whether or not to sentence a Member to a period of imprisonment may err on the side of leniency, but, in so doing, may be accused of being overly lenient, ensuring that the MP is neither incarcerated nor subject to a recall petition. Electors may not share the judge’s view, but there is nothing they can do about it other than feel that the system has let them down.
These amendments take out the element of discretion. There is simplicity, there is objectivity. If an MP is convicted of an offence, any offence, he or she becomes eligible for a recall petition. The issue is simply one of innocence or guilt. If the Member is found guilty, it is then up to the electors whether to begin a petition to recall the Member. If it is a minor offence, as my noble friend Lord Tyler mentioned, they are not likely to take action, but it is up to them. There is no intermediary between the MP committing some wrongdoing and the electors.
In short, these amendments create conditions which electors will understand, and it is then up to them. I suspect they are more likely to feel strongly about MPs who break the law than those who offend against the rules of the House of Commons. If an MP accepts money for raising issues in Parliament, then that should perhaps no longer be a matter for disciplinary action by the House but for a change in the law.
As I argued at Second Reading, this is an imperfect Bill. These amendments are designed to render it less imperfect. I hope, even at this late stage, that the Government see, if not the light, at least a chink between the curtains.
Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)
My Lords, Amendments 2 and 3, which have been spoken to by the noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Norton, have the combined effect of making the provisions of the Bill even more severe than they now are and of weakening the capacity of the House of Commons to discipline its Members itself. That seems to me to be an unhappy combination.
The noble Lords believe that a Member of Parliament found guilty by a court of any offence—not necessarily an imprisonable offence, but any offence—ought to become subject to the recall petition process. As the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, suggested, a minor motoring offence could expose the Member of Parliament to that process. He was optimistic that constituents would have the moderation and kindliness not to take advantage of that, but it does seem to me that a lot of politics could quickly come into this and that an opportunity might well be seized by those who wanted to see a Member of Parliament of a certain party displaced. Perhaps more seriously, a Member of Parliament who was found guilty in a court of some offence of obstruction during the course of protesting against proposals for fracking or wind turbines—or perhaps the tripling of tuition fees—would, again, be subject to the recall process.
This means that the Member of Parliament, instead of being subject to the rounded judgment of all his constituents in due course at the general election, becomes immediately subject to the wrath of all the Mrs Grundys in his constituency and of the censorious minority—only a small minority, 10% of registered electors, need to sign the petition to trigger the process. Members of Parliament will have to be paragons of virtue and constantly on their best behaviour. Those of us who know the character of the House of Commons well may think that pressures in that direction are not likely to be very positively productive.
The amendments would mean that suspension by the Standards Committee was irrelevant—that would be struck out as a trigger. Even if the amendment would not mark the formal abandonment of attempts by the House of Commons to regulate itself—I acknowledge that the rather substantial volume that the Committee on Standards has released today indicates that it has not given up on that process—it would certainly seriously undermine the capacity of the House of Commons to police itself.
The noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Lexden, made much in Committee of paragraph 13 of the report of the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House. However, that report does not recommend removing the jurisdiction of the Standards Committee. What it does is to point to an inconsistency in the Bill, between its desire to increase the direct accountability of Members of Parliament to electors and its desire to retain a significant role for the Committee on Standards. There is a tension and a contradiction there, but for those of us who believe that it is grievously misguided to introduce this recall procedure, that tension or contradiction is something of a mitigating factor. I certainly do not think that the noble Lords can pray in aid the Constitution Committee as endorsing what they are seeking to do. They have decided that it stated a very important problem and that it is a problem that they want to solve.
Amendment 6, in the name of my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours, takes us, as he has explained, only a small part of the distance that he wishes to travel. While I deeply respect his knowledge of the ways of the Standards Committee, on which he served for many years, I profoundly disagree with him. The noble Lord, Lord Norton, has reminded us that the stated purpose of the legislation is to restore the reputation of MPs and Parliament. The way for Parliament to restore its reputation is to demonstrate to the public that it has found better ways to handle, discipline and organise itself.
I am against what has already begun to happen. I am against the introduction of lay members. There is everything to be said for the availability of high-quality advice. I am much in favour of the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards but, as a famous parliamentarian once said, expertise should be on tap, not on top. It is for the House of Commons itself to find more convincing ways to regulate itself and demonstrate to the public that it is doing so.
Some people may ask what all this has to do with us in the House of Lords. I simply reply that we are a House of Parliament. We have a particularly close interest in the good functioning of Parliament, as do all the people of this country. I think that it is legitimate for us to offer advice. I agree that the House of Commons will surely wish to consider this important report from the Committee on Standards. That may mean some delay before we reach Third Reading, if matters are to be properly and decently conducted. There is no doubt that we are entitled to take a view on these matters. However, I disagree with noble Lords who have proposed these various amendments.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, I have considerable sympathy with this amendment, and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, has come up with an ingenious way of bringing it forward. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, indicated, it raises an important issue of principle, which is the freedom of choice of the electors. This is something to which I keep referring and it is why I opposed attempts to ban dual mandate. My view is that if electors wish to put somebody into assemblies, it is entirely a matter for the electors. It might be impractical, but that is not for us to say. It is for us to allow electors to do that. So I agree with the point that the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, made. It may be that the court says, “You have committed an offence”, but if the electors feel it is important that that person should be returned to represent them, then it is entirely a matter for them.
We keep bringing forward rules that restrict the freedom of electors. We should be looking at it the other way, trying to open up our process as much as possible and leaving it up to electors. If they want somebody to represent them, that is a matter for them. Leave it to the electors. Do not impose restrictions on them. For that reason, I have considerable sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, is trying to achieve. Certainly, I am all in favour of reviewing that provision and perhaps even widening it, for the reasons I have given, to look more broadly at how we can protect electors in making the choice that they wish to make, having whom they wish to elect and not being restricted in that.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
My Lords, as my noble friends have spelt out, the Bill raises the interesting question not just of the interplay between this process and that of the election court but also of what I think is the Government's slap-dash drafting of the Bill, with their cut-and-paste from other legislation, without actually thinking through the best way of dealing with allegations of wrongdoing. As I have said, and as the noble Lord, Lord Gardiner of Kimble, has echoed, we do not want ever to see this Bill used. We hope that MPs will never find themselves in the position of triggering a recall petition. However, if it happens, we need to be sure that the most appropriate mechanisms and penalties are available to suit the particular misconduct. We may have it in this Bill, but we may not; it may not be right. Indeed, on the reverse side, it might be much better for other misconduct to trigger a recall petition rather than straight expulsion, as my noble friend Lord Dubs suggested. The proposal of a report to consider this in the round and come forward with proposals on that basis seems eminently sensible. I hope that the Government will support this amendment.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, I, too, very much welcome this amendment. It is a step in the right direction. I have just one question for my noble friend. Why was the consultation to which he referred not undertaken before the Bill was introduced?
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
I am going to be a little more generous than the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, and thank the Minister for listening to the debate on the amendment that we moved in Committee. He will not be surprised that we are delighted with this. Not only is it the right answer in itself, but I also think that it will reduce the demand for postal votes. That will save the resources of the petition officer—their time, their staff and their money—because there will be less need for people to apply for postal votes. So we are very happy to support this government amendment.
Lord Tyler
I was enormously impressed with the noble Lord’s very dramatic introduction of his amendment. Perhaps he has been over-Mantelled recently and has been watching too much “Wolf Hall”. However, in these circumstances, he has a perfectly valid point.
My questions follow on from the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Hughes. Who advised Ministers that it should be eight weeks? Most significantly, there is the very important cross-reference with the number of signing places, which my noble friend Lord Norton and I referred to in Committee. If there are only two signing places, perhaps you do need longer; but if there are 10, you should obviously review that situation. Has whoever gave advice to Ministers on the number of weeks, on the original basis of a maximum of four signing places, been asked to review that advice in the light of the Government’s now much more flexible attitude? That is something we need to be told now, otherwise it seems to me that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, has huge merit, at least in making the Government think again about the very new circumstances that their own flexibility has now created.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, I, too, support this amendment for the reasons we discussed in Committee. I argued then that the number of signing places should be expanded and the period of time in which you can sign reduced. The Government have got half way there, so I hope that they will now go the rest of the way as well, for the reasons that have been well advanced.
Like other noble Lords, I cannot understand the rationale for eight weeks. As the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, said, it is much longer than an election campaign. In the case of one election, the Prime Minister announced it and it took place four weeks to the day after that. However, here we are saying that twice as long should be available for people to reflect on whether they should sign a petition—eight weeks. Why on earth should anyone take eight weeks to think about whether they should sign a petition or not? The news about the Member being eligible will be out quickly. It will be in the news and, as has been touched on, it will then cease to be newsworthy after a matter of days, if that. Why are we going to linger for weeks with people sat at polling stations twiddling their thumbs waiting for people to turn up and sign? I can see no argument for that length of time. It is not even as if we are still in the period where it took days for news to reach people and they then had to rely on some slow means of transport to get somewhere to actually sign something. Even if we were in that period, they could do it in less than eight weeks. Why nowadays, with instant communication and the ability to get to one of potentially 10 places to sign fairly quickly, do we need as long as eight weeks? It may be an arbitrary figure, but why eight rather than, say, six?
The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, said that he is flexible and that it could be four or five weeks. I thought he was, if anything, generous in saying three weeks. Why on earth would you need three weeks to reflect? Are you going to call the family together to hold great deliberations about whether you should sign it or not? Once you know about it, you think about it and then you decide whether you are going to make the effort to go and sign the petition—you go and sign and that is it. That could be quite easily achieved within a period of three weeks and, to be honest, one could achieve it with a much shorter period.
As I said, the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is being quite generous in putting down that figure. Had he not put down his amendment, I would have put one down to reduce the period and would probably have chosen an even shorter period. The argument for his amendment is eminently rational. It does not raise any serious issue of principle in terms of recall per se, so I see no reason why the Government, having moved on the number of places where signing can take place, could not be moved just as easily on this. It makes perfect sense. There is also the practical point that was touched on about people having to staff the places at which signing can take place. There is a cost to the public purse, and we should not lose sight of that.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Howarth of Newport has made a good case for considering whether and why eight weeks is somehow the perfect period for the petition to run. We remain unclear on the question that my noble friend Lord Hughes raised as to why the Government chose this period—a question to which they never gave a clear answer in Committee. As I said before, two weeks, as it was then, did seem too short a period if it was to include the run-up to the signing period—in other words, the time to get the signing issues out and for everyone to get to know about them as well as the signing period itself.
The Electoral Commission thinks eight weeks is, in its words, a relatively “long signing period”. Certainly, in democratic terms, two months is a long period for an MP to be effectively out of the Commons and fighting to retain his or her seat. However, the period does have to be sufficient for people to know about it, to hear the debate and to come to a view, and three weeks probably is too short if it is to cover the whole of the public awareness period—I do not like the word campaign—as well as the actual signing period. Amendment 12, as it stands, might not be the right one, but it will be very interesting to hear whether the Government can give us any reason why they chose eight weeks and, even more interestingly, whether they are willing to consider some movement on this.
Recall of MPs Bill
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(11 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Soley (Lab)
My Lords, this amendment would create a sunset clause; that is, it would bring the Bill to an end five years after the date when it became law. I came to the conclusion quite a few years ago that sunset clauses were useful in a couple of situations. That was originally drawn to my attention in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, in which we had a sunset clause because the Government accepted that the powers in it were very serious and we needed to consider the idea of letting the Bill lapse if it did not need to be renewed. In fact those powers had to be renewed, and we did that. The other case in which it is useful, which is much more relevant to this one, is where the outcome in the Bill as regards becoming a law and its effect is very uncertain, and it contains constitutional implications. That is the case for reviewing it at the end of a certain period. The Minister may want to say that the Government do not like the idea of a sunset clause—I know some of the arguments against sunset clauses—but if they would like to consider just reviewing it at that stage, that might be another option.
I have two fears about the Bill. I will start with the simple one that does not keep me awake at night much: that it would be largely ineffective and might not even reach the statute book intact. There are so many uncertainties in the Bill, many of which we have heard about this evening, that it is quite hard to see how it would be in good enough shape to become a complete law before the general election. It will not surprise me if it does not quite achieve that. You could say, “Well, that could be the end of the matter”. The second and much more worrying fear, which causes me concern and which has come up a number of times on both days of Committee, is that there are possibly quite serious implications here. Indeed, the Constitution Committee picked out one of them, which we have referred to on a number of occasions. If the offence that a Member of Parliament commits is a political one, the committee indicates that the outcome of that is a very serious matter.
The noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, who has gone now, used the example of Zac Goldsmith and Heathrow Airport, of which I have some knowledge. I have no doubt that in due course the Conservative Party will change its position on the third runway and conclude that it was its idea to expand the airport all along and that I had nothing to do with it despite the last 20 years of campaigning. However, the important point about Zac Goldsmith is that, to his credit, he has indicated that he will resign from the Tory party if it changes its position. Let us assume that the party changes its position—which I think it will, whether it is in government or not—and Zac Goldsmith resigns from it. That would not trigger an election. However, he feels very strongly about this issue, and if he feels so strongly that he does some form of demonstration in the Chamber of the House of Commons and gets himself excluded from the House for more than 10 days, we will enter into this process. You have to ask, “Do you really want to create that sort of condition?”. The last few debates have been about how important it is to debate the issue of the MP’s wrongdoing. In this case, I suggest that if Zac Goldsmith behaved so badly—I am not saying that he would—that would be the effect, but the election would be all about the third runway at Heathrow, and all the campaigners on both sides would pour in on it. There are many examples of that; my noble friend Lord Hughes gave some, and I gave others. There is a danger of politicising elections.
The other thing that troubles me about this, and the other reason why some form of review or sunset clause is necessary, is because there are umpteen opportunities in the Bill for pulling in the judiciary. The last few amendments we have discussed are all replete with opportunities for legal challenges, which would go either to an electoral court or—which would be less likely, but is conceivable—to a conventional court. All that seems to be opening up an area where we pull the judiciary more and more into the political process, which I am very strongly against. The case of Phil Woolas that I quoted at Second Reading is a dramatic example of why we should not get the judiciary muddled up with political process, and of how right the 18th-century political philosopher was—his name escapes me—who said that the electorate are sovereign in the British political system. The electorate must decide. That is very real and we should stick to it, so keeping the judiciary out of politics is a good idea.
All that suggests to me that the case for having some review system at the end of the Bill would be useful. We need to remember that the sunset clause is an advantage. If the Bill is not used at all, which is quite possible, it will just die. It will come off the statute book and we will not have to bother about it again. On the other hand, if it requires reform, we can reform it at that stage. That was done with the prevention of terrorism Acts. The alternative is that it works fine and we can renew it. That is not a bad safety valve to have in a Bill of this nature, which has constitutional implications and, as I have indicated, certain serious provisions.
I looked through the Constitution Committee’s report and it contains a number of important issues. I will not repeat them all now because we dealt with some of them earlier. It is not just a matter of politicisation. As has come up recently, if the Electoral Commission is not to be heavily involved in this—and clearly it is not, from what has been said in Committee this evening—then there are all sorts of opportunities for challenges for the proper running of a recall election. What will happen then? Are we going to have to have another recall election, just as we would if an MP or someone else challenged the validity of a conventional election for that MP? There is an opportunity here for all sorts of applications to court, particularly on the expenses issue. Incidentally, Edmund Burke was the philosopher that I was trying to remember at this late hour.
We really need some way of ensuring that we can review this Bill. My best guess is that it might not be used much if at all, in which case it could die after five years. If it is used, frankly there could be very real dangers in it. It is very important, as the Constitution Committee pointed out, that there are ways of removing MPs. The expenses scandal was a classic example of that: several MPs were removed. Indeed, one of the saddest things about the Bill is that every MP in the House of Commons now has been re-elected by the electorate, who are sovereign in our system. None of them has done anything wrong. However, this Bill is about flagellation. As I think I said before, flagellation is a bad idea at the best of times but do-it-yourself flagellation when you are not even guilty of anything is ridiculous. No MP need be sitting at the moment thinking, “I have done something wrong”.
As the Constitution Committee points out, if the Bill is designed just to reassure the electorate, it is unlikely to have any effect. The most we can hope for is some sort of publicity of this sort of event and the hope that people notice it. The chances of people taking much notice of what is happening on this right now are very limited. If an MP did something, they would almost certainly be disciplined by the procedures that operated effectively even in the last Parliament. As I say, at best this Bill is unlikely to be used and therefore should die after a five-year period; at worst, we could have situations where very heavily political cases had to be fought on that basis. That is bad news for democracy and I ask the Government to look at a way of reviewing the effectiveness of this Bill after a five-year period and then to let it lie, to amend it and bring it back, to get rid of it or, if I am wrong and it works, to just accept that it works.
Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Soley, made a persuasive case. However, I am particularly drawn to the alternative that he identified, which is to provide for a review of the Act after, say, five years. The precedent already exists in the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. We have already written into that Act that it will be subject to review.
The Minister may say that this Act will in any case be subject to post-legislative review by the relevant department three to five years after enactment, but I think there may be a case with such a significant constitutional measure for the review to be post-legislative scrutiny and for it to be included in the measure. I commend that review proposal as an alternative to what the noble Lord is putting forward. It is something to which we may wish to return on Report.
Lord Tyler (LD)
My Lords, not for the first time I entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth. However, I want to make one more substantial point about the Bill and say why I think that some form of review is necessary, whether it is a sunset clause or a review of the kind that my noble friend has suggested.
I have followed the course of these proposals from the very early days of the draft Bill in the other place. I have attended debates there and have watched and listened and have been involved in a number of discussions with Members of both Houses. We should recognise that a feature of this Bill which has been very evident from our discussions in your Lordships’ House is that Members of the other place were for understandable reasons very inhibited when they examined the details of the Bill. They felt that it was self-serving to some extent and they were embarrassed at looking at it in great detail and finding fault with it because they felt that, in so doing, they were somehow putting themselves in an invidious position. Indeed, some were also influenced by pressures from outside not to say anything, not to question, not to challenge and not to query. For that reason, the Bill, as it now stands, will satisfy no one.
In those circumstances, we should bear in mind very carefully what was said by noble Lords on all sides of your Lordships’ House—that they hope that the Bill will never be used. It was said most recently by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. He said that he hoped it would never be used or used very infrequently. In those circumstances, it would be irresponsible of Parliament not to set out some sort of review procedure to determine the timescale for looking at the Bill again. The proof of the pudding will be in its eating. If nobody eats it, is satisfied with it or finds it digestible in any form whatever, Parliament has a responsibility to go back and look at it again.
We have all discussed in various fora the advantages of post-legislative scrutiny, and I know that my noble friend is a protagonist for that. Of course, we should do that more often but in this particular case it is important that Ministers think very carefully between now and Report about what mechanism they would prefer for doing that. I do not mind which it is, whether it is a review or a sunset clause. This is an unusual Bill in the way it has been treated in the other place and the considerable concerns and anxieties that have been expressed throughout the House. I make no bones about it: I think it is still capable of being improved. Some think that it is beyond improvement. I have put forward some proposals and am still hopeful that Ministers will meet me and other colleagues from all sides of the House to look at the concerns and criticisms of the Constitution Committee to see whether we can meet them in a more effective way. However, as things stand, I believe that it would be simply irresponsible for Parliament to leave this Bill in its current state without including some mechanism for proper review in a prescribed way and at a prescribed time.
Lord Norton of Louth
My noble friend made the point that the Government wish to avoid a situation that would require the introduction of primary legislation should a sunset clause be effective. The advantage of putting a review into the Bill would be that it would avoid that, so that this would be a preferable way of dealing with the situation.
Recall of MPs Bill
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(11 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
These are the merits of the Bill. I thought the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, made very good points in relation to his former constituency. I have made the same points in relation to mine and they apply a fortiori—ad absurdum, if you like—to Orkney and Shetland, and to the Western Isles. I was merely making that point. I do not need to repeat the comments about what kind of buildings there should be in each of these areas or what provision there should be, for example, for blind and disabled people. There is a whole range of unanswered questions and, with great expectation, we look forward to the answers from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace.
Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendment, which should be read in conjunction with Amendment 39 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. It strikes me that the problem is that there are too few signing places but they are open for too long a time. If the period is shortened, that would presumably free up resources that might help to cover the cost of having more places open within a short period. If the two were put together, it could be cost-neutral but very beneficial to all those who want to take part in the process.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, managed to entertain us for more than an hour during the first day in Committee. I fear that he may be hoping to do the same on the second.
Lord Teverson (LD)
My Lords, perhaps I can intervene in what seems at the moment like a Second Reading debate. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, mentioned my noble friend Lord Tyler. I point out that although the electorate recalled him, I am pleased to say that they changed their mind a few years later and sent him back, and he served a number of Parliaments before he decided to stand down from the House. That is just for clarification.
Lord Grocott
Perhaps I need to further clarify that exactly the same procedure happened in my own case.
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, I will get in eventually. I outlined my alternative to the Bill on Second Reading. Addressing the amendments before us, I reiterate my support for Amendment 39 in particular. I cannot see the logic of eight weeks because I cannot see who benefits from that. Obviously, you can argue that it is unfair on the Member over whom this sword of Damocles would hang for that length of time, but I cannot see any benefit to electors. If there is that demand to recall a Member, they will want the by-election as quickly as possible, and this will just delay matters. If they feel that strongly, they would not want that length of time in which to do it. It would make far more sense to provide a much shorter period but with greater opportunities for those who want to go and sign. Therefore there should be a correlation: the more you narrow the period, the more opportunities you provide for those who want to go and sign, and it benefits everybody involved to do it as quickly as possible.
Baroness Corston
My Lords, I support Amendment 39. I will follow on from the comment made by my noble friend Lord Grocott against the eight-week signing period. In every election I fought I was preached against from pulpits on the issue of abortion. A general election takes about three or four weeks. I can imagine what would happen to a Member of Parliament in a constituency when an issue such as that moulders on for eight weeks, and the degree to which that single issue could influence the outcome of an election. However, to return more specifically to the issues raised by my noble friend Lord Foulkes on the necessity for returning officers to become petition officers and oversee the recall mechanism, can the Minister tell us in his response what discussions the Government have had with the Local Government Association about the way in which it sees this legislation working—and, if there have been such discussions, what was its response?
Lord Norton of Louth
My Lords, I argued at Second Reading that this Bill would not achieve its purpose, which is to restore trust in politics. The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in the other place made exactly the same point. In fact, in some respects, the Bill could be quite dangerous. By focusing on sanctions to deploy in response to bad behaviour, it detracts from the need to encourage strong and positive leadership.
I developed the point at Second Reading that if it is a true recall, electors would be in the driving seat. By that, however, I meant electors—not just a small proportion of electors. I take the diametrically opposed view to that of my noble friend Lord Finkelstein. I would argue for low triggers but a high percentage of electors who would have to trigger a recall. I take the point that it should not be a small number of electors, who could be the opponents of the Member, just being able to sign up and trigger recall.
If someone is elected in a general election and gets 40% or 50% of the vote, I do not see why a further election should then be triggered by 10%, who, as my noble friend Lord Hamilton was arguing, could be comprised of supporters of the opposing parties. There is a compelling case for a very high threshold. To some extent, Amendment 41 might be rather generous in being as low as it is. I can see a stronger case for a much higher percentage. If electors in a constituency really want to remove a Member, I think there should be a much higher threshold. I would move in that direction. It would not achieve what I was arguing at Second Reading in terms of a proper recall vote, but at least it would make a bad Bill less bad.
I support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Hamilton because there is a lack of equity in the arrangements embodied in the Bill. Although I do not think that allowing a counterpetition would necessarily restore trust in politics, it would probably increase interest in politics. It would allow voters who have a view one way or the other to get engaged. If we got that far, that would be the preferable way to go. But, as I say, what we are debating is amendments designed to render what is a fairly bad Bill somewhat less bad.
Lord Grocott
My Lords, this is a heroic attempt to create, as my noble friend said, a level playing field. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, would acknowledge that Amendment 51 could be tidied up but the objective or principle behind the amendment of trying to make some provision for fairness is an important one in a very extended procedure. We know about the time between the Speaker and the petition officer and then the eight weeks that is in the Bill which will all have been preceded by lengthy considerations in perhaps a court or in the committee of the House of Commons, during which time the only case that will be heard is the specific case against the Member of Parliament. During the eight weeks, if the Bill stays as it is at present, the drama, at least at constituency level, will be all about how many have signed so far, “Have enough signed so far? Roll up! Sign up! We’re nearly there”. What is the defence against that? There is no defence.
The principle behind Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, is an impeccable principle. I hope that the Minister, even if he does not like the particular wording of the amendment, will at least acknowledge the importance of the principle.
Recall of MPs Bill
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, a provision for a recall of elected representatives is used by a number of nations but it is an exceptional procedure. It is exceptional in that the nations employing it are in a minority and within those nations the use of the procedure is rare.
The Bill seeks to put the United Kingdom in that exceptional category. It does not replicate recall as understood in some systems; that is, by removing a person from office through a local referendum, asking should the person be recalled or not, and followed, in the event of a yes vote, by a new election. We have no experience of recall, although we do have experience of a mechanism for triggering by-elections: when MPs were appointed Ministers, they were subject to re-election in a by-election. That remained the case until 1926.
There is clearly a debate to be had as to whether such an exceptional procedure as recall should be introduced in the United Kingdom. That debate, though, has already been had in the other place. I do not believe we should be challenging the ends of the measure, as decided already by the Commons. Our task is to focus on the means. Given that it is clearly a measure of constitutional significance, it merits enhanced scrutiny.
My starting point, therefore, is the question: what is the Bill designed to achieve? Once we know that, we can see whether the provisions are adequate to the task. As we have heard, the Bill is essentially the product of the expenses scandal of 2009. In the wake of that, the three main parties brought forward proposals for recall. The intention is to restore trust in politics through allowing electors to remove an MP other than at a general election when the Member falls below expected standards. According to the Deputy Prime Minister in the other place:
“It strikes a fair balance between holding to account those who do not maintain certain standards of conduct, while giving MPs the freedom to do their job and make difficult decisions where necessary”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/9/14; col. 41WS.]
My concern is more with the first part of that balance than the second. If one wanted to ring-fence the independence of MPs, one would not have the measure at all. Given that the other place has agreed the Bill, the focus must be on having some safeguards. There is a need to ensure that the provisions do not work against Members who express independent views, though I am not sure that electors do have a desire to move against MPs who are independent in approach—rather the reverse. MPs who challenge their own party and are working hard in the constituency generally have no reason to worry. When Enoch Powell regularly voted against his own party in the 1970-74 Parliament—which he did 115 times—consideration was given to withdrawing the whip. It was decided not to pursue that because the Whips recognised that he was too well entrenched in his constituency.
In any event, provision for a form of advance recall already exists through local parties. They can deselect sitting Members. They are not removed immediately, but in effect are sacked, the sacking taking effect at the next election. That is likely to continue to be a more potent constraint on the actions of MPs than the provisions of the Bill.
My principal concern, therefore, is whether the Bill will do much to restore trust in politics. As it stands, I am not sure that it will. It is designed to hold to account those who, in the words of the Deputy Prime Minister,
“do not maintain certain standards of conduct”.
The problem, as we have already heard, is that these standards are determined by Parliament and not by electors. By-elections can be triggered only if an MP breaks the law and is sentenced to a custodial sentence, is convicted under Section 10 of the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009 or is suspended for at least 10 sitting days by the House of Commons. In other words, it is a matter either for the courts or for the House of Commons as to whether a recall petition can be started, and judges and MPs will be aware of the potential consequences in passing sentence or voting for suspension. Electors can engage in a recall petition only when given the green light by a body external to the constituency.
The provisions leave out electors and they omit conditions that electors may well believe fall below their expected standards. One is where an MP switches party without triggering a by-election. Douglas Carswell made the point in the Commons that:
“I feel so strongly about recall that I recalled myself”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/10/14; col. 804.]
The conduct of Messrs Carswell and Reckless in triggering by-elections may have set a precedent, but what if future defectors ignore it? I am aware of the argument that they should not have to submit themselves for re-election. It is a powerful argument, but it has to be seen now in the context of the Bill and what it seeks to achieve. Will not electors in a constituency who have elected a Member on one political programme have cause to feel aggrieved if that Member then switches to another without them having a say in the matter? That Member will have fallen below the standards they expect. That grievance will be all the greater now given the combination of the precedent set and the provisions of the Bill.
The other condition would be where a Member neglected a constituency, failing to perform constituency duties but not in a way that fell foul of the Code of Conduct and triggered action by the House resulting in suspension. The neglect may be such as to result in deselection, but what if electors wish to take action to ensure that the neglect does not persist for the rest of the Parliament? My argument is that the Bill as drafted is in danger of raising expectations that cannot be met. Electors are led to believe that they can recall errant MPs, but they have no direct say in whether a recall petition can be triggered, and the triggering provisions in the Bill exclude conditions that to electors may constitute especially egregious failures to meet the standards they expect of their Member of Parliament.
What can be done to address these problems? The obvious answer is to provide for electors to have the capacity to trigger a recall petition. This need not be in place of the existing three triggers in the Bill, but rather in addition to them. In the Commons, Zac Goldsmith moved an amendment to provide that if 5% of voters in a constituency signed a “notice of intent to recall”, and 20% then signed a recall petition, a recall ballot would take place. That was rejected, and there may be little merit in pursuing it in that precise form. However, it may point us in a direction that is worth pursuing.
There is a case for pursuing a true recall provision, as utilised elsewhere. This would also have the advantage of building in a powerful protective element against misuse by political opponents or a minority of aggrieved constituents. One could have a recall petition which, if signed by 15% or 20% of registered electors, would trigger a true recall election—that is, a clear binary election in which voters say yes or no to the Member remaining in office. If a majority in the ballot vote against them, the Member is out. There is then a by-election to elect a successor.
I appreciate that such a mechanism would incur costs—elections are not cheap—but the likelihood of its frequent use is remote. The cost would be offset by the achievement of direct involvement by electors, and by the need to achieve a significant number of signatures for a recall petition and a majority in the recall election. I see no problem with setting a fairly high bar for the percentage of signatures necessary for a recall petition. For a recall election to be held, there needs to be both breadth and depth of feeling among electors that an MP has transgressed standards.
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 provides for five-year fixed—or, rather, semi-fixed—terms. As we have heard, that is relevant in the context of this Bill. As a result of that Act, as the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, has said, electors are likely to have the opportunity to elect their MPs at less frequent intervals than was previously the case. That has the potential to undermine, rather than enhance, trust in politics—and this Bill will do little or nothing to counter that effect. My view is that if we are to restore trust in politics, we need something more imaginative than this Bill. However, given that we have the Bill, we must do our best to ensure that it at least goes some way to achieving its intended purpose.
Lord Dubs (Lab)
My Lords, before I come to the substance of what I want to say, I will comment briefly on what the noble Lord, Lord Norton, just said. I found myself agreeing with quite a lot of it, until he came to his idea of recall petitions. I cannot think of anything that would undermine democracy more than to have an open door for any group of people in a constituency, particularly those who are well financed, to have a go at an MP. How can an MP vote according to their conscience, how can an MP do their job, if they are always watching their back to see whether there is a group of people trying to undermine them? It would destabilise the position of MPs, and I do not think it would be a good idea.
Lord Norton of Louth
My whole point is that such a provision would raise the bar that would have to be overcome before there could be a recall petition. It would actually protect the Member far more than if there were a lower threshold. The chances of its being used are extremely slim, to put it mildly—but the fact that it was there would be a protection for constituents, a majority of whom in a ballot would have to vote for a recall.
Lord Dubs
I am afraid that if it is simply a matter of collecting signatures, I am not sure whether that provides the protection that the noble Lord claims. All I know is that I would have been miserably unhappy in my time as an MP if I had had always to watch my back—not on issues of principle, not where there were clear arguments at stake, but because some group of people who did not agree with my views on abortion, or whatever, might seek to undermine me. And they would have done—of course they would have done. I just do not think that representative democracy can work on that basis. I have to differ from the noble Lord; I think that if he talked to most people who have been elected to the House of Commons, they would agree with me and not with him.
I watch “Question Time” quite often, and I watched it last Thursday night. One of the things that happened also happens at other times on that programme. Whenever an adverse comment about the integrity of MPs is made, either by somebody on the platform or by somebody in the audience, there are enormous cheers from the audience. I find it rather depressing and sad that so many of our fellow countrymen and countrywomen—or at least, those who get selected as a “Question Time” audience—think that jeering and shouting abuse at the people who are elected is somehow helpful to democracy. I think that we have gone far too far in denigrating those whom we elect; I shall say more about that in a minute.
I support the principle of recall, as does everybody else who has spoken—but we must be careful that, in putting this Bill forward, we do not seem to overpromise to the voters about what will happen. I suspect that some of them will believe what the noble Lord, Lord Norton, has just said—that that is what they are in for. We must be careful, because the Bill is, in some ways, rather limited.
Comments have been made about whether, when an MP switches parties, there should be a by-election. To the best of my knowledge of this—I have not done a survey—MPs who switch parties have a by-election only if they think they are going to win. If they do not think that they are going to win, they jolly well hang on in there until the next general election. Looking back at this over the years, it seems to be the case. I am not arguing that this is not a matter of integrity, and that if an MP switches party they should not call a by-election. It may be a good thing—but I am talking about what happens in practice.
All parties, in their last election manifestos, made some reference to the desirability of recall. I am conscious that when the House of Commons passes a measure that affects that House rather than what we do here, we must be very careful before we take issue with what its Members have decided to do—because it is very much their responsibility. Nevertheless, I think we are right to be critical: there is no point in having a second Chamber unless we can be critical of anything that the other House does.
I particularly want to comment favourably on the speech made by my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours. He put his finger on something absolutely crucial. He speaks with a great deal of experience, and he has driven a coach and horses through that provision in the Bill—because it is obvious that behaviour on the Standards Committee will be precisely as he said it would be. We must look hard at that provision.
Of course it is right—this is where I differ from the suggestion of open recall—that elected politicians should not be subject, between elections, to recall for their views, even if some of their views might not be too popular among their constituents. The time to deal with that is at the following general election. Otherwise we would belittle the principle that matters of conscience are important, and belittle the ability of Members of Parliament to exercise their conscience without being under pressure from one moment to the next.
I looked up what the excellent Library Note says about other recall measures in different countries. In the United States they seem to have a variety of models of recall. Some of them are open, as the noble Lord, Lord Norton, suggested; some are more limited. I am not sure that there is anything very useful we can learn from them. In Switzerland, although there is no right of recall for federal elections, six of the 26 cantons do have the right of recall—but that right applies to the whole of the canton, not just to individual elected politicians. I am not suggesting that we should do that, although I suspect that if we had that sort of right of recall, the coalition would have been thrown out several years ago—I just mention that in passing.
One matter that bothers me is not included in the Bill. That is the question of the election court. I think it was in 2010 that Phil Woolas, a Labour MP, appeared before the election court, lost his seat and was not allowed to stand again in the following by-election. Whatever he did, some other potential wrongdoings by Members of Parliament may appear more significant. I am not saying that he did nothing wrong, but if we are to have a system of recall as envisaged in the Bill, we should include what the election court does, because I see no reason why Phil Woolas should not have been allowed to stand in the following by-election, his voters having heard what the election court said. The penalty on him was out of all proportion to what he did.
Perhaps I may say a little about respect for elected politicians, which I mentioned at the beginning. We now have a culture in which it is standard to abuse elected politicians. They would do it to us if we were elected. That does not mean that I do not support elections here, but that is a different argument. The way in which MPs are denigrated, abused and vilified, as my noble friend Lady Corston described, devalues democracy. One cannot run a democracy effectively unless there is some respect for the people who are elected through that system. We are weakening our democracy by allowing that to continue, and it is important that we speak up.
It may be that the Bill is intended to be a small step along that path—if so, fine, although we have reservations about the detail. It is time that we as a country stood up and said, “We elect these people. They face the electorate every few years. They can be thrown out, but in the mean time, we should not denigrate and abuse them and imply that they have the basest of motives”. From my knowledge of MPs—I have known quite a few over the years—whatever party they are from, they are all there to perform an act of public service. They are not doing it for the money—or if they are, they are jolly mistaken if they think that that is the way to get money—but for principles. I may not agree with some of their principles—that is why we have a party political system—but they are there because they want to serve their fellow citizens, and it is time that we all stood up and said that.
Electoral Registration
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to increase the electoral registration of British citizens living abroad.
Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to raise this important but largely neglected subject. My starting point is that a high voter turnout is the sign of a healthy democracy. One cannot achieve a high turnout unless those eligible to register as voters actually do register. Many nations recognise and treat their citizens overseas as a major asset and actively solicit their engagement. In contrast, UK citizens living abroad are an untapped asset. Indeed, they are a largely ignored asset.
There are believed to be something in the region of 5.5 million Britons living abroad, and of those about 3 million are estimated to be eligible to be on the electoral register; that is, aged 18 and over and having lived abroad for no more than 15 years. It is very much an estimate as there are no official statistics, but the number is clearly substantial. How many are actually registered? The figure is believed to be between 20,000 and 30,000, well under 1% of the total estimated to be eligible. Even if the estimate of those eligible to register is substantially out—even if it is 2 million rather than 3 million—it is clear that an appallingly low percentage is registered to vote. Although a great deal of concern is expressed about low registration rates in the UK, this concern does not appear to extend to UK nationals living abroad. They are in many respects neglected voters, or rather, non-voters.
This neglect may stem from various myths that exist about British nationals living abroad. Contrary to how they are sometimes portrayed, most of those eligible to register are working abroad. Nor are Britons living abroad a drain on United Kingdom resources, but a major resource for the UK. Working abroad for UK firms means that many contribute significantly to the UK economy. There is clearly a case to encourage British expatriates to participate in the electoral process. It will strengthen their ties with the country and they will bring a valuable international perspective to our elections. Their active interest will be passed on to the next generation and beyond, and help to retain the latter’s ties with Britain. Furthermore, Britons living abroad are a major source of soft power for the UK. Encouraging their active participation can be a means of getting them to influence attitudes towards the UK in their country of settlement.
The most compelling case for action, though, is one of principle. British citizens who live abroad, and have done so for less than 15 years, are entitled under UK law to vote. They should therefore be encouraged in the same way as are citizens resident in the UK to ensure that they are registered and exercise their right to vote. As I said in opening, a high turnout rate is the sign of a healthy democracy. UK citizens living abroad should be seen as intrinsic to ensuring such a democracy.
Recognising the nature of the problem, a cross-party group of parliamentarians was formed last year to address the issue, and I had the honour of chairing the group. The other members were my noble friends Lord Lexden and Lord Tyler, who are present today, as well as the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross, and the noble Lord, Lord Parekh. The noble Lord, Lord Parekh, is speaking at a conference today and cannot be with us. He had hoped to be here to explain the efforts being made by the Indian Government to engage with the Indian diaspora. We were joined by Geoffrey Clifton-Brown from the Commons. Our report, entitled Making Votes Count, was published in March of this year. Our task was to identify the obstacles to achieving a high registration rate and what could be done to tackle them.
We identified seven problems. First, there is the difficulty of identifying UK nationals living abroad who are eligible to vote. Their whereabouts are often not known. Data on citizens living abroad are held by public bodies, but the data are limited or not necessarily current, and the bodies concerned are usually precluded from releasing personal data to other bodies. Secondly, there is poor communication. Limited efforts have been made to reach citizens living abroad. One study of British nationals living in New Zealand found that those who were registered had discovered their right to register only through word-of-mouth rather than by receiving any official communication.
Thirdly, there are practical difficulties in registering and voting. British citizens resident overseas are to a much greater extent responsible for their own registration than citizens living in the UK. The current process of issuing and returning ballot papers also creates problems. That was highlighted by a number of UK expatriates in evidence to us. The extension of the election timetable will go some way to reducing this problem, as will the move to online application in respect of registration, but the problem of ensuring that those eligible to vote actually register to do so remains.
Fourthly, there are separate responsibilities within Government. It was clear from our inquiry that there is an absence of joined-up government. Responsibility for overseas voters is spread among a number of bodies.
Fifthly, there are different approaches taken by embassies and consulates. The willingness to encourage registration appears to vary considerably.
Sixthly, there is an absence of incentives. The absence of joined-up government means that there is no one body that sees it as its responsibility to give a lead or has an obvious reason to do so. The only body with a clear remit is the Electoral Commission, but its role is to encourage. There is no clear incentive within departments to devote money and resources to enhancing voter registration by UK citizens living abroad.
Lastly, at the root of the problem, from which the foregoing stems, is an absence of political will to ensure that British citizens living abroad are taken seriously as citizens eligible to register and hence to vote in elections in the United Kingdom. They are, as we noted in the report, forgotten citizens for the purposes of implementing effectively UK electoral law.
Tackling the problem has at its starting point recognition of the merits of encouraging British nationals to exercise their statutory rights. Once the political will is there, many of the practical problems that we have adumbrated can be overcome or at least tackled. Identifying the problems forms the basis of the solutions. We recommend joined-up government, with responsibility for British nationals abroad and driving up voter registration, vested in one Minister; incentives for different bodies responsible for enhancing voter registration; data sharing, so that citizens living abroad can be identified; greater dissemination of information, not least through social media; exhortation—citizens living abroad should be seen to be valued and voting encouraged as a civic duty; and, finally, enabling ballot papers to be downloaded electronically.
It is clear that a great deal can be done to encourage British nationals living abroad to register and exercise their right to vote and we believe that there is an overwhelming case for it to be done. My noble friend the Minister is, I know, very much seized of the issue—he was among the witnesses to give evidence to the group—and I look forward to hearing from him about what the Government are doing to address what is a very serious issue.
House of Lords (Expulsion and Suspension) Bill [HL]
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(11 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, I, too, add my support to the Bill. On the last occasion on which I was the last Back-Bench speaker in a Second Reading debate, I used the opportunity to respond to opponents of the Bill. My role today is clearly different in that I am here to add my support to everyone who has spoken.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, made clear, the provisions of this Bill are based on previous measures. In the last Parliament, I served on the Joint Committee on the Draft Constitutional Renewal Bill, which became the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. The provisions for expulsion were lost in the wash-up. In this Parliament, I served on the Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform Bill. The Labour Government supported the former Bill and the present coalition Government supported the latter Bill—in other words, all three main parties have signed up to the provisions embodied in this Bill. The drafting of this Bill follows that of the previous Bills, especially the House of Lords Reform Bill, so no party with any merit can claim that the Bill deviates from the provisions that they have previously supported.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, said, the Bill extends our current limited powers and brings us into line with the other place. There is clearly a powerful case for bringing us into line with the House of Commons. The two Houses do not necessarily have to march in step but, if there is a difference, there is a more powerful case for this House to have the power of expulsion. After all, MPs do not enjoy security of tenure; they can be removed by their constituents. They may be removed in between elections in exceptional circumstances, if the Recall of MPs Bill before the House of Commons is enacted.
As my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury said, membership of this House is a privilege, but it is also a responsibility. We have to maintain high standards. We have the code of conduct; that is necessary but it is not sufficient. We lack the powers necessary to enforce it in the event of a major transgression. We can suspend Members, but only for limited periods, as we have heard. That is useful and we have made use of it, but we need the ability in exceptional circumstances to suspend for a greater period than is presently possible or even to expel. It is not difficult to envisage circumstances in which a Member brings the House into serious disrepute without breaking the law.
The provisions of this Bill give us the powers that we need. It is up to the House to provide due process for the consideration of cases. The report of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, echoing previous committee recommendations, detailed the minimum requirements for fairness in such cases. These should be embodied in Standing Orders and not in the detail of the Bill—otherwise there is the danger of the provisions coming within the purview of the courts. The Bill in my view gets the balance right. It is a modest Bill, at least in length, but it is a necessary one for the reasons that noble Lords have advanced. Like my noble friend Lord Cormack, I see no reason at all why it should not be permitted to proceed to the statute book and do so swiftly.
House of Lords: Labour Peers’ Working Group Report
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(11 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, on securing this debate and on the report that is before us. The report constitutes a constructive contribution to the debate on the future of this House. In my view, it is far superior to the documents laid before us in recent years by successive Governments. White Papers have taken as given, first, that the second Chamber should be elected and, secondly, that the functions of the current second Chamber are appropriate and should be retained. By not justifying either point, the Government have avoided addressing the fact that the two are not compatible: if you accept one, the other has to be abandoned. Election would change, fundamentally, the terms of trade between the parties in the House. There would be no reason to accept the existing functions of the House or to exercise restraint in the use of existing powers, let alone to accept those powers as adequate.
By not addressing the contradiction, Governments have been able to focus solely on composition. Election is seen as the democratic option, and the functions are fine, so let us just proceed with election. This stance is fundamentally flawed, so the Government’s House of Lords Reform Bill of 2012 was always going to be a bad Bill. It failed to grasp the need to address functions and powers, just as it failed to recognise that election is not necessarily the democratic option.
This report is to be welcomed because it avoids those mistakes. It addresses functions, doing so through recognising the position of the House within a system of asymmetrical bicameralism. It recognises that the functions derive from the House seeing its role as complementary to that of the elected House. The report puts it very well:
“It is a ‘think again’ house, not a ‘yield or we veto’ house”.
In other words, the House adds value by fulfilling functions that do not challenge the primacy of the elected Chamber. Those functions have, on the whole, been well fulfilled, but there is scope for increasing the efficiency and the effectiveness of the House. The report goes on to say:
“The task then is to find a model for reform that tackles the defects of the present House while preserving its strengths”.
I think it important to recognise that the reforms advanced in the paper are practical proposals that derive from a clear appreciation of the role of the House. I find myself in agreement with most of the proposals embodied in the report, which is hardly surprising given that many echo what was in the original Steel Bill. However, there are a few with which I would take issue. Rather than seek to make what would be essentially Committee-stage points, I will just make a few general comments designed to contribute to the debate.
The report follows the Steel Bill in recommending that the House of Lords Appointments Commission be put on a statutory basis and that the by-election option for hereditary Peers be abolished. There was a reason both were in the Bill. Either they need to be implemented together or putting the Appointments Commission on a statutory basis needs to be achieved before the by-election provision is ended. The merit of the by-election option is that it brings in Members over whom the Prime Minister has no veto: he cannot block a Member who comes here under the provisions of the 1999 Act. At the moment, the Appointments Commission is formally an advisory body to the Prime Minister. By putting it on a statutory footing, one can protect the independence of the commission and there would thus continue to be a route to this House that is free of executive control.
I support the recommendations that this House should be smaller than the House of Commons and that no party should have a majority in the House—again, provisions of the Steel Bill—but I would not necessarily reduce the size to 450. I would be wary, in any event, of a fixed number of Members and one geared to the existing committee activity of the House. I think we could reduce numbers but expand the committee role of the House. I would also be wary of using an age limit to reduce the size of the House, which I would regard as too arbitrary. My view is that we should consider a scheme whereby, at the start of a new Parliament, the parties agree on how many Peers each should retain in the light of the outcome of a general election—the proportions could be geared to the proportion of votes achieved—and then each party group would be responsible for electing those they wish to retain. That would enable the issue of overall size, as well as party balance, to be addressed effectively. Providing that the House was never larger than the House of Commons would prevent the membership ballooning in size.
On the wider issue of a constitutional convention, I am one of those who support that proposal. I have argued previously in this House for creating a constitutional convention, although one somewhat different in scope to what is often proposed. I believe that we need a convention to help us make sense of where we are, and not necessarily to tell us where we should be going—Parliament can decide that once we have a much clearer appreciation of where we are in terms of the structures and relationships that form our constitution. Just over 30 years ago, I published a book entitled The Constitution in Flux. If it was in flux then, how are we to characterise it today? As the report recognises, we have experienced constitutional changes that have been both rapid and discrete. One change impinges on others, but in ways that have not necessarily been thought through. We are particularly vulnerable to the law of unintended consequences. If we plough ahead with further changes, that vulnerability becomes even greater. Hence the case for having a commission able to stand back and assist us in making sense of where we are.
We are now in a situation where it is difficult for a Government to resist the recommendation that there should be a referendum in the event of their embarking on an attempt at major change. I have made the point before that I have a principled objection to referendums, but the problem for successive Governments is that they have not. They have therefore conceded the case for referendums on proposals for major constitutional change. The position was well summarised by the Constitution Committee in its report, Referendums in the United Kingdom, published in 2010. It was for that reason that, as a member of the Joint Committee on the Government’s draft Bill, I voted to recommend that the Government’s proposals be subject to a referendum. The situation is not the ideal, but it is the real, and that is what we have to deal with.
To conclude, I very much welcome this report. It is a considered contribution to debate and forms the basis for moving forward to achieve change which is both practical and desirable. Moving forward on a cross-party basis is to be encouraged. This report meshes with, and reinforces, other contributions to the debate on the reform of this House and I hope that it will be considered seriously by both sides of the House.
Coalition Government: Constitution Committee Report
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(11 years, 9 months ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, I am delighted that this important and timely report is being debated this evening. Like others, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, and the Constitution Committee on a valuable and prudent analysis of the constitutional implications of coalition Government. I was especially impressed by the committee’s analysis of the convention of collective responsibility. Its explanation of and justification for the convention are superb. I support strongly its recommendations in paragraphs 138 to 141. Indeed, there are no recommendations that I do not support, although—as I shall argue—there are some that I would wish to develop.
The report is measured and realistic. Its starting point is that there may again be coalition Governments following elections in which no one party wins an absolute majority of seats but it accepts that that is a case of if rather than when. The conditions of 2010 were exceptional in terms of the confluence of electoral arithmetic and economic crisis. In other circumstances, the outcome of a hung Parliament may be minority Government rather than a coalition. If there is an indecisive outcome and if negotiations take place for the formation of a coalition Government, it would be desirable to have in place some agreed framework for those negotiations. The report offers eminently reasonable recommendations for that framework.
The recommendations are essentially modest in that they cannot solve two basic problems associated with such negotiations, but they go some way to addressing one of them. The basic problem is that of a democratic deficit. Coalitions formed as the result of post-election bargaining lack the seal of electoral approval. Some argue that if party A gets 35% of the vote and party B gets 20%, then a coalition of the two parties enjoys the support of 55% of the electorate. It does not. It enjoys the definitive support of not one elector because nobody was given the opportunity to vote for A plus B. Its legitimacy comes from the support of the parties in Parliament. Its popular legitimacy is, in essence, indirect rather than direct.
The second problem is that of incomplete information. Whatever one thinks of party manifestos, each party has time to prepare its policy proposals to put before the electorate. There may be a lengthy process of internal discussion and, indeed, of external consultation, drawing in specialists to advise. There may even be an opportunity to anticipate one’s stance in the event of an indecisive election result, but one cannot utilise the same process of consultation and discussion. In coalition forming, as we have already heard, there is pressure to reach agreement quickly—at least, there is in the United Kingdom.
We are used to a quick and almost seamless transition from one Government to another, usually on the day following the general election. As has been mentioned, by our standards, the five days of negotiations in 2010 were a long time. The pressure on negotiators was to reach agreement quickly and in conditions of competition. The discussions took place in secrecy. Deals were agreed in a virtually sealed environment. There was no opportunity to consult on what was being agreed, in terms of not just political acceptability but feasibility. I am concerned here not with the partisan aspects but with the evidence base. Those involved with the negotiations may be very bright, but they may not be specialists in all the subjects under discussion.
Let me illustrate that with a couple of commitments embodied in the coalition agreement. The Conservatives conceded the case for a fixed-term Parliament. The coalition agreement stated:
“We will put a binding motion before the House of Commons stating that the next general election will be held on the first Thursday of May 2015”.
No binding Motion was ever brought before the House of Commons, for one very good reason: there was no one to be bound by such a binding Motion. The prerogative cannot be bound by what is a declaratory Motion.
The agreement also said that the legislation would provide for an early dissolution if 55% or more of MPs voted for it. Did this figure derive from a study of practice in other legislatures? If one looks at the provisions of other legislatures, the answer is clearly no. It was the product of a quick calculation based on party strengths in the new Parliament. It was only later that a change was made to make the figure two-thirds of MPs, a figure employed by several other legislatures.
I take those as illustrative of the problem of incomplete information. The pressure to reach agreement quickly in conditions of secrecy may result in commitments that are difficult to undo. There is added pressure on Parliament, not least your Lordships’ House, but if the coalition partners mobilise a majority in the other place, we are limited in challenging the ends of the policy even if we have the scope to affect the means. It would be far better if the policies agreed were the product of considered and informed reflection. I therefore welcome the recommendation of the Constitution Committee at paragraph 22 that five days should not be taken as a complete period for forming a government. It recommends that no more or less time should be taken than is required to produce a government able to command the confidence of the House of Commons. I would be inclined to say there should be no more or less time than is required to generate informed policy commitments and to command the confidence of the House of Commons.
Lord Maclennan of Rogart (LD)
Does my noble friend agree that to seek to lay down a programme for government for five years in five days is in itself unachievable, that events will change things, and that it is therefore better to enunciate the principles, vision or goals rather than the precise methods of achieving them?
Lord Norton of Louth
I am not suggesting that it has to be detailed; I am referring to the feasibility and to quickly checking that what is being suggested at a high level of policy is at least grounded in what is feasible and correct.
There is one other problem to which I wish to draw attention. It complements the recommendations embodied in the report. The formation of a coalition may exacerbate a problem of experience in government. There are benefits in Ministers having some grounding in government by either experience or training. In recent decades, we have had people appointed to senior ministerial office with no prior experience of government. That is a consequence of a party being in opposition for a relatively long time. The problem is compounded by the formation of a coalition where it draws in a party which has not had expectation of being in office and has no Members with ministerial experience.
I have pursued for some time the need for ministerial training and, indeed, for training of senior civil servants when it comes to understanding our constitutional arrangements. If there is a significant churn in senior civil servants and Ministers are taking office with no prior experience or knowledge of the subject, we have serious problems.
We have generalist Ministers and generalist civil servants having responsibility for what may be important, and at times complex, areas of policy but with no grounding in the subject at all. A particular example is training. At the end of 2012 I tabled a Question asking how many Ministers in the Cabinet Office and the office of Lord President of the Council had received training from the National School of Government or Civil Service Learning in constitutional principles and practice. My noble friend Lady Northover provided a concise answer: “None”.
We need to think seriously about how we ensure that Ministers new to office get a grasp of how to undertake their responsibilities, as well as gain some knowledge of the area of their responsibility. Relying on officials may not be sufficient, especially if the officials are as new as the Minister. There may be a case for those on the Opposition Front Bench not only to have contact with officials, but also to be provided with sessions with specialists, not just in the subject area of their portfolios, but also in the running of government.
In the event of a coalition there may be a case for some briefing sessions to be incorporated into the period between reaching agreement and the meeting of the new Parliament. I strongly support the recommendations of the Constitution Committee at paragraph 40 for administrative support and factual briefings for those engaged in negotiations, but I think there is a case for further advice and training once a new Government are formed. For that reason I also support the recommendation at paragraph 26 for a 12-day gap between an election and the meeting of a new Parliament to be the preferred choice, while recognising that even longer may be required.
I raise the issue as an important one for the quality of government. It goes beyond the issue of coalition formation, but forming coalitions may, as I say, exacerbate the problem, especially if it involves third parties which have had no expectation of office.
I again congratulate the Constitution Committee on another excellent report. Its message is that we may not have a coalition government in the event of an indecisive election result, but if we do, we need to have the mechanisms in place to facilitate it. It is an eminently sensible report. I trust that the Government will embrace its recommendations. I say to my noble friend Lord Lexden that I am not sure whether or not that is fine wine, but then I am teetotal.
Standards in Public Life
Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts(12 years ago)
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Lord Norton of Louth (Con)
My Lords, I too congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Bew, on initiating this important debate. I wish to make three short points. The first is that maintaining standards, as embodied in the Code of Conduct, is necessary, but it is not sufficient to establish high levels of trust in our political system. As is clear from the survey, we have some way to go to meet the necessary standards. However, ensuring compliance with the code should be seen as only part of the solution. What flows from the survey, and the Hansard Society’s annual Audits of Political Engagement, is that we should be pursuing both a bottom-up and a top-down approach to restoring trust.
The bottom-up approach is captured by one of the final sentences of the survey, on page 51:
“It also seems likely that perceptions of standards would respond to better public information about how different institutions try to ensure that they live up to the principles in public life”.
One of the problems is lack of understanding of the political process. Like the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, I believe it is necessary to bolster citizenship education. It is in the national curriculum, but there are no incentives for head teachers to take it seriously. We need to be ensuring that there are incentives, and resources, for schools to deliver it effectively. It is essential to the health of our political system.
However, ensuring that people are more informed about the system is no guarantee that it will enhance support for it. That will come when people recognise that politicians are acting in good faith to deliver on their promises. There is thus a major challenge for politicians in terms of behaviour. We need political parties to move away from empty partisanship and to get out of the Downsian cycle of outbidding one another. We need politicians to show leadership—the top-down approach—to lead from the front and not follow focus groups or the latest passing bandwagon. Margaret Thatcher pursued policies that were contentious, but her leadership style resonated. We need to be addressing these issues. It is easy to advocate constitutional reform, but that is a form of displacement activity. It is to suggest that the structure, rather than those who occupy it, is the problem. The problem is the people who occupy it. Once we accept that we are part of the problem— indeed, a central part—we can then start to tackle it.
My question to the Minister is straightforward: do you agree?